As a result of their deliberations committees may make recommendations which they include in their reports for the consideration of the House of Commons or the Government. Recommendations related to this study are listed below.

Recommendation 1

That mandatory information and training sessions on foreign interference threats, activities and tactics be made available to all members and their staff by the House of Commons, both as part of the Members’ Orientation Program, and on a continual basis. These sessions ought to be developed by the Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security, working in collaboration with national security and intelligence agencies and partners, and the recognized parties.

Recommendation 2

That a contact person be assigned by the House of Commons Administration to liaise with members on all matters related to foreign interference threats.

Recommendation 3

That the government work with recognized parties’ whips to facilitate security clearances, at Secret level or higher, of caucus members who are not Privy Councillors (particularly those who sit on committees with mandates concerning foreign affairs, national defence and national security), who shall be taken as satisfying requirements for a “need to know,” to ensure that they may be adequately briefed about important national security matters, including foreign intelligence threat activity directed toward Parliament, or their party or its caucus members.

Recommendation 4

That the government instruct and work closely with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to provide improved and additional support to Parliament.

Recommendation 5

When a threat is identified, Canadian Security Intelligence Service must immediately and directly inform individual members about specific foreign interference threat activity which targets them, directly or indirectly, including information on the identity of the persons and/or entities involved in the threat activity. The briefing on the threat must include measures being taken to ensure their safety. Updated briefings must continue throughout the duration of the threat.

Recommendation 6

The Speaker, under the guidance of the Sergeant-at-Arms, will work to create a clear protocol and a reasonable threshold about informing the whips of all recognized parties about foreign interference threats, who will then inform their members, with the Speaker contacting Independent members for the duration of the threat. Further, additional support must be provided to members and their offices.

Recommendation 7

That the Canadian Security Intelligence Service undertake to improve and increase outreach to diaspora communities most impacted by foreign interference and intimidation, in order to increase public trust and transparency and create a space for Canadians who are harassed and intimidated by foreign entities to be able to come forward.

Recommendation 8

That the government encourage a culture change at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in respect of communicating about foreign interference threat activity to enable better targeted individuals and diaspora groups, and all Canadians, to identify, mitigate and overcome these efforts, and that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service report to the House on its progress about the culture change referred to in this recommendation in the service’s annual report to Parliament under section 20.2(1) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

Recommendation 9

That the government address concerns about systemic “over-classification” of intelligence products and analyses by revisiting its classification levels and processes for these documents, with a view to being more in line with transparency and disclosure practices of Canada’s Five Eyes partners, and that the government report to the House, in a year’s time, an update on its progress.

Recommendation 10

That the government undertake to lead a process to determine the declassification of information to enhance transparency.

Recommendation 11

That the government urgently introduce legislation to establish a registry of foreign agents aimed at promoting transparency regarding foreign influence on Canadian soil, ensuring that governments, elected officials, and citizens have access to this registry.

Recommendation 12

That the government undertake a thorough national security review and create an updated national security strategy that defines the range of national security threats that Canada faces, the responses to those threats, and the manner in which the strategy fits into a democratic framework for a society engaging with these threats.

Recommendation 13

That the government work with national security and law enforcement agencies to clarify and reconcile the definition of foreign interference threats.

Recommendation 14

That the government conduct a legislation review to modernize the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act with a focus on foreign interference threats to national security and democratic institutions.

Recommendation 15

That the overdue statutory review of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act be undertaken by a committee of the House forthwith with a view that that committee be transformed into a joint parliamentary committee, along the lines of similar committees in the United Kingdom and the United States.

Recommendation 16

That the government introduce legislation to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act in order to permit greater sharing of information concerning foreign interference threat activity directed towards democratic institutions and processes with both Houses of Parliament, their committees, individual parliamentarians, federal recognized political parties, and provincial and municipal governments.

Recommendation 17

That the government urgently consider measures to address the “intelligence to evidence” challenge in law, policy and operations, so that charges of offences related to foreign interference threat activity may be prosecuted more effectively and frequently, and that the government report to the House, in a year’s time, an update on its progress in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s annual report to Parliament under section 20.2(1) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

Recommendation 18

That the government review the position of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor and consider establishing a committee to focus on actionable intelligence.

Recommendation 19

That the government consider establishing a fixed five-year term for the role of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor.

Recommendation 20

That a cabinet committee on National Security and Foreign Interference regularly discuss matters pertaining to Canada’s security interests.

Recommendation 21

That the government and its intelligence and national security agencies strengthen the internal governance and accountability process around the sharing of information and intelligence with relevant ministers and the Prime Minister.

Recommendation 22

That the government work with its national security agencies to establish clear lines of responsibility and recommendations on how to react to intelligence and the flow of information when intelligence becomes a threat.

Recommendation 23

That the government establish a clearer process for funneling intelligence to top officials (i.e., the most senior public service and political levels,) including greater accountability for ensuring that the right people see the right intelligence.

Recommendation 24

That the government put in place tracking protocols to allow for a reconstruction of whom saw what document, and when.

Recommendation 25

That the government consider establishing a position within the Privy Council Office with the power to flag important intelligence to the Prime Minister and other ministers.

Recommendation 26

An appropriate process be considered to provide security and intelligence briefing for election candidates.

Recommendation 27

That Elections Canada consider implementing an awareness campaign to reassure voters and the Canadian public that the electoral process in Canada is secure and that measures are in place to combat any attempt at foreign interference. Further, that it also educate citizens on how to identify foreign interference and where to report any suspicious activity.

Recommendation 28

That individuals involved in the work of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel, or any successor bodies, be adequately briefed, in advance of a general election, about ongoing or recent foreign interference threat activity targeting parliamentarians so that they might better appreciate the context of activities which could carry over into an election period.

Recommendation 29

That the government amend the Cabinet Directive on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol with a view to empowering the non-partisan public servants on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (a) with greater discretion on whether to inform the public about events or incidents of foreign interference; and (b) with greater authority to direct national security agencies to directly brief candidates, political parties or Elections Canada, as the case may be, who are affected by events or incidents of foreign interference.