:
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
[Translation]
thank you for inviting me back to speak with you about Canada's Air Force. It gives me great pleasure to see members of Parliament show interest in the Canadian Forces. I know that some of you are amongst those who spent time at our headquarters and on our wings last year, meeting and speaking with our personnel and, in most cases, flying in Canadian Forces' aircraft. I encourage all members of Parliament to visit their Air Force and gain a better understanding of what our men and women are doing on a daily basis to provide security at home and abroad.
[English]
I'm delighted to have with me today the people you've introduced, Mr. Terry Williston and Mr. Len Bradshaw from Public Works and Government Services. They will cover off certain aspects of your interest in the procurement process. Colonel Dave Burt is my subject matter expert on requirements matters and brings a wealth of experience with him.
As Chief of the Air Staff and commander of Canada's air force, I am responsible for what we call force generation. This means ensuring that commanders who employ air power in Canadian Forces operations have the equipment and trained personnel required to do the job. As the force generator, I set the operational requirements for air force equipment that will be used by our men and women to conduct the job assigned them by the Government of Canada. For the air force, that job is wide-ranging as we focus on Canada's security needs.
Day to day we maintain surveillance and control of the air space enveloping the second-largest country in the world. We assist our navy in monitoring the maritime approaches along the longest coastline in the world. We respond to calls from Canadians in need, providing immediate assistance through our search and rescue squadrons. Our personnel are on duty around the clock, integrated into Canadian Forces operations, contributing to Canada's economic, environmental, and physical security in the post-9/11 world.
Air force personnel continue to make a tremendous contribution to Canadian Forces operations around the world, especially in southwest Asia, where the air force has been present since Canada first became engaged in the region over five years ago. Today you can find air force personnel almost everywhere you turn throughout the theatre of operations: at the theatre support element, largely run by the air force; with the joint task force in Kandahar, both on the airfield and outside the wire at the forward operating bases, and with the provincial reconstruction team; and elsewhere throughout Afghanistan. Many of them are working side by side with their colleagues from the army, some in fully integrated units.
[Translation]
Since my last appearance before this committee in November, you have had an opportunity to visit our personnel who are doing such a great job in Afghanistan. I trust you are as impressed as I am with the tremendous job being performed by the men and women deployed in that theatre of operations. And I hope you had a chance to observe the challenges our people face in carrying out such operations on behalf of Canadians.
[English]
That brings me to the focus of this meeting: the challenge of generating air force capabilities that are needed to conduct and support Canadian Forces operations here in Canada and around the world.
Canadian Forces operations are, for the most part, no-fail missions. Whether it's rescuing a hiker from the mountains of British Columbia, saving lives over the stormy Atlantic, providing essential life-saving supplies to Canadian communities in distress, or supporting humanitarian or combat missions around the world, we must succeed, often under extreme conditions. And unlike sports, in combat operations there is no second place.
My role as the force generator of aerospace forces is to ensure that we have the right combination of equipment and trained personnel to carry out the tasks assigned to us by the Government of Canada, to a standard that will permit us to succeed and survive to carry out those tasks another day.
Two years ago, on February 7, 2005, my predecessor appeared before the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence. At that time he characterized the state of the air force as fragile, as increased pressures were put on the air force to protect Canadian interests in the post-9/11 world. He said:
Currently, aging fleets and infrastructure impose further strains on the air force's ability to fulfill its roles. The gap between national procurement funding and the need and the diminishing experience levels of and the ability to retain our personnel exacerbate these existing problems.
In short, the air force faces a sustainability gap in its ability to generate operational capability as it transforms to fulfill its role in defence of Canada and Canadian interests.
[Translation]
He emphasized that in the post 9/11 security environment the changing nature of the threat places even further demand on the Air Force' stretched resources.
[English]
What has happened since then? Since February 2005, two successive governments have reinvested in defence, and while much work has been done to put spare parts back in the bins in order to keep our aircraft flying, our aircraft continue to get older and continue to run out of hours.
