I don't fault the House leader for doing things this way. Taken on its own, and without the omnibus motion and the artificial deadline imposed by that motion, it's not bad in many respects.
I am a bit puzzled why some of the things are in there, because we did discuss them at previous meetings of this committee and rejected them. The most obvious item is the proposal to abolish Friday sittings. We indicated we didn't support that. That was actually reported back by this committee, so it seems odd that we're being asked to consider it again.
There are others that haven't been discussed, including, for example, electronic voting. The electronic voting issue was discussed, as noted here, by the McGrath committee. It was discussed and a report was actually issued on electronic voting—true fact—by the committee on standing order improvements set up by the Chrétien government. It was a special committee, as I mentioned. It issued six reports.
I have not had a chance to read those reports—although, obviously, I would want to do this. We would all want to do that. We'd probably want to enter them into evidence. Six reports, one of which was on electronic voting the time, were issued. Things have changed. Systems have changed for electronic voting. I'm guessing they're more reliable than they were in the past, and as the government House leader's report observes, we are moving to the West Block.
The House of Commons will be there, I think, by the end of this Parliament. I'm not certain of that, but, if not, it will be where we open the next Parliament. So as one is installing desks, one could put in electronic voting systems. There is an obvious logic to that from an infrastructure cost point of view, and so on.
There are things in there that on their face strike me as reasonable. By the way, I don't want to launder the details of that proposal, but that's one kind of electronic voting. You can also vote without actually going to the chamber. That's how they do it in the U.S. Congress. I don't like that. I think we should be in the House. I won't say we have no lessons to learn from the American representatives, but that is not one of the lessons we have to learn from them, or if we do, we have to learn the merits of doing things while actually being in the Commons for what it's worth.
There are a number of things in here, and I'm not belittling the report. I did say I didn't really agree with the arrangement of three themes. Theme one is management of the House, of which the subsidiary headings include the issue of sittings, including Fridays, and then electronic voting. Those are just different topics. They're not two subsets of the same thing, but different topics going back to the omnibus point I was making earlier about the House calendar, whether we should start sitting earlier in January, earlier in September, whatever, and the nature of routine proceedings.
There would be another review of private members' business, which involves a number of technical changes. Let's go through private members' business to make the point about the difficulty of trying to do all these things within the very tight deadline suggested by Mr. Simms' motion.
Remember I said it was theme one of three themes. Within the rubric of management of the House, we have the subsidiary headings of the sittings, electronic voting, the House calendar, routine proceedings, private members' business, and prorogation.
Prorogation is obviously also an entirely different topic and not a simple matter, because it involves moving from the House and its privileges to the nature of the crown, and what the Constitution, particularly the unwritten part of the Constitution, the conventions, say about prorogation. I think prorogation is a very important issue. I spent a lot of time reading about it in the midst of the crisis that led to prorogation in 2008. Given the tiny number of people who know anything about this at all, I regard myself to be in the upper one per cent of the Canadian population in my knowledge of prorogation, at the risk of sounding a bit self-promoting in that regard. We could spend an entire Parliament dealing with the issue of prorogation in itself. It might be a good topic for us to look at.
We'd look at conventions. We'd have to look at how what we report affects conventions. Conventions are the practices that are seen as being particularly weighty in public opinion, the things that it is outrageous to violate, even though there is no law to that effect. Those take form in a particular way, and if you want to change a convention or affect it, or systematize it—which I think is really what we're trying to do here, to systematize it—you have to act in a certain manner.
A committee report can be very valuable in that regard. A committee report that just mentions this thing in passing as part of a rush would be very unhelpful. One of the things that happens in scholarly disputes is the issue of does a convention exist here, is there still that usage or has a convention eroded and one that previously existed does not exist. You'd have to bring yourself up to date with some very significant scholarship on this. Albert Venn Dicey, the great 19th century English writer, wrote Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, the classic text that created the term “convention”.
Lord Bryce, who would be named the British ambassador to the United States, in his book The American Commonwealth, in which he wrote about the American political system for a British audience, pointed out to his British audience that although the Americans thought they had a purely written constitution, they had conventions too, and he listed examples of the conventions that existed. Conventions are restrictions on a power that nominally exists, an unwritten restriction, or at least an uncodified restriction, not written down in the statute of the Constitution, the violation of which would result in profound sanctions.
One that existed at that time was that the president, who in theory could serve unlimited consecutive terms, would serve no more than two, following the precedent set by George Washington. That convention prevailed until 1940 when Franklin Roosevelt ran for a third term and was not punished for it. Voters voted him in, but sometime within the Eisenhower presidency Congress and then three-fourths of the states passed identical resolutions amending the constitution so that couldn't happen again. No president can serve more than two terms. It is not a slight against Franklin Roosevelt to say that a lesser man with an equal temptation could use that office and the perpetual holding of that office in ways that the framers of the Constitution, and obviously the majority of Americans in the 1950s when that amendment was passed, did not think were appropriate. And so a convention was codified to ensure that it could not be overridden again.
It's all about conventions when it comes to prorogation, and it was not clear what the conventions were. So I'm not saying that prorogation shouldn't be here. I think it's a really great topic to study. I'm just saying that it can't be studied as one of a three-part list, part one of which has six subsidiary parts, one of which is something that is so vast that you have to get into.... I didn't mention Ivor Jennings, another great scholar we could look at. If we did study prorogation, the amount of work would prevent us from having time for anything else. And we've got to do this by June 20th?
We have to come up with witnesses, according to Mr. Simms' motion, if we adopt it today, by Tuesday of next week.
In terms of the chief authorities on conventionality and on the way in which prorogation is handled and historically has been handled in Commonwealth countries, these precedents are taken very seriously by our main scholars. They could not be located within seven days. In some cases, we would have to find out who these people are. How do we know? We're not specialists.
That's just for prorogation. I'm only mentioning it because it's the one that my eyes stopped upon as I went down this list. It's not because it is the standout, but maybe it is the standout.
On private members' business, here is what is written. The 's report or discussion paper frequently cites the McGrath committee. It reads:
A principle objective of the McGrath Committee report was to find ways to give Members a more meaningful role in the legislative process. A well-functioning House depends on the extent to which Members feel like they are involved and contribute to the legislative process.
That's the first paragraph. You can't object to that, except to say that for making members “feel” like they're involved, I would say that it's more about the extent to which members are actually involved, but that's okay. That's a minor thing.
Here's the next paragraph. I want you to keep track of all the different potential ways in which we could change private members' business. There aren't bullet points here, but I'm going to number them. I'm quoting again:
A key way to empower Members is through Private Members' Business. Possible changes to Private Members' Business could be examined to achieve that objective.
Some examples include:
...adding another rubric for Private Members' Business each week; examining the possibility of allowing Members' to exchange places on the List for the Consideration of Private Members' Business under certain conditions; and ways to manage Senate Public Bills that delay the replenishment of Private Members' Business, possibly by having a separate rubric for these bills.
There you go. There are three separate subsidiary pieces of business under private members' business. Our three-part program of adjustment to our rules, which turns out to include, in the case of theme one, six separate substantive subheadings, now involves a third level of subheadings. It's starting to look like a statute: section 1, subsection 1(a), sub-subsection 1(a)(i), etc. It's kind of looking like that.
There is a lot of substance here, and we're supposed to find the experts who can deal with this within seven days and to have all of discussions done and a report back by June 2.
Let me tell you about the experience of the electoral reform committee of which I was a member, with its December 1 deadline. That did not mean we had open discussions and were getting new and fresh ideas up until November 30. That is not what happened. We had to take a considerable amount of time towards the end to go through it. We could go and look it up, but there was a three-week period or so during which we simply could not add new material and have it translated. The professional staff, the analysts, and the clerks were, as is typical here, of superb quality, very hard-working, and very long-suffering.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
Mr. Scott Reid: There is a consensus on that.
They did what they could to give us as much time as possible and to put off our decision points on various things as long as possible. We were able to put off the recommendations later than the rest, but we had a substantial amount of summation of witness testimony.
I don't see how you could accomplish that given the June 2 deadline, which in practice means, I don't know, a May 15 deadline for starting to sum up the witness testimony or for complete.... Actually, it would be earlier than that, probably, but we can go back and examine that. The records of the electoral reform committee exist and provide as close a parallel as I can think of to this sort of thing, where you're dealing with something that's very amorphous in its initial conception, as opposed to a committee being presented with a bill, where there's a whole different system we go through, or as opposed to us dealing with a matter of privilege, again, in certain situations.
When it comes to this kind of thing where you have an amorphous subject matter and you have to turn it turn it into recommendations, a substantial lead time must be taken into account. Your deadline is actually much earlier than it appears to be. That is a significant issue for us as we work toward this deadline.
Mr. Simms' motion proposes that we be prepared to engage in extra sittings.
Where is that...?
:
Sorry. One was on official languages. It's called
Lament for a Notion: the Life & Death Of Canada's Bilingual Dream. That was my second book. The first book was called
Canada Remapped. It was about the issue, then current, that in the event that Quebec was to secede from Canada—and parts of Quebec were not in favour of going along with secession and wanted to remain loyal—how would we deal with the so-called partition issue. In my view, that was the most vexing of the questions that Canada then faced in the context of the separation debate. Those books were both published in the nineties.
Mario Silva and I co-edited a book on anti-Semitism called Tackling Hate: Combatting Antisemitism: The Ottawa Protocol. You were in Parliament at the time we had hearings with a group called The Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to Combat AntiSemitism. It was an informal all-party committee that met, produced a report, and then published a collection of the essays that had been submitted to us.
Anyway, the point of these parallels is the time that it takes. One of the smaller of the books, maybe the size of a report, took me a year. The larger one—I had a lot more experience—still took me two years, with a couple of research assistants. Doing something between now and then is hard to do.
In my illustration, where I'm writing the entire thing just to suit myself, I just go through and look at what's out there, and what I think are the best examples in my own exclusive discretion. I am kind of mentally assuming that I don't have a day job, so I'm also not going back and attending events in my riding, which we all have to do. I think everybody on this committee has to travel further than I do. I'm assuming I don't attend question period. Someone subs for me when the committee is doing other things, like the hearings into the minister's agenda on changes to the Elections Act.
All of these things, Mr. Chair, are burdens that we can't free ourselves from, and we've given ourselves, if we adopt this motion, an impossible task, reporting back on everything. I'll get to what the negative implications of that are for democracy, process, and rule of law in a second.
Let me first just take, again, another illustration from page 7 of the government House leader's report. It makes the point very clearly:
The House could examine the application of a “Made-in-Canada” programming scheme for Government bills, motions and for the handling of Senate amendments. It could include a range of time for all stages for the consideration of a bill, which would be negotiated between House Leaders then would be subject to debate, amendment and a vote in the House. It would be useful for any programming model to have the ability to accommodate more debate when desired. Including a mechanism for additional debate would make the programming model more responsive to the needs of opposition and back-bench government Members who wish to participate in debate.
It says, “Made-in-Canada”, so it implies we're not looking at international models. I don't know if that's meant literally. Sometimes the term “Made in Canada” gets thrown out because it just sounds good, kind of the way that people's sounds good in front of the word republic. However, if it's literally to be something designed de novo, without regard to foreign models, then that requires a significant amount of craftsmanship. It's also just not the way we do things, because you always look for the best models and take what we can from them.
Anyway, with regard to a “programming scheme for Government bills” to handle this, I would note that some of the things we have looked at aren't made in Canada. They're used elsewhere, but we've discussed the idea of a parallel chamber for certain items like private members' business of various sorts and statements where the equivalent of S. O. 31s could take place.
That's the way they do it in Australia. They have a parallel Federation Chamber. It's a very fancy committee room, where quorum requirements are reduced. Essentially it allows for more words to be said by members than the number of hours the House is sitting permits. That's how they deal with it.
It's an innovation in the sense that it's part of the Hansard. Just as we are able to suspend time by seeing the clock at a certain time, we can cause two things that are happening in separate rooms to appear on the record as if they happen in one, for the benefit of those who happen to read Hansard. That's not, I think, the way most of us interact with our members of Parliament and their statements; we interact with them now through electronic media, seeing them on Facebook or Twitter, giving a little talk in the House, or whatever.
Looking at that kind of model and then figuring it out that would take a fair bit of time. That in itself is a subject that could consume a significant number of meetings until we figured out what we want. Then we would have to do the actual drafting. Then we'd have to review the drafting. That wouldn't happen quickly. That in and of itself would be very time-consuming.
It says we would negotiate among House leaders. That would involve taking the informal House leader meetings, which happen every Tuesday.... They happen right after question period. The House leaders meet in camera, and the meetings are purely informal. They have no formal authority; they have a conventional authority, in the sense that everybody expects that everybody else at the meeting will not reveal what happened at the meeting, and that is firmly honoured. I know of only one case in the decade I spent as a deputy House leader when someone leaked the content of what happened in one of those meetings. That is an indication of how seriously it is taken, because it's a better record than most caucuses have. In all fairness, there are fewer people in the room, but nonetheless it's pretty impressive. They take this seriously, then. There's no formal rule. You're not in contempt of Parliament if you say what happened at a House leader's meeting.
That informal process is going to be formalized, I assume. It involves a substantial rewriting of the rules, if we're to do this, because this is about changing not the conventions but the Standing Orders. It means that you can't draw on conventions. We've drawn conventions into our Constitution, as when we speak in the preamble about the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick desiring a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom. That is shorthand for saying we are drawing on the convention of responsible government that exists in the United Kingdom and importing it to Canada. That's what it means.
At these informal meetings, which are purely conventional and where we try to find common ground, sometimes there isn't common ground and the government will just say they're going to move ahead on something. this. But they'll also ask, “Are you opposed to this motion that we're proposing, this bill that we're proposing”, whatever it is, “because you oppose it to your roots and you want to fight it tooth and nail, or are you opposing it because you have a few people in your party for whom this particular issue”, whatever it is—child care or firearms, or whatever is their...I don't want to say hobby horse, as that makes it seem shallow, but their special interest...?
Then you have to give them a chance to speak and get their views on the record. How much time do you have to allocate for it? That's how allocation of time in the normal course of events works, and it works better or worse depending on the personalities of some of the people who are involved, but on the whole it does work.
We would, then, be talking about changing this and formalizing it. That's not necessarily a bad idea, though it's not necessarily a good idea either—I actually don't know—but which on its own would consume all the available time between now and June, if that were the item we decided to privilege. I'm not sure we would come to a consensus, although we might, because it's conceivable you could go through the process without actually taking power from the opposition and giving it to the government. It's a possibility, but again, my goodness, it would take all the time we have to deal with this, and there are so many others. That particular item is under “Time Allocation”, which is one of the subheads under the second of the three themes, “Management of Debate”.
It seems appropriate at this point, Mr. Chair, to illustrate another point that my amendment would allow us to sever. Page 8 of the government House leader's discussion paper addresses omnibus bills, so there's a certain irony in what I'll read, although I think it may have some merit.
The Government committed to end the improper use of omnibus legislation. Omnibus bills can be defined as a bill that contains separate and unrelated themes packaged into one bill. Members are then forced to vote for or against a bill that could have elements that Members would support or oppose. The only recourse for Members has been to seek to divide omnibus bills in committee, but these motions rarely come to a vote or are agreed to by way of unanimous consent.
I'll pause before going to the second paragraph of that point and point out that they rarely come to a vote or are agreed to by way of unanimous consent, which means that they sometimes are, which is a not insignificant point.
The reason they are, if you look back, is that something becomes contentious. Thanks to the tools of delay and being able to bring things to public attention, the government becomes aware that the opposition is succeeding at that and says they have a little water in their wine. They don't need to blow their credibility over this. Yes, they have a government. They are in power. Yes, if they are a majority government, they have all the reins of power. Nonetheless, if they face an election, it will be costly for them to have a record of opposing these reasonable changes, and so sometimes bills are divided.
It happens. It happened in the last Parliament. It has happened in Parliaments before that. Not all the time, but surely part of the reason for that is that not every bill is an omnibus bill. Nobody argues that. They argue that some bills are omnibus bills. They argue in particular that budget bills are omnibus bills and contain a whole bunch of stuff that shouldn't be in a budget. This may not happen. We don't know. There will be some irony if the upcoming budget turns out to contain omnibus provisions at the very time we are debating this here, but we don't know if it will.
At any rate, let's continue:
Since the Clerk of the House has the power in Standing Order 39(2) to divide written questions, a similar approach could be used by the Speaker to divide omnibus bills. The Speaker’s authority could be prescribed by criteria to define and establish “a unifying theme” of the bill. This approach would allow for the divided bills to be debated together at second reading, report stage and third reading but would be subject to separate votes at each stage. In addition, the divided bills could be sent to separate committees if the subject matter of the bills warranted such action.
That is an interesting suggestion. I don't know if it's a good suggestion, a bad suggestion, or has a precedent—that is to say, this is how they do it for the sake argument in the Parliament of India or some other Commonwealth jurisdiction. If so, has it worked out well for them or not when we look to these examples?
I think it's legitimate to find out more about this on its own. I think it would be hard to get this done by June 20 if it were on its own. It's not inconceivable. This is, if I may say, a more completely thought-through approach than some of the others. Again, it makes the point I'm driving at when I talk about the problems of dealing with all the subject matter at one time. I have to assume that this thought did not just occur to the government House leader out of thin air. It came from somewhere.
An hon. member: Absolutely.
Mr. Scott Reid: Yes. Everything comes from somewhere. Occasionally, something interesting does occur out of thin air, the very first time, but I suspect it's not the case here. I suspect this is something that is precedented somewhere. I'm just guessing that. If there was a footnote to this, we'd actually have some idea where it came from, some authority would be cited, but we don't have that. So how do we find out?
I suppose if I had thought of it, I could have asked the government House leader on Sunday, because I ran into her at Pearson Airport. We had a brief chat. She was on standby, so she was distracted by the need to rush up to the desk and get her boarding pass. It was a nice chat. There could have been a Liberal caucus meeting on that airplane, by the way. It was amazing. Anyway, there were a lot of people on that plane, and she was one of them. I could have asked her then, “Hey, where did you get this idea from?” But I didn't think of it. Now I literally can't ask her because I am in this committee holding the floor in order to make sure that something doesn't get through, which could be disastrous, I think, for the way the House of Commons runs. I can't go and ask her where she got this from.
Then we could go and look at that example, where you got it from, and whether it works there. How does it work? How good is it? Is it a successful sort of thing or not? It may have positive features. It may have features that look positive at first glance, but aren't so good once you look at it in a little more depth. That happens a lot.
That was the feeling I had when I looked at the Australian Federation Chamber. It's the room where the parallel debating takes place. It sounded better at first than it seemed as you investigated in more detail—at least that was my impression.
This might be brilliant; it might not be brilliant. I do wonder. The Speaker, of course, is meant to be independent. But he's independent in a way that essentially allows him to garner increasing independence from the agendas of the parties as time goes on, so a new Speaker has less gravitas than a Speaker who has served several years. This would be true with every Speaker, regardless of how much intrinsic gravitas they have. It's true of the current Speaker; it's true of his predecessor, Andrew Scheer. It was equally true of Peter Milliken, who came very well-equipped for the speakership, but who nevertheless grew in his job as time went on.
Here we're getting the opposite starting to happen. The Speaker is supposed to define a unifying theme for the bill. Maybe there's academic literature out there he can draw upon to say here's a unifying theme. Maybe there isn't. I actually don't know. But you'll notice when the Speaker actually has to make a ruling on something, a tie vote, for example, he almost magically has in his hand a piece of paper that he reads, which says that—and I'm paraphrasing—whereas the underlying principle of Parliament is the continuation of debate, and it is second reading, and my vote against this would cause debate to be precluded, thereby also precluding the possibility that a majority of the House will find on one side or the other; therefore, I'm voting in favour. Whereas we are at third reading, and voting in favour of this motion would cause it to cease to be within the purview of the House where no more debate could occur; therefore, I'm voting against.
He is breaking a tie vote, but he's breaking it in a way that is entirely based on precedent. His authority is all based on the will of the House. I wasn't sure if you wanted to....
:
I was building on all the different things that you have going on here. The Speaker is supposed to divide omnibus bills.
I remember where I was going.
I'm trying to illustrate here, by means of a parallel to the amendment that I proposed, how it takes a long time. I had this idea that we should be electing the Speakers this way. My primary reason was not to save the time, actually, involved in Speaker elections. It was the idea that you're more likely to get a consensus candidate under a preferential system, someone from the middle of the road. For the same reason that it doesn't work in a federal election—you'll always elect the guy in the middle of the road, which means the Liberal—the same thing happens here. You elect a person who's acceptable to all parties. That's the virtue of it.
I had to design the thing, so I came up with a concept. I actually wrote a memo to the Prime Minister, saying there was no point in my pursuing this if he wasn't going to support it, so here was my suggestion and what did he think. I dropped it off with his chief of staff, Ray Novak, and it made its way up to the PM who got around to it and eventually got back to me. Then I took it, went off, and started writing.
It went from being about as long as this paragraph I've been dwelling upon regarding the Speaker and omnibus bills, to then designing a section of Standing Orders. It's now in the Standing Orders, so you can take a look in there and see it. It's about a page long to deal with all the different things you have to deal with. It deals with multiple ballots. You still have to keep in the parts of the Standing Orders that relate to people who forget to remove their name from the ballot—we're all candidates, so you have to withdraw your name as candidate—so it deals with that.
The whole drafting process took me about a month. Frankly, I came very close to not making the deadline because of all the different unexpected wrinkles that were involved in what had appeared conceptually to be a very simple change and what ultimately looked like a relatively simple change when you saw it on paper. There was nothing straightforward about it. Then it went off to a committee, to this committee. I recused myself from my seat on the committee for the purposes of that discussion. I sat as a witness and presented why I thought it was a good idea.
The committee came back with a report. Interestingly enough, I think it was actually the first time this has happened where.... It came before this committee because it changed the Standing Orders. That's where changes to the Standing Orders go. Even if they're initiated as a matter of private member's business, they come to this committee. If it had been a private member's bill, it would have gone to some other committee. It came here and the committee did something that I don't think it's ever done before, which is that it said it was not endorsing and not rejecting; it simply heard my testimony. I can't remember if the report had some other considerations in it, but it didn't actually endorse or oppose.
Then it went to the House, and we had a vote in I think the last week of the sitting. I'd wanted to get every member from my party to vote in favour of it. That didn't happen. A significant number—I think about 25 or 26—did not, which meant we didn't have a majority large enough to push it through without the support of other parties, but it did get the support of many NDP members. I can't remember how many, but not the full caucus. They'd had a free vote on it. I think it was the only completely free vote they had in that Parliament. I think, but I'm not sure. It got the support of most, but not all, Liberal MPs. Mauril Bélanger voted against it, Mauril whom I respect enormously. The late Mauril Bélanger, as you know, had been someone who'd been a potential candidate for Speaker and he had some thoughts that were, if you will, idiosyncratic to him, but they were thoughtful and intelligent as was everything he did. He voted against it, but the rest of the Liberals voted in favour of it. It had a version of all-party support.
I was actually using this to illustrate one point, and I realize I've actually illustrated another.
The primary point was to illustrate how long it takes to get something as apparently simple as changing the manner in which the Speaker is elected through. It was not a quick process. The committee part of the process wasn't quick. The drafting part of the process, which in my case was entirely done by myself—it was entirely extra-parliamentary, there were no other parliamentarians involved in it—was not quick. It doesn't get faster when you add more chefs to the kitchen, as everybody knows. I would have had trouble doing just that within this deadline.
The second point to be made based on that story comes back to the theme of unanimity. There wasn't unanimous support in the House for this amendment. In the end, there was all-party support.
In theory, the government could have taken the approach this government appears to be taking, which is, we'll produce changes, use our majority and force them through, and have a tight deadline for it. We'll bring them into the House and have a vote on party lines. That could have happened in that case, but it didn't happen.
I think there can be merit in individual members bringing forward items for which there is not a consensus but for which there is majority support across party lines, and introducing them in the House of Commons. As I say, I've done it myself. That is so different from the approach being taken here. The amendment I propose would bring us back to a situation in which that would prevail. That is the reason for the motion.
In regard to the idea that we can rush to conclusions on things, let's talk about electronic voting. Electricity is not new. Electronic voting, conceptually anyway, has a long history. It was discussed, in the case of the Canadian House of Commons, as far back as the mid-1980s. Thirty odd years ago, the McGrath committee recommenced electronic voting. This is cited by the in her discussion paper. It recommended electronic voting. The Special Committee on the Modernization and Improvement of the Procedures of the House of Commons, in 2003, made a similar recommendation. I don't know if the recommendations were similar, but they weren't rushed into place. Creating a situation in which we could have electronic voting may have merit, I think actually a lot of merit, but again, it's not something that you can rush to a conclusion on. In fact, if you read carefully, you realize that what is being proposed here is not necessarily one form of electronic voting, it's a discussion about many different kinds of electronic voting. How we would choose one of these in a limited amount of time is difficult for me to see.
In this case, the minister makes reference to a number of sources, so it's more helpful than the discussion about dividing up omnibus bills. She says, “The United States House of Representatives has implemented an electronic voting system, as has the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.” I don't know how the Scots and Welsh do it, but in the U.S. House of Representatives, you don't even have to turn up in the house. It's clear that she is at least considering that as a possibility because she says, “Ringing of the bells and the taking of recorded divisions is a time-consuming exercise.”
The taking of recorded divisions is overcome by the pressing of a personalized button on your desk and then going to the next vote. But ringing the bells, that's summoning you to the chamber. There seems to be an assumption we'd move to votes without having a ringing of the bells, without that 15 minutes on Mondays.... Sorry, I can't remember if it's 15 minutes on Mondays and 30 minutes the rest of the week or the other way around. At any rate, it's without that time. That seems to be assuming you could vote from wherever.
How wherever is wherever? Is it with an electronic card as they do in the States, with that little ID card you insert and then vote with?
There's more than one electronic way of voting. You need a simple push button on your desk, separately wired like a kind of scoreboard. Frankly, you need technology that is quite literally a century old. They could have done it in 1917 as well as in 2017. I'm not even sure you need electronics; you could probably do it with a system of bells. My steampunk mind is working here. In Downton Abbey they pull a cord, a bell rings, and you can see which room it came from. It's not so different from that, but it does assume you're in your seat.
There's actually a debate to be had over what you mean by electronic voting. The minister is at least hinting that she is open to both of our systems. I actually don't know, because I haven't read the reports, whether the McGrath Committee in 1985 favoured that kind of electronic voting, where you aren't even there, or electronic voting from your seat.
As for the special committee in 2003, again, I don't know. Actually, their report is online and my omnicompetent legislative assistant Dennis Laurie has put together a document with links to it, but I have not had the opportunity to find that particular recommendation—it was one of their six reports—and look through it.
But there you go—there's more than one way of doing it. Electronic voting is not necessarily a bad idea, and the is entirely right that “Given that the House is to move to West Block in 2018, and while Centre Block is being refurbished, this would be an excellent opportunity to implement a system of electronic voting as a pilot.” She's right. I agree with that.
Here's a question, to give you an example. Given the time constraints we have between now and June 2—or our real deadline, which is before June 2, sometime in May—how do we determine whether we need to rush to get this through? Maybe they're at the point now where they're going to be installing the desks soon and setting up the apparatus for electronic voting depending on what we say, and it is something that needs to be rushed, or maybe not. Maybe, if we have another year, we could deal with this. I have no idea.
Do we make this an expedited item? My suspicion is that here, of all items, is one that is unlikely to produce a great deal of dissension. Here is one that just stands out as being something on which there's been consensus in the past. We had it with that all-party committee in 2003, which made all its recommendations based on unanimous consent.
Notwithstanding my colleague Mr. Christopherson's enthusiasm for circulating around the House and meeting other members during votes for the Speaker, I think he will agree with me that all-night voting sessions—where we go through one amendment after another to a piece of legislation, as we did with the back-to-work legislation in June 2011—are not a great time for kibitzing with others. You're stuck in your seat. This would reduce the amount of time there.
By the way, it would do so in a way that happens to fit in with the government's agenda of speeding things up and depriving the opposition of tools that can be used to slow things down. It might actually, nonetheless, be in a manner that we would all find reasonable and that could get all-party support. That is meaningful. There you are. There's something sitting right there that we could all agree to, and here we are instead, trying to avoid coming to an agreement.
Looking through her report, I see other areas that are more problematic. I'm looking now to question period. It seems appropriate to address it as we are just moving into question period right now, where I anticipate that the hearings of this committee will be the subject of questions. That seems like a reasonable guess.
There's a little bit of rhetoric here, but then we get on to the substance of what the government is proposing. The discussion paper says:
Question Period is where the Government is held to account for its policies and for the conduct of Ministers. The Government committed to reform Question Period so that all Ministers, including the Prime Minister, are held to greater account.
This is all rhetoric so far:
Reforms to Question Period could include instituting a Prime Minister's Questions time, as is done in Britain, and could also include lengthening the time allotted for questions and answers.
These are two separate topics. The Prime Minister's question time and changing the time allotted for questions and answers are separate items.
It goes on to deal with written questions. I want to stop there for a second and talk about the time allotted for questions and answers.
Late show questions used to take the form of a brief question and a brief answer. If memory serves, it was a four-minute question and a four-minute answer at the end of adjournment proceedings on some issue about which an MP said that he or she had not received an adequate answer. The assumption made was that the reason these adjournment proceedings exist at all is that if there were more time, issues for which they could not get a decent answer in 35 seconds, they could get a decent answer for in four minutes.
But what has happened?
This was the status quo when I arrived in 2000. The member would arrive, make his little speech about what was wrong with the government's policy and probably about how evasive the government was. Then not the minister but the parliamentary secretary would stand up and read a prepared answer.
You're a former parliamentary secretary, Mr. Chair, so you know how this works. You aren't actually designing the policy. You have to read the policy. You can't do it on the fly—and that's not a prudent practice for ministers either—and you really can't say “the government”, because you're not a member of cabinet, so all you can do is say, “Here's the response that was prepared for me.”
I do remember once getting up back in those days and asking a question to Larry McCormick. He was a great guy, a Liberal MP who was from a riding to my west and then they merged our ridings and I had to run against him. I was asking a question, and in the four-minute ask I moved from the narrow, original subject matter to something else. He said, “I came prepared to answer the question that I thought Mr. Reid was going to ask based on the question he asked in the House, and now I can't answer the stuff that I don't have notes for, because I have to answer with what's given to me.”
I thought it was a very charmingly honest answer. “I'm not the minister. I can't just invent something here. I wish he'd told me.”
Here's how we would try to adjust and improve on this. Back during that period, which I'm beginning to make sound like a golden age and I don't mean to, in the Chrétien government when the special committee was reporting on changes to the Standing Orders, it reported that we should make a change to the late show question. Instead of it being a four-minute question and a four-minute answer, it would be a four-minute question and a four-minute answer and then one minute of rebuttal or further commentary from the MP and a further minute from the parliamentary secretary, which allowed for a little bit of freedom. It's not as much time as you get in a four-minute question, but it allows you to stand up and say, “You didn't deal with this part of my question”.
The parliamentary secretary, while he was no freer than he had previously been to say, “Here's how I will use my own discretion to deal with it”, could say, “All right, let me deal with that”. It allowed for a somewhat freer discussion. I do not mean to suggest that this was utopia. The late show is still a largely scripted event, but it's better than it was previously.
I had the great honour of asking the very first question under the new rule. That rule was adopted as a one-off based on a consensus of all parties on that committee. They have something that they can go on in the time allotted. There is no panacea, and there's no single way of doing this. You could change the time. It's only length. I agree that making them shorter would be very problematic. Making them longer, perhaps....
I remember an experience that is germane. I used to live in Australia, as I think many of you may know. On one occasion in the 1990s, I was driving from Sydney to a place in the New England highlands. There's a part of New South Wales that is called New England. There's a university, the University of New England, there. That detail is very confusing. When many people think New England, they think of the northeastern part of the United States, but there is a New England in Australia.
Anyway, I was going there to go through the university's archives to look for information about the New England separatist movement. In the 1960s, there had been a movement for New England to separate from the rest of the state of New South Wales and become a separate state of Australia. The New South Wales government actually held a referendum to facilitate this, but ultimately the referendum failed, largely because of the inclusion of the city of Newcastle on the coast. This was really an inland, rural rebellion against urban-centred state government.
Anyway, I was on my way to do some research in the archives. The materials of the New England separatist movement had been put into the archives at the university, so up I went to take a look at them. You have to drive up a big escarpment and at the top of the escarpment is a big plain. As I was driving up the escarpment, the number of radio stations I had the opportunity to pick up on my car radio diminished. They diminished to the point where the only station I could pick up was the live broadcast of the debates from the Australian Senate.
It just happened to be question period in the Australian Senate, where they, as I recall, have two minutes for questions and two minutes for answers. You might think this would lead to more substantive questions and more substantive answers. I regret to say that in the particular round of questions I heard—which were about Australian natural resources policy, something completely out of my expertise, and therefore, I'm in no position to say who was right and who was wrong—a minister responding to a question started his response by saying, and there's obviously no rule in Australia about addressing the Speaker, “You are just pathetic.”
The two-minute questions and answers had not automatically translated, all other things being equal, into greater decorum, I regret to say, but that doesn't mean there isn't merit to discussing it. It means we want to look at examples like the Australians, the New Zealanders, the Brits, and so on, about the questions. It might be that questions should be different in length from supplementals. That seems like a reasonable possibility. It's one that is actually incorporated into late show questions, where a one-minute snapper round comes after the four-minute question and four-minute set piece answer.
Another possibility.... This is from a different trip, one with this committee. In 2005, we travelled to Australia and also to New Zealand. We were examining electoral reform at the time. We travelled to those two countries and had the opportunity to attend question period in the New Zealand House of Representatives. We sat up in the gallery reserved for visitors, and we were introduced in the same way that visitors are introduced to us in our House. We stood up and received applause. It was very nice.
We got to watch their question period and they have a very interesting system in which a lottery is conducted to determine the topics that will be up for debate in question period. The lottery determines what will come first. In the first round of questions.... Because they have a multi-member proportional system, they have more parties than we do. They have maybe five parties or a party status of six. I can't remember and this is historical information. It's some number greater than the number we had back in 2005. They have a different number of seats and the number of questions, as with us, is allocated differently for each party.
You have the equivalent of our leader's round where you get a larger number of questions for the main opposition party, and then a smaller number for the next opposition party, and then it goes around, but they all act on the same topic. If, as was the case when we were there, the topic is fisheries, it is not appropriate for me to stand up—In fact, I think I would be ruled out of order if I stood up—as Leader of the Opposition or as an MP, and proceed to ask a question about agriculture, but it can be anything within fisheries.
I think the way it's divided up is by departmental responsibility. I'm not sure of that, but I think that's essentially how it works. There's a first round, second round, third round, and so on.
First to go is the first opposition party. Let's say it's the Labour Party, and then you go to the National Party, and then to whoever comes next, with diminishing amounts of time. You complete the questions on fisheries, then you come back to deal with the next subject, which might be natural resources.
Okay, so it—
I thank my colleagues for their care in this.
I turn now, with your permission, Mr. Chair, to the question of unanimity. The substance of what is being proposed here, the substance of the words, the majority of the words, is the new paragraph (e), which is all about making sure that you must have unanimity to move forward.
The practice in the House has been not to move forward without substantial consent. There's this debate about what constitutes consensus. First of all, there's majority. If you have majority, near majority is not consensus. It's something more than that, but what is it? In certain circumstances, when you have to actually quantify it in law, it can be two-thirds.
For example, if you want to change the fundamental rules of corporate governance of a corporation, you need to get the consent of two-thirds—a supermajority—of each of the classes of shareholders. If you have classes A through F preferred shares, you have to get two-thirds of the holders of each of those classes of preferred shares. I have some experience with that, and it can be a time-consuming enterprise to put together. There's that kind of thing.
You can have three-quarters. You can have some other number. In our Constitution, we have the 7/50 formula, but the point is that consensus is something more.
So what is it? We've put down unanimity here, and I suppose one could argue that unanimity is too much. But in practice on something like this, I think it's reasonable to expect that we are not acting as individual agents, dividing with our colleagues from the same party. We are acting as agents for our respective parties.
I'm here as a Conservative member of Parliament. Mr. Chan and Mr. Simms are here as agents for the Liberal Party. Mr. Christopherson is here as an agent for the New Democratic Party. Since there's only one of him, the practical result is that if we want to make sure that all parties are involved, we have to say that the consent of all members is required, thus the reference to unanimity.
I have a question about when you go to the House and you need unanimity there. Would, for example, Elizabeth May on her own be able to say no and stop everything? That's not part of this motion. It is a reasonable question to ask. I suspect that if you took an inclusive approach, she'd be on board too. I think the things that she would find objectionable would very likely also be found objectionable by other opposition members if they were proposed. While I think the things that she would ultimately like—I shouldn't be speaking for Elizabeth, but I think I'm accurate in saying this—as proactive changes might be things that wouldn't be acceptable to the rest of the House. They might involve additional privileges for members who are not part of a recognized party. The Bloc Québécois during the hearings on the electoral form emphasized this. They didn't have party status, and they felt that the lack of a research budget had hurt their ability to act. They would have liked to see us change that. They didn't want to change the Standing Orders to something; they just wanted a change.
That's fair enough. We have unanimity down here. I could see an argument being made that we should set a lower consensus bar, but—and here I really am very tightly addressing the proposed amendment—the amendment requires unanimity in this committee. I actually think there is sufficient material and we will have no trouble finding standing order changes for which there is unanimous approval. The logical way is to start and say, as we have always done until now, “What is the low-hanging fruit? Where do we see the likelihood for such unanimity to emerge? Let's focus on those things; let's not focus on the others.”
Before I go through and try to point out some of those items and distinguish them from some of the others, which would be less likely to be the object of a consensus, let me first.... I'm just trying to think of what would make the most sense. I'll go through these and point out some of the things I think could be items that are likely to have consensus.
The paper starts with a bit of history, as these papers tend to do. It explains the justification of using three themes. As I mentioned, I am not necessarily supportive of the three themes, but we bounce up as the very first subsidiary item.... There are six subsidiary items under theme 1, which is “Management of the House”, and the first of these is what is called “sittings”, which means the days on which the House sits. The statement is made that.... I'm actually not sure that this is a factually correct statement, to be honest, but it says:
Among the provinces and most international legislatures, Canada is unique in regularly sitting five days a week. Most legislatures have either the Monday or the Friday as a constituency day. The exception is the United Kingdom, which tends to sit on 13 or 14 Fridays out of 36 sitting weeks (i.e., 38 per cent of Fridays). In terms of provincial legislatures, Nova Scotia sometimes sits five days a week. As a result, the House of Commons sits many more days and hours each year than provincial and territorial legislatures. While the House does sit five days a week, certain procedural and time limitations on Fridays make these sittings less effective than other days.
I might disagree with that. It's a less effective day for getting business through—there are certain things you can't do—but it is actually effective at what it does. At any rate, let's go back to the text.
All recorded divisions on bills are automatically deferred on Fridays, which means in some cases, the business that is taken up on Fridays cannot resume on Mondays. Additionally, Friday sittings provide for no more than 2.5 hours for Government Orders and committees do not meet.
The argument here is that we shouldn't have the House sit at all. This is not an area where we are likely to get consensus. I'm surprised that it's here again, because we had it come up in the past and it met with considerable opposition. Yesterday, it was the lead-off point for a number of the questioners in the House of Commons in question period. Their questions were, “Canadians work five days a week, so why shouldn't we?” Of course, constituency work takes place on Fridays and on weekends, and it is real work, but the work of the House of Commons, our legislative work, ought not to be subsidiary to our work as members of Parliament.
It was as recently as the 1950s and 1960s that members of Parliament started introducing constituency offices. They didn't have constituency offices before that. People elected them to go to Ottawa to deal with legislation on their behalf. The member would typically take the train, if you go back to the days before the airplane. They would go to Ottawa, stay for the sitting life of the Parliament, and come back. If you were far enough away, even a week off was not very helpful to you in the days when it took several days of train travel to get to the west coast, for example. You would just not visit your constituency at that time, so we developed the pattern. I shouldn't say we developed, but we retained the inherited pattern that the British had of long breaks over the summer and long breaks at Christmas, and then a compressed period of sittings.
I think we're moving away from that bit by bit. The schedule that was agreed to at the House leaders' meeting last autumn, which involves the one-off, one-on period, so the week-on,week-off arrangement that we now have, is a move we all agreed to, maybe against our better wisdom, I don't know. We all agreed to the move, which had the effect of causing us to very significantly....
I will just make the obvious comment that this would not have happened in the 19th century, or indeed in the first three-quarters of the 20th century, when it was too difficult to get back to some areas.
Take one of your predecessors, Mr. Chair. There was a Speaker of the House whose name, if I'm not incorrect, was George Black, from Yukon. When he was a member of the House back in the thirties and forties, getting back from Ottawa to the Yukon could not have been something that happened quickly enough to get a week in—the turnaround time. It's still not convenient for you. I know this from the adjustments you've made to your schedule, notwithstanding the vast improvements in transportation technology.
People came to Ottawa with that expectation. Now, effectively, you can see our adjusting bit by bit the same number of sitting weeks. Let's spread them out differently so that we have a week on, a week off, then a week on, a week off. Then I think it's two weeks on, two weeks off through the period of February, March, and April, after which we get down to the old-fashioned four on, one off, four on. I think that is the remainder of our parliamentary calendar to the summer.
The first thing to observe about this is that it was agreed to through informal negotiation, which led to a one-time-only 2017 suspension of the sittings that would have prevailed. We put them in place. In fact, this particular part of the Standing Orders are designed to be subject to constant revision to accommodate that. Every year there is a very substantial debate at the House leaders' meeting in which party allegiances break down and people are aligned by province, based on when their kids' school break is, as to when our sitting weeks and non-sitting weeks will be. It's the Ontarians against the British Columbians against the Quebeckers against the Albertans, based on everybody wanting to make sure they can have a vacation when their kids are off school.
That shows, number one, the virtue of doing things informally, and number two, the virtue of flexibility and doing things informally at the House leaders' meeting, flexibility as to the ability to adjust from one year to the next and actually build that flexibility into the rules. Number three is the virtue of not trying to do things in an omnibus manner.
All of that is there to be seen . All of that is relevant to the search for unanimity. because although in those meetings we don't all agree, we manage to come to a consensus every time. I've never seen the House sittings and the way they work imposed by a majority, by one party, or by the government imposing itself, and saying that we're going to do it this way. We've never needed to. We've always managed to find a consensus solution on something that is genuinely contentious and on which emotions run high.
Partly what happens is that the House leaders use the parties as their mediating bodies to go back to enforce a certain discipline upon the various caucuses. But whatever the mechanism, that works better than doing it through formal changes.
All right. Working us back now to the Fridays, Friday sittings don't provide much time for government orders, and committees don't meet. Those are absolutely true facts. This situation lets people get back to their ridings. It is a reflection of how we have adjusted our behaviour to permit MPs who are from further away to trade duty days. This is an informal system that has sprung up in every caucus so that they can be away from the House.
I actually am from near the Ottawa area. When there's no traffic, it takes an hour to get from here to my front door out in Perth. It feels like a million miles away, but it's actually a one-hour drive away, when there's no traffic. When there's traffic, it's a different story. I regularly take the Friday duty days of other MPs. I will sit for them on Friday, and they will sit for me at some other time, freeing me up from, among other things, committee work here.
That is a sign that things are working. This is presented as not working, but actually it's working well. You get 2.5 hours of government business on a Friday, which is 2.5 hours more than zero. You can have committees meet on Fridays, if they choose to do so. I was on one just last autumn that did that. It also met in unusual locations and at unusual hours. This committee has met at various times, although admittedly not on a Friday. It's a flex day.
I could go on and on about the history of weekends. Weekends used to.... Saturday was considered a half-day. Students would go for a half-day of school on Saturday. It was a half-holiday, they called it. Nobody got a two-day weekend. Before that you'd get the half-holiday. The week was that on six days you laboured and one day was the Sabbath. That's the Biblical way of doing things. Before that, in the ancient Roman empire, they had an eight-day week, with only one day per weekend. That really sucked.
The paper goes on to suggest options. It says:
One option would be to reapportion the time on Friday sittings to other days, and another option would be to make them more like other sitting days. It should be recognized that the important work of Members takes place both in the House and in their constituencies.
Now, it's true that constituency work is important, but as I say, a century ago people understood that they looked to their MP to go to Ottawa to vote in a certain way, according to the platform of the party to which that individual belonged.
I do want them to represent their constituency, but their representation would normally take the form of making sure, if a lot of cattle producers were in my riding and a lot of people in the fishing industry were in Mr. Simms' riding, that I did not sacrifice the interests—in, say, trade negotiations—of our cattle producers to our fish producers. His constituents would send him here with the same understanding in reverse.
They didn't, however, say, “I need a passport. I'll go to the MP's office to help me out with that.” They didn't say, “I'm having a problem. My Canada pension plan cheque is an incorrect amount. I want the intervention of my member of Parliament” or “The flag on our service club is wearing out. I'm going to get a Canadian flag”.
We can do all those things, and while those things are important, they are not actually our primary responsibility. I'm constantly trading time with people who say, “I have to get back to my riding for this event. It's absolutely critical.” When push comes to shove and it's an important vote, nobody expects you to be at a high school graduation or a 100th birthday party or a bar mitzvah or a Santa Claus parade. They expect you to be in the House. Which constituent would have been happy seeing their member of Parliament at a Santa Claus parade, important as it might be, instead of voting on, for example, the assisted dying bill?
Maybe that's a bad example because that was in June and Santa Claus parades are in December, but you see my point. In the end, even the people who say, “You have to come to our event” are more upset when you're not doing your duty in the House. That's our primary duty.
I am editorializing on concerns that I have with regard to the way in which this is laid out to show that this might very well be an item on which we would not be getting a consensus.
I'll just finish the last part here. Should Friday sittings be reapportioned, it would be important to reallocate any lost time to the remaining four days including time lost for opposition or for question time and private members' business. This could be accomplished by having the House meet earlier on certain days. Alternatively, if Friday sittings are retained, they should look like any other sitting day with the possible exception of having two hours of private members' business at the end of the day to allow some members to leave earlier to travel to their ridings. Somehow, maybe that's an option that we could actually get consensus on. In all fairness, I speak as someone who doesn't have a long travel day on Friday, and perhaps that could achieve success.
All right. I'm going to pass over with your permission, Mr. Chair, to electronic voting. I think there's a real potential for a consensus but I did deal with that earlier, and I'm anxious to be respectful of the other members who have all been listening intently and will not want me to repeat myself.
:
Thank you. I knew you had it on the tip of your tongue.
Not only do we follow the practices of the House, but here's one where the House could follow the practices of the committee, the idea being that the.... You notice it's fewer than half the members. That rule is designed to allow the government to call a committee back or the opposition to call a committee back. In practice, in our multi-party system, it almost always means that you would have to get the agreement of more than one opposition party.
We have two parties right now with official party status that are in the opposition. We would have to get the consent of the New Democrats and the Conservatives to make that happen, but that can be done. Also, of course, the Liberals could do it on their own.
You could do something like that where you say, look, either one could call the House back. This would all assume it's not prorogued of course. Prorogation is not within our powers to stop. Prorogation is important for us to discuss, but it's something that is a crown power, and it is just not part of our Standing Orders. When we're prorogued, that's it. That's cemented externally, and you have to live with it. But when we're not prorogued, when we are merely not sitting for the summer, you could call us back. Government can really do that anyway via the Governor General, so that might have some merit.
