Introduction

On 10 May 2023, the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (the Committee) received the following order of reference from the House of Commons:

That the prima facie contempt concerning the intimidation campaign orchestrated by Wei Zhao against the Member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other Members be referred to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

On 16 May 2023, the Committee commenced its study. That day, it also agreed to a motion that included, among other things, that in relation to its 10 May 2023 order of reference, the Committee:

[M]ake use, for the purposes of this study, of the evidence received during its study on foreign election interference, without limiting the witnesses who may be called.

Further, at the Committee’s Meeting 87, which spanned three separate calendar days (26 September 2023, 28 September 2023, and 5 October 2023), the Committee agreed to a motion that expanded its study. In particular, it agreed to:

[E]xpand the scope of this study, further to the Speaker’s ruling of Wednesday, May 31, 2023, and the evidence of the Acting Clerk of the House on Thursday, June 8, 2023, to include the matters raised in the House by the Honourable Erin O’Toole on Tuesday, May 30, 2023.^[1]

During its study, the Committee heard from 35 witnesses during 14 meetings. The Committee wishes to thank all of the witnesses for contributing their testimony to this study. The Committee reserves a special thank you to those witnesses who have endured intimidation efforts by foreign states but who, in the face of potential reprisals, nonetheless came forward and shared their experiences and perspectives.

Lastly, the Committee notes that on 7 September 2023, the Government of Canada established the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions. The Public Inquiry will be led by Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, who was appointed its Commissioner.^[2] Under the terms of the Orders in Council that established the Commission and the deadlines for the completion of its work, the Commissioner must be given access to certain confidential cabinet documents, and the Commission is required to submit two reports: an interim report by 3 May 2024 and a final report by 31 December 2024.

Background

A. The Speaker’s 8 May 2023 Ruling Regarding the Honourable Michael Chong, P.C., M.P.’s Question of Privilege

On 8 May 2023, the Speaker of the House of Commons ruled on the question of privilege raised by the Honourable Michael Chong, P.C., the member for Wellington—Halton Hills. Mr. Chong raised his question of privilege in the House on 2 May 2023, concerning alleged intimidation against him and his family by the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC).^[3]

Mr. Chong told the House that he had learned from a newspaper article, published in the Globe and Mail on 1 May 2023, that he and his family had been the subject of acts of intimidation carried out by Mr. Wei Zhao, a diplomat representing the PRC in Canada. The article stated that acts of intimidation on the part of Mr. Zhao came as a reprisal against Mr. Chong for having moved a motion on 18 February 2021^[4] regarding the recognition of a genocide carried out by the PRC against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims living in China.

Mr. Chong asserted that the alleged acts carried out by Mr. Zhao constituted intimidation against him as a member of the House and interfered with its proceedings, both of which, in his view, amounted to breaches of House privileges.

The Speaker’s ruling addressed the following three points about Mr. Chong’s question of privilege:

• Mr. Chong had raised his question of privilege in a reasonably timely manner.
• The contention that the alleged intimidation carried out by Mr. Zhao has not been corroborated and may have occurred outside of Canada was, in the Speaker’s view, immaterial in his making a prima facie finding. The Speaker ruled that, at this stage, the matter appeared serious enough to warrant priority of debate.
• The right possessed by Canada’s parliamentarians to carry out their parliamentary work free from obstruction, interference, intimidation and molestation, was constitutionally founded and recognized by procedural precedent in the House.

As such, the Speaker concluded that, in his view, the matter raised by Mr. Chong was serious enough to take priority of debate over all other parliamentary proceedings. The Speaker stated that a foreign entity, which attempted to intervene in the conduct of the House’s proceedings through a retaliatory scheme targeting a member and his family, squarely touched upon the privileges and immunities that underpin the House’s collective ability to carry out its parliamentary duties unimpeded.

B. The Speaker’s Ruling Made on 31 May 2023 Regarding the Honourable Erin O’Toole, P.C., M.P.’s Question of Privilege

On 31 May 2023, the Speaker ruled on a question of privilege raised in the House, on 30 May 2023, by the Honourable Erin O’Toole, P.C., the member for Durham.^[5] Mr. O’Toole alleged that PRC officials and agents had been carrying out an ongoing campaign of foreign interference against him, which dated back to the 43^rd Parliament (i.e., from December 2019 to August 2021). Mr. O’Toole stated that his question of privilege was distinct from Mr. Chong’s because the PRC campaign carried out against him was not related to a single event (i.e., the opposition motion of 18 February 2021). Further, Mr. O’Toole indicated that the alleged interference was carried out on such a large scale that it violated not only his privileges, but those of many more members of the House.

In his ruling, the Speaker stated that the points raised by Mr. O’Toole were extremely serious. He agreed that they needed to be addressed properly. However, the Speaker noted that in his finding of a prima facie case of privilege on 8 May 2023, his ruling referred to actions taken against a member by a “foreign entity,” rather than the actions taken by “one specific individual” against a member.^[6]

As such, the Speaker stated that he believed the appropriate forum for further discussion on Mr. O’Toole’s question of privilege was the Committee, which had already been instructed to investigate the matter of foreign interference. He invited Mr. O’Toole, and any other member impacted, to make representations to the Committee, as part of its study on the intimidation campaign carried out by the PRC against certain members.^[7]

C. Parliamentary Privilege in Canada and Members’ Right to Freedom From Obstruction, Interference, Intimidation and Molestation

Canada’s Parliament and its members possess rights, immunities and privileges, collectively referred to as parliamentary privilege, which have been claimed over centuries of parliamentary tradition. These exist to assure the institution and its members have the necessary independence to perform their constitutional functions without outside interference.

In Canada, parliamentary privilege is rooted in the preamble and section 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and is further claimed in section 4 of the Parliament of Canada Act. Through these measures, both houses of Canada’s Parliament, and the members of these houses, have claimed the parliamentary privileges enjoyed by the U.K. House of Commons at the time of Confederation, as well as certain privileges that were established since that time.

There is a recognized list of rights and immunities, under parliamentary privilege, that is possessed by the House as a collectivity and members individually. Among the rights possessed by members is their right to go about their parliamentary duties undisturbed, free from threats, intimidation, interference and any other form of obstruction.

This privilege has been clearly and repeatedly confirmed by parliamentary authorities. According to House of Commons Procedure and Practice:

Assaulting, threatening, or insulting a Member during a proceeding of Parliament, or while the Member is circulating within the Parliamentary Precinct, is a violation of the rights of Parliament. Any form of intimidation of a Member with respect to the Member’s actions during a proceeding in Parliament could amount to contempt.^[8]

According to Maingot’s Parliamentary Privilege in Canada:

Members are entitled to go about their parliamentary business undisturbed. The assaulting, menacing, or insulting of any Member on the floor of the House or while he is coming or going to or from the House, or on account of his behaviour during a proceeding in Parliament, is a violation of the rights of Parliament. Any form of intimidation […] of a person for or on account of his behaviour during a proceeding in Parliament could amount to contempt.^[9]

While an enumerated list of rights and privileges exists under parliamentary privilege, there is no exhaustive list of what constitutes a contempt of Parliament. To that end, “the House may consider any misconduct to be contempt and may deal with it accordingly.”^[10]

With respect to past Speakers’ rulings, examples include 19 September 1973, when Speaker Lamoureux affirmed in the House of Commons that the “principle that parliamentary privilege includes the right of a member to discharge his responsibilities as a member of the House free from threats or attempts at intimidation.”^[11]

Further, attempts by improper means to influence or obstruct members in carrying out duties directly connected to their parliamentary work could constitute a finding of contempt by the House. The decision on what constitutes “improper means” depends on the facts of each individual case.^[12]

D. Role of Various Agencies With Regard to Foreign Interference

On 30 January 2019, the federal government announced an action plan to safeguard Canada’s elections and democratic institutions in anticipation of the October general election that same year. Since then, elements of the plan have been evaluated, and measures have been improved and renewed for subsequent elections. The plan has four pillars of action:

• enhancing citizen preparedness;
• improving organizational readiness;
• combatting foreign interference; and
• building a safe information ecosystem.

The third pillar includes:

• establishment of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, which seeks to prevent and pre-empt “covert, clandestine or criminal” activities from influencing the electoral process;
• implementation of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, an initiative to “strengthen coordination across the G7 in identifying, preventing and responding to threats” to the democratic processes of G7 democracies; and
• cooperation with various partners from academia, industry and civil society to identify foreign threats to electoral processes.

Several security and intelligence organizations share responsibility for threats to Canada’s democratic institutions. The roles and activities of the partners that make up the task force are outlined in Table 1.

Table 1—Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force—Partner Roles

Source: Table prepared by the Library of Parliament using information obtained from Government of Canada, Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force.

E. Documents and Other Matters Referred to in the Committee’s Report

This section contains explanatory information about particular documents, reports, and other matters, which came up during the course of its study and appear in this report.

The May 2021 Canadian Security Intelligence Service information management note: The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has developed a process for producing a specific type of document for when it has remarked that a matter of high importance has occurred and needs to be brought to the attention of, at a minimum, the Department of Public Safety and the Privy Council Office. This type of document was referred to by witnesses as an “information management note” (IMU). IMUs are sent to individuals within the recipient departments, who are able to access, print and pass along IMUs.^[13]

According to the First Report - The Right Honourable David Johnston Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference, the May 2021 CSIS IMU noted that CSIS had intelligence about the PRC intending to target Mr. Chong and another member of the House of Commons, along with any of their family in China. Further, the First Report noted that:

• CSIS intended to provide Mr. Chong and the other member of Parliament with a defensive briefing;
• the May 2021 CSIS IMU was sent to the then Minister of Public Safety, his Chief of Staff, and his Deputy Minister, although neither the Minister, nor his Chief of Staff received the IMU; and
• the IMU was provided for the then Minister’s information and did not recommend any particular action or ask for any direction from the Minister.^[14]

The 20 July 2021 CSIS intelligence assessment: CSIS produces intelligence reports that contain analysis, as opposed to raw intelligence, on the intelligence available about a specific topic.^[15] This type of report was referred to by witnesses as an “intelligence assessment.” These are shared with the Department of Public Safety, who then curates them for examination by the minister. However, it is for the department to decide what information the minister will have access to.^[16]

In respect of the 20 July 2021 CSIS intelligence assessment, the Committee heard that its purpose was to raise awareness on the topics it covered but was not intended to spur any action by those who read it. Further, the report did not contain the name of any member of the House of Commons.^[17]

June 2017 Privy Council Office memorandum: Within the Privy Council Office (PCO), the national security and intelligence advisor’s team drafts memoranda in instances where “enough factors have come into play, making it essential for the Prime Minister to be informed or for recommendations to be made.”^[18]

In respect of the June 2017 Privy Council Office memorandum, the Committee heard that it was drafted by Daniel Jean, the then National Security and Intelligence Advisor. He noted to the Committee that this memorandum had earlier drafts and a final version. He recalled that the reason it was written was that his office was increasingly concerned about “all kinds of foreign interference activities” being engaged in by the PRC. Further, the 2016 U.S. election had, at that time, recently occurred during which the matter of cyber foreign interference emerged as topic of concern.^[19]

Canada declared Zhao Wei persona non grata:^[20] On 8 May 2023, the Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued a statement which indicated that Zhao Wei was declared a persona non grata in Canada. The statement noted that:

• Canada will not tolerate any form of foreign interference in the country’s internal affairs;
• diplomats in Canada had been warned that if they engaged in this type of behaviour, they would be sent home; and
• this decision had been taken after careful consideration of all factors at play.

Evidence

A. Appearance of Members of the House of Commons Who Raised the Questions of Privilege

1.     Appearance of the Honourable Michael Chong, P.C., M.P.

a) Chronology of Events as Stated by Mr. Chong

Mr. Chong told the Committee that on 24 June 2021, he received a briefing, which was general in nature, from CSIS about foreign interference threat activities. He indicated that the briefing gave him helpful information about the tactics used by authoritarian states, like the PRC, and that all members of the House could benefit from such a briefing. He noted that no mention was made at the briefing about Wei Zhao, a consular officer for the PRC who was posted in the Chinese Consulate General in Toronto.^[21]

Mr. Chong stated that he met with CSIS on three occasions (5 August 2021, 25 February 2022 and 18 July 2022) in the 13 months following the initial briefing to provide information about threats or threat activities aimed at him that he believed were carried out by the PRC.^[22]

Mr. Chong stated that he first learned that Mr. Zhao was collecting information on his family from a 1 May 2023 Globe and Mail newspaper article. In it, the article stated that Mr. Zhao’s purpose in collecting this information was to potentially use it in the future to sanction and put pressure on Mr. Chong and other members of the House of Commons, in respect of debates going on in the House.^[23]

Lastly, Mr. Chong indicated that on 2 May 2023, David Vigneault, Director, CSIS, told him that Mr. Zhao was involved in gathering information about him.^[24]

b) Impact on the Member of the PRC Intimidation Campaign

Mr. Chong told the Committee that the threats and intimidation campaign carried out against him, which he believed were related to the PRC, had resulted in a trying time for himself and his family in Canada.^[25] He told the Committee that he did not want to share the specific threats that were directed at him for the past several years.

With respect to his family living in Hong Kong, he noted that he had deliberately decided, long ago, not to communicate with them, out of an abundance of caution. He stated that that many Canadians with family who live in authoritarian states face similar situations. Further, Mr. Chong stated that his case was but one of many in which Canadians have suffered in silence after having been threatened on Canadian soil by agents acting on behalf of authoritarian governments.^[26] He noted that, for too long, Canada’s government has not taken action to defend these Canadians.

He noted that he hoped that real change will result from the intimidation campaign carried out against him, and that Canada’s national security and intelligence will be strengthened to better protect its citizens and institutions.

c) Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

In his testimony, Mr. Chong provided the Committee with his viewpoints on a range of topics related to the operation of Canada’s national security and intelligence system.

Mr. Chong stated that the unauthorized release of intelligence to the media was, in his view, injurious to Canada’s national security and diminished the Five Eyes Alliance’s^[27] confidence in the security of Canada’s intelligence.

However, he told the Committee that, in his view, such releases would not have happened in a national security and intelligence system that was functioning properly. He criticized Canada’s government for not releasing information in a controlled and timely manner to Parliament or its committees.^[28] He noted that in the United Kingdom and the United States, a long history existed of security officials briefing legislators on highly sensitive national security and intelligence issues. He stated that legislators were responsible and effective in how such information was shared and used.

Mr. Chong indicated that, in his view, the failures of Canada’s national security and intelligence system were the sole responsibility of the head of government (i.e., the Rt. Honourable Justin Trudeau). He stated that in the Privy Council Office document entitled Open and Accountable Government, the sole individual responsible for the machinery of government is the Prime Minister.

As such, if Mr. Trudeau did not know about Mr. Chong’s case, then, according to Mr. Chong, this meant that there was a breakdown in the machinery of government for which Mr. Trudeau is responsible. Mr. Chong found it inexplicable that the government had information about his case but did not act.^[29]

With respect to intelligence products produced by CSIS, Mr. Chong indicated that it was his understanding that CSIS transmits these products to 17 national security points within the federal government’s departments and agencies, including the PCO. He told the Committee that this transmission system has a record tracking system.^[30] In his view, it was important to clarify who had been in receipt of the 20 July 2021 CSIS intelligence assessment, in order to ascertain where systemic problems within the government exist and must be addressed.

With respect to Mr. Zhao, Mr. Chong stated that the Globe and Mail newspaper article indicated that CSIS had “a significant intelligence file on this individual” upon his arrival in Canada in 2018.^[31] Further, the article stated that Global Affairs Canada knew for three years that Mr. Zhao was targeting Mr. Chong and other members of the House.

In Mr. Chong’s view, the government should use every tool at its disposal to combat foreign election interference. He stated that expelling one diplomat was “pointless” when considering the overall issue of foreign interference.^[32] He noted that Canada’s democratic allies have been much more willing to expel diplomats of authoritarian states where their conduct runs counter to their diplomatic or consular status.

d) Foreign Election Interference in Past Federal and Provincial Ministries

In response to a question asked about foreign interference during the ministry of the Rt. Honourable Stephen Harper, Mr. Chong provided the Committee with his recollection of previous instances of foreign interference in Canadian elections. Mr. Chong stated that he recalled that under Mr. Harper’s ministry, CSIS had been authorized to brief the provincial governments in Ontario under former Premiers Dalton McGuinty and Kathleen Wynne on foreign interference threat activities.^[33]

Mr. Chong also noted that information provided about foreign interference from the then National Security advisor, Richard Fadden, during Mr. Harper’s ministry “should have been relayed to the [then] prime minister, but I do know that action was taken on that foreign interference because it was a bit of a controversy at the time.”^[34]

Further, Mr. Chong explained that, in his view, the nature of the PRC changed significantly around the time when the President of the PRC, Xi Jinping, assumed a second term in power, in March 2018. Mr. Chong stated that:

[t]he form and the nature of President Xi became much clearer, and it became clearer that this was a much more authoritarian state that was using foreign interference threat activities as a way to promulgate its authoritarian model of governance around the world and to defend its interests.^[35]

e) Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

Mr. Chong provided the Committee with the following recommendations for its consideration:^[36]

• That Mr. Zhao be censured by the House of Commons for his foreign interference threat activities targeting a Canadian member of Parliament.
• That the Committee obtain the documents and track records related to the 20 July 2021 CSIS intelligence assessment entitled People’s Republic of China Foreign Interference in Canada: A Critical National Security Threat.
• That CSIS inform individual members of the House of Commons directly about specific, detailed foreign interference threat activities targeting them and their family. Such briefings should include information on the identity of the persons involved in the threat activity.
• That CSIS inform the Speaker of the House of Commons about the identity of any persons in Canada involved in foreign interference threat activities targeting members of the House and their families. The Speaker would then, in turn, inform all members of the House of the identity of these persons. Mr. Chong noted that, in 2022, the Speaker of the United Kingdom’s House of Commons was informed by MI5 about an agent of the PRC who was engaged in foreign interference threat activities, and that the Speaker subsequently notified all members of the House via email about this individual.
• That the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) be made into a joint parliamentary committee, similar to of the U.K. and the U.S.
• That the government introduce legislation creating a registry for foreign agents.
• That the government commit to holding a public inquiry focused on PRC foreign interference threat activities.
• That the government undertake a national security review as soon as possible.

