NDDN Committee Meeting

    Good morning. Welcome to the committee members and to our two witnesses.

    This is the 18th meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are continuing our study of the role of Canadian soldiers in international peace operations after 2011.

     I want to thank our witnesses today.

    We have, from the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Ms. Ann Livingstone. Merci. Bonjour. And from Paix Durable, we have Monsieur David Lord. We're very pleased that you're here. Thank you very much.

    You'll each have five to seven minutes. I will start with Madame Livingstone, and then Mr. Lord.

    You have the floor.

     Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you on this important topic. I would like to begin with a few comments based on my work on behalf of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, hereafter PPC. I look forward to our subsequent dialogue.

    The PPC is a non-governmental organization founded 15 years ago by the Canadian government. Our focus is on researching, educating, training, and building capacity on complex peace operations. Since its inception, the PPC has trained civilians, military, and police personnel from Canada and 150 other countries as they prepared for deployment to peace operations.

    We continue to write and provide evidence-based analysis on complex peace operations, and we are currently engaged in capacity-building projects in Latin America and over 30 countries in Africa. We also offer training to international military personnel through the military training cooperation program, with which you are familiar.

    My comments and responses today are based on how the PPC thinks and works on this complex subject. I have also read the evidence from your previous sessions with interest.

     I have four principal foci for today's commentary: one, what is peacekeeping in the 21st century; two, what is the nature of conflict and its environment; three, what is a whole-of-government response; and four, what might the possible role of the Canadian Forces be post-Afghanistan.

    First, when the PPC thinks of peacekeeping, we do not envision traditional peacekeeping à la Suez. We focus rather on a continuum that begins with conflict prevention and extends through multiple phases and steps to peace-building and sustainability. It is not a linear process. Actually it's rather chaotic, and it demands critical analysis from a systems perspective.

    As previous speakers have noted, it is no longer our fathers' world. The international community is dealing in an environment where intrastate conflict is more the norm than the exception. The response to this sort of conflict environment is as complex as the nature of intrastate conflict itself.

    The response involves a multiplicity of actors from whole of government. It has to factor the power of non-state actors that are well equipped in both arms and technology. It has to include local civil society and the whole range of NGOs, both domestic and international. It cannot ignore international financial organizations, such as the World Bank. It must deal with the UN family. And it is increasingly alert to the expectations of regional organizations, such as the African Union, the European Union, and NATO. This has resulted in our use of the words “complex peace operations”, which more accurately describe the response rather than peacekeeping.

    Second is the nature of conflict. The first question you provided to me asks about the nature of the environment in which Canadian Forces can expect to operate. We propose that what we currently see is likely to be the framework in which countries, including Canada, will deploy personnel. I would commend to you Thomas Friedman's Hot, Flat, and Crowded, as he defines this space very clearly.

    We have four cross-cutting variables that we pay a great deal of attention to when we are looking at conflict and conflict environment and response. One is socio-economic realities. Two is youth bulge. Sixty per cent of the world's population are between the ages of 14 and 25. That's a terrifying thought when you think of education, housing, clothing, jobs, etc. Three is information technology and social networking, which changes the nature of information. And four is environmental changes. These affect the development of asymmetric conflict. Furthermore, the increase in visibility and authority of regional alliances and organizations and their standby architecture will impact on how and who responds to complex peace operations.

    The retreat by developed countries from UN blue helmets complex peace operations as troop- and police-contributing countries is matched by the increased demand from the global south. They contribute boots to the ground and expect to be more systematically consulted by the Security Council and the Secretariat on the mandating and resourcing of peace operations, despite their often substantive lack of trained and well-equipped personnel for deployment to these operations.

    It does not go unnoticed that the developed countries are engaging in non-blue helmet missions in coalitions of the willing, and developing countries are relied on for their contributions to blue helmet missions. This does result in a two-tiered system of responses, and it is resulting in significant debates on command and control structures, training and equipment needs, political will and resourcing, and mandates in their identified tasks, such as protection of civilians and robust peacekeeping, however broadly defined.

     It's a complicated picture for your consideration.

    Turning to the third focus, since 1956 Canada has been engaged in a variety of complex peace operations, and the lessons learned are many, but I would suggest the following are seminal: the need for a credible and legitimate partner; asymmetric conflict does not lend itself to shooting one's way to peace; the non-state actor is a credible force ignored at our peril; the continuum of prevention and peace-building and sustainability is a long-term, expensive proposition, which generally fails as our attention span shortens over time. Finally, I think all of us have learned that planning the exit is as critical as planning the entry. The analysis for both must be based on an accurate and comprehensive understanding of history, geography, people groups, religion, economics of the specific conflict.

    One of the more interesting responses to this reality has been labelled a three-D or whole-of-government, or joined-up, or multi-dimensional approach. It is framed by the need to have all of the players and actors at the table, including the local actor who will bear the responsibility for sustainable peace, if it's at all possible. The idea of specific or exclusive tasks operating in linear sequence is not useful in this particular conflict environment. At the PPC, we prefer the whole-of-government language, which defines a total government effort in which staff, resources, and materiel are coordinated towards achieving the defined objective. Co-location and sharing of information among a broad spectrum of governmental stakeholders, including the local partners, means that civil and military coordination or cooperation becomes the critical aspect in “whole of government”. Fundamentally, the whole of government succeeds when there is shared power and political will; this is difficult to achieve at the best of times.

    One need, for the whole of government to work, is more robust, joint, scenario-based training activities in which personnel can practise decision-making at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels before going to the field. Our experience over 15 years tells us that it is cost-effective to train in the safety of a classroom, as the mistakes do not cost blood and treasure.

    The need for a civilian rapid response force has been recognized in the U.S. and other countries, and there is a concerted effort at building the “blue briefcases” who are instrumental in development, rule of law, security, and capacity-building for institutions in civil society. We are all a very long way from having this managed well.

    The fourth focus is on the role of the CF.

    Canadian Forces are a tremendous group of professionals who have acquitted themselves brilliantly across the years. Their accolades cannot be based solely on the Afghanistan experience. Coming from a country with no colonial past, which manages its multicultural diversity without blood in the streets, and whose historical diplomatic ability, lawyer skills, and development focus make Canada and its forces extraordinarily attractive in the current environment, the Canadian Forces in a post-Afghanistan environment could play a role of significance to complex peace operations, particularly in the following: providing mentoring and support to regional organizations such as the AU in building a strategic, operational, and tactical expertise; using the lessons learned in fighting a counter-insurgency in complex peace operations that will, by necessity, be robust; using the experience gained in the PRTs as a model for civil-military relationships, based on clear understandings of roles, responsibilities, and authorities; re-engaging with the UN and UN-mandated missions to provide needed technical expertise as well as high-tech equipment, which would provide needed support to current troop-contributing and police-contributing countries. Generally, this is capacity-building, and the CF are well suited to the task.

    The Canadian Forces will be impacted by how intrastate conflict is conducted, how multilateralism evolves in an age of economic tensions, and how complex peace operations, regardless of nomenclature, are conducted. Complex peace operations in the 21st century require the use of a well-trained military force, married with diplomacy, development, economics, rule of law, good governance, human rights, and a host of alliances and partners that can build an environment in which the cost of war is more than the price of peace.

    Thank you. I look forward to our conversation.

    Thank you, Ms. Livingstone.

    I will give the floor to Mr. Lord.

    Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président.

    Thank you to the members of the committee for inviting me to appear before you.

    Peacebuild/Paix durable is a network of about 70 Canadian organizations and individuals involved in a range of activities related to peace and conflict situations. Today I am appearing in my personal capacity and not representing views of the network.

    My initial comments will focus on criteria for Canadian engagement in responding to violent conflict or the threat of violent conflict, but I would be happy to discuss in the question period, if there is interest and if time permits, other issues.