Again, this is not a simple matter. It's not something we're going to get discussed and sorted out by early June. We could discuss it. I mean discuss them—there are actual multiple topics in here. The number of sittings could be based on demands to sit. We could change the order in which things come before the House, so urgent and important matters before the House are given their fullest consideration despite time pressures. That suggests some kind of new system for reallocating business. We could discuss allowing it to sit longer on a given day. You would have to be careful you don't design it so you get extra time for debate during which the proceedings can collapse when members are trying to get off to the airport to get back for business in their ridings. Those things take time to discuss and sort out.
These are technicalities, but everything in the Standing Orders is technicalities. It's all technicalities.
I should comment on the acrimonious proceedings leading to the summer and winter adjournments. I guess there's some acrimony. It seems to me that they are simply very time-consuming, and they go late into the evening, which is different from being acrimonious, I would assert.
There has been acrimony, for sure. We're trying to get business done. Also that is the point at which you frequently get substantial co-operation of pushing some business through. The acrimony is in seeing how much the government can push through by holding out the threat of sitting late into the night every night. It's just normal government business. It's kind of like the people who, during the electoral reform hearings—I see Erin, our very talented.... We are joined by one of the analysts for the ERRE committee.
There were some utopian people coming and saying we need to get the contention, the acrimony, out of politics, and they had a system that would do that. But you don't have a system that will do that. You might improve it in a variety of ways, but politics is by its nature the battle for political office in which there's one seat and multiple candidates. It's inherently confrontational. It's unavoidable.
That's why a large number of words, including one I used earlier, are considered unparliamentary, and that's why we have a whole bunch of other things meant to tone it down. I don't think the kind of acrimony they are describing can be avoided by giving us an extra week. I think it would have the effect of causing our acrimony to occur a week later, frankly. I disagree with that.
There is a reason for why we have the allowance for the late-night sittings in June but at no other time. You have a choice here. You can sit late into the evening or, if the government has business that's important in the government's eyes and there's a majority, the government can move a motion and extend the sitting into the summer. You won't like that, but you'll dislike it in a different way from the late-night sittings. Maybe we could agree that you'll limit the number of speakers getting up for debate. That's kind of the government's bargaining position.
The opposition parties have similar bargaining positions. They all assure each other behind closed doors that their members are raring to go and would love to stay all summer if that's what it takes. Of course, that is not how the conversations are actually transpiring in the various caucuses. We all know that it's a bit of a fiction. Like the chest-beating displays of gorillas in mating season, the fact that nobody really wants to get into a fight is not communicated directly but through indirect means. Ultimately, you come up with some kind of solution. I've never seen it not happen. It's not always a solution that makes everybody happy, but the rules are surprisingly sophisticated.
The same-sex marriage bill was a great example. When there is something that is closer to a consensus than a mere majority, as reflected in our party system, you'll have a majority of the parties in the House agreeing to something and then you can extend the sittings. That is a way of saying that we're going to allow the spirit of consensus to trump the ability of those who oppose to put up endless speakers on the list, which is something that every government feels a desire to do.
This now brings me back to the 's motivations. He is frustrated, as every holder of executive office since the pharaohs has been, both the dreadful ones and the great ones. It is frustrating to have to go through a process that frustrates my will, but the system is designed to frustrate your will. It is designed to ensure that there must be some degree of buy-in, of what , when she was the Minister of Democratic Institutions, called “broad buy-in”.
That's right, you need to get something.... If you have a majority, sometimes you can get two-thirds or three-quarters, depending on what you're talking about. It can be a majority of parties. It can be the 7/50 formula. You see patterns all over the place, in the House of Commons Standing Orders, our Constitution, our corporate law, and our internal rules of corporate governance. It's in Robert's Rules of Order. The ideas that you have for different situations are everywhere.
If we were to hunt down the history of that section.... In the annotated Standing Orders, there's typically an explanation of the history of each section. I don't know the history of that particular one, but my suspicion is that some kind of situation arose where a party was blocking progress in the House of Commons, by everybody speaking to their maximum time, and slow voting, and all that stuff.
After that crisis was over and everybody could see it was a problem, the Standing Orders were adjusted so that kind of use of process by the opposition, which used technical rules in a way that violated the spirit of the House, would be corrected. As in the law of testaments and wills, the technical rule trumps the spirit in our parliamentary Standing Orders. However, when that is used in a way that is clearly contrary to the spirit, the majority ought to be able to decide, and when it's more than a majority, a smaller minority should not be able to hold things up in such a way as to prevent moving forward.
Ultimately, a change was made when everybody was not invested in one side or the other in that particular dispute. A system was found, which, although it was used in a way that was against my party and against me in 2005, I have to concede was not wholly unreasonable. There is a lot of that kind of thing in there.
That is a bit of a discussion about the House calendar. You'll see in that discussion, which I am now wrapping up, that again, there is a lot of meat in there.
I actually said you can't discuss this on its own. It has to be discussed in conjunction with the discussion about the length of our workweek and the hours we sit every day. This, on its own, in conjunction with that, would be too much for us to discuss and complete by June 2, although it might not be too much for us if we were to set it aside to discuss and complete by the end of the Parliament or even by the end of 2017, although that seems wishful to me.
If we had a separate committee dealing with this—this is not what my motion recommends—much as there was a separate committee under the Chrétien government meeting full time with regularly scheduled meetings— it could be twice a week or whatever— I think they could get through a lot of this stuff and make the same kind of progress that committee made. If we agreed to the consensus part of it, either that committee or we—it remains in our hands, as my amendment proposes—could have the effect of dealing in a businesslike fashion with those items on which there is consensus, of which as you can see there are several—several aren't and several might be—we could make real, meaningful progress. We would leave the 42nd Parliament, or if you like, we would create the 43rd Parliament better than we found the 42nd, which is not what's going to happen if we go the way the government is proposing doing this.
Now I turn to routine proceedings. Routine proceedings are the stuff that has to get done. This is the least exciting, and frankly, probably the most important part of the House when it sits. Some people want to drive a car because they want to get from point A to point B. Other people love flipping up the hood and tinkering with the internal workings and adjusting the pistons and all that stuff. People like that are the ones who like routine proceedings. People who just want to get from point A to point B find routine proceedings a drag, but it structures the business of the House.
Now I am going to read what the government House leader has to say:
However, certain rubrics of Routine Proceedings have been used to give rise to debate. The rubric of “Motions” allows Members to move a debatable motion that could, on certain days, deprive the House of the ability to deliberate on the intended item for debate during Government Orders. This not only applies to items emanating from the Government (i.e., debate on a bill), but could also apply to items standing in the name of an Opposition Member (i.e., an Opposition Day motion). More often than not, it is either a motion to concur in a committee report or a motion of instruction to a committee. The House should examine different ways to schedule debate on such motions.
I can tell you this is one area in which the government is simply not going to find consensus. By the way, in the event that the government is successful in wearing us down, passing Mr. Simms' motion in the middle of the night, and then pushing through what is going to be a non-consensus report, then there would be a concurrence debate, voting on party lines in favour of it and emasculating the opposition. If all that happens, I predict this will be in there. It's probably illegal to bet on government business, or at any rate, we should go to the Ethics Commissioner before we engage in laying wagers. I would be willing to bet of everything here, this is the one that's going through.
The ability to take away the opposition's power to move concurrence debates as a delaying tactic is something that every majority government wants rid of. It's less of a problem in minority governments, though it happens, and for an interesting reason.
Given the debate we all had, in which everybody expressed the virtues of minority governments, I just want to say, as somebody who has lived through both, that I observe that in minority governments.... I'm not sure they are better than majorities, actually. In some ways they are and in some ways they aren't. That is a subject for a discussion over a beer.
In a minority government, the fact that you are going to be defeated on a measure anyway if you're trying to push it through means that you have to compromise with the parties earlier in the process. You have to compromise by getting one other party to sign on with you, depending on the size of the parties. When Stephen Harper had a minority government in two successive Parliaments, he had to rely on the support of the Liberals, the New Democrats, or the Bloc—any one of the three would be enough. When Paul Martin was in power, it was a similar kind of dynamic.
I think that was something else. I don't think it's us.
:
No, I have Kleenex. Thank you.
The goal here is to require unanimity in the committee, and the amendment states that this is consistent with the committee's past practices as discussed in its December 8, 2016, meeting. At our meeting on December 8, 2016, we reviewed what our practices in the past have been on this committee. We sometimes use majority consent in this committee. In other words, party line votes, and ultimately, when it's a majority government, the government gets it's way; that's how it works. However, we try wherever possible to be consensual. We single out certain things for a greater expectation of consent than other things. For some things, we just say, “It's going to be party lines. That's the way it works.” For other things, we say, “No, we have to treat this differently.” It is the nature of this committee to have more of that kind of business submitted to it, and above everything else, that includes the Standing Orders, our constitution.
The fundamental law that rules us, the rules of the game, the rules of engagement, if you will.... I mention all of this to bring around the important parallel—partly because it's so important in its merits, and partly because it's so important as a parallel, as a high-profile illustration that anyone can understand—of the electoral reform debate that took place earlier in this Parliament. This committee was not directly involved in it, although some members of this committee travelled across the country: Ms. Sahota, Mr. Richards, and myself. If you actually stop and look at what they were saying, the way the parties approached this was different in its details, but the same in this important, this foundational, respect. If you're changing the rules of the game, as you'd be if you were changing the electoral system, then you must have something more than mere majority support, especially in a situation where majority means one faction, the largest faction.
The way my party, the Conservatives, expressed that was by saying that there should be no change to the electoral system without a referendum whereby the new system is approved by the voters of Canada. They are the ones who get to establish what is legitimate and what is not legitimate. If they approve of a system, then, whatever that system happens to be, it is legitimate, assuming you have a clear majority on a clear question. That's a standard set by the Supreme Court.
The Liberal approach was to say.... They didn't say this initially, but they did by May of last year. Minister Monsef stood up in the House of Commons and said that they needed broad buy-in. She didn't define what broad buy-in was, and earlier in my remarks I indicated that I felt that was a bit of a moving target. The term “consensus” came up as a stand-in for the term “broad buy-in”, but it was never clear exactly what that meant, and that was a problem. It clearly did not mean a majority of fifty per cent plus one of committee members, fifty per cent plus one of the House. I think everybody understood that.
Looking at her remarks, and even though we confronted each other in the House of Commons, I think I always maintained a respectful approach towards Minister Monsef, who I felt was, if you will and are knowledgeable about poker, “playing a bad hand” as well as she could. I thought she was doing a creditable job, and she's also a very nice person. I enjoyed bantering with her. I compared this once to Archy and Mehitabel.
The broad buy-in she was talking about clearly also included, in that case, some form of broader consent from the Canadian people. We did an e-survey for the committee, which got 22,000 responses. People were asked about the possibility of using what's called a citizens' assembly to see whether that provided, in the minds of Canadians, a legitimate level of extra consensus.
People were generally favourable towards it, although they didn't seem to see it as the definitive indication that Canadians had bought in—when I say “people”, I mean the 22,000 respondents—I think perhaps because a citizens' assembly is really a process that occurs earlier in the drafting and development process, not later on. It's not really a ratification process. It is a design process. Having said that, it was an attempt to find consensus.
The New Democrats said that what you needed to have was the support of at least one opposition party as well as of the government. I don't think I'm being unfair to the New Democrats when I say that this was actually meant as a kind of bargaining offer—“Come to us, and if you're willing to find something that we can agree to and you Liberals agree to, we have a deal”—and not a referendum. Ultimately, they agreed, in a great generosity of spirit, to put the question of electoral reform to a referendum.
The point I'm getting at is that everybody agreed, on all sides of the House, that when you're dealing with the rules of the game, the rules of engagement, the Constitution—the de facto constitution, because the electoral system is not a strictly constitutional matter, or at least in most respects it isn't—you have to have a higher level of buy-in.
We have conventions about this. These conventions are then the practices of this committee, or the usages of the committee, if you wish. They are reflected in the way this committee has dealt with its standing orders in the past. As well, they are the way the House of Commons itself has dealt with the Standing Orders in the past. The House of Commons has normally, when dealing with a change in Standing Orders, tried to seek unanimous consent through the channel of getting the House leaders to agree among themselves, through some back-channel negotiation among themselves.
Then eventually, someone stands up—one of the House leaders—and says the words we all know: “Mr. Speaker, if you seek it, I think you will find unanimous consent for the following motion.” This is usually preceded by, “There have been consultations” or “All parties have been consulted”, or some other statement that indicates that the Speaker should take this seriously, and that there actually has been a way of finding agreement.
We're permitted to do that. It doesn't mean that the actual rules of the House are suspended for more than that vote, and there's no precedent-setting value to a unanimous consent motion, because we understand that it is the exception. But the Standing Orders themselves are the exception. They're the exception to the way the House normally works. The Standing Orders are, as I say, the rules under which we operate, under which we conduct ourselves, so they get special consideration.
The last time the House tried to significantly bite into the Standing Orders and take a real chunk to make a significant change, 14 years ago, it set up a special committee to deal with it. The special committee operated by unanimous consent. It approved nothing. There were no dissenting reports, because there was no dissent. Nothing on which there was dissent was put forward by the committee, which recognized that it had a wealth of material to work with and therefore had no need to focus on contentious items. It thus focused on items for which consent was going to be found on a unanimous basis.
In the interim, while the vote was going on in the House, Mr. Chair, I had the opportunity not to read, unfortunately, but to download the reports of the special committee chaired by Bob Kilger, the Deputy Speaker of the House at the time, whose seniority indicates the seriousness with which the House took the business of looking at the Standing Orders. The culture the committee members applied—I actually don't know because I didn't get a chance to read their discussions, nor the discussions that took place in the House as the motion was going forward. It may be that these were very limited discussions. It might be one of those things where they got unanimous consent by having House leaders talk about it. This is before my period serving as deputy House leader, so I would not have been privy to any of those discussions.
Although I was an MP at the time, June 2001, I was very, very junior and was frankly just lost a lot of the time when it came to what was going on at a technical level. A lot passed me by. Like any new MP, I was still discovering which local events were actually important and which were really important in the minds of the people who insisted that I had to be there. All MPs go through that in their first year.
At any rate, that approach, that consensual, unanimous approach, was adopted by the House in that round of hearings. That explains, to a large degree, why the legacy of those Standing Order changes that were made upon the recommendation of the committee have stood the test of time. I think at this point, 14 or 15 years is a good indication of the test of time. We live in a world in our Parliament where we have Standing Orders that in some cases have been on the books via our Parliament and the mother of parliaments in Westminster since the time of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Some of them go back that far.
The rule that prohibits the king or the king's men from preventing a member from entering the House of Commons goes back to the time of King Charles I, who was in the habit of sending thugs—and they didn't have hotels in those days, so they slept in a room over a tavern—great big guys, who could just stand at the door and make it impossible for MPs to get out if they were going to vote the wrong way. MPs would have to climb out of second-storey windows to try to get to the House of Commons to vote.
:
We're at motion number six.... What I've been doing in the amendment is trying to show the importance of consensus as reflected in the practices of the committee and this House in the past and by tying these to Motion 6, the confrontational way in which it was brought up, the way in which it was withdrawn, and the statements that were made by the then House leader, Mr. , at that time, all of which indicate a pattern of expected future behaviour—future from the point of view of a year ago—that is not being followed through on. I'm trying to demonstrate that point.
Forgive me, I left off on proceedings pursuant to Standing Order 38 under paragraph (d):
proceedings pursuant to Standing Order 38 shall take place at 6:30 p.m. on Mondays or at the conclusion of the taking of any recorded division deferred pursuant to paragraph (e)(ii), whichever is later; at the expiry of the time provided for Private Members' Business on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays, and when the debate on the matter or matters raised pursuant to Standing Order 38 has ended, the motion to adjourn the House shall be deemed to have been withdrawn and the House shall resume consideration of Government Orders;
And then there is paragraph (e):
subject to paragraph (f), when a recorded division is requested in respect of a debatable motion, including any division arising as a consequence of the application of Standing Order 61(2) or 78(3), but not including any division in relation to the Business of Supply or arising as a consequence of an Order made pursuant to Standing Order 57
(i) before 2:00 p.m. on a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday, it shall be deemed deferred until the conclusion of Oral Questions on that day's sitting or
(ii) after 2:00 p.m. on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday, or any time on a Friday, it shall be deemed deferred until the conclusion of Oral Questions on the next sitting day that is not a Friday, and any vote deferred to Monday taken up at 6:30 p.m.
Just for those who are wondering, regarding 61(2)... knows this stuff by heart, but for the rest of us, 's kids aren't here to answer the question and so I'll just tell you that 61(2) is dealing with previous questions, an item that is a procedural tool available to the opposition, so that effectively obviates that.
Next is 78(3). I'm not going to read all of 78(3), which is a page long, but this has to do with the procedure in cases where time is being allotted. It's about time allocation. Section 78 in general is about time allocation. This effectively gives additional tools to the government with relation to time allocation.
I have a little bit more on this to go on with, but I want to stop and draw the attention of members of the committee to something else that I think is very significant.
Early in his mandate, Minister appeared before this committee. He at the time was House leader, and as is traditional with House leaders following an election, he came before this committee and said, my job is to fulfill my mandate letter. My mandate letter dictates what I must do, he said, and my mandate letter dictates that I must work on improving and modernizing the House of Commons' Standing Orders.
His mandate letter, to the best of my knowledge—and I'm actually going to check this out—was inherited unchanged. So at least this aspect was inherited unchanged by Bardish when she became the new House leader, and so she has the same mandate.
She hasn't had a chance to talk to the committee about that. This will hopefully be resolved soon and we'll invite her, I would hope, to discuss her discussion paper.
Indeed, I would have liked to make our first order of business rather than Mr. Simms' motion. At any rate, his mandate letter effectively is the mandate that guides him and that to which we are responding.
I want to make this point about it. Not everybody in this room was here at the time, but a number of people were here when he came to this committee. He put a strong emphasis on his mandate letter and he made kind of a humorous interaction where he said it was meant to be very inspiring. I said it was so inspiring that I read it to my kids at night before they go to bed. This is where I fess up and admit that I don't actually do that; I just said it.
At any rate, we did have a discussion about it, and I said one of the things of concern to me was that this was a lot to bite off. There's a lot of meat here. Do you think it's necessary for us to deal with this as one mega-study, one mega-set of amendments, one unified whole? I didn't use the word “omnibus” at the time, but should we deal with this as one omnibus measure? I was trying, as I think MPs from a recently defeated government ought to do, to save the self-righteousness for later in the government's mandate. If you've just been dealt a defeat, you ought to be very respectful of their new mandate.
So I asked whether it was okay to deal with this on a piecemeal basis. Would that be acceptable? I mean, you're not our bosses, but we have to work together here. Your desire to change the rules, the Standing Orders, is not in conflict with our desires. We may disagree on specifics, but not on the general policy.
He indicated at that time that a piecemeal approach was okay with him. Now I recognize he's not the House leader anymore, but I took that as being the way the government was going to approach things while he was minister. After Bardish Chagger became government House leader, it continued to be the way the government, or so I thought, was approaching things. There was no indication during the debate required under our Standing Orders about the Standing Orders, the debate that took place on October 6. I wasn't present for it, but I have read through some of what transpired that day, not perhaps with as much attention as it deserves, but in all fairness to me, I did make the assumption that we'd get some kind of warning that this was going to be the next thing on our agenda, and I would have turned my reading to it.
In the interim, I've been reading about electoral reform and then more recently about other aspects of the election law, because we anticipated right up until this committee sat down at 11 o'clock this morning that we would be dealing with the Elections Act, with the report on the 42nd election and our response to it. We received from the same government at our last meeting a request from the relevant minister to make that our focus in order to give her the time to sign legislation. That was where I was going, and now we see this change.
The amendment I'm proposing allows us to return to that piecemeal approach, which is more consensual, more precedented, more likely to produce high-quality changes. It is striking how few Standing Orders have to be altered to revert to more loyal, more basic underlying values of our Parliament, which are about freedom of speech and openness, adequate discussion prior to the implementation of measures. All of that is better encapsulated in the motion I propose than in Mr. Simms' unamended motion. I'd also say it is a better reflection of what the government House leader indicated was the direction the government was willing to take when he first addressed this committee. It actually may be the only time he addressed this committee. I can't remember for sure.
Anyway, that was the right direction to go in then, and I think it's still the right direction to go in now. It does not permit the radical transformation of our system into one where we have an emasculated opposition. The system would be, if not unique in the jurisdictions that share our Westminster heritage, but certainly unique among first-tier jurisdictions: those that have large parliaments, a long history of self-government, and a profound internalization of the values pioneered or developed or evolved at Westminster and elsewhere. It would be unique as in unlike, and in opposition to the spirit that we see at Westminster itself, and in the parliaments in Canberra, Wellington, Delhi, and the other first-tier jurisdictions. I can't speak to those countries that have lapsed into dictatorship and come back out. That does not probably enhance the ability of a parliament to develop a really sound body of Standing Orders. But in the first tier, we'd be the only ones going in this direction.
There's been a lot of talk of working together. Mr. Simms, in his opening remarks, talked about the importance of working together. When I ran into her at the airport in Toronto, we did not have a long discussion, as I mentioned, and she was a little distracted, but the government House leader did say, “It's just a discussion paper. We're trying to bounce ideas out there”, something which is profoundly at odds with what's happening now. But I think she was sincere.
This doesn't correspond with anything that's happened here: the minimum period of notice; the extremely unrealistic timeline. It's hard not to get the feeling that in this government, certainly on this issue, and it's maybe true on several issues, it's as if the left and the right hands are not talking to each other. There appear to be those who want to move forward in the traditional manner, the manner, it seems to me, that was followed by the Chrétien government and others before it; and those who want to, I'm not sure what the right term is, adopt a very aggressive approach of “Let's go for an absolute victory. Let's go for the absolute transformation of our system.”
Had electoral reform gone through in the manner proposed by the , we would have had a preferential ballot, we would have had a radical or permanent and very negative change to our democracy, where, in practice, only one party would stand a realistic chance of forming a government in any election, and in which it could get fewer votes than its main opponent, and still form government, and in which it could get fewer than one-third of the votes and still form a majority. That's pretty radical stuff.
It's true there, and it's true here as well. So that's the maximalist approach. Let's use the minimalist and maximalist approach, or the evolutionary versus revolutionary approach. In my less-guarded moments, I say the Gladstonian approach versus the Juan Perón approach. But one is suited to our system, and one is just not reflective of the values of Canada. We are an evolutionary people, not a revolutionary people. That is notwithstanding my respect for those who have engaged in rebellion, like the rebels of 1837. But we are an evolutionary people.
We have felt that a loyalty to the practices that undergird our Constitution is the best protection for our liberties, our freedoms, and all the values that we hold dearest. That includes accepting a series of conventional limitations on actors who, in law, could go further. This is how you achieve evolutionary change as opposed to revolution.
In revolution, you overthrow the king, and depending on what country you're in, you chop off his head or.... Last week, we passed the 100th anniversary of the overthrow of the Tsar in Russia, so if you're in Russia, you shoot him, or you.... Anyway, that's revolution.
In evolution, you take the king—Henry VIII was a dictator—and you gradually reduce his powers, even though on paper, monarchs can still, for example, veto any law, to this day.
The fact is that no monarch has exercised the veto since Queen Anne. In 1708, she vetoed the Scottish Militia Bill, back when Scotland was still a separate kingdom, shortly before the Act of Union. That was the last time a monarch exercised the veto.
In Canada, that veto is exercised by the Governor General. It is never exercised in practice. If the Governor General were now to say that he's not signing a piece of legislation, even though the two Houses of Parliament had passed it, and even though on paper he has the power to withhold his signature, we all understand that what would happen is that the Prime Minister would get on the phone with the Queen and say, “I think the Governor General has lost his marbles. Could you appoint a successor?” The Queen would take the call and that's what would happen.
Some version of that happens any time a convention is breached. The more serious the breach, the more profound is the consequence, up to and including removal from office, or in the case of the government, defeat in an election. That's how we do things.
That brings us back to the point about consistency with our past practices and the need for unanimity. There is no rule that says you have to have unanimity. It is a practice, but the reason for my lengthy comments is to make the greater world aware of the fact that something unconventional in the proper sense, against convention is happening here, and that convention must be respected. It must be enforced.
If the public finds that what's happening here is unacceptable, it will indeed confirm that a convention exists, and the government will back down. The breach of a convention carries a penalty severe enough that it obviates the action that was being attempted by the actor within whose nominal power it was to take that action. That's what defines it as a convention.
Now, maybe I'm mistaken. Maybe the government is right in what I think is a calculation that I and the other members of the committee from the New Democratic Party and the Conservative Party will sputter out and lose energy somewhere in the middle of the night, and they'll be able to move the motion and get it through on a partisan vote without the world paying much attention. Then, tomorrow, there will be a budget, which of course is the real reason we're getting this motion now. I'm pretty sure the budget is going to be a bad news budget, and the negative attention on that will consume all the available negative energy.
As a matter of fact, when I saw this coming out, when I learned about Mr. Simms' motion, my reaction was, “Oh wow, it's going to be a bad news budget,” because if it were a good news budget you wouldn't want negative coverage of this to get in the way of the budget. It's the same reason that governments of all stripes release vast swaths of documents with unfavourable information in answer to order paper questions, all on the same day. Get all the bad news out there at once. It's just the way communications work.
If the government does all of this in this way, achieves the end I think it's aiming for, gets away with it, and is able to proceed to have a report before this committee on June 2, which will certainly not have anything remotely resembling a consensus, it will be a report that the Liberal members will push through over the opposition of Conservatives and New Democrats, who will write dissenting reports.
If they do that, and they go to the House, and they get it through, and they have a concurrence debate in the House and adopt it, again on a divided vote over the lamentations of the opposition, and the public puts up with it and says yes, whatever, summer's coming, then we'll have established that a convention actually doesn't exist, and that in the end it was just a practice that was not that important in public opinion. That is how you test a convention, according to Albert Venn Dicey, a great scholar, who developed the term “constitutional convention”.
I'm calculating that's not the case. I am laying out the case that this is a sufficiently deeply internalized belief among Canadians that opposition will build in a way that the government has not anticipated. Therefore, my suggestion would be...because I am not a maximalist here. Whether it's on behalf of the government's agenda or any government agenda that my party has, whether my party's in government or opposition, I'm always in favour of taking the smaller, surer bet of tactical rather than strategic victories—of modest achievements instead of massive achievements—which ultimately lead to a massively positive result. Our history of modest and incremental approaches to democracy issues have made us in Canada one of the most democratic and stable countries in the world. Our history of applying this in the law has led to us being one of the most law-abiding countries in the world. Our history of doing this in other areas has led consistently to improvement, even in the areas where our heritage is one of which we are now either uncomfortable or even ashamed.
I thinking here of our treatment of our aboriginal people, of the way in which the people on the Komagata Maru were....There was no Canadian citizenship in those days. They were British subjects, just like us. As citizens of the British Empire, they had a right to be in Canada. The Laurier government invented a law. I'm an enormous admirer of Laurier, but not of this law, which allowed them to take British subjects and ship them back to another country. We're ashamed of that, justifiably.
We're ashamed of the internment of Ukrainian and Galician Canadians in the First World War. They were loyal British subjects but they came from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, so they were rounded up and sent off to labour camps. We are ashamed, with justice, of our treatment of Japanese Canadians in World War II—loyal Canadian citizens, again British subjects because we didn't get Canadian citizenship until later, but loyal to our laws and institutions—purely on the basis of race. And we are not ashamed, but only because we're not aware, of the fact that the government of the day actually tried to deprive these people of their citizenship and kick them out of the country, even people who were born here after the war was already over. It's a profoundly racist action that is deeply shameful.
I mention all these incidents, but in each of these areas we see improvement. We see it because we act incrementally. It is not a lack of ambition to want to act incrementally, to want evolution rather than revolution.
I think of revolutions as being parallel to volcanic eruptions. The tallest mountains in the world are not volcanos. Mount Everest is not a volcano. It is the size it is because of the slow acting of plate tectonics—evolution rather than revolution. While that is purely a metaphor, it does make the point about which is the better way of doing it. Evolution and consensus go together. The wider the group of people you have to bring in, the smaller the changes you are able to make.
Bringing this back to my amendment, this is, in essence, introducing a notion that in academic terms would be referred to as Pareto optimal. Pareto optimality is a concept named after an early 20th-century Italian scholar. I've forgotten his first name—Vilfredo, I think. He said that there are different ways of achieving optimal outcomes, depending on what your standard of optimality is. You can adopt the Benthamite approach that the good of the greatest number is the optimal approach, but it may not seem optimal from the point of view of every participant in the process. If we are together on a raft that is sinking low in the water and we all agree that the solution is to throw my colleague Garnett here to the sharks, that is perhaps optimal for the rest of us. It's not optimal for Garnett. That would miss the test of Pareto optimality. Pareto optimality is where you make an adjustment so that the outcome is better for all participants and no one is worse off.
You can do this as a mathematical formula where you simply assume that everybody in the room has $100 and you have to come up with a new system for allocating wealth. You can use that kind of numerical measure, but you can also—and I think this is the more robust way of doing it when you're dealing with systems that can't easily be quantified.... They think systems that can be quantified lend themselves to Benthamite calculations. Let's redistribute income so that—and I'm not sure I believe in the myth of the 1%—the Bill Gateses and Warren Buffetts of the world pay more so that we can adequately fund our food banks or something like a welfare state or a health care system, all the different things that are involved in our system: public transportation, public policing. You can go on and on. You get the idea. It redistributes. At the end of the day, is Warren Buffett...? I'm thinking of him because Gates is the richest guy in the world, and Buffett is the second richest. Is that right? Is it beneficial from his point of view? Maybe. We can measure that numerically. Money is a proxy for value and it lets us quantify it, so it allows the state to do certain things.
When you are dealing with things that are qualitative, like our Standing Orders and the values they incorporate and reflect, it is hard to rely upon quantitative measures. We try to do these things. We keep track in the House of Commons; every party does. How much time is the Speaker allowing for questions from this party or that party? Is he being unfair to us? How come he keeps skipping over me in the rotation? You get up angrily and say, “I had a question for that speaker. Will you give me a chance?” He says, “Well...” and he provides you with an explanation based upon some attempt to quantify. He says, “I go Liberal, Conservative, NDP, and around in the rotation”—or maybe he doesn't. Maybe he says that there are more Liberals than there are New Democrats, and then he gives them more. Maybe he says, “We always start with someone who is not from the party that just spoke to the question” or “I'm making up for the last Speaker; we have an imbalance in the direction”, or something. There is some kind of attempt to quantify it. He will be struggling and he might get it wrong from time to time, with good intentions.
Now we are drifting on to matters that are much more profoundly subjective in their implications for freedom of speech and for the opposition's ability to advocate or present its policy alternatives to build enough of a case that it can change the mind even of a majority government. As we just saw with the electoral reform issue, the government could have ruthlessly pushed forward with a change to the electoral system—the preferential ballot—that reflected its interests but not the will of the House of Commons or the will of those who came before the committee as witnesses.
While I think the government should have acted on its election promise, and followed through, and had a referendum on changing its system, I do respect the choice it made compared to pushing forward in disregard of—there's no Canadian consensus on electoral systems—a population that effectively is divided between those in favour of the current system and those in favour of proportionality, with very few people being in favour of preferential.
It was within its legal powers to push forward. There is legally nothing that would stop it. To this day, actually, I think you could still do it with the time constraints that are involved. It's getting harder all the time. It did that because public opinion was not on its side. Public opinion was not on its side because of the extensive hearings that took place with the committee travelling across the country, the minister holding her own hearings, the town halls, and many MPs holding their own town halls in their own constituencies. That was not something I did, but many others did. The NDP and Conservatives both sent out questionnaires. We got back 80,000 responses. It got back, I think, 35,000.
The point I'm getting at is that it was the ability to engage the Canadian public from the position of being opposition members that caused the government to change its course. That was true on that matter. Equally I think it would be true in regard to this matter, but not if all the tools are taken away.
Now you go from a situation, which we can advocate through tried and true institutions, institutions that have served to allow, in the last Parliament, Liberal and NDP members to very effectively counter the government's agenda.
I can tell you as someone who has sat on the other side of this committee that opposition pressure was most effective in building up a strong case in the media and with the public against the Fair Elections Act to the point where one of our Liberal colleagues, the former parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Democratic Institutions, took to referring to all these as the “unfair elections act”, and people knew what he was talking about.
That shows how effective you can be. It became an election issue, and it became something that the minister has indicated in part, although not in full, that she's going to seek to repeal.
Here are things that happened in those hearings that will not happen under this motion, unless it's amended, in these hearings about the Standing Orders. It's impossible, given the timeline and given the other things on our agenda, unless we're going to go and say to the minister, “Look, you're out of luck. We're not giving you anymore feedback on the elections act.” Even then the ability of the opposition to raise the kinds of objections likely to swing public opinion is minimal given the short timeline, and while there may be another explanation, that, I would suggest, is the reason this is being promoted in this manner at this time.
:
It was October 19, 2015. Yes.
In its report, the committee talks about many subjects, but I want to start with the introduction and just read verbatim some of what they said, which makes the point about how strongly they valued the idea of seeking consensus.
Let me read. There's an enumerated list in the introduction. This is paragraph 6:
There is a feeling that individual Members of the House of Commons need to be empowered, and the role of the Speaker, as the servant of the House and its spokesperson, enhanced. A balance needs to be achieved between the Government’s interests in implementing its legislative agenda, and the Opposition’s interests in questioning and criticizing the Government.
Maybe I should have just read the second of those two sentences:
A balance needs to be achieved between the Government’s interests in implementing its legislative agenda, and the Opposition’s interests in questioning and criticizing the Government.
That balance is best achieved when both the government and opposition, which ultimately means all parties, are both at the table and capable of denying their consent and therefore preventing the measure from going forward. That goes without saying.
Paragraph 7—I won't read the whole paragraph—says in part:
We have recommended changes in those areas in which we could all agree.
When I say “all” I mean membership taken from a wider range of parties than faces us today. The partisan structure of the House of Commons in those days was different from now. The chair, Bob Kilger, was a deputy speaker so in a sense a non-partisan figure, but a Liberal. The vice-chairs were Don Boudria, Liberal government House leader, and John Reynolds, Canadian Alliance House leader. The members were Bill Blaikie, a New Democrat; Michel Gauthier, who I think was the House leader of the Bloc Québécois, the future leader of the party; Peter MacKay, the House leader for the Progressive Conservatives in those days, and later on the leader.
The committee had five different parties represented. In fact, it bears some resemblance to the structure of the ERRE committee, the Special Committee on Electoral Reform, in that its membership did not include a government majority. It's quite striking that it did not include a government majority. Therefore, its proposals literally could not go forward without the consent of a majority of the parties in the House of Commons.
In all fairness, the governing party still had an advantage in that, if the committee had presented a report that made recommendations that were unsatisfactory to the governing party, it could use its majority in the House of Commons to deny consent to the report of the committee, thereby exercising a veto. It had an absolute veto. But in practice, everybody had a veto. The structure made that very clear.
To be honest, I had not been aware that this was the structure used—even though I was around at the time—until very recently. There you are: it has exactly the same principle behind its structure as was used for the electoral reform committee, and for the same reasons. There was the voluntary ceding of control. There were also some ground rules set down that are quite striking.
Paragraph 7 says inter alia:
We have recommended changes in those areas in which we could all agree. While we do not pretend to have solved all of the problems or addressed all of the issues, we feel that we have made a good start.
Here, they agree so much with the philosophy that I hold personally:
We may not be revolutionizing Parliament, but incremental changes can be extremely useful and effective, and, in the long run, much more significant.
Incremental changes, when they accumulate one on top of the other, are ultimately more powerful than revolutionary changes—which produce counter-revolution, counter-reaction—that are not legitimate. To think of the political metaphor I used earlier, the illegitimate overthrow of the Bourbons in the French Revolution, not that the Bourbons were.... I'm no defender of the Bourbons, but the illegitimate manner in which they were overthrown led to a situation in which France, a country previously characterized by its political stability, went through, in the course of the next century and a half, a republic, followed by an empire, followed by a monarchy, followed by a second monarchy, followed by a republic, followed by an empire, and followed by another republic. I think I missed a republic in there at about 1870 around republic number three, after empire number two, and after monarchy number three, followed by two more republics.
It seems to me there's a lesson there, which indicates that we should be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and that in the long run, changes made through incremental and consensual reformation, as the committee says, are much more significant.
Paragraph 8 of the introduction makes a statement that I guess is anodyne:
All of the members of the Committee—and all of the parties—want to make the House of Commons work as well as possible.
The next part, the next few sentences, I think are much more significant:
We are all committed to the modernization of the House of Commons, and the improvement of its procedures. Where possible, reform of parliamentary institutions and procedures is best carried out by consensus, and with all-party agreement.
I would ask you to listen to this next part:
The motion establishing this Special Committee requires that any report must have the unanimous agreement of all the members of the Committee, and this has guided our deliberations.
They continue on to say:
The requirement for unanimity has meant that on a number of issues, recommendations were not possible; by the same token, on some issues the members of the Committee have compromised and worked toward achievable solutions that reflect our differing interests. There is also a remarkable degree of agreement, and shared concerns. While we may not always agree on the nature or causes of problems—or of the solutions—we have attempted in this report to recommend changes that we believe will improve the House and the work of its Members.
The really important bit here is that they recognize that the unanimity requirement meant there were certain things they weren't going to get movement on, and that realistically for the government, if we move away from the model that Mr. ' unamended motion suggests or advocates to the model that I think we should advocate, it does mean that certain things come out of the government's agenda. It means that we don't go to four-day weeks, for example.
Although some of the other suggestions that Ms. Chagger made in her discussion paper about how you could deal with it—making Fridays into full days and moving around the kind of business that occurs on Fridays—are possibilities, if that one is really absolutely key to the government, well, it's not compatible here. It just isn't. Also, I could point to some other things.
On the other hand, there are many things on which I think we could achieve success, and the same kind of success that was achieved by this predecessor committee a decade and a half ago.
Paragraph 10 from the report states:
Procedural reform is an on-going process. The changes recommended in this report will need to be assessed to ensure that they are working as intended and not having unforeseen consequences. We encourage the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs to undertake a review of the operation and effect of these proposals in about a year, and to continue the work of modernizing and improving the procedures and practices of the House.
They recognized that when their special committee would come to its end, its work ought to return to the procedure and House affairs committee. Thus, I think I am justified in saying that this committee is a direct predecessor to our committee. When I referred in the amendment to “our” past practice, that is “our” as in this committee's past practice, even though, in the strictest technical way, they were a different committee.
The report indicates that even though they have worked by consensus and have restricted themselves to topics that they think are unlikely to be so grand or so vast as to produce radical unforeseen consequences, they accept and nevertheless recognize in all humility that there might be unforeseen consequences, and they build in a mechanism for ensuring that these changes can be adjusted back if necessary.
That humble practice of recognizing that it might be appropriate to revert has been done on a number of occasions where Standing Orders have been changed on a temporary basis. I think that is in general a good practice, recognizing that you might make mistakes, but of course one way to avoid mistakes to keep it consensual, to eliminate the things where someone says “I am worried that we may be going outside of where we have appropriate or complete knowledge”, and to therefore have an ability to make a change that will not do things that we did not intend to have happen.
Going through it and just looking now at how they broke it down, it's interesting to look at the subject matter, because it's not grouped under the same kinds of grand thematic headings that are in Minister 's discussion paper. It's grouped in an order that appears to me to primarily be in the order the items arise in the Standing Orders, in that Standing Order 35 is discussed before Standing 39 and so on.
There is a certain thematic consistency to the Standing Orders, to be sure, but it's not the order mapped out by Minister . My suspicion is that this may be a wise way of doing things, but I don't mean to diminish what she was trying to do. My concerns, as you know, are with Mr. ' proposed motion and not with Minister 's discussion paper per se.
Next are speeches by candidates for Speaker. It was the first item that was discussed. Standing Order 3.1 was suggested.
I'm going to go through these pretty quickly. The next thing they came along and actually made changes to was Standing Order 30, which deals with the “daily routine of business”, which appears at 3 p.m. on Mondays and Wednesdays, at 10 a.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays, and at 12 noon on Fridays. It states that:
the House shall proceed to the ordinary daily routine of business, which shall be as follows:
They then list a few things. The new thing that's introduced is that the “Introduction of Government Bills” comes after “Tabling of Documents”.
:
That's great. Thank you very much, Chair. I appreciate that.
I want to say how much I've enjoyed the last few hours, and I say that only partly tongue in cheek. I do enjoy hearing from Mr. Reid. It's always interesting. He knows his history, and I like history. I'm no expert, but I enjoy it. I'm pleased to pick up where he left off and to continue to point out why what's going on is so unacceptable.
Maybe to warm to the subject, I would start on a positive note; that is, I want to say to the government that this is not where we want to be. I can't speak for others, but the proof for my own motivation is the leadership role that I played in helping us get back to the Chief Electoral Officer's report, even though I was the one who blew it up the first time. The fact was that once we had dealt with that, the minister came in, and we got as much out of the minister as it appeared to me that we were going to get, and it was sufficient—barely—to allow us....
Then, colleagues on the government side, in camera and in public, you know that I was one of the leading voices for getting us back to work, and we did so. Very quickly, we managed to set everything aside. We were working, but now we're back into it again, for the same kind of problem, which is the government just dropping something out of nowhere in the middle of the floor and causing all this kerfuffle.
I said that I was going to try to start out by being positive, so what I want to do is just to reaffirm this. I like negotiating. I'm an old negotiator—and now I am old—from way back. I love negotiating. I love the give-and-take. It's like a poker game and I love playing poker. I don't win much but I love playing the game.
I want to say to the government that if there is any way at all that they are interested in the House leaders getting together—or whips, or members of this committee, or a combination thereof for any group at all that the government would like to identify—we in the NDP certainly are quite prepared to sit down, and I suspect my colleagues are, but I'll leave it to them to speak for themselves, and to try to find a reasonable compromise that recognizes the government's right to set an agenda but also respects the right of opposition in our role. I think we could find that if we came together in goodwill.
I want to say—and I say this much more in sorrow than in anger—that I wish that approach had been taken in the beginning. I have a sneaking suspicion that we wouldn't be here like this. As bad as we are, this is the worst I've seen it. This is worse than Bill . It's worse because we're going around the clock, and the government knows.... They were with us in opposition and they know what we do. They know that we already have rotations, we already have schedules going, we have people who are going to be coming in through the night, and we're working on schedules for next week. We see where we are.
This is serious. Also, it's not very productive. It's not going to get us anywhere, other than two forces staring at each other. That's where we are right now, unnecessarily so. That's what is upsetting. I's that it didn't need to be this way. If the government wants to review these things....
Again, when the minister came in and said that she'd like us to try to get our work on the chief electoral report done by—what was it?—May, I think it was, our heads exploded, and we asked how we were going to do that. We didn't suddenly say, “No way—nothing.” I offered that we would do what we could. I said that to her privately. I can't say anything more than that as it was a private discussion, but I did offer privately and reaffirmed publicly that if we could find a way where this committee, if the government worked with us to identify areas where they wanted to bring in legislation.... I'm supportive of a lot of things the governments wants to do, not all of it but a lot of it, especially the removal of some of the ugly Bill stuff.
If we could have sat down and worked on an approach that would let us get through this and deal with it in a fair-minded way.... I was saying that I offered to the minister—and I think the official opposition was onside—that if we could, we would accommodate the minister's schedule, even though we don't have to do that. We're masters of our own destiny, but hey, we offered to do that, and we said that if they wanted to identify to us areas where they wanted to bring in legislation and would like the benefit of the thinking of this committee, then we would take that. If it was out of sequence with how we were going to do it, we were open to that.
I still remain open to the idea of moving our work so that we get at that in a timely fashion, which helps the government in terms of informing them of our thinking, so they can then introduce legislation. We get away from this Bill , dropping a bill in the House before you've even heard from the committee, and then out the other side of your mouth telling us how important the committee work is. That just doesn't wash.
It's not like there's no evidence that we could work together, or there's no evidence that there's desire on the part of the opposition to be co-operative. Part of our mandate is to review the Standing Orders anyway. I would have been open to having that discussion, but I have to tell you, the ham-fisted way that this has been dealt with really feels like the last government. This feels a lot like Bill , which really should inflict horror in the government members to find themselves sitting right where Harper's MPs sat. They're doing much the same as what Harper did on Bill , only this time, instead of the election laws, it's how we run our House. It's the same attitude, that same bully approach.
I never thought I'd see anything like that, especially with the new government. I have to tell you, I'm not understanding any of this. I don't understand how the government thinks they're going to win on this, or how they think that ramming through changes to our Standing Orders is going to make the House work any better. There comes a point, Chair, where no matter how much we might want peace, if the government absolutely refuses to extend the olive branch of peace, then what I worry about—and, Chair, I say this to you as someone who is as non-partisan as our system allows—is that I'm not sure this committee can continue to function if we keep having things like Bill and this motion happening at this committee. I would be a fool, as one member, to continue to be co-operative with the government when all they seem to do is kick us in the arse. Why would I do that?
That's not my preferred way. I've been doing this for over 30 years. Having fights with the government, or fights with the opposition if I'm the government, is not new or exciting. I'm tired of all that. I have to tell you. I don't get a lot out of it.
What really turns my crank is when we get together with disparate political beliefs, different experiences, but come together in goodwill. Then we collectively try to find—like when we're doing reports—language that accommodates your concern and my concern. That I find stimulating because it goes against the grain. That's not easy to do in an adversarial system. Therefore, for me personally, after all these decades, that becomes a far greater challenge than just standing on some soapbox screaming and hollering. I've done that for decades, everybody's heard it, and we're all getting a bit tired of it, I suspect.
An hon. member: On division.
Mr. David Christopherson: On division? I think it would be unanimous.
I say all of that again, and I want to try to end on a positive note. It's hard, given the subject matter in front of us, but I do put that forward, and I mean it very sincerely. If it changes, I'll let you know. If we cross the Rubicon where, “You know what? I don't want to talk to you guys anymore. Forget about it”, I'll let you know. Up until then, it's a standing offer, because I don't find this particularly fun. I don't find this particularly productive, and I don't think taxpayers are going to be all that impressed either.
I think the government's going to have a heck of a time trying to blame us. Maybe they could accuse us of being obstructionist or something. Good luck! Given your own background on Bill and on the whole approach, especially when you compare it with the approach that could have been taken. Why did you miss that opportunity? I don't get it. Why didn't they sit down and try to find some common ground so that even if we're at odds, it's maybe on a few little things that we could try to.... Even if we had to have a bit of a set-to over it, it would be narrowed. Right now, it's the whole thing. We're in the ditch. We're in the middle of a filibuster defending the right to filibuster.
I'll just go so far as to say that I choose to believe that there are quite a number of government members on the other side who are not feeling good about this, because this is not exactly sunny ways. This is not exactly consultation. This is not co-operation. This is not respect. All the things the government promised, and I will go so far as to say that when my colleague from Hamilton, Filomena Tassi spoke about those things, I believe she believed it and came here believing that was the way her government would act. In some ways they have. It's not as if it has always been like this, which is another reason it's so surprising.
I don't expect anybody to comment, but I have to believe this is not sitting well with a lot of Liberal members, especially the new ones who came in, in the last Parliament. Everything before then was the olden days and this is the new era and they've certainly tried to conduct themselves in that fashion. This has got to be one of those things in the pit of your stomach where they think they really don't want to defend this back home. However, that's their decision to make.
I would again reiterate the offer to have any kind of offline confidential discussions so that if they break down nobody is losing face. I've been around a while and I know how these things are done. I know how we got to “yes” back in the seventies, but it doesn't happen this way.