Mr. Chong also noted to the Committee that the definitions of foreign interference in the Security of Information Act and in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (CSIS Act) are different from each other and need to be reconciled. Similarly, he stated that the security community's definition of foreign interference needed to be reconciled with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP) differing definition.

Further, Mr. Chong stated that it was important to ensure that the RCMP has the resources it needs to prosecute foreign interference and espionage. He indicated that there was a whole range of things that should have previously been done to protect Canadians from foreign interference and espionage.^[37]

2.     Appearance of the Honourable Erin O’Toole, P.C., former M.P.

a) Defining Foreign Interference Threats and Motives

The Honourable Erin O’Toole, former leader of the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) (August 2020 to February 2022), former member for Durham, defined foreign interference by using the definition given by Richard Fadden, the former director of CSIS, during a parliamentary committee appearance in 2010. That is, foreign interference was an attempt by agents of a foreign state to influence the opinions, views, and decisions of Canadians with the aim to obtaining a political, policy, or economic advantage.^[38]

Mr. O’Toole noted that Canada is a diverse and free country. At the same time, he held concerns that the diversity and freedom of Canada could be “turned against us in this age of unprecedented disruption, misinformation and geopolitical realignment.”^[39] In his view, Canada needs to take a serious, non-partisan approach to dealing with foreign interference.

b)    Threat and Intimidation Campaign Against Mr. O’Toole

Mr. O’Toole briefed the Committee on the four types of threats identified by CSIS and carried out against him by the PRC. He noted that he would not discuss them in further detail so as not to disclose elements that could undermine Canada’s intelligence-gathering efforts. These threats were:^[40]

• foreign funding was used to undermine his electoral prospects, and those of the CPC, the party for which he was the leader;
• people were used on the ground in Canada through the United Front Work Department;
• foreign controlled and directed social media messaging was used to spread disinformation to electors using foreign-language channels like WeChat; and
• efforts were made by the PRC to suppress voting in one electoral constituency in Canada.

Mr. O’Toole stated that the PRC had targeted him. Further, he noted that the usage of the term target can mean observation or tracking, rather than having a more aggressive meaning. He stated that either form of being targeted was equally concerning. He was also advised that the concerns he previously raised about the PRC means he will continue to be targeted by that regime.

In response to questions about how being a PRC target had impeded his ability to carry out his parliamentary functions, Mr. O’Toole stated that it was important for each member of the House to have the right to freedom of expression, without limits.^[41] He stated that every member:

deserves the ability to make the decision themselves on whether they would exercise their privilege as a member. I was always trying to put the public good and what was best for Canada first, but I believe every member is entitled to make that decision, and if there was a dossier on a member, I believe it’s a breach of his or her privilege for them not to be aware of it at the moment it comes to the attention of the responsible minister.^[42]

c)     Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Mr. O’Toole provided the Committee with his perspectives on several aspects of Canada’s security and intelligence system and community. Among these, were that:

• The breakdown in the machinery of government whereby neither he, Mr. Chong, nor Jenny Kwan, the member for Vancouver East, was briefed about being a target of the PRC amounted to one of the “largest breakdowns of accountability with respect to sensitive intelligence and members of Parliament that I’m aware of.”^[43]
• He wanted Prime Minister Trudeau to take “some more responsibility” and be accountable for this breakdown. Further, Mr. Trudeau should have responded to the more aggressive style of conduct of the PRC post-2017. In his view, that the public is learning years later about matters he believes Mr. Trudeau was briefed on should trouble Canadians.^[44]
• The Report on the assessment of the 2021 Critical Election Incident Public Protocol had numerous important flaws, such that he viewed it to be “a colossal failure.” These flaws included that its author, Morris Rosenberg, did not speak with any of himself, either of his two security-cleared designated officials, or Kenny Chiu, the former member for Steveston—Richmond East made “his report completely incomplete to a point of professionally negligent in my view.” Mr. O’Toole also considered the timing of the release of the report, which was made public less than two weeks after the appearance of the Globe and Mail article about foreign interference, to be very suspicious.^[45]
• The conduct of the panel of five senior public servants needed to be examined because foreign interference incidents that had occurred in 2019 had, in his view, met a threshold for telling political parties at the start of the 2021 election about the current risks in the environment. In his view, not informing the parties was an error. Instead, Mr. O’Toole stated that he and the CPC were led to believe that there were no serious problems with the 2019 federal general election.^[46] He also noted that concerns that he and the CPC raised with security and intelligence officials were dismissed.^[47]
• Jody Thomas, National Security and Intelligence Advisor, told the Committee that the CPC was “given a robust response to our concerns, that was incorrect. She never sent the letter to us.”^[48]
• Mr. Blair, whom he described as a “key minister of the Crown” was “not checking emails, not reading intelligence briefs.”^[49]
• The Rt. Honourable David Johnston, Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference, whom Mr. O’Toole has profound respect for, “really disappointed me.” Mr. O’Toole stated that during his meeting with Mr. Johnston, he was told that the draft of Mr. Johnston’s report was written and was being translated. As such, Mr. O’Toole felt like his meeting with Mr. Johnston “was like I was a checkbox on a list.” Further, Mr. O’Toole stated that, in his view, Mr. Johnston only received a partial intelligence briefing, and that the outcome of his report was predetermined.^[50]

d)    Observations About the People’s Republic of China

Mr. O’Toole indicated that Canada’s relations with China had

always been a challenge for Liberal and Conservative governments alike because the economic opportunities were so important and that meant there would be a risk that some of the conduct of China at home and abroad might be ignored.^[51]

He employed the metaphor of Canada being like a frog in a pot of boiling water. Multiple governments, of both stripes, had ignored warnings from Canada’s intelligence agencies about the heat in the water from China. In his view, Canada has been waking up to the heat in the last few years.

Mr. O’Toole recalled that in his first year as a member of the House, he spoke about China for the first time in a debate on counterfeit goods. At that time, he stated that all political parties knew of the risks with China, but the importance of economic relations with China took priority.^[52]

He stated that his approach to viewing Canada’s relations with the PRC has always been one that is serious and non-partisan. He indicated that this was reflected in his 2019 motion to create the special committee on Canada-China relations. He viewed his motion as advocating for a chance to pause and reset Canada’s interests and values with respect to its relationship with China. He told the Committee that his motion was the result of “many years of questions about the handling of this relationship by Prime Minister Trudeau.”^[53]

e)     Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference

Mr. O’Toole told the Committee that he wished to raise some questions for the potential consideration by Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, who was tasked with leading a public inquiry into foreign interference. These questions were:^[54]

• If CSIS had flagged concerns about a senior Ontario Liberal party elected official for review in 2010, why did it take Minister Blair four months to authorize a CSIS warrant for this same person in 2021?
• Why did Mr. Rosenberg, who was selected by Mr. Trudeau and the PCO to perform an assessment on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, not interview the Conservative leader or its campaign chair who was his designated and security-cleared representative?
• Who made the decision to say that there was no significant cause for concern in the 2021 election? This given that the public now knows: that there were intelligence reports involving clandestine funding by China in the 2019 election; that there were multiple intelligence briefings to Mr. Trudeau in 2021; that there was a threat assessment involving a Chinese embassy official and the family of Mr. Chong just before the 2021 election; and that other members of the House were targeted and that NSICOP had reported in 2019.

f)      Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

Mr. O’Toole provided several potential recommendations about foreign interference for the Committee’s consideration. These were:^[55]

• establish a foreign agent registry, like Canada’s allies;
• create a mechanism for foreign interference risks to be outlined to members of Parliament; and
• ensure there is a mechanism to flag threats made by foreign states to Canadian parliamentarians, inform the parliamentarian of the threat, and equip and protect parliamentarians.

B. Appearance of Cabinet Ministers

1.     Appearance of the Honourable Bill Blair, P.C., M.P., Minister of Emergency Preparedness

The Honourable Bill Blair, P.C., M.P., Minister of Emergency Preparedness (October 2021 to July 2023) appeared before the Committee twice during this study. The first time (on 1 June 2023) he was the Minister of Emergency Preparedness, while the second (on 23 October 2023) he was the Minister of National Defence.

a)     Observations on the Question of Privilege Related to the Intimidation Campaign Against the Member for Wellington—Halton Hills and Other Members

At his first appearance, Mr. Blair underscored his belief that no parliamentarian or their family should be threatened for advocating their beliefs.^[56]

Mr. Blair explained that he only learned about the possible threats against Mr. Chong when The Globe and Mail published its report on 1 May 2023.^[57] He stressed that had he been briefed about a threat of violence towards an individual parliamentarian he would have quickly referred the matter to law enforcement.^[58]

Mr. Blair noted that CSIS had expressed concern that members of the House may be subjected to foreign interference.^[59] He had a number of discussions with the director of CSIS on this issue, and specifically activities by the PRC, but at no time was he informed that any particular member of the House was being targeted.^[60] Upon learning that there were possible threats of foreign interference, he asked CSIS to provide targeted parliamentarians with awareness briefings.^[61]

Mr. Blair explained that CSIS did not communicate with him or his office through email. Instead, CSIS would either brief him in person at a secure location, or they would send information to a secure terminal.^[62] Information sent through the secure terminal would then be printed and given to Mr. Blair.^[63]

Mr. Blair explained that he never saw the May 2021 information management note (IMU) regarding possible threats against Mr. Chong and his family.^[64] He understands that CSIS authorized the IMU to be shown to him, but he never received it. Mr. Blair also noted that CSIS never provided a brief on the issue.^[65] He told the Committee that if had been made aware of a threat against Mr. Chong, or any member, he would have called the police and taken steps to protect them.^[66]

At his second appearance, Mr. Blair reaffirmed much of what he shared during his first appearance. In particular, he stated unequivocally that he never saw the IMU mentioning potential threats against Mr. Chong, which was sent to a secure terminal. He further explained that neither he, nor any members of his staff, had log-in credentials to access the secured terminal, which was located in an office at the Department of Public Safety.^[67] Mr. Blair explained that neither CSIS nor the Department of Public Safety took steps to make him aware of the IMU.^[68]

b)    Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

During his first appearance, Mr. Blair explained that intelligence can take many forms. He noted that CSIS is responsible for collecting intelligence, determining its credibility, and deciding whether that intelligence requires action from the government.^[69] Mr. Blair noted that he can only act on information that is shared with him.^[70]

From Mr. Blair’s perspective, while transparency within the intelligence system is very important, to protect information and people it is not always possible.^[71]

Soon after Mr. Blair became Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, COVID-19 was declared a pandemic. Mr. Blair explained that during the ensuing years there was “an observable increase in activity from hostile foreign actors attempting to interfere with Canada’s national interests.”^[72]

Mr. Blair was asked about reports that he took four months to approve a warrant request from CSIS to conduct surveillance on Michael Chan, former member of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Mr. Blair explained that he took an oath not to discuss the details of these proceedings but noted that reports that it took him four months to approve the warrant are fundamentally incorrect.^[73]

During his second appearance, Mr. Blair highlighted that Canada’s intelligence system collects and holds enormous amounts of information.^[74] From his perspective, the role of an intelligence officer is to analyze the credibility of a source and determine what is happening to better inform action.^[75]

c)     Measures Taken to Counter Foreign Interference Threats in Democratic Processes

In his first appearance, Mr. Blair highlighted some of the work the government has done to combat foreign interference. This includes:

• The establishment of NSICOP to provide parliamentarians with insight into the intelligence that is collected and the resulting actions.^[76]
• Set aside $48.9 million in Budget 2023 for the RCMP to strengthen its capacity to protect Canadians from hostile foreign actors.^[77]
• Set aside $13.5 million in Budget 2023 to establish a national counter-foreign interference office at Public Safety Canada.^[78]
• Holding consultations to create a foreign interference transparency registry.^[79]

Additionally, in December 2020, Mr. Blair sent every member of Parliament a letter outlining political interference by the PRC. This letter was also tabled in Parliament and posted online (see Appendix A).^[80]

In his second appearance, Mr. Blair told the Committee that since his previous appearance, the Prime Minister created a new cabinet committee, the National Security Council, whose purpose is to routinely brief members on top secret and classified material.^[81]

d)    Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

During his first appearance, Mr. Blair noted that the CSIS Act, which was written in 1984, is due to be modernized to account for current and emerging challenges.^[82] Further, at his appearance on 24 October 2023, he stated that Canada would benefit from a foreign agent registry and that this measure would help protect country’s interests.^[83]

2.     Appearance of the Honourable Marco Mendicino, P.C., M.P., the Then Minister of Public Safety

a)     Defining Foreign Interference Threats and Motives

During his opening remarks, the Honourable Marco Mendicino, P.C., M.P., the then Minister of Public Safety (October 2021 to July 2023), indicated to the Committee that foreign hostile actors were continuing to undermine Canada’s national interests and threaten its security. Among these hostile actors were the Russian Federation, the PRC, and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

b)    Measures Taken to Counter Foreign Interference Threats in Democratic Processes

Mr. Mendicino told the Committee that the government has a four pillared plan to combat foreign interference. These pillars are prevention, protection, accountability and transparency.^[84]

In respect of prevention, Mr. Mendicino called the Committee’s attention to the Digital Citizen Initiative, a program that works to develop “citizen resilience to foreign interference and online disinformation and by establishing partnerships to support a healthy information ecosystem.”^[85] He noted that under this program, the Canadian Digital Media Research Network was conducting activities to help Canadians become more resilient and to think critically about the information they consume online. Further, he noted that, in 2020, the Honourable Bill Blair, in his capacity as Minister of Public Safety, had issued a letter to all parliamentarians providing them with information and supporting resources. Also, CSIS continues to provide protective briefings to parliamentarians.

In respect of protection, Mr. Mendicino referred to a budgetary increase of $48.9 million for the RCMP earmarked to help “protect Canadians from harassment and intimidation by foreign actors, to increase its investigative capacity and to proactively support communities most at risk of being targeted.” Further, he noted that his department was working with the Sergeant-at-Arms and the Parliamentary Protective Service (PPS) to provide more security for parliamentarians and their staff, and that his department had recently established a new national counter-foreign interference coordinator.

In respect of holding hostile actors more accountable, Mr. Mendicino noted that the RCMP had reported shutting down all of the PRC’s unofficial and illegal foreign police stations opened in Canada, and launching over 100 investigations into the matter. Further, he reminded committee members that the Honourable Mélanie Joly, P.C., M.P., Minister of Foreign Affairs, had expelled Mr. Zhao from Canada and was “implementing a system of sanctions against the Iranian regime.”^[86] Also, he noted that the government was pursuing the creation of a foreign influence transparency registry.

In respect of transparency, Mr. Mendicino reiterated that his department had created a national counter-foreign interference coordinator, along with its work on a foreign influence transparency registry. Further, he highlighted the work of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, the NSIRA, and the work completed by the Rt. Honourable David Johnston, Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference, in his first report. Mr. Mendicino told the Committee that the government and Canada’s national security agencies “being more open than ever about the threats we are facing is the best way to protect and strengthen our democracy.”^[87]

c)     Unofficial and Illegal Foreign Police Stations Opened in Canada and the May 2021 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Issues Management Brief

During Mr. Mendicino’s appearance, some members of the Committee raised questions about two separate matters: first, statements that he had made about foreign police stations that opened in Canada at a previous appearance before the Committee, and second, his handling of a May 2021 CSIS IMU.

During his 27 April 2023 appearance before the committee, Mr. Mendicino indicated that all PRC unofficial and illegal foreign police stations opened in Canada were closed. Some members held the view that testimony heard after that committee meeting contradicted Mr. Mendicino’s assertion. In some members’ view, his statement was inaccurate and incomplete.

In response, Mr. Mendicino stated that he stood by his “statements before this committee. The RCMP have been clear and consistent in regard to these foreign activities in relation to the so-called police stations.”^[88] He further acknowledged that these PRC activities uncovered problems that required reinforced protocols for combating foreign interference.^[89] He commented that a challenge faced by the RCMP was distinguishing between legitimate activities and potential foreign interference activities. He noted that the PRC was deploying a wide array of tactics when it came to foreign interference, not only through unofficial and illegal foreign police stations opened in Canada but equally targeting the economy, academia, and other democratic institutions.^[90]

Also, committee members questioned Mr. Mendicino about his lack of receipt, and his predecessor’s lack of receipt, of a May 2021 CSIS IMU that the agency sent to the Department of Public Safety’s Deputy Minister. In response, Mr. Mendicino stated his department had “addressed this issue through the ministerial directive, which requires CSIS to directly brief me where there’s foreign interference with parliamentarians, as well as the Prime Minister.”^[91]

d)    Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

During his appearance, Mr. Mendicino provided committee members with suggestions for strengthening Canada’s ability to combat foreign election interference, which included:^[92]

• Introducing legislation that would create a new foreign agent registry as quickly as possible.
• Strengthening internal governance around the sharing of information and intelligence.
• Examining a legislative route, in particular the Canada Evidence Act, to convert intelligence into evidence. He noted that provisions in this Act allow for court proceedings in which “judges can access classified information and make determinations based on privileges that can be asserted by the government to protect national security and the people who work within those institutions, with the relevance and the probity of that evidence so that it can then be used in open proceedings.”
• Engaging directly with diaspora communities through bodies and forums such as The National Security Transparency Group and the Cross-Cultural Round Table on Security.
• Working closely with CSIS to provide additional support to parliamentarians and their offices on foreign interference matters. He noted that in 2022, CSIS provided protective briefings to 49 federal parliamentarians. He further stated that such briefings would be made available to candidates during elections.