The most critical situation we face right now is with the air mobility fleet, in particular the CC-130 Hercules fleet. That is the aircraft on which you flew into Kandahar recently. As you heard last week from my colleague Mr. Ross, the assistant deputy minister for materiel, four of our fleet of 32 aircraft have already run out of hours and are sitting on the ground in Trenton. By 2010, we will have only 18 flyable aircraft remaining from the original fleet of 32. So we welcome the government's decision to move quickly to acquire four strategic airlifters and 17 replacements for the CC-130 Hercules aircraft, which will restore our ability to support Canadian Forces operations at home and abroad into the future.
Other areas are also being addressed. By early 2009 we expect the first of the Cyclones, the replacement for the Sea King helicopter, to arrive, and we're working towards acquiring Chinooks to replace a capability lost in the 1990s.
While we are slowly beginning to recover from the fragile state described by my predecessor, the need remains urgent as time runs out on our legacy fleets of aircraft, which brings me to the main point: how we determine the operational requirements for equipment we need, which is the air force's role in the procurement process.
The requirements flow from defence policy. The defence policy, and scenarios that are developed from that policy, help us to identify the capabilities we need to accomplish the tasks assigned to the Canadian Forces.
When we first identify a need for a new capability, we establish guiding principles. One of the key guiding principles is in fact to obtain best value for Canadians. Based on these guiding principles, we use capability-based planning to identify what we call the high-level mandatory capabilities. These high-level mandatory capabilities are derived from internationally agreed standards and an analysis of the needs of the Canadian Forces that will employ the equipment.
From the high-level mandatory capabilities flow the mandatory requirements, those requirements that any potential supplier must meet in order to satisfy the Canadian Forces' needs. By way of example, the strategic airlifter required by the Canadian Forces needs to, among other things, take combat-ready equipment across long distances, including the oceans, and rapidly deploy them where and when they are needed. The mandatory requirements, along with a number of rated requirements, are packaged into a statement of operational requirements.
Draft statements of operational requirements go through a challenge process within a range of organizations within the Department of National Defence. They are subsequently refined to ensure they represent the capability required before being submitted to the minister.
Once the statement of operational requirements has been finalized, the rest of the procurement process can begin, based on the tenets of fairness, openness, and transparency, as you heard many times from the Minister of National Defence and from ADM Materiel last week.
The statement of operational requirements is just that: the statement of what the men and women of the Canadian Forces need in order to undertake the missions the people of Canada call upon them to perform. I'm happy to see that Canada's air force is beginning to receive the equipment it desperately needs in order for our men and women to continue to serve Canada and to serve Canadians.
[Translation]
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I would happy to answer any questions you may have at this time.
:
Thank you very much, general, colonel, gentlemen. It is an honour and a privilege to have you here.
We know that we are dealing with several billion dollars here and that this money needs to be well spent. We also recognize the importance of the equipment for the Air Force.
Because this is a two-hour meeting, we will have many questions. My first question is for you General Lucas, and then, given that you have brought along an expert in the field, Colonel Burt, I would also have some pointed questions to put to him.
First off, you must know that Liberals do not approve the purchase of the C-17s. We think that we could have rented them and made better use of public funds, furthermore, we get the impression that we've given the Americans a blank cheque because we don't have the copyright nor will we be doing the maintenance on these aircraft.
Today, general, I'd like to discuss C-130J with you. Through the agreements and synergy brought about through the CF-18 modernization project, the costs and risks were shared among the countries, which was to the advantage of Canadians. We did it with Australia, the U.S., and the U.K.
If there is this brotherhood of nations, fairness and some fair-play, why did Australia purchase the Hercules C-130Js for U.S.$54.5 million and the U.K. for $64 million? These amounts included initial technical support. You can't say the Canadian aircraft cost more, because the additional costs were already included. The Americans paid $64.5 million. Yet, it cost Canada $188 million per aircraft, or twice the price paid by our allies.