Chair, I would just urge any influence you have as a bona fide, full-fledged member of the government caucus to influence that, because you've been doing an excellent job as chair. You had big shoes to fill. Joe Preston was probably one of the best chairs of PROC to come around in quite some decades, not just Parliament, and it was mostly through the force of his personality.
:
It would be even more so if that's the way it really happened, because nobody believes it. It didn't happen that way. It didn't happen that way at all. My sense is, and I can't give you the particulars, but I think we all know that the PMO's fingerprints are all over this thing. There is no way after what we went through with Bill that any of the government members would be bringing in a notice of motion as draconian as this one without the absolute 100% okay from the , the , and the whip. The first time, it could be a mistake. You know, first time, shame on you, and that kind of thing. But here we are again a few weeks later and it's the same darn thing.
The last government didn't want to appear reasonable. They wanted to appear to be strong and winners. It was a whole different approach, so in a lot of the things they did, they were at least on brand. I'll give them that. They were very disciplined.
I don't understand the government: sunny ways but shutting things down, transparency and ramming through changes with only one...even Harper didn't try to do that. That's how bad this is. He didn't even try to do that. So here we be. The government has identified the areas in which they want change. We know what those motions are. Some of them they tried out in previous vehicles. Motion six, remember that debacle? It was the same kind of thing. Every time you guys try to play Mad Max, it doesn't work for you. It's the same darn thing then.
We find ourselves now with no alternative except to do exactly what we're doing, which is to fight to defend what is arguably the last real tool that an opposition member has in their tool box, which can at least slow down the government. We can't stop it. It has a majority. It's going to get its way at the end of the day and it's going to win votes 10 times out of 10. I used to be part of a majority government provincially, not as massive as the one we have here, but a comfortable enough one that every time I walked in the House, I had that feeling that we were the government and we were going to win this vote. I haven't felt that since.
A couple times they were in minority, which is a whole different other story that we may need to get to later to fill time as we go through this, but not for tonight.
What the government has done is to identify the things it wants, including taking away our right. Here's the thing about it, Chair. Filibusters are a lot like strikes. You will know, Chair, from our time together, that originally I'm a product of the Hamilton labour movement. That's where I came from. That's how I got into politics, and I still self-identify as someone from the labour movement. That never leaves you. I look at these things and I want to find a way to get through them. I want to find a way that we can come to grips.
But for the government to then go through these things and cherry-pick the things it wants.... There was no consultation ahead of time, no discussion of any give or take, no saying it was looking at certain things. If you're serious about co-operation, there are ways for those kinds of discussions to happen, but it's clear that this government had no intention and has no intention. I don't know why, but the knee-jerk reaction seems to be to go from trying to be the nicest people in public life in the world to suddenly being the most vicious. It's happened two or three times. I don't get it. I don't at all get it.
I understand that the calculation here is probably one of a long game. It's taken a look—because that's what you do when you're in government—and it's said, “Okay. Let's go to when the next election is and work backwards and identify the things”—we used to call them our signature pieces—“our keystone pieces and make sure that they are brought in in a timely way and they're implemented and we're watching those”. I think they have deliverology, which is the same sort of thing. You're usually working backwards from a date to identify things you'd need to do at a certain point.
I'm assuming that the calculation is that there are things the government wants through the House by the time of the next election, and that the ability to all but guarantee that they can get them, on any time frame of their little heart's desire, is worth the pain and the price that we opposition members are trying to make them pay.
I assume that this is the calculation. The budget's tomorrow. The fact that this happened today is not a coincidence. We know that. Obviously, the government's hope is that we'll blink.
The government needs to understand that there is nothing more important in front of the opposition right now than defending our rights. Again, we do this a lot, but there are members of the government benches who've been in opposition and who know that someday they're going to be back.
Trust me, if you ever achieve this, there will come a day, especially for the younger ones, when you'll be in a situation sitting where I am, let's say, or on this side, and the government's over there. You'll be reaching for every tool because of some outrageous thing that is really wrong. You'll reach into your quiver for that arrow, and it ain't going to be there. Then you'll say to yourself, “Hmm, it seemed like a really good idea at the time.” The people on the government side will say, “You know, at the time I thought it was a bad idea, but right about now I think you guys were probably right. It was a good rule change. Well done. Thank you. We appreciate that.”
What could an alternative have been? Just about anything would be better than this. I mean, for anybody who's watching....
The other thing to say to the government is that there probably aren't many people paying much attention right now, but that number will grow. There are a lot of people, especially people who used to vote for us, for the NDP, who went with the Liberals. It was for a bunch of reasons, but for many of them the signature piece was electoral reform, specifically proportional representation. They've paid a real price for backing off this. Those people are very upset, really upset. This will affect those very same people.
Why you want to do that to your brand is beyond me. That's what I'm not getting. Brand is everything. A new government spends most of the first four years building that brand, the brand of their choice. From what I can see, this is not it. Undemocratic, ramming things through, taking away rights from the opposition, forcing committees to go around the clock and filibuster to defend the right to have a filibuster—that's your brand? Really?
Is it the “Liberal Conservatives”, or “Conservative Liberals”...? The Conservatives over here would probably tell you that they wouldn't stoop this low, and not to attach their name to this idea. You have to give them their due, because they didn't do that. They did some horrible things—I was there—but they didn't do this. It was this government—I'm going to keep coming back to this, because this is the most annoying thing—that promised to be different. They were going to be respectful of committees. Where's the respect?
Bill , I was willing to forgive you that one. I mean, the government was in a tough spot. I understand the politics of it. I get it. They were in a tough spot. They were taking a lot of heat. They were getting negative reports on electoral reform. They wanted to get something positive out there to provide a bit of a counter to it. I get that, but that doesn't in any way justify the ham-fisted way it was done.
The minister—the second minister, not the first one—all but said that. She came a little shy of that. Okay, I can understand what the advice was from her ministerial staff, but she came a very long way towards saying, “You know, we screwed up, and we didn't show this committee respect.”
Although I didn't get an absolute promise that it wouldn't happen again—I can see why, given what's happening today—at least what was said gave us enough, because we had the desire to get back to working positively. It gave us enough to take what was said and use that to say, “Okay, it's a pass. It's a C. It'll get us there. Let's get back to the electoral reform report. That's the primary focus. That's what's really important here.”
I wouldn't normally talk about these things, but in this context, because the government has to vilify us for what we're doing—I know it's coming—I need to publicly remind my colleagues that certainly I, as one member of this committee, did everything I could, and successfully, with others, to get us back on track. Up until even yesterday at the beginning of the meeting we were fine.
By the way, that's another thing, too. We haven't talked about all the money that was wasted today by the way the government's doing it, not just on this but all the time that the staff took, the very professional staff who came here from the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer. They did their homework. They prepped. They were all ready to go. We were all ready to go. All of a sudden, out of nowhere, I guess I can't go too far on what was said in camera, but suffice it to say, in a blink, we were public and this thing was being jammed down our throats. That's how quickly it changed.
On the motion in front of us, the amendment, again this is the kind of area where with no discussion and the government refusing to go here or to offer an alternative or to try to find a compromise, they're leaving it clear to all of us that they are prepared to use their majority to ram through changes to our House of Commons. Their majority, their ramming...our House, our Parliament. That doesn't sound like the campaign trail. It was so different on the campaign trail.
I had suggested a compromise that worked before. I suggested earlier today, Chair, that perhaps we could look at the model that was used for the special committee that reviewed democratic reform. That got us off the dime and got us into a positive venue. Now I must say for the record, too, that it was young who actually conceived of the idea, but it was Nathan who said, “That is a good idea.” He took it, ran with it, polished it, and changed it around. I want to give Dan his due for the initial concept, but Nathan's the one who gave it life and Nathan did an excellent job on that.
Maybe that's something we could still do to get off this dime. Is the model something that would help us get through this impasse? The government says that it's sincere about wanting to have give and take, and consult. All the usual words that you use when you do mean it, they're using now. Maybe that's the mechanism that lets us get going.
But that's only if the government actually did want to have consultation, discussion, openness, transparency, and all that other stuff they talked about in the election that they don't seem to want to live up to anymore. Again, if those things had been suggested either at a House leaders' meeting or at a steering committee here, anywhere, at any venue, any opportunity, other than “our way or the highway”.... That's the way the last guy did it. This government was going to be different. They're different when it suits them, but they're not different consistently.
They're not really different. It amounts to another broken promise. We're getting quite a collection of them—biggies.
The model would also allow something that I don't think has been raised yet, but I did slip out of the room a couple of times. It may have been mentioned, but not a lot, and that is, what about the rights of members of the House who don't belong to recognized parties? We went out of our way in the Cullen model to ensure that they got a say in the election rules that were being reviewed. It's their election, too. Where are their rights in all this? Where is their opportunity to have input and consultation? The government doesn't seem to have even thought about it.
Again, you know, it's talk one game, act another game. The model would provide us with an opportunity to have a fair discussion where everybody gets their say. The structure enhances or pressures the members to find compromise, and there was a mechanism whereby less than everyone could conclude a decision and have it carried on. You had the ability to work your way through things in a way where everybody was agreed at the beginning what the rules—that new structure—would be. None of that discussion....
What we have in front of us right now.... It will be interesting to see how many amendments we end up with from the two opposition parties by the time this whole process is done. We might be setting a new land speed record with that one. For now, we have a motion that calls for a requirement that there be all-party agreement. The government doesn't agree with that. They don't agree with that. They don't agree with a compromise. They don't agree with.... The only thing they seem to agree with is that whatever they want to do, they can do it. That, they agree with.
It was also interesting, even today, to watch...and this was in public, not in camera, so I can talk about it. Mr. Chan, a government member, raised this right here just a few hours ago. He raised the idea of perhaps.... You recall, Chair, that I tried to get this committee to adjourn the debate on something that we hadn't caucused yet. That would have allowed us a chance to take it to our caucus tomorrow to get a mandate, so that when we spoke at committee, we had the support of our caucus. We would know what their thinking was and that we were speaking on behalf of our caucuses. The government said no to that.
I mean, how unreasonable. We are debating right now a motion and a policy change that affects everything we do in the House, and the government thinks it's okay that we don't get a chance to take it to caucus first. Come along. No one out there—no matter how much you decidedly look at your Blackberrys and iPads, no matter how much you try to glance away from the wreckage of this—the people out there aren't buying it. You can't defend it. How can you defend forcing members to debate one of the most important policies we could possibly debate—the rules of the House—without even having an opportunity to take the discussion paper and the motion to our caucus?
You did call it a discussion paper, didn't you? Except you denied us the chance to discuss it. How is that fair? How do you defend that one? Yet every one of the government members lined up to say, “No, you debate now. We say now”. We had people from the Chief Electoral Officer here, we were all ready to do it. We had our papers all over, ready to go, and the government suddenly said, “No, we're going to deal with this motion right away.” I asked for at least a two-day deferral and it was refined by my friend, Mr. Reid, who had the better idea to adjourn just the debate—rather than the whole meeting—and allow us to get back to do a day's work on the Chief Electoral Officer's report. That was a great idea. I accepted that as sort of a friendly amendment. It was a good improvement on what I was trying to do. What did the government say? No. The government said no.
That was early on. As question period was approaching, Mr. Chan—he's a very reasonable man and I enjoy working with him—suggested, reasonably, I guess actually forgetting that the Liberals aren't in reasonable mode right now.... I'm sorry, Mr. Schmale mentioned it and then you responded. I don't want to get it wrong. I certainly don't want to wrong you on this. I'm going to wrong you, but decidedly where you deserve it, not on something you don't. If it came from Mr. Schmale, that's fine.
But it's fair to say that Mr. Chan did respond positively and say, “Fair enough, maybe we could suspend for question period and then come back”. When we asked what time we should come back, that's when the senior staffer came over, had a huddle on the side, and had a couple of words. The next thing Mr. Chan said was “No, we're going to keep talking through”.
I have had members of the Liberal Party brag to me about how that didn't happen and was never going to happen. They said, “Remember, Dave? Under Harper, the staff was always there telling them what to do, just like a bunch of puppets and seals. We're never going to do that. We're here as independent members. We're going to think for ourselves. You can count on that, Dave; don't worry. We're far away from that nonsense.”
Not so much, because that's exactly what happened.
Mr. Chan reasonably responded, because in my opinion he's a reasonable man, and said that, yes, it made sense that way, because we were going to do this for days or weeks. For him to say, “Yes, we'll take a few minutes to go and let everyone exercise their right to be part of question period” and have it countermanded by the staff, vetoed by the staff, well, why don't the staff just sit there instead so we can get some work done directly and get rid of the middle people?
Folks, particularly the new members here, this is the kind of stuff we used to hit the government backbenchers in the Harper government with all the time, and they deserved it. Now you're letting it be done to you. It's not me. I'm the one who's doing the words, but none of this would be happening if it wasn't for your actions. You're bringing this all upon yourselves. Not all yet, but slowly and surely you're working your way through all the areas that you said you would do differently. Guess what. Watching a senior staff person come over and dictate to the MP sitting there what the decision is going to be, especially when it reverses the decision of the sitting MP, is about as far away from respecting committees and accepting that they are masters of their own destiny as you can possibly get.
Why? I don't know. All I see is a failed political calculation. Does the government have any idea how resolute we are on this side of the House? This is the closest the Conservatives and the NDP have worked for, well, as long as I can remember. I was starting to think and going further, but this is the closest for a long time. It's not because suddenly we agree on everything, but one thing we do agree on is that this is wrong and doing it this way is wrong. If you're going to try to take away one of the few tools that we have left to be effective opposition members and you think we're going to blink for any reason, the government is misreading this.
I can tell you that it goes all the way to the top in terms of the resoluteness of the two opposition parties. I know that Madam May feels the same way—she has been here once—and I have a sneaking suspicion that the rest of the independents are going to feel pretty similar, especially since they don't even get a say. They don't even get a say, and the government didn't give any thought at all about the opposition members. Who are they? Who cares? We're the majority and what we want is what matters. We have to deal with those official parties, and we will. We'll fix them, don't worry. The other ones, well, they have no power and we'll just make sure they stay that way.
You were going to be different, though; that's the thing. It's not as though I have to hold up some high ideals and make it look like you backed them. The Liberals were the ones who were giving all these lofty speeches during that bloody 11-week campaign, so you had lots of opportunity to repeat to everybody how you were going to be different. Telling people one thing and doing something else is not doing things differently. Canadians have had their fill of that. The government said, “We'll be different; you can trust us, Canadians.” They did, and now, by this kind of nonsense, the government is insulting those very same Canadians who put their trust in them.
I don't know what's going to happen to the changes to the electoral act. When I turn my mind back to a few hours ago when we were actually doing productive things, I had some sense of maybe where we were going. I have no idea now. Let's just take a second to mosey on down that trail.
The new asked us to try to complete our study of the Chief Electoral Officer’s report, which is pretty lengthy by the way, by May 19, and we really hadn't already gotten our heads around how we were going to do that except that we were prepared to try. Again, based on the idea that if it looks like timing is going to be a problem. If the government wants to give us some indication of areas that they prefer to move on earlier rather than later, then we can rejig our work so they can have the benefit of our....
That's all gone now, Mr. Chair. As long as we're tied up in this none of that's going to happen, so does that mean that the Conservatives.... I mean the Liberals. You start getting into this stuff and the old ways kick in.
Does that mean the Liberals have decided that their ability to have 100% control in the House and in every committee is more important than removing some of the Bill ugliness, the unfair elections act? Or does it mean that you're going back to not respecting the committee and their opinion like Bill ? Because you can't have both. You can't have us locked into this pitched battle for days and weeks on end and expect us to complete a report that we weren't even sure we could finish under the existing schedule if we're not even talking about it. So what does that mean? Does that mean the government's going to say something's got to give, and it would look like listening to the committee and respecting the committee and waiting for our report is what's going to give, which puts us right back where we were with Bill . That's not that far away from the process that was followed with Bill , the unfair elections act.
We already heard Mr. Reid admit that the opposition approach to Bill did damage. I didn't even have the Liberals with us fighting Bill as strongly. They did fight it but not as strongly as the official opposition is now linked with the third party to make sure this doesn't happen. There are two injustices: ram through the changes that you want, opposition be damned, and then put in whatever electoral changes you want, committee consideration be damned. Is that where we are? Is that what this committee is now reduced to? It looks like it.
We've been struggling with our work plan to try to fit everything in. I just mentioned the most acute one. We have a lot of important work and anyone who's been on this committee for any length of time knows that we don't go too long before somebody from somewhere sends us work that we have to deal with. The Speaker refers things to us. The House refers things to us. Bills come in here. Even though we've set our work plan it's always a struggle to stay, and that's when we're all co-operating, respecting one another, and fighting in common cause to get through an agenda because we believe it's in the interest of the people we represent to do so. Where's that? I'd love to hear somebody from the government tell me.
What are you going to say? Is it we're going to start meeting six days a week? Is that the solution because that only works so far? We could do something like that maybe if we were going to the model where we're, again, working together and we set out how we can do this. It may be possible, but the government doesn't want to talk about that. They have no interest. The ones I feel sorry for are the backbenchers who are sleepwalking through this.
I know some of them get it and they know how dangerous this is to their brand in their own ridings. I know some of them get it. The ones I feel sorry for really are the ones who don't get it and they're just going along and doing what the government told them. They say, “Yeah, okay, I'll support that. Sure, yeah, okay,” and they go back to their ridings and it's like whoa what happened? We all know.... I don't want go too far into this. I wouldn't raise it if it wasn't in the media but there it is, low-lying fruit. There's already a little bit of that tension that we all know exists between cabinet and backbenchers, and I've been both.
I've been the backbencher who felt frustrated, and I've been the cabinet minister who is carrying the responsibility. I get it. You have a couple of days coming up when you're going to be struggling with these things. The fact that you don't think there's maybe enough consultation with the cabinet and with the caucus before things are done is not new—trust me—and anybody who is in your caucus who has been in government before will tell you we've been here before.
Things like ministers coming into ridings and you don't know about it, and you get all ticked off because the minister is coming in and you didn't know, are not new. This is not new. You're having these kinds of stresses. I suspect that, especially among the ones who really get politics on the ground and have a good political gut, they're going to go into that caucus meeting tomorrow morning or the quasi-retreat on the weekend and there's going to be a lot of expression of serious concern about what's going on, because this stuff is hard to defend, not because it's complicated but because it's so wrong.
You caught me just at a weak moment there. A colleague told a joke that was not in any way funny, but I had to laugh anyway. Of course, Mr. Brassard is always funny. I won't share the joke with the committee, though. It wouldn't be right.
I've listened today to some really good arguments, some really good points from my colleagues on this side. I guess the government side is hoping to just wear us down, and they're hoping they'll get their way. They're just going to ram through these changes and hope that we'll all put up a fight for a little while and eventually get worn down and won't be able to carry on, and they can just do what they want. can be the dictator that he wants to be.
I can tell you right now that's not going to happen. If you look around this room, you'll see there are a lot of MPs who don't even need to be here right now, and it's almost 11 o'clock in the evening. What does that tell you? That tells you there's a commitment here on the part of the opposition in both parties to fight this. We're going to fight this not for ourselves, but on behalf of Canadians, because what is trying to do is take away the accountability that he and his government have to Canadians.
An hon. member: Hear, hear!
Mr. Blake Richards: That's what he's trying to do here. Let's not mince words. Let's not pretend anything else. That's what this is about.
talked in the past about admiring the basic dictatorship of China. He's said some wonderful words about his uncle, Fidel. At the end of the day, he wants to be them. He wants to be a dictator in Canada. I know that sounds extreme, but that's what we're seeing here. I may as well just call it what it is, because when you start looking at these changes, that is what he is trying to do. He is trying to take away any ability to be held to account.
Mr. Chair, I shared a Facebook post. It was a news article put out about the committee proceedings earlier today. In a minute, I want to share that. First of all, I went off on a tangent there and I forgot what I was actually getting at when I first talked about having heard from my various colleagues today, on their thoughts and their opinions, which I very much appreciated.
The one who really stuck out for me was my colleague Mr. Reid. When he was here earlier, he spoke for more than a few minutes. I'm not sure, I wasn't keeping track, but it was probably more hours than I can even count to, which isn't saying a lot of hours, but it's a few.
One thing stood out to me. I've sat on committee with Mr. Reid for a number of years now. I've served as a member of Parliament with him for over eight years, and one thing I've known about Mr. Reid is that he's very rational and calm. I would say he takes a very academic approach. It's actually quite atypical for a politician. A lot of politicians are about the show and about putting on a performance to ramp up the rhetoric. That's quite common among politicians, rightly or wrongly. It's something that Mr. Reid is certainly not known for. I saw him legitimately angry over this issue today. He wasn't putting on a show. It's something I've never seen from him before, and I've been through a lot of very stressful situations with him. I've been through a lot of committee hearings on difficult topics, and I've not seen that.
I think that means something. I wouldn't call it an outburst, but we saw that kind of passion and emotion come out of someone who just generally doesn't take that type of approach. He was angry. He used a word that he probably wishes he hadn't used, but it was out of a real, legitimate, and passionate concern for what this government is trying to do as far as the accountability of the government to Canadians goes. It was quite evident in his comments and in how he delivered those comments that this struck him like nothing I've ever seen. I was already well aware of how much of a problem this really was, but I think it really just drove it home for me.
If all Canadians were to see that, they would understand, if they don't already, exactly what the concern is here. I listen to other colleagues, as well, who make very impassioned cases for why it's so important in a democracy—which is what Canada is, or at least it still is at this point—for the opposition to have the ability and some tools to be able to use to hold the government to account.
As Mr. Christopherson rightly pointed out, nearly 100% correctly, the government is going to win the votes 100% of the time. We obviously saw a vote once in this Parliament that was pretty close to not being 100% of the time. At the end of the day, it's a pretty rare circumstance when the government isn't going to win the vote—extremely rare, in fact.
There's merit in that, I suppose. Some people would argue otherwise. That said, it's important the opposition have the ability to draw attention to issues that are of concern and to make the government accountable. One of the biggest reasons it's necessary is that often a government can take that power and use other powers, which they're also trying to change—I'll go through those as I speak tonight, Mr. Chair—and trying to put in place here. They can take something and ram it through, and they can do it in a rushed fashion. They can force things through, force a vote, and the goal would be for the government to try to do this—I think that's what they're trying to do in this case, frankly—before anyone can take notice and anyone can build up opposition to it.
What we're seeing with this motion, the discussion paper, and the timeline that's put in this motion, is an attempt to.... Let's face it, when Canadians hear that Liberal MPs want to take Fridays off, when they hear that the Prime Minister only wants to be accountable one day a week in the House of Commons, their reaction is not very good. I can tell you that the people who are aware out there.... I had a lot of people approach me when I was in my riding last week, saying, whoa, hold on. What is this government? Are they really trying to do this? Are they really trying to work fewer days? Are they really trying to make sure the Prime Minister...? I'll get to some comments directly from people in a minute or two, Mr. Chair.
The point is that when people hear about this stuff, it concerns them. The government is hoping to get this through before people can hear about it, before they can get angry, get amped up, and provide some kind of opposition.
Let's face it. Canadians are busy. They're raising their families, they're trying to run businesses—when the Liberal government isn't trying to tax them out of business, of course—they're trying to hold down their jobs, they're getting their kids around to activities, they're caring for their elderly parents. Whatever it is, they're involved in a lot of things. They have busy lives. I think people are busier now than ever before.
That means they don't have as much time as they might like to follow what goes on in Parliament or in the legislatures in their provinces, and political happenings generally. Sometimes, if the government can do a thing like this quickly enough and slide it under the radar, it can get away with it before anyone can know about it. That, I think, is what the goal is here. That's why the opposition has to tools to try to slow down the process, to allow Canadians to have a look at what's going on and allow parliamentarians to fully go through it and raise concerns on behalf of their constituents—who are Canadians—and bring those concerns out into the public forum so that Canadians can judge whether what's being done is in their best interests before it gets rammed through and not afterwards, when it's too late.
That's what's at the heart of all this, Mr. Chair. As I said just a couple of hours ago, I put the following story up on my Facebook page. It's a story from the other day on this filibuster, whatever you want to call it today—this committee meeting that has been going on for some time.
I hope you'll indulge me, Mr. Chair, because I wouldn't want to be accused of trying to go on for a long time, but I think I should read it to provide context for some of the comments I'm going to make. I won't necessarily read the whole article, but a part of the article that I put up, just to give members some sense of it.
It was actually an article from the National Post, and the headline referred to the comments that Mr. Reid made earlier that I talked about and I think really were atypical for him and showed how disgusting, I'll say, this attempt by the government is.
The heading is:
Tories accuse Liberals of ‘ramming through whatever the f— they want’ to make changes to House procedure
I'm going to click on this article so that I can pull it up, if you'll bear with me a second. I'm going to read in part from this article.
It says:
Opposition parties slammed the Liberal government on Tuesday—
It still is Tuesday, I think, but not for much longer.
—for trying to “ram through” major changes to how the House of Commons does its business.
So, it talks about ramming through major changes. The next paragraph reads:
—which is a key point as well—
—the Liberals moved Tuesday to have the Procedure and House Affairs committee study major changes to standing orders put forward by Liberal House leader Bardish Chagger, giving a tight June deadline and offering no indication that they wouldn’t use a majority to impose changes to House rules without opposition consent.
I'm going to stop quoting there, because I think there are so many important points being made in the first couple of paragraphs of this article. It's talking about the government trying to ram through what the author of the article calls “major changes to how the House of Commons does its business.”
We're not talking about everyday, sort of run-of-the-mill type changes. We're not even talking about changing a significant piece of legislation that the House of Commons would look at. We're talking about changing the actual rules of how the House of Commons does its business and trying to tip the scales far more toward the government.
Then it goes on to talk about little notice being provided. Again that speaks to what I was referring to earlier, the fact that the government would try to sneak something through without it being noticed.
It moved to make major changes to the Standing Orders. The other point in that sentence is that they were put forward by the Liberal House leader. It's not the committee making recommendations to the government, which the government would then consider, as I think it is trying to do—I think that's the efforts the government is trying to make to pretend that might be the case. I'll go into detail later about how in fact what's in this letter doesn't line up at all with what the committee had looked at previously. It doesn't line up with a lot of the things that were heard in the take-note debate even, which is another thing that we're hearing pointed to by the government as the opportunity when everyone got a chance to have a say.
Of course, notwithstanding the fact that another of the failed promises of this government was the electoral reform promise. A number of us who were point men for the opposition on this file travelled with the electoral reform committee. Call me a conspiracy theorist, but I have to wonder a little bit as to whether that was done deliberately, especially given what has happened since then. Was it done deliberately so that the people who would maybe have the most invested in these issues and probably pay the most attention to these issues from the opposition caucuses weren't present. If it weren't done deliberately, then it was really quite reckless, at the very least.
Then the article goes on to talk about a tight June deadline and, most importantly, the government's offering no indication that it wouldn't use its majority to impose changes to House rules without the opposition's consent. Obviously, as has been said many times today, the practice has typically been and should be that, when you're talking about changes to the very rules that govern the House of Commons, all parties should have some say in that. As we're debating this motion now, that would not be the case. This amendment would, of course, enable that to be the case. We see no indication whatsoever from the government that they're even open to it and it's quite clear that their intention is not to allow that.
I certainly hope that, with the reaction they're getting, they'll choose to reconsider that. That would be really wise on their part. I think it would be in the best interests of Canadians, it would be in the best interests of Parliament, and it would even be in their own best interests, Mr. Chair.
The article it goes on to talk about some of other things. It says:
The long list of items for study includes: halting House sittings on Fridays; only requiring the Prime Minister to be in question period one day a week—
It also talks about introducing electronic voting and restricting opposition parties' ability to filibuster bills in committee. Those are a number of things it discusses. There are other things, which I'll go through in detail in a few moments.
I think people would be and are quite troubled by the idea of giving Liberal MPs Fridays off and by the idea of the having to be accountable to Canadians only one day a week. Electronic voting is something that could certainly be debated. It was debated by this committee previously with no decision made to proceed with it, but I'll get back to that in a minute.
As for restricting the opposition parties' ability to filibuster bills in committee, I guess I can understand, on a day like today, why the government might see that as something they'd like to see. But again, it is a tool that allows the opposition, on behalf of Canadians, to hold the government accountable and to bring to light some of the issues of the day. Those are the tools the opposition has to provide a contrary, opposing, or potentially complementary view of bills put forward before the Parliament so that Canadians can consider what an alternative, or an additional, approach might be. There is a reason those tools are there. You don't just get rid of them without some kind of agreement among all parties.
The article goes on to give some of Mr. Reid's comments. He said Liberals are trying to “ram through whatever the f... they want”, and it mentions what I pointed out earlier, Mr. Chair, that it was indeed a “rare outburst” for MP Scott Reid. I don't know if I'd call it an outburst—
An hon. member: I don't know if I'd call it rare.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
Mr. Blake Richards: —but the point is that it is not something that is typical or that Mr. Reid is known for. He usually takes a very methodical and academic approach to issues, and this was a very passionate approach, so it obviously means it is something quite unusual that is happening here. It's very unusual.
He called the manoeuvres “despicable, a tissue of lies and a contemptible abuse of our system”. He also called the an “arrogant, selfish, rude individual” for trying to steamroll all opposition.
I think he put it really well. Trying to steamroll the opposition is what's happening here. We can go back to , as has been alluded to a couple of times earlier today, to the previous attempts by the government to curtail the abilities of the opposition to hold them to account. In response to what happened at that time—the elbow that happened, the 's trying to forcibly have his way and ending up elbowing a female MP—there was an uproar, of course.
Frankly, what we're seeing now is even more contemptible. We have a government that just thinks they can do whatever they want, and forget the opposition. They believe they can just drive the bus right over the opposition and therefore drive the bus right over Canadians. They think that since they were elected, they have a dictatorship and can do whatever they want.
That's not how it works. I think this government needs to wake up and look at what's going on here. For the members who sit here in this committee, it's not in your best interests either. As has been said earlier, at least some of you will probably sit in opposition some day, if you have any length of a career in Parliament. I know that many of them are new, but they're going to be realizing at that point why these tools are so important and why it's so important there is some government accountability. And I can tell you that if they don't realize this very quickly, the time they get to spend in opposition might come a lot quicker than they expect, and that's why it's in their best interest, too.
I see we're about to have a change of clerk here. I guess what I would like to say is thank you for your efforts today, because you've had a long day as well and have had to be here the whole time. So after about 13 hours or so, you will have a chance to get a little sleep, I hope. We just want to recognize that.
Some hon. members: Hear, hear!
Mr. Blake Richards: I'll go back to where I was. I'm not going to quote myself because that would be weird, so I'll skip by the quote of me. In fact, I probably used those words already as I've spoken here, but it refers to my calling this attempt “disgusting and pathetic”. I probably already used that language, so I don't need to do that.
And it then the article goes on to say, “In an unusual move Tuesday”.... So again, here's that idea of it being very unusual: “In an unusual move Tuesday, Liberals repeatedly blocked opposition attempts to delay the motion, including extending the committee” and blah, blah, blah. Then it goes on to the fact that Mr. Christopherson “made much ado about the fact that opposition MPs were not given the time to bring the Liberals’ proposals to a caucus meeting”, with the next one being just hours away now. What they gained by not allowing the opposition members to go to their caucuses, I'll never understand. I guess they like listening to long speeches from opposition members so much that they.... I can understand why; there were some pretty good speeches today. Now that you have to listen to me, they might be rethinking that, as mine maybe isn't quite as interesting as some of the others, but nevertheless they're going to continue to listen to it until they smarten up and realize this is not acceptable.
Really, a delay for a half a day to allow people to have a chance to talk to their caucuses, I can't imagine what the harm in that would be. Who knows? It's anyone's guess, I suppose.
And I'll pass by the part where Mr. Christopherson calls them “clowns”. There's the part where he says:
“This is not a good day for Liberal promises”.... The Liberals had promised to work more collaboratively and openly with other parties, but instead are trying to use their majority to change rules that will have a major effect on all members of parliament.... “How the hell is that fair? How does that come anywhere near what you promised in the campaign?”
It's a good question. We still haven't had an answer because the Liberal MPs aren't really speaking. I guess they're just hoping....
Yes, fair enough, David Graham did give us 30 seconds or so there. So, maybe we'll hear a bit more from one of our colleagues on the other side later and maybe they'll explain a bit more about why they're trying to do this. Maybe they don't know. To give them the benefit of the doubt, maybe they've just been given the orders and they don't really know why that is. I don't know. Who knows?
The bottom line is that the article I posted gives you the context. Now I'm just going to share with you some of the comments that people made. Some of them I can't share because they're referring to the Prime Minister with some language that I don't really feel is appropriate to use in a parliamentary committee; and I don't blame people for that, by the way. I understand that, because what he's doing here is frankly despicable. I can understand why people would feel that way. They probably don't need to use some of the language they've used, but it is despicable.
One person is calling for a vote of non-confidence.
An hon. member: Hear, hear!
Another says, referring to the Prime Minister in question period currently, that he refuses to answer when he's there now.
That's a good point; he rather does.
Again, another person says, “There needs to be a vote of no confidence” and puts three exclamation points after it.
“He is destroying our country with a smile on his disgusting face.” There are four exclamation points after that sentence.
Another fellow says: “Hold him accountable, Blake. I know you're committed to that. Thank you.”
I guess what I would add to that is that I'm not the only one committed to it. There are many opposition MPs—in fact, I'm sure every single one of them—committed to it. That's why I hope they have comfortable seats on the other side: they're going to need them.
Another person said, talking about the Prime Minister: “He is never held accountable, never answers a direct question. He makes me sick.”
The next one I actually can't use, because it refers to the Prime Minister in a very uncomplimentary and unparliamentary way, so I won't cite it.
The next gives good advice, I think, for her fellow Canadians. She says: “Should start putting the heat on Trudeau MPs on 'How can they support their leader?' and make his caucus start going against him. Everybody should start calling the Liberal members of Parliament.” It's good advice, actually. People need to hear it. The Liberal MPs need to hear from people who are concerned about this.
I also had an email, which I got earlier—I have my phone plugged in, so I may read it a little later—in which someone talks about feeling that there should almost be a revolt in Parliament, I guess. That's essentially what they're trying to say. I don't have it in front of me, so I won't read it word for word, but that's essentially the point they were trying to make.
The point is that this isn't just a few opposition MPs lighting their hair on fire over nothing; this is Canadians saying this is not acceptable. They get it. They even understand some of the tools that Parliament might be able to use to hold the government to account.
Maybe I shouldn't have shared those, because maybe the government will try to take them away too.
It obviously concerns me, and it concerns a lot of Canadians. I think that's something the government needs to pay attention to: the reaction of people that I'm seeing on social media, as I've outlined from some of the comments on my page. I know that a number of things have been going around on social media showing concern about this, and there have been many media articles.
This can't be going well. Next week, Liberal MPs will be back in their ridings, and maybe—I'm not sure, but maybe—they will hear from their constituents and their concerns about this. Maybe that will give them some fresh perspective. Let's hope.
I want to address this idea in a little more detail, Mr. Chair, the whole idea about this being rammed through Parliament. It's a word that's been used a lot today. It's been used in the media; Canadians are using it; it's really a good way of describing what's happening here: it's being rammed through. That's the attempt, anyway.
This also has been alluded to many times today: the so-called “discussion paper”, which I'll talk to in more detail, because I've analyzed it and see the key.... I guess what the Liberals have to do is to accomplish their marching here at committee. This was put out, as was mentioned, on a Friday as a constituency or break week, or whatever you want to call it, was starting, essentially meaning that they wouldn't have to be accountable in Parliament for the next week concerning these items.
Then of course came the motion that Mr. Simms put forward within minutes or an hour and a half or whatever it was of that meeting, which is—and I'm not casting aspersions on Mr. Simms, because I know it isn't really something he wrote himself—draconian. It's: “Ram this through. Don't let the opposition have any say. Get it back as quickly as possible.”
Where's the accountability? Where are the “sunny ways”? Where are the efforts to be open? Where's the different kind of politics? Where's any of that in this? I don't see it.
Maybe it's invisible ink or something, because the stuff I see on the paper is certainly not any of that. When I look at that, and I look at the report this committee put out previously....
We started looking at the Standing Orders. At one of our very first meetings as a committee in this Parliament, we had then House leader Dominic LeBlanc come in and break up the Standing Orders into chunks. I could be a little bit off on how he explained this, but think it was his suggestion and not the committee's—although we took it up as a committee—to look at the family friendly initiatives. I believe that came from the House leader—I could be mistaken—but in breaking it up into chunks, we certainly looked at the so-called family friendly initiatives.
Of course, one of the things the Liberals were trying to call family friendly, somehow—I'm still not sure how it really would be so—was this idea of eliminating Friday sittings so that Liberal MPs could have another day off every week. It was opposed pretty vigorously by opposition MPs. I would say it was pretty significantly opposed by Canadians as well.
I'm just trying to find the report. I have a lot of papers here in front of me. I believe this is it, but give me a second, Mr. Chair.
Yes, this is the report itself. It was a unanimous report, I believe. Was it not, Mr. Chair? I believe it was a unanimous report of the committee. We had looked at the Friday sittings, and the conclusion was this:
Given the lack of consensus the Committee has heard regarding whether the potential benefits of eliminating Friday sittings outweigh the potential drawbacks, the Committee does not intend to propose a recommendation regarding this matter.
Now I'm going to point something out here, because one could try to read into this some intention of “at this time,” or “Maybe we'll revisit this.”
I'll point out that a couple of pages later—and this is in referring to the idea of implementing proxy voting or electronic voting—it says:
The Committee has no recommendations to make at this time regarding the implementation of proxy voting or electronic voting; it may revisit this topic in further study.
There's a clear distinction between that and this other one about the Friday sittings. In the one about the electronic voting or the proxy voting, in two different ways, it indicates that though they're not going to do anything with this now, they may come back to look at it later. It says that it has no recommendations to make at this time, and that it may revisit this topic in further study.
However, when we were looking at the changes about Friday sittings, there was nothing that indicated any of that. In fact, it clearly says there was no consensus and that the Committee did not intend to propose a recommendation regarding this matter, period, full stop, end of story.
The committee has expressed its will unanimously. That means including opposition MPs from two different parties. It means government MPs, who had the majority and who, had they wanted to try to ram a change through at that time, could have done it. But they unanimously agreed with the opposition members at that time that this was not something we should proceed with.
Let's see. It looks like that was on February 2 of last year. Fast-forward about a year, and we get this letter or whatever you want to call it, a directive, whatever it is, from the new government House leader.
I'll go through it in detail in a few minutes, Mr. Chair. It does refer again to the electronic voting, but it also brings in the idea of getting rid of the Friday sittings, giving Liberal MPs that Friday off that they're so seeking, for whatever reason that might be.
Explain to me how that is any kind of effort to work with the committee, which was so promised to us by the new democratic institutions minister. Maybe this is why they keep having to replace these people. They keep making promises that....
Mind you, I guess that's not true, because then we'd have to replace the too, if we were going to get rid of the people who didn't keep their promises. So that can't be it, I guess.
An hon. member: Hear, hear!
Mr. Blake Richards: At the end of the day, they break their promises in embarrassing kinds of ways. Well, no, hold on. Actually, even breaking their promises in embarrassing kinds of ways isn't enough, because then we'd still have to get rid of the . I don't know. I guess I just don't understand it. At any rate, they have to keep getting rid of these people and replacing them with new people.
It's just that I don't get, Mr. Chair, how in 2016 we can say as a committee, very clearly, that we don't believe there's a consensus, that we should not be eliminating the Friday sittings, and that we're not going to make any recommendation about that. Now we get this direction out of this discussion paper, or whatever you want to call it, from the House leader of the government saying that we should get rid of them.
Then we get this motion from Mr. Simms: let's ram this stuff through, let's do it quickly, let's not give the opposition any chance to have any say on it.
I mean, they're going to claim, of course, that they are. You've already heard some of the arguments. They're claiming, oh, you know, there was this take-note debate one day in October last year; that was it; everyone got a chance to have their say.
It was one day. It was done when the critics for the official opposition and the other opposition parties were not able to be here, because they were with the electoral reform committee. I'm sure it was just a coincidence—not—that this was the date chosen. At the end of the day, is that enough to say that MPs got input?
They also said, oh, by the way, we'll give you some committee meetings, and let's get this done by June 2.
How many weeks is Parliament sitting between now and June 2? We're March 21 today. We'll take this week out of it, I guess, because I think we'll be in this discussion for some time. Even if we weren't, we wouldn't have been able to get really started, I don't think. We were seven days for witnesses.
Next week, Parliament is not sitting. There are two weeks in April and probably three weeks in May. We're talking about five weeks of parliamentary time. During that time we have a lot of work before this committee—a lot of work. We have Elections Canada and the report from the Chief Electoral Officer, which we've gone a long way through, and which, I will point out, not that long ago Liberal MPs on this committee were arguing vociferously was a huge priority and we needed to deal with it really quickly. I think even the minister had indicated to us that she wanted this done by the 19th of May or something like that.
Is that about right, Mr. Chair?
I appreciate Mr. Simms' intervention. It's good to hear from someone on the other side. I don't doubt his sincerity in what he was saying. I wish I could feel the same way about the motion that we have in front of us. I wish I could feel the same way about the actions we've seen from the government. When I say “the government”, I am not talking about the members of this committee; I am talking about the powers that be: the PMO, the House leader, and the others.
At the end of the day, I don't doubt anything Mr. Simms just said. I believe he really means that about Friday, that we could look at other options or full days. I think he is sincere about the idea of trying to have discussions about some of these items to see what's possible and what's not. I believe he means that.
I've worked with most of the members of this committee for an entire Parliament. Some of them are a little newer to the committee, but I think that's typical of the members of this committee on the government side. The problem is that none of this means that much when you have a motion in front of you that is pushing an artificial timeline like this. There is an attempt being made to amend the motion to make sure the opposition actually has input. It's great to say that we'll have discussion, and I believe in all sincerity that Mr. Simms means that, but we saw what happened earlier today. Mr. Chan was trying to work collaboratively with the opposition parties until the whip's office came over and whispered in his ear, and things changed. This is not to condemn Mr. Chan or anyone else. It's just what happened. It can happen again, and it seems that it will.
When you have this motion here, it seems that the government is refusing.... If I am wrong about this, I'd love to hear it from Mr. Simms or anyone else on the government side. When there is this deadline being imposed, and when there is what seems to be opposition to allowing the opposition to have a say, you can say, “We can let the opposition have all the discussion it wants, but at the end of the day we are going to do what we want”, or you can allow this amendment to pass, and therefore allow the opposition to actually be a part of that conversation and a part of forming what the final discussion, the final decision, and the final recommendations are going to be.
We worked that way with this committee in the past. The result in one of those cases was to say that we are not going to recommend getting rid of the Fridays. To speak to the point about the Fridays, it's sincere on Mr. Simms' part, but it doesn't seem like the result will be there, when that has already been the recommendation of this committee and we are now being given something else in a letter from the House leader. It doesn't seem that the unanimous input of this committee was considered. Although it is written in a way that would make one believe they might be willing to consider other things—there would seem to be an attempt at least—it doesn't really seem that way.
I am not trying to accuse any of these members of not wanting to work on Fridays. They don't want to be here on Fridays, but I'm sure they would do other work in their ridings and things like that. I don't want to be taken as trying to accuse them of that. I think what it actually boils down to is that the PMO has decided they want one fewer question period every week that we are here. That's what it really boils down to. That's what it is. And it's the same thing with the Prime Minister. Let's face it, his attendance record is pretty poor. It's terrible, in fact, in terms of attending question period.
It's funny because we often hear these allegations about Stephen Harper not having wanted to be accountable, and all these things. We even heard some of them today. Say what you want, but Stephen Harper showed up at question period and was accountable. He was very rarely not at question period. If he was in the country, he was here, attending question period.
You cannot say the same about Justin Trudeau. There's no question about that. He's just not here very often. There are people who argue he's probably only there once a week now. I've heard that. I've heard that comment by Canadians. Many Canadians have come up to me and said, “He's only there once a week, anyway. He's just going to put in what he already does.” Now, they're not happy about that, don't get me wrong. I'm not saying it should be codified, but that's being recognized.
I can understand that. His office can only write so many scripts for him, and if he goes off script, man, it goes badly for this government. So I get why the Prime Minister would want to try to avoid question period, but it doesn't make it right, and it doesn't mean that it should be possible. It doesn't mean that they should provide cover for him to do it, and that's what they're trying to do. And “they” is not referring to the members of this committee. I don't think that's their intention at all, but it's probably the orders they'll end up getting.
At the end of the day, I appreciate what Scott had to say. I believe he's sincere, but if this amendment isn't carried, it means nothing. It means nothing at all. It's words, and that's all it is if the amendment is not carried. It really reinforces for me why that amendment is so critically important. These are changes that change Parliament and the way it works for all Canadians. If the government thinks it can just change those things to suit the Prime Minister and his willingness, his effort, or his desire to try not to be held accountable, to really be able to dictate the way things are—that's what he's trying to do—then there really is no input from the opposition and from Canadians. It's just the Liberal Party, or probably just the PMO dictating how things are. “Dictating” is a word that describes this Prime Minister quite well.
, Mr. Chair, I'd like to take a bit of time to compare some of what is in this “discussion paper”. I use that in quote marks because I'm not so sure it's really about discussion at all, but a dictatorial letter, whatever you want to call it, from the House leader. The summary was put together by our analyst here, who does a great job, by the way, as do our stand-in analysts as well. I recognize all the hard work that he did on our electoral reform efforts, which ultimately didn't go anywhere, thanks, again, to our friend Justin Trudeau.
The analyst put together a great summary, in a chart here, of the discussion that took place during the take-note debate on the Standing Orders on October 6 of last year. He's categorized it and put it together quite nicely. I want to compare that to this “discussion paper”, again in quotes, from the government House leader.
I went through it, and from what I can see—and I may be skipping over something—there are about 14 key recommendations, I guess I'm going to call them, that have been made here. We'll compare that to what's in this document from this take-note debate. We'll see how seriously the government really took the debate and the considerations of the members of Parliament. From that we can probably conclude how seriously they are considering it and what's being brought forward by the opposition during the debates that will happen in this committee.
This is very germane to the amendment, because the government's position is, “Just take our word for it. We'll consider the opposition and what they have to say. Take our word for it. We've already had this one day of take-note debate, so we listen to people.”
Let's just see how much of that made its way into this discussion, which is supposed to be a starting point, apparently. Then we can see how seriously we can take the government at their word they they are taking the opposition's views into consideration at committee and therefore see whether there is a need to put in writing that this needs to happen.
This is something the government seems to be refusing to do, which would make one suspicious, to say the least. If they really were intending to make sure there was cooperation and some kind of agreement with the opposition on what should be put forward and what should not be, why would they be hesitant to formalize it? It seems a little odd to me that they would be hesitant to formalize it, in that scenario.
We already are starting from a place of suspicion, of course, and understandably so, but anyway....
There is, of course, the talk—actually, interestingly enough, the very first thing that's listed in the document and that I see is one of the recommendations being made—about the idea of looking at the Friday sittings.
To be fair, this document makes an argument that if those sittings aren't going to be eliminated, maybe we could reapportion them in some other way, or have a fuller day, and these kinds of things. Those are reasonable conversations to have.
I think, though, that to try to get rid of a question period every week...? No, that's not reasonable, obviously. What that is actually about is very transparent, which is to try to make sure that the has one less day and the government one less day on which to have to be accountable to Canadians. There is no other argument you could make for this.
That's the first thing we see in the discussion paper. The second thing is the talk about electronic voting. I see some talk about it in the document.
