:
Yes. I'll advise those who may have other commitments to arrange for a replacement. I've been advised that we are approved for two hours from the time I called the meeting. That was roughly around five o'clock.
We will be proceeding. The first hour is the public meeting with the witnesses on housing. The last hour is committee business.
Those appearing virtually have been sound-tested and were fine.
Before I begin, I want to remind members again to keep your earpiece in the assigned place when you're not using it. Actually, if you unplug it, that would work best. Please avoid touching the microphone boom while it's live, in order to prevent hearing damage to the interpreters.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format according to the House of Commons rules that were adopted. Members and witnesses are appearing in person in the room and virtually.
I would like to remind all those appearing that you have the option to speak in the official language of your choice. In the room, use the headpiece and choose the official language of your choice. If you're appearing virtually, click on the globe icon at the bottom of your Surface device and choose the official language of your choice.
If there is an interruption in interpretation, please get my attention. We'll suspend while it's being corrected.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, February 12, 2024, the committee is continuing its study of federal housing investments.
I would like to welcome the following witnesses.
We have, in the room, Steve Pomeroy, industry professor, Canadian Housing Evidence Collaborative; David Horwood, director, Effort Trust Company; and Tim Richter, president and chief executive officer, Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness.
We will begin with Mr. Pomeroy for five minutes or less.
Mr. Pomeroy, you have the floor.
Thank you to the committee for inviting me today.
I think the topic you are studying is important, not because we can change what we did in the past but because we can learn from the past to make sure that we don't repeat these errors in the future. The big error is the absolute lack of transparency in reporting out on what we have been doing with federal investments and the number of units that were created over the last two decades.
That data reveals that had we maintained the level of investment that we did between 1990 and 1994—before the termination of social housing programs, roughly 10% of completions in those years—we would have actually added another 330,000 units to our stock of non-market community housing in this country and gotten to a total of one million units.
I have shared with committee members a brief that has the bilingual data for these particular years. I'll come back to some specific recommendations about how I think we can improve transparency going forward.
Your committee asked three questions: How much federal investment did we make? How many non-market units of non-profit and co-op did we create? How many private sector rental units did we create? I have put together a detailed data piece that I've shared with you. This data was not easy to put together. I had to mine many sources, identifying areas where CMHC officials themselves didn't even know the data existed within their various files. I used to work there in the early 1980s and 1990s, so I knew where it was. It's not readily transparent, and it was a difficult task to put that together.
The bottom line is that, between 2001 and 2016, we created 41,000 new non-profit units, 10,596 co-operative housing units and just over 238,000 private rental units. That was done using a federal investment of $4.17 billion, much of which was actually through cost-shared programs. That was augmented by provincial cost-sharing in those programs as well. That money flowed directly to the non-profits and co-ops, not to private rental; that wasn't subsidized during that particular period.
In total, non-profit and co-op housing was about 2% of total completions, and the private rental sector was only 9% of the total completions of 2.7 million units over those years. Most of our housing was, in fact, directed to the home ownership sector. The fact that we undersupplied rental housing for those 20 years has had a significant impact in the current affordability crisis, where the lack of rental supply is now being exacerbated by high levels of immigration, with students and foreign workers who are renters contributing to the rental problem.
The funding sources for that $4.17 billion came from three places. A program called Investment in Affordable Housing, which started in 2001, provided about $125 million per year. That was augmented in the 2006 budget as a result of a negotiation between Paul Martin and Jack Layton, which created three affordable housing trusts totalling $1.4 billion that was flowed over the 2006 to 2008 period. Subsequently, during the economic recession or the global financial crisis recovery, Canada's economic action plan contributed $2 billion from 2009 to 2011, about $1 billion of which was directly to new supply. The $1 billion was for social housing retrofit. That's where those numbers actually come from.
As I mentioned, it was very difficult to put this data together. We just don't have good data sources. The CMHC used to produce—from 1955 to 2016—a very detailed statistical document that was of very much use to many researchers like myself to actually understand what was going on in terms of total housing starts, the mortgage market and insured lending, as well as public investment and social housing outcomes.
Since the programs were terminated in 1994—at the end of 1993—those tables have been diminished, and the publication has ceased completely. We really don't have good data going forward on this information—certainly not since 2016.