    In looking at Canadian engagement in peace operations post-2011, I think we definitely need some explicit criteria that are as comprehensive as possible for engagement, and a process—bureaucratic, parliamentary, and public—for debating and applying those criteria to specific cases. I'd suggest, however, that criteria shouldn't be limited to possible involvement in peace operations but applied to determining the nature and scope of any major engagement by Canada in support of international peace and security, whether that involves support for conflict prevention to avert violent conflict, resolution of a hot conflict, or substantial involvement in a post-conflict situation.

    Some basic categories for looking at any involvement would be, first, relevance to Canadian interests and values; second, what resources and capacities Canada could bring to bear on the situation; and third, the risks of engaging or not engaging.

    In the first category, I personally would put humanitarian and human rights considerations at the top of the list. Would engagement serve to protect human life or prevent war crimes, possibly even genocide? Would engagement contribute to protecting or establishing the rule of law? Would it help democratic practice and attitudes to develop? Would it protect or strengthen gender equality, minority rights, or individual human rights?

    In addition to these value issues, there is a set of issues related to national interests. These include how important the situation is to Canadian trade, whether there are strong diaspora links, shared language, or cultural links.

    Our interests also include how much of a threat to international security the situation is or could become and how much of a direct threat the situation could be to Canada's national security or that of our friends and allies.

    Another part of this equation is determining what Canada can bring to the situation. Do we have the resources and capabilities to engage in the state or region in question? Do we have a positive and constructive history in and some in-depth understanding of the situation? What are others, including the United Nations, Canada's allies, regional organizations and states, international NGOs, and others doing to respond? And are we likely to fill a crucial need?

    How receptive will the local population and political leaders be to Canadian involvement? Are there adequate international or bilateral coordination mechanisms already in play?

    Thirdly, there should be a determination of risk to Canadian lives from either taking action or inaction, and of the risks to local people of action or inaction. Other possible risks include internal or external spoilers—states or armed groups with a potential for negatively altering the dynamics of the situation—and whether waste or misuse of Canadian resources can be prevented.

    Last but not least, it should be determined whether there is a realistic chance of success, of meeting clearly articulated objectives. Coming up with adequate, usable criteria for engagement would be a good first step. Effective application of criteria presents another set of issues that I'd be happy to talk further about in the question period.

    Thanks.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Lord.

    I will give the floor to Mr. Wilfert.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    If I give you a series of quick questions, could you give me a series of quick, short answers? This is to either one of you, through you, Mr. Chairman.

    What do you define as our national interest?

    I'll start, Mr. Wilfert, if I may.

    I think international peace and security, writ large, is in our national interest. In some particular situations we have more direct national interest in investment and trade. I think we have a national interest in responding to the will of the Canadian people in certain areas. This moves into issues of values as well.

    From a political perspective, we have obligations to meet: legal obligations, treaty obligations, moral obligations. I think all of these things are in the national interest.

     I would basically concur, but if we go back to Political Science 101, as you know, securing the borders is the principal activity for a government and for national interest. One can argue that when we look at the kind of conflict environment we are currently experiencing, borders are no longer as sacred as they used to be, and it's quite easy to infiltrate.

    Should our national interest be confined to this hemisphere or go beyond?

    In a globalized world, the idea of focusing only here, to the exclusion of there, probably is a bit limiting. You have to focus where the national interest is, without losing sight of what is also over the horizon.

    But that would be predicated, presumably, on one's capabilities.

    Yes, it would be.

    How would you define international peace operations?

    Well, the UN has a whole new book on principles and guidelines for how they'd define it. I think international peace operations would be any and all activities that respond to imminent conflict on that continuum from prevention to peace-building.

    One would presume, then, that our national interest should be linked directly to whatever we see as relevant to international peace operations.

    I would think so.

    There's been criticism that the United Nations has been subcontracting out lately, particularly to such organizations as NATO, the OAU, etc. Could you briefly comment on that?

    Quite frankly, I don't understand that criticism. In certain circumstances there are capabilities within NATO and the African Union, and a certain aspect related as well to political legitimacy when it comes to the African Union's involvement in these types of operations within Africa. A more positive spin on that idea of contracting out might be regional responsibility and subsidiarity, and building up the capacities to respond to issues in your own backyard, as far as the AU is concerned specifically.

    I also hear from my colleagues at the secretariat that part of the reason for the outsourcing more regionally is that there is a lack of appetite among the developed world to be there, so there's very little alternative to going where they are going in doing the outsourcing.

    Thank you.

    You identified two interesting areas. One is non-state actors. Clearly, in the public's mind and in the media, it seems, people have not been able to distinguish between peacekeeping and peacemaking. Could you briefly comment on that?

    May I go to the definitions?

    Definitions are always good to have.

    Yes, so the UN thought.

    If we talk about peacekeeping, there is a presumption of a peace to keep and there is a presumption of interpositionary forces that are lightly armed. Peacemaking, on the other hand, assumes that there has been difficulty in having everybody around the table, including non-state actors, and that therefore there must be some sort of use of force, well mandated, well resourced, and well articulated, to create an environment in which peace can be articulated.

    Do you feel because of Afghanistan that in the post-2011 world that Canada will find itself in...? Our troops are at the highest trained...I mean, they do a phenomenal job in Afghanistan. But will the skill sets involved in what they are trained to do now be the same skill sets we're going to need post-2011, if we go back to what some would suggest is our traditional role in peacekeeping?

    I would suggest, sir, that the traditional role of peacekeeping is maybe a pipedream.

    Again, going back to your definition, there has to be a peace to keep.

    If we're going to go that route, then the experience gained in the fields of Afghanistan, which mimics what we are seeing in a Congo and other places, is a capability that the forces have exhibited that we will need, if we are to engage in peacekeeping that is very robust. It is not traditional peacekeeping; it's a far grander experience.

    Your observation that western powers, particularly in the developed world, have less of an appetite for peacekeeping is an interesting comment. Can you quickly explain why you see that and how we address that issue, given that developing states...? Clearly the OAU has not been able to respond either effectively in places such as Somalia, where there's clearly no peace to keep, or on issues such as Darfur and the Sudan.

     I think the withdrawal of the developed world from peacekeeping was really highlighted in the debacle of the 1990s, and I don't think we've let go of that yet. I also think that because of politics and national interest arguments, there's less appetite for the UN in general as a multilateral organization. It's much easier to write a cheque than to put boots on the ground and face the reality that soldiers will die, as will civilians, in this conflict environment. I think one thing we forget is that civilians are now targeted, whereas they didn't used to be before, so the dynamic has changed. It's much easier to pay the bill for the AU to put boots on the ground as opposed to Canadians putting the boots on the ground, or the Dutch.

    I was going to talk about chapter 6 and chapter 7, but maybe I can come back to that.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you very much.

    Monsieur Bachand.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    First of all, I want to congratulate you both on your excellent presentation that I find quite comprehensive. But I would like to clarify some details and to go a little further.

    My first questions are for you, Ms. Livingstone.

    By virtue of our positions, members of Parliament regularly hear from military representatives and people like you who are civilian representatives. The representatives of the military often tell us that NGOs cannot provide services if they are not protected and if they do not enjoy a degree of security. We hear civilians say that the military presence is detrimental to their effectiveness and to the delivery of those services.

    Ms. Livingstone, I would like your opinion. Who is wrong and who is right?

    Thank you for a very interesting question.

    I'm not sure that it's about right or wrong. I think it's much more about a changed landscape for the delivery of services in a conflict environment that doesn't obey all the rules and complicates the relationship between the humanitarian NGO community and the military. One can make a very strong argument that it's not one or the other, it's both, which is why there was such a need for a robust understanding of civil-military coordination and cooperation.