That could be considered. Again I want to draw the distinction I made in relation to that committee report earlier, in which it was clear that this committee felt we shouldn't move forward with getting rid of the Friday sittings. It also said it wouldn't make a recommendation at this time but might revisit the idea of electronic and proxy voting.
There's a distinction there. This is an attempt by the government to bring back for discussion something that this committee, first of all, said they weren't going to make a recommendation on but might reconsider. I can understand why it might be reasonable for it to be brought back for discussion, but for the committee to say that this is not a good idea and we're not going to recommend going forward with it, and for the government to then bring it forward is a different story.
The discussion paper goes on to talk about the House calendar; it talks about changing the months and stuff that we sit in. I'm not going to get into giving a position on these items per se but will just summarize the effect they might have, for example, without really offering a firm position on them per se.
I don't want anyone to take anything I say as a position on the thing, formed on behalf of the opposition or anything like that. It's more a general comment on them and what the effect would be, or how they compare to what's in the...because obviously there's a lot of debate for us to have yet. I'm hoping the debate will actually mean something. That's what the discussion we're having today is all about today.
There is, then, some talk about changing some of the sitting months and things such as that. There is the idea of a greater degree of flexibility built into how many sittings the House has in a given year. Then it gets into the question of motions. What they're trying to do here is to eliminate the capacity to move certain motions. They're saying that's because there's a possibility that the opposition would deprive the House of the ability to deliberate on the intended item for debate during government orders. I think that's the accusation they're trying to make.
I don't see anything in here that would make any kind of corresponding change to the ability of the government to move closure or time allocation, except where they try to do something in here that would allow for proactive closure and things like that. This is what it essentially is. I'll get to that in a minute.
Again, they are taking some powers away from what are typically used by the opposition parties, but there's no corresponding change to similar types of powers of the government. I'm sure it's just a coincidence that it happens to be the opposition ones that are being contemplated, but the government ones they want to keep. In fact, they want to add to them. That's what they're saying.
There's some talk in here about adding to private members' business each week, allowing more consideration for members to change their places, and those types of changes to private members' business. I won't comment on that at this point.
Then it talks about prorogation and some options that could be looked at there in how that might be dealt with in terms of the government giving its rationale for why it would do that.
Then we get into proactive use. Rather than having to impose closure they're going to use programming; they'll do it right up front. Why have to get messy about it? That's the impression I have of that one.
It talks about reforms to question period, about the Prime Minister's question time. Everyone has interpreted that. The only person I've heard interpret it any other way was Mr. Simms just now.
That microphone wasn't on, was it?
Everyone whom I've heard thus far, other than Mr. Simms, has interpreted this to be the trying to be here once a week to be accountable to Canadians. I won't go over that. I've been over that enough times. I think I've made my thoughts on that pretty clear as well. I think I've made it pretty clear how I think Canadians are going to feel about that, if that's what the government is trying to do.
Then they're talking about increasing the amount of time that they would have to respond to detailed Order Paper questions, and I think limiting the number of words in that, if I'm not mistaken. The bottom line is that it's limiting the ability for opposition to get timely information to be able to hold them accountable. Again, that is removing accountability.
The next one I have here is on the omnibus bills and giving the speaker the power to divide those. That was mentioned as well earlier. Mr. Simms mentioned that there might be some legitimate concerns that were raised about it. We'll see if his government listens to him and others.
Then it talks about committees. There are three recommendations here. One is talking about trying to weasel a little out of the promise that was made about parliamentary secretaries on committees. One could argue whether that was an advisable promise or not. They're trying to sort of walk on both sides on that one with that promise here. They're sort of saying to let them come and participate and be a part of committees, but maybe not in a voting role. I think this is what this is trying to get at. It's sort of trying to let them back in the door a little bit. They're careful to make a point that they're trying to keep their promise there—not completely, but keep their promise a little bit.
Then there's this talk about putting a maximum time for speeches in committee—10 minutes. I've probably exceeded that by a few minutes already. I think a number of other members did today too. I'll quote Mr. Christopherson. He's fond of saying he can't even clear his throat in 10 minutes. He's probably right, actually. Again, all humour aside on that one, that's really an attempt to take away a tool the opposition has to draw the attention of Canadians to issues, to try to flesh out alternative proposals and suggestions and things like that, as I pointed out at length earlier. Ten minutes is not actually a lot of time to substantively.... For example, I don't know how much time I just spent going through a very basic bit of thought on each of these proposals. If I were to be in this situation, I couldn't have even gotten through that in 10 minutes or given them any kind of due diligence in terms of making a critique. There's no doubt about it; I couldn't have. It's an ability to eliminate the possibility for opposition to really be able to be critical and to offer alternative positions. That doesn't really seem in the spirit of democracy, to say the least.
What I wanted to do now was to go through the summary that was provided by the analyst of this take-note debate on October 6 and look at it. How much of it was really taken up in this? We'll see how seriously the debates and the conversations that were held there were actually taken, and that will give us some glimpse as to what we can expect from this without any kind of assurance in a motion, which we don't have now and which we're seeking, but which sort of seems like we're going to be denied.
It looks like there are 111 items, hopefully if my math is good, but over 100. There are 111 items that have been picked out by our analyst here.
I have the entire answer here, but I will not get into that. Maybe later, but not right now. Hopefully, we don't have to do that, but I am prepared to, if needed.
The point is that some of these things were brought up once by one member. Others were brought up numerous times. For some, it looks like there was disagreement. Some members thought things should go one way, some thought another. Some were for, some were against. The bottom line is that it's a summary of 111 items that were discussed, like suggestions, proposals, recommendations, that were made by MPs during these take-note debates.
As I go through them, I am not going to speak to each of them, at this point at least, but I will point out some of the ones that at least in some way appear in the letter. In fact, sometimes they are contradicted in the letter and other times they're partially taken up, so that we can get a sense as to how much of this actually was taken up.
It's broken up into various tables. In the first table, there are two suggestions, neither of which was taken up in this discussion paper. In the second table, there are 11 suggestions. Again, none were taken up in this paper. We are at 13, well over 10% now, and none have been taken up in this discussion paper, so they weren't considered. We won't get into good, bad, or indifferent, but 13 of 111 are not in there at all.
In table 3, there were a few of these items out of the eight in this next section. A few of these items were covered in the discussion paper, but all of them were contrary suggestions to those proposed by MPs. As an example, there was talk about longer debate periods or a longer time for speaking. All of these were things were suggested to go one way and the government went the other way, so we're still not doing too well here. We are at 21 out of 111 and there has not yet been one thing that's been taken up in the paper in a positive fashion and some have even been contradicted.
In table 4, there were five suggestions. None of them. In table 5, there is only one suggestion there, but it wasn't taken up either. In table 6, there were three suggestions. None of them were taken up.
In table 7, hold on here, we've got nine suggestions. Two of them were at least—I would actually say, now that I look at this again, that one of them was tangentially brought up in this report. It's the idea of increasing the number of hours for private members' business. I think where that comes up is the alternative idea of a Friday being longer. They were going to allow two hours of PMB rather than one, just to make the day longer—but not really make the day longer, if you get what I'm saying, Mr. Chair. I don't know, maybe we could give them one-quarter on that one. It's not really a full suggestion, but there may be a little piece there taken up on that one.
I've been through about 37 of these suggestions, so about a third of them. So far, about one-quarter out of 37% has been taken up in this discussion paper.
As for records—I don't know—it's not much better. It certainly would be nowhere near a passing grade, that's for sure. In fact, you probably could show up for five minutes in one class all semester and get that grade. That would be good for the Prime Minister, because he doesn't really like to show up that often, so maybe it would work okay.
On table 8, there are a couple of these that were taken up. I did make a note, though, that I wanted to check to see who had made the suggestion. Was it the Prime Minister's parliamentary secretary or somebody like that? It might make me wonder a little if it had been, but who knows?
I want to check that in a future intervention, because I think there's going to be more opportunity here in this debate, Mr. Chair, and I can come back to that when I've had the chance to take a look through the Hansard of that day, which I have here. That was the idea of a Prime Minister's questions day that was brought up.
They have one now. It's in here. It's one that a lot of Canadians aren't very happy about, but it's there, so they have one.
There was another one that came up, but, again, they went in the opposite direction of what was being suggested. We're kind of at about one and a quarter now out of about 51, so we're almost half-way. We have one and a quarter that have been taken up here by the government's discussion paper, the so-called listening to all members of Parliament and coming up with a discussion paper to get the discussion started based on proper and true engagement with MPs. Yes, it seems like it. I hope you detect the sarcasm in my voice there.
Table 9...oh, hold on. Here's another one: electronic voting. There were some MPs who wanted electronic voting and some who didn't, so I guess it's okay to have that discussion again.
I'm going to be really charitable and say we'll give him three-quarters on that one. We're at two out of 60 now, I think.
Next is table 10. There are seven recommendations here. One of these is kind of touched on. It talks about giving the Speaker the power to judge the quality and substance of answers to Order Paper questions. We can't give the government any points on this one, because not only is it just somewhat related to what's in the discussion paper, but it's also really contrary to the spirit. What's in here says that the Speaker should be able to judge the quality and substance of the answers to Order Paper questions. Surely, the answer must relate to the question.
I can understand why people might feel that would be a good thing. I'm not sure if that's the right way to do it or not, but I can understand why people would feel like they're not really getting a proper answer now and think someone should be able to force a proper answer. I can understand the desire for that. I've felt that desire on occasion myself, and I'm sure you've been there too, Mr. Chair. I'm sure others members in the room have been there too. But, of course, the problem is that the government's discussion paper refers to the question and it wants to increase the number of days in which the government gets to respond. I don't really think that's going to do anything to deal with the quality of the answer. It's just going to mean you're going to get the same terrible answer, or get no answer but take longer to get it, or rather, not get it. We can't really give them a point on that one.
What are we at now? I think it's at about 67 or so. I'm losing track, but anyway, we're still at two that have been taken up, and probably getting about two-thirds of the way through this thing. We're not doing so well so far.
We get a little more here, when we get to table 11. It's a little better here. This seems to be one of their big focuses. My guess is that these suggestions were probably being made by government MPs, at least the ones that were positive about it, but they were mixed.
The first one is the idea of Friday sittings. There were people who wanted to eliminate those sittings; there were people who wanted to keep them; and stuff in-between. I don't know; we'll probably give the government half a point there. At least it was discussed, and there were positives and negatives.
There was also a tangential mention of the parliamentary calendar in the government's discussion paper. That was also brought up in the October 6 take-note debate. But supposedly it was somewhat different from what was made in the government's discussion paper, so we can probably give them a half a point on this one again. So we're at three now.
Here's one that I think the government almost accidentally stumbled upon. There's a suggestion to increase the amount of time set aside for private members' business on Fridays. It's in there as a sub-alternative proposal. It's almost like a sub to the sub-alternative proposal, where they say that we could maybe add an extra hour at PMB if we did this, if that didn't happen, if this happened. They gain probably a half a point there.
Then the next one is to study the rules on the use of prorogation. I think we could probably give them a full point there because they're talking about looking at that. Well, it's more about justifying it, not the usage of it, but I'm going to be really charitable and give a full point anyway. So we're at four and a half.
Then there's some talk about a proposal to change the sitting weeks, but it's really vastly different, and it's obviously a unique, one-off proposal. It's not at all what's in the report, so I don't know if we can really do much there in giving the government any credit.
The next section is table 12; there's nothing taken up there. On table 13, there are 10 proposals there; none of them are taken up.
It gets really bad from here, Mr. Chair. On table 14, there are three proposals, with none of them taken up. On table 15, there are just a couple of proposals there, with none taken up. On table 16, there are 20 proposals here. This is almost 20% of the proposals made. Guess how many were taken up here? A big fat zero.
So, of the 111 proposals, I think probably being charitable, four and a half were taken up. That's less than 5% of them. Now, if we even have that much success in this committee—with less than 5% of the opposition's suggestions taken up here—we would consider that an utter failure and disgrace of democracy.
I don't know if there's anyone having trouble sleeping right now. It's 12:30 a.m. If they're having trouble sleeping and they're listening to this, I'm sure I've probably bored them to sleep, so it's fine. But if they did somehow manage to get through it, and they're listening, they would have, I think, no doubt left that there is a need for the opposition to have some kind of assurance that it's not just saying, “Take our word for it. Trust us, we're the government.” Who's heard that before? “Trust us, we're the government.” That never ends very well for anyone when they decide to trust. This government's made it pretty clear why.
Take a look at this motion. The amendment is really quite reasonable. It says that this government should and could do what's always been the practice and precedent to deal with these kinds of changes. This government should and could ensure that Canadians continue to have the ability to hold the government accountable through their opposition parties by ensuring that the opposition parties have actual input. But instead they're saying, “Just trust us. It's all going to be fine. We had this debate and we listened to MPs. We included less than 5% of what was suggested. We included that in this discussion paper. It's supposed to be this starting point of the discussion.”
Keep in mind, if that's the starting point, and we have only 2% or 3% of the stuff that was suggested before, this could change. Maybe some of it gets dropped. Maybe we get none of it. But let's say we get all 2% or 3% of it. The opposition has concerns about a lot of it. There is a lot of this that really concerns me and I think many of my colleagues. We just want to have an opportunity to see that we get real input into this. That's all this amendment is about: give us real input. Let us make sure that millions of Canadians who support us have a say, that they get to be heard too, and that the government does not just change the rules to suit themselves.
I can point back to the electoral reform initiative. I was intimately a part of it on the special committee, and it became clear to just about everybody pretty quickly that this was a government that made a promise.
I'll give it credit. Except for the one slip of the tongue by the that they then had to write into their platform, they were pretty careful on how they worded it. They wanted to fool people who were in favour of proportional representation into believing that this was what they were suggesting. I know there were even Liberal candidates who argued for it; I heard it myself. I knew all along that they were making a promise they never intended to keep—it's a typical thing that Liberals do—but people believed them. There were people who, despite the Liberals' past record, believed them. Boy, they figured out in a real hurry that this was a mistake.
They were careful, anyway, about how they worded it. What they were really trying to do was make this promise and deliver something else. They were making a promise that they would change the electoral system. People believed it was going to be to proportional representation.
The has made it quite clear since that time that it was a ranked ballot he was really after. When he realized no one was going to go for that and there was no way he could do it without a referendum, as was clearly being demanded by the vast majority of Canadians; when he realized that people wanted proportional representation.... He had thought they might be happy if they at least got some kind of change. He realized they were not going to be be happy, that in fact they would probably be angrier than they were with nothing. He saw he was not going to get away with that one, so he decided to just back away from it. That's what Justin Trudeau decided, obviously.
When we look at this paper, we can see the parallels. “Hey, don't worry. We have a couple of suggestions in here out of all the suggestions made by MPs, so we listened, right? We listened.” It's probably just an accident, actually, more than anything, with that few of them, but, “Don't worry; we don't need to give you any kind of assurance that your concerns are going to be taken into account, that anything you have to say is going to make its way in here. Just trust us. We never lie.”
Well, I guess I'm not supposed to say that they lie, but they do, so I'm not going to trust them. I have a lot of respect for members on the other side of the table. We've worked well as a committee, for the most part, and I'm sure they are sincere, but I don't believe for one second that the PMO and those who are directing them are sincere. I know there is no such intention here, and if there were, they would be willing to codify it to give real input to the opposition and therefore to Canadians who have concerns.
I hope that over the next several days or however long this goes on prior to there being a vote on this question about the amendment, they reconsider this; that they realize they are wrong, realize that they need to allow the opposition to have input, that they need to allow for their government to be held accountable to Canadians. If they do that, then we can try to move forward and see what can be done here to improve the Standing Orders.
At the end of the day, when I look at some of the suggestions being made in the take-note debate, there were actually some suggestions that almost seemed like no-brainers.
Where is the one I am thinking of that really jumped out at me? I guess it doesn't really matter that much, but there were some really obvious suggestions in here, just wording changes. There was one—I can't remember what it was.... I think it was where there was clearly just a typo in the Standing Orders that has been there for years. It was like saying, let's change that; it makes sense, doesn't it?
There are a few things like that—obvious no-brainers—and then there are lots of other things in these suggestions made from the take-note debate. Let's have a discussion about those and see whether we can come up with something that parties can agree to and then move forward with it. Even in the letter from the House leader there are probably some things like that about which we could have discussion to see whether all parties can agree.
There are some things here that are non-starters, I think, for opposition members, without question: the idea of the only having to be there once a week, of taking Fridays off, of removing some of the tools, of eliminating the amount of time that a member can speak in committee, for example. Some of these things are non-starters for the opposition, but there are some things there that could be discussed.
Until we have some kind of assurance, however, that there's actually going to be consideration of what the opposition has to say, that it actually will be taken seriously—and that means there has to be something in writing that says that.... This amendment would clearly do that, and I cannot, for the life of me, understand why they would oppose it, unless they don't intend to allow any input by the opposition.... Until that happens, we can't even begin a discussion about those things, because we're not going to get there. We'll have this debate for as long as it takes to preserve those rights for the opposition and Canadians.
Once we get to that, if we can get something from the government that would allow this amendment—if they think better and realize that this is wrong—we can have a discussion about the motion and can try to move forward. Until then it's just a really sad, pathetic commentary on this government and Justin Trudeau's desire to be a dictator. It's as simple as that, and that's pretty sad.
How did we get from the role he played in the election, the thing he pretended to be, to where we are now in this period of time? I have a feeling that if Canadians could go back and take a look, knowing what they know now and knowing the actions they've seen, they wouldn't believe what they were hearing. I certainly can't believe what I'm being told without some kind of assurance from the government, because I see no reason to believe that they can be trusted.
With that, I'll close for now. There's a good chance I'll have more to say, but I'll turn the floor over at this time, Mr. Chair.
For those who are following the audio at home, that is the amendment I think we are discussing now.
Just to speak to the value of that amendment again, for those who may not have been following the translation, the unanimous requirement is what we're talking about here. That is to say, in recognizing the important role and different perspective that every party brings to the table, it's important that we have some degree of unanimity and consensus among the political parties before we move forward with changes to the Standing Orders.
The context is that this is an amendment to a motion put forward by Mr. Scott Simms of the Liberal Party. It is a motion, as others have mentioned, for which I think we suspect there's pretty clear direction from the leadership.
The government House leader put out a discussion paper, a paper basically naming the kinds of changes they want to see. I'll talk a bit about that discussion paper.
I eagerly read through it as soon as it came out because I do spend quite a bit of time in the House of Commons. I found some interesting points of discussion, but certainly plenty of things to disagree with.
Frankly, there are many things in this discussion paper that were clearly designed to advantage the government. Somebody was sitting down and thinking, “Hey, how do we strengthen the relative position of the government in the House of Commons and weaken the capacity of the opposition to respond and use the tools they are supposed to have?” This is what I saw in the discussion paper we had in front of us.
Then, immediately, we had a motion from the Liberals calling for an immediate study of this discussion paper, with a very tight timeline. Of course, our concern is that there are no safeguards at all in the proposal in this motion, to ensure that there is a substantial degree of consensus among all the parties on how we move forward on this.
In the absence of the amendment we proposed, there is a real concern that what the government would like to do is to push forward changes already laid out in this discussion paper, which would severely weaken the important role of the opposition that I've talked about.
It was said at the time of the debate on motion number six—which reflected a very similar approach by the government and the previous government House leader—that the government seemed to view all of the opposition parties, not just the official opposition, as a sideshow to the main event, which is the government governing.
The opposition is not a sideshow. The opposition has a central function in the process of governing. Naturally, as we have fairly regular changes of government in this country, who the opposition is changes. Those who are in government now will likely one day be in opposition and vice-versa. Really, it is in all of our interest to protect the role of the opposition and to ensure we have a strong opposition that has the tools and capacity to respond.
It has been interesting hearing the interventions by government members on this. They've been fairly limited. We have had comments by Mr. Graham and Mr. Simms that I think have expressed the view of the government in relatively similar ways. They have talked about some aspects of the substance of the discussion paper. They have said, “Let's get on with the study. We want to have a discussion about the Standing Orders. We want to have a discussion about how that works. Let's just get on with doing the study.”
It's similar to the talking point we heard from the government on the issue of electoral reform, when they said, “Come on, guys, stop talking about a referendum, stop talking about process. Let's just get on talking about the substance of the discussion.”
Our perspective, and I think it's the right perspective, is that you need to have some—
Mr. Graham is surprised that I think it's the right perspective.
The discussion of process needs to precede the discussion of substance. There have to be some ground rules on how a decision is going to be made before we step into the process of making the decision. I think this is quite sensible, because if we immediately start down the road of having a discussion of the substance before we've set ground rules, then we've already ventured into a space in which the government may well try to make decisions without involving the opposition in those decisions. We need to establish how decisions will be made before we go on to that next step.
What was striking about the electoral reform discussion was that once it became clear to the government that they had lost the process debate, they stopped having any interest in the substance. They were only interested in moving on to a discussion of the substance of electoral reform once they were sure they could fully control the process of decision-making.
I think members across the way have a point when they say there's important substance to be had here. Their option would be to say, “Yes, we're going to endorse the opposition amendment and accept the principle of changes being made to the Standing Orders with the agreement and acceptance of all parties.” Once that happened, then yes, absolutely we could proceed to the next steps. It would probably make sense to get a bit of a sense of their rationale on timeline and some of these other issues. This is something that could be done and developed through consensus.
I'm a relatively new member, but I worked here as a political staffer before. Generally, the committees I've been a part of have worked on a consensus model anyway. That's how the committees of this House, I think, function best: when there is a collaborative spirit that informs the type of agenda that is set and the way in which we proceed.
It falls to those members, Mr. Graham and Mr. Simms, who made these points earlier on, who are interested in getting on to the study and who have perspectives on issues such as Friday sittings, to agree to a decision-making process that is fair and that respects the role of the opposition; then at that point we can move on to the next steps.
But we shouldn't put the cart ahead of the horse here. In other words, we shouldn't jump on to the study without agreeing on the ground rules, because if we were to do that, we would be ceding, I think, too much ground to the government. We have to first establish a principle, which is the role of the opposition and the important function that they have.
I'd like to go on to the next point. There is a fundamental principle at stake here in the amendment itself that really goes back through the history of our parliamentary system.
There are two ways to think about the origins of constitutions, of rules of order, of governing documents for any institution. You can think of some as coming up in a revolutionary way and some as coming forward in an evolutionary way. I'm going to argue that our system is broadly speaking evolutionary as distinct from revolutionary and that this is good and we need to preserve this character, and that in the absence of this amendment, the motion and the approach of this government deviates from our parliamentary traditions by being overly revolutionary.
When I speak about a revolutionary approach to the construction of rules of order, of standing orders, of constitutions, of legal frameworks, that revolutionary approach would be one in which you start with a group of people who think they're smart and may actually be smart or may not be taking control and themselves seeking to design from the ground up what an ideal system would look like, perhaps with limited respect for history or tradition; rather trying to say, “What has gone before isn't that important; we are starting today in year one. We are going to do something radically different and we in our wisdom are going to design a system that works best.” Whether you're talking about law, society, social institutions, constitutions, or rules of order, this is a revolutionary approach, an approach that rejects the past and starts from now as a way forward.
This is very much the tone of the discussion paper that has been put forward. It's also the tone of all of the talking points we hear from the government in the House. It is a revolutionary approach to political theory that says, we are going to redesign a system that accords with our perception of the needs of the present, and we're going to do it through the power that we have grabbed hold of.
You see this in the repeated use of the language of “modernization” without clarity as to what constitutes “modernization”. This is inherently revolutionary and I would argue quite dangerous. Modernization, of course, can imply and mean certain very legitimate and good things. Modernization can mean updating the way we operate to respond to new challenges, new realities, new opportunities, but there is no explanation of how, for example, moving to having a prime minister working one day a week, reducing the number of sittings—any of these things—has any relationship to unique circumstances of the present time that have not existed in the past.
We're talking about the government wishing to make changes, but we're not actually referring to any recognizable concept of modernization. We're not talking about changes that really reflect an updating towards the modern world. What we're actually seeing is the terminology of “modernization” being used as a justification, as a kind of gloss for the fact that the government wants to change things.
The government wants to change things, so they're going to call their approach a more “modern” approach. Again, it's not obvious that having the Prime Minister there one day a week is any more or less modern. It's different, and we can have the argument about that, but the tone—and I think the intended tone, actually—is a revolutionary one.
That, then, is the revolutionary approach. When it comes to the constitutions of different states, we see a revolutionary basis probably more evident in the American constitution and certain constitutions that have been developed, although our tradition—the Canadian tradition and the tradition it draws from, the British tradition—is more an evolutionary one. In other words, it's one that has emphasized the importance of a regard for the past, of a reverence and a regard for our history.
The Standing Orders we have aren't standing orders about which someone a couple of years ago sat down and said, “I'm going to write standing orders”. Our constitution has elements that were written at certain times, but our constitution isn't composed entirely of something that someone sat down and wrote at some point in time. Our constitutional framework is an evolved one; our Standing Orders are evolved; our institutions are evolved. We can see elements of our tradition that harken back to different periods in our history. I think we can go through that history and can see this process of evolution as it has unfolded.
Now, at first blush it appears strange that we would prefer a system that doesn't actually seem to be the result of intelligent design. Revolutionary systems reflect the mind of someone who at least considers themselves an intelligent designer, whereas evolutionary systems really are the result of the accumulation of historic wisdom but don't reflect the immediate design of a particular person or even of specific groups of people.
I think the endurance of our constitutional framework and the British constitutional framework upon which it stands shows the benefits of an evolutionary approach. We have also seen in the history of the evolution of the British democratic system, however, this revolutionary tendency. There have always been those who have been skeptical of history and tradition and have instead wanted to insert their own brilliant ideas, in the form of modernization or whatever it is, and to use the power they have to do so. I think we see that tendency in a particular way with this current government and with this current Prime Minister.
They do not have the appropriate reverence for history and for the way in which history has evolved our institutions to a point that reflects the collective wisdom of our political and our literal forebears. We need to acknowledge that wisdom and not simply throw it out on the basis of claims to modernization.
Someone told me once that if there's a pillar in your house and you don't know what it's holding up, your first instinct shouldn't be to knock it down; you should first find out whether it's holding anything up. In other words, you shouldn't assume it's there for no reason; you should find out what it does, and if you conclude that it's not needed anymore, then by all means proceed.
The evolutionary conservative political tendency that I've described is not one that is opposed to all change. Indeed, we are open to a discussion of changes to the Standing Orders; however, we wish to make changes in a way that reflects and respects our traditions, that in other words is evolutionary and not revolutionary.
The ultimate guarantee of that is in the amendment. Ours is a tradition that involves the ongoing input of members of Parliament from all parties. Not only are we talking about respect for tradition in terms of the Standing Orders as they represent our traditions; we're talking about respect for our traditions in terms of the processes by which changes have traditionally been made to our Standing Orders.
As colleagues of mine have mentioned, this has been the practice of previous prime ministers: to recognize with reverence the traditions in our system that are represented by the Standing Orders that I have in front of me and to understand the responsibility that they have as the inheritors of that tradition—not even fully as the inheritors of that tradition, but as the managers of that tradition for the benefit not of themselves but of future generations. The requirement of unanimity ensures that.
Let me then comment a little bit on the way in which our tradition has been impacted by the revolutionary tendency, because ours is not, to be fair, a tradition of unbroken evolutionary development of parliamentary institutions. It's one throughout which there have been challenges to that evolutionary idea, again because it's not an obvious idea. It is not intuitive that the best institutions, the best constitutions, or the best laws are not simply developed on the spot but have been evolved over time. It hasn't been an obvious insight, but I think it is one that has been proven true.
Our constitutional tradition really starts with the Magna Carta, when during the Hundred Years' War—a war between England and France, to the extent that those names made sense in that time—the English king was seeking the support of elites within his society. They came back to him with certain demands, certain conditions. This is the beginning of the idea of a constitutional framework that limits the power of the executive. This occurred a little more than 800 years ago. Two years ago we just celebrated the 800-year anniversary of the Magna Carta.
It begins that process in a way unique to our own tradition of recognizing the need to limit the power of the executive. Actually, what's striking is that it does so in a particular way that is even at its inception evolutionary. In other words, even the framers of the Magna Carta were not in their minds creating out of thin air new rights or new obligations or new responsibilities. Perhaps we might say that they were, but they did not think of themselves as doing that; they did not explain what they were doing in a way that was revolutionary. Rather, they spoke about a recognition of pre-existing rights.
Take, from section 1, for example:
In the first place we have granted to God, and by this our present charter confirmed for us and our heirs forever that the English Church shall be free, and shall have her rights entire, and her liberties inviolate; and we will that it be thus observed; which is apparent from this that the freedom of elections, which is reckoned most important and very essential to the English Church, we, of our pure and unconstrained will, did grant, and did by our charter confirm and did obtain the ratification of the same from our lord, Pope Innocent III, before the quarrel arose between us and our barons: and this we will observe, and our will is that it be observed in good faith by our heirs forever. We have also granted to all freemen of our kingdom, for us and our heirs forever, all the underwritten liberties, to be had and held by them and their heirs, of us and our heirs forever.
If any of our earls or barons, or others holding of us in chief by military service shall have died, and at the time of his death his heir shall be full of age and owe "relief", he shall have his inheritance by the old relief, to wit, the heir or heirs of an earl, for the whole barony of an earl by £100; the heir or heirs of a baron, £100 for a whole barony; the heir or heirs of a knight, 100s, at most, and whoever owes less let him give less, according to the ancient custom of fees.
If, however, the heir of any one of the aforesaid has been under age and in wardship, let him have his inheritance without relief and without fine when he comes of age.
The guardian of the land of an heir who is thus under age, shall take from the land of the heir nothing but reasonable produce, reasonable customs, and reasonable services, and that without destruction or waste of men or goods; and if we have committed the wardship of the lands of any such minor to the sheriff, or to any other who is responsible to us for its issues, and he has therein made destruction or waster of what he holds in wardship—
:
Yes, absolutely. This section speaks very specifically to the importance of legal judgment by peers, by a multitude of people who are involved in decision-making. That's precisely what we are arguing for in the context of the amendment—the inclusion of a broad range of voices in the discussion—and that is not something the government believes in. It wants to create a system in which we don't have the ability for a broad range of voices to pronounce on questions and directions. What it wants is a deviation from the tradition that I've been discussing and one instead that leaves too much power in the hands of the executive—one that is inherently revolutionary.
I would like to make some more comments on the history. Maybe I'll come back to that, but if members are interested, I may take this opportunity now to share a few thoughts on the discussion paper that has come forward, and why in particular it is important that we have the full range of parties and members commenting on this. I know, of course, that it is important to establish the process point before we go on more fully to a study of the substance, but we do need to establish the importance of the substance as the basis for why we need to have that process discussion.
As I mentioned, the introduction here speaks repeatedly about modernization. It has this sentence that jumps out at me, “As society changes, the demands of our institutions change as well”, but it's not clear at all how there have been societal changes that necessitate the kinds of changes proposed by the and her staff, or by the or whoever is directing this effort. It's not at all obvious that those things have any relationship to changes that are taking place, and this is a concern we have, that in fact what they are trying to do is make changes on the basis, not of any credible account of modernization, but simply at the whim and will of the government to create the kind of system that works to its advantage, which does not sufficiently engage the opposition as a critical and necessary partner in the process of the decisions that need to be taken.
It says:
The impetus of all major reforms has had a common theme: a recalibration of the rules to balance the desire of the minority’s right to be heard with the majority’s duty to pass its legislative agenda.
What the government wants, in the absence of this amendment, is to recalibrate that balance by itself. There is an acknowledgement—at least verbally—in the discussion paper that there is a need for a balance, and I would very much assent to the principle that there needs to be a balance.
What is striking though is that the nature of the effort, the way the government has gone about doing what it's doing, is that it thinks it should be able to entirely define the form, nature, and result of that recalibration effort. It is saying there needs to be a recalibration, but on what basis is not clear. The basis is a generic appeal to modernization with no substantive account of what modernization actually means or entails in the context of the discussion we're having about the Standing Orders, but then the responsibility for defining that recalibration would, in the government's view, be entirely its own. It gets to recalibrate what it acknowledges is a balance.
I would say to members of the government: acknowledge the clear contradiction here. Acknowledge that there is a contradiction between the claim on the one hand that there needs to be some kind of recalibration of a balance, and on the other that the balance should be defined entirely by one actor in the process. This is like asking one team in a hockey game...and I don't mean to liken our politics to a game. It's not a game. We deal with serious issues and it's much more important.
In a sporting sense, though, people would intuitively appreciate that one team shouldn't be picking the referee. One team shouldn't be able to make rules that play to their inherent strengths in the context of the competition. It's just sensible, that in any sense of any rules the calibration of balance between different sides needs to be done, perhaps through some external independent process but more likely, and particularly in this case, through the direct consent of those who are involved in the process of decision-making.
That's what our amendment seems to do, recalibrate the recalibration. It's to say that if there is going to be a process of recalibration between the government in general—this uses language of majority and minority, but more properly, since we're hoping to talk about what these rules would look like over a longer period of time, we can speak about government and opposition—we need to recalibrate the mechanism of that recalibration to ensure that we are not excluding one half of this equation.
If it were just the Conservative Party that had these concerns, you might say that the Conservative Party has its own interests, but everybody else agrees. This is, however, a very clear government-versus-opposition situation, because we have a unity of perspective on this amendment and on the broader questions around the process we have in front of us. We have a unity of perspective between the Conservatives and the NDP. I haven't heard directly from Ms. May, but my understanding is that the third party shares our concerns as well about the government abusing its position to define the way in which these decisions will be made.
I think that should clearly show the Canadian public.... Conservatives and New Democrats don't always agree. I think we'll probably have very different takes on...I was going to say tomorrow's budget, but in fact it's today's budget.
When the government put forward motion number six, which was about the government unilaterally changing the rules of the game, trying to relegate the opposition to a sideshow and making the government the main event instead of letting our system be what it's supposed to be, which is a meaningful exchange between different sides, we had the unification of voices from the opposition coming together and saying that this is not how our system is supposed to work. We have that happening again, because this is a revolutionary change in the way we approach these things. That's the issue of the recalibration.
It's interesting that in the introduction, the discussion paper speaks about the need for politicians to find common ground to ensure robust and effective ways of deliberating on the issues of the day. What is striking repeatedly about this government is the way in which their rhetoric actually gets it right. Yes, we need to find common ground.
As my friend points out, this is the title of a book in whose production the may have had some involvement, yet there are no efforts to find common ground from the government members at all tonight. They want us to gloss over the fact that in the way in which they have set up this study, in the absence of the amendment wisely proposed by my colleague, they are not finding any common ground at all. There is a dissonance between some of this rhetoric and what they are actually doing, which is not at all about finding common ground; rather, it is about trying to take control of the way in which the process proceeds.
Earlier in our discussion we had some specific comments from Mr. Simms about the issue of the number of days that the House sits. This is an important, substantive point on which, wherever we go, there needs to be a consensus. There needs to be agreement from parties about the way in which we proceed. The current system involves a certain balance that has five days a week of opportunities for the opposition to challenge the government.
Now let's be very clear. We all know that members of Parliament don't only work when they're in Ottawa. As members of Parliament, we don't have your traditional nine-to-five job. Sometimes there's work that has to be done at 1:30 in the morning. Sometimes we have events and constituency meetings that go outside of regular hours. Oftentimes we're working regular hours as well. We work when the House of Commons is in session, but we also have preparation involved in the things we do in the House, we have preparation involved in the committee, and we have reading and studying that we should be doing, which informs our understanding and our broader perspective on the issues that are in front of us.
Do I think the only work legislators do is the work we do when we're sitting in the House? No, I don't. That is why, when I spoke about changes to the way the House operates, I proposed a change during the debate we had on the Standing Orders that was a bit different from what many of my colleagues were talking about. It was to say that we can look for a way of increasing flexibility by, say, having another day on which votes don't occur. This would allow members to spend time in their ridings if they need to, but we would still continue to have five days a week on which debate occurs in the House of Commons, on which questions are posed to the government, on which the government is...well, not, I guess, formally forced to answer, but at least expected to respond. That ongoing accountability is important, and we can look for ways of facilitating flexibility for members to spend more time in their ridings, but we have to do that in a way that doesn't derogate from the real important accountability functions of the House.
Of course, I should add, the government talks in this discussion paper about the need to move legislation forward, and of course, absolutely, an elected government should be able to pass legislation. I think, as an opposition, our opposition has been reasonable in engaging the government in discussion about the fact that there are some bills we can move forward on more quickly and there are some that require more time. We've been having those discussions and trying to come to agreements, and of course not always coming to agreements, and then the government brings forward closure.
I'll talk about the use of closure. It's striking how the government seems very concerned about the political implications of criticism of closure, yet this was, of course, a political argument that they used repeatedly. They sought to frame the use of closure as a disaster for democracy, and now that they're in government they repeatedly use closure and are so concerned about it that they want to fundamentally change the mechanism. It's striking that they would sort of bemoan public perception and political debate around a particular aspect of our rules that they defined, that they sought.... Well, they didn't define them, but they themselves sought to shape them when they were in opposition. I guess that should be a good reminder to all of us that governments become oppositions and oppositions become government, usually, in the fullness of time, and we don't know exactly when that transition is going to take place.
Speaking to this point about the number of days, the discussion paper implies that, essentially, how important are Fridays really because there are no more than two and a half hours for government orders, and committees do not meet. Of course, the day is not two and a half hours long. There are other things that happen on that day. There are also opportunities to debate private members' business, there is question period, and there are statements by members. The private member's bill debate period, question period, and the statements by members period are the same length as on any other day.
Yes, there is an opportunity for further debate on government orders. There is also an opportunity....
I should mention that on Fridays, of course, we have routine proceedings, an opportunity for members to table petitions, to move motions, to present private members' bills. So many parliamentary functions happen on a Friday. The flexibility of a Friday, where you don't have standing votes but you do have an opportunity for debate, actually allows that accountability function while also allowing many members to spend time in their riding, if and to the degree they need to. If members are able to stay on a Friday, perhaps they have a greater opportunity to give a speech or to participate in the discussion in a way that they might be less able to during other times of the week when more members are there. It gives members an enhanced opportunity to participate in the discussion.
Really, the Friday that we have recognizes the need to have some degree of flexibility, but crucially, it preserves and does not derogate from that important and natural and necessary accountability function. However long the government orders are, we have five days a week on which members of Parliament can bring forward legislation that is specifically important to them and their constituencies. I think we've had many Liberal members use the private member avenue to champion legislation that is not necessarily supported by their front bench but they've been able to champion. If I think about the range of private members' bills, many bills have either passed or at least been advanced onwards when they may not have had the support of cabinet, which does speak to the importance of the private member channel and the way in which Fridays facilitate that.
Now, the discussion paper does refer to the reapportioning of time on Fridays to other sitting days, but it doesn't at all indicate how you would do that while preserving the number of slots for private members' business. You couldn't very well add 15 minutes to the private members' bills slot four days a week and yet divide up that fifth private member's bill by 15 minutes each day. Perhaps they envisioned the extension of that period of time for debate on each private member's bill, which would have the effect of fewer private members' bills.
Perhaps there are ways around that. We don't really know what the government has in mind here. What's clear is that the government wants to put forward these ideas, but not really for discussion. In many ways, the title of the paper is misleading in terms of suggesting that this is a discussion paper. This is actually the basis on which the government appears to want to be able to dictate what a new set of revolutionized, modernized Standing Orders will be that reflects what they want to see. They are not willing thus far, although hopefully they will evolve—let's not call it a revolution in their thinking—to recognize the value of our perspective, which is that there does need to be an assurance that we will have the ability of all parties to have their voices heard, and not just heard but also listened to and protected in the process. That is not what we have currently envisioned by the process.
When they speak of Friday sittings, the government seems to envision an alternative, which is to move to full-day Friday sittings that mirror the hours we have on other days. Of course, members know that the hours of sitting are not uniform throughout the week. On Wednesdays, for example, the House only sits for four hours, I think, which I think is less than or the same as the House sits on Friday, because we have caucus meetings.
The House starts at a later hour on Mondays. It starts at a slightly earlier hour on Tuesdays and Thursdays. I'm part of a committee that normally meets at about 8:30 on Thursday mornings.
Members have a range of responsibilities, and a move to make Friday like the other days of the week would limit the flexibility that members have to spend time in their constituencies. That's a discussion that could take place as long as there's a recognition of the important role of all parties, all members, being involved in the discussion, as is outlined in our amendment.
The other point that's important about Fridays is that there is the issue of the reapportioning of private members' business that I spoke about, but also a question of time lost for question period. Already we know—and I'll talk about this because it's later on in the discussion paper—the is not interested in being in question period every day. He's not interested in participating in question period more than one day a week.
Our view would be that it's important for the to be accountable five days a week. There is the possibility, alluded to in the discussion paper, of reapportioning the times perhaps. Right now, question period is 45 minutes, so you would divide that up and add 10.25 minutes to question period on each of the remaining four days.
That would preserve the amount of time for question period, but it would not be nearly as effective from an accountability perspective, because it would not involve the government being accountable to the legislature, to the people of this country, five days a week. The adding of time to question period is not as important, from my perspective, as the fact of regular accountability created by the presence of that regular question period as it presently exists.
I think the government knows this. I think they would make exactly the same points were they in opposition and were a government trying to make those changes. I think, by the way, the things that Stephen Harper was accused of when he didn't come close to trying to eliminate a key venue for accountability like this.... You know, the names he was called for proroguing parliament. Of course, we can have a discussion about that, but it's something that has been used many times throughout this country's history. Yet what is revolutionary, highly uncommon, is a government that wants to completely rewrite the rules to its own advantage by eliminating that crucial venue for accountability. They want to do that in the absence of the passage of our amendment. They want to do that without allowing a protected role, a protected voice, for the opposition in the context of that discussion.
These are concerns that I have about their proposal to remove Friday sittings. I would not want to proceed down that road unless we had assurance that we could look for what my colleague Scott Reid correctly called these Pareto optimum improvements—improvements every party sees as being fair to us and beneficial for our system. I would not want to go down this road unless we had the protection in terms of a process being followed that would be fair and just, the engagement of all those who have an interest, in a way that would ensure we are not getting ourselves out of balance as we would move forward down that road.
The discussion paper speaks, as well, to the issue of electronic voting, and it suggests that maybe there's an opportunity, because of this massive renovation going on, to implement a system of electronic voting. Even here, the sort of revolution-oriented language is striking: “implement a system of electronic voting as a pilot”.
This is our Parliament. To start doing something completely different and call it a pilot.... I think we should be sure we're covering all aspects of potential pros and cons before we go down that road and not just say let's try it out as a pilot project. If we implement it and it has some real unconsidered problems, then I think we're going down a road that we shouldn't unless we are sure it makes sense to proceed in that direction.
I'm certainly not opposed to having the discussion, but I would not want to cede full control to the government and allow it to dictate to us what should be happening on the question of electronic voting. I think there are some legitimate questions about the kind of process that would take place.
If it's envisioned that members would be voting remotely, electronically, there certainly are some major questions that are raised by that, verifying that the vote was actually cast by the member. There is also a sense in which the presence of members at the time of voting is a way in which they signify that they have been present for the debate. Of course, it's not necessarily the case that members are present for the entirety of a debate on every question they vote on, or even any of the debate, but the fact that they are currently expected to be present at the House at the time of the vote to hear the question read out and to respond to the question speaks, I think, to the kind of responsibility we have invested in us.
The idea that members might not even be present for a vote raises some concerns. There are different ways in which voting is done. In the British House of Commons, my understanding is they don't vote the way we do, and in part it's a space issue actually. All the members of Parliament don't fit in their House of Commons, whereas ours is structured differently. We do all fit for the time being, so we vote in a different way.
Of course, we also apply votes. We apply past votes as a way of speeding up the time, but at least for every block of votes there is a point at which members stand up, are seen to stand up and take ownership of the position they are taking as an individual, and are accountable to that.
One of the questions I would like to probe on this is what the ways are in which electronic voting impacts accountability, because it has the potential to be somewhat more impersonal. Also, what are the effects of that on party discipline? Are members who are less concerned about the visual of them standing up to vote a certain way more likely to vote against their party, or are they more likely to vote with the party?
We have seen recently—finally—some Liberals take action in voting differently from the government on some transparently good legislation that they were right to support. Mr. Chair, one of those bills was your bill. Even though people in the front bench of both major parties were opposing it, we had many members in both parties who supported it, and I was proud to be one of them.
What would the effect of moving to electronic voting be on that aspect of party discipline? Would it be easier for members to do the easy thing and toe the party line instead of recognizing the visual associated with a public vote and stand up and be counted? It might seem like a small point, but these are distinctions that can matter. They require detailed study and the input of a full range of voices.
Part of the value of the unanimous provisions that are put forward here is that it's not only a matter of having unanimity, as in including multiple parties. Members across the way should think about this. The unanimity provisions provide a greater degree of leverage for individual members of the government who may actually have different views on the Standing Orders than the government itself.
I shouldn't say members of the “government”; I should say members of the “government caucus”. They may realize, through this process, some of the ways in which the proposed changes to the Standing Orders—the elimination of Friday sittings and the changes to question period are among them—would have the potential to weaken the ability not just of the opposition but of others within the government to be holding their government to account, to be exerting their influence on behalf of their constituents. This is something that the government would do well to be mindful of, and it's another argument in terms of illustrating the clear benefits of the amendment that we have put forward.
There are other things that I could draw out in the meantime. With the House calendar, the changes to routine proceedings, and so forth, I think there are certainly some issues there. One of the frustrations I have is that there was a time a couple of weeks ago when the proposed a unanimous consent motion on a substantive issue in the middle of debate on another issue. I think there should be a discussion about how we handle unanimous consent motions, that we would only see substantive unanimous consent motions at certain times and have a built-in requirement for engagement and consultation on those before they could be moved.
This is another way in which the protection of the prerogatives of individual members of Parliament is at stake. If a unanimous consent motion is moved when a member is not in the House, and it is then reported that this was a unanimous decision of the House, when in fact the member.... For unanimous consent motions there are no bells. There is no advance notice required. There are some real issues and concerns around the protection of the privileges of members, and they need to be discussed.
Part of the protection that's provided, when you have provisions around unanimity, is that you have the engagement of all issues. There are issues that are raised in this discussion paper. There are also issues that are not raised in this discussion paper. When you have the requirement that changes happen unanimously in the committee, you might end up with some horse-trading. You might end up with members saying that they can enhance the role of the opposition here, enhance the role of the government there, and on balance agree to those things. But in the absence of the passage of this amendment, you don't have the opportunity to address many of those important issues that I've highlighted. Instead, you find yourself in a situation where the government just gets to go out and do whatever they want. They can use their authority to impose things on the committee.
Now, there's a crucial theme in this whole discussion. It's one of the biggest concerns we have about what the practical effects would be if we were to move forward in the absence of a clear signal from the government that, yes, unanimity will be protected. One of the concerns we have is found under “Theme 2”, which deals with the question of time allocation.
This is one of the many ways in which we see the clear political nature of this document, by the way, that in the midst of supposedly creating a discussion on modernization, this government just can't resist throwing these totally unbalanced, partisan barbs into their comments by talking about, for example, the use of closure in the previous Parliament. Closure was used in the previous Parliament. It's also been used many times already in this Parliament, by many of the same members who themselves decried closure as being a dire moment for democracy. This is a political rebranding exercise, though, for closure.
What we have here in its wisdom is the discussion paper proposing to call closure by a different name. To paraphrase Shakespeare, closure by any other name—I don't know if it smells sweet or not, but I guess that's up to your perspective—is the same whether you call it “closure” or “programming”.