The $3.2 billion contract is for the purchase of 17 aircraft; that's quite a lot per aircraft. Out of these $3.2 billion, over $1.7 billion will go to maintenance over a 20-year period, for a total of $4.9 billion. That's a lot of money.
What could possibly explain why we would be so inclined to buy aircraft which cost $188 million in Canada when they cost half that amount in other countries?
:
So eventually it will be answered. Thank you.
Colonel Burt, we saw an exchange of a lot of e-mails. You're becoming pretty public these days. I saw some in the newspaper, Le Devoir, and from CanWest, on a series of issues.
It's a bit troubling. We surely don't question your integrity. You have a great reputation. You're a man of integrity. You're one of our greatest experts on the requirements, and you clearly know how to deal with an SOR.
What's troubling me is what happened after the famous meeting on May 1 with General O'Connor.
You've been saying since the beginning, and starting on April 28, that the requirement for the strategic airlift was based on a certain weight, which is the 43,000 pounds. You were also talking about delivery dates. We all know the process of the strategic airlift took years and years, and it seems that within weeks we changed some of those requirements. Why was it amended on April 28, from your initial e-mail saying we should have a competition between the two companies?
I'm not biased. As a matter of fact, all I care about is that we have the best equipment. But because it's taxpayers' money, I'd like to make sure it is fair and well spent. We all agree on that.
By some intervention, it seems we changed the way the procurement was put together. We took out the A400M. That's a bit troubling, because perception sometimes is reality.
What happened after April 28? Something also happened between May 1 and June 13. I believe the integrity of the SOR was not necessarily honoured because we had some political intervention.
Would you please expand on that situation? I noticed some of the e-mails that Major Goulden, you, and the others talked about. What happened in the timeframe?
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to welcome everyone.
First off, I'd like to start by explaining to you why members of the Bloc Québécois called for this study. We had started work on Afghanistan, and after that, we wondered what other issue we could address. That is when we decided to study the procurement process.
I hope you share our opinion, in that Parliament, at this point, is not very involved in the decision-making process. I must admit that I've always been somewhat frustrated to see the astronomical amounts being spent. Indeed, an amount of approximately $20 billion has been announced.
In my opinion, parliamentarians need to take a critical look at this issue, because we're dealing with taxpayers' money. That is currently the philosophy which guides our committee and it has led us to undertake this study.
I also have a few questions to ask.
Last July 7, I was surprised to see that a number of contracts were already posted on the MERX's site. The C-17s, the Chinook and Hercules were there. However, when it came to the Hercules it was a letter of intent. I would imagine that is how the Department of Public Works and Government Services wants to proceed with the Hercules. What I was surprised by was the C-17s and the Chinooks, both platforms are produced by Boeing, and there were advanced contract notices out, for ACAN.
Finally, I even wrote an article published in Frontline; I hope you read it. I found this article quite interesting. I spent a lot of time writing it. I'd like to hear your comments once you've read it, if you have not already done so.
I believe we lose our bargaining leverage when we tell a company that it is the only company we want to deal with. Do you agree that it affects our bargaining power? From that point on, the company understands we will only do business with it. In that way, it can be stricter as to the time when it will manufacture the product, where it will be done and how it will be done. I think we're losing bargaining leverage.
I would like an answer to that first question.
:
Thank you for your question.
I agree that this is an important matter.
[English]
In fact, because of the dollar value associated with procurement, it demands a fair bit of attention from us. I'm quite pleased that we're looking at this subject. As we move forward, finding a way to deliver useful products to the men and women of the Canadian Forces in a very timely fashion, while meeting the needs of the taxpaying public, is a wonderful thing.
I can provide part of the answer, but once again I would defer to these gentlemen when it comes to the negotiating process. That is really their bailiwick.
With respect to ACAN, we set a requirement based on what our needs are and then we go out and have a look at what products are available. If it is found that in fact there is only one product likely to be able to meet our needs, this is when the government is inclined to use ACAN, the advance contract award notice process, so that we can move expeditiously.