    I realize this is not always a popular stance with some of my humanitarian colleagues. I fully appreciate the need of a secure environment for them to do their work. I also appreciate the fact that they need to have an understanding and respect for what the forces provide for them in terms of their capacity to do their work. I don't think we've come to the end of the discussion or argument yet, but when I look at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and CMCoord and OCHA, talking about coordination, I think we're slowly making incremental steps towards this.

    So, in fact, you are advocating for better cooperation between civilians and the military. But I have already had this discussion with the military in operational areas and when they decide, for example, that they are going to go somewhere, it is unfortunately rare for them to advise NGOs. For NGOs, things are much the same. The principle is the same and we have to work to improve it.

    In the case of Afghanistan, do you feel that the overall coordination of all the governments—several of them are on the ground there—should be handled by a civilian or by a military commander like General McChrystal?

    We believe in civilian oversight of the armed forces in this country and in most democratic countries. Again, I think it's not as easy as one or the other, but what is the shared relationship, what is the shared information, and what is the co-location that is required to ensure that all the parties around that table have a clear understanding and appreciation of where they are going, what they are doing, what the costs are, and what the risks are? So I'm talking about a risk mitigation strategy that is responsive to a military perspective and a civilian perspective, and don't forget, there's a rule of law with policing in there as well that has to be managed. I think this is a more interesting way on a go-forward basis, but I probably should defer to my colleague.

     I think it's dependent on the situation. We've been very much caught up in Afghanistan and the particular examples of Afghanistan.

    Situations are different in different parts of the world and that fact must be recognized. In some cases, it is perfectly safe for NGOs to be working in many parts of a country. In others, it is very dangerous and it is wise to work in closer cooperation with the military, the United Nations, or with whomever can provide a measure of security. Each situation has to be assessed on its merits.

    In the case of Afghanistan, we can see that some NGOs are very comfortable working with the military. These are not necessarily humanitarian organizations. Members of humanitarian organizations who see the military when they are working to distribute assistance or working with the people may consider that the presence of the military puts a target on their own backs. Military and humanitarian personnel have to be aware of that. Other organizations are working in governance or to support the government administratively. They are able to work with the military very easily.

    Mr. Lord, I have a question for you. You mentioned national interests. We have often talked about that here at the committee. Some western countries seem to feel that UN approval is important. But we are beginning to see some exceptions. In Kosovo, the decision to intervene and to go there was NATO's. Then other things started to happen. There was the coalition of the willing in Iraq, headed by the United States.

    Now there are other ways of working in accordance with international law. I would like to hear what you have to say about the duty to protect. This is a new legal concept that we do not quite know what to do with.

    Can you or Ms. Livingstone share your concept with us, where one or more states intervene in order to provide protection, but without a UN or NATO resolution? Is that something you can conceive of, and, if so, what form would it take? I know that might be a long answer.

    We can conceive of it because it has already been done. Recently, I feel, we have seen a change in the attitude of the Americans. They are now talking more of a multinational approach. I think much of the world is more comfortable with that approach after the setbacks we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    Fifteen seconds left, Ms. Livingstone.

    I think with the emphasis on multilateralism in the current administration and the emphasis on smart power, there's going to be much more interest in seeing how the UN and others can be shaped in their running of mandates to the Security Council to become more active. So I think it bears watching.

    Thank you.

    Now I will give the floor to Mr. Harris.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you for your presentations. I have four questions, and I will try to see if I can get through them in the time allotted to me.

    First of all, to both of you, but Mr. Lord, since you have 70 organizations in your umbrella group, do you see a role, or what role do you see for Parliament in making decisions about getting started in peacekeeping operations or continuing?

    We see mission creep in various things that we get involved in. Should we have a rule that says we ought not to deploy troops without parliamentary oversight or parliamentary approval. Do either of you have any views on that?

    I certainly have views on that. I think Parliament should be as involved as possible in tracking, information gathering, and analyzing situations as they evolve, on a regular basis.

    You're talking about values, the decision being based on Canadian values and the national interest. Surely the government has a role, but parliamentarians obviously care about these things too.

     I would suspect that parliamentarians have a wide range of interests in these issues, that there are values and there are interests related to Canada's economy, Canada's alliances, and so on. I think there's a way to sort of differentiate between values and some of these other things. I would think that parliamentarians should take a look at this range of issues related to intervention and be prepared to play a role in gathering information, assessing that information, and making known their views on how Canada should proceed.

    I would assert that Parliament speaks for the people in a democracy and that all politics is local. When Parliament is out and about and is sharing with its constituency, this constituency is very much affected by how the economies are changing and how conflict affects that.

    I think the role of Parliament is quite important in setting parameters.

     I was intrigued by your statement, which I'll ask you to elaborate on, Dr. Livingstone. You were referring to particular circumstances. You can't shoot your way to peace. That's a pretty loaded statement. Pardon the pun.

    Obviously, this is the kind of activity we sometimes get involved in unwittingly. Can you elaborate on that and tell us why you use that phrase in terms of a particular type of conflict?

    I use that phrase because of the change in the nature of conflict. Conflict is no longer nicely ordered between sovereign states, but it's certainly managed by non-state actors who engage now in low-intensity, longer-term, much more violent conflict.

    The response we see to that isn't always useful, because there's a whole other piece to why that low-intensity conflict is going on. Is there an economic window to this? Is there a cultural issue? Is there an internecine conflict? What is driving that low-intensity, longer-term, longer-lasting conflict? Civil wars used to last three years. They now last five because of the amount of small arms and light weapons running around the world.

    If we think we're going to move in with a heavily armed group, as we have done oftentimes in counter-insurgency—we also saw this in Vietnam—we can't always shoot our way through that, because there are other issues on the ground that create a responsiveness among the people who will shift sides depending on where their needs are being met. That's why I said that.

    You mentioned the PRT as potentially an example of a military model for the future. If I could be the devil's advocate for a moment, one of the criticisms of the PRT is that you have the military trying to deliver development. I think for the first couple of years there might have been half a dozen or 12 civilians involved in the PRT. Basically it was the military delivering development activities.

    It's seen by those on the other side as just an aspect of foreigners trying to do things their way. How do you match this development? You can't really do development without peace, in my estimation. How would the PRT be a model, using the military and hopefully civilians as well? Can you explain how that might work elsewhere? I know Afghanistan is a bit sui generis, but....

    We had a similar model in the early days of Vietnam, where we realized that there had to be a marriage of when you created a secure environment, how quickly you got development going, how quickly you got rule of law going, and how quickly you got people's needs met. That activity of responding to the local population had to happen with multiple hands.

    You had to have local involvement, police involvement, military involvement and NGO involvement, and I think coordinating that is where we're all falling down. This is fairly new. On a go-forward basis, some of the lessons learned are how we train together better, how we think about this differently, and how we identify roles, responsibilities, and authorities. I do think this is the way we're going to be constructed in the future.

    I have one last question, if I have time, and maybe both of you can jump in.

    We talked about the nineties, and I won't get you to explain your version of that. We were told by some that things have changed at the UN, with Resolution 1265, the responsibility to protect civilians, the New Horizon project, etc. Do either of you think Canada should be playing a role at the UN in trying to assist this process and provide some leadership at the UN on this matter, or should we leave that to somebody else?

    In every meeting I go to, I'm asked one question: when will Canada come back and help us? I think Canada's leadership on the world stage—particularly in areas like New Horizon, which talks about partnering, which talks about the need for a command-and-control structure, which talks about the need for training and equipment—Canada's long-term history, and Canada's experience in Afghanistan makes it a principal player in this.

     I think we've been through an extraordinary period since 9/11, and this has changed the direction that began at the end of the Cold War. I think we're continually going through a readjustment, and the current readjustment that is out there is the Americans returning to more of a multilateral approach, more work through multilateral organizations like the United Nations, coming to friends and allies and asking for their support in that new direction. While we've been focused almost exclusively on Afghanistan, there has been a lot of other movement and progress within the United Nations, and we should be looking at not necessarily going back to a leadership role--that would be great--but simply greater participation, because that's where a lot of the action has been and will continue to be.