In terms of recommendations, in the old days—prior to 2002—as part of the CMHC's starts and completions survey, they had a box on the survey form that counted which units were funded under a National Housing Act program or affordable social housing. That stopped being collected, even though we continued to collect the data at every single start about whether it's rental, whether it's condo or whether it's home ownership. Simply adding a box back to what is now an iPad—that's where the enumerators collect that data—would allow us to have data on a monthly basis and be able to put it into our monthly housing statistics, along with information on rental and ownership housing.
As I mentioned, many of the programs in the past were funded under cost-shared programs with the provinces. Under the national housing strategy, that's also the case, but for a small part of the national housing strategy, only three particular programs—about 10% of total funding in the national housing strategy—are funded through bilateral agreements.
As part of this agreement, CMHC imposed a very onerous 12-sheet spreadsheet requirement for the provinces to report data for the purpose of claiming their cost-sharing amounts. There's an accountability framework around that, an action plan and a set of targets. That's 10% of the national housing strategy. CMHC does not apply that policy to itself. What's good for the goose is good for the gander. It would be great if this committee directed CMHC to produce the same level of data collecting and accountability for the unilateral federal programs that is done for the provinces.
My final point would simply be to make sure that data is published in the kind of tables we used to have, so it's available to researchers, parliamentarians and taxpayers.
Thank you very much.
:
Good evening, Mr. Chair. I'm pleased to have the opportunity to address the standing committee as it continues its study of federal housing investments.
My name is David Horwood. I'm a principal at Effort Real Estate Corporation and the Effort Trust group of companies based in Hamilton, Ontario. Our group is active in the management and development of rental housing properties across Ontario. We are a third-generation family business that is proud to serve customers across the rental housing spectrum, and we take our responsibility as housing professionals and tenant advocates very seriously. We're active members of numerous industry associations that advocate for sensible housing policy at the municipal, provincial and federal levels.
As has been shared with this committee in the recent past, purpose-built rental housing plays a critical role in Canada's housing continuum, with more than 10 million Canadians living in private-market rental housing.
In the 1960s and 1970s, our business, like countless others across the country, was engaged in the development of rental buildings that served the demand among people who both chose and needed the flexibility that professionally managed rentals, as opposed to formal home or condominium ownership, could provide. However, due to a variety of factors—the most impactful being legislative changes federally and provincially that serve to impede, restrict, complicate or increase the cost of development—our business, like countless others, stopped building rental housing. Simply put, we could no longer advance projects for which we had no reasonable prospect of earning a modest return, let alone ones that justified the major risks inherent in projects of this financial and engineering complexity.
Although we have continued to manage and reinvest in our existing portfolio of rental properties, we avoided all new construction projects until very recently. The introduction and subsequent refinement of CMHC programs to foster new rental housing construction have been of critical importance in allowing us to return to the new-construction business. The program formerly known as RCFI—now called the apartment construction loan program—whereby federal funds are loaned to developers at below-market interest rates and subject to very strict qualifying criteria, has been one such vital initiative.
The MLI select program, another offering of CMHC, has been very useful for many developers—including us—trying to de-risk and reduce the cost of new rental construction projects.
The rebate of GST on new rental construction and the corresponding PST rebates in many provinces also serve to make new rental projects more viable by reducing a major cost item. I commend the current government for finally taking this step after years of deliberation. However, the regulations around this rebate remain incomplete. This will only delay new projects from starting, further delaying the vital increase in the supply it is intended and should create.
I strongly encourage you to consider a few simple adjustments to existing programs and further revisions to the legislation around rental housing.
Firstly, the apartment construction loan program was revised in April to require that applications be virtually ready to start, or be “shovel-ready”, as is said in the industry. Although I understand CMHC would like to consider projects that are ready for construction, I can tell you that, as a proponent of such applications, it is nearly impossible to commit to a final building design with all required supporting studies and reports until one has actually been approved for the program. It's a classic chicken-versus-egg problem: We won't finalize until we are approved, but we can't even apply until we are finalized. The process is serving as a major disincentive to new applications.