All of the defence procurements that were announced are needed urgently in the Canadian Forces, which have tended to use a process that, while fair and equitable, moves quickly.
I have to say that with the arrival this summer of the first C-17, the process from announcement to delivery capability will be almost unprecedented. I am certainly delighted.
I would now ask my friends from PWGSC to respond to the second part of your question.
:
I believe, as Mr. Ross has said, this possibility exists. I've certainly not seen it, and certainly what we have here is a process. Let's just talk about airlift, because that's the one that seems to be the focus of attention.
We've had on the books for quite some time the requirement for a total airlift solution, both a strategic piece and a tactical piece. Depending upon the priorities of the military and of the government, we would then be able to address either all or part of it.
I was delighted when the resources were made available to address both parts of the airlift equation this time around, both the strategic and the tactical piece. Our strategic requirements are essentially fourfold. We want to be able to lift large amounts of material, for long distances, at rapid speeds, and to bring them right into where they're needed--those four pieces. And the air force doesn't do this in isolation. We work with the army, for instance, and ask, “What is the nature of the kind of equipment...over the next 10, 15, 20 years. What are the kinds of things you're going to need to move?”
I began in my opening presentation by talking about the high-level mandatory requirements. We've identified this as a way of expediting the procurement process. Instead of trying to identify every last little piece, we've identified a representative piece. A representative load for us was two light-armoured vehicles, two LAV IIIs. A representative distance for us was from here to Ramstein, Germany, because if you look at where we are in the world, an awful lot of what we think we're going to do over the next couple of years is either in the African domain or over in the Asian domain. To get there, it makes an awful lot of sense for us to hop first into Europe and then out of Europe into those domains.
:
Thanks very much, Mr. Chairperson.
I want to welcome each of you to committee, too, and as you can see by the questions from the opposition members on the committee, I think we all have some unease about the appearance of a sole-source contract, and I think all the questions are heading that way.
I have some specific questions about the C-17 and how this process has gone. I'm wondering when the change in lift size happened and exactly why, because for quite some time it was 43,000 pounds, and then suddenly it seemed to increase to more than double that.
I'm also curious about how high up in the chain was the involvement of the SOR, the statement of operational requirements, for the C-17. I wonder if you could answer that.
And my final question in that vein is this. Who initiated and who approved the national security exemption on this contract?
There might be a variety of people who can answer this question.
:
That's a good question. In fact, as I said, requirements are built into the system and they come up, but they're not really completed until they get to the top. In fact, it was before it got to me that we began to challenge the idea that it made a lot of sense for us to buy a strategic lifter that could only lift one LAV III.
We talked to the army. We looked at the kinds of scenarios that were unfolding for the future, and we identified that a more representative load for us to lift would in fact be two LAV IIIs, and the distance from Trenton to Ramstein would be a distance that we would want to do because the kinds of places in the world we're likely to go with this would require that as the first hop, that 3,500 miles.
That's some of the background. I have to say that for a while the file was not proceeding as quickly. When the new government came in, they identified this as one of their platforms. We began to work on the file a little more, so that was probably why, in that timeframe, you saw more work being done on it. And the challenge function caused that requirement to be put in better shape, because when I signed off on it, saying it needed to be able to lift two LAV IIIs, I was confident that this was in fact a load that a strategic lifter should be lifting, and the distance of the 3,500 nautical miles made perfect sense from my perspective.
We have I think a very good, solid requirement. The one that went forward has my complete endorsement as being the kind of thing that makes sense. Especially if you're going to have a strategic lifter and a tactical lifter, you want that strategic lifter to be able to lift the big loads, cover long distances quickly, and get into those destinations you want it to be able to.
:
I would like to point out, for the record, that after the Tsunami, there was no equipment-related problem, because in the course of 48 hours, once a political decision had been made, the Canadian Armed Forces were ready to go. So, it had nothing to do with the C-17, etc.