To be specific, this document envisions what it calls an alternative to closure, which is actually just the rebranding of exactly the same thing. It just changes the timeline along which it would be done. It says the idea is that:
Following discussion with House Leaders—
There is no requirement indicated here of their buy-in, and certainly we don't get the impression that the government is interested in securing the buy-in of the opposition. They certainly aren't doing it with respect to the motion that we have brought forward, and they're not thus far interested in an amendment which would protect the input of the opposition. The programming following that discussion among House leaders would involve the government giving notice of a motion following...and I'm quoting exactly here:
—the Government gives notice of a motion following second reading of a bill to allocate a specific number of days or weeks for the committee stage, and the time needed for debate at report stage and at third reading.
This is interesting because you see the closure effectively being automatic, saying that from now on—not just on some bills, not just when the government House leader alone decides for whatever reason to proceed in this direction—it would become a matter of course that on every single piece of legislation, the government would say right up front, “We're doing closure after this number of days.” This would not just be in the House, but also it sounds from the language here that there would be a prescription of a certain number of days at the committee stage.
I say to this committee that this is, of course, a significant deviation from the normal practice of committees. The normal and proper practice of committees is for committees to be the masters of their own domain.
There are certain provisions in the Standing Orders for the automatic referral back of private members' legislation after a certain period of time. This is designed to protect the important role of private members, so that government majorities can't simply hold up and sit on private members' bills at committee. With the exception of private members' business and certainly when we're talking about government legislation, the committee is master of its own domain. It is up to the committee how it manages the study of that legislation.
This discussion paper would pull us in a dramatically different direction. It would effectively create an automatic procedure for the invocation of closure. Surely this is something that should only be done if there is a consensus of other parties.
There are many other alternative models that could be considered if the government feels that change is needed. You could envision a system in which days were set and publicly announced with the consent of opposition parties. Such a system would, I think, be more fitting to the word “programming”. It would involve the collective efforts of the House to decide on the number of days that were appropriate for a bill.
Importantly, the number of days that a government thinks are appropriate for discussion or debate on a particular bill might be different from opposition parties. The number of days that a particular opposition party feels are appropriate might be different from another opposition party. There might be a bill on which the NDP feel that they need to make a stand and all of their members care very much about, but that Conservatives have fewer people interested in speaking on. On other cases you might have the inverse—bills where more Conservative members are interested than NDP members.
That's why we currently have a system where House leaders sit down and have a discussion. They talk about the number of days they think are appropriate. Of course, there's give and take and hopefully then the opportunity to come to agreement.
The current rules provide for, yes, a vehicle for the government to move their legislative agenda forward if they are unable to reach an agreement, or really for whatever other reason the government chooses to put forward that motion. I don't think the system is perfect now, but as this discussion paper points out, there is a certain mechanism of political accountability. Under the current system, any time a minister moves a closure or time allocation motion, there is a period of questions and answers—maybe not answers, always, but questions. Members can spend that period of time, not question period but a period for questions, posing questions to the minister that can and often do reflect the substance of the legislation, and speak to the reasons why that particular minister has put forward a closure or time allocation motion. There is a vote, and then there is further discussion.
Yes, when votes that happen in the House are not at a time that has been agreed on by House leaders, of course that process is disruptive. Many provisions—motions that a member be heard, for example—are not used all that commonly. Yes, they involve votes that happen at different times of the day, and they interrupt committees that are in progress. Of course that can happen. That can be disruptive, but that actually is precisely why it is good for House leaders to be able to operate on a consensus basis, and certainly why our House leader works very hard to collaborate with the other House leaders to develop a consensus around the amount of time that makes sense.
This change to the way in which time is set, is managed, and is controlled would be truly revolutionary. The presumption throughout much of our history, indeed perhaps going back almost to the Magna Carta, is that members are given the opportunity to speak on issues that are important to them and that debate proceeds on an issue as long as there are members who are interested in speaking. That's important, because members who speak in the House of Commons don't just speak based on what they think is important or interesting. Members of the House of Commons are here as representatives, as trusted leaders, and in some sense, though it's not a fully exhaustive role, as delegates of the interests and values of their constituents.
We have this accepted tradition that, yes, members should be allowed to speak. Why? Because the people they represent should be allowed to speak. Members need to be heard not because there's anything particularly unique or special about me or anybody in this room, but because we are here on behalf of people back home. We have a right to speak because they have a right to speak. They have a right to have their interests, their values, and their priorities respected. That's what's at stake here when we talk about the engagement of the opposition in the process of changes to the Standing Orders, and specifically when we talk about the implications of that for the discussion of the way in which time is managed.
The rebranding of closure or time allocation, not the fundamental changes but the rebranding so that the government can use it more often as a matter of course automatically, and the application of time management, so-called, by the government to committees, are revolutionary changes that should not be the sort of thing the government imposes unilaterally. It is not in keeping with our traditions. It is not just. It is not just in terms of a proper appreciation of the rights of the people who sent us here, never mind the traditional prerogatives and privileges that we understand for members of Parliament.
I'm struck by the use of buzzwords in this discussion paper to cover what the government is doing, and their refusal to ensure that opposition will have a voice. This discussion paper speaks “of a 'Made-in-Canada' programming scheme”—scheme is the right word, at least—for government bills and motions, and for the handling of Senate amendments.
We have a made-in-Canada process. It's our existing Standing Orders. Sure, we're talking about a made-in-Canada approach proposed by this, but we're actually talking about made-in-the-'s office. We're talking about a made-in-Canada—but made by a very small number of Canadians—scheme that involves a very small number of Canadians completely controlling and setting the agenda, completely responsible for deciding the number of weeks, the number of days, and the number of hours spent in a discussion of legislation, not just in the House but also in committee. This is something that particularly the members who care about parliamentary committees should be seized with—the idea that the House leader would say right off the bat, “Hey, this is how much time your committee has to study it.”
Committees, by the way, are supposed to be the experts. We're supposed to be the people on committees who understand the topics. Surely you can envision a situation in which members on a committee would say, “We really need more time on this issue, because with our understanding and the witnesses we're hearing, we realize we need to hear more from more witnesses.” Yet you've already had this preprogrammed motion from the House leader saying when the discussion has to end. That is limiting the ability we have to speak for our constituents and also to do the kind of study—to hear from experts, to hear from witnesses—that is so important to the process of legislation.
I am very concerned about the way this is set up. Does this mean we can't have a conversation about looking at improvements that could be made to the way the legislative calendar is managed? No, it doesn't mean that we can't or shouldn't have that conversation. It doesn't mean that it would be impossible to have those conversations, but those conversations have to happen in a way that is respectful for the role of all parties, even for the fact that in a majority government legislation is probably going to pass anyway. It is not infrequent that amendments to government legislation are put forward and successfully passed. It happens, and it should and could happen more.
It shouldn't be considered automatic that as soon as a bill is put forward by the government it's going to become a law and that's that. We should respect the parliamentary process, recognizing the insights through the speeches that members give, as well as through the expert input that is provided at committee. We should acknowledge and expect there to be refinements.
I know there were cases, in fact in the previous government—one in particular, and I won't discuss the example because it might be a little painful for our side—in which legislation was put forward, but because public concerns were raised, the legislation did not proceed. This speaks to the importance of the parliamentary process.
There are reasons that we have multiple stages—we have committee study, the House, and the Senate—and it is out of, I think, respect for traditions and the value of moving slowly through the legislative process, through changes that are made, yet we don't see that respect for tradition, either in what seems to be the desired system by the government or by the process by which they are proceeding. They want this to be able to come forward quickly and for the government to be able to entirely control the discussion, and to not have a protection for the role and involvement of the opposition. That would be a significant shift from what has been our normal operating procedures in the past and what has been characteristic of the traditions that we have and that we work under in this place.
Now, the discussion paper speaks of reforms to question period. This government is talking about changes to question period, of course. We had a private member's bill put forward by in the last government that was about reforms to question period, separate from the Reform Act.
I think many Canadians would like us to be open to having the discussion about what question period will look like as we continue into the future. There can be no disputing the importance of question period as a unique feature of the day. Most of the time we spend here is under the reasonable and important general presumed equality of members of Parliament, that members each have an opportunity to speak to questions and to debate back and forth as members of Parliament.
It's the same in committee, where we have members of different parties but they act together as committees, hearing from witnesses, debating and discussing legislation, etc. But question period is that period in the day when we step into a bit of a different position from our tradition of us debating, as members of Parliament, into a more clearly demarcated position of government and opposition. We pose questions as opposition to the government about the business of the day.
Of course, question period isn't just for members of the opposition. Question period provides an opportunity for members of the government party caucus to pose questions to members of the cabinet and parliamentary secretaries about the operations of government. I think those questions could sometimes be used better to actually challenge the government about things that are important in individual constituencies.
Nonetheless, we recognize the importance of question period and the unique way in which question period does provide a forum for opposition to pose questions to the government. It's probably no secret that it is principally an opposition forum. It's principally an opportunity for the opposition to pose questions to the government. I think, generally, the opposition would want to have more question period, and the government would want to have less question period.
At the same time, I think a responsible government understands the value of that institution for democratic accountability, recognizing that, yes, the government of today may be the opposition of tomorrow, but also recognizing that our institutions, our governance, and our society are strengthened by having more mechanisms for accountability, and that question period, as well as Order Paper questions and other ways in which opposition can pose questions to government are all important vehicles.
Then the government, shockingly, would like to take this vital structure of our democracy and impose unilaterally through the discussion paper and then through the unamended motion, if it were to proceed without the amendment, an ability to unilaterally make changes to this opposition forum.
Specifically around the question of where this goes in the future, if the amendment were not to pass, the government would have established a very dangerous precedent, one that I think members of the government should ruminate on a bit, that if the government can change the way question period works, even in ways it thinks are defensible—
Mr. Simms, I appreciate your comments.
These are, of course, ideas that members have brought up and discussed. I spoke to them when I had the opportunity to make a speech in the House about potential changes to the Standing Orders. They really relate to two separate issues: the question of question period changes and the use of party lists in general.
I'll say, by the way, that I didn't mean to bring up . I think you are correct that it was a motion about question period. I did not bring it up as sort of a wholehearted endorsement of the content, but just to say that there are good ideas about changes to question period, and that our opposition to revolutionary change should not be construed as an opposition to any kind of change. It's simply an opposition to change that is radical and unilateral, and that doesn't reflect the best judgment either of those present or of those in the past.
G.K. Chesterton had a phrase that I quite like. He talked about respect for tradition being an acknowledgement of the democracy of the dead, in other words the inclusion of opinions past and present, of people who are no longer with us. The democracy of the dead, it has a real ring to it. I think it might refer to voter fraud as well, but that's not what G.K. Chesterton had in mind.
Specifically, with respect to the point, I think it is a very good thing to explore the question of reducing the use of party lists. What's interesting is that the Standing Orders do not speak at all of the use of party lists, either for question period or any other time. It would be very easy for members to think that the rules say that the whip gives the name of the member, and the member on the list given by the whip is the one who speaks next. What the rules say, in fact, that if Mr. Schmale is on the list and I stand up first—even if he stands up as well but I stand up first—the Speaker should call on me, and that includes during question period.
The practice that we normally observe, in fact, is that the Speaker calls on the member next, even if that member is not standing. The member who is about to speak next may well be sitting, yet the Speaker calls on that member—anticipating that they will stand—on the basis of their presence on a list. Is that something that should probably be discussed in a review of the Standing Orders? Sure. If nothing else, we might say that the Standing Orders should reflect reality, but I think there is some wisdom in the system that is envisioned by the Standing Orders.
I think question period should include some opportunities for what we informally refer to as a leaders' round, for the leaders of opposition parties and lead critics to pose specific questions that reflect the priorities of the collective of the opposition. However, it would be easy to figure out some allocation of question period between a period of time that was more oriented for those leader- and/or front bench-type questions and time for members to pose questions reflecting their own priorities that don't involve a list. Of course, informally, parties might have some system of coordinating them, but the absence of the list at least creates a certain degree of uncertainty and therefore flexibility.
I've spoken about this before. I think this is a good opportunity for study and discussion of the Standing Orders. What is striking to me, Mr. Simms, looking at the discussion paper that we received from the , is the absence of a discussion about those kinds of changes to either the present Standing Orders or the practices of the House. They are the kinds of changes that would actually strengthen the role of individual members of Parliament relative to the front bench.
This is the kind of discussion paper that we would expect somebody in the cabinet to put forward. It's the kind of discussion paper that speaks to changes that are not only talking about advantaging the government caucus versus the opposition caucus, but that deal with issues that are the priorities of party leaders and those around them, as opposed to the priorities of others in parties. Those who are not part of a leadership team of a party might be much more likely to raise questions of, “What about party lists? What about the fact that they informally, though not formally, put all the power in terms of who speaks in the hands of the whips?”
These are important questions. We have a discussion, though, framed fully through the lens of a discussion paper generated by the and then through a motion that does not require the engagement of all members of the committee.
I say again, with respect to party lists, that members of the government caucus should appreciate that this is about changing the rules in a way that could not only disenfranchise the opposition but could weaken the important role government caucus members who are not part of the cabinet can have in providing that kind of accountability check. That is to the issue of party lists.
I'll add this, Mr. Simms, to the point you made about sharing the questions in advance. This is the point I made when I spoke to the Standing Orders in the House. We already have a system in place in the Standing Orders that involves ministers having received questions in advance and having longer periods of time to respond to them, as well as longer periods for the opposition to pose those questions. We already have that. It's called, informally, the late show, or more formally, adjournment debate.
Adjournment debate is when questions that have already been asked in the House, that have been given in advance, are re-asked in long form, and the responses can be given in long form, and then there is a chance for follow up. The problem with adjournment debate is that it happens at the end of the day, that it doesn't get a lot of attention or focus, and that the minister is never the one who answers. It's almost always the parliamentary secretary, and sometimes it's the parliamentary secretary not responsible for the file. He or she is just there to check that box.
The culture that has grown up around adjournment debate is that the House is virtually empty. The other thing is that the way the scheduling works is that you end up receiving your allocation for the adjournment debate question months after the original question was asked. It may still be relevant. It may be a point that's worth coming back to, or the underlying dynamics may have dramatically changed on the question you are seeking to pose.
What I propose as a simple reform, as an incremental but sensible reform, is to switch the time a little bit, with question period at two o'clock, followed by the late show, and statements by members moved to the end of the day. The minister responsible for the file would be required to be present in the House to answer the question at what we now call the late show. It would have to have a different name, given that it would happen at a different time. Given that there would be flexibility around the scheduling, it would be quite easy to be accommodating of the minister's schedule. If the foreign affairs minister was out of the country for a particular week, you could very easily schedule those late shows on the following day. Again, you would have to have a different name for them, but let's call them long-form question and response supplementary oral questions.
Would that reform help the opposition or the government? I think it actually would just be good for substantive discussion on issues. The ministers might say it's disadvantageous to the ministers, because the ministers would then have to be in the House for longer than they would otherwise be. On the other hand, it would save time at the end of the day, when a parliamentary secretary would perhaps have to return. It would create additional opportunities for members to be present and hear parts of that discussion. I think it would enhance our democracy by providing that opportunity for more substantive debate.
That's a change to the Standing Orders. In the framework of a study, where there is an acceptance of a principle moving forward unanimously, we could say, “Yes, this is a change, this is a reform, that might make some sense”. It would allow us to enhance the effectiveness of our institutions.
It's not a dramatic change, but it's a change that could enhance the effectiveness of our institutions and not be done in a way that dramatically changes the grounds under which oppositions parties are operating. It would be a change that would be respectful of the opposition.
It's striking to me, as we look at the discussion paper, the motion, and the opposition that we see from the government to the amendment we're putting forward, that there isn't a discussion of some of what I think are critical issues for the way that the House operates. There are critical issues, which fundamentally are about members of Parliament, as opposed to, strictly speaking, the government opposition dynamic. All of us who are in this room, first and foremost, are members of Parliament. We can see the value of that and grab that opportunity to stand up for our position in the House as members of Parliament, not simply as members of government or opposition, although, of course, I have spoken about the importance of the roles we have as members of government and opposition.
I appreciate the points made by Mr. Simms. I'll come back, though, to talking about the discussion paper and its relationship to the motion and the amendment, because I didn't yet speak directly about this issue of the Prime Minister's question time. Those who talk about Prime Minister's question time recognize that this is an institution that exists in the U.K. There are ways that our Parliament and our traditions build off of the British tradition, and I've spoken to some extent about that. There are obviously ways that our traditions, through continuous evolution, have evolved to have slightly different characteristics. The daily question period is important. The accountability of the government five days a week is important, and we would like to see the Prime Minister engage with that process on as many days as possible.
There is nothing to stop the from answering every question on one day a week. He is welcome, under the present rules, to do that. Of course, under the present rules, he chooses not to attend question period quite frequently. There are instances where it appears that the Prime Minister is present in the general vicinity yet he does not attend question period. I acknowledge that the Prime Minister has to travel internationally at certain times; there are weeks when he is not here at all.
As we speak about a Prime Minister's question time, if we move forward in the direction that's envisioned by the discussion paper, we effectively give the Prime Minister licence, just as a matter of course, to not be present in question period on four days a week—or maybe three days a week, if other recommendations of the discussion paper were to move forward. However, it is a giving of “social licence”, let's call it, for the Prime Minister not to be present in question period. Also, there are periods of time when the Prime Minister travels or may indeed have other legitimate responsibilities.
On both of those fronts, on the front informed by the prospective change to the Standing Orders, but also on the front of the realities of the Prime Minister's schedule, that further reduces the presence of the Prime Minister in question period. I think many Canadians would be struck and surprised by that, especially in light of a system in Canada where the Prime Minister is particularly powerful. A discussion that I guess informs this discussion would be, what are the powers of the Prime Minister, what should they be, and does he have too much power?
Certainly, the present power of that office means that the occupant of that office, out of respect for his office—as well as for Parliament—needs to ensure he is frequently available to respond to questions that are posed.
As to the changes envisioned for question period in terms of the number of question periods, as well as the presence of the in them, I can anticipate the defence, which is that if the Prime Minister answers a lot of question on one day, he might end up answering as many or more questions on that day as he would throughout the week. Okay, but there is something to the government being accountable five days a week and to the Prime Minister being accountable to answer questions on as many of those days as is reasonably possible, and to at least, in a sense, if he chooses to be absent too much, be accountable for that absence, to be challenged in a public way about the fact that he may not be attending question period as much as he should. The opportunities that exist for that regular accountability would be dramatically changed by the introduction of this change.
It doesn't mean, by the way, that this is something that can't be studied or shouldn't be studied. Again, it's the 's prerogative, on behalf of the government, to choose to answer more questions that are posed in question period. If he were to do both—to improve his attendance record in question period and to also answer more questions—I don't think he would get any complaints from us about that.
That is provided for in the existing rules, but a fundamental change in the expectations around the presence of the in question period is something that, as we should all be able to agree, would require the buy-in of all members of Parliament in the process of that change, I think, in that we should be involved in and consenting to changes that would take place in that context. That is precisely what we are protecting. Again, it is not just about the ability of the opposition. It is about the ability of members of the government caucus, but it's particularly about the opposition, which obviously has a very important role in being able to hold the government accountable.
I have to say that the direction envisioned in terms of Order Paper questions here is not at all clear to me. I think there is an argument for changes to the whole process of Order Paper questions, but in a direction that would actually require that the government be held accountable for cases where there are some concerns about the information that has been provided and where there is perhaps a dissonance between the information provided and what appears to be the reality. There should be some greater mechanism for accountability for that.
Again, this discussion paper, which is supposed to form the basis of a study on which the opposition would have no guaranteed say, frames this purely in terms of the kinds of concerns that a government House leader would have, not in terms of the kinds of priorities that you would expect to be at the forefront of the minds of members of the opposition.
Next, then, there's this issue of omnibus legislation that is discussed here, and again we see the entry of partisan language into what is supposed to be ostensibly a more dispassionate discussion paper. It shows, I think, a lack of interest in genuine productive discussion and, in fact, in reality shows what we see as the desire of the government to be dictating to the opposition. We see that tone in terms of the language, and then we see the government seeking to come up with a distinction between the kinds of omnibus bills they do and the kinds of omnibus bills, so-called, that the previous government did, in a way that allows them to defend their omnibus bills and criticize other omnibus bills. Transparently, the last budget brought forward by this government was an omnibus bill.
Of course it dealt in general terms with the economy, but it dealt with many different things that are related to the economy. The same could be true of legislation that was brought forward by the previous government and by others previous. You have a budget bill that deals with a range of different subjects that are relevant to the budgetary plans of the government and the government's economic agenda.
The discussion paper makes a bit of a false comparison. It says there's an ability of the clerk to divide written questions, so the Speaker could do the same on omnibus bills. This would amount to a very substantial amount of power to give to one person, the Speaker who would unilaterally split a bill. It's quite a bit of power for one, even certainly an important officer of the House to have.
On the other hand, having the splitting of omnibus bills done by a Speaker who certainly is a neutral person, but is not one who is representative of the opposition.... The Speaker is not supposed to be representative of anyone of course, but this does not allow an opportunity for the opposition to be engaged in discussion or decisions about what actually constitutes an inappropriate omnibus bill.
Usually the objections about what is and is not an omnibus bill, of course, come from the opposition. It's the opposition who would have these concerns about a bill with too many different themes that are just lumped together. That is the kind of concern you would expect to come from the opposition.
To expect that the Speaker could unilaterally divide legislation, to think it particularly likely that the Speaker would use that power in a context in which the Speaker is an elected member of Parliament, and ultimately, in the context where it's generally difficult for the Speaker to make these kinds of highly subjective calls—the question of whether things relate to an overall unifying theme or not—it would be very difficult to say definitively, yes or no, what that relationship would be.
Yet this puts that power solely in the hands of the Speaker. I think it risks situations where the opposition would perhaps inadvertently be in a position of disagreement with the Speaker, which creates other potential questions and challenges. Again, I'm not at all opposed to the idea of having a discussion about what constitutes an omnibus bill for the purposes of being reasonable and not reasonable. There are certain kinds of omnibus bills that make sense. I think the government should have a budget every year. I think the budget should deal with a variety of different things related to an overall unifying theme, and the degree to which that may or may not apply is something that reasonable people can and will continue to disagree with.
I think there needs to be a discussion about omnibus bills in a way that speaks to the kinds of concerns that opposition parties might have. How would opposition parties be inclined to express those concerns? What kinds of processes or Standing Order reforms would allow the opposition to effectively bring forward the kinds of concerns they have?
We can have that discussion. We can have that discussion here at this committee under the framework established by the Conservative amendment, an amendment that prescribes a framework whereby there's a discussion that can take place, perhaps a bit of horse-trading, perhaps a bit of coming around to each other's perspectives, looking for those improvements that are beneficial to all, and more importantly that are in the public interest, and moving forward on them.
Yes, some of that discussion might involve omnibus bills, but that is a discussion that should engage all parties, and certainly engage the kind of perspective that opposition will bring, as well as the kind that the government will bring.
Moving on, as we look at the kind of framework established by the discussion paper, we see that the discussion paper speaks to the management of committees. It speaks to the way in which committees operate. One of the changes it would make, of course, is that it would seek to impose time limits for members' speeches at committee. I know members of the government are thinking this would limit their opportunity to hear from someone like me in a context like this. I know that's not something that they would want to do through changes to the Standing Orders.
However, what should be clear in the midst of this exercise is that it's important for the opposition to have certain procedural tools to use in extreme circumstances. When the opposition feels, as we feel as a unified opposition, that this motion, in the absence of the amendment, would severely tread on the rights and privileges of members, we should have an ability to raise the level of attention on this issue, to raise, in a sense, the intensity of that discussion. The opportunity to talk the issue through fully is one of those tools that members have. I think my colleague from the NDP, Mr. Christopherson, made the point very well earlier that sometimes having the ability to press that panic button doesn't mean you're going to do it.. Having the ability to do it—and he made the analogy to strikes—might mean that you actually push it very rarely, but the fact that it exists as an option is a mechanism for forcing the government to participate meaningfully in this conversation.
Earlier in the evening, we were almost there. As we were discussing the amendment, we had agreement for a period of temporary recess and discussion between parties, between members of parties, and I presume between other staff members in their parties. Those discussions took place. At that time we didn't get to an agreement. I'm hopeful that at some point in the future we will see agreement from the government to pass the amendment. However, the fact that the opposition had options and had a capacity to raise these issues gave us an ability to at least start to force those conversations, an ability that we wouldn't have had under the framework envisioned by this.
If you think in general about the time management aspect, the proposal around so-called programming or what might be better called “automatic time allocation” or “automatic closure”, were the government to move these things through unilaterally without engaging the opposition in the conversation, the effect would be that the opposition wouldn't really have any meaningful tools at our disposal, other than being able to speak in the limited time prescribed for us by the government. We could only speak when and for the time permitted as prescribed by the government. That would be it. We wouldn't have the opportunity to challenge the government in the more extended way that is necessary. We have evolved to appreciate the value of being able to do that within the type of parliamentary system that we have in Canada. Yes, we have a made-in-Canada solution already, one that has evolved to include and reflect the collective wisdom of the history that is embedded in our institutions.
I should say as well that my concern about the time limits imposed at committee isn't just about situations like this one, where it is important for us to press the panic button and say to each other and the public, “Whoa—something important is going on here.” It's not just for situations like that. It is also important because it allows members to actually air out substantive issues in a way they just wouldn't have time for in the House of Commons.
Let's remember what committees are for. Committees are opportunities for members of Parliament to develop specific and deep expertise in topics that reflect their own interests, their own constituencies, or assignments they've been given, whatever the case may be. Recognizing that we cannot all be experts in every public policy issue that is up for discussion, we can drill deep into specific areas and develop a deep knowledge and appreciation for the challenges and conflicts. Then we can talk out and explore them in the context of the committee with a depth that is not available in the House of Commons.
I sometimes find that 10 minutes or 20 minutes just isn't enough time to get around an idea that I want to convey in the House of Commons. I'm sure at least Mr. Graham feels that way sometimes too. I don't know about other members. There are some topics—and it's not every topic, of course, but for me it's almost every topic—
Mr. Tom Kmiec: What about Rouge park?
Mr. Garnett Genuis: Twenty minutes was not enough for Rouge National Urban Park. It was enough for some of the members who were sitting behind me for the camera shot. They were done with hearing from me on that topic after 20 minutes.
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Mr. Graham really wants me to cross the floor. I suppose I could then join the large number of Liberal members voting against the government. That's not going to happen, just to put all my cards on the table.
Speaking of all my cards being on the table, I would like to continue where we left off last night, or rather earlier this morning, with the important issues that we're dealing with. Our discussion was in the context of a notice of motion that came forward from Mr. Simms, and I should say that the motion came forward in a way that I don't think is respectful of the tone and of the way in which we typically operate within this place.
We had the release of a discussion paper that, as I think others have reflected, isn't so much about discussion as it is about dictating. It's just supposedly to raise some issues and some questions and some matters for consideration, but then, very immediately, it was followed during a constituency work week by a notice of motion. On the day before the budget, the government wanted to move forward with this motion that would have involved a study of the issues in this so-called discussion paper about the so-called modernization of the Standing Orders. They thought that somehow the boundaries of that study had to be determined the day before the budget.
Of course, we know that Canadians are legitimately weighing out. They are looking at the budget, looking at how much this government will increase their tax bill by and at how much debt will be left to the next generation. In the midst of that, we have something happening that I think was designed to slide in under that discussion and prevent us from really giving it the scrutiny it deserved.
What did we on this side of the House do? Not just our party but all on this side of the House, including our good colleagues in the New Democratic Party, stood up and said “no”. We said it was not right for the elected government of the day to do this. They do enjoy a certain mandate to implement aspects of their policy agenda, but it is not right for them to try to unilaterally change the way in which our parliamentary institutions function.
That has been the pattern with this government. It has met with strong opposition in every case. Initially the government thought they could unilaterally change the way in which elections occur, the process by which they take place, in a way that would work to their advantage. The opposition stood up and said “no”. We were eventually unified in saying that you cannot, as one party, change the rules of the game. You have to engage with others in the process.
This is exactly what our amendment speaks to. This is a continuation, another step in what we've already seen so far from this government. First of all, they wanted to change the way in which elections occur without meaningfully engaging Canadians or meaningfully engaging their representatives, except for those who were part of their party. Even then, we sometimes have good reason to doubt how meaningful the engagement is, even within the government caucus, given the responses we see in terms of things that happen in the House as a result of that.
Now that they've backed away from that, we see them effectively doing something very similar. They're trying to change the rules of our parliamentary processes, again unilaterally, again proceeding in a way that is not set up to be respectful of individual members of Parliament and those other voices who need to be represented in that discussion as well.
It is interesting that there is a clear similarity, a clear parallel, in terms of the kinds of arguments that are being used by members of this government in this context. My colleague Mr. Reid, on the electoral reform file, would ask repeatedly of in the House of Commons, “Why won't you commit to a referendum? Why won't you commit to the wider public engagement that we would expect to take place?” Those were the questions that he asked, and the response—to the extent that the questions were answered at all—was always something in the form of “Let's put aside these questions of process and let's talk about the substance.”
We ought not jump to a discussion of substance without really prefacing that with a meaningful discussion of how the discussion will proceed, the process by which it will unfold. Yes, I am as eager as members on the other side are to have a discussion about how we move forward with respect to our Standing Orders, but that has to be done in the context established by the amendment. You can see a parallel to that in the call for a referendum that came from the opposition before. It was us—not just us as the Conservative caucus, but the united perspective of the opposition—saying, “You cannot change the rules of the game on your own.” That is not what Canadians elect governments to do.
Canadians elect governments, or members of Parliament, to be precise, and members of Parliament then coalesce to define who the government is. Through that process of selection, Canadians identify a government that they expect to make policy decisions and to propose laws for debate and discussion. At the same time, though, I think Canadians expect governments of the day to leave intact the basic framework that allows for ongoing, fair, democratic competition. To the extent that changes are necessary in that interaction—either changes to the way in which people are elected or changes to the processes of the parliamentary activities that we're a part of—any time there are proposals for change, it is not good enough that one player in the game decides that they want to make those changes.
I don't want to reduce what we do here to a sports analogy, because what we do here is much more important and consequential, but I think members would clearly understand that if one combatant in a sporting event were to set the rules of the game, the other side might have some real, significant, and legitimate concerns about that. The way in which democracy is supposed to work is that there is a set of ground rules that are identified, independent of the particular interests—and certainly independent of the narrow, immediate interests—of one particular party. Those ground rules are established with a wide degree of social consensus.
In the context of electoral reform, we said it was important that it occur through a referendum. In the context of changes that are proposed to the Standing Orders, it is important that the discussion occur through the meaningful engagement of members of Parliament. That means members of Parliament of all parties, including all members of the government and all members of the opposition.
What we have sought is an amendment that reflects the expectation that Canadians have of fairness in our democratic processes, where the framework, the ground rules, and the context in which we operate are not simply established or pronounced upon in a definitive way by one player in the game.
There have to be meaningful mechanisms for the opposition to advance their concerns, to bring them forward and discuss them. It's not surprising to me that we see, unfortunately, this repeated pattern from the government of seeking to make changes not just to policy, not just to decisions of the government, but also to that underlying substructure of democracy. Moreover, they want to to do so in a way that does not reflect our normal processes and traditions, that doesn't reflect our normal expectations of fairness. We see this in the approach they took on electoral reform, which they immediately pulled back from once they realized they had lost the public debate.
I'll say something to members of the government on this discussion of the Standing Orders. You did not win the issue of electoral reform in the way that many in the government wanted to, because Canadians rose up and objected. They spoke out clearly about the problems and the concerns they had with the things that were going on.
The public response on that issue was overwhelming. This is a new issue. This is something that the government started trying to push forward at committee yesterday. Looking at the comments people are making and at the level of engagement we are seeing on social media, I perceive this issue, and specifically the issue of the amendments we are bringing forward, to be one that is garnering very substantial public concern and consideration.
There is a reasonable expectation from the public as people discuss these issues. There is an increasing level of engagement from the public on this issue, and members probably are noticing it as they check their emails. I know we were here late last night, into the wee hours of this morning, and many of us had caucuses to attend, but I would encourage members while they are here to ask their staffers if we are hearing from people on this issue from within our own ridings. Already there has been a very strong response to this issue. People who didn't even know I was here last night have been writing to me about things they've heard from other people and are saying they hope I am engaged in this process.
This is the kind of issue Canadians want to get engaged in, because Canadians take our parliamentary institutions very seriously. They also have an intuitive sense of procedural fairness and the importance of people being engaged, of all parties being engaged, not just because there are different individual perspectives that are important, but also because we are speaking in a way that is reflective of the people who represent us, and the people who represent us—not just those from Liberal ridings who may not be heard in this process, but all Canadians—deserve to have some say over the way our democracy works.
In the government's opposition to the amendment, we see their desire to limit the ability of the opposition to have a meaningful say on the kinds of changes to the Standing Orders that would come forward. We also see in the specific proposals for change that are coming from the government a desire to remove all of those meaningful tools that the opposition has for challenging the government. There is nothing in this proposed so-called modernization that takes away the ability of a member to speak maybe once, if they can get a slot, for a limited amount of time, but in every case they remove those provisions that allow members of the opposition the strong and meaningful opportunity, on issues of vital concern to their constituents and to the nation, to stand up in a more pronounced and fundamental way and say no.
It removes the ability, for example, of members of Parliament to talk for more than a very limited period of time in the context of committees. That's obviously a problem, because the committee can be the one place where members of Parliament, generally those who sit on particular committees, will have a particular interest or degree of expertise in specific areas. This discussion paper proposes to limit the ability of not just members of the opposition but also members of the government to stand up—I guess we normally speak sitting down at committees, but to metaphorically stand up—and object in a way that is clear, effective, and pronounced.
As I look at the text of this discussion paper, and I've read through it a number of times, I see some real dissonance between the tone of the discussion, the stated objectives, and the way in which this government is proceeding vis-à-vis the amendment and the changes they are proposing to bring about. For example, as I said earlier, this discussion paper refers to modernization without clarity or definition, but it also refers to some words that are, in and of themselves, good words: “greater accountability, transparency and relevance”. How in the world, though, does removing the ability of the opposition to have a say, either with respect to the ground rules or with respect to the actual ongoing deliberations of the House, promote greater accountability? How does removing one question period every week, even if the time is reapportioned—because you are still removing the opportunity for accountability five days a week—provide what is stated as an objective, greater accountability?
It states:
Parliament must adapt to a changing and evolving...landscape and should respond to demands of greater accountability, transparency and relevance.
Greater accountability, transparency, and relevance: these are all important things, yet the way in which the government is proceeding—today, this morning, yesterday—is fundamentally at odds with the objectives we discussed here.
It was in fact our party that pushed to have these discussions in public. It was our advocacy that said Canadians have to see, in a clear way, what's going on and what the government is trying to do, which is to remove the ability of the opposition to be an effective force, and to do it in a way that doesn't give the opportunity for the opposition to be meaningfully and effectively engaged in this discussion.
Incidentally, to further support my point about public engagement on this issue, I'll just say that members saw me doing a Facebook Live about 20 minutes ago, before this committee. I had some technical difficulties because I had my camera facing the wrong way initially. That often happens with me. You might be able to tell my ability with technology by my comments about the concept of modernization, but I have figured out Facebook Live, and in 20 minutes we've already had 19 shares. That's a little less than a share per minute. I don't normally get that much traffic on the videos I post, not even on something as contentious as motion number 103, so we are seeing a high level of engagement from the public on this issue.
I think members of the government would do well to note that, and to realize that when they talk about things like greater accountability, transparency, and relevance, Canadians are already scrutinizing what we are doing here. When it comes to the government's desire to limit the conversation by not supporting the amendment, by not allowing the opposition to be meaningfully engaged in that discussion, we see that the public, who are much more able to be engaged because of social media, whether members of the government like it or not, are already reacting to that and being very clear about the kinds of concerns they have as that happens.
There is something in the introduction to the discussion paper that I neglected to draw attention to last night. The introduction talks about the recalibration of the minority and majority, and yet the process envisioned by the government is one in which that recalibration is undertaken unilaterally, where you have one member of the process doing that recalibration.
The discussion paper also says, “This balance is in need of constant attention and periodic adjustment to reflect the will of the House and of the people it serves.” Isn't that exactly what we in the opposition are talking about and are seeking to do through this amendment? This is to ensure that any recalibration or balance that takes place reflects “the will of the House and the people it serves”.
Let's be very clear about what that needs to mean. As the government was keen to talk about, at least until recently, we have a majority government that was not elected with a majority of the popular vote. That's fair. That's how our system works. That doesn't in any way take away from their legitimacy to govern, but it does speak to the fact that we need to have a little bit more of a multipartisan approach if we are to meaningfully talk about the will of the people that the House is supposed to serve, especially when we make changes that shift the underlying substructure of our democratic discussions.
It is striking to me how in this discussion paper you have the nominal recognition of the need for periodic adjustment to reflect the will of the House and the people that it serves, and yet you have a motion that seeks to allow the government House leader's vision to be unilaterally imposed on the House and on the opposition.
When we speak about the will of the House, some members might suggest that could be just a majority of the House. After all, the House can vote, and the government has a majority, so they can carry the vote on the basis of their majority. Doesn't that reflect the will of the House?
Well, I would say that the will of the House should be expressed in different ways that are appropriate to the kind of situation that is being adjudicated.
If we were to have a public whipped standing vote on the selection of the Speaker, I would consider that inappropriate. I would consider that an inappropriate expression of the will of the House in the context of that institution. It is important for the Speaker both to be neutral and to be seen to be neutral. Although formally the process of a whipped standing vote right at the beginning of Parliament would mean that the Speaker would be chosen by a majority, I think it would undermine the principle of the will of the House.
This is recognized in the Standing Orders, which for different kinds of things prescribe different kinds of numbers for the will of the House. Obviously, for the passage of legislation, there is a requirement that there be a majority of those voting who support it. On certain other matters there are different metrics or requirements. There are certain things that the House can only do through unanimous consent. There are certain things the House can do through a majority, but which need to have a proper notice given in advance.
There are certain things that can occur in the House that require a certain threshold to be passed. I am thinking of Standing Order 53 and Standing Order 56.1, standing orders that allow motions to be put forward that are deemed adopted if a certain number of members do not stand to object. In the case of Standing Order 56.1, the government can put forward a motion, and if the opposition fails to stand 25—well, it wouldn't have to be the opposition, of course—if 25 members of Parliament fail to stand, then the motion is deemed adopted. That is to deal with changes to the normal procedural mechanisms of the House.
Standing Order 53, which we had use of on Bill last spring, allows the government to seek to suspend the normal notice process that takes place for the discussion of a bill. Certainly we would not want the normal notice process to be suspended with a simple majority of the House, but I think it is sensible and right that we're willing to accept that even if there are a couple of members who object—and for the purposes of Standing Order 53, it's not 25 members but 10 members—the government can proceed with something for which there hasn't been the normal notice given, if the will of the House is for that to be done in the way that I have described.
This is the central point. The will of the House is a concept that I think requires a certain degree of proper collaboration in response to the specific events that we are dealing with. Yes, there has to be periodic adjustment, but there has to be an acceptance of the way in which that periodic adjustment takes place that meaningfully reflects the will of the House.
I think the amendment that we in the opposition have put forward reflects an appropriate concept of the will of the House in the context of this type of decision. We accept, as is well established in Standing Orders 56.1 and 53, and elsewhere in the Standing Orders, the use of unanimous consent motions in general, which would be another example of certain situations, especially procedural things, wherein a simple majority is not enough, because if we are shifting the procedural ground of the House, and the government can do that simply with a majority vote, then that puts at risk all of the subsequent discussion that should be occurring on substantive legislation.
It's not just out of sort of parliamentary nerdiness and navel-gazing that we are concerned about questions around the Standing Orders and process. It is, rather, because those things provide the substructure for discussion of substantive issues that matter to Canadians and that inform their lives in a real and practical way.
It's a reality that government legislation may have unintended consequences. It may contain mistakes, and that's why the process of parliamentary scrutiny is so important. That's why the role of all members of the government caucus, not just the cabinet, and the role of the opposition are so important: it's because our ability to engage in a meaningful way in the discussion is a bulwark against the kinds of mistakes or unintended consequences that can occur in legislation.
We need to protect that substructure and we actually, I believe, for the most part, need to have a higher standard of support for making changes to that substructure—yes, to protect it, but also to protect the meaningful policy decisions and outcomes that stand upon that framework. That's something that is particularly important.
Further, there are certain things, certain further acknowledgements in the discussion paper that while ultimately recommending changes that would be injurious to our institutions and, indeed, to a proper understanding of the role of the opposition and of all members of Parliament in that institution, that I think should point in the direction of support for the amendment that we are defending today.
I draw the attention of members to a sentence on page two, partway down the first paragraph, when it's discussing some of the issues of the deliberative function of the House. It acknowledges, “Every issue is unique and requires an amount of debate that is commensurate to the significance of the matter before the House.” This is very true. There are some issues that require less discussion; there are some issues that require more discussion. What has been striking to me in witnessing the way in which this Parliament has operated is that we've often seen efforts to curtail debate on some of those most substantive and sensitive areas where surely we can recognize the need, or we should recognize the need, for very extensive discussion.
The first time that this government proposed time allocation or closure was with respect to Bill , the government's euthanasia legislation. Although, as I'm told, previous governments have used time allocation from time to time, this was a unique case on an issue of fundamental values and conscience. There were significant differences of opinion within every party, and certainly within the two largest parties, and the government moved forward with time allocation on that issue.
This speaks to some of the problems around that whole area of discussion. It also should remind us, when we're properly calibrating the discussion in the House, to recognize the differences between different kinds of legislation and recognize that different kinds of legislation require different amounts of debate, especially on legislation on which there may be broad agreement among the parties that it's something that's okay to move faster on. However, the significance of the matter, the relative time that is required for discussion in the House, is also something that we can't speak of as having a certain ontological objectivity. It is not, strictly speaking, an objective point with regard to how much discussion is required on certain items of legislation. Members of different parties will disagree based on what they're hearing from their constituents.
A recent example of this, to compare what the Conservatives and the NDP were saying, was the discussion around the government's pre-clearance legislation. I can't recall exactly the number of that bill. Our view was that this was legislation that was good, which we could support. It was a government bill. Our caucus was supportive of the government's approach with respect to pre-clearance. The NDP was not. The NDP had some grave concerns. The NDP wanted in particular to ensure that they were able to be fully engaged in the discussion. Notably, when time allocation came up on that bill, our Conservative caucus joined with the NDP in opposing the imposition of time allocation on that point. We recognized that from the perspective of the NDP, the time commensurate to the significance of the discussion of the issue had not been given. What you see today, and what you've seen on matters like this around the management of the time of the House, is some real agreement among parties with obviously very different broader philosophies.
As we think about this issue of the way in which time is allocated, this speaks to very important rules about how the House operates. Yes, individual parties, but also individual members, have an opportunity to meaningfully put forward and discuss the concerns they have. The absence of an ability to do that, the absence of the ability for the opposition to have a role, as envisioned by the study in the absence of the amendment, can obviously create some real problems with respect to the way that balance is set up.
The normal process for making changes to the Standing Orders, as well as for figuring out the time that is allocated to different things, is for discussions to occur among House leaders. There is provision in the Standing Orders—and I think there should be provision in the Standing Orders—for the government to move motions around the allocation of time when they feel there is urgency in moving a measure forward, but the important point is that those motions create an avenue, an opportunity, for public debate and discussion around the use of that procedure and create some accountability and scrutiny of that process.
The way in which the government is proceeding here really seeks to limit or minimize the debate that would normally occur around that.
Later on in the introduction to the discussion paper, the government House leader lays out some proposed reasons for these changes. As we discuss how to do the study and the level of engagement we would expect from members with respect to unanimity or not, we need to take on board and consider the reasons that have been put forward.
The discussion paper speaks about the need to ensure members have a better balance, and to encourage under-represented segments of society to seek elected office.
We should be quite aware and critical of the fact that very often this government uses references to minority and other under-represented segments of society to impose its own interests. We saw this with electoral reform, where they objected to the idea of a referendum. It seemed to be on the basis that we have to ensure that the full range of diverse voices be heard, but we never got an answer as to why a referendum would exclude a full diversity of voices.
Referendums, in fact, would generally make it easier for people to engage who may otherwise be unable to participate in the kinds of consultations that don't involve the simplicity of being able to cast a direct ballot. A red flag should go off in our minds when the government uses this reference to under-represented segments of society, if it is in the context of a broader plan to simply impose its own agenda and, perversely, weaken the ability of the full range of voices to be heard in the process.
The first point of justification that the government House leader puts forward for wanting to proceed in this direction is the comment, “to ensure Members have a better balance”. I'm not entirely sure what “a better balance” means—especially when we have a normative word like “better”—when what is envisioned by the approach the government has taken is that we're going to have a balance that is entirely conceived of and determined by the government on the ways in which Standing Orders operate and debate proceeds. The system that is envisioned is one in which the government decides before the fact how much debate is going to be allowed or not allowed on any given provision, so it's not at all clear to me what is meant there by “balance”.
On the other hand, perhaps better balance isn't speaking so much in this context of the calibration between the role of government and opposition. Rather, it's speaking about the kind of balance that members might want to have between their duties, their families, and other things in their private life. As we think about the Standing Orders in that context, there are a lot of options that we could identify that could enhance the effectiveness of representation while facilitating an optimal balance, but the engagement of those changes shouldn't be something that the government House leader does unilaterally. Of course, the government House leader is in practice a bit removed from the practical life of other members of Parliament, because the government House leader has far more staff. They have certain resources at their disposal, a driver, and so forth, that other members of Parliament don't have.
I'm not objecting to that. I'm simply saying that if you want to have a discussion about the kind of balance that can be achieved in practice for members of Parliament, you'd better make sure that you're actually engaging the full range of voices of members of Parliament.
Now, the kind of balance that is necessary in the life of a member of Parliament will be different for the government and for the opposition members, because government and opposition members have different kinds of responsibilities. In the government, of course, members have access to a greater spectrum of staff support. There are larger budgets on the government side for those kinds of things. Opposition has to spend that much more time on the kind of research and analysis that's happening within our own offices. That impacts the kind of balance we can have.
On the other hand, there are different responsibilities that may be particular to the life of a government member of Parliament, who is probably more involved in making announcements. Committee chairs, not always but generally, are members of the government. Parliamentary secretaries have another set of associated responsibilities that are different from those of other members of Parliament. This issue of balance for members of Parliament is different depending not just on whether you sit in government or opposition but also on which party you are in and what kinds of responsibilities you have within your party. Perhaps there's an issue between recognized parties and unrecognized groups. Then, of course, there's the issue of independents.
In a discussion of what constitutes a better balance, I think it should be obvious that we would want to engage the full and broad range of voices in that discussion. That's exactly the opportunity that is established in the context of this amendment. If the amendment were to pass, it would ensure that we would hear from the different kinds of perspectives that are raised by all members of Parliament as we discuss this important question of balance.
These issues of what constitutes balance will vary within parties, but they will also vary across regions. I mean “region” in the sense of the part of the country you're from or the kind of riding you have, whether you represent an urban or a rural riding. I think the kinds of expectations and the kinds of work we do for our constituents vary widely, depending on the kind of constituency we have. Some of us have to spend much more time travelling. Some of us may have a relatively greater volume of immigration casework to do. Any discussion of balance shouldn't reflect just one political party, not just because it shouldn't reflect only one party's political interests but also because it shouldn't reflect just one regional type of perspective. It should be a conversation that is inclusive.