    Thank you very much.

    I will give the floor to Mr. Hawn.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you both for being here and for your excellent presentations.

    I want to explore the skill sets and the Canadian approach a little bit. We talked about the skill sets that we're developing in Afghanistan, that we have developed, that take account of cultural differences and the spectrum of things we have to deal with in a place like that.

    I'd like comments from both of you, I guess, on the Canadian approach, which changed significantly about a year and a half ago and is now being copied, basically, by the allies, wherein we now have the capacity, boots on the ground, to go into a place and (a) clear the Taliban, and (b) stay there and do development, and that goes back to development without peace. Yes, that's difficult, but I'd like to suggest that peace is local. All politics is local, peace is local, so development, I suggest, can go on locally in places in Afghanistan--not necessarily the whole country--but really, that is a more practical approach to it.

    I'd like comments from both of you, please.

    Yes, I would tend to agree, sir, it is local, and you start small. You have to make it fit where you are.

    I think some of the skill sets that are most important are simple skill sets that are quite complex, like mentoring and advising and monitoring and evaluating and knowing how to negotiate and mediate, knowing how to have intercultural communication, being savvy to what that landscape is. I think Canada, in this instance, has acquitted itself quite brilliantly in understanding how to do that. Therefore, when it comes time to develop that local development capacity, there is a trust relationship that is built there that is really critically important in Afghanistan, but you would find that same need in the Congo.

    In your study you focused on peace operations post-2011. I think one thing you might want to consider, and this might sound a little bit off the wall, is the possibility of progress toward a political settlement within Afghanistan, greater involvement of the United Nations in leading that and also forming the backbone of a security structure to implement a national political settlement within Afghanistan, and possibly a role for Canada in a peace operation that is run by the United Nations within Afghanistan post-2011.

    I would agree with you and with Ann that peace is necessary at the local level across the board in any country, to have that kind of sense of security and harmony and a space for development and progress and so on. But I think you also need it at the national level and you need it at the regional level when it comes to Afghanistan, and that's something I think we should be working toward.

    Yes, it's a building-block approach, I would suggest.

    We talked about the continuum of operations and how at the far end or the higher end of the spectrum they can be pretty chaotic. The UN has bluntly, in my view, been a dismal failure at dealing with chaos. How do we get the UN back on track in being able to deal with chaos more effectively than they have in the past?

    I would assert that the UN is only as strong as its member states allow it to be. It's a voluntary compliance organization, and I think here again is where the developed world's absence from the discourse and absence from decision-making has allowed or has resulted in the UN's abysmal responses.

    Can I ask you to go a little deeper? Two-thirds of the members of the UN are not democracies. I think this is some of the frustration of the developed world in trying to deal through the UN, because they get thwarted to death at most turns by the undemocratic two-thirds of the organization. How do we fix that?

    Right. Again, one can say that we wish we could wave the magic wand and have them all democratic in a nightfall, but I think the reality is that the slow drip, drip of leadership, mentoring, and advising by countries such as Canada helps to dissuade and helps to change.

     Part of that is again complex peace operations versus the classical word “peacekeeping”. There's a fair bit of education I think that needs to go on for the Canadian public. We've talked about the attention span of the public and government, and the media, frankly, because it is a long-term process; it's a drip, drip process. How do we keep Canadians' attention span long enough to try to build a little bit of understanding about some of these very complex operations? It's not just simply put on a blue beret and strap on a sidearm and go fix the Congo.

    I think that's where Parliament has such an important role as a teacher, as a leader to its constituents. I think that's where history becomes very important. I think that's where myth busting becomes extremely important. And institutions like Peacebuild and the PPC can be helpful in that, but when economic tensions and economic realities address local folks' pocketbooks, it makes it a little bit harder to keep the attention span going on, I'll grant you that.

    Mr. Lord, do you have any comments on that?

    I'd agree very much with the idea that Parliament should be leading on this kind of issue. I think part of what you're doing here with this study and other studies that the committee undertakes is part of that process. I'd also make a pitch for talking more with NGOs and with academics, and maintaining those connections, maintaining that kind of consultative mechanism and momentum, because that's a means of connecting with the public and connecting with larger constituencies.

    I'd like to talk about parliamentary involvement in decisions a little bit. The decision to deploy troops is a prerogative of the executive, technically speaking, although obviously parliamentarians should have a knowledge. I would suggest that in terms of the pre-discussion about parameters, about conditions under which we should deploy, it's the purview of parliamentarians to work with the public to build understanding and so on. But because of time constraints and lack of specific knowledge by parliamentarians about a specific situation, I think it would be a little bit unrealistic in a lot of cases for Parliament to make the decision on deployment.

    Do you have comments on that?

    I would agree with you on that. I think any new situation is going to be difficult. I think there's perhaps a problem arising where we're looking for the perfect situation for Canada to get involved in. That ain't going to happen. It's going to be a place where we don't have the knowledge, where we don't necessarily have the historical capacities, where it will seem to be a great necessity. There will be public pressure. There will be political pressure. Hopefully, we've learned some things in relation to Afghanistan and other events of the recent past about how to gather information, how to process that information, and how to move along with the public on some of these issues, and to communicate more about what are the parameters for involvement.

    Thank you very much.

    Mr. Martin for cinq minutes.

    Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président.

    Thank you very much, Ms. Livingstone and Mr. Lord, for being here today.

    Ms. Livingstone, what do we do in cases...? These days most conflicts are intra-state; there's no willing partner, which, as you said, was a prerequisite for action, but we have a responsibility to protect. What can we do to deal with those conflicts?

    Responsibility to protect as a political process I think is different from protection of civilians. I would like to address it from a protection of civilians perspective, because I'm not adroit enough at speaking about politics.

    When we have the kinds of conflicts that we do, where we see the damage to the civilian population, whether it's in genocide or the mass rape that we're seeing in Congo, I think one of the questions that has to be asked is, how and when do we engage? Do we engage at the prevention cycle, at the very beginning of it, when we see the patterns emerging, or is this a good use of resources and time, and is this a values issue? In the intra-state conflict, where it's all confused with economics, and it's confused with politics and with time, I think that's when we have difficulty making a decision.

    I'm not sure I'm answering your question.

    In the interest of full disclosure, I asked Jack Granatstein the same question and he couldn't answer it either. It's a tough one.

    I'd like to ask both of you for your ideas. Do we have to improve our own intelligence capabilities, including our ability to provide better skill sets in language and culture? We saw in Afghanistan what in my personal view was an abysmal failure in terms of understanding the people and the cultures that we were dealing with. In the process of that, we've had an appalling political process that had to.... We had a good military intervention, but the political process was a mere runt compared to the military one. Part of that I think is due to the fact that we didn't understand the culture. I'm not sure we actually have the cultural and linguistic capabilities to do that, nor the intelligence capabilities, which I don't think we have external to our borders.

    Do we need to develop such a capability, and if so, how would we do it?

     I think Jack Granatstein said he wasn't qualified to answer that question.

    He said he couldn't.

    But I'll take it at a different angle. As far as the intelligence establishment, I'm not qualified to answer that question either, but I certainly have opinions about what could be done to increase the knowledge of parliamentarians, the media, and the bureaucracy in these kinds of situations. Part of it is using this tool of parliamentary committees to get involved and get focused on a particular issue and begin bringing in expert witnesses. There are hundreds of non-governmental organizations, academics, people within various diasporas, and so on, who have a tremendous amount of knowledge about their particular homelands, areas of work, and/or academic expertise. I think one of the issues is pulling that information together in a hurry in certain circumstances to be able to begin making the judgment calls that are necessary.