C. Evidence From the Rt. Honourable David Johnston, Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference

1.     First Report—The Right Honourable David Johnston, Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference

Mr. Johnston provided the Committee with a high-level overview of the findings reached in his first report on foreign election interference and responded to questions about the report’s content and conclusions.

Mr. Johnston stated that the production of the report followed eight weeks of intensive examination of top secret intelligence and interviews conducted with, among others, senior intelligence, security and elected officials. The report found that foreign governments, including the PRC, were “working in hostile and clandestine ways to undermine our democracy.”^[93]

Further, the report outlined very serious shortcomings in Canada’s systems of dealing with foreign interference, indicating that these require a very substantial review and improvement. In particular, he stated that greater clarity is required when matters are moved from intelligence to being considered a threat. He stated that the current system “simply does not deal with information as well as it possibly should.”^[94]

Mr. Johnston stated that the report paid full respect to the confidentiality of classified information, while making public “what we could.” He indicated that the report’s annex contains some of the classified information he used to reach his conclusions. This classified annex was provided to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) and NSICOP committees.^[95] Also, an invitation to review the annex was extended to the leaders of parties represented in the House of Commons, should they obtain the necessary security clearance. Mr. Johnston noted that the purpose of seeking this review of the annex was to elicit corrections regarding his conclusions and to find out if there was fault in not assessing responsibility where it lies.^[96]

Mr. Johnston encouraged members of the Committee to read the report and focus their attention on its conclusions about the clear, present and pervasive foreign interference in Canada’s elections.

Questions on several topics about Mr. Johnston’s report were raised by some committee members during his appearance. These questions included:

• That while disinformation about the Conservative Party of Canada’s platform was recirculated on social media accounts sponsored by the PRC, Mr. Johnston’s conclusion in the report was that social media recirculation could not be attributed to any state actor. In response, Mr. Johnston indicated that when drafting his report, he based his conclusions on the intelligence then available from CSIS and other sources. At that time, the information he had did not permit him to conclude that there was a state-sponsored source.^[97]
• That the report indicated that in May 2021, a CSIS IMU was sent to the then Minister of Public Safety, Mr. Blair, but not received, due to a lack of access to a top secret email network.^[98] However, in his appearance before the Committee, Mr. Blair stated that there was no email. In response, Mr. Johnston stated that it was his understanding that Mr. Blair did not receive the email in question though his name or office was on it. Mr. Johnston considered this to be a “very substantial flaw in how information is crystallized and finds its way into the hands of recipients who have the accountability to act on it.”^[99]
• That Mr. O’Toole had stated that during a briefing with CSIS, he was told that he had been the target of a sophisticated misinformation and voter suppression campaign orchestrated by the PRC before and during the 2021 general election. However, the report stated that there was no clear evidence that it was state sponsored. In response, Mr. Johnston stated that the evidence available to him at that time permitted him to come to the conclusions he made in his report.^[100]
• That the report noted irregularities, tied to the PRC consulate in Toronto, which were observed with the 2019 Liberal Party of Canada nomination contest for Don Valley North. However, the report did not conclude that the Prime Minister should have taken some action. In response, Mr. Johnston indicated that the Prime Minister was aware that there were some questions about the actual nomination. He also noted that CSIS does not cast its attention in great depth to party nomination contests because these are governed by the rules of each party. He stated that nomination contests have been a difficult area to regulate, and that “one looks to the parties to develop appropriate rules.”^[101]

2.     Role of the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference

Mr. Johnston told the Committee that on 15 March 2023, he was appointed by the government as the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference.^[102] He indicated that in this role, he was given a broad mandate to “assess the extent of foreign interference and make recommendations on how to better protect our democracy.”^[103]

During his appearance, he noted that he was approaching his mandate in phases. The first phase of his mandate had lasted about eight weeks and entailed the examination of documents and papers, conducting interviews with relevant witnesses, and the preparation of his first report.

Mr. Johnston stated that the planned next phase of his mandate would last about five months and would involve holding public hearings, where he would hear from witnesses such as government representatives, security and intelligence officials, and diaspora communities. In this second phase, his work would be supported by three special advisors with expertise in national security intelligence, law, and diaspora community matters.^[104]

He noted the issues that he hoped his remaining work would address, including:^[105]

• placing a strong focus on the urgency of dealing with foreign interference;
• encouraging Canada’s parliamentary institutions to develop and implement appropriate reforms, thereby building the public’s trust in Canada’s democracy;
• putting a real light on the threats that diaspora communities face;
• developing more effective ways to equip Canadians and Canada’s intelligence agencies to deal with foreign interference threats more effectively;
• acquainting Canadians with the fact that many people in diaspora communities are the unwitting victims of foreign states;
• giving consideration to whether NSICOP was properly constituted as a committee of the executive, rather than a committee of Parliament; and
• examining NSIRA to see whether it was working properly in its role as an oversight body.

Mr. Johnston noted that his mandate was only one part of “an array of work and initiatives that can be undertaken to address this threat.” To that end, he encouraged contributions from other bodies, such as the Committee, NSICOP and NSIRA, to help ensure Canada is well equipped to detect, deter, and combat foreign interference.

Further, Mr. Johnston acknowledged knowing the results of the motion passed by the House of Commons on 31 May 2023, which, among other things, called on him “to step aside from his role as special rapporteur.”^[106] He told the Committee that he held “a deep respect for the House of Commons, and for its right to express an opinion on my work.”^[107] He stated that he heard clearly that there was disagreement about his recommendation not to call a public inquiry, along with allegations about his integrity and independence. He told the Committee that these allegations were false and that repeating them did not make them true.

During Mr. Johnston’s appearance, some committee members raised questions about his appointment as Special Rapporteur, along with matters corollary to this appointment. Some members expressed the view that, by accepting the role of Special Rapporteur, Mr. Johnston was in a conflict of interest. To support this contention, examples and media excerpts were cited that contained statements about the relationship between Mr. Johnston and Mr. Trudeau, his family and/or his extended family.^[108] For example, a quote was raised in which Mr. Trudeau referred to Mr. Johnston in the media as a lifelong family friend. In response, Mr. Johnston told the Committee that he was friends with the Rt. Honourable Pierre Trudeau, through his life in politics. With respect to his relationship with Mr. Justin Trudeau, Mr. Johnston stated that over the course of almost 40 years, the two had had no meetings, no dinners, and no particular contact.^[109]

Further, questions were raised by some members about:

• Mr. Johnston’s association with the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation. In response, Mr. Johnston clarified that he was not a member of the foundation’s board of directors. Rather, he was a member of the foundation, a role which he stated was akin to being a shareholder in a general meeting. He told the Committee that he resigned as a member in March 2023, when he was appointed as Special Rapporteur.^[110]
• The legal opinion that Mr. Johnston had received that concluded his acceptance of the role of Special Rapporteur did not put him in a conflict of interest. This opinion was prepared by Frank Iacobucci, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. Some members noted that Mr. Iacobucci is a current member of the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation. In response, Mr. Johnston stated that he and Mr. Iacobucci are lifelong friends and that he made Mr. Iacobucci’s acquaintance when he was around 25 years old, when the two were law professors at the University of Toronto.^[111]
• Mr. Johnston’s choice of Sheila Block as senior counsel to the Special Rapporteur. Some members stated that, in their view, Ms. Block is a “lifetime donor and supporter of the Liberal Party, including attending fundraising events with the Prime Minister in recent time.”^[112] In response, Mr. Johnston stated that:^[113]
• she is a pre-eminent senior counsel who is renowned for the quality of her work and that he has every confidence in her;
• he does not believe her role as senior counsel to the Special Rapporteur put her in a conflict of interest;
• with respect to her contributions to the Liberal Party, Ms. Block also made contributions to other parties, all while serving Canada with great eminence;
• he was extremely fortunate to have her skills, integrity, and commitment to improving Canada’s way of dealing with foreign interference; and
• she served him faithfully as senior counsel when he was invited by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Harper, to review allegations of the involvement of Karlheinz Schreiber with former Prime Minister, the Rt. Honourable Brian Mulroney.

On the point of having his integrity and non-partisanship called into question, Mr. Johnston told the Committee that he hoped to have given good evidence of non-partisanship and integrity during his 55 years of public life. He cited his service as Governor General and his involvement as chair or member of around two or three dozen advisory committees.

He stated that his appointment as Special Rapporteur was the first time that either his impartiality and integrity have ever been called into question or that suggestions have been made that he was in a conflict of interest. Mr. Johnston suggested that, on the matter of his potential conflict of interest, Canadians look at his record of service and draw their own conclusion. He further pleaded with the Committee to focus its attention on foreign interference and his report.^[114] To this end, Mr. Johnston stated that:

quite apart from changes of positions by people on whether my integrity evaporated three or four years ago for some reason with the change of government, I’m anxious that we get to the real issue here, which is foreign interference.^[115]

3.     Merits of Holding Public Hearings Versus a Public Inquiry

Mr. Johnston provided the Committee with his reasons for deciding to hold public hearings rather than recommend that a public inquiry be established. He commented that he had deliberated long and hard over this matter.

Mr. Johnston indicated that, in his view, the dilemma centred around how to deal with classified information. It cannot be discussed in public, nor can it appear in any report. He stated that this same issue arose in other past inquiries. As an example, he cited the Commission of Inquiry Into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar. Upon its completion, its Commissioner, Dennis R. O’Connor, commented that public inquiries held under the Inquiries Act were

very difficult tools to use for something whose job is to shed light on situations, particularly situations of negligent responsibility and so on. Because they are led by lawyers with cross-examination, they have difficultly getting at information that is classified. We can’t do that in public. They are very expensive and very time-consuming and often do not result in providing that light.^[116]

Mr. Johnston stated that his proposed public hearings would offer witnesses the option giving testimony in camera, while offering them all of the appropriate protections. He further foresaw in camera proceedings to hear from officials who possess classified information.^[117] Further, witnesses who did not feel comfortable appearing at a public hearing could provide him with a written submission. He noted that he had already received about a half-dozen submissions from diaspora communities, which eloquently set out the burdens that they are bearing and asking for help.^[118]

Members of the Committee expressed a mix of views about whether potential witnesses on foreign interference, who fear reprisals for speaking out, would participate in public hearings.

• Some members noted that for the witnesses, public hearings that offer an option for in camera testimony would be tantamount to the proceedings of a public inquiry, which would presumably offer witnesses the option to appear in public or in camera.
• Some members expressed the hope that Mr. Johnston would address how to make families from diaspora communities feel safe to come forward and participate in public hearings.
• Some members told Mr. Johnston that they knew of witnesses who would not come forward and participate in public hearings for fear of reprisals. Instead, their preference was to hold a public inquiry, with proceedings that can be held in camera, while also possessing the power to summon persons and compel documents.

Further, some members raised with Mr. Johnston that, in their view, the expense of a public inquiry was not relevant. A member asked, rhetorically, what was the price and value of democracy?

4.     Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

During his appearance, Mr. Johnston provided committee members with his views on how Canada’s regime for combatting foreign election interference could be strengthened. These included:^[119]

• examining the role and structure of NSICOP and NSIRA with a view of reinforcing and strengthening their work;
• contemplating amendments to the CSIS Act that might assist in fighting foreign interference;
• establishing a national security committee of cabinet to deal with foreign interference at the highest level and with a sense of urgency and importance; and
• seeking out lessons from other jurisdictions, especially those in the Five Eyes, which have gained considerable experience in dealing with similar challenges;

In respect of machinery of government, he raised issues to the Committee about:

• improving the processes for funnelling intelligence to top officials (i.e., the most senior public service and political levels), including greater accountability for ensuring that the right people see the right intelligence;
• putting tracking protocols in place to allow a reconstruction of whom saw what document, and when;
• establishing clearer lines of responsibility for recommendations as to how to react to intelligence; and
• commencing a government-led process (rather than an agency-led process) for declassification of information to enhance transparency.

D. Evidence From Officials From the House of Commons

1.     Eric Janse, Acting Clerk of the House of Commons

a)     Parliamentary Privilege and the Role of the Committee

Eric Janse, Acting Clerk of the House of Commons, provided the Committee with information about parliamentary privilege. Mr. Janse quoted a report from the Special Committee on Rights and Immunities of Members, in the 30^th Parliament (September 1974 to March 1979), which stated that, “the purpose of parliamentary privilege is to allow Members of the House of Commons to carry out their duties as representatives of the electorate without undue interference.”^[120]

Mr. Janse explained that it is not the Speaker’s role, when ruling on a question of privilege, to make a finding of fact.^[121] Instead, the Speaker’s role is to determine whether the matter appeared to affect members’ privileges in a way that “warranted priority consideration by the House.”^[122] Mr. Janse noted that by referring the matter to the committee, the House determined that it required further investigation.^[123]

Mr. Janse outlined the process that a committee typically undergoes when examining a question of privilege. He explained that the steps normally include establishing the facts of what occurred, considering whether the events represented a breach of members privilege or a contempt of the House, and considering proposed remedies.^[124]

Mr. Janse urged members to phrase recommendations carefully, if the Committee chooses to make a report to the house, explaining that they should be “be actionable, and should fall squarely within the Committee’s mandate.”^[125]

b)    Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

Mr. Janse told the Committee that House administration could help to coordinate the flow of information between an intelligence agency and members.^[126] He highlighted that a memorandum of understanding had been signed between the House and CSIS on 30 March 2023 but noted that the details of the agreement had not been finalized.^[127]

2.     Michel Bédard, Interim Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, House of Commons

a)     Parliamentary Privilege and the Role of the Committee

Michel Bédard, Interim Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, House of Commons, told the Committee that, in general, parliamentary privileges are rooted in the Constitution and have constitutional status.^[128] He explained that one of the parliamentary privileges that the House’s committees have is to send for records and papers, including those dealing with national security.^[129]

Mr. Bédard informed the Committee that the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel have the capacity and appropriate clearances and facilities to review and, if needed, redact top secret documents.^[130] He stated that his office had previously reviewed and redacted classified documents, but had never dealt with documents containing national security information.^[131]

Mr. Bédard underscored that the power of the House and its committees is limited to Canadian territory and would not extend to persons outside of the country.^[132] He noted that there is no known case in Canada where a committee compelled the attendance of a diplomat.^[133] Furthermore, Mr. Bédard suggested that even if compelling a diplomat would be allowed by parliamentary law and procedure, there would be important public policy considerations to weigh before making such a decision.^[134]

3.     Patrick McDonell, Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer, House of Commons

a)     Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Patrick McDonell, Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer, House of Commons, told the Committee that if CSIS wished to share information with all members of the House of Commons, it could go through his office.^[135] Conversely, if CSIS had concerns of foreign interference for an individual member, it would reach out to that person and their staff directly instead of going through his office.^[136]

Mr. McDonell noted that his office’s level of involvement with respect to CSIS briefing members of Parliament on foreign interference threats is that of “logistics officers” to facilitate CSIS briefing members of the House on foreign interference threats.^[137]

b)    Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

Mr. McDonell referenced a memorandum of understanding between the House and CSIS’ Integrated Threat Assessment Centre.^[138] He noted that the House and CSIS had consulted with Five Eyes as they developed the details of the memorandum of understanding.^[139]

Mr. McDonell outlined his office’s plan to organize a series of briefs to members of Parliament with regular awareness sessions to follow.^[140] Additionally, his intention is to include more information about national security and foreign interference in orientation material for newly elected members of the House.^[141]

E. Evidence From Election Administrators

Stéphane Perrault, the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO), appeared three times for the Committee’s related study on foreign election interference: on 1 November 2022, 22 November 2022 and 2 March 2023.^[142] At his first appearance, Mr. Perrault was accompanied by Serge Caron, Deputy CEO and Chief Security Officer, Digital Transformation Sector, Elections Canada.^[143]

Caroline Simard, the Commissioner of Canada Elections (CCE), appeared twice on the Committee’s related study foreign election interference: on 1 November 2022 and 2 March 2023.^[144] At her first appearance, Ms. Simard was accompanied by Marc Chénier, Deputy Commissioner and Chief Legal Counsel, Office of the CCE.^[145]

The CEO and the CCE play separate but complementary roles in elections and referenda. The CEO is responsible for administering elections and referenda at the federal level, as well as other aspects of election infrastructure. The CCE is responsible for ensuring compliance with and enforcement of the Canada Elections Act (CEA) and the Referendum Act. The CCE conducts investigations independently of Elections Canada, the government and the public service.^[146]

1.     Definitions and Legal Framework

a)     Current Framework

Mr. Perrault told the Committee that the term “foreign interference” refers to threats that can take various forms, such as cyberattacks; illicit funding of candidates, parties or third parties; disinformation; and intimidation. Because of this diversity and because it involves state-to-state relations, addressing foreign electoral interference requires coordinated efforts between a range of departments and agencies. Mr. Perrault also noted that the CEA does not define foreign interference.^[147]

As Mr. Perrault explained, the CEA prohibits various actions through which foreign pressure on elections could be exercised, particularly through the political financing regime. Moreover, some offences could result in various penalties, including up to five years in prison.^[148] However, under the current legal framework, foreigners can have some level of influence – for example, by making a statement encouraging electors to vote for a specific candidate or party, or by expressing an opinion.^[149]

Mr. Perrault gave examples of offences:

• the CEA provides that only individuals who are citizens or permanent residents are authorized to make a political contribution;
• the CEA prohibits foreigners from registering as third parties;
• the CEA prohibits third parties from using foreign funds for their regulated activities; and
• the CEA prohibits certain activities constituting “undue influence by foreigners,” such as incurring any expense to directly promote or oppose a candidate or party during the election.^[150] This prohibition is limited to the election period.^[151]

If there is information that would assist the investigation of illegal contributions from a foreign entity, it should be sent to the CCE.^[152]

2.     Recommendations on the Legal Framework

Mr. Perrault stated that Canada’s political financing regime is “very robust,”^[153] and it is “the envy”^[154] of many countries. The regime includes a mix of private and public funding, strong disclosure rules and low contribution limits. Canada’s regime also regulates a range of political entities, including nomination contestants, electoral district associations, political parties and leadership contestants.