Sometimes when we see the policy decisions of this government, it strikes us that there isn't really an appreciation of the dynamics happening in more rural parts of Canada, and that's across the board. That's something that needs to be taken into consideration when we think about the kinds of balance and the kinds of activities involved in representation for all members of Parliament. That's why it's important for us to ensure that as we undertake discussions of what balance looks like, we have a greater level of that full engagement.
Mr. Chair, I don't want to put members on the spot here, but I notice that there's a declining number of members at the table. I'm open to a brief suspension, if that is what members want.
I'm happy to continue with my remarks, but we have a pretty small number of members at the table right now.
:
That's what I do after 3 a.m., when the committee suspends.
Certainly, Mr. Chair, members are welcome to be where they want in the room; I don't mean to dictate to members on that point at all. I just want to make sure that we're taking advantage of the opportunities to have discussions about some next steps here, because it would be worthwhile for the government to see the logic of what we're doing, and to work with us to facilitate study and discussion of these issues in a way that is properly collegial and properly inclusive of the broad range of perspectives that we have in front of us. In the absence of that amendment, that is not happening, so I think that's something that we need to see at some point. Whether we see the government go through that process of introspection and change after a day or after a month, it's going to have to happen at some point, because the way in which they are proposing to bring about change is just so fundamentally unacceptable to those of us in the opposition.
We recognize the importance of the role that we have as elected members of Parliament who speak on behalf of their constituents, but also as an opposition that has a responsibility for framing the public conversation and that has different tools for calibrating the intensity of our response. Sometimes we support legislation and proposals the government brings forward and sometimes we object, but we object in a way that allows the process to proceed, and very rarely do we stand up, or in the present case sit down, and say, “The government is trying to do something that is fundamentally unacceptable to the way that our democratic processes work.” That is something that we in the Conservative caucus are deeply committed to—and I know that Mr. Christopherson spoke very forcefully about this last night as well, that the NDP caucus is also deeply committed to this. I don't know if he gave the barnburner at caucus that he promised, where everyone was on the roof—
Mr. David Christopherson: Well, they're still on the ceiling, as I promised
Mr. Garnett Genuis: They're still on the ceiling. Okay.
I want to continue, in the context of this discussion paper from the government House leader, by speaking to the second point that was given in terms of rationale for the changes that the House leader wants to bring forward, and that is, she spoke about this issue of encouraging unrepresented segments of society to seek elected office.
It is not at all clear to me how the efforts of the government to effectively neuter the opposition, to turn the opposition into more of an audience than a part of the process, would somehow encourage under-represented segments of society to seek elected office. I think what people look for when they consider whether or not to seek a career in public office is the opposite. What they look for is a sense that they will be able to meaningfully contribute to the process, regardless of what part of the House of Commons they're in. I think it would probably be harder to recruit someone to run for public office if you had to tell them, “Well, if you're in the opposition, the government is basically going to do whatever they want, and you don't have any tools at your disposal.” I think that might be the sort of thing that would discourage people from running for public office if they had to grapple with the fact that our rules had been changed unilaterally in a way that did not actually allow for the meaningful engagement of the opposition in the ongoing process. That's my general view about how the proposed changes by the government would impact this question of under-represented segments of society seeking elected office.
However, it's striking that despite making that assertion—as is typical of the government's rhetorical style of throwing out these concepts without actually ever explaining their relationship to the fundamental objectives, which is to weaken the role of members of Parliament and strengthen the power of the Prime Minister's Office and the House leader and the cabinet—they make absolutely no attempt to explain the relationship between that reference to under-represented segments of society seeking elected office and what they're actually in a substantive way trying to do through the way they proceed.
Moving on from that, there's further discussion of what constitutes modernization. The discussion report says:
Modernization of the rules of the House also includes ways to improve the functioning of committees. It has been frequently noted that it is in committees that the substantive work of Parliament is done, and where a significant share of a Member’s parliamentary work takes place. While committees continue to function effectively, there are merits to examining ways to improve not only their effectiveness, but also their inclusivity.
That again speaks to the dissonance in some of the government's rhetorical tone in the context of this discussion paper and the reality of what they are trying to do. They are not creating more inclusive committees. What they are seeking to do through this process, in the absence of the amendment, is to create the context in which the government can unilaterally impose things on the opposition with respect to the kinds of decisions that are made, and to do so without, then, opposition members having the normal processes that are available to them such as being able to talk about their concerns.
How is it more inclusive for the kinds of interventions and the length of interventions members could make, especially when the government House leader explicitly acknowledges in her comments on these remarks that committee members generally develop a significant degree of expertise in the topics before them? The proposed time limits for committee are actually 10 minutes, which is less than.... Well, of course, the time limits in the House vary, depending on the type of measure before the House, but every bill has a period of time for 20-minute speeches.
There's actually a provision in the House for unlimited time on certain kinds of measures. I can't quite remember exactly, but I believe that the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, in certain situations if not in every situation, but certainly the mover of a government motion and certainly the person who immediately responds to the government motion has unlimited time. Unilaterally, this government wants to make changes to the Standing Orders that would place greater restrictions on the ability of members of Parliament to make long interventions in committee than in the chamber of the House of Commons. One of the things this suggests to me is that, in the process of moving unilaterally, the government is doing it rather sloppily. They haven't even reflected upon the fact there is this dissonance with the existing Standing Orders, which do permit 20-minute speeches in certain cases and unlimited time in certain cases, while they would propose to severely limit the time available for discussion at committee.
How in the world would that make committees function more effectively? In what world does that increase effectiveness or inclusivity? Certainly if the government's goal, as it seems to be with respect to the amendment and the motion, is to just get through committee work as quickly as possible, to transform committees from meaningful, deliberative bodies into rubber stamps, if that's their metric of effectiveness, then we can see where they're going. Of course, effectiveness is a concept that can be very much in the eye of the beholder. It seems that every time the government talks about effectiveness, they don't mean effectiveness from the perspective of the health and vitality of the institution; they mean effectiveness from the perspective of the interests of one particular set of actors, not even being the entire government caucus but being those on the front bench, the Prime Minister, the government House leader, and their fellow travellers.
A less slippery term than “effectiveness”, though, is “inclusivity”. Transparently, what the government is talking about doing is not enhancing inclusivity with respect to committees. Although they have contemplated a provision with respect to independence, they've applied the same point to parliamentary secretaries with respect to committees. This raises some real and obvious problems, where on the one hand the government takes this holier-than-thou stand of saying they're not going to place parliamentary secretaries on committees, but then afterwards says they're going to create a defined role for parliamentary secretaries, in addition to that of the members they already have there.
There's a legitimate debate about what role parliamentary secretaries should have on committees. I know that it was the practice of the previous government to have parliamentary secretaries as members of committees, but I think what those who objected to that practice were objecting to was not the fact that the parliamentary secretary had a vote, but the fact that the parliamentary secretary was, from their perspective, in some way impeding, as a spokesman of the government, the independent functioning of the committee. Yet when you reinsert the parliamentary secretary into the committee as an additional member doing everything short of voting, all you've done is add an additional non-voting member to the committee. The principal power of the parliamentary secretary at a committee isn't the fact that they can cast a vote; it is the ability that they might have to influence other members on behalf of the government.
Mr. David Christopherson: Exactly.
Mr. Garnett Genuis: We see this a lot. It's ironic that this government ran on the slogan of “real change”, because there never was change that was more unreal—and not unreal in the good sense—than the way in which they talk about changes and their supposed desires to reform our institutions. You can say they're “real changes”, but they're not real changes in the direction that most Canadians envision them happening, and they're not real changes in line with what the discussion paper refers to.
There are some points I would like to address with respect to the management of the time of the House. The discussion paper draws a comparison between different legislatures as I think a basis for implying that they would like to get rid of Friday sittings. They note that many provincial legislatures do things differently. They don't have five sitting days a week.
There is an exception, that being the United Kingdom.
Of course, it needs to be mentioned and actually is noted later in the discussion paper that we have far more members than any provincial legislature. This reflects the fact that we are a large, geographically dispersed country.
The discussion paper notes an exception, that being the United Kingdom, which does sit on some Fridays, and I don't think it's a coincidence that the United Kingdom's is also a very large legislature. When you have more members of Parliament—as Mr. Chan mentions, yes, the United Kingdom is twice our size—when you have larger legislatures, in the case of Canada or in the case of the U.K., I think it is sensible that we acknowledge that, yes, there is a different set of operating procedures that would make sense in that context to ensure that all members of Parliament can be heard.
In my home province of Alberta, there are 87 MLAs, and so the kinds of rules that would require that all 87 MLAs have an opportunity to speak on behalf of their constituents might naturally be different from the kind of rules we require here to ensure that all 338 sitting members of Parliament have an opportunity to speak on behalf of their constituents. That is fairly intuitive, and so when the government tries to create this justification, this basis for unilaterally moving in this direction by making comparisons with other legislatures, they do so without meaningfully acknowledging that different legislatures operate under different realities, and one clear difference in the realities under which they operate is the number of members of Parliament who are there.
There are some other differences with the British parliament that I want to speak about later on in the context of the way in which the House manages its schedule.
I did my master's degree in the United Kingdom, so I have a bit of a sense of our having similar institutions in a general sense while also having very different political cultures. When the government tries to justify unilaterally moving in a certain direction simply to reflect procedures that have been undertaken in the U.K., we should stop and acknowledge the different bases for the different standing orders that exist because of the important and very real differences in our political cultures, differences that are evident to members who have spent substantial amounts of time in the U.K.
The discussion of the management of time in this paper goes on to speak about how the House of Commons sits many more days and hours each year than provincial and territorial legislatures. That is true, of course, but it reflects the reality that we have more members of Parliament.
The other issue about the way this deals with Friday sittings is the tone and attitude that this discussion paper takes—and this is striking to me—with respect to the way we govern private members' business. The alternative being proposed with respect to Fridays is that, while it could be turned into a sitting day like any other, having two hours of private members' business at the end of the day could allow some members to leave early to travel to their ridings. I don't know if this was intentionally said in that way, but it's a clear expression of the government House leader, it seems to me, that somehow private members' business is less important than government orders, and that of course members might be much more willing to leave early to go home to their ridings if it were just private members' business at the end of the day.
Private members' business is critically important. A private member's bill could certainly become law, and we have private members' bills that make very dramatic changes to our national life, with much more limited debate. The Standing Orders we have prescribe only two hours of debate at second reading before the first vote occurs. It would be very rare that government legislation would move forward with the same limited debate, and there is no provision for questions and comments during private members' business except for the mover of the motion.
The government wants, to judge by the way they are proceeding and their rejection of our amendment, to unilaterally make changes that already clearly reflect a certain attitude toward private members' business. They want to do it in a way that would allow them to change the rules of private members' business. That is something we should find very concerning, especially because of the precedent it sets. When we speak about private members' business, we can refer to all kinds of rules in the Standing Orders that clearly prescribe the structure of private members' business. The intent is to protect private members from the games that a government might want to play, which negatively impact their privileges as members of Parliament to bring forward legislation that is important to them and reflects the priorities of their communities.
I think members will be familiar with these rules. The ability to bring forward a private member's bill is based on a random draw, not by party. The order that unfolds for the proposing of private members' bills is based on a random draw. There's a provision for members to trade these spots among themselves, but members can put forward those bills. They are allocated on the basis of a draw. These come to a vote. If these bills pass second reading and are referred to committee but are not considered by that committee in a certain period of time—I can't remember off the top of my head exactly what that period of time is—there is provision for their automatic referral back to the House.
Now, these Standing Orders were developed I think in the collective wisdom of the House to protect that important role that private members have, to ensure they are meaningfully able to bring forward legislation in a way that doesn't involve game playing. You could imagine that in the absence of the automatic referral provision, if the government didn't like a private member's bill, they would stack the committee with those who were like-minded with respect to that private member's bill, and then the committee would simply fail to consider that bill. Again, in their wisdom, the Standing Orders, reflecting the collective wisdom of our history in the development of them and of our institutions, insulate against that fact.
I would not want to set a precedent that the government can unilaterally, without achieving the kind of unanimous support that our amendment speaks of, change the process of private members' bills, because this would be the thin edge of the wedge. First they're saying, okay, well, we are changing it so that we have private members' bills at the end of the day on Friday so people can go home. That's the tone of the discussion here. But if we establish a precedent, if we undo what to this point has been a convention, which is for the broader engagement of members of Parliament in considerations about these kinds of things, then it becomes much easier for the government to go the next step.
This is the important thing to consider about private member's business, about every aspect of our institutions. Even with good intentions perhaps, when we undo conventions of the way in which decisions are made, we have to think not only about whether this is something we want to do right now for our immediate purposes; we have to think about the implications more broadly, more long term, for the health of those institutions. What will the likely impact of that be over time if a future government—or if later on this same government—tries to do what they perceive as further modernization, as further steps, that have the effect of further undermining and showing further disrespect for the important role that members are supposed to have in the context of private members' business? That's something that concerns me when I see the kind of language being used with respect to this whole issue.
Now, further in the discussion paper, I do want to reflect on a separate point about this issue of the way in which votes take place. I shared some thoughts last night about the broader questions of electronic voting. I am not saying I'm opposed to electronic voting, but that we need to have a discussion on its implications and to ensure that those discussions unfold in a framework in which we cannot have the government moving unilaterally. That is because if, in the context of that discussion, we discover that electronic voting reduces the willingness of members of Parliament to vote differently from the government because they feel they can simply follow the government in a relatively more anonymous way—I'm not saying that would be our conclusion, but if that were our conclusion—then the government might say, “Hey, that's a great idea; let's proceed with it then”, even if other members were saying, “No, that's not what we want to have happen at all”. If we go down the road of doing further study on an issue, I think we need to have a bit of a sense of what the implications of that would be, and we're not seeing that clarity here at all.
In terms of the time of votes, it says:
Ringing of the bells and the taking of recorded divisions is a time-consuming exercise. Electronic voting would permit each Member to record their vote and then resume other political and constituency work.
What's striking to me about this is that there are many aspects of our responsibilities that consume time, but it's not a sufficient basis to critique a practice by saying that it is consuming time. More importantly, a practice should only be critiqued if it is consuming time unnecessarily or improperly.
I see a great deal of value in the way in which we do recorded divisions. Of course, I'm open to a discussion about how these might be done differently, but the way in which we vote is an important way that members of Parliament stand up publicly and are counted clearly and visibly. With Canadians increasingly watching what we do on social media and participating in those conversations online, I think that is something that is much more immediate and practical to them. Certainly, I have shared video of members of Parliament voting, and I know other members have too. Just from tracking the response that those things get on social media, there does seem to be a real level of engagement and interest.
Indeed, there is a transparency to the kind of public approach we take with respect to recorded divisions. There is a transparency to that, which certainly still exists in a certain sense around electronic voting, but not in the same clearly identifiable and visible way. This is something that requires discussion and is a legitimate thing for us to study as a committee, but we need to make sure, if we go down that road of studying it, that ultimately the conclusion about how we proceed will be made on the basis of the public interest, not on the basis of the interests of one particular player within the process. That is the difference here. That is what should be happening, and that is not what will happen unless the amendment that has been put forward is supported and endorsed.
Again, I see the value of this discussion of the Standing Orders, but it has to be done in a context that respects the integrity of those institutions and the integrity of the processes by which those institutions have traditionally developed and evolved and changed over time.
The question of the House calendar is another issue that will be a part of this study and is, therefore, informed by the amendment and the process of study envisioned here. This is a matter that I did not have a chance to discuss yesterday. This House calendar section seems to envision expanding the number of weeks in which the House sits.
It speaks of having the House sit earlier in January, later in June, and earlier in September. There is no mention here of sitting in July and August, but there is mention of expanding the sittings in three months of the year: January, June, and September. In the case of January, we have almost no sittings—I guess sometimes we sit on the 31st—and in the case of the other months, they are less than the full month.
What we have is the government proposing, on the one hand, that we reduce the number of days we sit, and on the other hand that we expand the number of weeks we sit. It would probably be appropriate to reflect a bit on the implication that the change they are advocating would have for the carbon footprint of members of Parliament. What presently happens, with the House sitting five days a week, is that members can come here and stay for a longer period of time at once, and then those who live outside of driving distance would fly home. What the government is envisioning doing here is creating a dynamic in which members of Parliament sit for shorter weeks at a time but a larger number of shorter weeks, so there is a lot more flying back and forth involved. I do enjoy those red-eye flights, Mr. Chair, but we need to acknowledge the impacts they would have on our environment, something that seemed to be important, at least verbally, in terms of the comments of government members.
Also, there is the impact on the effectiveness of our work, when we have more starting and stopping as opposed to the continuation of the work of the House for a certain time.
I think we could continue with our current system for Friday and other sittings. When members of Parliament are coming all the way from British Columbia, Alberta, and the Maritimes, as well as from places that are relatively close but still not that close, they are staying here for a longer period of time to do their work, rather than coming for shorter periods of time but more often. That's potentially a sensible way to proceed.
The way in which we traditionally approach the House calendar—as far as I recall the Standing Orders, and I could be wrong on this—I don't think there is anything to preclude sittings at some of the times that have been mentioned: earlier in September, later in June, and a different time in January. The sense is that the way it happens now is through conversation among the House leaders. Perhaps the whips are involved as well, but there are conversations among representatives of parties, sometimes also involving those who are not members of recognized parties, and then the presentation of a House calendar that reflects the agreement, the considered judgment of the people who represent all of the caucuses. That's the kind of unfolding of the development of the House calendar that normally occurs.
Again, this is a unilaterally introduced document, which, in the context of the motion and in the absence of—
Mr. David Christopherson: You would know.
Mr. Garnett Genuis: For sure. I think maybe we'll get on to recognizing that after the government finally agrees to support our amendment. I will just say with regard to the discussion that just occurred, it is disappointing that members of the government are not willing to allow unanimous consent to televise these proceedings. I think it probably reflects the fact that they know that Canadians are very engaged with this conversation at a time when there are a lot of issues of importance out there. Canadians are specifically engaged on the issue of the amendment. I'll just provide some support for that.
I've been speaking so far for an hour and a half today. I mentioned earlier that before I started I posted a Facebook live video, which admittedly was of fairly suspect technical quality. It already has 124 shares from my Facebook page. There are 124 shares on a video speaking about a procedural matter on an amendment that the procedure and House affairs committee is discussing, but one that I think speaks fundamentally to Canadians' sense of the fairness of our institution and the way in which these conversations have to proceed. Canadians are clearly engaged in this conversation and are looking for those opportunities to rebroadcast those conversations. There are some very good comments coming in with respect to these amendments from people who are posting comments.
Bryan Buck says, “They were never given a mandate to change parliamentary procedure.” That is a good point. There is no mandate for the way in which the government wants to proceed with respect to this. There's not a section in the Liberal platform that says the government is going to run roughshod over our parliamentary institutions and try to make changes to the way Parliament works without allowing opposition to be effectively engaged in the discussion. There wasn't a section that said that anywhere in the Liberal platform.
Bryan Buck goes on to say, “We know the Liberals do not want input from Canadians, but to take away the voice that we have is underhanded.” I think the way they have proceeded here certainly is underhanded. I don't think it reflects the way we expect the House to operate, which is that we make changes to the underlying rules of the House only in a way that reflects a consensus of the political parties, so that they do not make that narrowly respond to their specific interests.
We have a comment from Ed Gaschnitz that “The gov't needs to remember that they work FOR us. We essentially hired them. I call what they are doing insubordination. Insubordination in the real world results in termination in many instances.”
These are a couple of the many comments that I'm getting on my Facebook page with respect to the efforts of the government, and I'll use the word even if some members of the government may not like it unilaterally. So we're seeing high levels of engagement with this issue on social media and in correspondence we're receiving in our offices. I'm sure the government members are receiving the same degree of engagement and response in their offices. We are hearing and receiving those messages; and yet in response to a very good suggestion from Ms. Block about televising these proceedings so that the Canadians who are already very engaged with the process can follow it more closely, government members were not willing to allow that to proceed.
The reality of course is that Canadians are following this. They can follow this other ways. They can listen to the audio, and I know that members of our esteemed press corps are following this issue closely as well and will be sharing the details of the conversation with Canadians in the various ways that they can.
Not allowing the televising of these proceedings is not even a very effective way of shutting out the sunlight. It does speak to the government's response, which I think is concerned about the level of engagement from Canadians but not responding to it in the correct way.
I think the correct way to respond to that level of engagement from Canadians would be to listen and to seek a way forward that supports the amendment, that allows the discussion to take place. I think that would be the right way forward and the right way to respond to the public engagement and pressure we are seeing from people on this issue.
I wanted to come back to the point Ms. Tassi made before we got into this discussion of how we broadcast these proceedings. Her points were to object to the use of the word “unilateral” on the basis that the government is really seeking to provoke a discussion at the committee. We can be certain they are trying to be unilateral in the way in which this study is constructed.
That doesn't bode particularly well for the way they will proceed down the line. Yes, it might be that despite rejecting an amendment requiring unanimity that they come around after the fact and say they would not proceed with the recommendations if they didn't have the support of the opposition. Being more realistic, if it were their intention to listen to the opposition, to not proceed in a unilateral way, and to have a more fulsome level of parliamentary engagement in the process, then why would they not simply support our amendment?
If Ms. Tassi and other members representing the government on this committee do not like us to refer to them as acting unilaterally, then the simple solution is for them to cease to act unilaterally. Then we will cease to use the word, at least in that context.
Mr. David de Burgh Graham: Unilaterally.
Mr. Garnett Genuis: Yes, we will unilaterally cease our use of the word “unilaterally” if the government steps back from its unilateralism and embraces the value of consensus when it comes to moving forward with the way we operate with respect to prospective changes to the Standing Orders.
In her intervention, Ms. Tassi also said that we can broaden the discussion and get going on the study. There's a really simple way for us to get going on that study in a way that reflects a broadening of the discussion, and that's for us to move forward with this amendment.
If we have agreement from the government on this amendment then, yes, let's have the conversation about how things work in the Standing Orders. Let's recognize through that conversation what the ground rules are going to be for making a decision.
You cannot simply skip to a discussion of an issue, in some cases, without having that prior discussion of what the ground rules will be with respect to the ultimate making of the decision. That's especially so in this context because if we were to skip that step, if we were not to pass this amendment, then we would be putting in place the conditions that would allow the government to move forward—dare I say it—unilaterally with respect to changes to the Standing Orders.
I think what we see through this whole process is a potential cascading of unilateralism. First of all, they want to pass a motion without an amendment that would allow them to do a study in a way that would not ensure a meaningful role for the opposition. If that allowed to occur, then they could unilaterally propose changes to the Standing Orders.
Those changes would have the effect, over the long term, of allowing the government to move legislation forward without meaningful opportunities for the opposition to respond, without sufficient time for debate, without opposition engagement in how the House functions with respect to the allocation of days, and without the opposition having the opportunity to raise those concerns at committee. This is what you might call the three-step potential cascade of unilateral decision-making and centralization of power in the hands of the government.
The first step is this amendment. This amendment is the opportunity for us as members of the opposition to, in a clear way, express our concern and our disagreement with what the government is doing, and to stand our ground on that in defence of our parliamentary institution.
I appreciate comments from the government on that, but in reality, I think the words we have used are fitting to the situation. If the government members would rather I use different words to describe their actions, then I invite them to act in a different way.
Before we moved into this area of discussion, we were talking about the House calendar and the way the House calendar is set. As I noted, of course, the government House leader proposed that we increase the number of weeks the House sits and at the same time reduce the length of each sitting week, reducing the opportunities that exist therein for the government to be challenged and held accountable.
It seems to me, from reading the section of this discussion paper on the House calendar in its totality, that the direction the government is really trying to go here is somewhat different. It talks about the possibility of sitting at other times, but then makes this plea for flexibility in terms of how many sittings the House has in a year, the length of those sittings, and so forth.
The government House leader should know, as I'm sure she does, that flexibility already exists. It's just that the flexibility is presently expressed through consensus, not through unilateral action of the government.
The discussion paper says that the number of sittings should be based on the demand to sit. Well, we're not talking about markets, where demand can be described as an impersonal force that, in a certain sense, has its own ontological status. We're talking about specific actors with specific interests here.
When the discussion paper refers to “demands to sit”, let's ask whose demand it is that the House sits. It seems very clear to me that, in light of the tone taken by the government in this committee and its approach to this amendment, and the other things that are said in this discussion paper, it would understand “demands to sit” purely in terms of the government's desire for the House to sit or not.
This government has a history, for example with respect to its proposal around motion 6 last spring, that the timeline of sittings would be entirely at the discretion of the government. Is that what the House leader means by “demands to sit”? I hope not, but probably, yes it is.
The House does not meet simply to pass government legislation. It meets in order to achieve a whole variety of objectives at once—yes, to deliberate upon legislation and to pass some legislation; but also to provide a forum for the airing of constituent concerns; to provide opportunities for the government to be held to account; to create opportunities for the House to pronounce on motions, which themselves may not have legislative force but may have wider implications for the way in which we proceed; and certainly, if I didn't mention it already, for deliberation and votes on private members' legislation.
These are all reasons that the House sits, which is why I think it's important to ask, if one says the House calendar should be changed so that the number of sittings is based on the demands to sit, how that is different from the way we work already. Right now the House is scheduled on the basis of a consensual understanding among the parties of what is appropriate, recognizing the different functions of the House and the different responsibilities it has. If we were to move to a system where demand was somehow adjudicated in a different way, I suspect, if we note the actions of the government across the board, that this would not be demand aggregated in the same sense.
Elsewhere the document refers to the government after it has spoken to people in other parties, which still, obviously, provides the framework in which unilateral action could take place. This is another example where we see, in the draconian way we've seen relatively consistently throughout the life of this government, a proposal for weakening the strength of our institutions. In fact, the final sentence of the section on the House calendar makes the concerns I have reflected on quite explicit. It says:
While there are mechanisms to allow the House to sit beyond adjournment dates, they are usually implemented by unanimous consent or by the use of closure.
If changes to adjournment dates are made by unanimous consent, that's obviously a very good way to proceed. We should seek to, as much as possible, proceed within our operations in the House in a way that is unanimous, in a way that is reflective of the consent of the House as a whole. At least in cases where closure or time allocation are used, and certainly there can be inappropriate uses of those things, the current procedure for closure or time allocation has the effect of, in each instance, convening a certain kind of public conversation. It can become an issue for discussion and debate when those things are put forward, but if we were to see a change imposed through this process in this committee, in the absence of the amendment, if we were to see this change pushed forward by the government House Leader, which would allow, without either the accountability mechanisms associated with closure or the really positive types of decision-making processes we see through unanimous consent, that would create some real concerns.
The next section of the discussion paper, which I also neglected to mention in our discussion last night, is the issue of proposed changes to routine proceedings. It's interesting, because the misuse, so-called, of routine proceedings is something we've seen frequently in the activities of this government. We have seen many cases in which, at the beginning of routine proceedings, a member of the government front bench puts forward a motion to proceed to orders of the day. Then we have a vote on it, which, so far, the government has always won, because it has a majority in the House, and it forces the House to move on to orders of the day. We lose the opportunity for routine proceedings, but we also have a vote that takes place that introduces something else into the flow of the day, which maybe creates an issue for committees that are going on, and so forth.
I'll say this to the government. If they have concerns about routine proceedings, this is one form of unilateral action I would find acceptable: cleaning up their own behaviour and not moving motions that restrict the ability of members to do the important parts of their jobs that are part of routine proceedings.
It's interesting that they they present certain uses of routine proceedings in the context of the discussion paper as if they are problems, yet these are things the government has done. Again, this is one area where the government can and should act to change its own behaviour to show more respect for members of Parliament. Reforms to the rules governing routine proceedings that go beyond that should obviously be ones that engage the entire cadre of members of Parliament.
Again, the tone here is striking, because in this and other sections we get the sense that the government really does believe that the principal job of Parliament is to provide a stamp for their intended legislation, their intended area of discussion, as opposed to having it exercising its functions in a more fulsome way as a genuine representative body.
The section on routine proceedings speaks of this:
The rubric of “Motions” allows Members to move a debatable motion that could, on certain days, deprive the House of the ability to deliberate on the intended item for debate during Government Orders.
First of all, if there are motions that members need to bring forward, the ability to convene debate on that is not unlimited. The government House leader should know—and I'm sure members here would know—that it's not simply the case that any member of the House can propose a motion during routine proceedings that eats up the whole day. There are, of course, opportunities for the government to move to adjourn particular debates. As well, there are provisions they have that allow them to respond to these conversations and to come forward. If members, in the context of routine proceedings, were to move concurrence motions, for example, those have a prescribed time limit in the Standing Orders; I believe it's three hours.
Yes, it means that if the government wants to be discussing a particular legislative initiative for the full day and there is an important committee report, members can't immediately.... First of all, members cannot immediately move concurrence motions. There is a period of time that has to elapse between the tabling by the committee and the presentation of that concurrence motion, and it's not a short period of time. I can't remember exactly what it is, but there is a period of time that has to elapse.
Also, given that the government has a majority on committees, it is unlikely that the government would suddenly start to see a spate of frivolous committee reports as the basis for subsequent concurrence motions. In reality, under the current rules, we see concurrence motions moved relatively rarely in terms of leading to concurrence debates, and oftentimes that does occur with some degree of discussion or advance notice. The House of Commons can and often does work through discussion and collaboration, through consensus among the different actors within it, but this section would seem to imply that there is some grand, grave problem associated with members of Parliament exercising their legitimate prerogative.
If a member wishes to move for a concurrence motion during routine proceedings—interestingly, the last one we had was related to electoral reform issues, which is another case of talking about how our democratic system functions—that debate can occur if the debate is not adjourned, and it can be adjourned. If it's not adjourned, it will proceed for up to three hours. Then, for the remainder of the day, the government has an opportunity to proceed with government orders. Most of the days that we sit are allocated for government orders.
I don't see the logic in the suggestion that somehow there is a fundamental problem that a concurrence motion could be moved. Some of the language in this discussion paper doesn't seem to reflect a fulsome awareness of the current practice. The last sentence of this section says:
The House should examine different ways to schedule debate on such motions.
Members of the House already have the ability to work collaboratively to identify the times when a concurrence motion could be put forward and to proceed on that basis. The House is not limited in its ability to do almost anything, provided there is a consensus among parties and members of Parliament to proceed in that way. There are virtually no restrictions on the actions we can take via unanimous consent. Certainly, it would often be quite sensible for the appropriate notice to be given and discussion to be had about when a concurrence debate should occur, just as it can happen with respect to take-note debates, emergency debates, and other things of that nature.
We already have a system in place that allows the members of the House to collaborate on issues of scheduling, although perhaps not always on the floor of the House. When the government, in the context of this discussion paper, talks about somehow changing it or doing something different, I think that suggests they want to shift the balance in a way that works to their advantage.
That might not be their intention. They might be looking for ways to strengthen the effectiveness of routine proceedings in good faith, and perhaps there are ideas that can be proposed in that regard, but I'm not convinced there's a need for that. There are other reforms that I think would be helpful with respect to the Standing Orders. There's an opportunity to establish the conditions on which we can have a good, meaningful, and in-depth discussion on the function of routine proceedings and how its supposed to work. However, we should do that in the kind of environment that we have emphasized, one in which there is a consensus among the parties and members on the way to proceed.
The discussion paper speaks about the rubric for private members' business and it makes a proposal that is interesting in adding another rubric, which I suppose means adding another hour or another period of time when we can have debate on private members' business. If we could develop a system that would allow a larger number of private members' bills to be put forward and to be flagged for debate, I think that would certainly be a good thing. Of course, it would be important for all members of Parliament to be engaged in that discussion. I think one question that we should consider is whether to treat private members' motions and private members' bills somewhat differently because we see a large number of private members' motions without legislative force coming to the House, and they may be important and reflect priorities of constituencies. However, when there are private members' bills that come forward....
Mr. Chair, the lights are flashing. Does it mean something?
:
These meetings may end up getting scheduled in Kanata at the rate we're going.
The issue of private members' business is addressed within the discussion paper that the government has put forward. There are plenty of possible changes that could be made to the way we do private members' business. One might be to distinguish between private members' bills and private members' motions and to create avenues for greater debate and a faster movement of the discussion specifically on bills on substantive legislative initiatives that members of Parliament might want to put forward. That would be one option for change.
The important point is that there needs to be an engagement of all parties and all members in this process. We've seen with respect to private members' business a really interesting dynamic on the government side where—and I'm not sure whether this is a function of forms of communication or just the way they intend it to be—very often members of the government propose private members' bills that have more support from the opposition than from the government. I have had a chance to vote in favour of many, I think, good private members' bills that have come from members of the government. I'd have to do an exact count, but I probably have voted for more Liberal private members' bills than the Prime Minister has.
This is why there's a need for engagement of all members in the discussion about private members' business and why we should proceed on the basis of unanimity, which would not only protect the interests of the opposition in a discussion about the form and structure of private members' business, but would also protect the legitimate role and expectation for engagement by members of the government who may, on questions of structure of private members' business, have views that are slightly different from the government caucus, which they are a part of. So that's the issue of private members' business.
I'd like to talk a bit about the issue of prorogation. This is particularly serious because, although it happens on the advice of the prime minister, it is not the prime minister who does it. Prorogation is a crown prerogative. It is not, strictly speaking, the Standing Orders that prescribe crown prerogatives. As much as we wouldn't want to have a system in which our monarch or her representative exercise too much discretion, I think that the weakening of some acknowledgement of the role of the crown in this can have the effect of strengthening the office of the prime minister in a way that we wouldn't want to see.
I was politically active, actually a staffer, at the time of the infamous coalition crisis of 2008, when opposition parties proposed to form a coalition and assume the government. At the time, of course, the prime minister prorogued Parliament. Members will remember the history of this. I think that privately, many Liberals were relieved that Parliament was prorogued because they saw that the public was not reacting well at all to their proposed coalition strategy, and they were not at all sure how their planned collaboration with the New Democrats and the Bloc would work in practice.
Mr. David Christopherson: Do you think they still feel that way?
Mr. Garnett Genuis: Perhaps. Who knows what Michael Ignatieff thinks these days about that?
Mr. David Christopherson: We can guess. Never say no to power.
Mr. Garnett Genuis: Yes, but the point was that this was a very dynamic time in which Canadians were grappling with and debating questions of how our elections actually work and whether it is appropriate or not for a party that just went through a significant loss of seats to then position itself to be the government, and for a party that only runs candidates in one province to then have a veto effectively over the decision-making of government. These were all questions that Canadians were grappling with. It was not a slam dunk. The Governor General would necessarily at that appointed time prorogue Parliament.
I think she made the right decision. I think it was a decision reflecting what the public was looking for, as well as a decision that reflected the traditions of this place that have evolved. It was a decision that I don't know we could properly describe as being within the full ambit of personal discretion for the Governor General. It was one on which I'm sure she engaged constitutional experts. It was a decision which I think reflected the evolution of our system, but it was ultimately a decision that was not made by the prime minister. It was a decision that was made by the Governor General.
When we contemplate changes to prorogation, and when we think about the way in which those decisions are allowed to take place, I think we have to acknowledge the role of the crown as in some sense a guarantor of our constitutional order in the process of those decisions. Certainly, it seems to me that some of the proposals with respect to prorogation don't seem to properly acknowledge that reality.
I'll draw the attention of members, for example, to the first sentence of the third paragraph in the prorogation section of this discussion paper which says, “One option would be to require that the Government table a document early in the following session that sets out the reasons for proroguing Parliament.”
Now, this idea of having a sort of prorogation ceremony would seem to suggest that this was fully within the discretion of the government, and that's not to say that it could not be undertaken with the proper development of the process. Another concern I have is that this is just the government creating another venue outside the normal orders and processes of the House where they can stand up and try to use the time to justify their own political agenda. The government could pursue prorogation, and having pursued prorogation, could then opt to take the opportunity in Parliament to provide a justification that really they could provide in other formats, and that doesn't need to be provided.
Of course, the discussion paper envisions that happening early in the following session. Very likely this is relatively after the fact anyway. If the government were to choose to prorogue Parliament—let's say they were to do that some time this spring—then, as envisioned by this process of a prorogation ceremony, the follow-up to that, their justification for that, would not happen for months until Parliament resumed. If there were a question about prorogation, certainly having that opportunity to make a statement at some point in the distant future...very likely clear statements would have been made as well.
There is a provision for a study to be done at committee, for a report being automatically referred to committee for study, and it could be the subject of debates on supply days. Well, that's very generous, but of course anything can be the subject of debates on supply days. On supply days, the opposition can put forward motions on any topic they wish.
When it comes to the tone of the discussion paper from the government, it is trying to create the impression that the government is offering concessions on things that might be beneficial to the opposition. For those who dig into these rules, it's quite obvious that the government is looking for ways to sort of nod to things that the Liberals thought when they were in opposition, while really moving forward with the draconian approach they envision, which is something that hasn't been done by previous governments, which is seeking to unilaterally make changes without the full engagement of those who should be engaged with this discussion.
I'd like to speak to the issue of the management of debate as it's envisioned in this study and, first of all, about some of the issues around so-called closure or time allocation. Again, we see references here to protocols in the British House of Commons. I think there is an important point that's missed in that comparison, recognizing one of those differences in political culture between the way our democratic system operates and the way their system operates. I'll talk about that in a few minutes, but I think that should be highlighted in terms of the way we proceed with respect to the Standing Orders.
Again, this is a case where the government seems to use, as implied justification for moving in the direction they want to move, that this is something that is done in the British House of Commons and they seem to like it. However, there are important differences. Notwithstanding that our institutions are relatively similar, there are important differences. I'll get to that.
In the first paragraph of this discussion paper, where the government talks about the use of time allocation, it notes the history of it and its controversial nature, and it says that its use has been seen rather disdainfully by the opposition and by the media. Certainly, many members of the current government who now defend the use of time allocation were part of the commentariat that viewed time allocation particularly disdainfully.
It's interesting to think about the way our system operates, because there are formal checks and then there are public opinion checks. There are ways in which the government has the ability to do certain things, but there is an implied sense that if the government goes to certain extremes, these would be the subject of greater public debate, and they would risk a greater backlash. Perhaps an analogous case might be the use of the notwithstanding clause. Although the notwithstanding clause gives the federal government the ability to override certain kinds of decisions of the courts, in practice, governments thus far have been fully reluctant to use it at the federal level, perhaps for a host of reasons. One of them likely is the way in which that would be viewed by the opposition, the media, and the wider public. That's not to say it might not be something that's usable and in some cases legitimately, but it's the sort of thing that would raise more questions than would be raised if it were not used.
The same is true for time allocation, although time allocation has obviously been used much more frequently than the notwithstanding clause. It's one of those things for which the current rules provide fully that the government can do them, but they open a situation in which there is a heightened level of conversation around them, and that's built into the procedure by which the discussion unfolds.
As members know, there is a period around the proposal of time allocation where ministers can be asked questions about why they're doing it, and yes, there's an opportunity for public debate and conversation around it. Does that mean the current system is perfect? No, I'm sure there is value in having a discussion here about ways in which that system could be changed, and perhaps we could seek a different kind of calibration between the legitimate competing interests. That calibration first of all should recognize that the system we have already has the push and pull of the institution there, but it also should recognize that improvements cannot be considered real improvements if they are just undertaken to advance the interests of one particular actor within the system.
The time allocation proposal in this discussion paper is essentially one in which the imposition of time allocation would be automatic. The government would decide that a certain number of days would be used. This is completely different from the normal process, in that the government would prescribe a specific number of days or weeks at the committee stage. I only really noticed this reference to the committee stage on my second or third time through this. The Standing Orders at present, as I understand them, provide for time allocation in the chamber, but they don't provide for the allocation of time for study of legislation in committee. Certainly they don't provide for the government House leader, the cabinet, to impose time allocation on a committee. This isn't even a committee itself, through its own deliberations, deciding to impose certain limits on itself in terms of amount of time that would be spent discussing particular items.
We're talking about a significant derogation from the principle that committees are supposed to be masters of their own domain, by introducing a provision that allows the government House leader to automatically, as a matter of course on every item of legislation, say that a committee will only have a day, a week, or a certain period of time to consider a piece of legislation. That is a revolutionary change. That is a significant deviation not only from the way we normally operate but also from the sort of foundational assumptions we have about what committees are supposed to be about.
Committees are supposed to be about providing opportunities for members of Parliament to become expert in particular issues, to study those issues, to drill down more deeply into those issues, and then to engage in a meaningful consideration of them, and yes, a consideration of them that may involve more time than we allow during House debates. Naturally, in controlling the flow of House debates, we have 338 members, and in committee we have nine members, excluding the chair, so obviously there's more allowance for discussion of substantive matters at committee and among people who have a real level of expertise. Even with respect to the time management issue, there is a point here that the committees would be more restricted in terms of the length of an intervention than many House speeches.
The discussion of the management of debate then proceeds to review the experience of programming, or this form of automatic time allocation, in the context of the British House of Commons. While I have a great deal of respect for the British House of Commons and for its operating procedures, of course it doesn't change the fact that there is a legitimate expectation here that the changes we make reflect the consent of the Canadian people and reflect the wide expression of voices of Canadian members of Parliament and of Canadian political perspective in the context of that discussion.
There are a few important differences between our system and the British system that would suggest how this automatic time allocation would operate differently. One is the number of members of Parliament. There are twice as many members in the British system, and this probably creates different time pressures than exist in our system, where there are half as many members. That's one aspect of the dynamic we can think about.
Also, it's interesting to reflect on the different processes of candidate selection undertaken in the British system versus our system and the implications of that for expectations of local representation. Obviously, Canada is geographically much larger than the United Kingdom, and expectations for regional representation to some extent vary, even across our country, but we generally select candidates through a process of local nomination elections. We can think of it in some ways as a hybrid between the American system of large-membership open primaries and the British system. Although certain political parties are experimenting with nomination or primary-style contests, the traditional approach to candidate selection in the U.K. has been somewhat different, and I'll mention that in a minute.
Our nominations, because they involve the process of local nomination elections, generally emphasize the ability of a candidate to fully engage with a particular community, to represent that community, to draw support from that community, and then to be elected from that community to speak on behalf of it in Parliament.
The denial of the opportunity for certain members to speak fundamentally limits the voice of that constituency, which has, through the process, generally speaking, although sometimes there are cases where leaders intervene in nomination processes, chosen a person who, because of the process they went through, is clearly there as someone from that constituency speaking on behalf of it.
The British tradition of candidate selection is slightly different. The typical form that candidates would follow in the British system is that a candidate would go through a process of application to get themselves into a larger candidate pool. They would apply through the party and would present an accounting of their skills. Then they would be added to—I can't remember exactly the names used by the different parties—a candidate selection pool. The process that is then followed is one of individual constituency associations seeking applications from people who are on this prospective candidate list based on what they think will be important for their constituency. The U.K. geographically is a much smaller country. It is common that a person may get on a general candidate list. Then they may make multiple applications to different constituencies, conduct interviews with different constituencies, and then be invited by a particular constituency to be the candidate for that party in that area. It is possible that the candidate would have grown up there or would have lived in that constituency. To me, in the context of our democracy, it seems that the U.K. does not attach the same importance that we do to having somebody come out of a particular geographic location.
If you compare, in general, our system with the British system, you see that our political culture is much more defined by our geography. We are a vast country in which it is harder for people to fully understand what is going on in a different part of the country, because it's so much farther away than it might be if Canada were a smaller country. Obviously there's also the issue of the two official languages that we have here in Canada, which further accentuates that geographic or regional dimension that informs our politics.
When we talk about how debates are managed in terms of the time for discussion in the context of the British system, we need to recognize those differences. In their system it may be much easier to say certain members who are there principally for their interests and particular topics can speak to those topics in a certain period of time, whereas for other members who may have less of a specific interest in that topic, there is less of a need. This report claims, and I haven't verified that claim one way or the other, that British MPs don't mind the systems that have been put in place. However, the structure of our system is one with that heightened geographic dimension in which the use of this programming, the use of closure in general, might prevent members of Parliament who have a particular need to bring forward a specific regional or geographic voice in Parliament from doing so. We, as 338 members of Parliament, representatives of 338 regions, should be able to have the opportunity to bring those voices forward.
Very often when the government brings in closure motions—and under the current rules we at least have an opportunity to debate and challenge the government on it, an opportunity that we may well not have in the context of the proposal for programming—the government will say, “Well, we've already had 30 members speak to this.” Of course, that's nowhere near the full number of members, and we wouldn't expect that every single member of Parliament would speak to a particular issue or bill, but when there is an effort to bring about an advanced closure of the conversation, that of course limits the opportunity to give voice on the basis of some of those regional perspectives. This is the kind of dynamic that we need to be aware of.
I would caution members and I would caution the government House leader on the suggestion that we should, in the absence of an amendment, move unilaterally in the direction of this motion as it engages the discussion paper. We cannot assume that the structures that exist in other places are applicable here, or at least fully applicable, given the range of ways in which our country is unique. We have institutions similar to those in some other countries, but certainly profound differences in political culture, and specifically for the purposes of the argument that I've made here, very substantial differences in the way our geography informs our politics.
Further to the discussion of time allocation or so-called programming, the discussion paper notes that other legislatures have different kinds of measures to plan the business of the House that are “similar in principle to programming”. I haven't had time, given the short notice with which this motion has been pushed forward, to study in detail the kinds of processes that exist in New Zealand or in the United States, but I'm skeptical of a claim such as “similar in principle to programming” because, let's be clear, that could mean almost anything.
I will just raise the issue here that the motion put forward by Mr. Simms doesn't at all give due time to do, for instance, a detailed study of the kinds of systems that exist in other places. I'm not usually the biggest apologist for committees going on extensive international travel, but this might be a case where actually getting a deeper appreciation of the way these mechanisms operate in practice would be worthwhile.
What there is instead is a timeline where it seems the expectation is that the committee would simply take the government House leader's word for it that the systems in these other countries are working in the way she has described. As much as there are differences, as I've outlined, between our system and the U.K. system, it would be worth having those conversations with British members of Parliament. That wouldn't have to involve travel. There would be, of course, other ways of engaging their perspective, such as inviting experts to appear via Skype and so forth, to actually get a sense of what people are saying there about the way their system works. This would be the benefit of an opportunity for a longer and more detailed study. It would give the opposition the opportunity, in the context of an expectation of ultimate unanimous decision-making, to ask questions that would probe in a deeper way the assumptions that are present in the discussion paper that we have from the government House leader.
This is, I think, one of the key reasons that the amendment is important, because at certain points, when the discussion paper isn't just arguing the government's perspective but is making statements of fact or implied statements of fact, such as “similar in principle to programming”, a good, fulsome study would give opposition members the opportunity to more deeply study and probe those claims, and the expectation that at the end of that probing they would be meaningfully engaged in decision-making. That's one of the other key arguments we can see coming out of this discussion paper, pointing us to recognizing the importance of passing the amendment that has been proposed.
Recognizing the discussion of the international context here, the discussion paper speaks of a made-in-Canada programming scheme. I mentioned before that this sounds a lot like a made in the Prime Minister's Office programming scheme. We have no problem talking about made-in-Canada changes to the Standing Orders in general terms that engage all voices here, and that's exactly what our amendment does.
In the final paragraph in the section on so-called programming, the second sentence states:
It could include a range of time for all stages for the consideration of a bill, which would be negotiated between House Leaders then would be subject to debate, amendment and a vote in the House.
Let's be clear about what already exists. We already have a process by which House leaders can and do negotiate the amount of time that will be spent on the discussion of particular legislation. We already have a process by which that can and does take place. It doesn't always work. At times the government House leader is intransigent, and certainly that's never the case with the opposition House leader. The government then proceeds with a motion for time allocation. There already is provision for there to be discussion and negotiation about the process that takes place.