    So in relation to Congo, Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, or Ethiopia, there are hundreds if not thousands of people within Canada who have a tremendous amount of knowledge related to those situations. Some sort of systematic process could tap into that.

    As a quick example, when we were preparing for a course we were delivering to the UN police in Darfur, we reached into the diaspora community in Hamilton and learned how to address issues of sexual and gender-based violence that are culturally taboo. So we were able to get questions translated in Darfur. My staff understood how to put culture into the training materials, which then resulted in a very successful course in Darfur that allowed police to be more effective at gathering evidence.

    On the intelligence structure--the capability for us to know what's taking place abroad, where would such an organization...? Would it be a strengthening of CSIS, an extension of CSIS?

    What do we do with those groups that are actually instigating and contributing to conflicts, for example, in the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe formerly?

    As far as countries intervening in DRC--the neighbours, for various reasons--one of the few avenues we have is diplomatic pressure on the Ugandans or the Zimbabweans. That's very limited, but sanctions are another possibility in these kinds of situations. I think there is a range of diplomatic instruments that could be used in those situations.

    I'll pass to Ann on that.

    Again, using the bully pulpit Canada has, using pressure of all kinds, is an excellent way to stay the regional neighbours into their own borders.

    As to the intelligence, the UN is no longer thinking intelligence is a dirty word, so there's quite an appetite for learning and understanding more about what intelligence-gathering is and what it really means for a mission. But I'm not equipped to talk about intelligence-gathering.

    Thank you.

    Thank you very much.

    I will give the floor to Mr. Braid for five minutes.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thanks to both of our witnesses for being here this morning for two excellent presentations.

    I wonder if I could start by asking a couple of questions to allow you to further elaborate on some of the points you made.

    Ms. Livingstone mentioned that one potential role for the Canadian Forces would be to provide mentoring or support for regional associations or organizations like the Organization of African Unity. I have a couple of questions about that point.

    First of all, do you feel that those regional associations have the capability to have primary responsibility in peacekeeping operations?

    As much as I would like to say yes, I have to say no, if we look at UNAMET, UNMIS, and some others. However, most of the countries of the African Union are 60 years old and independent, so they're quite new at this game. I think that's where the mentoring, advising, and provision of support are extremely critical if we really want the African Union to become robust enough to handle African problems in African ways.

     In terms of that mentoring and support role, what might that role look like in terms of size, scope, and responsibility on our part? Do you have any thoughts there?

    I think it would require a fairly robust response of seconding individuals in over a long time. It would again be whole of government, helping the African Union with capability, with staffing, with planning, and with understanding how that works, and all in the cultural context. It's so very different, so it takes enormous time. I think it would be a long-term commitment with a substantive array of military, civilian, and police personnel to stay the course in that kind of environment in order for them to then be able to take over.

    Very good.

    Ms. Livingstone, you referred to the valuable lessons that we've learned from Afghanistan. Could you outline what those key lessons have been, in your mind, for our Canadian Forces?

    I think one of the key lessons is the role of patience and intercultural communication and understanding. Nothing happens quickly. We are taking a 13th- or 14th-century environment and trying to propel it to the 21st century. There are a whole range of activities that require patience, due diligence, deliberateness, relationship-building, and trust-building that are sometimes viewed as outside the purview of a force. I think that is probably the most critical lesson we are all learning from the Afghanistan experience.

    Mr. Lord, you mentioned that one of the factors we should consider before deploying the Canadian Forces is to have a determination of the risks. Do you have any thoughts or suggestions on how we assess those risks? Would it be through a particular framework or specific criteria? Can you give us any elaboration on that point?

    There are different frameworks, different criteria that have been developed within the Canadian bureaucracy by academics and so on. I think these need more work, and they need more weighting in particular areas. The risks will be different in different situations, and all these different components relevant to Canadian interests, capacities, and risks have to be considered at the same time, so I can't give you a particular set of risk criteria to be used in any circumstances. It has to be I think related to the specifics of a particular situation, and certain types of risks will rise to the top. Based on the information that's available, you'll necessarily have some priorities in terms of what the risks are, but in the abstract I can't answer your question.

    Thank you.

    In my remaining time, I'll present this final question to both of you. We've had two previous witnesses suggest that there should be a period of downtime post-Afghanistan and that Canadian Forces should have a respite before re-engaging.

    Could both of you please comment on that?

    I respect the military officers and analysts who have made the case for a respite. I wonder if it's going to be possible, though, and I wonder what degree of commitment and engagement is going to be needed in the short to medium term. I can understand the need, with the tempo of deployments to Afghanistan, the many people who have gone through that process, the wear and tear on equipment, and so on, but the world does not stand still, and there could be considerable pressures for Canadians to be deployed elsewhere in the near to medium term.

    I think it's extremely important that the military personnel have a chance to reflect and rest, but I also agree with David that there probably will not be time for that.

    Merci beaucoup. Thank you very much.

    Go ahead, Monsieur Bachand.

    I would like to focus a little on the importance of Parliament in decision-making. I have often noticed that, when members first join a committee, we are told that there is a lot we do not understand, and that is true. We sit opposite scholars who have been scholarly forever. Great generals with 30 years' experience come and tell us exactly how things are as they understand them. There are civil service mucky-mucks called deputy ministers who have been around for decades. There are also distinguished experts like yourselves.

    But I cannot help recalling that none of them has been elected by the people. So we have responsibilities, including a $250 billion budget, though our responsibility is not just for financial management. When Canadian soldiers die in Afghanistan, we are partly responsible. As elected officials, we decided that they should go there.

    Because it may be said that parliamentarians do not have sufficient understanding, do you believe that it should be up to the executive to decide to send Canadian forces into a conflict, or not? Do you not feel that the decision would be much more sound if parliamentarians and Parliament as a whole made that decision? That question follows up on what Mr. Hawn said.

    The environment must also be appropriate. The government must be transparent with Parliament and must provide us with all the information we need to make an informed decision. But the fact remains that the informed decision is ours to make. Most of all, we have to live with the consequences of that decision.

    Even if, legally and constitutionally, the executive must make the decision to engage in a conflict, would the decision be sounder if, as Mr. Harper has in fact done during the last two extensions of the mission in Afghanistan, the decision was made by Parliament as a whole rather than just by the executive?

    With that kind of issue, consensus is much more empowering for all. The executive and Parliament have a shared responsibility. They have to consider and analyze the problem and propose options.

    Ms. Livingstone, what is your opinion on the matter?

     I'm always hesitant to speak on politics, because it's not my forte. In a democracy, where you have the selection of government by the people, it is a shared responsibility. I have never been elected, so I don't walk a mile in your shoes. I do know how difficult it is to make the decisions that you do for the treasure and talent of your country. So I have a lot of respect for it, but I think it can't be one or the other; it's both.

    I am not very clear on what you are saying. Is it Parliament, cabinet, or the executive that should decide on a country's involvement? Democratically, which is the most sound?

    I feel that the Prime Minister and the cabinet were also elected. In our system, ultimately, they have the responsibility for the decision. The responsibility is shared, but it lies with the Prime Minister and the executive. In terms of the analysis, the discussions, the options, the positions taken by MPs, everyone is equal and has the same responsibilities for decisions as an elected official, even on a personal level.

    Thank you very much.

    I now give the floor to Mr. Payne.

     Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I'd also like to welcome the witnesses here today and thank them for their presentations. I have a couple of questions to ask through the chair.

    First of all, we did talk briefly about the national interests, and particularly the peacekeeping operations or peacemaking operations. In particular, we talked a little bit about Afghanistan. It was mentioned that these operations are much longer and much more costly. Again, how do we ensure that the public is on board to make sure that our national interests are looked after?

    That question is for both of you.