[English]
Two weeks was another issue. There was maybe some political bickering, but it had nothing to do with the equipment. We were supposed to do it. I was not in cabinet at that time, though.
General Lucas, you swear there was no intervention. We also know that the minister has the final say in writing on the requirements, so we can proceed with the rest of the process.
On May 1, Colonel Burt said there would be a meeting with the Minister of National Defence at 10 o'clock sharp.
There was some question about what is the CF vehicle that drives the weight, and at that time it was 43,000 pounds, and is this vehicle weight-limited, and so on. So you were discussing requirements with the minister.
On May 1, the final recommendation of Colonel Burt was as follows--he sent this to General Martin:
As you and I have discussed, tracked vehicles were not included on the understanding that they would not form part of a rapid reaction team. Do we still consider this valid in the context of recent DCP discussions? If a decision were taken to incl track vehicles, this would reduce contenders to one. I recommend we not incl the complexity of the ADATS in the Strat HLMC (and leave the HLMC as amended on 18 Apr);
So Colonel Burt's recommendation at that time was that we stick to the 43,000 pounds.
I would like to know, first, what was discussed with Minister O'Connor at that time, since there was some follow-up. On June 14, another e-mail says, “Bring us the latest version”, and this is at the exact moment that we changed the 43,000 pounds. So the payload was changed at that time.
What was the discussion? What was the decision? And why did we change a study of six years, the statement of operational requirements? Even in 2003, my colleague, the former Minister of National Defence, was sending a letter to the president and chief executive officer of Airbus saying that, “DND has completed its assessment of airlifters against its Statement of Operational Requirement, and the Airbus A400M has been found to be a fully satisfactory solution.”
Something happened. Perception is reality. I'd like to know what happened, since the experts, the ones who truly have all the expertise for the requirements, said we should stick to 43,000 pounds.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to speak this morning.
I'm also pleased that the committee can consider the issue of procurement, because I realize it has been a long time since the Canadian Armed Forces had assessed the tools they needed in order to accomplish their missions, be they rescue missions here or military and humanitarian missions abroad. I want to thank you for taking the time to meet with us and give us some explanations. The clarification is much appreciated.
I have flown on board a Hercules, from the host country to Kandahar. We felt like we were in a relatively safe vehicle, but as you explained, it is at the end of its life cycle and must be replaced. It is a tactical aircraft, as you explained. Many questions were also asked on strategic airlifters.
I remember one of your sentences, Mr. Lucas. You said more or less the following:
[English]
“I am happy to see that Canada is finally getting what it desperately needs.”
[Translation]
Finally, this morning, that is at the very heart of our discussion.
You clearly indicated that the only thing government did was, essentially, to make the resources available. You said so on two occasions since the beginning of your presentation. What is important is to know that the government's role is to make resources available so as to cover our area of jurisdiction at the federal level with respect to military equipment, rather than encroaching in other areas of jurisdiction.
We have learned, from the testimony we've heard, that there was a radical downsizing in Canadian aircraft fleet over the last decade, which not only jeopardized our ability to ensure our own sovereignty, but it made us vulnerable. That came across clearly.
So, what is embarrassing, is not necessarily to have started a procurement process, but rather the fact that we are doing it now, in 2007, when 18 out of 32 Hercules are still operational. I think it is important to stress that. I am also very open to the process we are undertaking.
We have seen that the military role is to define its needs. We really noticed that you do have the necessary skills to do so. The government's role is to make the resources available to the Department of National Defence. You mentioned defence policy and principles. We clearly see that you developed estimates based on performance.
This allows me to get back to what was saying. Mr. Bachand said that when he was young he had a Firebird. But needs change. When you have children and other needs, you sometimes have to set aside your Firebird in order to buy a minivan, which is more spacious. So there you are, needs change!
Perhaps that has something to do with income, Mr. Bachand.