Secondly, just last week, changes to CMHC's MLI select program were introduced, and they have already been widely criticized by the development industry. One major change has the consequence of reducing the potential rental revenue that can be charged. The result is—clearly—a roadblock to projects being financially viable. The outcome will be dire. Far fewer buildings using this previously advantageous financing program will be contemplated.
Lastly, the HST rebate is planned to apply strictly to projects that started on September 14, 2023 or later—the date of the announcement. Developers who started rental projects earlier in 2023 or in 2022 that won't be finished until this year or next do not qualify for this critically important incentive.
I suggest that consideration be given to allow projects that started before this arbitrary date to qualify under the strict condition that any incentive be mandated to apply on an incremental, additional rental project.
What would happen? We will see experienced, proven builders be incentivized to build more buildings, resulting in more supply and more choice for rental households quickly.
I'm mindful of the time and would love to talk further about taxation of new projects and the MURB program that would lead to far more construction very quickly, but I will limit my remarks.
I thank you for the opportunity to share my comments. Like you, I'm eager to work together to achieve a measurable improvement in the housing market during what we would all agree is a period of crisis in affordability, in supply and in stability.
:
Good afternoon, and thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. My name is Tim Richter. I lead the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness. I'm happy to join you from Calgary.
Homelessness is a housing affordability problem. It's driven by high rent and low vacancy. It's not caused by mental illness or addiction. The surge in homelessness that we're seeing today, and the tent cities, as your study is discussing, are the result of the cost of living crisis. I'm going to discuss this with a bit of an analogy.
You know what I mean when I talk about musical chairs, right? In musical chairs, you get 10 kids around 10 chairs. Imagine that in this game, there's one little kid, a girl named Alice, who has a broken ankle. The music starts. They take a chair away, and the kids all sit down, except Alice. If you asked Alice, “Well, how come you're not in a chair?” She'd say, “Well, it's because I have a broken ankle, and I couldn't get to a chair fast enough.”
Is the issue that Alice is not in a chair because she has a broken ankle or because there aren't enough chairs? The fact is that there aren't enough chairs.
When we measure inflation using the consumer price index, unfortunately the CPI measures inflation based on a middle-income basket of goods. For low-income Canadians, 80% to 90% of their income goes to pay for food and housing costs, so for them the inflation rate isn't 2%, 3%, 4% or even 6%. It's tied to the cost of the two biggest ticket items that they have to pay for, food and housing. Now, depending where you live, we've been seeing food price increases of 10% a year and rent increases of over 20%. That's what low-income households are facing. That's their real inflation rate, and they have far less ability to absorb these increases.
Now imagine that you're struggling with a health issue. You don't have friends or family to rely on. You're in a low-income household. You don't have any spare income at the end of the month, or maybe you struggle with addiction or acute mental health concerns. When rents skyrocket and the availability of units decreases, low-income households or people with other needs end up forced out of their homes. Like Alice, they can't compete when there aren't enough affordable housing options or chairs.
I'm old enough to remember a day when mass homelessness like we see today didn't exist. The roots of our current homelessness crisis and the surge you see in tent cities, as you're talking about, are tied to the roots of our housing crisis. That began in 1980 with the federal withdrawal from incentives to support rental housing construction, followed by subsequent reductions in affordable social co-op housing investment through the 80s, and the elimination of federal affordable housing programs in 1995 and 1996.
As Steve could tell you in great detail about all of the housing programs between then and now, this is a problem that's over 40 years in the making. If we want to solve homelessness, we need to ensure that we have a healthy housing system, a system where there's affordability and choice from social housing to ownership. The whole system needs to be healthy. If the ownership system isn't working, isn't affordable, people stay in rentals. If the rental system isn't affordable, if there isn't a balanced market, the burden falls on the non-market, and people are pushed out the bottom.
To resolve these, we need a clear federal strategy to eliminate homelessness. Importantly, as the Auditor General has highlighted, we need to connect the housing strategy with the homelessness objective and the homelessness strategy. We need to have an approach that's grounded in cooperative federalism, and this is perhaps the greatest weakness in the federal government's approach today.
Solving homelessness requires a national strategy with an approach similar to a disaster response, where there's a plan and an agreement between the different levels of government on who does what within their different jurisdictions. If you imagine any natural disaster as it plays out, the local government leads; the community leads; and provincial and federal governments come in and support, right? That's key to the approach to ending homelessness.