    As I said earlier, I think it's an ongoing process. It's an ongoing process for you as MPs, for the media, and for non-governmental organizations, and so on, who are interested in these issues and have a sense of a stake in them as well, to continue to communicate what's going on, to try to put forward ideas, and to look for solutions to problems. That's the way to engage the public and to make some progress on some of these issues. They are large, complicated, and long term, but I think Canada's reputation in the past has been as a constructive player and a constructive and creative innovator in some of these situations. That's what needs to continue. We can't give up on them.

    It's always important to link the public with something that is bigger than themselves and to help them understand that what happens in the plains of Afghanistan also has an impact on Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan. That's where the role of Parliament, the role of the media, and the role of NGOs such as the PPC and Peacebuild can be very useful in saying the world has changed and now what happens over there is intimately connected to you. One of the things we don't do enough of is really linking to that globalized environment.

    We actually had one of the previous witnesses make a very good connection between Afghanistan and Canada, particularly with the U.S. border and the thickening of the border. I think that was quite a bit of an eye-opener. How do you link that, and how do you get that message across to the public?

    Obviously, a lot of the public have had difficulties getting into the U.S. They now have to have passports or other legal documentation to do that.

    One of the other things that I was interested in, Ms. Livingstone, was when you talked about the need for joint training and certainly a cost-effective and civilian rapid response force. I'm not sure if you were just talking from a global point of view, or were you talking UN or Canadian?

    I'm talking at all levels of this.

    Any time you can do a training activity that is scenario-based, that puts military, police, and civilians in the same room and compels them to deal with the issues to solve the problem, whether it's a Canadian group of people, Africans, or whomever else we train, we are very convinced that it is in this interface of scenario-based training that allows them to understand roles, responsibilities, and authority. It should happen at all levels.

    I find that is an important piece. Where do we start? Do we start with the UN? Do we start with Canadians? How do we roll that out to the global community?

    We can start here. We can do it simultaneously with some of our colleagues in the Secretariat. The Pearson Centre has been involved recently in helping write operational guidance to heads of missions in anticipation of a senior mission leaders course at the UN that prepares future SRSGs and force commanders for their roles and responsibilities. It's also training the African Union that this is how you do planning, this is how you do exit strategies, this is how you do this.

    So we have a lot of experience at multiple levels in rolling out this kind of training. It's not one way or the other; it's all.

    Mr. Lord, do you have any comments on that?

    I think there is a tremendous amount of different opportunities for Canada to be involved. I'd go along with Ann in suggesting starting at home but working through the UN and working through other regional organizations and looking at what their particular needs are. Part of the issue here is the complexity of these operations and the situations. So it's working with others to understand and to be able to apply the right kinds of tools in the right kinds of situations.

     Thank you very much.

    Mr. Wilfert for five minutes.

    Ms. Livingstone, you started by saying this isn't my father's world. My father's world was the beaches of Normandy and the Battle of the Falaise Gap and Caen and Holland. That was his world. His world was not peacekeeping. We went through peacekeeping, and now we've directed our military to one major operation, which is Afghanistan.

    Although the UN has tried to reform itself in terms of the nature of peacekeeping operations, one is forced to ask the question of whether peacekeeping is realistic given the state of affairs in the world today, the various non-state actors, the role of international terrorism, etc., and given that we are terribly inconsistent in international foreign policy. I mean, we were very tough in the 1980s on South Africa because of apartheid, and yet we are hypocritical on Zimbabwe, and hypocritical on Burma, and dealing with the Chinese.

    If we accept the fact that we're totally inconsistent, both us and everybody else, the question goes back to the initial question I asked about the national interest. What is in our interest in order to move forward if in fact the nature of peacekeeping, which I would suggest is really peace enforcement, is the nature of the day? Maybe we are going to go back to our traditional role as a nation, which is what my father's world was.

    But one could argue that your father's world and my father's world really doesn't exist in terms of the interstate conflict that drove them to the beaches of Normandy.

    It may not, but the ability as a fighting force to go in with clear objectives is still there.

    It is still there, and one can argue that if there was leadership on the Security Council, at the Secretariat, in a devising of mandates that were clear and resourced appropriately, and if there was the political will to have that mandate, then peace enforcement or complex peace operations, or whatever nomenclature you choose, might have a chance at being more successful in those kinds of environments.

    That is predicated on the fact that the United Nations, as it currently exists, needs to be badly reformed, and not simply the Security Council. The national interest clearly plays a role, as we're going to see very shortly, on the situation on the Korean peninsula, where the Chinese will probably do what they traditionally do, and I don't think that is in anyone's interest.

    The UN has recognized some of these issues, and they have made some changes in their operations. But essentially, do you see a point where Canada could demand of the UN that if we're going to go in--as the EU did, for example, in Lebanon in 2006--it's going to be under certain conditions? We're going to say we want, this, this, and this, otherwise we don't participate. In other words, do you think we have the leverage, as one of the few that in theory is out there doing this kind of work and that can actually get some results?

    I think in the future, precisely that will have to happen. The developed world, if it's going to go back, will put on very strong terms and references for the UN Security Council and Secretariat. It will be if you want A, then you must do B. And then Katy, bar the door for the C34 conversations that will happen, and that will say if you want this, then you're going to have to do that. I think there's an appetite for that, quite frankly.

    That would also mean that if we do believe in the role of multilateralism, Canada has to take a much more aggressive and pronounced role in the United Nations in order to get those players lined up.

    I think that's why there's such an interest in Canada having a non-permanent seat on the Security Council.

    It's too bad we passed that over in 1945. We were the only nation to actually be a member of every committee of the United Nations at the time.

     I'm a great student--probably out of fashion today--of Hans Morgenthau. Hans Morgenthau talks about world public opinion and about the need, as policy-makers--and maybe we haven't done this in Canada as effectively--of getting the public to understand the nature of our operations in Afghanistan under the UN, if you want to use the term “subcontracted out to NATO”, or what we actually went into in Somalia, which was not peacekeeping. How do we get all of those different aspects you mentioned, from human rights, diaspora, and all those wonderful things, to be able to clearly articulate what we are doing in order to achieve the objectives we supposedly believe in through the UN, which is to create a better international climate?

     I wouldn't put aside peacekeeping so categorically. I think that in certain situations in which there is consent, a peace agreement, and so on, Canada can look at participation in peacekeeping. The key issue is consent or non-consent. If there's non-consent, then it's another ball of wax completely.

    That's my 15 seconds.

    I'm torn on the issue myself.

    I'm equally torn, because I think Canada's presence is important. It's not going to become any less complex, and I don't think there's an easy answer for this.

    Thank you very much.

    Mrs. Gallant is next.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    About five years after World War II ended, we saw the conflict arising in Korea. The Russians and the United States were jockeying for influence in the region, and our government of the day decided it was in Canada's national interest to go into that theatre of war.

    Now, 57 years after that armistice, some of our troops are getting home from Afghanistan, many of them are still deploying to Afghanistan, and the situation seems to be heating up again.

    Recognizing that the best war is that which is avoided altogether, and whether or not it is North Korea or some other country pulling its levers, should the Canadian Parliament and world bodies come to the conclusion that we do need troops in the area, then given everything we've discussed today, including the role of Canada's future military, what do you see as the role for our soldiers in that unthinkable situation that we have to be prepared for?

    Could you each divide your time evenly? Thank you.

    I find thinking about war between North and South Korea, or primarily between North and South Korea, is really quite unthinkable. The world has changed so much since 1950 in terms of destructive military capabilities that we can't imagine a similar kind of military event taking place in the Koreas, so I'm one step away from considering the possibility of a Canadian deployment.

    I would see all hell breaking loose there, with a tremendous loss of life, and opening up all kinds of potential for other disruption in the region. If I were a military planner, it's not something I would like to be contemplating. At this point I just can't see a role for Canada in the possible scenarios that I can imagine.