Mr. Perrault believes one of the key strengths of Canada’s political financing regime is that it is reviewed on a regular basis, including through the Committee’s examination of the CEO’s recommendations after every election. In addition, independent election administration, including the appointment of the CEO by the House of Commons rather than by the government, is a strength of the current system.^[155]

In his testimony, Mr. Perrault discussed some of the recommendations to strengthen the electoral legal framework that were presented in his most recent recommendations report. Mr. Perrault said that, under the current legislative framework, foreign funding can find its way through to political parties. As a result, although third parties are required to disclose the source of funding for a regulated activity, foreign financing for general purposes can flow through a third party. On this point, Mr. Perrault noted that he had made a recommendation to resolve this potential breach in his most recent recommendations report. He recommended that groups that receive a certain amount of funding in the form of contributions be limited, for the purposes of activities regulated by the CEA, to using contributions from a bank account containing donations only from eligible Canadian donors.^[156]

The CEA provides for certain prohibitions regarding foreign interference during the election period. In his most recent report, Mr. Perrault recommended that the period in which these prohibitions apply be extended to the pre-election period. However, he told the Committee that it could also have the prohibitions apply at all times.^[157]

Mr. Perrault also remarked that he had recommended increasing the transparency of digital platforms in the context of elections. In Mr. Perrault’s view, Canadians would have more confidence in the electoral process if social media platforms’ internal policies for handling misinformation, disinformation and illegal content were public.^[158]

Mr. Chénier clarified that the CEA prohibits circumventing the prohibition on using foreign funds and that, after the Elections Modernization Act was enacted in 2018, new measures to strengthen the electoral system to reduce the ability of foreign money to get into the system were implemented. Mr. Chénier also noted that Yves Côté, Ms. Simard’s predecessor, had recommended that Parliament expand the concept of “undue influence” in the CEA. Under the current legislative framework, undue influence occurs when expenses are incurred to promote or oppose a party or candidate, or when an activity that is carried out to promote or oppose a party or candidate contravenes a federal or provincial law. Mr. Côté had recommended that the CEA recognize a third way of exercising undue influence – that is, when a foreign entity or person sows confusion or intentionally disseminates disinformation.^[159]

In response to a question, Ms. Simard explained that, since the Elections Modernization Act was enacted in 2018, additional powers concerning administrative monetary penalties were given to the CCE. However, Ms. Simard said that more administrative powers are required, including with respect to the preservation and disclosure of evidence.^[160] She also stated that current administrative sanctions are “grossly inadequate.”^[161] For example, the cap for penalties on entities is $5,000.

3.     Defining Foreign Interference Threats and Motives

Mr. Perrault stated that Elections Canada did not experience any breaches of its IT infrastructure or interference with its election operations during the 2019 and 2021 general elections. The organization had also not been made aware of any efforts to undermine the ability of electors to vote.^[162] While there were no breaches of the organization’s IT infrastructure, Mr. Perrault nevertheless noted that Elections Canada experiences cyberattacks on a regular basis, “as does any institution.”^[163] There is no way of knowing whether the attacks are from foreign or domestic actors.

Mr. Perrault also told the Committee that, in preparing for the 2019 election, national security agencies took part in a meeting of the Advisory Committee of Political Parties, under the auspices of Elections Canada, to raise parties’ awareness of the risk that foreign state actors would interfere in the election. According to Mr. Perrault, political parties, electoral district associations and local campaigns also have crucial roles to play to counter foreign interference.^[164] He also noted that the existence of risks of foreign interference became clear after the 2016 presidential election in the United States.^[165]

Regarding the media reports of alleged foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections, Mr. Perrault said that he was not in a position to comment on the accuracy of what was published and that he did not have any details on any potential interference campaign by Beijing, other than what he had read in the newspapers. He stated that this information was not shared with him before or since the articles were published, and he had not met with the Office of the Prime Minister on this matter. He also said that he had not received any reports regarding specific instances of non-compliance with the legislation or Chinese interference in the election.^[166] In response to a question, Mr. Perrault further indicated that, based on the information he has, he has no reason to believe that the 2019 and 2021 elections were not “free and fair,”^[167] although some incorrect information on the voting process was disseminated.

Mr. Perrault noted the need for caution before using information in the media to make a statement about the fairness of an election. Without questioning the work that journalists do, Mr. Perrault pointed out that no investigations into the allegations have occurred and that we do not know what happened or which constituencies were targeted. He warned that drawing premature conclusions risks unjustifiably discrediting the electoral process. Mr. Perrault also remarked that the CCE will decide to investigate if she deems there is sufficient evidence to do so and that she will take appropriate action depending on the outcome of the investigation.^[168]

According to Mr. Perrault, it is “extremely difficult” to establish a causal relationship between the existence of financial irregularities in the electoral process and the outcome of an election.^[169] He said it would be “very speculative” to conclude that the results were affected based only on financial contributions to candidates discussed in newspaper articles. Mr. Perrault pointed out that all kinds of irregularities take place in an election, but they do not undermine its overall fairness. However, if an individual believes that the results of an election have been influenced, the CEA provides a mechanism for deciding the issue: challenging the election in court.^[170]

Still, Mr. Perrault explained that, while one cannot “draw a straight line” between the existence of foreign influence and the outcome of a particular election, acts of foreign interference nonetheless affect the fairness of the electoral process and must be addressed to protect Canadian democracy.^[171]

Mr. Perrault reminded the Committee that he submits a report to Parliament after every election. He noted that he would never hesitate to report concerns about the fairness of the election and what worked well and what did not.^[172]

During her first appearance before the Committee, Ms. Simard noted that she had not observed any change in the number of issues giving rise to complaints about foreign interference in the last two general elections.^[173] Her office did receive complaints about interference, but no official action was taken.^[174] She also stated that she was not in a position to discuss the details of files that may be or may have been the subject of a complaint.^[175] However, she said that, in the 44^th general election, 13 situations involving foreign interference were brought to the attention of her office in 16 complaints, out of a total caseload of 4,000. Mr. Chénier said that, in the 43^rd general election, there were complaints about 10 situations that could involve foreign interference. The existence of a complaint, and therefore allegations of interference, does not mean that the underlying facts have been proven.^[176]

In her second appearance before the Committee, Ms. Simard reported that, since November 2022, allegations of foreign interference had circulated in public and had led to the filing of new complaints with her office. She stated that her office was conducting a rigorous and thorough review of every complaint and piece of information brought to its attention in this regard and that this review was continuing in order to determine whether any tangible evidence of wrongdoing under the CEA exists. At the time of her appearance, Ms. Simard could not provide further details on the ongoing review, the complaints or any other information received, as her office is bound by confidentiality rules to protect the presumption of innocence and to avoid compromising the integrity of the investigations.^[177]

4.     Measures to Combat Foreign Interference Threats to Democratic Processes

a)     Role of Election Administrators

Mr. Perrault told the Committee that the role of Elections Canada is to administer elections and protect the electoral process from threats, irrespective of their source. The organization must take appropriate steps with the advice and support of various security partners to protect election information technology (IT) infrastructure. According to Mr. Perrault, Elections Canada has made significant progress on IT security in recent years and receives support from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security to closely monitor its infrastructure.^[178]

In addition, Elections Canada ensures Canadians have correct information about the electoral process, in part to enable electors to register and vote, and to enhance trust in the electoral process and its results. Mr. Perrault stated that Elections Canada continually monitors publicly available information to counter the spread of inaccurate information about the electoral process from foreign or domestic sources. Accordingly, the agency monitors 67 social media platforms in 15 languages.^[179] In its monitoring, the agency focuses on content related to voting processes and electoral administration, as its mandate is not to scrutinize misinformation circulating about candidates or political party platforms.^[180]

Mr. Perrault further noted that Elections Canada prefers to use the term “inaccurate” information rather than “disinformation.” He encouraged political parties to refer voters to Elections Canada in case of doubt about information shared on the voting process. He also clarified that Elections Canada is not equipped to ascertain the scope of foreign efforts to influence elections; for instance, Elections Canada cannot identify who is behind particular criticisms of parties or candidates.^[181]

Mr. Perrault also stated that some groups of voters are more vulnerable to disinformation than others, partly because of a lack of knowledge about federal political institutions and the electoral process as a whole. Consequently, some of Elections Canada’s outreach activities are geared towards these groups. For example, Elections Canada is working on a pilot project with Indigenous communities in northern Ontario to develop a civic education program specifically for Indigenous peoples.^[182]

According to Mr. Perrault, if Elections Canada has reason to believe or even suspect the law has been breached, the agency refers the case to the CCE to decide whether the facts warrant launching an investigation or a review. That process may lead to various penalties, ranging from administrative monetary penalties to criminal prosecutions.^[183]

Ms. Simard stated that her role as the CCE is to ensure compliance with and enforce the CEA, including the provisions prohibiting activities that could be attempts at foreign interference.^[184] The wording of the obligations and prohibitions in the CEA define the scope of her office’s work. Ms. Simard also informed the Committee that the involvement of activities, individuals or entities outside of Canada’s borders can significantly increase the complexity of an investigation.^[185] She also noted that her organization works primarily on the basis of public complaints and that she does not have a prevention role; she therefore encouraged Canadians to file complaints if they observe a possible violation of the CEA.^[186] Investigations are conducted in a confidential manner. However, some information is made public if official action is taken.^[187]

b)    Cooperation With Various Partners

According to Mr. Perrault, ensuring secure elections is a team effort that requires a whole-of-government approach. He stated that Elections Canada works with a variety of government security and intelligence agencies, including CSIS and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). The various partners have developed joint protocols and practices for discussing threats to elections, sharing information and ensuring that each partner plays its part in promoting secure elections.^[188] Elections Canada also receives general briefings from the security community on the overall environment, including the interest some countries may have in Canadian elections.^[189] The information received in this type of briefing is “fairly high-level.”^[190] Mr. Perrault noted that a big part of the work of ensuring elections are secure is clarifying responsibilities so that everyone knows who to go to when a problem arises.^[191]

Mr. Perrault also reported that Elections Canada works with various international partners, including its Australian counterpart agency. During the most recent election in Australia, a registry of misinformation was created to identify false statements circulating about the electoral process. According to Mr. Perrault, Australian authorities thought the registry was a valuable addition to their program. Elections Canada is therefore considering creating a similar registry for Canadian elections.^[192]

Likewise, Ms. Simard stated that she works with several national security and intelligence and law enforcement organizations to ensure effective communication and a better understanding of threats to elections.^[193] For instance, memoranda of understanding for information sharing and assistance have been signed with CSIS and the RCMP.^[194]

Ms. Simard also noted that, consistent with its role of ensuring compliance with and enforcing the CEA, the office of the CCE has initiated a dialogue with various online publishing platforms, which has so far been “extremely positive.”^[195] Ms. Simard said that some content had been removed from this type of platform at her office’s request.

5.     Other Considerations

Mr. Perrault was questioned about certain mail-in ballots that were allegedly not counted during the most recent general federal election, which made some people say that the results of the election would perhaps have been different if these votes had been counted. Mr. Perrault said that there were no indications that the mail-in ballots had any swing effect on the election; furthermore, the 200,000 ballots in question were not uncounted; rather, these were ballots that were either not received or not cast. According to Mr. Perrault, the voters who had requested the mail-in ballots may have opted to vote in person, may not have mailed in their ballot, the ballot may have been received late, or the ballot may have been completed in a manner that invalidated it.^[196]

F. Evidence From Current and Former Security Officials

1.     Tara Denham, Director General, Office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

a)     Measures Taken to Monitor Foreign Interference Threats in Democratic Processes

Tara Denham, Director General, Office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, provided the Committee with an overview of the functioning of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), which was created in 2018. Ms. Denham noted that the RRM:^[197]

• is led by Canada on a permanent basis and supported by a secretariat located at Global Affairs Canada;
• strengthens the G7 partners’ collective understanding of foreign threats to democracy as well as its own capacity to counter these threats;
• uses open-source intelligence techniques, and operates under an ethical and methodological framework;
• identifies potential tactics or campaigns used by foreign states, to identify information, and to provide updates; and
• supports, during writ periods, Canada’s SITE Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol by monitoring the online information environment for signs of foreign information manipulation and interference.

Ms. Denham stated that the RRM’s objective was to understand and shed light on the information environment, and the manipulative tactics being used in that space.^[198] She noted that existence of information and disinformation operations carried out by foreign states may not, in and of themselves be significant enough to affect the results of an election. Rather, this was a high threshold.^[199] She further noted that it was not the RRM’s role to counter disinformation campaigns but instead to shed light on their existence and raise awareness about their tactics.

Ms. Denham commented that Canada and the Netherlands collaborated on the creation of a declaration of information integrity, which calls on states to not promote disinformation campaigns and invites private companies to increase their transparency in their handling of such matters.^[200]

b)    Federal by-Elections Held in June 2023

Ms. Denham told the Committee that, in the summer of 2023, the SITE Task Force monitored and reported on federal by-elections for the first time – a task it had only previously done for general elections. The Committee notes that officials from both the SITE Task Force and the RRM appeared it previously in relation to its study on foreign election interference.

During the by-elections, their monitoring role consisted of seeking out potential issues of foreign interference and violent extremism in the information environment. The Site Task Force provided daily updates on their findings, along with a publicly-available final report following the by-elections. Ms. Denham noted that the Site Task Force made no observations of foreign interference or violent extremism in the June 2023 by-elections.^[201]

However, in the course of monitoring the by-elections, Ms. Denham stated that the RRM Canada team discovered activity unrelated to the by-elections, but appeared to potentially be information manipulation targeting Mr. Chong. This activity took place between 4 and 13 May 2023. It is worth noting that Mr. Chong was not a candidate in the June 2023 by-elections.^[202]

An investigation ensued that validated the initial indications of suspicious activity. This led the RRM to alert the appropriate partners within Canada’s security and intelligence community. Further, a statement was issued by Global Affairs on 9 August 2023, indicating that the RRM had detected an information operation targeting a member of Parliament.^[203]

The suspicious activity detected by the RRM included the spreading of false and misleading narratives about Mr. Chong, foreign information manipulation and interference that included coordinated content and timing, abnormal shifts in the volume and scope of online activity and engagement, and the concealment of state involvement.

Ms. Denham stated that upon concluding their investigation, Global Affairs briefed Mr. Chong on the foreign interference activity, raised their concerns with the Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Canada, and engaged with Tencent, which is the parent company of WeChat, about the activity.^[204] In respect of the latter engagement, Ms. Denham indicated that foreign disinformation campaigns more often than not violate the terms of service of social media platforms and that it should be the responsibility of these companies to actually adhere to their terms and conditions.^[205]

In response to questions about the challenges faced by the RRM in determining whether a disinformation campaign was state-sponsored, including the timeliness of the results of the RRM’s work, Ms. Denham indicated that there needed to be strong indications of a link between foreign information manipulation and a government entity. She noted that it was not unusual to find state-affiliated news sites that have disinformation on them. However, for the disinformation campaign to be state-sponsored manipulation, the RRM must determine that the elements of the campaign are linked, and that coordinated efforts have been made to try and artificially amplify the disinformation to make it sound louder and give it the appearance of a natural conversation.^[206]

c)     Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

Ms. Denham indicated that her department places a high priority on protecting parliamentarians from foreign interference campaigns. She noted that during the writ period, political parties were continuously briefed by security and intelligence officials about their findings. Ms. Denham indicated that her department would continue to consider how these briefings could be strengthened.^[207]

She further noted that Canada’s population is comparatively inexperienced when it came to exposure to disinformation campaigns. However, currently, foreign interference had become a live conversation, and that a greater collective understanding of foreign interference tactics and how to identify them would benefit the country.^[208]

2.     Michael Duheme, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Mark Flynn, Deputy Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

a)     Defining Foreign Interference Threats and Motives

Michael Duheme, Commissioner, RCMP, told the Committee that the RCMP considers foreign interference to be activities undertaken by a foreign state to advance their strategic interests using threats of violence, coercion, or surveillance of the public.

Those subjected to foreign interference may include culturally or linguistically diverse groups, human rights defenders, political dissidents, pro-democracy advocates, and politicians at all levels.^[209] A number of states engage in foreign interference, such as the PRC, the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, among others.

Mr. Duheme stated that foreign interference poses a complex threat to the security of Canada and Canadians. As such, the RCMP has been actively utilizing all the tools at its disposal to combat foreign interference. He noted that the RCMP’s role in combatting foreign interference has been to intervene when interference falls into the criminal realm, which is distinct from CSIS, whose focus is on gathering intelligence. He noted the challenge faced by the RCMP of converting intelligence into evidence.^[210]

b)    Measures Taken to Counter Foreign Interference Threats in Democratic Processes

Mr. Duheme told the Committee that the RCMP has opened an investigation of reported allegations of intimidation targeting Mr. Chong.^[211] Mark Flynn, Deputy Commissioner, RCMP, added that no investigation had been opened for the alleged cases of intimidation involving Mr. O’Toole and Ms. Kwan. Mr. Flynn stated that the RCMP had learned of the allegations of foreign interference against these members through their public disclosures.^[212]

Further, Mr. Flynn noted that, in accordance with a memorandum of understanding, the RCMP had contacted the Commissioner of Canada Elections to offer its assistance in their investigation of incidents involving the alleged intimidation of members.