If you read more deeply into it, I think the sentence is saying that there would be a process of negotiation—it doesn't say “agreement”—among House leaders. It just says that there is going to be a process of negotiation taking place.
Then it would be subject to debate, amendment, and a vote in the House, which effectively means that again if the government proceeds with this unilateral motion to make unilateral changes, in the absence of the amendment they will establish a reality in which they could effectively—a majority government at least, not a minority government—unilaterally put forward what I suppose would likely be a motion setting out the amount of time that certain bills would be discussed, and that would still be imposed via a vote in the House.
I guess on the one hand you might say, depending on what the intention is here, that if the government is proposing legislation and in each case there is going to be an individual programming motion that will have to be debated and voted on, then all we actually have is a commitment from the government to use closure on every bill. That's all that would amount to: having the debate and the vote, perhaps minus the existing provision for a period of questioning of the minister that I think is an important part of the current time allocation procedure.
It should be noted that we say “negotiate,” but it's still subject to a vote, and there's a question as well of what would constitute the threshold in the context of that debate. If you were going to have a debate and a vote, would it be a simple majority? You could imagine a system in which programming could be voted on, but you would have a higher threshold. You would have something like the threshold established in Standing Order 53 or in Standing Order 56.1, but that isn't specified here, and noting the government's general attitude toward this amendment, noting the broader tone of this debate, I suspect that we would not have them taking great interest in the increase of that threshold to allow that discussion to take place.
I will go on to this whole area of question period and how this amendment, this motion, would inform this vital institution, which I guess unfortunately we've just missed.
The section on question period begins: “Question Period is where the Government is held to account for its policies and for the conduct of Ministers.” I might have appreciated if they had added “and of the Prime Minister,” but the important point here is that this discussion paper does seem to acknowledge the purpose of question period is for holding the government accountable for the things they have done, the decisions they have made, and also more broadly, for their conduct. However, we still see a desire to weaken the accountability associated with that mechanism. Surely the government should acknowledge that if that kind of objective is going to be achieved, you need to have meaningful opposition engagement in the discussion around what constitutes the rules for that question period.
:
I'm establishing one of my fundamental concerns about the motion in the absence of the amendment, which is that it reflects this unhealthy prioritization of efficiency over accountability. This, I think, emanates from an admiration of supposed efficiencies that exist in other systems, which I think this article well establishes do not exist. I think this article highlights the problems of that romanticism. I think that does inform our political conversations that happen here and I think we need to be aware of that as a committee.
For Mr. Reid's benefit, the quote was:
But if I were to reach out and say which kind of administration I most admire, I think there’s something to be said right here in Canada for the way our territories are run. Nunavut, Northwest Territories, and the Yukon are done without political parties around consensus. And are much more like a municipal government. And I think there’s a lot to be said for people pulling together to try and solve issues rather than to score points off of each other. And I think we need a little more of that.
That's the end of the quote, but I'm going to continue reading from the article itself. We're approaching the end, not of my remarks, but of this article.
Trudeau is essentially right in his description of how consensus government works.
Oh, here we go:
But he is wrong about the Yukon, which in fact has had standard responsible government with competing political parties since 1978. Only the Northwest Territories and Nunavut have consensus government.
While this comment received less attention, this remark and his praise for China are not as tangential as they might first appear. The only difference between consensus government and an authoritarian regime is whether the threat of force and coercion are necessary to mandating, manufacturing, and maintaining that consensus. In small communities, a genuine consensus can emerge legitimately and peacefully. But this is impossible in a large State.
What appears to animate Justin Trudeau’s political thought therefore, is, above all, something akin to Counter-Enlightenment Romanticism. It seems to be a “philosophy of community” where “all strive to be virtuous according to the same definition of virtue.” In its mild and benign form, political Romanticism manifests itself as a kind of “civic republicanism,”
—and I know David will be interested in this because of his interest in virtue ethics—
which derives more from the Ancients like Aristotle and his views on a “virtuous and participatory citizenry” than the Moderns. In its worse forms, Romanticism derives from Counter-Enlightenment philosophy from Rousseau onward, with infusions from Hegel and Marx.
Romantics see the absence of consensus as an existential threat to the general will and the public interest. Therefore, anyone who disrupts that consensus prevents the political nation from realizing the general will and becomes an impediment that must be removed. Romantics also view history as teleological and thus as a force inexorably moving in one direction toward a clear endpoint.
Trudeau expresses his teleological “sunny ways” romanticism in his blithe phrase, which has since become a meme, “Because it’s [insert current year].” In other words, anyone who attempts to disrupt, slow down, or alter the course of history must simply step out of the way of progress. Trudeau’s “post-nationalism” best corresponds to what political scientists would call “post-materialist politics,” which concerns itself with “opening opportunities for political demands” — particularly of historically marginalized groups — and participation rather than the distribution of scarce resources. In short, as Ajzenstat puts it, “romantics shrink from the adversarial politics of the parliamentary system.” Trudeau laments the “politics of division,” enveloping himself in what Weber would call “monarchical authority” in his official biography, as the living embodiment of Canadian unity:
His passion for public service and vision for Canada are shaped by his experiences and influences — his father, Pierre, and mother, Margaret; the Trudeau and Sinclair families; his roots in the East and West, French and English.
Note that “The Trudeau and Sinclair families; his roots in the East and West, French and English” evokes the Tudors, with their rose both red and white, with roots in the Houses of Lancaster and York, both North and South.
However as Christopher Hitchens observed, “politics is division by definition,” because in a liberal-democratic society, we are free to express disagreement and because our parliamentary system itself legitimates opposition and adversarialism in order to maintain the accountability of the government. Politics is by nature divisive. Without the disagreement and dissent that comes from persons who sincerely hold opposing views and beliefs, politics would cease to exist.
It might seem strange to members who know my political philosophy well that I would read from an article that praises Hitchens and criticizes Aristotle.
I don't agree with everything in this article, especially some of the implied latter critique of virtue ethics. I think that, broadly speaking, an Aristotelian virtue ethics lens is compatible with a belief in the importance of political diversity and dissent. I think the compatibility of an Aristotelian account of virtue ethics and modernity is well established in John Stuart Mill's work. I could talk more about that, but that might go beyond the scope of the amendment.
Mr. Blake Richards: Don't encourage him.
Mr. Garnett Genuis: Maybe with unanimous consent, we can go further afield than I normally would.
I think the fundamental point of this article is a really fascinating one: the reality that dictatorship should not be in any way romanticized, first because of the basic violations of human rights and dignity that it entails, and second because it really is not efficient.
Even if we could have benign dictatorship in the absence of human rights violations, I think all the evidence suggests that it would still make bigger mistakes and be less efficient in the long run than democratic societies would. Even if they move slower, democratic societies, by including more voices, are more likely to be moving in the first instance in the right direction. They are more likely to be heading where they intend to head.
What we are debating today is not something that will end the formal process of democracy or democratic elections, but we are very seriously contending with questions of the strength of our system of responsible government and the kind of relationship that exists between the executive and the legislature, with how they understand their roles relative to each other.
This article lays out that it is Parliament, not the government or the , that speaks on behalf of Canadians at the end of the day.
Our approach to proceeding with prospective review and changes of the Standing Orders might appear to members to be less efficient if you take up this romanticized idea of centralized power as the road to efficiency. You might be critical of this amendment on the basis that it seems to be inefficient because it requires engagement with more people. It requires consultation. It requires more voices to be heard in the process of determining how to move forward, but what we have put forward is right. It respects our values and our traditions, but it conforms to a more realistic and, in a sense, a deeper understanding of what constitutes efficiency, because again, as Churchill said, it is first knowing what we ought to do and then proceeding in that direction.
As I was growing up, in my own personal history of political development I recall that one of the most important political movements that I initially focused on was the Reform Party tradition. The tradition of reform coming out of western Canada highlighted all these issues about the need to counterbalance the increasing power and control of the executive and strengthening the role of the legislature.
At the same time, it reflected the genuine will of the people, which was for greater efficiency of the public service, which was for the improved effectiveness of government, which was balanced budgets. It was a tradition that was both realistic and interested in efficiency and effectiveness of government, but it was also bold in its call for this evolutionary move to enhance accountability and to enhance the role of members of Parliament.
I think we really need to revisit that tradition. It was not just about the role of the opposition. It was about the way our government works with respect to all parliamentarians and with respect to the relationship between parliamentarians and the executive. It was a tradition that said there is a role, yes, for the executive, but it is the members of Parliament who speak on behalf of the people who elected them; and there is a need for, on key changes, a more substantial level of consensus when those kinds of changes are made.
That was the tradition put forward. I do think that there are changes that we need to talk about as a committee, and we need to do it in a way that is informed by the amendment that says we will move forward together and that the process won't be controlled by one party. There are changes we do need to talk about that live out this tradition.
It's interesting to me that this was a tradition that came out of what was, in many senses, although perhaps not in every sense, the Conservative Party, the Reform Party, but this rhetoric has been adopted by the Liberal Party since the time of Paul Martin. Paul Martin spoke about the need to address a democratic deficit, and the Liberals, in their last election commitment, talked about reforms, but certainly they did not talk about dramatically changing the rules of Parliament and the process by which consent would normally achieve that.
We are seeing this increase in public expectation for engagement, but at the same time there have been actions of this government that go fundamentally against public expectations, and indeed, I think, deviate quite significantly from the commitment that this government has made in the past.
Members only need to reflect on what happened today. Many of us missed question period because the work of this committee was going through at that time. We had the Leader of the Opposition and the leader of the NDP each building off the legitimate points that the other was making.
With respect to what happened in question period and the impact this had and the discussion around the amendment, first the Leader of the Opposition asked the Prime Minister what he would have said if Stephen Harper had done this. I think this is a very good question, because Stephen Harper advanced policies that reflected a Conservative perspective, but he did so with respect for and within the rules of the system that were established and well accepted. He did what we would expect a Prime Minister to do, which was, within the context of the rules, seek to advance policies that are reflective of his priorities and the priorities of his government. That is what happened under Stephen Harper.
However, now we have Justin Trudeau, who was supposed to represent real change, and yes, it's real change, but it's not in the direction that I think folks expected.
That is, it is going in the other direction with respect to what's happening in committee. He was asked, what would you do, if Stephen Harper had done these same things? He made some comments about heckling in the House of Commons, but he never answered the question at all.
Thomas Mulcair posed the same question. Again, we had some references to children who were in the gallery, and those are the children for whom we are trying to preserve the integrity of our democratic institutions. He made some references to this, but did not answer what I think was a very legitimate and important question.
Then we had something else happen today. I think all members here were witness to it, because it was right after a vote. It was in the context of a suspension that had then taken place in the work of this committee, concerning which repeated issues of privilege had come up in the House of Commons about breaking of the rules—in one case by a government member.
There was also what appears to be a case of government members receiving the budget when they shouldn't have, in advance of its being read in the House. There were issues of members being prevented from voting, for reasons I didn't fully understand, but for something involving the vehicles. I don't know who was responsible for that, and there's a need for a thorough review, of course, of all of these questions. I know the Speaker will be coming back to the House on those questions.
What happened today should, in the context of what's happening here, give us all some real pause, because members have important responsibilities and members were limited in their ability to undertake their responsibilities, just as this discussion paper proposes to do and just as the mechanism by which it is proposed that we would discuss this discussion paper, absent the amendment, would have us do.
We have, then, the very important issue of the integrity of our parliamentary institutions at stake here, but there are also other issues that are part of the discussion. We have issues of—
An hon. member: I have a point of order.
Mr. Garnett Genuis: Mr. Chair, maybe you could ask for a little quiet.
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Excellent. It would be consistent with Mr. Simms to emphasize the 99%, I suppose.
I'm sure that whether they are on or off the record, Mr. Reid's comments are always well informed and insightful. We look forward to having those continue in a couple of days when I finish.
I was reflecting some interesting comments from Ms. Vandenbeld who suggested—and I'm quoting the article—“powers currently allocated by the government House leadership team to the Speaker on things like the use of time allocation”.
What's envisioned by this is that perhaps after the process of negotiation between House leaders and discussion, if there were an impasse, the Speaker might decide, given the nature of a particular topic, that it were time enough for the discussion. She said during the debate, “I think we should weigh the advantages and disadvantages of giving the Speaker more of a say over the parliamentary agenda. Canada has a Parliament where the government side has more to say over the agenda than almost any other legislative body.”
Incidentally, this has been part of the debate around question period as well. It's the possibility of empowering the Speaker to not only do what he does now—he or she; in the present case it's a he—to maintain decorum, to rule on specific narrow sets of matters but also to take a more substantive role in forcing ministers and parliamentary secretaries to answer questions.
There is one proposal in the discussion paper about enhancing the power of the Speaker that involves the splitting of omnibus bills. I'm going to talk a bit more about omnibus bills later, because I haven't really gone into those yet. There's also the question of the Speaker saying, sorry,, you didn't answer the question, and I expect you to answer the question. There are different proposals around enhancing the power of the Speaker.
I see both sides of this. On the one hand, we already ask the Speaker to make certain kinds of substantive judgment calls. One case where we do that is on requests for emergency debates. Members come forward with things that they say are matters of urgency. Although the Speaker, of course, when making his ruling will always refer to the Standing Orders, it doesn't seem to me that the Standing Orders, with respect to the criteria for emergency debates, are overly prescriptive.
The Speaker makes a judgment call with respect to the holding of emergency debates. It's interesting that he does that already, so is it that much of a bridge for him to then start deciding how long a debate should go?
Furthermore, another possibility is that rather than having the Speaker limit the amount of time for debate, he could enforce rules of repetition across parties and not just across an individual speech. My understanding of the present Standing Orders is that I can make a series of arguments and then another member speaking later could make the same series of arguments. That wouldn't be considered repetition because it would be a different member making the argument. The standing order, as I understand it, does not refer to the repetition of matter already discussed, but refers to the repetition of the same point by the same member.
Perhaps one way of addressing some of the prospective efficiency concerns would be simply to have the Speaker identify or intervene in cases where there was a repetition of arguments that had already been made. If someone were advancing a line of argument, for example an objection to a particular bill, the idea would be that the Speaker would say, “We've already heard that particular argument, so you need to be making new arguments.”
That would still require the Speaker to make substantive judgment calls about substantive issues. It wouldn't be quite as arbitrary as what Ms. Vandenbeld seems to have envisaged, which is a system in which the Speaker would decide that this is the kind of bill that needs three days of debate, or this is the kind of bill that needs five days of debate. That would be a difficult role for the Speaker to have, and I'm not entirely sure that would be a role the Speaker wants.
If we recognize that's a role that the Speaker shouldn't have, then certainly it's a role that the government House leader shouldn't have on every piece of legislation either. If I had to choose, I probably would say that the kind of programming envisioned by the discussion paper, in which the government House leader effectively decides exactly how long every debate is going to be, would much inferior to the alternative in which some of those decisions are made by the Speaker. Of course, this is an important other distinction between 's proposal and the proposal in the discussion paper. It doesn't seem that Ms. Vandenbeld is envisioning that the Speaker be controlling the amount of time that committees spend discussing issues. Notwithstanding the Speaker's broad jurisdiction over what happens in that place, that would infringe on this important idea of the sovereignty of committees over matters that are within their own domain.
I wanted to highlight that as one part of the history we heard in terms of the discussion of the Standing Orders. We know there is a diversity of opinion among government members with respect to the best way to proceed on changes to the Standing Orders. Maybe if we pass this amendment and we proceed to do a study in which we are thoroughly engaged in hearing the perspectives of all members, then we'll actually have an opportunity to present some of these alternatives. What about having the Speaker make recommendations about the amount of time spent debating a bill? The Speaker could even make non-binding recommendations, perhaps. I think each of these things have potential problems to them. There is no change that is totally without a potential downside, but that doesn't mean a consensus cannot be achieved.
The history of discussions of parliamentary evolution and reform is one in which there have been changes made during the tenure of multiple prime ministers that have reflected consensus, yet they haven't been uncontroversial. They've been changes to the amount of time that members can speak, changes to the makeup of committees, to the number of committees, and so forth. There are changes and improvements that we could, through discussion, agree on, and in a way that draws on the diversity that's represented by different parties, as well as the diversity that's represented by different individuals within different parties.
I want to clarify a point that I made yesterday. In the context of our discussion last night, I was making some comparisons with the more republican approach to government, which is in a certain sense revolutionary. You draw up in a moment in time a constitution. I compared that with our tradition, which is an evolved tradition. Of course, we have written documents, but we draw on a tradition of an unwritten constitution as well. I made the argument that our evolutionary tradition is better.
Our tradition reflects the wisdom of history; it doesn't just narrowly reflect the wisdom of one group of people in a specific time. I therefore made the argument that we need to make sure that the discussions we're having are evolutionary in nature, not revolutionary; in other words, that we are proceeding in a consensus way that preserves and builds on the best of our traditions rather than seek to tear up our existing approach and adopt a different one.
But I did not want or intend to give the impression in those remarks that our system does not also entail some unique potential problems with respect to the relationship between the executive and the legislature. Some of those problems arise specifically from the fact that there is an absence of clear codification.
In, say, the American system you have clearly written rules that describe the relationship of the executive to the legislature and the way in which power is distributed, and the powers that the executive does and doesn't have. In our system these things are much more subject to convention. Our system has the benefits of that evolutionary tradition insofar as we're drawing from things that have been done in the past and are benefiting from those things as much as we choose to. There is always a risk, however, when you don't have the clear codification of limits on the power of the executive, that over-reach occurs, and it is harder to put your finger on the rule that says you can't do that.
There is no law that prescribes that you need to have, for example, unanimity in a committee on procedure and House affairs in order to move forward with proposed changes with respect to the Standing Orders. It is a convention, and it's a convention that is fundamentally the necessary product of our well-established traditions of responsible government. We aren't just arriving at this arbitrarily; we're drawing from a tradition. We can talk about some unique risks that emanate from that lack of codification.
I think the importance of passing this amendment is that it speaks to the need for members of Parliament to understand what our tradition of responsible government obliges us to do even in the absence of clear codification of specific rules that tell us, we have to do this and don't have any choice. Our tradition entails challenges, but in that sense you might also say that it expects more of us, because it expects us to interpret our tradition in a definitive way.
What is at stake in this discussion is this tradition; it is this idea of responsible government that we have. I don't think the failure of this amendment would mark the end of democracy, but it would mark a limiting of responsible government, because it would establish a precedent by which the executive—even beyond what we know, because I've read one of the alternative points of view of a member of the government caucus—can completely rewrite the rules under which Parliament operates.
If we can do that; if we can say it's up to the executive to decide how Parliament works, I submit to members that this really is the thin edge of the wedge.
I have raised a variety of concerns about the provisions of the discussion paper that have set off this discussion. Members might completely disagree with the concerns I have raised with respect to the discussion paper, but hopefully I think they would appreciate the fact that the way in which this government breaks through these established conventions has the potential to open the door for further use of that broken convention, for further abuses of what happens. Members of the government might be comfortable with the unilateral decisions of with respect to the Standing Orders, but they might not be as happy with the unilateral changes that a hypothetical Prime Minister Obhrai might make to the Standing Orders. Even if they might like the power they have, it is important to leave intact institutions that preserve the integrity of our democratic system.
There is a great line on this from A Man for All Seasons. I can't quote it verbatim, but it's a discussion between Thomas More and his son-in-law.
Can you look up the anecdote I'm talking about from Thomas More? I'll read it into the record. It's short.
Okay, that's good staff member. I offered him a raise earlier, and this is where we go.
Mr. Chair, while I just sign my summer jobs allocation, I want to share with members some of the....
Thank you, Mr. Simms, for your comments with respect to programming. Perhaps I can address the underlying question in the context of the amendment and then speak more specifically about the issues you raised.
At the end of your intervention, you alluded to putting this forward in good faith. You said that you want to provoke a discussion about this, and that this is based on evidence you've heard from some people in the context of British politics. Perhaps there are other points of view. Perhaps there are other experiences of programming. Perhaps there are members of Parliament in the U.K. or members of other legislatures who have found that this doesn't work. We could hear that evidence and take that on board.
I certainly have no problem with having that discussion take place in a framework in which we know that the ability of the opposition to be engaged in the evaluation of that evidence will be important as well, because a different evaluation of the evidence may come forward. We may hear from different MPs who represent different perspectives on that question. The opposition may conclude one thing, or we might even end up agreeing on the broader principle but have sub-disagreements about the exact operationalizing of different components of it.
This is precisely the reason we have put forward this amendment—to guarantee a framework in which we can have a conversation about these issues and know that the government will not use that as an opportunity to advance their interests at the expense of ours. The framework established by the amendment is one in which we know that we will be able to have a good, meaningful, deep, and substantive conversation about this and all of the other issues that are raised.
We cannot simply assume the good faith of the government, especially—and here I say so not to impugn the reputation of any individual members—when we have reason to believe that what the government is trying to do here is move forward with changes that reflect their interests at the expense of the opposition. Reading the discussion paper, it doesn't just put out lots of things for discussion. It makes specific arguments for things in a facially neutral way, but clearly for things that advance the interests of the government. That's throughout the discussion paper.
Of course, in any proper consensus process, it would be reasonable for the government to put forward arguments or things that they see are in their interests and for the opposition to put forward arguments for things that they see are in their interests. Everybody recognizes the reality that probably at some point the opposition will be the government and the government will be the opposition. Over time we would adjudicate that, and come to certain conclusions where we could say, well, let's try to implement a change in this way that reflects all of our interests.
Mr. Simms and others in their interventions have asked that there just be a presumption of good faith, but there hasn't thus far been a good reason for us to presume that the government isn't doing what it appears to be doing—namely, trying to create circumstances that would allow them to unilaterally move forward with this motion and with changes. All they would have to do to provide the reassurance that would allow us to proceed with the study is to accept the amendment that we are advancing in the opposition. All that would be required would be for them to say “yes” to the amendment. At that point, yes, absolutely we can have the discussion about all of the issues around programming.
Mr. Simms talks about the range of witnesses we could have. Frankly, I do think there are some issues with hearing the full range of witnesses that he has talked about in the context of the timeline. The timeline proposes that there would be a report back to the House no later than June 2. We are today at the end of March.
We have a break week coming. The House will sit for two weeks in April and three weeks in May. So effectively there would be five sitting weeks. Even if we were to immediately get consensus on the amendment and move forward, we would have those five sitting weeks, and there would have to be time for consideration and discussion of a report. There would have to be time for translation and publication as well. There would have to be time on the front end for the contacting, recruiting, and scheduling witnesses.
We're actually left with a very narrow period of time. I'm not all sure that, even with the passage of the amendment, we would have time to hear from the witnesses being envisioned. That's another issue, but I think we do need to pass this amendment to establish the principle of consensus, and then discuss how we would build a study out of this at committee, one that draws on the expertise of members of Parliament here, which would really achieve the best results that people are looking for.
On the specific issues around programming itself, I take the point—and it's a good point that Mr. Simms raises—that it is worthwhile for the opposition to know if and when the government intends to introduce time allocation. All other things being equal, I don't think Mr. Simms would have met opposition members who are enthusiastic about debate being cut off, but I think they would have said yes, of course, if we accept that the government is going to cut off debate after three days. It is better to know at the beginning of day one that they're going to do that than to find out at the end of day two that they're going to do that, as is what happens under our current procedure, that being the time when the government would then put forward the appropriate notice of motion about its intention to move forward with a time allocation motion.
Right now, we don't have the use of guillotining, time allocation, closure, or whatever you call it with all legislation. Every time the government does use that, there is a price that is paid, and there is an ongoing opportunity for negotiation.
I think a better way to approach this would be.... Actually, I think Mr. Simms indirectly points the way there, when he talks on the one hand about the principle of programming but then, on the other hand, about the practice of programming. The principle of programming—that people would know in advance how a debate were going to unfold—is a good principle if it is combined with the principle of consensus. If you have a process to establish the number of days to comprise a debate, but you have that process on the basis of a real established consensus, then yes, predictability is an asset.
In the absence of consensus, that's just closure with an extra day's notice, which doesn't address the fundamental concerns. It is a little bit more notice, but still, effectively, it's the idea that there would be the automatic introduction of closure.
Even the way in which it was set up.... If I remember his intervention correctly, Mr. Simms was talking about this from the perspective of an opposition House leader. The emphasis in that model is still on one of the parties acting as collective monoliths instead of individuals acting on behalf of their constituents. He spoke of a particular case or example in which there was a change to the social benefit package introduced by the government, and the opposition had certain points it wanted to make.
Let's not forget there might be points that the opposition wants to make, but that there are also points that individual members may want to make that reflect the particular priorities or concerns of their own constituencies.
The question here is not just about a party being able to organize itself to present the debates in the way and in the time they want, but also about the individual members having the opportunity to participate in the discussion as it unfolds.
The point was made about open-ended debate looking like arm wrestling. I don't really understand or agree with that characterization. I think open-ended debate is debate in which as many members who want to speak on an issue on behalf of their constituents can do so. With the exception of certain circumstances, the first response to a government motion and so forth, generally there are the time limits.
Of course, the way that our debate works on bills, you go from a 20-minute time limit to a 10-minute time limit after a period of time, and members in the House can't speak more than once. There's obviously sort of a natural process to which that conversation would approach an ending, and it's not practical for every member to speak on every bill. Members have to focus their attention and their expertise on certain things.
There is one feature of advanced planning that would be interesting, and that is the possibility, in the context of certain debates, of determining speech length based on the number of members who were interested in speaking to it to fit in a certain number of days. Again, that would have to be done on the basis of consensus, or you would end up disenfranchising individual members of Parliament who want to bring forward individual concerns that respect the priorities of their ridings.
I think that addresses the points Mr. Simms has raised, both with respect to the process we're operating under, and these issues around the expectation of good faith—he didn't use these words—and why we can proceed with a presumption of good faith if the government supports our amendment. We can proceed to do a great study and make some recommendations and move these institutions forward on that basis. However, we cannot accept the government having the ability to unilaterally change the rules of the game. We're concerned about what the Prime Minister would do with that power, but we're also concerned about what a future prime minister might do, the norms of the engagement, and about transgressing the consensus among members. It is important that we very much preserve that in place.
Before I go on, I do want to assent to one point that Mr. Simms made, and that is the benefit of this study's being fulsome and its engaging international perspectives. The discussion paper from the government House leader comments about the way things operate in New Zealand and the U.S. House of Representatives. There are plenty of other parliaments. We could look at how time is managed among the competing interests, especially in very large, very populous democracies. I think it would be interesting to understand how time management is organized.
I suspect that for many of the democracies around the world, we would find that whatever they call it, there has to be a level of consensus. A level of consensus built into the system is fundamental to what all of us would expect there to be in the context of a robust well-functioning parliamentary democracy in which there is proper calibration of the relationship between the executive and the legislative function. This is what is at stake with this amendment. What is at stake is preserving that proper form of responsible government in this country that we have come to expect.
I would like to go on to make a few comments about the issue of question period and some of the proposals for it in the government House leader's discussion paper, in the context of some of the discussion about Fridays. One the proposed options is to end Friday sittings, and of course it is acknowledged that time from question period and for private members' business could be allocated to discussion on other days.
Think about that proposal in the context of some of the discussion in the section on question period. One of the proposals is lengthening the time allotted for questions and answers. I'm not sure about the part for answers. I didn't know that happened in our question period, but maybe they mean lengthening the amount of time for responses.
The issue, of course, is that if you are lengthening the amount of time for question period and also the amount of time allotted for questions and answers, or responses, the net effect is that you are reducing the number of questions that will be asked and answered. Depending on the changes made to the amount of time available, there is a real risk that changes would take place that would significantly reduce the ability of members of the opposition to ask questions if we were to be in a situation in which governments were giving much more extended responses to questions that should, in reality, be answered in a clearer, simpler, and more straightforward way.
I think there is some logic to the idea that if you have advance notice of questions that are to be asked and an ability to take a certain amount of time to answer those questions—actually, I think Mr. Simms spoke a bit about this yesterday—theoretically, you might expect that you would see a question and answer period that indeed looked a little bit more like a question and answer period.
Incidentally, I remember that when I took my then girlfriend, now wife, to question period for the first time, she very innocently asked me, “Why aren't they answering the questions?” This may or may not have been when the Conservatives were in government.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
Mr. Garnett Genuis: We've been married for six years, so I think anybody can do the math. I realized after I started to share the anecdote that it was going to get me into trouble.
That was a particularly abhorrent question period for us, I think. Most of the time—
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
A voice: You were doing so well.
Mr. Garnett Genuis: —we were quite good about answering the questions.
Nonetheless, when we speak about what would happen if questions and answers were longer, and if advance notice were given, we need to look at what already happens for “late shows”, because this is precisely the formula for what we informally call “late shows”, which are now adjournment proceedings.
In speeches I've given on this subject, I've advocated that we should look at ways of strengthening “late shows”, changing the time of them—I spoke about that yesterday—by exchanging time slots for them with statements by members. This is an idea that I think needs further exploration. It's the kind of thing that would enhance the value of that process.
We don't always get answers to questions in the context of late shows, but I think we do a little bit better.
Sometimes in question period we'll ask a question about a particular minority group, for example, and the government response doesn't mention the group, and then the government respondent does some research on the question and the next time we ask it, they are ready to answer the question. So having longer questions and answers and advance notice of the questions, and changed procedures for late shows, would get around the problem of a parliamentary secretary or a minister not having any idea of the issue, and therefore fudging and talking about nothing or something completely different.
That's a problem worth getting around, although it should be said that ministers and parliamentary secretaries should know their files without advance notice. They should be prepared to answer questions about important issues that opposition members are going to ask. If an opposition member is trying to surprise a government member with something very obscure, what's going on will be obvious to the public. But if you ask a legitimate question in good faith that reflects an issue that should be on the radar of the government minister or the parliamentary secretary, there is a reasonable expectation that there would be a response, even in the absence of advance notice.
Nonetheless, advance notice and lengthening of the time for question period, as some have proposed, would get around that problem of somebody just having no idea about an issue when a question is asked. At least it would give the opposition member a little more satisfaction at that point.
On the other hand, if we were dealing with an issue, and there are some when the government is fully aware of what's going on but still doesn't want to provide an explanation, then advance notice would not help. Many times, when reading the headlines, it's very obvious what the opposition is going to ask the next day, and although formally the government has advance notice, informally it knows exactly what subjects it is going to be questioned on, and it still doesn't make a meaningful response.
We can look at prospective changes that would strengthen question period, but the biggest issue in question period is a level of political will from the government and, to some extent, from the opposition, because sometimes the opposition asks questions that aren't designed to be answered. They are of a different nature, and we can't expect responses from the government on questions that are not respondable, but very often the opposition does ask questions about specific issues. These might not just be about policy issues. They might be about ethics or the conduct of the government, but in any event they are specific and clear and pointed answerable questions on which the opposition do not receive a response.
Neither advance notice nor expanding the time windows for questions and answers would change the underlying issue in questions and answers, which is whether there is a political will to respond, an expectation that the government will respond. Part of the issue around the absence of political will is some degree of political cynicism, that the public doesn't really expect politicians to give meaningful answers in question period, so it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
By the way, part of this whole debate we're having around the amendment, around the motion, concerns public expectations of our democracy. When we don't work together and don't embrace the principles of consensus and fairness that we, in the opposition, have talked about, we contribute to public cynicism that makes everything we do more challenging. It makes all of our efforts to move things forward in an effective way more challenging. That's part of the context in which we're having these conversations.
With respect to question period, I don't want to come across as not believing there are reforms that can or should be made. I'm not saying that. I think some of the changes would have the effect of accentuating public pressure on members of the cabinet and parliamentary secretaries to respond. Let's be clear, though, that this is not the solution to every problem.
I think a first step towards improving question period would be something that would happen outside of question period, something that could happen tonight and that could and should happen in the context of this committee. That would be the government's agreeing that it is to work on the basis of respect for the opposition and embrace the principle of consensus embodied by this amendment. We recognize that a strong system of democratic government requires a role for both the government and opposition caucuses, because it is not the government that speaks for all Canadians; it is only Parliament that speaks for all Canadians.
I think the government could recognize that, and if they were to recognize it, this could be a first step to their recognizing it in a number of different areas across the board: treating the opposition with a greater level of respect in the context of question period by providing substantial answers to substantial questions. I think it would be a positive way forward, but it would start with their saying here, in the context of this committee, that we recognize that Her Majesty's loyal opposition is an indispensable part of our system.
I'd like to now speak to the question of omnibus legislation. This question is really interesting, of course, because we just had tabled in the House the budget. I had a chance to read the budget in the half hour before coming down here.
No, I didn't actually—
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
Mr. Garnett Genuis: —but am just making the point that it's a very long piece of legislation and deals with a wide variety of very disparate themes.
It is natural that the budget would touch on a broad range of themes, and I'm not yet ready to pronounce on whether it covers more themes than are appropriate for the budget or not. That's something I would have to make a more thorough study of than I've had a chance to do in the intervening time. Every budget that comes forward touches on many themes.
I notice that there is a subheading on Canada-U.S. relations; there's discussion of Canada's role in the world. If in the context of a budget you're talking about foreign affairs issues and Canada's role in the world, of course there's expenditure involved in foreign affairs, but I can only assume that when you're speaking of Canada's role in the world, the discussion is going to cover some basic philosophy as well as a discussion of expenditure items.
Very likely, this budget is an omnibus bill, at least insofar as omnibus bills are defined in the discussion paper.
I have to say that the definition of omnibus bill given in this discussion paper actually illustrates the problem with some of the discussion that is so critical of omnibus bills, in the absence of having a clear definition of what an omnibus bill is: it's actually very difficult to define what kind of bill you don't like.
I guess you could identify as such a bill that dealt with completely unrelated themes, with absolutely no plausible connection between the two or need for them to be connected. Omnibus bills are described in the discussion paper in this way:
The Government committed to end the improper use of omnibus legislation.
Even there, they're committed to end the “improper use” of omnibus legislation. Presumably they will replace it with the proper use of omnibus legislation, and it's not at all clear what in their mind the difference is.
They say:
Omnibus bills can be defined as a bill that contains separate and unrelated themes packaged into one bill. Members are then forced to vote for or against a bill that could have elements that Members would support or oppose.
Let's be clear. Members are required all the time to vote for or against bills that have elements they support and oppose. Even very short bills contain elements you might agree with and disagree with as well. That's very common.
For example, there was a bill before the House recently. I can't remember the number of it, but it was a bill that dealt in some clauses with the opioid crisis that we face. It also made some specific changes to the community consultation provisions, and we took real issue with those changes. This was an issue for us as a caucus. We said there were many provisions in this bill around the importation of pill presses, around the opening of certain kinds of packages that are being imported, and around the enhancing of the inspection process that we agreed with, but then there was one provision that we didn't agree with. We proposed to split that bill, and the government refused to allow us to split it, even though it was emphatic about the urgency of moving this bill forward. We agreed to actually expedite both halves of the bill if they were split, and yet the government was still unwilling to accept that.
Was that an omnibus bill? It some sense it was, in that dealt with separate and unrelated themes. It dealt with the importation of drug paraphernalia, and then it also dealt with issues of community consultation around supervised consumption sites. In a certain sense we're talking about different themes, but in a certain sense of course we're not talking about different themes, because both of those deal with prospective responses to the opioid crisis that we face.
Was that bill an omnibus bill? Actually, it was in the public interest for that bill to be split. It did create a situation in which members were forced, to quote from the discussion paper, to “vote for or against a bill that could have elements that Members would support or oppose”. That's all well and good, but then how do you make the determination about what is and is not an omnibus bill? I know that the previous government attracted a great deal of criticism for what some regarded as the inappropriate use of omnibus legislation. The proposals that the previous government made and passed in our budgets were not at all dissimilar to the proposals advanced by this government in each of its budgets.
Any budget includes a broad range of different changes to taxation, to regulatory environments, and to expenditure in the name of advancing the government's economic objectives. Of course, every budget has a common theme. The common theme of the budget is the fiscal and economic plan of the government. That is a common theme. That's a theme that has a relationship to all sorts of other themes. It's not a theme that can exist in isolation from the other things that governments do, but it certainly is a theme. Yes, when a government proposes a budget or a budget implementation act, there are a lot of different things in there that would generally be around a common theme.
I think it's fair to say that in some people's minds, there is a lot of difference between the improper combination of things of a similar theme and the proper combination of things of a similar theme, but it's not easy to actually put your finger on the distinguishing feature of improper versus proper omnibus legislation. Perhaps if the amendment is supported and we proceed to a study, we'll get some further clarity around what the proper and improper are meant to be in that context. You've got to have a bit of a sense of what you're talking about, especially if the discussion paper envisions that this is a judgment call that would have to be made by the Speaker.
We can expect the Speaker to make decisions that reflect what is dictated in the context of a standing order on the basis of precedent. However, in the absence of any clear precedent for making some kind of a formal distinction between the proper and the improper use of omnibus legislation, I think you would be putting the Speaker in a particularly difficult position unless this committee could arrive at a clear definition of what was and was not acceptable omnibus legislation.
Perhaps some people might say it's all in the length, and that was some of the criticism of some of the previous government's legislation. It was just too long. However, if you're trying to roll out a comprehensive economic plan, it could well be that it would all be thematically related to the same thing and would indeed, in that context, still be quite long.
It's not at all clear to me where this intends to go, but I'll tell you what I suspect it's planning to do. The government made a lot of commitments in opposition about institutional changes they would wish to make. Sometimes opposition parties make commitments about changes to institutions that they don't actually want to implement. We've seen that, certainly on the electoral reform issue and on others as well.
When it comes to omnibus legislation, they have used omnibus legislation. They want to continue to use omnibus legislation. In this day and age, given the complexity of governments, it's hard to imagine not having a budget that dealt with a certain diversity of themes, but in the context of an overarching theme. However, they want to be able to cling to this distinction between proper and improper use of omnibus legislation, just as they want to distinguish between proper and improper deficits and proper and improper uses of time allocation. Really, what they're applying is not an objective filter at all about what constitutes the proper or the improper. Actually, what they are applying is a wholly partisan filter. We get the sense that when it says the government is committed to ending ”the improper use of omnibus legislation”, they're just speaking about trying to establish a distinction between what they do and what the previous government did, which is a difference of party but not a clear difference at all in terms of the substance of what is involved there.
This then puts the Speaker, the neutral officer of the House, in a particularly difficult situation, in that he or she has to adjudicate on the balance of properness or not, when it's something that can't even be clearly defined by the government. How is it fair for them to expect a neutral person who is acting on behalf of the institution to be able to make a fine, defined distinction, when it's not clear at all that they even have a real sense or grasp on what that distinction is?
The next section, theme 3 in the discussion paper, is management of committees. I have to just shake my head a bit at the title of this section. As I go through this discussion paper from the government House leader, there is what the discussion paper says directly in terms of the arguments it makes and the issues one can and should raise about those, but there is also the tone, the language through which things are expressed, that really sets off the kind of perspective that's being brought to it and why we need to have consensus at this committee. I would prefer, frankly, that we have this committee generate the ideas and the path forward, rather than having the framing of the debate coming immediately from the government House leader.
We get phrases like “management of committees”. That's something that someone in a leader's office would say: “Okay, we have to manage the committees.” Those of us here on a committee would say that we have to consider the “governance” of the committee, the committee as a self-governing entity, not as a group of potentially stray children who have to be managed, but as a vital organ of our democracy that has to consider the way in which it's governed.
Some of these turns of phrase are disappointing. However, in a way, they're useful because of how revealing they are and how they hopefully will draw the attention of all members, government members as well as opposition members, to the need to pass an amendment that allows us to proceed with a discussion that is framed in a fundamentally different way, and that we need to start that discussion on a bit of a different foot.
Nonetheless, on “Theme 3: Management of Committees”, as it's called, there are a few other turns of phrase here that I think should jump out at members in terms of illustrating the problems with the tone taken by the government House leader, and therefore why protecting the input of the opposition through this amendment is so vital. It reads, “Members who are focused on substantive issues are less [likely] to resort to tactics.”
Let's be clear. What we had is the introduction of a discussion paper, so-called, with all these problems with it, during a break week, and then a refusal to support an amendment that would establish the conditions in which the government would seek to unilaterally impose dramatic changes to the way in which our parliamentary institutions operate. If you want to talk about resorting to tactics, that's certainly resorting to tactics, although it's still a rather strange and awkward turn of phrase.
The discussion paper continues, “As a result, the House could examine ways to make committees more inclusive as well as ways to ensure that obstructionist tactics do not crowd out the substantive work of committees.” This is, I think, setting up a justification for limiting such things as members talking at length about particular issues. Really, what is envisioned here are changes that would still leave in place the ability of the government to resort to tactics. In fact, that's what they're doing, through their motion, discussion paper, and refusal to support our amendment. It would simply eliminate the ability of the opposition to have tools to use in response.
What we have right now is a certain kind of equilibrium that is shaped by the Standing Orders. This means that the government has certain tools available to them. The opposition has certain tools available to them. We calibrate our use of these tools in response to certain circumstances, to certain situations. We use them in response to what's in front of us. We use them more or less. If we're wise, we use them sparingly, only to draw attention to very particular concerns we have that are indeed things we think have resonance with the wider public.
We have every incentive, as elected officials, to use the tactics available to us in a way that is wise, that is judicious, and that is measured. Instead, through the process they have set up, in the context of what's happening in this committee, the government is establishing the circumstances in which the opposition would not be able to use tactics, even while the government would be able to use tactics.
The language specifically refers to “obstructionist tactics do not crowd out the substantive work of committees.” It doesn't refer to the alternative set of tactics, which is dropping a motion on a Friday. Having a timeline, at this point, so that if the amendment passes and we were to go forward, even if it still limits the amount of time that could be used for debate, is not an obstructionist tactic. That's the inverse of the government tactic to try to inappropriately push something through that would merit a greater length and depth of conversation.
I think I've already objected to the title “Management of Committees”. I think a better title would be “Governance of Committees”, but a more accurate title, a more descriptive title of the content here, would be “Management of the Opposition in Committees”, or “Management of the Opposition's Desire to Represent Their Constituents”. It is important that we be able to use tactics to challenge the government and to challenge the ways in which they do things that are injurious to the interests of our constituency.
Now there is a proposal that I think one can probably see the value of in principle but some problems with in practice, and then immediately after see that it is actually about setting up the justification for something else the government wants to do that I have a real problem with. This theme 3 that we're dealing with talks about creating the space for “one independent Member [to be] an ex officio member of committees with all privileges except for the ability to vote, or to constitute quorum.”
I'm quoting, of course, and the quote continues, “This would allow independent Members to participate in in camera proceedings, question witnesses, and travel with committees.”
Now, on a few issues here, yes, there might be a need for provisions that would allow for greater opportunities for questioning and for travel, although I believe it should be the practice that we allow elected members to attend in camera meetings of committees. That hasn't always happened, and in the case of one particular bill early on in this Parliament that didn't happen, and I was very concerned about that. Generally speaking, it should already be the case that any member of Parliament who wants to sit in on the proceedings of the committee, whether they are public or in camera, should be able to do that, provided, of course, they respect the provisions that we know are associated with being in camera and the use of documents that are produced in camera. I think all members know about that and have an understanding of what's expected of them in that context, and if they're not a member of a particular committee, they may be a member of another committee.
The issue of in camera proceedings, I think, wouldn't necessarily be a dramatic change. I do want to ask a couple of questions, though, about this question of the involvement of independent members on committees with some of these privileges. I guess the question would be this: who gets to determine which independent members are on the committee? Who gets to determine which independents get to sit or be part of which committees?
The other question is that if the process would allow independent members of Parliament to choose which committee they wanted to affiliate themselves with, then it would actually have an effect of giving independent members of Parliament powers that members of Parliament who are members of political parties don't have because, as I'm sure government members know, typically the process is that they don't choose which committees they are on. It is the whip and their office who assigns them to committees. It's possible that some of the members who are here today didn't choose to be on the procedure and House affairs committee. I'm sure that's unlikely, but it's possible, yet, what is envisioned by the process that is imagined by the House Leader here is that the decision about who goes to which committee would be something that the independent member could choose.
It's not stated, but I think it's implied. They could say they wanted to be on the finance committee or they wanted to be on the foreign affairs committee. Then I guess we would end up with one of two problems. One, it would be at the government's discretion which independents ended up on which committees. I don't think you would want that, but the alternative would be to give independent members of Parliament in a sense a greater level of influence than members who are members of parties, because of the issue of committee selection.
There would be ways to address this. I think it would be interesting to imagine a committee system in which, independent of parties, members could signal their interest in being on particular committees. Then that allocation could be done in a more independent way. You could imagine that as being a possible alternative that would both engage independent members of Parliament in the process and at the same time ensure a certain equality of those who were members of parties and those who were not members of parties.
This is a concern I had around the government's legislation, Bill , but it applies in this case as well. Bill says that for the security intelligence committee—I'm not getting the name exactly right, but it's the intelligence review committee—the Prime Minister appoints a certain number of members, only a certain number of whom can be members of the government caucus. That, though, creates an issue in which you could have independents who, for whatever reason, left the government caucus, but then they are, in a sense, quasi-members of the government caucus. They are being used by the government, because the rules provide for only a certain number of government members to be on a committee, yet the government could appoint someone as a non-member of the government who is effectively acting as a member of the government in that context.
We have the case of at least one former member of the government caucus who votes very frequently with the government. The government could recognize, in the context of having an independent who's outside of their caucus, that they can actually use that person to do things that government members can't do, such as be an additional person on a committee. If we were to see a government use those kinds of tactics, I think that would be a concern. I think that would be a misuse of process and of what it is to be an independent.
Right now, of course, there aren't many advantages to being an independent. Primarily, in the way our system is constructed, it's principally a matter of disadvantages associated with being an independent. There are potential concerns that are created, both by the framework established by Bill and by some of the language that's used here, that illustrate the need for that broader discussion. The opposition needs an opportunity to raise, to pronounce on, and in the context of the unanimity provisions to be involved in a discussion about some potential concerns that the government may not have thought of around some of these questions that may be more technical in nature. They may just be matters of not necessarily foreseeing something.
Why not build into the process a more ground-up, consensus-based approach to decision-making than the one that has been set up by the motion in the absence of the amendment?
I'm very pleased to be able to join the debate, finally, after my colleague Mr. Genuis was able to complete his introduction and reserve future comments at a later point.
I have written an outline of the comments I want to make. Unlike Mr. Genuis, I don't have the gift for being succinct and even-tempered in this commentary.
Maybe what I'll start with is my first day here in Parliament, those first few weeks when we started. I remember being a brand new member, a rookie, and about 200 of us were at the Sir John A. Macdonald Building for the first rookie orientation session. When we went there, we were told what our roles were going to be and what a privilege it was to serve as a member of Parliament. We were told that very few people have come here before us, and that it was an opportunity very few people have had to take the seats of our predecessors and be able to serve our country in that way, whether serving at a provincial legislature, which is equally a privilege, or serving in the Parliament of Canada.
I remember, then, that the had come in at one point, and the proceedings were interrupted. He was given the opportunity to speak and to address all the rookie parliamentarians who were there. He mentioned how important the role of a member of Parliament would be and how he would raise our capacity to contribute to Canada, to contribute through legislation and debate. It was a fine sentiment to have at the time. I just don't see it being followed through in the day-to-day activities when I see motions such as this, and then a very reasonable amendment being proposed to make it even better, to make it exactly what this place should be about, which is about the members of Parliament, the parliamentarians, and not about the executive.
I have big problems with the discussion paper and how the process went down to get to the point where we have this motion now before this committee for what I would consider to be a rushed study.
This isn't camp. I've been a camp counsellor before. I've been responsible for others. I've been a supervisor at the Chamber of Commerce for policy staff and for the operation of volunteer committees that did a lot of the same work that Parliament does, but for the business community in Calgary.