Which leads me to my question. You mentioned that it was necessary to have the resources available. Can you tell us about the versatility of C-17s? You explained that it was a strategic airlifter, which travels long distances, but which can also be used for tactical purposes. You also mentioned that with respect to the Hercules, which is at the end of its life cycle, you may be able to do what you referred to as operational bridging, given the aircraft's versatility. I'd like to hear what you have to say on that, to start.
If there is any time left, Mr. Williston, could you tell me about Public Works and Government Services' role, because we will be hearing from departmental officials soon. So, I would like to get back to the role of PWGSC in the procurement process as well as on the issue of competition. How can we ensure competition in the procurement process once the needs have been defined with the Canadian Forces?
Mr. Lucas.
Unfortunately, my translation device has just died on me, but I believe I understood the intent of your question.
For the most part, the Canadian Forces are among the best in the world at deriving the last useful piece out of any piece of kit we have. So as in the case of our Hercules aircraft, for the most part the oldest of them will probably be too uneconomical to continue to work with.
That being said, there are times when, for reasons, we have some useful economic life left in aircraft. In many cases, we turn them over to Crown Assets Disposal for sale, and we have derived benefit from them. In some instances, we've been able to do that with helicopters. Or we find a different use for them. Some of the Griffin helicopters that we determined were surplus to our needs we have essentially turned over to the company that is now helping us with our helicopter training in Portage.
In most cases, the older equipment is pretty much dead by that point in time. Essentially, it's disposed of for the components; it's down to that level. In some cases, obviously with some limitations for some military equipment, it gets turned over to Crown Assets, and that revenue is returned to the Government of Canada.
:
Thank you for that opportunity, and I do apologize for it being a long response, but there is an amount of it.
What I was getting to there is that there is a period, in defining the requirements, when the requirements are in draft mode. And until the point when I actually bring the document to the Chief of the Air Staff for his signature and advance it through the department and to the minister, we have a period of refinement.
There are a number of things that we learn through that process. In this particular case, what was interesting for me, personally, through the period of May-June of last year, was that my section head, who was developing this requirement, fortunately got a posting to a flying job and he had to go relearn how to fly.
So I was dealing with a couple of majors in his section. I became much more intimately familiar with the statement of operational requirements, and I was asking some very pointed questions and was seeking some detailed answers.
In the case of the e-mails that have been referred to in the media, there are a couple of issues that are very important, and one has to do with accuracy. Regarding the one quote, which has been in the media, it took me some time to find that e-mail, because I was looking through my text e-mails. Then I realized that this was probably not from me; it was probably from somebody who wrote to me. And indeed, that's where I found the e-mail. It was from one of my staff who was giving me some of the details. And as I was describing earlier, the discussion was about track and wheel vehicles and whether we should be including the ADATS, which is the air defence anti-tank system, in our weight consideration.
The banter that has been referred to by other members around the table had to do with whether we would include the heavier track vehicles, what that could do to change the requirements, and whether that was an appropriate thing to do in terms of what we were dealing with at that time. We came to the conclusion that because the ADATS is actually of less weight than the LAV III, we would not change the wording of the high-level mandatory capabilities to include track vehicles. They would just be wheeled.
At some point later in the process, because of my personal responsibility, now, to be reviewing the SOR, I asked some specific questions about the guiding principles, specifically the guiding principle that had to do with being better than the current Airbus A-310, our Polaris aircraft. I asked how much weight that can carry over a distance of 3,500 nautical miles, and the answer was 2,800 metric tonnes. I said, well, we now have an inconsistency between that guiding principle and the high-level mandatory capability that states 19.5 metric tonnes.
We studied for a period of time what options we had to deal with that inconsistency, and we came to the conclusion that in order to get the best value for Canadians--the efficiencies I referred to earlier--and in order to provide the best long-term capability, the best representative load would be two LAV IIIs, which would leave our guiding principle as it stood. We would get something better than the current Polaris capability and provide better efficiencies and better value for Canadians and the Canadian Forces.