Mr. Duheme added that the RCMP currently has about 100-plus files open on foreign interference. Duheme clarified that foreign interference is a broad problem, which encompasses matters beyond those related to elections, such as intellectual property theft.^[213]

Mr. Duheme told the Committee that the RCMP has many tools at its disposal to address foreign interference. He noted that its investigative teams probe potential offences carried out by state actors under the Criminal Code (e.g., threats of violence, harassment and intimidation) and/or offences under the Security of Information Act (e.g., breach of trust, intimidation, criminal harassment and foreign-influenced threats or violence). Further, the RCMP works closely with CSIS under their co‑operation agreement, and collaborates with domestic and international law enforcement and security and intelligence partners, to adapt to the criminal methods used by foreign actors.^[214]

On the matter of the PRC’s unofficial and illegal foreign police stations opened in Canada, Mr. Duheme stated that the RCMP was confident, based on its criminal intelligence, that the policing activities at these sites have been shut down, although investigations into their activities continued. As a caveat, he noted that the buildings which were being used had also been used, at times, as community halls.^[215]

In terms of preventing future unofficial and illegal foreign police stations from being opened in Canada, Mr. Duheme indicated that the RCMP needed to build stronger relationships with diaspora communities.^[216] Mr. Flynn added that part of the RCMP’s approach to shutting down these stations was to demonstrate public visibility, in terms of uniformed members and police cars, in the affected communities. This approach was meant to help build trust and confidence in the RCMP so that community members would feel comfortable coming forward and reporting illegal activities. However, Mr. Flynn noted that a challenge in this matter, for both the RCMP and diaspora communities, was that the threats faced by these communities and their families were coming from outside of Canada.^[217]

c)     Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

Mr. Duheme told the Committee that a key operational area that the RCMP continues to examine for resolution is converting intelligence into evidence. He stated that intelligence that is actionable allows an investigation to begin. In law enforcement, when the RCMP lay charges, they need to be able to disclose the information and/or intelligence about how they started the investigation.^[218]

Mr. Duheme indicated that in 2018, an Operational Improvement Review was conducted, which focused on the challenges of using intelligence as evidence. Of the 76 recommendations that resulted from the review, 18 have yet to be fully implemented to facilitate the full use of intelligence to prosecute criminal cases.^[219]

3.     Cherie Henderson, Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

a)     Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Cherie Henderson, Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, told the Committee that CSIS defensive briefings are intended to inform the individual member of the House of Commons and create awareness about foreign interference.^[220]

Ms. Henderson explained to the Committee that CSIS established IMUs in 2015 to allow it to “inform on a specific event at a specific time.”^[221] Ms. Henderson explained that IMUs are sent to specific individuals within a department.^[222] Ministers and deputy ministers do not have access to the system that receives IMUs. Instead, if CSIS determines that a minister should see an IMU, a note indicating this is added to the document.^[223]

Ms. Henderson told the Committee that CSIS determines whether to share information by assessing each piece of information on its own merit and considering how it fits into the larger picture.^[224] She further added that sharing information before it is thoroughly vetted could undermine the credibility of the organization.^[225]

4.     Daniel Jean, Former National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister

a)     Defining Foreign Interference Threats and Motives

Daniel Jean, former National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister (16 May 2016 to 22 May 2018), told the Committee that, in his view, foreign interference was a “much broader issue than the electoral one.”^[226] He indicated that a great concern to him remained the surveillance, intimidation and harassment of diaspora communities living in Canada. He noted that, recently, there was an increase in the number of people from these communities coming forward and with this issue, as well as the revelation in the media that suggested that a member of Parliament had been targeted by foreign interference.

b)    Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Mr. Jean indicated that he had contributed to the authorship of two recent reports that evaluated the current state of Canada’s national security strategy. The reports’ authors noted Canada’s absence of a national security and intelligence culture. He stated that they had wondered whether the only time that there was political interest in security and intelligence was during some kind of crisis. In his view, Canada needed to demonstrate greater maturity when it came to national security.^[227]

In respect of Canada’s membership in the Five Eyes Alliance, Mr. Jean noted that the country will never be in a position to contribute as much as the U.S. or the United Kingdom, as we do not have the resources. However, he noted that in his conversations with Five Eyes partners, he would always stress that the quality of a country’s contribution was more important than its quantity.^[228]

c)     Evidence About Miscellaneous Canadian National Security and Intelligence Matters

Mr. Jean provided the Committee with information about the June 2017 PCO memorandum, for which he was the final author. He noted that the memorandum was sent to the Prime Minister and later was disclosed without authorization to the Global News.

He stated that the national security and intelligence advisor’s team will write memoranda in cases when it is a matter that needs to be addressed by the PCO and “enough factors have come into play” whereby it becomes “essential for the Prime Minister to be informed or for recommendations to be made.”^[229]

As for the reasons for writing the June 2017 memorandum, Mr. Jean stated he and his office was increasingly concerned about some of the activities by the PRC. In particular, they were very concerned, at that time, about economic security and the PRC attempting to acquire sensitive technologies.^[230]

Further, at that time, Mr. Jean recalled that President Xi Jinping was leading a major anti-corruption campaign. Some in the security community held the view that some of the targets of this campaign were likely Mr. Xi’s political rivals. As such, Mr. Jean’s office wanted to be clear with the PRC that they should not in any way attempt to undertake activities in Canada, such as pursuing individuals that the PRC claimed were fugitives. Mr. Jean stated that he had a number of conversations with the PRC on the importance of going through normal diplomatic channels.^[231]

In response to a question from a committee member about the apparent omission of a sentence, in the June 2017 PCO memorandum, from one draft to another, Mr. Jean indicated that at that time, CSIS had “not yet started to name China in its annual CSIS foreign interference…. It’s only recently that we started to name China.”^[232]

d)    Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

During his appearance, Mr. Jean provided committee members with suggestions for their consideration about strengthening Canada’s regime for combatting foreign election interference. These included:^[233]

• Updating the CSIS Act. He expressed concerns that CSIS may have been very limited in what it could share with Mr. Chong, because of the lack of legislation. Further, he stated that other countries update their national security legislation every three or four years. He also noted that “if you go too far with a ministerial directive in the absence of legislation, at some point, people, the courts, will say that you may be out of your boundaries.”
• Putting in place a foreign registry. He noted that such a registry would not be a panacea in and of itself. Also, the registry should not have “huge” exemptions and should have meaningful penalties, whether criminal or monetary, for those who choose not to comply. He also suggested that the registry could be modelled after the Lobbying Act.
• Creating a mechanism to convert intelligence into evidence. He suggested that “we do something narrow to start with and then we test it.”
• Changing the culture at CSIS with respect to its outreach to people that they know are being targeted by foreign interference, to make sure that they are able to defend themselves.
• Creating space for Canadians who are harassed and intimidated by foreign entities to be able to come forward.

In addition, Mr. Jean recounted the steps taken in Australia to combat foreign interference. He stated that in 2017, they called upon John Garnaut, a journalist who is an expert on China, for his assistance. Mr. Garnaut worked with the Australian equivalent of CSIS to produce a report classified as secret. This report was the basis for the measures taken by Australia, in respect of “their policies, their registry of foreign agents, their stiffer sanctions for foreign interference, and their measures to protect elected representatives.”^[234]

5.     Michel Juneau-Katsuya, Former Chief of the Asia-Pacific Unit, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

a)     Defining Foreign Interference Threats and Motives

Michel Juneau-Katsuya, former Chief of the Asia-Pacific Unit, CSIS, explained to the Committee that an understanding of how the PRC government and its intelligence services function still eluded many western intelligence agencies, particularly CSIS. In that regard, he stated that CSIS tends to analyze the intelligence world using a Russian or Eurocentric perspective. However, in his view, the PRC operates differently because the government there is never elected and, as such, its intelligence operations can have lifespans of 5, 10, 15 and 20 years.^[235]

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya stated that since the mid-1990s, CSIS had noticed foreign interference activities coming from the Chinese embassy in Canada. He estimated that, in his experience working at CSIS, more than 70% of PRC embassy staff are spies.^[236]

Further, a committee member read an excerpt about the PRC’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which states that “[a]s long as national intelligence institutions are operating within their proper authorities, they may, according to Article 14, ‘request relevant organs, organisations, and citizens provide necessary support, assistance, and cooperation’.”^[237] In response, Mr. Juneau-Katsuya indicated that he viewed this law as sending an aggressive message to other countries and the entire Chinese diaspora. With respect to the diaspora, he stated that this law signifies to them that they must collaborate with the PRC, whether or not their collaboration makes them traitors to the country where they reside.^[238]

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya stated that Canadians needed to understand that the PRC’s intelligence services are almost in direct line with the PRC central committee, which gives them their marching orders.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya also noted that, according to allegations found in media reports, some individuals residing in Canada were on the payroll of the PRC. In that respect, domestic foreign interference is not only carried out by foreign diplomats but also by Canadians who help assist foreign countries in a way that approximates treason.^[239]

b)    Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya provided his views to the Committee on communications issues within Canada’s national security and intelligence system, and the challenges of converting intelligence into evidence.

He noted that communication problems within the national security and intelligence system existed both in the vertical and horizontal directions. The horizontal communication problem was that information was not circulating among security and intelligence agencies as it should.^[240] He indicated that this lack of horizontal information sharing has undermined national security, citing examples in which CSIS, the RCMP, and the other agencies, failed to communicate with each other as they should have. He cited Air India Flight 182, the Adil Charkaoui affair, the Ahmed Ressam affair, and the Jeffrey Delisle affair as notable examples.

In respect of the vertical communication problem, he stated information was not being effectively transmitted from the agencies to leadership (e.g., the Prime Minister’s Office and relevant Ministers).

In terms of the dilemma of converting intelligence into evidence, Mr. Juneau-Katsuya stated that this problem has existed since CSIS’ creation. In his view, CSIS was created for the wrong historical reasons with its order to never put themselves in a position where they would have to testify in court.^[241]

In the cases that Mr. Juneau-Katsuya cited in which information was not shared horizontally between agencies, he indicated that the blame lay with CSIS, as its agents did not want to testify or provide information. He stated that when CSIS provides information to the RCMP for a court proceeding, the RCMP must identify the origin of that information. However, CSIS has avoided testifying in court at all costs.

c)     Foreign Election Interference in Past Federal and Provincial Ministries

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya told the Committee that every Prime Minister, since the ministry of Mr. Mulroney, has been “compromised one way or the other and led to decisions that were questionable in terms of the interests of Canada.”^[242] In his view, this was the result of “the agent of influence that succeeded in gaining access to the decision process.”^[243] As such, in his view, while Mr. Harper was guilty of wrong decisions, he was not the only Prime Minister to have done so.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya also provided the Committee with his perspective on the government’s decision to ban Huawei Technologies from being involved in Canada’s fifth generation wireless network. He stated that, faced with the same decision as Canada about involving Huawei or not, its Five Eyes partners made a relatively quick decision to ban the company. Meanwhile, Canada lagged far behind its partners in arriving at a decision. In his view, the ambivalence that Canada displayed on this matter supported the evidence that since the 1990s, the U.S. had engaged in an operation called Dragon Lord. The purpose of this operation was to monitor Canadian political activities and actions, as the country was suspected of having been influenced, infiltrated, or having failed to take appropriate steps to protect the Five Eyes alliance, along with Canadian security generally. In his view, the events of Huawei appear to be consistent with the view that Canadian decisions needed to be monitored by its U.S. security partner.^[244]

d)    Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya provided to the Committee a recommendation that every candidate who participates in a federal election must sign a declaration, on their honour, that they are neither influenced by or under the authority of a foreign state. He proposed that the same declaration be signed by the staff of the candidates.^[245]

6.     Mike MacDonald, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Office of the Chief Information Officer, Treasury Board Secretariat

a)     Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Mike MacDonald, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Office of the Chief Information Officer, Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) told the Committee that about his background in Canada’s national security and intelligence community. From 2020 to 2023, he held the position of assistant secretary of the security intelligence secretariat, housed in the PCO. In 2021, he served as the acting national security and intelligence adviser for a period of two and a half weeks (15 July 2021 to 3 August 2021), which coincided with the distribution of the 20 July 2021 CSIS intelligence assessment concerning threats to Mr. Chong.^[246]

He noted that his current role was with TBS, which advises and supports the national security and intelligence adviser and provides management functions for interdepartmental security and intelligence committees.

Mr. MacDonald stated that, in his view, Canada has in place robust tools to combat foreign election interference, such as the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, which established both the panel of five and the SITE Task Force. Further, he noted that both NSIRA and NSICOP were conducting studies on foreign interference.^[247]

However, he indicated that Canadians should be under “no illusions about the threat posed by foreign interference against our institutions.”^[248] Indeed, the seriousness of these threats dictated that extreme due diligence was needed. At the same time, Mr. MacDonald noted that, in security and intelligence operations, a balance needed to be struck between identifying facts and taking action. He noted that it takes a judgement call to determine whether action needed to be taken, versus continuing to monitor, assess and advise.^[249]

Mr. MacDonald also indicated that, in his view, there was confidence that Canada’s 2019 and 2021 federal elections were free and fair.^[250]

b)    The Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s 20 July 2021 Intelligence Assessment

During Mr. MacDonald’s appearance, questions arose regarding the 20 July 2021 CSIS intelligence assessment. Mr. MacDonald acknowledged that he was the acting national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister at the time that this report was produced. However, he only first learned about its existence from the Globe and Mail news article on 1 May 2023.

Mr. MacDonald told the Committee that he had checked his personal holdings from the time when he worked at PCO and confirmed that he did not directly receive the 20 July 2021 CSIS report. He stated that he was unaware of what offices received the report. He surmised that it “went to places in the PCO where most intelligence is sent for forward distribution and/or printing in packages and so on.”^[251]

Mr. MacDonald stated that, in his experience working in the national security community, intelligence was sent out and shared with individuals through various means. These included:^[252]

• through the electronic system or the top secret classified system;
• directly by intelligence analysts;
• in prepared briefing packages; and
• at his request, the client relations officer at CSE would create intelligence and information based on the issues of the day and his requirements.

Mr. MacDonald indicated that the matter of the 20 July 2021 CSIS report demonstrated that, at that time, the communications process was insufficient and ended up breaking down. He stated that systems have been put in place since that time to address the fact that information was not shared when it should have been.^[253]

Lastly, he underscored the enormous volume of intelligence created by Canada, which amounts to 60,000 intelligence reports annually. A volume that does not account for reports created by the Five Eyes. He stated that the sheer volume of information was hard to go through and distill and be aware.^[254]

c)     Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

Mr. MacDonald shared with the Committee lessons that he had learned from senior officials in the security and intelligence community, which were that members of the House of Commons:^[255]

• as consumers of intelligence, needed to challenge the intelligence that they received. This was because intelligence was often not a complete picture, but rather a moment in time;
• needed to assess and contextualize the intelligence they received to seek clarity and create a bigger picture of what it shows or does not show; and
• needed to give informed advice on what intelligence means and what the options are for senior decision-makers.

He also noted that there needed to be better ways in which intelligence can be both shared, and identified and flagged for individuals when needed.^[256]

7.     David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

a)     The Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s 20 July 2021 Intelligence Assessment

David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, served as the acting national security and intelligence adviser for six months, starting in early July 2021 (July 2021 to 21 January 2022). He told the Committee that he had he undertaken this role while simultaneously serving as the foreign and defence policy adviser.

Mr. Morrison provided information and responded to questions about a CSIS intelligence assessment on Chinese foreign interference, which was disseminated on 20 July 2021, and later, in May 2023, was disclosed without authorization to The Globe and Mail.

He stated that Privy Council Office records indicate that the 20 July 2021 CSIS intelligence assessment was included in his reading pack on 17 August 2021. According to Mr. Morrison, he had “no recollection of receiving it or reading it on that date.”^[257] Rather, he recalled being fully occupied, at the time, with the Taliban having taken control of Afghanistan on 15 August 2021, and the related evacuation efforts.

Mr. Morrison indicated that he read the 20 July 2021 report once the situation in Afghanistan stabilized. He commissioned a follow-up memo from analysts at PCO, in order to gain the fullest possible picture of Chinese foreign interference in Canada.^[258] This memo, which was intended for information purposes and not for action by any individual, was not finalized before Mr. Morrison ceased to be the acting national security and intelligence adviser, though he acknowledged that much of the memo’s contents were reported on by Global News. He stated that he was aware that the PRC’s United Front workers department had existed, in one form or another, in Canada since the 1950s, and was interested in knowing more about their activities.^[259]

Further, Mr. Morrison told the Committee that, in his view, two important aspects about the 20 July 2021 CSIS intelligence assessment seem to have been widely misunderstood. These were that:^[260]

• Firstly, the report’s purpose was to raise awareness on the topics it covered but was never intended to spur action by those who read it. It was meant to establish “a ‘baseline for understanding the intent, motives and scope’ of Beijing’s foreign interference in Canada.” The report did not contain the name of any member of the House of Commons. According to Mr. Morrison, CSIS reports of this type were meant to be lengthy periodic assessments, designed to build understanding of complex issues. He indicated that, for these types of reports, it was “certainly not something that I would have rushed to brief up the Prime Minister on.”
• Secondly, anyone who read it could “have safely assumed that any necessary action on any of the specific points raised had already been taken.” Indeed, this was the case for the reference in the report to PRC actions against Canadian members of the House.

As background information about the 20 July 2021 report, Mr. Morrison stated that following Mr. Chong’s 18 February 2021 motion in the House of Commons, regarding the recognition of a genocide carried out by the PRC against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims living in China, the PRC built profiles and contemplated action against Mr. Chong and other members of the House.