    I would tend to agree.

    I don't think the North and South Korea situation, if it emerges into conflict, is going to be the kind of place where what we call complex peace operations will be valuable in the initial stage. I think there's going to be much more involvement by the large players, particularly China and the United States, and I think they will determine the pathway. I don't think it's a revisiting of the 1950s. I think it's entirely something else. I'm like David; I cannot wrap my mind around what that looks like.

    In 1950 there was the “uniting for peace” resolution, which at the General Assembly was fairly easy; this is something else entirely. There's some argument that it may take us back into the timeframe of our fathers' world, in which sovereign states will be much more at play than intrastate conflict: you do have a North and South Korea, and all the other players in the neighbourhood are quite powerful states.

    Thank you.

    I have no further questions.

    Thank you very much.

    Now I'll give the floor to Mr. Hawn.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Ms. Livingstone, you mentioned a senior mission leaders course at the UN. I hadn't heard of that, although I understand what it is.

    What kind of people are you trying to get there, and what are you trying to teach them?

    That course is sponsored and paid for by member states or institutions like the PPC. The United Nations puts together a list of potential SRSGs—heads of mission, force commanders, police commissioners, heads of country teams—and brings them together for a two-week period to work together in decision-making. They learn how the UN system works and what a mission looks like. We have been involved in those training activities several times now.

     Mr. Lord, we've talked about the difficulty of getting into a mission, and obviously missions change over time, especially when you're there for a number of years and it may not look anything like it did at the start. Another factor in that is the local actors. You know, we don't get to pick the local actors. We don't get to pick the Taliban. We don't get to pick Hamid Karzai. We don't get to pick Karzai's brother or any of these guys, but we just have to work with them.

    Can you just comment on some of the challenges of that and how we handle that, as we tend to apply Canadian context to Afghanistan, and the difficulty that presents to messaging, that it's not Canada and we can't expect things to happen in Afghanistan as they happen in Canada?

    I do see this as you do, as a tremendous dilemma. Situations will arise during the course of an engagement that make it look increasingly difficult, with the increasing possibility that we are looking at a tremendous waste of life and money and political capital. And how do you keep the faith? How do you continue to bring the public along with an engagement that remains necessary?

    NGOs, for instance, were involved in Afghanistan prior to the Taliban and through the Taliban era. And they will continue to be involved there after the Americans are gone and perhaps.... There is that continuity of engagement of various groups and constituencies.

    Canada will continue to be involved in Afghanistan diplomatically as long as it exists as a state. Our military intervention, as part of a larger process, has had its ups and downs, and hopefully we're moving very, very gradually towards a more peaceful Afghanistan where there will be stability and there won't be that need for the military commitment and so on.

    Taking a long view is a means of appealing to the common sense of people. We've made these investments. It is important to us and to the region to try to keep things in perspective, while being realistic as well about the setbacks and not diminishing the importance of the setbacks.

    Along that line, 40 years ago Afghanistan really was a reasonably 20th century country with arts and culture and government and a thriving economy and so on. It has gone back to the 14th century in many ways. Obviously we're trying to bring it back to the 20th century.

    I know there is no answer to this, but what is your perspective on the patience required and the challenge required to stick with this for the long term? And what do you see Canada doing to help that, post-2011, if you have some specific suggestions?

    In Afghanistan it's going to be that continued involvement at the local level and making sure that which is local stays safe. And that can extrapolate up, then, into the regional and then into the national. So with the staying power to ensure local stability, people begin to see how their lives are better and then they themselves take responsibility for their security. That will be the key for Canadians' involvement.

    Is it a matter of giving the Afghan people themselves just simply the confidence to say, “Yes, we can do this and we can control our future”? Right now they're probably not very confident.

    Part of it is confidence building. Part of it is capability analysis. A lot of it is capacity-building. A lot of it is involvement of the women of Afghanistan, who are far more powerful than we give them credit for being.

    So again, it's that more holistic look at what we can do from our lessons learned and our best practices that will ensure the sacrifices that have been made are not in vain and they valorize that in many ways.

    Do you have any specific suggestions about what Canada's role should be, post-2011?

    In Afghanistan?

    Yes.

    I would like to see Canada stay, in terms of development, in terms of diplomacy. I would like it to be engaged in capacity-building for the Afghan government. How do you get rule of law that is both culturally appropriate and within the confines of universal principles? Again, it is a long haul.

    Thank you.

    Thank you very much.

    We're going to have a third round of two minutes for each party.

    First, Monsieur Bachand pour deux minutes, and after that Mr. Harris, and after that somebody from the Conservative Party.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have two minutes, so I will be quick.

    Could you talk a little about PRTs? In a way, PRTs are an American invention that NATO has accepted. As you know, PRTs are not all alike. Each country decides on its makeup and its philosophy. I clearly remember General Richards, from Great Britain, explaining to us that he was in favour of the ink spot theory. He said that it would be the PRTs throughout Afghanistan that would spread democracy and put children back into school, and so on. I have to say that they are not having much success at the moment.

    So could you talk about PRTs? Do you think that they should have some basic uniformity? What is a PRT? Do you think that the ink spot theory is the best approach in Afghanistan, or anywhere else?

     I haven't seen any comprehensive study of the PRTs. I haven't seen very much information at all, objective information, about Canada's PRT, so I think it's difficult to make a judgment on their reach, their efficiency, and how useful a tool they've been in Afghanistan.

    I agree that there are a lot of different kinds of approaches. One of the principal approaches I thought with our PRT was to be a springboard to augment the Government of Afghanistan's reach within and around Kandahar and so on. It does not seem to me to have been a success, from what I've...just in the limited Canadian PRT range.

    There has clearly been a need expressed by the 35 different PRTs for some semblance of coherence, for similar patterns. But again, when this is a new idea, sometimes we have to do what we do right now in order to learn the lessons, and figure out what the best practices are when we come back together again in this model.

    Merci. Thank you very much.

    Monsieur Harris.

    Thank you.

    I have a rather vexed question. This is partly about military culture. We heard Mr. Hawn say we can't just put on a blue beret and a sidearm and go down to fix the Congo. I say this with respect: that's a scoffing view of the role of peacekeepers. We had General Hillier say, “We're here to kill scumbags and murderers.” So the military may have a view of their world that is totally different from other people's.

    Are they the ones who do this mentoring, mediation, peace-building, capacity-building, all of that within their culture, or does that have to be done by somebody else? We put a lot of money into the military. We're spending a lot of money on the military in Afghanistan. Do we need, for lack of a better word, a peace corps that we are prepared to spend lots of money on to do similar work on the building side, or can it be done through the military? It's a very vexed question.

    Within the United Nations there's been a lot of work done in the last couple of years on building up mediation capacity, which is a political capacity. There's a mediation support unit that's been developed there that goes into hot spots and tries to work on solutions to emerging conflicts. NGOs are involved in peace-building at a local level. Some NGOs are involved in conflict resolution at the political level in track II kinds of diplomacy. There are all kinds of different instruments there.

    The military, in these particular areas, I think sometimes has a need to act as a mediator, but the military, in my mind, is focused on military objectives. Diplomats, NGOs, local governments, and so on are focused on political objectives, economic objectives, security objectives. So there are different approaches and different sets of people involved in these kinds of issues. In some cases, there's a good fit; in others, it's not a good fit.

    I think this is where my language of the “blue briefcase” becomes really important. It is that other side of the security envelope where you get rule of law, corrections, justice, economics, and institution building, that has to move alongside of the military when you're coming into a secure environment. Is it just the military's job? No. Is it just a civilian job? No. It is this complex “joined-up-ness” that we still have a hard time getting our heads wrapped around.