Because you're the man—and everybody said so—you're saying clearly here: “I recommend we not incl the complexity of the ADATS in the Strat HLMC”. You go on to say, “As discussed”, so you were expecting something that had happened. You also say, “certification and delivery time are expected to be the key discriminators”, meaning that at the end of the day, there won't be any competition; it's going to be between Boeing and itself, so Boeing will have the deal.
I have a few questions, but to finish that one, I want to know what happened with Minister O'Connor. When your department met with him on May 1, something happened. For all those years we stuck to 43,000 pounds. In a few days we changed it.
General Lucas, are you ready to deposit all the e-mails between May 1 and June 14, so we can have—because as I said, perception is reality—a clear way of knowing what happened at that time?
Regarding the other question, you said that the C-17 has to carry two combat-ready LAV III vehicles. Why does the requirement for the C-130Js not include the capability to carry one combat-ready LAV III? General Ross said that the 130J was a 90% solution. So I guess the LAV III is the 10% that's missing.
Anyway, let's talk first about the e-mails. What happened with the minister? What did the minister tell you?
Also if we have time, I'd like to hear from Public Works, because you're supposed to know how much money you have to spend. I fear the issue of the $188 million per plane for the C-130Js. If the Brits and the Australians have a better deal, why can't we have the same price?
So go for it.
:
General Lucas, Colonel Burt, Mr. Williston, thank you very much for being here. General Lucas and Colonel Burt, thank you for the service to our country that you do. We really appreciate it.
I have three questions, gentlemen.
The first concerns the Auroras. In my province of British Columbia, the Auroras are going to be mothballed and replaced with drones. The range of the two is very different. Could you explain to us how the drones are going to meet the capabilities of the Auroras, particularly since we've put a very large amount of money into upgrading the Auroras?
The second question relates to the C-17s. When we were in government, our proposal was to buy the tactical airlift, lease the strategic airlift, have the C-17s in Canada--have six of them, which we determined was the minimum amount to meet the requirements of the air force--and in doing that, we would save the taxpayer over $400 million. The Americans were in favour of this. We were in favour of this. It seemed like a wonderful partnership, good for the taxpayer, good for our Canadian Forces. I don't understand why the significant departure in moving in the direction we have.
My last question relates to the fixed-wing replacement for the Buffalo. It's my understanding that the minimum flight speed has been elevated to 140 knots. For our SAR techs to do contour surveillance in the mountains of British Columbia, the minimum flight speed is between 70 knots and 120 knots. So if the stall speed of the SOR is going to be above the flight speed required to do a visual search in the mountains, it seems to me we're opening the situation up to one that would put the lives of our SAR techs in danger. If it's true that the SOR for the minimum flight speed was raised, why was it raised?
Thank you.
:
I'll very briefly answer number one and number three, and then I need a little bit more explanation on number two.
Regarding the Aurora, it is our intent here to have an ISR--an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability in the future. The UAVs or drones, as you refer to them, are complementary to a manned system. They are not to replace the manned system. They will do certain things for us, and they do them very well, but they do not complete the range.
Among the options for Aurora that we're examining right now is a replacement aircraft with people on board, which will perform many of the functions the Aurora is performing right now. So just to relieve your thought that we're going to simply leave the job entirely to UAVs, that's not the case. UAV will be a complementary capability rather than a replacement capability.
With respect to fixed-wing search and rescue, first of all, we don't have an SOR out on the street yet. So that's one issue. The second thing is I don't believe that even in the draft or the version of the SOR that exists right now there is a minimum speed specified. I believe the document talks about the existing capability, and I believe there was a statement in there that did say up to 130 knots. After we examined that, we recognized that in fact it was referring to existing technology. The existing technology, the C-130, under certain weights actually can't fly at 130 knots. It has to fly a little faster, at 140 knots.