Mr. Morrison noted that, in February and March 2021, when the intelligence first surfaced of a threat to members of the House, the information was alarming but there was no physical threat. He stated that it was up to others in the security and intelligence system to determine, at that point, how loud the alarm was ringing and what actions were required to be taken.^[261]

In response to this activity on the part of the PRC, CSIS wrote an IMU in May 2021, directed to the Minister of Public Safety. The purpose of the IMU was to inform the minister that CSIS intended to provide defensive briefings to members of the House who, according to the intelligence, the PRC had intended to target. However, the IMU was not an action note seeking a decision from the minister.^[262]

Overall, Mr. Morrison stated that the security and intelligence system did function according to the protocols that were in place at that time. He noted that the system has since been changed, including a new ministerial directive that was issued on 16 May 2023 requiring ministers to be briefed on any intelligence received about specific members of the House.^[263] He also stated that the focus on the 20 July 2021 report has been misplaced because action by the relevant authorities with respect to the targeting of members of the House had already been taken before the report was even published.^[264]

Some members of the Committee expressed astonishment that, upon reading that a member of the House and his family were being targeted by the PRC, Mr. Morrison did not ensure that the member was informed, as well as the relevant minister and the Prime Minister. Similarly, some members expressed concerns that Mr. Morrison, who served as a member of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol panel for the 2021 federal general election, did not appear to link the significance of the memo concerning threats to politicians provided to him two days after the election was called with the information that he was subsequently briefed on during the election about suspicious activity.

In response, Mr. Morrison indicated that the reports and memos he received in his role as acting national security and intelligence adviser, and deputy minister, were for information only, and not for action.

b)    Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

Mr. Morrison told the Committee that, in his view, the current set-up of Canada’s national security system was to combat terrorism. He indicated that this system was put in place starting around 1989, and that, following September 2001, the primary national security threat was deemed to come from terrorists. However, after Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, he indicated that terrorism continues to be Canada’s primary national security threat.^[265]

8.     Dan Stanton, Former Executive Manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

a)     Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Dan Stanton, former Executive Manager, CSIS, told the Committee that he is very proud of his 30 years of service with the agency and the important work it does to keep Canadians safe.^[266] However, he believes that the system is not working. Mr. Stanton asserted that Mr. Chong should have been told, on a priority basis, that he and his family members were being targeted by the PRC as soon as credible information was made available to CSIS.^[267] In fact, Mr. Stanton believes that CSIS should have told Mr. Chong directly rather than waiting for the information to move through the machinery of government.^[268]

Mr. Stanton is concerned by the way in which information flows, or doesn’t, from CSIS to ministers. He believes there are gaps in the information sharing process that need to be rectified. He stressed that that critical information must be shared with ministers so that they can make decisions.^[269]

Regarding Mr. Chong, Mr. Stanton’s understanding is that CSIS collected intelligence, determined that it needed immediate attention, they sent it through the routine system, but it was not read.^[270] Mr. Stanton described this as “disheartening,” noting that he spent 32 years collecting information.^[271] As there is considerable risk and expense associated with producing intelligence reports, they should be read.^[272]

While the existing mechanisms for sharing information are not working from Mr. Stanton’s perspective, he also warned against a system where intelligence agencies are shaping the narrative by telling policymakers what they must read.^[273]

Mr. Stanton also expressed concerns about the information leaks.^[274] He believes that because Canadians have distrust with the institution, there is a “nobility” among the leakers. He wants to see a stop to the leaking of information.^[275]

b)    Merits of Holding a Public Inquiry

A public inquiry, in Mr. Stanton’s opinion, is needed so that Canadians can regain trust in our intelligence institutions.^[276] He is not persuaded by the argument that a public inquiry would upset the Five Eyes.^[277] Mr. Stanton told the Committee that he worked with nine of the twelve Five Eyes partners’ intelligence agencies and that they have high regard for Canada’s intelligence agencies and national security infrastructure.^[278] If Five Eyes reporting was captured by a public inquiry, it could be “sanitized” for disclosure.^[279] Additionally, if a public inquiry came across sensitive materials, it could hold in camera discussions to protect that information.^[280]

Mr. Stanton told the Committee that there are precedents for public inquiries on national security matters, highlighting Justice John Major’s commission inquiry into the bombing of Air India flight 182.^[281]

c)     Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

Mr. Stanton explained that CSIS, CSE, the Canadian Armed Forces and others are subject to an annual review of their performance and compliance with policy.^[282] Mr. Stanton suggested that the same type of review needs to occur for policymakers receiving intelligence.^[283] Mr. Stanton argued for increased ministerial accountability where each department takes responsibility for briefing up intelligence.^[284]

9.     Rob Stewart, Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

a)     Measures Taken to Combat Foreign Interference Threats in Democratic Processes

Rob Stewart, Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development told the Committee that foreign interference is an ongoing challenge. It is clandestine and deceptive, and seeks to influence our democratic processes. He stated that foreign interference is a serious problem that needs to be taken very seriously.^[285]

Mr. Stewart stated that, as the Deputy Minister of Public Safety during the 2021 federal general election, he was a member of the panel of five, which was entrusted with administering the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol.^[286]

He told the Committee that for both the 2019 and 2021 federal general elections, the panel concluded that foreign interference did not impact the integrity of either election. However, he stated that the threat to Canadian democracy is real.^[287]

Mr. Stewart provided information about the government’s whole-of-society plan to protect Canada’s democracy ahead of the 2019 federal general election. He began by noting that the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol was integral to informing Canadians about any impact on free and fair elections during the caretaker convention period (i.e., during the election period).

He stated that the protocol is administered by a panel of five senior public servants. Drawing on information and intelligence sources, from within and outside the public service, the panel is entrusted with exercising significant judgment in determining whether an incident or series of incidents meets the threshold for public announcement. The threshold for public announcement by the panel is high and considered to be a last resort. Determinations made by the panel are made on a consensual basis.^[288]

Further, Mr. Stewart indicated that the panel had interpreted its job as being to determine whether there is a threat to the integrity of the election in broad terms, rather than whether there was a threat to the election in a specific riding. To that end, he noted that the panel was informed of “questionable activity in various ridings.”^[289]

The Committee notes that it holds concerns about how the criteria are established for meeting the threshold for a public announcement to be made, and whether the threshold, as it stood in the past two federal general elections, is too high. Similarly, the Committee holds concerns that the panel was informed of questionable activities that were observed in various ridings and yet none of the affected parties were informed, in a timely fashion, if at all, about these matters.

In respect of information and intelligence sources, Mr. Stewart stated that, for the 2021 election, the panel received briefs from SITE, which consisted of the CSE, CSIS, the RCMP, and the RRM at Global Affairs Canada.^[290]

b)    Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Mr. Stewart provided the Committee with information about intelligence collection in Canada and resulting reports. He stated that, domestically, Canadian agencies collected two kinds of intelligence: human intelligence (i.e., human sources) and signals intelligence (i.e., electronic transmissions).

He explained that the veracity of intelligence, particularly raw intelligence, ranged from some degree of certainty to very speculative. As such, intelligence required a credibility assessment. He noted that in the security and intelligence community, the language used about matters tended to state that “we assess this to be the case” rather than “we know it to be true.”^[291]

Mr. Stewart stated that human and signals intelligence was turned into two types of reports: raw reports and assessed intelligence. The latter have been distilled and analyzed for credibility and verifiability. Further, he noted that “a couple of units in the government” create stand-alone intelligence pieces that generate views of the world that are informed by top secret intelligence, and have top secret information embedded in them. Lastly, Canada obtains intelligence through the Five Eyes network, which are the product of various agencies in those countries.

Mr. Stewart stated that the intelligence from these sources were bundled into a binder every couple of days. In his role as Deputy Minister of Public Safety, he stated that “[y]ou flip through the binder, and you try to detect trends or issues of interest. Those tend to be from a public safety point of view, the larger ones.”^[292]

Mr. Stewart noted that intelligence gleaned from social media was very opaque and not at all easy to understand. Certainty in assessing this type of intelligence is difficult because “we can’t be certain as to how social media work or who’s doing what.”^[293] As such, he stated that when a situation arises, the security and intelligence community has to take the time to carry out an in-depth investigation, using their tools.

c)     The Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s May 2021 Issues Management Note, and Its Report Dated 20 July 2021

During his appearance, Mr. Stewart responded to questions about his knowledge of both a May 2021 CSIS IMU, and a CSIS intelligence assessment dated 20 July 2021. It was noted that the IMU contained information about the PRC targeting Mr. Chong and other members of the House of Commons.

In respect of the May 2021 CSIS IMU, Mr. Stewart told the Committee that he likely would have read it in May 2021. He did not brief Mr. Blair about the IMU, as the responsibility for raising IMUs to senior decision-makers generally belonged to CSIS, as part of their discussions with Public Safety Canada. Further, Mr. Stewart did not recall of an operational decision not to inform Mr. Blair about the IMU.^[294]

In respect of the 20 July 2021 report, Mr. Stewart indicated that his job as Deputy Minister of Public Safety did not include informing the many people in Canada, who, on an ongoing basis, are being targeted by foreign interference, that they are targets. He stated that there are processes in places for informing people that they are being targeted, and that he was not tracking other people’s work on this front.

Mr. Stewart also told the Committee that intelligence information is circulated in Canada through secured communications technology. He stated that these secured systems had end points, located in secure spaces. Normally, a minister or their staff would not have access to the systems, as access was “tightly controlled and generally run by bureaucrats.”^[295]

Mr. Stewart noted that the secured communications systems were not conventional email systems. However, there was mail on the systems, but that it was contained within the systems. As such, he noted that he did not believe that Mr. Blair would have been sent the May 2021 CSIS IMU by email. Rather, it would have sent on a top secret system to a secured end point, downloaded, printed, then packaged for Mr. Blair. Mr. Stewart noted that, at Public Safety, intelligence moved through the department in paper form. Mr. Stewart told the Committee that he receives briefing binders on a regular basis with the contents of intelligence produced by various systems.^[296]

10.     Jody Thomas, National Security and Intelligence Advisor, Privy Council Office

a)     Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Ms. Jody Thomas, National Security and Intelligence Advisor, Privy Council Office (11 January 2022 to 26 January 2024), told the Committee that Canada’s security agencies collect between 3,000 and 4,000 pieces of intelligence every month.^[297] This is in addition to intelligence that Canada receives from Five Eyes.^[298] Ms. Thomas explained that intelligence agencies cannot share all intelligence in their holdings.^[299] Instead, client relations officers identify and distribute intelligence.^[300]

In her role as National Security and Intelligence Advisor, Ms. Thomas is provided with a daily reading file that contains somewhere between 50 and 100 pieces of intelligence.^[301] Ms. Thomas noted that, in some cases, intelligence is sent to her and then she decides who within PCO should receive that intelligence.^[302]

Ms. Thomas explained that she receives different types of intelligence in her role. In some cases, she receives intelligence that has been assessed by the Intelligence Assessment Branch within PCO.^[303] At other times, she may receive single-source, uncorroborated intelligence.^[304] In her remarks to the Committee, Ms. Thomas explained that it is rare that a single piece of intelligence is a “smoking gun.”^[305] Intelligence reveals pieces of a story built over time that requires analysis.^[306]

Members of the Prime Minister’s Office receive daily reading packages on intelligence similar to those Ms. Thomas receives. Packages for the PMO are put together by client relations officers. In addition to these daily reading packages, Ms. Thomas and the intelligence assessment secretariat in PCO provide members of the PMO with weekly briefings on a range of issues.^[307]

Ms. Thomas told the Committee that Canada’s elections have been free, open and safe.^[308]

From Ms. Thomas’ perspective, Canada’s intelligence agencies do a good job of collecting and assessing intelligence, but do not provide government with adequate advice.^[309] She noted that the critical part of intelligence is what you do with it, which requires discussion about what it means and how it should be used.^[310]

Finally, Ms. Thomas also told the Committee that CSIS is limited by its Act, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. She explained that CSIS is only able to share information through a formal threat reduction measure.^[311]

b)    Measures Taken to Counter Foreign Interference Threats in Democratic Processes

Ms. Thomas told the Committee that there should be no single point of failure within the intelligence system.^[312] She said that, in the case of Mr. Chong, there was not only a breakdown in process, but insufficient process to begin with.^[313] Ms. Thomas explained that steps have been taken to rectify the issues identified by this case. Ms. Thomas told the Committee that on 6 April 2023, the Honourable Dominic LeBlanc, the then Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities (October 2021 to July 2023) and the Clerk of the Privy Council submitted a report to the Prime Minister outlining a number of actions that have been taken in response.^[314]

• In the spring of 2023 Public Safety Canada completed a public consultation on a foreign influence transparency registry.
• Work is being done to develop legislative proposals to modernize legislation so that intelligence and law enforcement agencies can better detect the threat, assist Canadians in protecting themselves against it, and hold to account foreign interference actors.
• The SITE Task Force began enhanced monitoring and assessment of foreign interference threats during by-elections.
• Improvements to the way intelligence is communicated and coordinated within government.
• Public Safety Canada has established a national counter-foreign interference coordinator, who will drive the government’s proactive response to the threat of foreign interference.
• The creation of the deputy minister committee on intelligence response, which will examine intelligence, direct appropriate response and develop related advice for the government.
• A direction made by the Minister of Public Safety that parliamentarians will be informed of threats to them, whenever possible and within the law, while protecting the integrity of investigations.^[315]

With regard to the last point, Ms. Thomas explained that the Prime Minister and Mr. Mendicino have given clear direction to CSIS and other intelligence agencies that there is an expectation that members of the House be briefed on all intelligence holdings about them, regardless of the severity or reliability of those holdings.^[316] Additionally, moving forward, intelligence that references a member of the House will be brought to the NSIA directly and to deputy ministers.^[317]

In addition to briefing the member in question, Ms. Thomas told the Committee that the Prime Minister has directed that any intelligence mentioning foreign interference and a member of the House must be briefed up, regardless of its credibility.^[318] This direction was formalized by a ministerial directive issued by Mr. Mendicino.^[319]

Ms. Thomas told the Committee that briefings with members of the House regarding intelligence requires trust that the member will not make information shared with them public.^[320]

c)     Observations on the Question of Privilege Related to the Intimidation Campaign Against the Member for Wellington—Halton Hills and Other Members

Ms. Thomas explained to the Committee that she was not in the role of national security and intelligence advisor in 2021 when CSIS identified the threats against Mr. Chong.^[321] Ms. Thomas became aware of the targeting of Mr. Chong when it was published in the Globe and Mail in the Spring of 2023.^[322] She explained that she also became aware of the targeting of Ms. Kwan and Mr. O’Toole around the same time.^[323]

Once the targeting of Mr. Chong was made public, the Prime Minister organized a meeting between Mr. Chong and Ms. Thomas where she provided a briefing.^[324] Following this meeting, Ms. Thomas conducted a review to determine who the July 2021 CSIS memo was sent to.^[325] As a result of this review, Ms. Thomas learned that the memo was sent to PCO in July of 2021 and was presented to the acting NSIA in August of that year.^[326] Additionally, the memo was sent to the deputy ministers of public safety, foreign affairs and national defence, but was not shared with any Minister.^[327] Ms. Thomas shared the results of the investigation with Mr. Chong.^[328]

In July 2021 Ms. Thomas was Deputy Minister of Defence, and therefore was one of the deputy ministers who were sent the July 2021 CSIS memo.^[329] However, Ms. Thomas was on leave during that time. Ms. Thomas explained that the Deputy Minister of Defence was the only person within the Department of National Defence that was approved to read the memo.^[330] The memo would have been destroyed through regular destruction processes and was never read by Ms. Thomas.^[331] Ms. Thomas noted that had the July 2021 CSIS memo been “relevant to the operating of the department of National Defence” somebody else in the department would have read it and actioned it while she was away.^[332]

d)    Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

Ms. Thomas believes that there must be a better system of management for intelligence that is sent to deputy ministers’ offices, ministers’ offices and the NSIA so that they can properly brief the Prime Minister and ministers.^[333] Ms. Thomas also stressed that sharing intelligence is just one element. The second important element is that intelligence agencies are giving advice on what to do with that intelligence.^[334]

Ms. Thomas believes that CSIS is limited by its Act in what it can share with MPs, opposition parties and other levels of government.^[335] Ms. Thomas believes that a modernizing the CSIS Act and providing CSIS with a broader ability to share information would be “extraordinarily useful.”^[336]

11.     David Vigneault, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

a)     Observations on the Question of Privilege Related to the Intimidation Campaign Against the Member for Wellington—Halton Hills and Other Members

David Vigneault, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, told the Committee that in May 2021 an IMU was sent from CSIS to the Minister of Public Safety, Mr. Bill Blair (at the time), warning that Mr. Chong and his family were being targeted by the PRC.^[337] The IMU included a specific directive that it be forwarded to the Minister.^[338] The purpose of the IMU was to highlight the information and bring it to the Minister’s attention.^[339] When asked whether the information contained in the May 2021 IMU was information that Mr. Blair did not need to know, Mr. Vigneault stated that “the fact that we did an issue management note speaks to the notion that we wanted to highlight the information” to Mr. Blair.^[340] However, it was Mr. Vigneault’s understanding is that it was clear that Mr. Blair never saw the IMU and that he had no reason to doubt Mr. Blair on that point.^[341]

Mr. Vigneault explained that he, or other senior CSIS officials, would meet with Mr. Blair to brief him on information they thought he should be aware of. In some cases, information was also shared through documentation.^[342] Documents are sent electronically to the department where it is printed and made available to the minister.^[343] Mr. Vigneault explained that he did not have any specific discussions with Mr. Blair about the May 2021 IMU.

Mr. Vigneault estimated that CSIS sends zero to three IMUs per week.^[344]

Mr. Vigneault believes that this situation highlighted that the processes in place at the time were not working.^[345] He noted that CSIS and other intelligence organizations take risks to collect intelligence and that it’s important for it to be made available to the right people.^[346]

CSIS provided Mr. Chong with a threat reduction briefing in May 2023, during which classified information was shared that made him aware of potential threats against him.^[347]

b)    Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Mr. Vigneault described to the Committee how CSIS collects, analyses and shares intelligence. First, CSIS collects intelligence from open sources, technical intercepts, human sources, partners, interviews and other investigative techniques.^[348] Second, intelligence professionals analyse the information and build an intelligence picture that is developed over time.^[349] This analysis consists of several steps including an assessment of the source and reliability of the information, the ability to corroborate the information and historical trends and context.^[350] Finally, CSIS determines what information to share and with whom.^[351] CSIS may share “raw” intelligence, or it may share intelligence products that provide a better understanding of the whole picture.^[352] Mr. Vigneault explained that “the threshold for sharing intelligence and advice is not an exact science.”^[353] When making this determination, CSIS considers the government’s intelligence priorities and requirements. Intelligence products are shared to inform Government of Canada decisions.