    Yes, it's vexing, but my suggestion would be that we'd better get our heads around it, because if we don't, what we see is that even if you get peace you'll see a return to conflict within a five-year window in about 50% of these things. One can make an argument that if you get rule of law institutions, good justice, good corrections, and good policing and public safety, that is a mitigating factor in returning to an insecure environment.

    A voice: And good parliaments.

     Thank you very much.

    Now I will give the floor to Mr. Hawn.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Far from being a scoffing view of Congo, I would suggest it's a dose of just plain bloody reality. I would like your comment on what Mr. Harris said about the Canadian military. I would suggest to you, and I'd like your comment as you see fit, that the Canadian military is trained in much more than weaponry and so on. In my personal view, they are probably the most well-equipped individuals in this whole government group, who can take everything from doing the really tough stuff to doing the mentoring, the development, the training, and the capacity-building. They are probably, individually, the best trained group overall to do that. I'd like your comments on that.

    Again, I'm not going to damn the military. I think they are extraordinarily well trained, and I think they do have that strategic, corporal piece of them that we've all read so much about. So yes, they can do those things. They can do them singly or they can do them in conjunction with a variety of other actors. Which makes the most sense in a particular environment is where you do your risk analysis and your overall analysis to determine what it is this local community needs to get itself sorted out, because it should be about that local community.

    And from either one of you--and this is a simple question to which there is no simple answer. From what we know of particular places in the world today, where should we go and where shouldn't we go next?

    I think Congo is begging for some assistance. I realize what that landscape is. We've been there since 1960. I think places like Timor...to continue capacity-building and strengthening that environment, and keeping our eye on what's going to happen in Sudan with the elections coming up. I think keeping our eye on Somalia and the mess that place is going to be. Even keeping our eye on Kenya, if you look at what happened after the elections, and we realize the fragility of that place....

     So I think it's a matter of keeping our eye on things and then doing the risk analysis of where is Canada's rich history and rich ability best used, and then you can make that decision.

    Thank you very much.

    I want to thank the witnesses.

    Thank you for sharing your experience with us, Mr. Lord and Ms. Livingstone. It was very useful.

    At this point, I am going to suspend our session for three minutes. We will then continue in camera.

    [Proceedings continue in camera]

    We now resume the public session.

     We're in public now.

    I will give the floor to Mr. Wilfert.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I'll read the motion and then I'll explain it:

    I realize that on Thursday we will be meeting in committee of the whole for four hours. It doesn't necessarily mean, however, that we're going to be able to answer these questions. Given that it's the 100th anniversary of the navy, and given the fact that the navy is about 1,000 under strength at the present time, and getting a better understanding of just what has occurred here, given the fact that the admiral obviously copied the CDS back in April—I think it was April 21—this sudden reversal...obviously I welcome the change, but I'm concerned about the process. I think the process is extremely important. Given the sad state of the navy at the present time, the two supply ships being on their last legs, etc., I think we need to have a more in-depth discussion with the three principals involved. I think it would be constructive and helpful if we did this.

    I had modified, as the clerk knows, my original motion, taking into account the announcement of May 14. If all our answers are dealt with on Thursday, I don't need to deal with this motion afterwards, but I want it on the record, and I'd like to have it passed so that we can deal with it.

    So with great respect, I put it forward and we'll see what happens.

    I will give the floor to Mr. Hawn, and after that to Mr. Harris.

    We clearly do not support this motion. In the first place, his decision was not to scrap half of the fleet of 12 vessels. That's simply a misstatement of fact and complete rubbish. Secondly, this Minister of National Defence has been before more committees than any other minister of the crown. Thirdly, you have four hours during committee of the whole on Thursday, so question your little socks off on whatever you want to.

    In fact, overall budgets to the navy have not been cut; they've been increased substantially. It's a matter of allocation within those budgets that might be at issue, but clearly, notwithstanding Mr. Wilfert's comments, we believe there's a little bit of political mischief in this as well, and we simply do not support this motion.

    So we can get it over with quickly or we can get it over with after a long discussion, but we do not support the motion.

    Mr. Harris.

    I share Laurie's concern about the use of the word “scrap”, because it was really standing down half of that, but there was also more to it. There were other operational decisions that I think a lot of people across the country found worrisome. But I support the principle of the motion that it does bespeak certain issues within the navy.

    As a committee, we just went through the Arctic study and talked about the Arctic patrol and the role of the navy in all of that. So it just came as quite a shock to me to learn that, within the military, at least, the use of the patrol vessels was not considered a priority enough to continue with all of them.

    I'd like to hear more about it, frankly, regardless of whatever political mischief Mr. Hawn thinks someone might be up to. This is a very serious issue and the kind of issue that the defence committee should elaborate on. I don't think we're necessarily going to get the kinds of answers that are needed in terms of the committee of the whole. Obviously we can ask questions of the minister at that point, and maybe the officials will be there, too.

    Will they be there, Laurie? The deputy minister, CDS—

    The CDS, the deputy minister, and associates.

    Maybe there will be some scope there, but in principle.... For example, we had the chief of recruitment here a few weeks ago, and there was no problem with recruitment and everything was going hunky-dory. Now we find we're short 1,000 people and we can't get enough people into the navy. So I think we do have to probe this a little bit, more than just the kinds of questions that might be asked in the House of Commons.

    But I would change the word “scrap”. I'd offer an amendment here. “Stand down”, I guess, is a better term: “stand down half of its fleet of 12 vessels”. I would suggest that change, because I believe Laurie is correct that scrapping is physically dismantling or getting rid of vessels. That wasn't being done.

    Fine. Thank you.

    Mr. Bachand.

    I was very surprised by Vice-Admiral McFadden's announcement. What is the problem exactly? That is what I want to know. Is it a personnel issue or a money issue? It is important for us to know, it seems to me. I am anxious to see how “step down” is translated in the proposed amendment.

    How did you put it, Mr. Harris?

     It's “stand down”.

    It is “supprimer” in French. Later on, I will be able to ask my favourite interpreters how they are going to translate it.

    Now I see the connection with the correspondence we have received on the matter. I would like to know if the correspondence will be tabled. There is certainly one letter that applies to the motion before us today. I see the connection. You promised us that you would do it. When are you going to do it?

    That depends on the one you are talking about.

    It is a request from Amanda Schweitzer, written on May 13.

    I thought that had already been distributed to the committee. It is possible that I am mistaken. I will check after the meeting and will be in touch with your office.

    Have you replied already?

    No, we have not prepared a reply. We did distribute it to the committee.

    You have not replied?

    No.

    Mr. Wilfert is next, and after that, Mr. Hawn.

    Mr. Chairman, I would accept Mr. Harris' comment as a friendly amendment, as long as it can be translated appropriately as “stand down”. “Stand down” is fine.

    I thank Mr. Hawn for suggesting that I might be involved in some political mischief. I haven't heard that too often from that side, so I appreciate it.

    Finally, my socks are not little, believe me.

    I would suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, that I did make the proviso that if all our questions were answered in committee of the whole, that would be fine, but I think we need the assurance to have this on the record. If in fact they were not, this issue needs to be explored in a more wholesome setting, which I think is this committee. It's extremely important for the men and women who serve in the navy, and for Canadians in general.

    Thank you.

    Mr. Hawn.

    I want to take exception to one of the things Mr. Harris said about General Semianiw's testimony. He did not say everything was fine with the navy. He said the navy has some challenges with personnel--recruiting and retention--specifically in the area of distress trades. That's what he was talking about. So he didn't say everything was fine with the navy. The navy, of all three services, is the one with the personnel challenge, and that is a big part of this whole picture.

    Do you have a comment on the amendment?

    I don't care what it says. We're going to vote against it.

    (Amendment agreed to)

    (Motion as amended agreed to)

     It's adopted. We'll see you on Thursday at the new location.

    Thank you. Merci.

    The meeting is adjourned.