The federal government's return to housing leadership with the national housing strategy and the new housing plan are welcome and long overdue. There's a lot in there that I think is really positive, and previous speakers have talked about it. It should be successful, I believe, if implemented well, in expanding rental and non-market housing construction, but that will take time.
In my mind, the Achilles heel of the housing plan and the housing strategy is the absence of federal-provincial-territorial coordination and collaboration. You could implement measures like the GST reduction or accelerated capital cost allowance, but if developmental charges eat up all of that freed-up space, you're no further ahead.
I'll leave you with three recommendations.
First, I would recommend a national strategy for the prevention and elimination of homelessness built in collaboration with the provinces and territories, with cities and experts as well, including people with lived experience, where municipal governments or community leaders lead the response to homelessness and other levels of government come in in their various areas of jurisdiction.
Just like when you're fixing your plumbing or your electricity, you need to turn off the water or electricity before you can fix the system, we really need a measure that's going to slow the flow of people into homelessness. The only way to do that in the short term is with a homelessness prevention and housing benefit, some form of income support in the short term to prevent people from becoming homeless.
Finally, create a true national housing accord with the provinces and territories that addresses the health of the whole housing system. It must include the creation of at least 655,000 units of social and affordable housing.
Thank you very much.
Thanks to the witnesses for their attendance today.
I'll start with Mr. Horwood. You probably heard the opening from Mr. Pomeroy, who talked about some of the financial changes made over several administrations, both Liberal and Conservative, that reduced the amount of resources that flowed through to the housing sector, in particular the affordable housing sector.
In your opening, you referenced legislative changes made at the federal and provincial levels that disincentivized your sector to build more units. The national housing strategy has sought to incentivize for-profit organizations to build more supply. That is certainly the goal of the apartment construction loan program. I know you've participated in that program.
Can you talk about your experience with that program, and whether it played a role in your decision-making to build new supply, not just in Hamilton, but elsewhere?
Speaking to the programs offered by the CMHC, the apartment construction loan program in particular—at the time of our applications, it was known as the rental construction financing initiative—was instrumental and vital in allowing us to refine our construction budgets in order to proceed with new rental construction. Very simply, without the RCFI and the apartment construction loan program, we would not have started the buildings that are under way today.
The CMHC has been very good about reaching out and consulting within the development industry, and talking to and connecting with apartment managers, such as us. It has been very consultative.
That being said, there remain improvements and tweaks that could and should be made, which I believe will continue to have a very impactful result in bringing new supply to market. Changes that are made are sometimes hard for us to understand in short-term doses, but when we have a better opportunity to review and consult with the CMHC, and to do that more regularly, I believe it will listen and try to find ways to continue to improve the programs.
I would point out that the question isn't whether it should continue. It is, why was it ever introduced for residential apartment construction? Where we have no input tax credits on revenue, why would we be paying HST or GST?
That being said, that is a decision that long predates my involvement in the industry.
What I can say is that the reduction or the proposed rebate of the GST from our basket of construction costs is a major step forward. I do believe that when the regs are introduced and when we understand—and as importantly, when the lenders to our industry understand—the mechanism for that reduction or elimination of that line item as being major, and ideally with corresponding provincial matching, that will go a very long way. It would serve to reduce a construction budget by, theoretically, something in the 10% range.
That is a major reduction in expense. That should allow projects that were marginal or slightly below a reasonable threshold—both from a developer's perspective, as well as from a financing perspective—to go ahead.
I do think this is a critical lever that is being pulled. I do hope that the regulations relating to it get defined very quickly.
As I've suggested, there are ways it could be broadened to include projects that have not yet made their final HST or GST self-assessment. If there were some way that the potential incentive or the potential reduction in cost could be grandfathered to existing projects, so long as it gets reinvested in a subsequent and incremental new construction project, I think that would serve to bring experienced builders back to the table very quickly and ultimately bring more supply to the table.
Thank you to the witnesses. I would like to say to those of you who are reappearing before the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities that your suggestions and insights are very helpful to us.
Mr. Richter, thank you for coming back.
I know that the issue of homelessness is a priority for you and the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness. This is a matter of great concern, because while homelessness has always existed, it has exploded in many parts of Canada. In Quebec, more than 10,000 people are homeless. That is a considerable number.