Mr. Vigneault explained that IMUs are one type of product CSIS produces. This tool was created so that CSIS could bring information to the attention of particular people, sometimes ministers but often other personnel within the federal public service.^[354] Mr. Vigneault explained that IMUs can contain intelligence, or another message they want particular people to be aware of.^[355]

Mr. Vigneault explained to the Committee that Canada benefits from belonging to a number of collective defence organizations including NATO.^[356] Additionally, CSIS has a significant international component with agents posted around the world.^[357]

Mr. Vigneault noted that CSIS has been investigating foreign interference since its inception in 1984.^[358] As a result of this ongoing investigation, CSIS has long been advising Canadians of the threat from foreign interference and from the PRC.^[359] In response to these ongoing threats, for the last 30 years CSIS has reported on foreign interference in its annual operational and public report. Additionally, it has published unclassified reports, including “Foreign Interference and You” in over seven languages.^[360] CSIS has also conducted outreach and awareness campaigns with communities, universities and the research sector.^[361]

CSIS prioritizes providing elected officials with briefings tailored to their individual circumstances.^[362] Mr. Vigneault noted that CSIS strives to provide elected officials with as much detail as they need in order to mitigate threats.^[363] Defensive briefs are carried out by trained, professional intelligence officers.^[364] If there is a threat to the personal safety of an elected official, it is immediately referred to law enforcement and the proper authorities.^[365]

Mr. Vigneault expressed concern over leaks from the intelligence community. He noted that leaks have damaged the morale and reputation of the organization.^[366] Mr. Vigneault explained that there are ongoing investigations, and he expressed his hope that the results of the investigation will be public.^[367]

In response to a question about CSIS’s budget, Mr. Vigneault confirmed that the 2021–2022 budget was $20 million less than the 2020–2021 budget.^[368]

c)     Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

Mr. Vigneault told the Committee that there is broad support for reviewing and updating the CSIS Act. He noted that Mr. Mendicino, Mr. LeBlanc, NSICOP, the Honourable Paul Rouleau who was the Commissioner of the Public Order Emergency Commission, and the Federal Court have all expressed a need for the Act to be modernized. Mr. Vigneault agrees and explained that a modernization of the CSIS Act would be an opportunity for CSIS to respond to parliamentarians more fully.^[369] In particular, CSIS needs broader authority to share information.^[370]

12.     Artur Wilczynski, Former Assistant Deputy Minister and Director General, Intelligence Operations, Communications Security Establishment

a)     Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Artur Wilczynski, former Assistant Deputy Minister and Director General, Intelligence Operations, Communications Security Establishment, told the Committee that the “dissemination, consumption and use of information in Canada must be modernized.”^[371]

Mr. Wilczynski explained to the Committee that, in Canada, intelligence is produced by a wide range of actors which includes CSIS, the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, FINTRAC, CBSA, the Privy Council Office and Global Affairs, with additional information flowing to Canada through the Five Eyes, NATO and other arrangements.^[372]

Mr. Wilczynski suggested to the Committee that it is “almost impossible to effectively manage” the large volume of classified information flowing to consumers of intelligence.^[373] Mr. Wilczynski suggested that Canada needs to invest more in the assessment and consumption of this intelligence.^[374]

b)    Merits of Holding a Public Inquiry

Mr. Wilczynski spoke in favour of an independent inquiry as a way of establishing trust in our democracy and institutions.^[375] Mr. Wilczynski noted that there have been cases of public inquiries involving classified documents and that this shouldn’t be a deterrent for proceeding with an independent investigation.^[376]

Additionally, Mr. Wilczynski expressed concern over House of Commons staff being responsible for reviewing and redacting classified documents. He suggested a public inquiry would be better suited for this role.^[377]

c)     Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

At his appearance, Mr. Wilczynski suggested that Canada needs to have greater transparency in intelligence and that this should be the role of the office of the NSIA.^[378]

Mr. Wilczynski believes that deputy ministers should be more accountable for how their organizations use the intelligence they ask for.^[379] He suggested that consumers of intelligence should communicate with the organizations that collect information and tell them how the intelligence was used.^[380] Mr. Wilczynski noted that without adequate feedback, clients are receiving a higher volume of information.^[381]

Mr. Wilczynski told the Committee that Canada needs to modernize and improve the coordination of the client relations officer. Mr. Wilczynski explained that the purpose of this role is to meet with clients to ensure the timeliness of information.^[382] He believes that there are too few of these positions, and that they ought to be at a more senior level to properly engage with deputies and senior officials.^[383]

Mr. Wilczynski discussed the importance of establishing a threshold for reporting information to members of Parliament.^[384] Mr. Wilczynski suggested that in the face of a threat against an individual, assessments to determine whether engaging with those targeted could help them manage the risk.^[385]

G. Evidence From Academics, Political Observers, Former Public Servants and Civil Society Groups

1.     Peter German, Chair of the Advisory Committee, Vancouver Anti-Corruption Institute

a)     Observations on National Security Literacy in Canada

Peter German, Chair of the Advisory Committee, Vancouver Anti-Corruption Institute, told the Committee to not underestimate the national security literacy of Canadians. He said that he suspected every Canadian would have an opinion on national security, in particular the members of the diasporas who have been targeted by authoritarian governments in countries where they formerly resided. He indicated that he lived in greater Vancouver, and that the large Iranian and Chinese diasporas knew full well about the implications of the issues related to foreign election interference, and that they held positions on the topic.^[386]

b)    Observations on Money Laundering

Mr. German stated that while national and international law enforcement bodies did not necessarily know how foreign states moved their money abroad, it was nonetheless important that this money be followed. For this to happen, he indicated that enforcement agencies need to have the necessary expertise and resources to track the money back to its source. He stated that most money can be traced back to its source, with the exception of cash.^[387] With respect to China, Mr. German indicated that the PRC was tough on organized crime and drug crimes within China. However, the PRC did little to pursue its citizens or persons of Chinese ethnicity who commit these crimes outside of China. As such, there is a lot of organized crime outside China with connections to the home country.

c)     Access for Parliamentarians to Confidential Documents

In response to a question about whether the members of the House of Commons who were offered the opportunity to examine the sensitive information reported on by Mr. Johnston ought to avail themselves of the opportunity, Mr. German responded yes but qualified his response. He stated that if the member considered that this intelligence was going to be of use in their work, they should certainly avail oneself of that intelligence.^[388] However, he noted that non-disclosure agreements have the downside of disallowing a person to talk about the sensitive information that they have learned about.

d)    Proposals for the Committee’s Consideration

During his appearance, Mr. German provided committee members with the following suggestion for their consideration about strengthening Canada’s regime for combatting foreign election interference. He noted that Parliament should strengthen the ability of the Commissioner of Canada Elections to investigate cases of electoral interference. He noted that the investigative unit in that office, in his view, did not have the necessary tools to carry out a money-laundering investigation. As an example, he indicated that he did not believe that the office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections had access to intelligence from FINTRAC, which is Canada’s financial intelligence agency, due to various restrictions. Further, he did not believe that the office could obtain a wiretap for electronic eavesdropping.^[389]

2.     Thomas Juneau, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa

a)     Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Thomas Juneau, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, provided the Committee with his perspective on several aspects of Canada’s national security and intelligence system. These aspects included systematic issues with the current functioning of Canada’s national security and intelligence departments and agencies, and the relationship between the security and intelligence apparatus, Parliament and the public.

According to Mr. Juneau, there remains an ongoing disconnect between the national intelligence community and parliamentarians. He stated that the national intelligence community has a culture that remains too insular, closed and resistant to change. Further, it suffers from weak policy literacy. On the other hand, the consumers of intelligence products, including Parliament and the bureaucracy, were not optimally positioned to ask for the right intelligence support, while also suffering from weak intelligence literacy.^[390]

To help remedy this issue, Mr. Juneau advocated for better training for the intelligence community, stating that their training programs are often mediocre and have very little measurement about how training money was spent. He also spoke favourably of increasing secondments and exchanges for intelligence officers into different policy areas, indicating that this could help break silos and foster mutual understanding.

Mr. Juneau stated that, in his view, there currently existed an epidemic of over-classification of documents by Canada’s national security partners. He considered this issue to be “a major obstacle to information sharing between clients and the intelligence world.”^[391]

Mr. Juneau also raised anecdotal issues that he had come across during his research about human resource problems in the national intelligence community. These included challenges related to recruitment, retention, morale, and career paths. Further, he noted that there were massive backlogs in receiving security clearance. He indicated that he had heard of new hires having to wait six to 12 months to finalize their security investigation.^[392]

Mr. Juneau recommended that, within Canada’s national security organizations, low-level promotions be contingent on “more ambitious criteria of diversity of experience requirements.”^[393] He noted that within several intelligence organizations, officials have been promoted up to the Assistant Deputy Minister level without ever having worked outside that particular agency.

Mr. Juneau also raised that, in his view, Canada’s intelligence community does not engage with civil society, academics and the media “as much as [it] should.”^[394] He noted that when such engagement occurs, the intelligence community tends to view it as an opportunity to tick a box. He stated that there was a need for serious engagement and two-way conversation between the intelligence community and Canadian diaspora communities being affected by foreign interference. Similarly, Mr. Juneau indicated that the intelligence community needed to engage better, in quantitative and qualitative terms, about foreign interference, with both the national media and smaller local media organizations. In his experience, he found that media do not receive answers from the intelligence community for days, and the answers they receive are “meaningless boilerplate speaking points.”^[395] In his view, this approach is deeply counterproductive because an educated population, buttressed by the media playing an important transmission role, forms a stronger national defence against foreign interference.

Mr. Juneau stated that, overall, in his view Canada was actively taking steps to counter foreign interference. He indicated that he had heard comments made by witnesses who had appeared before the Committee and members of the public stating that Canada is not doing anything. In his view, such statements in relation to the current or previous government were not true.^[396]

b)    Merits of Holding a Public Inquiry

Mr. Juneau told the Committee that a public inquiry could be held, while, at the same time, ensuring that important information remained secret. In his view, the argument against holding an independent public inquiry because it would reveal too much sensitive information was not a very convincing one.^[397]

However, he stated that, in his view, a public inquiry “would not make much of a difference” and would “add little value.”^[398] He indicated that those who were in favour of holding a public inquiry overestimated its potential benefits, while underestimating the contribution that could be made by the Committee, NSICOP, NSIRA, and other agencies.

In response to a question about comparing the benefits of the Committee’s study with the potential benefits of holding a public inquiry, Mr. Juneau noted that the Committee’s study was necessary and useful but that public hearings would have a less politicized context since they would not be held by elected politicians. Further, the public hearings would generate debate. However, he did not believe that public hearings would have a major impact.^[399]

c)     Miscellaneous Observations

Mr. Juneau stated that he did not find it surprising to learn that a minister would not use their top secret email. He noted that the system was not yet perfect and rather than describe those involved as having displayed “incompetence,” Mr. Juneau said that he preferred to use the word “imperfection.”^[400] In his view, the greater problem was that senior officials and politicians are not actually very interested in intelligence issues.

However, he stated that, compared to 10 or 20 years ago, today’s security and intelligence system has shown a trend of progressing and does function better. Nonetheless, it has not at all reached where it should be.

Further, Mr. Juneau stated that, in his view, the discussions about foreign interference have focused too much on China. While China was the main source of foreign interference, other threats included countries such as Iran, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, among others.^[401]

d)    Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

During his appearance, Mr. Juneau provided committee members with suggestions for their consideration about reforming the current national security and intelligence system. These included:^[402]

• Creating a register of foreign agents. He suggested that it be implemented carefully.
• Creating a cabinet committee on national security to provide sustained attention at the political level on national security issues. This committee would need stronger bureaucratic support through a strengthened national security and intelligence adviser position.
• Conducting a comprehensive national security review. He indicated that one had not been conducted since 2004 and that the need for a review was glaring. In his view, conducting such a review would have several benefits, such as responding to questions about identifying threats, responding to threats, and reassessing institutional governance and human resource functions. Further, a review would signal to the Canadian public and international allies that the country places a high level of importance on national security. It would also help raise awareness of national security and provide for a more informed debate on the topic.
• Strengthening the policy capacity in Public Safety Canada, which plays an important coordination role. In his view, Canada’s main threats, including foreign interference, need to be countered by both a whole-of-government effort and a whole-of-society effort.

3.     Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa

a)     Observations about the First Report by the Rt. Honourable David Johnston, Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference

Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, provided the Committee with her perspective on the First Report by the Rt. Hon. David Johnston, Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference. She indicated her surprise and disappointment that Mr. Johnston had decided against recommending an independent public inquiry.^[403] She noted that his report stated that the basis for rejecting an inquiry was that a public examination of the leaked materials could not be undertaken given the sensitivity of the intelligence. However, Ms. McCuaig-Johnston indicated that the contents of Mr. Johnston’s report did exactly that. She stated that Mr. Johnston’s thorough analysis proved that a person could assess intelligence and speak about it publicly.^[404]

Further, Ms. McCuaig-Johnston added the following about Mr. Johnston’s report:^[405]

• The report proposed that Canadian diaspora communities, such as the Uyghurs, Tibetans, Falun Gong, Hong Kongers, etc. attend the proposed public hearings but to do so would put these communities at further risk.
• By concluding that public hearings should be held, Mr. Johnston’s report demonstrates that it does not understand that the diaspora would never want to participate in them.
• A failing in the report is that it does not recommend any actions be taken against the PRC. Further, a failing on the part of the Canadian government is that it has not taken firmer action to combat the foreign interference Canada has seen so far.
• While the report indicates that Mr. Johnston has confidence in the integrity of the previous two federal general elections, she stated that “if even one riding was adversely affected by Chinese interference, that is a reflection of the Canadian electoral system and it should never, ever happen again.”

Further, she indicated that, in her view, it was very possible that PRC interference could account for the difference of 3,500 votes, which separated the first place and second place candidates, in 2015, in the federal riding of Steveston–Richmond East. It should be noted that the veracity of Ms. McCuaig-Johnston’s assertion on this matter was vigorously refuted by a member of the Committee.^[406]

b)    Merits of Holding Public Hearings Versus a Public Inquiry

Ms. McCuaig-Johnston told the Committee that she favoured holding a public inquiry over holding the public hearings proposed in Mr. Johnston’s report. She cited the following reasons:^[407]

• documents could be subpoenaed during a public inquiry;
• a public inquiry would receive more intelligence from CSIS and CSE that could be analyzed and assessed to determine the extent of foreign interference in Canada and to what extent Parliament and the public needs to be kept informed about it;
• in her view, public hearings would be seen to be superficial as it would not delve deeply into the issues that CSIS and others have exposure to; and
• that, in her view, the process for public hearings would be that public meetings would be held and would result in recommendations about the intelligence information-sharing process and governance, but would not delve into the details of the interference that China has been conducting in Canada.

Further, Ms. McCuaig-Johnston indicated that an NSICOP report on foreign election interference could be treated the same way as past NSICOP studies, whereby their important recommendations were ignored. She also noted that NSICOP reports to the Prime Minister, rather than to the House of Commons or Parliament.

c)     Observations About the Unauthorized Release of Top Secret Documents to the Media

Ms. McCuaig-Johnston expressed her gratitude to the public servants who leaked to the media the top secret documents about foreign interference by the PRC in Canada. In her view, they risked their careers and personal freedom to do this. She stated that without the leaked documents, the public would still be oblivious to the threat of foreign interference. Further, in her view, the leaks have “not caused the great harm to the Canadian interest that Mr. Johnston invoked.”^[408]

d)    Observations About the Chinese Diaspora Living in Canada and the PRC Consulates in Canada

Ms. McCuaig-Johnston compared the number of Chinese diplomats present in Canada (i.e.,176 diplomats) with the number present in the United States (i.e., 178 diplomats). She stated that Canada’s Chinese, Hong Kong and Taiwan diaspora counts about 1.4 million Canadians. However, she wondered why are the PRC was paying so much attention to Canada? She stated that, in her view, the PRC was attempting to use the diaspora as an extension of “the motherland,” have them support positions taken by the PRC, and not do anything to undermine those positions.^[409]

e)     Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

During her appearance, Ms. McCuaig-Johnston provided committee members with suggestions for their consideration about strengthening Canada’s regime for combatting foreign election interference. These included:^[410]

• establishing a national security committee of cabinet, which would meet regularly to receive CSIS-related intelligence, and would have the Prime Minister and other ministers as members; and
• creating a register of foreign agents that focused on the countries that Canada considered to be “a problem.”

4.     Andrew Mitrovica, Writer

a)     Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Andrew Mitrovica, Writer, expressed concern with the intelligence leaks emanating from the intelligence community. He noted that Mr. Johnston was correct in his report when he wrote that leaks involved “unsubstantiated speciation,” “limited intelligence” and a “lack of…context.”^[411]

Mr. Mitrovica also suggested that intelligence officers can and do make mistakes.^[412] He noted that intelligence must be considered in context and corroborated.^[413]

b)    Miscellaneous Observations

Mr. Mitrovica suggested the Committee show less deference to security officials who appear before it.^[414]

5.     Vincent Rigby, Visiting Professor, Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University

a)     Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Vincent Rigby, Visiting Professor, Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University, expressed his condemnation of the individual or individuals who have leaked highly classified intelligence.^[415] He stressed that the leaks undermine Canada’s national security, and could put peoples’ lives at risk.^[416] Furthermore, Mr. Rigby noted that isolated intelligence without context could present a misleading and incomplete picture of Canada’s national security concerns.^[417]

Mr. Rigby served as national security and intelligence advisor from 22 January 2020 to June 2021. He told the Committee that while he was in that role, he spoke with Mr. Trudeau about foreign interference on at least one occasion.^[418] Mr. Rigby noted that through his work he understood that foreign interference was a long-standing and growing problem in Canada.^[419]

During his 18-months as NSIA, Mr. Rigby estimates that he read between 5,000 and 7,000 intelligence reports. He suggested that the “vast majority” of these documents represented threats to Canadian democracy.^[420]

Mr. Rigby explained that the July 2021 report on the targeting of Mr. Chong and other members was produced after his departure from the role of NSIA.^[421] He told the Committee that he was not surprised that this intelligence was not raised to the political level. From Mr. Rigby’s perspective, Canada’s intelligence system lacked a formal system to flag important pieces of intelligence.^[422] Mr. Rigby described the system as “ad hoc, and…inconsistent.”^[423] He expressed concern about sending too much information on foreign interference for fear that it could “potentially gum up the system.”^[424]

Mr. Rigby told the Committee that during his tenure as NSIA, hard-copy intelligence packages of intelligence were presented to him.^[425] He told the Committee that he could not speak to the processes in Mr. Blair’s office.