So in fact it wasn't a future specification; it was an explanation about what we have now, and it's strictly factual. One hundred and forty knots is in fact what the current aircraft is required to fly at under very heavy weights, but it's not a specification or a limitation. And, by the way, that SOR is not in, say, the C-17 or the Chinook or the C-130J, because we have yet to take it to a finalized state at this point in time.
:
Talking just about mobility, which would include strategic, tactical, and fixed-wing search and rescue, the most pressing need right now is in fact to replace the aging C-130s.
Now, that said, it is going to take us a number of years. Regardless of what occurs, the Lockheed factory, once under contract.... If in fact PWGSC goes through the process and is able to come to a reasonable conclusion that it's to the benefit of Canadian taxpayers, there will still be probably a two-year period, if not three-year, before these aircraft begin to arrive. So even though our need is great, there is going to be a period of time before those first aircraft can arrive.
With respect to strategic lift, through the good graces of the United States Air Force, who essentially allowed us to jump the queue and in fact gain access to aircraft that were initially identified to go south of the border, we've been able to accelerate that. And this makes sense to us. Even though the requirement for the C-130 is greater, this actually will be an enabler for us. This will allow us to make the transition from the old C-130s to the new C-130s in a much better way than we would have otherwise. This will allow us to pick up that requirement. We'll be able to do some of the missions into Afghanistan, for instance, with that aircraft. It's really going to be very helpful to us in meeting the need that exists right now as the older C-130s fall off-line.
So even though it looks a little funny, the fact that the C-17 is able to become available to us earlier in fact helps us with the problem we have of the older C-130.
Fixed-wing search and rescue is a priority for us, but there are mitigation measures there. There are still a number of hours left in the newer C-130s we have. And the Buffalo aircraft is still a very capable platform, but it does require some investment in it if we choose to go down that path.
We have a couple of options available to us. Once again, that comes down to a prioritization issue, but without doubt, the older C-130s are getting older faster. Two years ago we learned that instead of five years, we in fact only had about two and a half years to address the problem. Some information came late to us at that point in time, and that caused us to focus our attention on that particular problem.
:
I'm very pleased to have you here, Mr. Williston. I hope we'll be seeing you on February 20
th because Minister Fortier will be here. We'll be talking about the ISS
[English]
and we'll talk about ITAR, because there's a difference between the first-, second-, or third-line maintenance under ITAR. Of course, at Trenton we can maybe do the first-line maintenance, change the oil, put some gas in the tanks, and some windshield washer, but that's another issue, and ITAR is a major issue.
We will have a debate on that, but I want to come back to Colonel Burt
[Translation]
and to General Lucas.
It is true because I myself have been a minister. One is accountable before Cabinet and one wants to know how things work. One therefore asks questions and becomes more interested. I was not minister of Defence but if I had been, I would certainly have wanted to know how the process works. I would set directions and I would make sure that the experts were doing their work in terms of the criteria that apply to the equipment that we need. Of course we have to help and support the Canadian Forces. I might also have an electoral platform and I would want to make sure that we have these aircraft.
You stated that ministers are particularly involved in their party's and their government's priorities, and that is true. General O'Connor is most certainly interested in strategic airlifter.
[English]
Colonel Burt, you've mentioned there was a refinement process. It was done and concluded on June 14. You sent e-mails to the chain of command, but there was a meeting on May 1 with the Minister of Defence. And when you look at no matter what refinement we're talking about, for the last six years, every time we talked about specific requirements regarding the weight lift at the platform, it was 43,000 pounds. So somebody said something to somebody.
I want to know if it would have been better, for the sake of perception, to have had a meeting with the minister after the refinement process had been done, because if he had been there on May 1 and he had asked the expert, because of what you mentioned, and you're the one, and that your recommendation was to keep the 43,000 pounds, what happened? Why did it change in due course?
And finally, Mr. Williston, please let's talk about the C-130Js. We spoke about the C-17s, but let's talk about the C-130Js and the $888 million per plane.
General.