In the Parliamentary Budget Officer's report of May 2024, as well as in the national housing strategy, which was mentioned earlier, the initial goal was to halve the number of homeless people in the country by 2027‑28. However, the government extended the deadline to 2030. In any case, the Parliamentary Budget Officer said that, to reduce chronic homelessness by 50% by 2030, the government would need to invest $3.5 billion a year. That is seven times more than what is currently provided for under the national housing strategy.
Do you have any comments on that finding?
:
Thank you for your comment. I'm thrilled to be back.
Honestly, I think the Parliamentary Budget Officer's report was actually quite flawed. Reaching Home is a program and, by itself, won't solve homelessness. You could add lots of money to Reaching Home and you likely wouldn't solve homelessness unless you solved the housing crisis.
To my mind, a critical component of that is going to be increasing—probably doubling—the percentage of social and deeply affordable housing in Canada's overall housing system. That would be about 655,000 units, which, on its own, is probably an investment worth $700 billion and not something the federal government can do on its own.
What I think is important here is that the homelessness goal, the homelessness objective.... I'll remind the committee as well that the government, in a Speech from the Throne, I believe in 2020 or 2021, committed to the elimination of “chronic homelessness”. I think it's important that the homelessness goal be matched with a housing strategy, and there needs to be a strategy to plan this. How are you going to achieve that goal? This is the challenge.
We have a national housing strategy, and we have a new housing plan, and there are some excellent elements in both that I'm very supportive of. Reaching Home is a program; it's not a strategy. In simply putting more money into that program—if you don't align the homelessness, don't align the housing strategy to that goal, produce a lot more deeply affordable and social housing, have a healthy rental market, and begin to work on fixing the ownership market as well—you're going to really struggle to end homelessness.
Unfortunately, I think that the Parliamentary Budget Officer's report was deeply flawed, and I would point the committee to the Auditor General's report of, I believe, last year.
I'm going to ask Mr. Pomeroy my questions first.
You made some disturbing comments earlier about not having data and the lack of access to data, and I think that's part of the reason we're here today. It's that there was information in silos that was not laid over or between those silos.
In a report that you did in 2019, you highlighted the fact that purpose-built rentals at that time accounted for only “40 percent of all rentals”, with “investor-owned condominiums” becoming more pronounced and making up more than a quarter of all starts in the major markets.
Mr. Pomeroy, do you think there are current federal policies encouraging the development of unaffordable housing? What I mean by that is, is the market lens, the market housing, fixing this problem?
:
Thank you very much, Chair.
We know, as we've heard over and over in this committee and from our constituents, that we're in a housing crisis. We know that having a place to call home should not be out of reach for Canadians, and we know that after nine years, and after this Trudeau government promised to lower the price of housing, rents and mortgages have doubled instead of going down.
CMHC has said that to maintain current home prices, which are already too high, Canada has to increase homebuilding by 50%. There have been lots of announcements and photo ops, but the reality is that housing starts are down across this country and, and according to RBC, the housing crisis is only on track to get worse and not better.
Mr. Horwood, if I could please start with you, I was just wondering if you could speak to the residential rental vacancy rates in the properties that Effort Trust manages. Are vacancy rates lower than usual? Has there been a trend in recent years? What does that look like?
Thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
Mr. Richter, I'd like to begin with you. We did hear at the outset of the questioning, when Ms. Gray put certain questions to you, that, yes, we're having an extremely difficult time, like almost every other democracy is, with homelessness. I suppose there are two courses of action that a responsible party can follow. One is to simply identify the problems. The other is to identify the problems and actually propose solutions.
Would you say, Mr. Richter, that any party that is serious about addressing homelessness would offer solutions to deal with homelessness, and in fact would actually go as far as coming up with a housing plan that, at the very least, mentions homelessness—yes or no?
[English]
Thank you to both friends on the committee. I appreciate it.
The Chair: You have two minutes, Mr. Morrice.
Mr. Mike Morrice: Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Peter and Louise.