While Mr. Rigby was NSIA, the Prime Minister received daily and weekly intelligence briefs prepared specifically for him.^[426] Mr. Rigby recalled briefing the Prime Minister on foreign interference but could not remember the specific pieces of intelligence.^[427]

Mr. Rigby expressed some concern over news reports that the Minister of Public Safety did not see a July 2021 memo with intelligence about foreign interference.^[428]

Mr. Rigby pointed to two reports published between December 2021 and May 2022, one authored by Wesley Wark and Aaron Shull, the other by Thomas Juneau and Mr. Rigby. Mr. Rigby told the Committee that both reports came to identical conclusions, that the national security structure in Canada was in peril, and that changes were required.^[429]

b)    Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

During his appearance, Mr. Rigby recommended the following measures be implemented:

• A position within the PCO with the power to flag important intelligence to the Prime Minister and other ministers.
• A cabinet committee be created on national security, chaired by the Prime Minister, that meets regularly to receive intelligence briefings and discuss responses.
• Transparency be increased by producing annual public threat assessments, responding to NSICOP reports, publishing intelligence priorities and sharing more intelligence with Members of Parliament.^[430]

Additionally, Mr. Rigby suggested that the position of the NSIA be reviewed and strengthened.^[431] He suggested the current NSIA should consider establishing a committee to focus on actionable intelligence.^[432]

6.     Wesley Wark, Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation

a)     Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

Wesley Wark, Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation, told the Committee that to strengthen the Canadian national security and intelligence system a three-part evaluation needed to be undertaken, consisting of: intelligence collection, analysis and reporting. He stated that improvements made to the machinery of government alone would not fix deficiencies in this broader intelligence cycle.^[433]

Further, he commented on the challenges faced by Canada’s intelligence community in combating foreign interference. He noted that threat actor intentions, capabilities and opportunities were all distinct elements that needed to be understood. He cautioned that threat actor intentions do not always translate into capabilities on the ground to carry out these intentions. He also noted that a key aspect to intelligence is timeliness.^[434]

Mr. Wark indicated that, in his view, a country’s intelligence culture is based on a shared understanding, between ministers, governmental departments and citizens, that good intelligence is a serious matter and vital for decision-making. He stated that Canada only episodically takes intelligence matters seriously, which leaves the country “offside” with its Five Eyes partners.^[435]

In Mr. Wark’s view, greater action could have taken by CSIS to inform Parliament about foreign election interference. He noted that the CSIS Act provides it with the power to apply threat reduction measures against identified actors engaged in foreign interference, including those who operate in sensitive sectors such as the political arena. He stated that had CSIS taken this approach, it would have been similar to the action taken, in January 2022, by the U.K. security service, MI5, when it alerted the U.K. Parliament about the activities of a Chinese agent of influence.^[436]

He noted that was incumbent on intelligence agencies to frame their reports and analysis in a manner that clearly shows what information they consider to be significant. In the case of the CSIS report that warned of potential foreign interference targeting Mr. Chong, Mr. Wark indicated that it was a nine-page intelligence assessment in which the warning about the targeting of unnamed members of the House was buried in the middle. He stated that a minister, staff or senior deputy minister cannot be expected to read through a nine-page report and see a vague reference in the middle that they really should have paid attention to, but nobody actually asked them to do that.^[437]

Mr. Wark noted that the intelligence system was not simple, had extremely voluminous intelligence flows and multiple classified systems to handle different levels of classification. However, he stated that it was inexcusable that intelligence can get lost.^[438]

Mr. Wark also raised a hypothetical concern with the Committee about the ministerial directive issued on 16 May 2023 by the Minister of Public Safety.^[439] This directive requires CSIS to investigate all threats to the security of Canada that target Parliament and parliamentarians and to inform parliamentarians directly about such threats where possible. Mr. Wark stated that the directive was an appropriate expression of ministerial accountability. However, he raised the concern about the potential politicization of intelligence, should a future Minister of Public Safety get too drawn into a decision-making role.

b)    Merits of Holding a Judicial Inquiry Versus Public Hearings

Mr. Wark told the Committee that he advocated for public hearings rather than a judicial inquiry when it came to investigating and making recommendations to combat foreign interference.^[440] In his view, Canadians lack literacy about national security, a deficiency which could be improved by holding public hearings on national security, as these could increase public understanding and education about this aspect of governance.

Mr. Wark stated that, in his view, the public hearings planned by Mr. Johnston would have served as an important opportunity to come up with fresh ideas for reforming Canadian intelligence.^[441]

Mr. Wark noted that judicial inquiries were important instruments for specific purposes. He indicated that these inquiries delved deeply into a matter and, as such, were meant to take time.^[442]

Further, he noted there were very significant secrecy protection issues involved in judicial inquiries. To that end, he stated that some of the media revelations, based on top secret documents, clearly compromised Canadian sources and methods.^[443] These documents revealed, among other things, that national security had intercepted communications flowing between Chinese diplomatic officials in Canada.

c)     Observations About the Position of National Security and Intelligence Advisor

Mr. Wark stated that, in recent times, the position of national security and intelligence advisor has been “a bit of a revolving door.”^[444] He indicated that while very good people have occupied the position, they have not done so for nearly long enough.

He further noted that a broader problem existed with the set-up of the office at present. He stated that the office of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor had only a skeleton staff and insufficient resources. Nonetheless, the office was being asked to deal with a vast flow of intelligence. As such, he stated that he was not surprised to hear that pieces of intelligence can get missed.^[445]

He noted that, should Canada make changes to this position, it may wish to take inspiration from the equivalent office in the U.K. There, the National Security and Intelligence Advisor is a senior civil servant who is in their last posting, and as such, does not hold concerns about career progression. Their role is to provide advice to cabinet.

d)    Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

During his appearance, Mr. Wark provided committee members with suggestions for improving the relationship between Parliament and the national security apparatus. These included:^[446]

• providing parliamentarians, especially new ones, and their staff, with formal training about the nature of national security;
• making available to members of the House of Commons, senators and their staff more unclassified information on national security and intelligence; and
• creating a national security strategy that defines the understood range of national security threats that Canada faces, the responses to those threats, and the manner in which the strategy fits into a democratic framework for a society engaging with these threats.

7.     Michael Wernick, Jarislowsky Chair in Public Sector Management, University of Ottawa

a)     Observations about the Privy Council’s Office

Michael Wernick, Jarislowsky Chair in Public Sector Management, University of Ottawa was the Clerk of the Privy Council for Canada from January 2016 to April 2019.^[447] He explained that within PCO, the NSIA acts as the coordinator for the various security and intelligence agencies.^[448] Information flows into the NSIA who then makes decisions about what to share and with who based on areas of interest and security clearance.^[449] As Clerk, Mr. Wernick met with the NSIA about once a week and trusted that the NSIA would share information that he needed to know.^[450]

Mr. Wernick explained that PCO keeps track of documents that it sends to the PMO. Documents are sent either for information, or for a decision.^[451] The Prime Minister shares his decisions through what is called “a PM return.”^[452]

As the Prime Minister cannot read everything, intelligence services, the public service and political staff use their judgment to identify what should be brought to the Prime Minister’s attention.^[453] The NSIA, the Clerk and the Chief of Staff are also responsible for establishing a processes that minimizes the risk of errors.^[454] Mr. Wernick believes that this situation exposed gaps that need to be addressed.^[455] In particular, Mr. Wernick stated that the CSIS memo citing threats against Mr. Chong should have been brought to the Prime Minister’s attention.^[456]

b)    Observations About the Canadian National Security and Intelligence System

In general, Mr. Wernick believes that there is a lack of trust in Canada’s democratic processes and institutions.^[457] In particular, Mr. Wernick is concerned that leaks within the intelligence community may damage CSIS’s reputation with Five Eyes partners.^[458] He worries that allies could hesitate to share information with Canada if they cannot trust that it will be protected.^[459]

c)     Merits of Holding a Public Inquiry

Mr. Wernick expressed his support for a public inquiry, stressing the importance of selecting the right person to lead such an inquiry. He suggested that the right person may be from outside of Canada.^[460]

From Mr. Wernick’s perspective, a public inquiry should not prevent the government from addressing the issues that have already been identified.^[461] He suggested that a public inquiry could happen simultaneously with the establishment of necessary safeguards.^[462]

d)    Measures Proposed by Witnesses to Counter Threats of Foreign Interference in Democratic Processes

In Mr. Wernick’s opinion, Canada must develop comprehensive foreign interference legislation.^[463] This should include legislating the role of the national security and intelligence advisor. In particular, the legislation should identify the powers of the NSIA, and make that role accountable for the flow of information so that a break down in communication like this one does not happen again.^[464] Additionally, he stated that the role of NSIA should be a fixed five-year term.^[465]

Mr. Wernick suggested that more members of Parliament, both federally and in provincial legislatures, should obtain security clearances so that they can access more information.^[466]

Discussion and Recommendations

During the Committee’s study, Mr. Chong and Mr. O’Toole stated that they had been apprised by CSIS that the PRC had targeted them, as members of the House of Commons, with threats meant to intimidate them.

In the case of Mr. Chong, these threats were leveled against both him and his family. For his part, Mr. O’Toole experienced threats meant to undermine his electoral prospects and those of the Conservative Party of Canada, coordinate the use of people on the ground in Canada through the PRC’s United Front Work Department and the use of social media disinformation, and suppress voters.

The Committee heard from numerous security and intelligence observers and current and former officials about the real, immediate and perilous threat posed to Canadian democracy by foreign election interference. At no point during the Committee’s study did it hear testimony to the effect that Mr. Chong, Mr. O’Toole and other members were not the targets of a PRC intimidation campaign.

Mr. Chong, Mr. O’Toole and all members of the House of Commons possess privileges that are based on the pre-eminent right of the House to the services of its members free from intimidation, obstruction and interference. In carrying out their parliamentary duties and functions, no member is to be threatened, challenged, intimidated, or otherwise obstructed. Such behaviours can impede members in carrying out their parliamentary duties and functions, and therefore, could constitute contempt of Parliament.

The scope of the threats carried out by Mr. Zhao and others in the PRC, were not limited to Mr. Chong and Mr. O’Toole, but were aimed at all members of the House of Commons, and by doing so, took aim at Canada’s democracy.

As such, the Committee can only conclude, unequivocally, that the coordinated campaign carried out by Mr. Zhao constitutes a contempt of Parliament. This Committee condemns in the strongest possible terms the actions of those involved.

A. Foreign Interference Training and Briefings for Members and Their Staff

The Committee recommends:

Recommendation 1

That mandatory information and training sessions on foreign interference threats, activities and tactics be made available to all members and their staff by the House of Commons, both as part of the Members’ Orientation Program, and on a continual basis. These sessions ought to be developed by the Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security, working in collaboration with national security and intelligence agencies and partners, and the recognized parties.

Recommendation 2

That a contact person be assigned by the House of Commons Administration to liaise with members on all matters related to foreign interference threats.

Recommendation 3

That the government work with recognized parties’ whips to facilitate security clearances, at Secret level or higher, of caucus members who are not Privy Councillors (particularly those who sit on committees with mandates concerning foreign affairs, national defence and national security), who shall be taken as satisfying requirements for a “need to know,” to ensure that they may be adequately briefed about important national security matters, including foreign intelligence threat activity directed toward Parliament, or their party or its caucus members.

B. Information Sharing Between the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the House of Commons and Parliamentarians

The Committee recommends:

Recommendation 4

That the government instruct and work closely with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to provide improved and additional support to Parliament.

Recommendation 5

When a threat is identified, Canadian Security Intelligence Service must immediately and directly inform individual members about specific foreign interference threat activity which targets them, directly or indirectly, including information on the identity of the persons and/or entities involved in the threat activity. The briefing on the threat must include measures being taken to ensure their safety. Updated briefings must continue throughout the duration of the threat.

Recommendation 6

The Speaker, under the guidance of the Sergeant-at-Arms, will work to create a clear protocol and a reasonable threshold about informing the whips of all recognized parties about foreign interference threats, who will then inform their members, with the Speaker contacting Independent members for the duration of the threat. Further, additional support must be provided to members and their offices.

C. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service

The Committee recommends:

Recommendation 7

That the Canadian Security Intelligence Service undertake to improve and increase outreach to diaspora communities most impacted by foreign interference and intimidation, in order to increase public trust and transparency and create a space for Canadians who are harassed and intimidated by foreign entities to be able to come forward.

Recommendation 8

That the government encourage a culture change at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in respect of communicating about foreign interference threat activity to enable better targeted individuals and diaspora groups, and all Canadians, to identify, mitigate and overcome these efforts, and that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service report to the House on its progress about the culture change referred to in this recommendation in the service’s annual report to Parliament under section 20.2(1) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

D. Review of the Classification of Intelligence Documents

The Committee recommends:

Recommendation 9

That the government address concerns about systemic “over-classification” of intelligence products and analyses by revisiting its classification levels and processes for these documents, with a view to being more in line with transparency and disclosure practices of Canada’s Five Eyes partners, and that the government report to the House, in a year’s time, an update on its progress.

Recommendation 10

That the government undertake to lead a process to determine the declassification of information to enhance transparency.

E. Creation of a Foreign Agent Registry

The Committee recommends:

Recommendation 11

That the government urgently introduce legislation to establish a registry of foreign agents aimed at promoting transparency regarding foreign influence on Canadian soil, ensuring that governments, elected officials, and citizens have access to this registry.

F. National Security Policy and Strategy Review

The Committee recommends:

Recommendation 12

That the government undertake a thorough national security review and create an updated national security strategy that defines the range of national security threats that Canada faces, the responses to those threats, and the manner in which the strategy fits into a democratic framework for a society engaging with these threats.

Recommendation 13

That the government work with national security and law enforcement agencies to clarify and reconcile the definition of foreign interference threats.

G. The Review and Update of Existing Legislation: Canada Evidence Act, Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act

The Committee recommends:

Recommendation 14

That the government conduct a legislation review to modernize the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act with a focus on foreign interference threats to national security and democratic institutions.

Recommendation 15

That the overdue statutory review of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act be undertaken by a committee of the House forthwith with a view that that committee be transformed into a joint parliamentary committee, along the lines of similar committees in the United Kingdom and the United States.

Recommendation 16

That the government introduce legislation to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act in order to permit greater sharing of information concerning foreign interference threat activity directed towards democratic institutions and processes with both Houses of Parliament, their committees, individual parliamentarians, federal recognized political parties, and provincial and municipal governments.

Recommendation 17

That the government urgently consider measures to address the “intelligence to evidence” challenge in law, policy and operations, so that charges of offences related to foreign interference threat activity may be prosecuted more effectively and frequently, and that the government report to the House, in a year’s time, an update on its progress in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s annual report to Parliament under section 20.2(1) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

H. National Security and Intelligence Advisor

The Committee recommends:

Recommendation 18

That the government review the position of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor and consider establishing a committee to focus on actionable intelligence.

Recommendation 19

That the government consider establishing a fixed five-year term for the role of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor.

I. Government/Executive and Security and Intelligence Matters

The Committee recommends:

Recommendation 20

That a cabinet committee on National Security and Foreign Interference regularly discuss matters pertaining to Canada’s security interests.

Recommendation 21

That the government and its intelligence and national security agencies strengthen the internal governance and accountability process around the sharing of information and intelligence with relevant ministers and the Prime Minister.

Recommendation 22

That the government work with its national security agencies to establish clear lines of responsibility and recommendations on how to react to intelligence and the flow of information when intelligence becomes a threat.

Recommendation 23

That the government establish a clearer process for funneling intelligence to top officials (i.e., the most senior public service and political levels,) including greater accountability for ensuring that the right people see the right intelligence.

Recommendation 24

That the government put in place tracking protocols to allow for a reconstruction of whom saw what document, and when.

Recommendation 25

That the government consider establishing a position within the Privy Council Office with the power to flag important intelligence to the Prime Minister and other ministers.

J. Matters Related to Federal Elections

The Committee recommends:

Recommendation 26

An appropriate process be considered to provide security and intelligence briefing for election candidates.

Recommendation 27

That Elections Canada consider implementing an awareness campaign to reassure voters and the Canadian public that the electoral process in Canada is secure and that measures are in place to combat any attempt at foreign interference. Further, that it also educate citizens on how to identify foreign interference and where to report any suspicious activity.

Recommendation 28

That individuals involved in the work of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel, or any successor bodies, be adequately briefed, in advance of a general election, about ongoing or recent foreign interference threat activity targeting parliamentarians so that they might better appreciate the context of activities which could carry over into an election period.

Recommendation 29

That the government amend the Cabinet Directive on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol with a view to empowering the non-partisan public servants on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (a) with greater discretion on whether to inform the public about events or incidents of foreign interference; and (b) with greater authority to direct national security agencies to directly brief candidates, political parties or Elections Canada, as the case may be, who are affected by events or incidents of foreign interference.