Mr. Pomeroy, I really appreciate the research you've done to help us identify where the housing crisis is coming from. Of course, part of it is the loss of affordable housing across the country. Your most recent research shows that my community is losing the most units for every new affordable unit getting built. For every one new affordable unit getting built, we're losing in Kitchener-Waterloo at least 39 units. In your research, you talk about “plugging the holes in the bottom of the bucket”. I assume you're referring to the erosion of those affordable units. You've also talked about provincial rent controls as one part of that.
Can you talk about what more is needed? Some have talked about, for example, removing the tax incentives that real estate investment trusts have access to. Can you speak about what needs to be done federally to plug the holes in this bucket?
:
For clarity, this is data that compares the total number of existing units under $1,000 a month with the number of units built under affordable housing programs for each city. Certainly, Kitchener-Waterloo has the highest number. In part, that's because of the change in the number under $1,000. Many units have moved to above $1,000 a month. Also, the number of units that were created in Kitchener-Waterloo is less than in other cities. That's how the ratio comes out of it.
Absolutely. Many of these units still exist, but they exist at higher rents, because there's very strong pressure on rental markets thanks to high levels of demand coming from both new immigration and the fact that folks can't afford to own, so they stay in the rental market. That puts pressure on the rental market, as well.
We have these pressure points on the rental market pushing up rents in a regulatory environment that allows vacancy decontrol. When units turn over, the rents can go up quite dramatically. We see monthly data from rentals.ca of rents going up 15%, 18% or 20%, year over year. That's the key issue creating the affordability crisis. We need to take a look at temporary vacancy rate and decontrol mechanisms. However, as I said earlier, that's not a federal jurisdiction. It's a provincial jurisdiction—one the federal government can only ask the provinces to take a look at.
I'm going to move to something else.
Mr. Chair, I know that this committee asked the CEO of Starlight Investments to come to the committee, and we heard back that it wasn't going to fit their schedule to come. Maybe it's a misunderstanding by the CEO of Starlight Investments, but this is a parliamentary committee and we work for Canadians. We really would like to have them here, and we wouldn't want to have to summons them, but it seems that we are going to have to.
I have a motion, Mr. Chair, that will be shared with the committee. I move:
That pursuant to Standing Order 108(1)(a), the committee summon the CEO of Starlight Investments, Daniel Drimmer, to appear before the committee by June 20, 2024, to testify in relation to the study on federal housing investments for a minimum of two hours.
In light of the testimony that we just had that they could be part of the solution, I think it's even more pressing.
Thank you.
:
I will let Ms. Zarrillo answer, of course.
Right off the bat, I honestly think there may be some rogue companies that are not following the regulations.
I hope that our committee's study will be constructive and help find solutions to the housing problem. However, I don't think that inviting companies like Starlight Enterprises to appear before the committee to find out what they are up to would be of any use to us. I don't see how that would help the committee achieve the objective of this study, which is to assess the impact of divestment.
My hope is that the witnesses we hear from propose solutions to the housing crisis.
I didn't see the point of inviting these companies, and I still don't.
I am opposed to the motion, Mr. Chair.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for the clarity.
I'll start with Madame Chabot's concerns and questions.
I think what we've heard in this testimony is that there's been a shift from home ownership in this country to rental housing, which we know has happened over the decades and especially as housing prices have increased. We know that rental housing is an important factor.
We heard testimony today that there is an opportunity for the government to intervene in rental housing and make that happen, so I think it's important and it's relevant to the study that we dig into rental housing.
I did want to address the letter from Starlight. I'm actually on a site right now, renx.ca, where some of their properties are for sale. Here it says, “Properties in the portfolio [of Starlight] have in-place financing at fixed below-market interest rates, of which a significant portion is Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation-insured. The $425 million in CMHC debt, with a weighted average 2.52 per cent interest rate and remaining term of 4.2 years, is assumable subject to lender consent.”
I think we need to get some clarity on what's published. Starlight itself has highlighted, even in some of its own press releases, that it has subsidies backed with public money.
Their evictions have been widely reported by CBC, CTV, The Hill Times, CityNews, Maclean's and more. If I had the time to pull it up, Mr. Chair, I could share with you a story from CBC recently about some of its tenants being on a strike and how Starlight has potentially served notice to some of its tenants.
I think all of these issues can be clarified when the organization and Mr. Drimmer come to committee.
Thank you.