I say this isn't camp because we shouldn't be treated as though we're a bunch of children who need the government to look over the activities we undertake on behalf of our constituents. I just don't think that's the right level of responsibility. That's not the right relationship we should have towards the government.
What I see in the motion being proposed for a study here is basically just that, the type of treatment that says we parliamentarians cannot govern ourselves, that we are incapable of doing what's best for both Parliament and in addressing individual public policy issues affecting Canadians from coast to coast or affecting individual provinces or cities. I think that's a very important thing to remember.
I really only have a couple of points, but I do have about three dozen sub-points to each of those couple of points. I think the motion is unreasonable as written, without the amendment to fix it. I think it's also reckless.
I've gone through the effort of looking at past times when there was unanimous agreement to change the Standing Orders of the House, and then other times when there wasn't unanimous agreement and Parliament started to break down. There was disagreement. The trust and the co-operative environment that we live in broke down and didn't exist anymore, and then things started to slow down. The government wasn't able to pass the legislation it wanted, and it would blame the opposition.
In truth, the government holds all the power. You all are not members of the government; you are members of the government caucus. You support the government because you believe in the policies they are putting forward. You are also free to disagree with them, just as we are on this side. We are free to disagree with our party and to vote according to our conscience and the dictates of our supporters and volunteers.
Sometimes there are members who will say that when they belong to a political party, the political agenda, the platform they ran on, is what they want to implement in this place and in this House. They do their best to get through as much of the policy books and as many of the policy platforms as they can, to try to get them implemented.
I would say, though, that we have circles of responsibilities that we have to adhere to. However we choose to vote and whichever policies we choose to advance, we are still responsible to somebody at the end of the day. I would like to think that as members of Parliament, as parliamentarians who have taken up seats that others have had in the past before us, we have a dual responsibility.
One is responsibility to today's Canadians, to the electorate that we have—our supporters, our donors, our volunteers, our families, our political affiliation, and our faith, if we're members of a faith community.
Our second responsibility is to those who came before us. Parliament didn't simply come to exist because it began as a start-up last year in 2016. It came about long before that, as Mr. Genuis has mentioned before when he started reading parts of the Magna Carta, which gave birth to a lot of.... Thankfully, he didn't go through reading the whole thing, because that would have been long. I was joking with him that he should maybe read it in French. A good translation would help him get through it.
Many members who have come before us, whom I could quote, have said how much more they appreciated Parliament after many years here than they did when they started as a rookie. I think it's natural when you start at a new work place. You wish you did things differently or you could show up at different times. You wish your supervisor was different or that your days were arranged in a different manner. I've heard this a lot before. I used to work in human resources. I was a registrar for a professional association in Alberta. This was very common. I had 6,000 members. I would talk to my membership quite often, and they would mention the types of issues they saw in their workplaces and the types of environments people work in.
Then you have that intergenerational mix. People like to work in different ways, depending on the generation they're in, so then there's an adjustment period for that.
I think Parliament goes through that as well. It changes the way we organize our business in order to match with the expectations of groups of Canadians and the generations as they come through the demographic cohorts that we live within.
I do not think, though, that Parliament is like a corporation. It is not like a not-for-profit organization. It's not like any other business. I wrote myself a note that if tomorrow a private business were to fail and people were to lose their jobs, people would go find other jobs. The corporation would wind down. Its assets would be redistributed. That can't happen in Parliament. It simply cannot. We must not let that happen. It's our job as parliamentarians to ensure that doesn't happen.
The changing of the rules and the way we do our business could easily lead to a situation of even less engagement by parliamentarians in the debates of the House. Our primary role is unlike a business. If you're in a for-profit corporation, you generate a profit either for shareholders or for the owners of the company, in whatever format that may be. If you work for a not-for-profit, as I did in a professional association, the chamber of commerce, it was to generate value for the membership in whatever form that was.
Here our role is truly to debate. We're a deliberative body. We're not rated based on how much legislation we pass on behalf of the government, which is why the amendment is so important. Changing the rules to make it more efficient has been the term that's been used in reforming the Standing Orders of the House of Commons, or the modernization of the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. I have a problem with the word “modernization”. It somehow implies that this place is not modern and that we can't do things in a contemporary environment through a past practice or through unanimous consent, as we've done many times before. These things actually help us do our work, so it's not “modernizing”, since we are modern, but maybe “contemporary” would be the term to use.
I also think another issue that we have is a conception that Parliament can't fail. It should not fail. It's the job of parliamentarians, not the Government of Canada, to figure out the best model and the best work environment we can have, and to determine how our daily business should be conducted in order to achieve that goal.
As a parliamentarian on the opposition side, my goal is to ensure that the government is held accountable for both its spending decisions and its policy decisions. By tradition, I really believe my role is to review the main estimates and to review the spending of the government on a regular basis, in the committee I'm on, which in this case happens to be the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.
After that, it is to contribute to the policy debates. We deliberate. We don't have a certain quota of legislation that we're supposed to pass at the end of the day, both for the government and for private members' business and motions.
Before I continue too much more, I just want to give you a brief outline of what I'd like to cover.
One of the first things I want to make comparisons to is a governance board. I want to compare Parliament to how corporations, chambers of commerce, and the places I've worked in did their business. Second, I want to talk about consensual leadership and consensus-based decision-making. I really think that Parliament works best when there is consensus, co-operation, and trust. You gain trust and you lose trust by different activities. I think it goes both ways, on the opposition side and the government side, but because we on the opposition side are really at the mercy of the government—both the government caucus and the government—we look for those opportunities for co-operation to build trust and understanding.
I've been going through different quotes from former prime minister John Diefenbaker, who had a great love for Parliament. In fact, one of the speaking crutches he had, instead of ums and ahs, was “I love this Parliament”. That gave him just enough time to think of what he wanted to say next, and then he continued for another 20 minutes. I'm sure that if he were here today, he would be repeating “I love this Parliament” every hour, but it wouldn't be a crutch. He would be truthfully saying how much he appreciated and loved this place. He loved this place so much that he refused to move his office at one point, and that has been to the benefit of the opposition since then.
He did say that Parliament was the guarantor of our freedoms. It wasn't just legislation that was passed in this place and it wasn't some belief in something outside of Parliament; Parliament is the guarantor of the rights and freedoms of Canadians, but also of parliamentarians and the privileges we enjoy in order to do the work that we have been elected to do in this place.
After that I want to briefly talk about the Great Reform Act of 1832 in the United Kingdom. For us on the Conservative side, the year 1832 and the decades that led into 1867 are quite important for the conservative movement in the United Kingdom and Canada because they led to the breakup of the original Conservative Party. Those 1832 reforms were really about how Parliament worked. They were about the rotten boroughs and how prime ministers were responsible to parliamentarians, as well as about the responsibility of political parties, political units, the whole coalition, the trust they had amongst themselves, and the lack of trust between the Peelite factions and others. I think it bears speaking about, at least a little.
Lastly, I'll probably finish by going through this document, “Reforming the Standing Orders of the House of Commons”, because I have deep problems both with the content of it and also with the process by which it is being implemented. I will go through the notice of motion and the very reasonable amendment we have proposed that would improve it. My issue is that much of this would have to be done as individual studies. I just want to speak more about that and give you examples from other jurisdictions that have done it exactly in that way. There is so much material in here that you cannot do it justice by rushing it from now to June 2. There simply isn't enough time and opportunity to do that.
I do have the McGrath report here, which I know many members have referred to as well. Mr. Christopherson referred to it repeatedly, showing that at the time there was unanimity, agreement, consensus, and co-operation at the committee level to put forward recommendations that all parliamentarians could consider to reform the way they do their business, but it was done with the trust and the confidence that they had done their work, which they had.
It's a pretty voluminous report. The joke goes that a standing committee of the House writes a report and puts it on the shelf, and nobody reads it. This is the one time, I think, that many of us have read it and actually gone through it in fine detail. It is an important work that should be referenced here, and it bears repeating.
I also wanted to mention, with the McGrath report, my experience on other committees. I have substituted on other committees of the House of Commons here during my time, and I have also worked on reports and studies with other committees where we did find unanimity. I happen to serve on the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, and to my knowledge, since I joined the committee on a permanent basis, we have not had a moment when we've tabled a dissenting report. I stand to be corrected on that, but I cannot remember having to write a dissenting report. That is because we have worked extremely hard at co-operation and seeking consensus. We've given in, as opposition members on the committee, and the government caucus members have given in as well. We found an opportunity to find common ground and recommendations that we could propose to other parliamentarians that actually reflect the views of the committee. You will find that the reports we write actually say, “the committee finds that...”, “the committee believes that....”
In every single instance where you find that in those reports, it's truthful. I know it's truthful because every time we have one of those lines, we stop and ask each member if they are okay with this, if they actually believe every single sentence that follows, and every time, we have found that consensus. I don't think it will be found here, first because of the process by which this motion was brought before the committee and then because the unreasonableness of resisting a very reasoned amendment proposal by my colleague to improve on this hurts the trust.
I understand that this committee so far has been able to work with a great deal of co-operation and consensus-building, which I think is an important feature of committee business and the way we do the work of the House of Commons.
Those are five main points I was going to raise. At different times I might move between them, and you'll forgive me for that if I do. I'll try to reduce repetition to as little as possible to make my points.
The motion does say on the back end, “...to create or to revise a usual practice of the House, which is not unanimously agreed to by the Committee....” I think that's critical. You don't get to this point without building trust at the committee level, and right now there just simply is an empty tank of trust between the two sides. I've been at this committee since Tuesday to debate this issue, and I had the great pleasure to listen to my colleague, Mr. Genuis, make his points. I think it was a Herculean effort on his part.
I also want to congratulate all of us. It was a Herculean effort to listen to him for the past nine hours. He's a great friend of mine. He made a lot of good points, and he robbed me of an opportunity to make those same points. I don't want to repeat what he said.
I'd better mention too the experience that I bring to this debate at this committee. I am a rookie parliamentarian and this is my first term in office, but I also used to work for a member of Parliament, about 12 years ago, when he was first elected to the House of Commons as a rookie. That was Mr. Steven Blaney, who became a minister. He's still a serving member of the House of Commons. I remember being just as confused by the standing rules of the House and the regulations as he was, and I took the time to learn them as well as I could to assist him in the work that he did.
I come to this debate, then, from several viewpoints. I'm both a sitting member and I used to work for a member of Parliament. I also have had the distinction of serving for the Minister of National Defence on his exempt staff on parliamentary business affecting the portfolios I was responsible for. Through that process I gained a deeper appreciation for the ability of the opposition to confound and complicate and make my life much more difficult as a staff member. At the time I didn't appreciate it, but I appreciate it now in retrospect. I think it's only with time that you begin to appreciate the ability of the opposition to slow things down, which might not be very efficient, but it gives time for reflection and it's well worth having.
Unlike many members here, as well I served as an exempt staff provincially at the Alberta legislature for both the Minister of Sustainable Resource Development and the Minister of Finance in Alberta, whom we also call the provincial treasurer. I served on his staff for three years as a policy adviser, but I also dealt with a lot of the standing rules of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta, so I bring both viewpoints here. I know there are many members, both on the government caucus side and in the opposition caucuses, who have served in a provincial legislature or a provincial parliament, as the case may be, who bring that type of experience with them as well.
I would always caution parliamentarians here not to look necessarily at how the provinces do business to find the best model of efficiency. In the Alberta legislature you can pretty much pass a piece of legalisation in one day. I don't personally believe that type of efficiency is what we want here. That's not the type of efficiency parliaments and legislatures were set up for. What we were set up to do is to deliberate, and this is maybe one point....
I'm just going to segue here to the actual document that was proposed, which is the study, the motion, which is based on studying parts of this and parts of the Standing Orders during that day of debate on October 6. It does say here, “While Parliament by its very nature is an adversarial system....” Now, if we stop right there, I have a problem with calling this place adversarial. I don't consider members of the government caucus my opponents. You're not my enemies. I actually think of you as colleagues.
I'm a junior colleague to you, Mr. Chair. We've enjoyed a couple of flights flying through Toronto, as well as Air Canada's stellar service, and we've been stuck in Toronto a few times. It does happen. I have great appreciation for my veteran members and those who have been here, who have more experience than I do, regardless of the political party they belong to, because they bring a great amount of experience to how this place works. I did not appreciate that as much when I came here.
We were elected in different “class years”. I hang out, so to speak, with my class of 2015 much more than I do with “the others”, we call them, regardless of the political affiliation they have, but it's from those others, such as chairs like , that we learn. I have learned a great deal from him about how to be a better committee member at the table. He's taken the time to explain to me the rules around committees, how they function, and where the great advantages and disadvantages are. I've changed the way I both behave and do the work that I'm asked to do at committee.
I appreciate that type of guidance. You don't get that from the rookie members, obviously, because we don't have that experience here. Those changes to the rules, then, depend upon the more experienced members giving us some guidance and telling us that these are where the pit traps are, these are where the fault lines are, and if you change the rules in this way, there will be unforeseen consequences.
I depend on members like Mr. Simms to explain to us what's happened in the past. As I was saying before, I look to the more experienced members, regardless of the political party, for judgment calls on rules, procedures, and how those should work.
Now, I really do feel that if the government pursues the contents of “Reforming the Standing Orders of the House of Commons”, as laid out here, and they achieve these goals in the timelines being proposed in the main motion, with or without the amendment, it would be to the detriment of parliamentarians. It would, in effect, through the rule changes, turn the opposition into an audience. We would be able to speak up occasionally, perhaps, but not really be able to contribute to this place.
In every single past reform and in every report I've read, from the McGrath report to the debates in 1991, 1986, and 1969, the thing that was most important for parliamentarians participating in those debates was ensuring that they were the ones who were receiving a greater opportunity to keep the government accountable—if you were an opposition member, that was key to you—and to do more effective legislative work. This would include proposing amendments and finding opportunities for unanimous consent motions that everybody could live with to change the rules temporarily for a particular situation or to make exceptions.
I'll just mention that before the election, I was registrar for the human resources profession in the province of Alberta, a not-for-profit corporation. Unlike the CPAs, the accounting profession, or the engineers, we had, and still have, voluntary certification, with 6,000 members who voluntarily pay dues in order to have a professional certification. In human resources and labour relations you would always say that the rules exist not as a straitjacket. They're not supposed to be a straitjacket. For HR professionals, you look at the rules and you ask where the exceptions are and where you can make your employees happy by making those exceptions. The right opportunity for that comes with experience, which builds judgment and then trust. They're all interlinked. You cannot get there by any other fashion.
I would always tell them...and these were experienced professionals with 30 to 35 years in labour relations, negotiating with unions on both sides. We had members on both sides of the table negotiating. They would always say that the rules exist, sure, but as long as we can all co-operate, we can reach an agreement and suspend the rules temporarily. If we all agree on that, we will find consensus. We will find agreement. Then we can move forward with it.
But you don't move forward with a motion like this, with the contents of this report produced by the government, which I believe it is unreasonable and reckless, and say that by unanimous agreement we will proceed. I think that's a mistake. That's an error. Many members before me have mentioned it. I am pretty confident that members on this side will repeat the point that it is an error. It would change the opposition into an audience. We would be ineffective at keeping the government accountable.
When the debates were moved from Parliament to the committees and we were given time limits for speaking in the House—that was a maximum time, but you can always speak less than the time you're allotted by the Speaker and by the rules of the House—they moved it here into the committees so that we would have an opportunity to speak, an opportunity to raise the points we would otherwise raise in the House of Commons, in Parliament. If you take that away here at the committee level and don't give us an opportunity to speak up on behalf of our conscience, on behalf of our constituents, our political party, our experience that we gain from being here for four, eight, 12, 16, 20 years, then I think you do a disservice to Parliament, do an injustice to this institution.
It's a human institution that has survived in this country since 1867 and in the preceding colonial parliament as well. I think it's important to remember that we are here as stewards of Parliament. We don't own this place. It's not ours to keep; it's ours to steward for future generations. This is something I tell my staff and that I tell my constituents. I say I may be the first member of Parliament for the riding of Calgary Shepard, but I will not be the last.
Now, I may be the last, if we change the rules so badly that Parliament ceases to work. There are many cases in the world in which the legislative assemblies don't work very efficiently anymore, and by “efficiently” I mean as deliberative bodies. I don't mean the speed at which they pass legislation; I mean as deliberative bodies, where people can debate ideas, in our case here in the safety of the House of Commons. I think this is important and bears remembering.
The last thing I'll mention about my personal experience and what I bring to this debate is that I used to work as the manager of policy and research at the Calgary Chamber of Commerce. At the time it had six policy committees, made up of anywhere from a dozen business persons interested in a particular subject matter to as many as 30, 40, 50, or 60 members, who sat in the morning at 7:15 a.m.—and our staff had to suffer through that almost every single day of the week—to debate policy issues. We would produce papers for them to consider, and then they would deliberate, much as Parliament does.
We had rules in these places, and it was the manager's job to apply the rules on behalf of the board. I was empowered, as a non-executive team member. The chief economist was the member of the executive who would direct me in managing the work of these volunteers. Each of these volunteers was a member of the Chamber of Commerce and had participated in the elections for the board of governors of the chamber. In a lot of ways, because they were members, they had a vested interest in how the chamber functioned, and they then deliberated.
We never said to them, “These are the policy issues you will talk about. These are the rules that will govern you.” Much of our work was done by consensus between the members and members of the staff. The members were there to deliberate the points they were trying to make. We never imposed on them a specific way of doing things. We would always try to find an opportunity to empower them to bring forward the issues they wanted to bring forward, especially if they were working co-operatively among themselves. If half the committee wanted to speak to an issue and the other half didn't want to, it wasn't the job of the staff to decide whose issues we would deal with. We waited and we deferred, based on the rules that we had.
That's the type of experience I bring to this discussion. I have seen how the Alberta legislature functions and I have seen how Parliament functioned 12 years ago. I've spent time learning the rules. Like everybody else here, I got that big green hardcover book, the Standing Orders of the House, and I've taken the time to read through it.
Now, I have not read it cover to cover. I have a great amount of difficulty to do that through and through.
Mr. David Christopherson: Shame.
Mr. Tom Kmiec: My colleague here is saying “Shame”. I will get there. I will get there eventually.
Speaking of Parliament, I mentioned Diefenbaker already and the speaking crutch. I get that from Sean O'Sullivan's book, Both My Houses: From Politics to Priesthood. I recently read it upon the recommendation of a member of the whip's staff.
Sean O'Sullivan was a member of Parliament here many years ago, who sadly passed away from cancer. He had a great love for this place, but he did not come here to—
Ms. Filomena Tassi: There's a connection right here. His nephew is right here.
Mr. Tom Kmiec: That's fantastic. Even better, I get to reference the ancestor, so to speak, of someone who is here too.
I immensely enjoyed his book. He started as a staff member in this House and was working for John Diefenbaker as his executive assistant. He had been a long-running volunteer who started very young. In his time, he was one of the youngest members of Parliament ever elected. His mentor was Diefenbaker. When he left this place, it was partly because he was disillusioned with how the place functioned, but he was also disillusioned with politics in general. He went into the priesthood. He heard the call of his faith and became a priest.
I've been thinking about a lot of the points he makes in this book, about the observations he makes about Parliament and how important it is, and I think a lot of his quotations from Diefenbaker bear thinking about. There are many parliamentarians who have come before us who have made immense contributions, who have served here for 12, 16, and 20 years. Reading books like O'Sullivan's and speaking to former members of Parliament, such as Jason Kenney, have made me rethink this, and I now completely disagree with term limits for members of Parliament, something that in my youth I thought was a great idea. Now I think it's not such a great idea, mostly because it's the veteran members, the experienced members, who pass on to the next members the traditions and the customs of this House, the House of Commons specifically. You won't have that happening very often if you change the rules so drastically that people get disillusioned much more quickly with regard to their ability to contribute.
The number one reason that people leave a workplace, an organization, or a corporation—and this was consistent across the board when I worked as a registrar—isn't that they weren't making enough money. It wasn't because they were not getting the opportunities to get training or professional development, or to travel, or to work on interesting projects. Ninety per cent of the time it was because they could not see how their individual activities, their personal activities in the workplace, were related to the achievements and success of the organization they were in. That was the number one reason.
I know what happens because I've seen it happen at the Chamber of Commerce and in other workplaces. I've been invited in either to give counsel or to listen to the HR professionals explain to me what the issues are, and then to listen to them debate about how to fix their workplace.
Ninety per cent of the time that's why people leave. I've seen it happen. People get disenchanted with the type of work they do, so they do less of it. They find opportunities to not be there as often, and then they start finding other work, typically on work time. They'll start using their workplace email and the workplace phones to find work opportunities elsewhere. I'm sure there are parliamentarians who have come before us who've taken the opportunity to sit in the House to do just that because they've become disenchanted with their individual ability to contribute to the whole—to make an amendment to a piece of legislation or to propose a rule change or regulation change.
I would hope that we would not change the rules through this motion without this amendment. It's a very important amendment. We should not change the rules in such a way as to disenchant members at committees and in Parliament from doing the work that they should be doing on behalf of their constituents, their supporters, and the political movement that they belong to.
I always mention “circles of accountability”. It's something I picked up in talking to so many HR professionals. We are not just accountable to our supervisors; we have circles of accountability. I'm accountable to my wife. I'm accountable to my three kids—whom I'm missing, as I haven't been able to Skype with them for the past four days because of this committee meeting—but I'm also accountable to my board of directors of my local association, just like I believe many of you are as well. I'm accountable to my supporters, to my electors, and I have a great many of them. I have the second-largest riding in Canada by population size. In my riding, it was a privilege to earn more votes than even Stephen Harper or Jason Kenney. I have an enormous riding. It's a big number: 43,706.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
Mr. Tom Kmiec: That's a big number, and it's a big riding.
I'm also accountable to all of them, and not just to the people who voted for me, but also to the people who didn't vote for me. How you do the balancing of those interests is actually one of the main points in the standards of professional practice of the HR profession in Alberta. I know that because I helped to write those standards for the balancing of interests. What I don't find in the reform of the Standing Orders of the House of Commons is that balancing of interests. I don't think the term even exists in here. There's no mention of that.
Also, it's not the balancing of interests here in this House between the government and parliamentarians, because that's not a balance. Parliament is supreme. Parliament comes first. Governments come and go; Parliament stays. There may be a time in the future, a hundred years from now, when political parties have broken down again and they no longer function the way they used to, but governments will always come and go. We as parliamentarians will always be here, and we should ensure that the rules of the House don't protect the government but protect parliamentarians first, which is why we can make points of order and claims of breach of privilege against the government and other members when we are defending our rights.
If we choose not to defend our rights, that is our responsibility. It is our fault if future parliamentarians become disenchanted with this place. I think that's what this motion will do without the amendment, because it gives us an opportunity to seek that common ground.
Also, if we don't achieve all our goals immediately, the goals set by the government that I believe the government caucus presumably agrees with—to varying degrees, I would hope—there is always an opportunity for future parliamentarians to take up the task themselves and find ways to change the rules to suit the needs of that generation, but they should always do it by unanimous agreement. The wording of this amendment to the main motion should be unanimously agreed to by the committee here.
The concept that you should seek common ground is not only the title of the Prime Minister's book, but it has happened many times before that members have tweaked the rules. I have examples here. I asked my staff to look into it.
Since 1867, there have been occasions when controversial proposals have led to lengthy debates where the government used its majority to amend the Standing Orders.
These include the adoption of closure in 1913, time allocation provisions in 1969, and a series of Standing Order amendments in 1991. I'll be referring to debates from that time. There were many members who were veteran members in the Chrétien government and in the Paul Martin government who had very astute remarks to make. Many of them had been rookie members then, but had excellent points to make. Just to the point I made, they looked to their experienced members to explain to them the traditions or customs of the House, how things had been done before, and why they should not be so quick to change all the rules, throw everything out, and bring in new ones.
Then there were amendments to the Standing Orders with respect to the report stage of bills in 2001—
:
Because we have Mr. here and he knows of my great love for Yiddish proverbs, I have this: “Before you utter a word you are the master. After words you are a fool.”
I hope I haven't been a fool so far and that I have made a substantive contribution to the debate with the research I have used to demonstrate that we do have an opportunity to find common ground and to have the amendment to the motion pass. It's based on a substantive reasoning that we should do it where we unanimously agree on changes to the Standing Orders as they may come.
Now what I want to do is refer to an article that deals with time allocation in the House of Commons, “Silencing Parliamentary Democracy or Effective Time Management? Time Allocation in the House of Commons”, which I think is to the point of efficiency that's in the government's “Reforming the Standing Orders of the House of Commons” document. Efficiency keeps being brought up in this document as the reason for the motion tabled and the amendment that was thereafter moved.
This article is written by Yves Yvon J. Pelletier, who was a parliamentary intern from 1999 to 2000. It's based on his research essay, which was awarded the Alf Hales prize as the best paper submitted by the 1999-2000 interns. I have gone through this article, and I made a few notes to myself, because it deals substantively with what we are dealing with here today, which is the role of members of Parliament and the Standing Orders of the House and how they enable us to have the rights and privileges we enjoy to do the work of parliamentarians.
Our privileges as members don't come from the Standing Orders. The Standing Orders don't grant us those privileges. We have those from our traditions and our customs. Some of them are written into statute, and some of them simply are practice. As I mentioned before, we come to learn about them mostly from the more experienced members of Parliament, who tell us about decorum in the House, whether or not we can wear ties in the House, and when we can be recognized to speak by the Speaker or the person in the Speaker's chair.
In this article, he mentions that the changes to the Standing Orders of the House of Commons have limited the opportunities of private members to influence the final wording of government bills. This has happened over time. Successive parliamentary procedural changes have made it a priority of the government and of the majority of the members. They have limited the ability of private members to influence the final wording of government bills. That has given the government some certainty about what the final product will look like once it goes to the Senate.
There has always been a need to balance the right to speak for an appropriate length of time and Parliament's right to reach decisions. It's Parliament's right to reach a decision, not the government's right to reach a decision. Government should have no expectation that there is an end date to the debate. Only once each member has spoken in the House, if he or she chooses to speak on a particular amendment or subamendment or piece of legislation, could we then say that Parliament has reached a point of making a decision. We know this. The Speaker rises, goes through the yeas and nays, and then we have the request: is it on division?
Maybe I'll segue just for a moment. “On division”, the two most beautiful words in parliamentary procedure, which we should use much more often than we do right now, are when we stand by for a recorded vote. On division at committee is the reason we're able to process amendments so much faster than we would if we had recorded votes for everything. On division is the reason we are able to go through a witness list at committee so much faster than if we went through a recorded vote. You could request a recorded vote on all those things and grind a committee to a halt. Sometimes the opposition may do that, if none of their witnesses have been accepted, in which case there is a valid reason to obstruct a committee solely to prove a point that you should compromise, co-operate, and at least show good faith toward the other political caucus at the table to reach a compromise and move forward.
You can build trust over time, or you might find situations where persons at the table are willing to forgo a particular witness or an amendment or whatever reason they have found for obstructing. “On division” are the two most beautiful words in parliamentary language.
I'll mention, too, as part of this segue, Bill , the anti-discrimination bill. I was mentioning this to . When the votes happen, we all get to count the votes and see who voted how, and it's part of the pageantry of the House. After having lost two votes, the executive members—the executive council, the cabinet ministers—rose to request a recorded vote after it was plainly evident that they had lost the voice vote. I was scratching my head the first time they did it, because I didn't quite understand the political reasoning for doing it. When they did it a second time, I thought to myself that I must have dozed off and missed something, because it was very confusing. They consumed another 10 minutes of time in the House, when there was no need for it.
This is about policing ourselves. The efficiency of the House was not hurt by parliamentarians. It was actually hurt by the executive. We could have been more efficient in managing our time if the executive team, the parliamentarians who also serve on the executive council or are members of the cabinet, had simply not risen and had accepted it “on division”, those two beautiful words.
We could pass, perhaps, this amendment to the main motion on division, and it would be beautiful, as long as it was accepted and passed on the yea side, not on the negative side.
I wanted to mention that the right to reach a decision is a right of Parliament, not the right of the government. They should never expect that Parliament will pass their legislation in the shape or form that they present it and table it before the House.
Now, the legislative role of MPs has declined as a result of time allocation. We know this. We've all experienced it. We've complained about it. A certain political party and caucus on the other side made a lot of hay out of it politically, and it was very successful for them.
When I reach the end of these notes, you'll realize I'll mention the government of Prime Minister Chrétien and will compare it to Mr. Mulroney's when time allocation was used, and it won't be as positive comparison for the members of the government caucus.
Prime ministers take advantage of the loyalty and inexperience of their members. I make this as an opinion statement, but it's also repeated in this article, which goes on to say that prime ministers use “...persuasion skills to limit, if not silence, their opposition to government measures on the public stage.”
Although I can see in the government caucus there are a lot of independent thinkers, which I appreciate very much, I hope they see on our side a lot of independent thinkers as well.
I voted with you, Mr. Chair, on your private member's bill, which I thought was an excellent idea. I know we had a side conversation about it. I was in the minority in my party. I was happy to do that because the idea, the policy goal, was the right one. That's what I thought at the time, and I expressed to my caucus colleagues and to my supporters that I would be doing that.
The Prime Minister and the executive team have a lot of tools they can use in order to limit the ability of the government caucus to express itself.
Maybe this is a good time to mention the free votes concept. We've all heard about free votes, that we should have more free votes. I have a lot of constituents come to me and tell me we should have more free votes.
We have free votes. Every vote is free, even the ones at committee, but all votes have consequences.
An hon. member: Hear, hear!
Mr. Tom Kmiec: As long as you can bear the consequences of your decisions, then you are free. If you can't, that's when you are not free. If you remember before we suspended, I mentioned that freedom is the right to be wrong, not the right to do wrong. We should never do wrong with how we vote, and what we vote for, just like on this amendment.
This amendment will help us avoid doing wrong. I think the members here, the members of the government caucus, as well as the members of the opposition parties represented at the table, have that ability to vote freely, and we will accept the consequences of those votes. I will. I'll vote my conscience on this if I am substituted in for the vote of this committee.
There is an idea that Canadian MPs are not elected to govern, but to ensure those who do are held accountable for their decisions. When we elect members of Parliament, when our constituents, our voters, go to the polls, although there is a lot of confusion about this, and a lot of people say they're electing the government, the prime minister, that's what they're voting for. It's a very presidential focus. It's come over time in Canada. It's Americanized our system further a great deal. Part of it is also the medium that we communicate with, such as television and social media. It makes it more about the person, the personality, than it does about the system and how we reach decisions.
We are not elected to govern, that's true. The executive council governs. That's why they have orders of the day and government business. They get to decide government business. They set the agenda, and we on the opposition side respond. But the government caucus responds too to the agenda of the day. Obviously, you are much closer and have a bit more intuition, maybe psychic knowledge, over what the government will decide to do, and we accept that.
The introduction of time allocation was an example of the executive's desire to maintain control over the legislative process of the House of Commons. This was granted back in 1969, to my knowledge, if I'm not getting the year incorrect. I have a quote here from 1956 preceding this.
Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament Donald Fleming said “the Canadian House of Commons has been gagged and fettered in this debate by a despotic government”. Speaking of the government, he said:
...you are jeopardizing the institutions that have proven themselves the bastions of democratic freedom, and destroying the rights of the minority in the house....This strategem was not given birth in any democratic mentality.
This was in response to St. Laurent's government imposing closure at each stage of a bill on public funding for a pipeline partly owned by American interests. The bill was passed in less than 15 days as a result. I bring it up because I'm from Alberta. We have a great love of pipelines in all forms and shapes, especially when they help our fellow Albertans get jobs.
I raise that as an issue because at the time they used time allocation—closure specifically, the proceeding name—in order to meet the government's agenda and their need for efficiency. Those rules still exist today in a slightly different format.
What has changed from 1956, when you could pass a bill in 15 days, to today, when we can't have at least 15 days of debate when members would like to rise and speak to a bill? I acknowledge that there are more members today, so there are more opportunities to speak to government business, but we all come here as generalists on parliamentary procedure and parliamentary policy, and then we specialize through the committee work we do.
We should not, though, give up the opportunity to speak on things we may know a little bit less about in the House of Commons outside of our area of specialization that our caucuses have asked us to undertake. I'm worried that this motion, without the very reasoned and reasonable amendment, may result in taking away the opportunity at committee to do just that, to avoid a situation where you could in the name of efficiency pass a piece of government legislation extremely quickly, perhaps without enough deliberative debate like we're having now, and without an opportunity to consider the clauses in the bill and the contents of the bill.
The member of Parliament in question, Donald Fleming, was probably excessive. Hyperbole is something our profession is known for. I always joke with my constituents that it's the 99% who ruin it for the 1% of us. It's true that we sometimes resort to language that might be considered hysterical. All sides do it. All sides have done it. We're supposed to police ourselves, just like members of the public who are working for a corporation or a professional organization, wherever that is, police themselves.
When I worked in human resources, there was always a question of difficult employees that a company or an organization might have. The number one thing they would tell them first, after seeing them, was “police yourself.” Self-censorship is not a vice, it's a virtue. It means you have learned a couple of lessons. It's when a government tries to censor you that it's a vice from the government side, but self-censorship, the knowledge not to be rude, not to be obnoxious, not to be a jerk, is a virtue that should be practised far more in public.
If they limit our debate at committee—they limit us already in the House in terms of how long we can speak—those opportunities to gain the experience and the judgment to practise this virtue and gain it are limited.
There would be far more opportunities for members of the opposition. Perhaps free-thinking members of the government caucus will then choose to go to the media, and maybe post something on social media they should not post, make a comment they should not make, or disparage a member they should not disparage.
I would like to take you back to the article here and to get a bit into the more technical reforms that happened in June 1969.
Between 1964 and 1969, the procedural committees examined “modernization”. This is the term used by the author, not my favourite term. It says:
...in the absence of a unanimous decision, they all agreed that the Standing Orders of the House of Commons could not be amended without unanimous consent. In June 1969
—that was the reform—
...Standing order 75A would permit the allocation of a specified period of time, when “there is agreement among the representatives of all parties”; Standing Order 75B would apply when “a majority of the representatives of several parties have come to an agreement in respect of a proposed allotment of days or hours”; and Standing Order 75C...would permit “[when no] agreement could be reached under the provisions of Standing Order 75A or 75B (...), that a minister of the Crown [may] propose a motion for allotting time”.
You can see how it goes. First, we talk amongst everybody. Can we seek some type of agreement? If we can't, you've already failed. At that point the House leadership has failed.
They then move on to the next one. Can we find an opportunity for several of the parties to come together and find a compromise? Is there sufficient trust maintained to still reach some type of agreement? Perhaps not everybody gets what they want. Perhaps it's something between the initial position of the government caucus and something the opposition parties wanted, or perhaps an independent member did not give consent.
The final point is that the minister of the crown comes in and simply demands that a certain time be allotted.
At the time, the opposition described these amendments as “the will of the government only”, and it was a previous Liberal government, led by Mr. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, that invoked closure on this debate.
I've quoted Diefenbaker substantially, so I want to give Conservative leader a chance here. Mr. Stanfield said:
The use of closure to force through rule changes, which are opposed by every member of the opposition, is of course an aggravation, and the use of this method of forcing through rules is so completely foreign to the traditions of this House as to constitute a breach of privilege.... [W]e are in a very sorry state indeed in so far as democracy and freedom are concerned.
This article deals with how we pass changes to the Standing Orders, which is the motion and the amendment to the motion. The article says:
...the opposition [parties] argued as one that parliamentary procedure should give all parties equal privilege in a limited debate and that amendments to Standing Orders should be based on a consensus.
You could almost exchange “unanimously agreed” with “consensus”. That's the idea behind it, if you have to put terminology in—“consensus”. This place runs on consensus built through trust.
Ironically, the time allocation [motion] was passed only through the use of closure, the very rule it was...suppose[d] to lighten.
After the House leadership had failed twice to reach a compromise—this is the last one—“the opposition described the use of...Standing Order 75C as anti democratic”. The article goes on:
...the government had promised that, despite the imposition of closure to ensure the passage of the time allocation rule, this measure would never be implemented.
They said one thing at the time, promised one thing, and subsequently did not follow through on it. I've quoted Diefenbaker enough, so I want to give Mr. Stanfield a chance. Stanfield called the use of Standing Order 75C a tactic “to save the political face of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance”.
My personal opinion—not the opinion of my caucus or anybody else—is that this motion, without the amendment, is a tactic, a stratagem, to attempt to save the political face of your House leader, just as it was in Stanfield's day. That is what I, not my caucus, personally believe. It's just a personal opinion, and I'm expressing it.
With the amendment, I think we can actually achieve the goal that may exist amongst some.
At the time, “[t]he opposition feared that 'If, some day, Canada should live under a government with more pronounced dictatorial ideas'”—I don't like using that term in this House—“'then, our parliamentary system might be ruined'.”
Efficiency comes to mind. The word “efficiency” means different things to different people. I've mentioned this before, but I truly believe that in the context of this reform package produced by the government, the reform of the Standing Orders of the House of Commons, what it actually means is “faster”—faster, faster, faster.
At the time,
...it was argued that, if this motion meant the slow but gradual decay of Parliament, “the Commons will no longer represent a forum for public debate but will flounder and disintegrate as an anachronistic tower of Babel, scorned by the Canadian people”.
All opposition parties “considered this initial use of time allocation to be closure and compared it to a guillotine or imposition by force.” The timelines proposed in the motion, without having the amendment, are essentially the same thing. By process—and Mr. Genuis mentioned this—you can achieve a lot of your goals anyway. You could limit debate just by rushing this report through.
I also mentioned the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, which I serve on as a permanent member. Mr. , who was here yesterday, serves with me on that committee. We took a year-long study to review a piece of government legislation. It was a mandatory review. We were not in a rush to provide the government with feedback and a complete report with recommendations inside. Our goal wasn't to be efficient in our time. It was to deliberate accordingly and deliver a complete and finished product to the government so it could determine whether these were recommendations it would take up.
When this report is tabled in the House, Parliament will be able to see it and then debate it, if a member so chooses, by moving a motion.
At that time, they'll be able to determine whether they want to proceed with it, but it has taken over a year. I think that's okay. Many people in the private sector would say this is really inefficient. Why does it take you a year to do something like this? It's because we deliberate. Our goal is not to produce a final....
Like, I'm not going to go back to my constituency and be able to tell them, listen, in my four years in the House of Commons, on your behalf, I produced 20 government reports with recommendations in them, 20 reports of Parliament. Nobody will give me a gold star for 21, or penalize me for 19. They will probably say they've never heard of a single one of them. But I know that there's a public servant somewhere in those departments whose responsibility it is to review the reports and see whether there's anything valuable that should be implemented. They can look at the contact information, potentially, for witnesses. They can review the witness list that was provided and discuss with those individuals how they can implement the recommendations provided to the government.
I'm an Albertan, and the national energy program in 1981 is an example of controversial bills passed more quickly, more efficiently, as a result of time allocation. We all know how deep an impact it had on Alberta, and on Alberta's political culture as well. Alberta has two political cultures, one in the north and one in the south. I'd refer you to the early 1970s. There's a great article written by Tom Flanagan describing these two political cultures. If you look at a political map of Alberta, you will see that in the voting patterns of Albertans.
The national energy program had a deep, lasting impact on the political culture of Alberta and the political fate of many Liberals and many Conservatives. It was passed with time allocation, efficiently moved through the House. The president of the Privy Council in 1971 promised that no precedent would be created by the initial use of time allocation, which turned out to be totally false. Again, in this article, “Silencing Parliamentary Democracy or Effective Time Management? Time Allocation in the House of Commons”, by Mr. Pelletier. It's in the Canadian Parliamentary Review, winter 2000-01 edition.
Prime Minister promised to govern without guillotining the opposition. “Guillotining” is the terminology from the article. This promise was broken barely two months after the start of the first session of the 35th Parliament, on a bill to change electoral boundaries. His government then also limited debate on gun control, constitutional protections for the LGBT community, and “imposed Standing Order 75c”, which is when, as I mentioned, the House leadership failed to reach an agreement by consensus 20 times.
The acting leader of the Canadian Alliance at the time, a great, great Albertan, , spoke for over three hours on May 16, 2000, about the Chrétien government's lack of respect for the primacy of the House of Commons. She argued that the government's use of time allocation was to simply brush issues out of the way in the name of efficiency. In six years the government used time allocation as much as the government did in nine years. This is common to the government side, to refer to the previous Conservative government's use of time allocation.
Every government has started off with the best of intentions and eventually used time allocation more and more often as their term has gone on in Parliament. Typically, it's because they ram through their agenda, as opposed to trying to seek conciliation of some sort and build trust with the opposition parties. There will be times when we can't agree, and there will be times when we have to disagree and the government executive will have to use time allocation.
We will hum and we will haw, but I hope we've been pretty measured in our comments, when we have risen in those 30 minutes of debate, not to accuse you hysterically of shutting down democracy too many times.
:
It could possibly be. The bells were left ringing for what I see here would be almost three days, and maybe four days, if my math isn't wrong, but at any rate for a long time, and I think this is our third or fourth day of debate here.
When the Speaker resumed on Friday, June 2—I'm sorry: this continued until Thursday, June 6, thereafter—the opposition had succeeded in disrupting the House for a whole week. It's not an activity that any opposition would take on lightly, I would think.
Dave Cooke, then the New Democratic House leader, accused the government of having the attitude of: “To heck”—his word did start with “h”, but I've heard the tell members not to use that word in the House—“with the opposition. We'll get at the rules by imposing.” Sean Conway, then the government House leader, responded to the opposition's comments on his rule changes by saying that the government would get its business done and would do so without the continuous obstruction from the opposition.
In 1990 Bob Rae became premier and Mike Harris became the leader of the opposition. This obstruction continued, obviously, and many of the same people were returning, so that lack of trust continued into the next assembly. They had lost trust in each other, could not build consensus while working together, and could not find a way to co-operate.
Harris's opposition to the premier's policies resulted in a number of tactics to delay government legislation. The opposition decided to get creative. On May 6, 1991, Mr. Harris introduced a bill whose title included every single body of water in Ontario. I'll let that sink in a bit. I'm not from Ontario, but I would assume that there would be a very large volume of names to write down. Not only did Harris, as sponsor, have to read it, but the Speaker and the Clerk had to read it, in both official languages.
[Translation]
They had to read it in French as well. It's interesting.
[English]
The opposition never would have done that if there had been an opportunity to find a way to build trust, consensus, and co-operation, which is why we're pushing this amendment to the motion. We're not saying that we're opposed to any type of change. That is not our goal. We're saying, “don't shut us down”, and I'm also saying, “don't shut yourselves down”. You're members of the government caucus, and working hard to join the executive, I'm sure. However, until such time as you're called upon by the Governor General to join the executive, you should be mindful of your roles as parliamentarians first and foremost. I think that's more important.
Parliamentary government assumes that the government will get its way eventually, but the opposition parties have the right to criticize and to delay business from occurring.
The New Democrats brought in some of the most restrictive changes to those standing orders; there were some that were complaints and were not so much brought in. They limited speech in debate, and time limits were introduced at that time. There was a limited amount of time for the introduction of bills, which is a direct result of Mr. Harris's private member's bill—or the equivalent in the Ontario parliament—that he brought forward, which caused that extensive reading of all the names of bodies of water into the record. They also provided for time allocation of bills.
All of these changes prevented the possibility of the opposition taking over the legislature the way it had been for the previous two years under the New Democrats. As a result, in the wording of the author, the legislature “is much less relevant”—I wouldn't say that about the Ontario parliament—“than it was twenty years” previously. Again, this is from an article, “Evolution of the Ontario Standing Orders since 1985”.
Prior to that I can't speak to the content, the standing orders that existed, and the types of changes that may or may not have been considered, but we have an example there where there are drastic rule changes as a direct result of the opposition's activities. Those were the results, and those opposition activities to obstruct and delay and to be heard were the result of the government's intransigence, inability, and unwillingness to compromise.
All we're asking for through this amendment, Mr. Chair, is compromise. It's a very reasonable amendment that would take a reckless motion and bring it more into line with what should be and must be the standard practice of this House, which is to seek consensus in this committee meeting. Of all the committees that should be able to agree, I think this committee should be the one that should find consensus as much as possible. As for what this amendment will do, it will say that we will study and we will look at the changes, but we want to unanimously agree for the report.
Then our colleagues the New Democrats and we on the Conservative side can come to some type of agreement with the members of the government caucus on what types of changes to the Standing Orders will be suggested going forward. That will elevate the quality and the opportunity of each member of Parliament to represent their constituencies, to edify Parliament, and to steward their seat for the person who comes afterwards.
As I mentioned before, we are parliamentarians first. There is no rule—I can't find anything in the Constitution—that says we must pass government legislation, except for those very few where we need to confirm the oaths of office for the members of cabinet and to pass their budget. That is our main role, along with the estimates, confirming that the government has the confidence of the House and is able to pass a spending bill, or successive spending bills in the case of supplementary estimates. Our core role is to review how the crown spends money. At committee I was told—I won't mention which member of the government caucus said this to me—that it's not as important as looking at policy issues. I agree that policy issues are very important, but looking at the main estimates and how government spends is much more important. It is our constitutional obligation.
As the official opposition, in fact Her Majesty's loyal official opposition, we don't oppose you because we consider you adversaries. As I mentioned before, you're not my enemies. You're not my adversaries. We may not be friends, but I would think that our relationship, as we build it over time, will get better. We can honourably oppose each other but also find ways to co-operate later on.
We are loyal to Her Majesty. We've taken an oath of office to fulfill our obligations. It's our obligation to oppose you, to criticize, and, when necessary, but only when necessary, to obstruct when you are being unreasonable or when we think you are being reckless. We take that responsibility seriously.
We would not obstruct endlessly, because any opposition could do that right from the start. They could just obstruct from day one and not allow anything to happen. There are many different things you could do in this House that would further delay the activities. We choose not to, because the opposition has a responsibility with all this power, just as the government, both the caucus and the members of the executive, have a great deal of responsibility.
I don't see that in “Reforming the Standing Orders of the House of Commons”, this document for discussion that the government has put forward. I don't see that. My personal belief is that they're reckless, some of the changes being discussed in here, or the potential for changes without great details. That's why. to me, this amendment is so important. Moving forward, we need to know, and have faith in you as members of the government caucus, that you will not see your roles as defenders of the executive but as defenders of Parliament.
The quote I like to use, the speaking crutch he used to have, that appears in his mention in Sean O'Sullivan's book—I see the gentleman's nephew sitting just behind—was, “I love Parliament”. As a speaking crutch it was incredible, but he didn't just say it, he believed it. We should all—all—believe it.
I mentioned an article at the beginning, and I want to briefly speak to it on the record. Again, it's germane to this discussion. Mr. was the New Democratic House leader at the time. He no longer is. When motion six was tabled by the House leadership, he called it a “draconian motion” that breached the privileges of members of Parliament. He said that it would “put all the other members in a straitjacket and limit their rights and privileges” and would “deny MPs the right to spark debates on the crucial work” of committees. About the executive, he talked about it “attempting to set aside those rights and privileges for all MPs, other than for cabinet ministers”.
That wasn't a belief of just politicians. That was also a belief of the media at the time. I'll quote Kady O'Malley here. She said that there was an attack “on the privileges of the House” and that it stripped “the opposition of their parliamentary rights”.
I think to the credit of the government, they didn't proceed with implementing the motion. I don't think it was because you were convinced of the argument—by “you” I mean the members of the executive—but more so it was the public pressure. We're seeing public pressure mount on the executive, on the government caucus, to stop this, to pull the motion off the table, which would then render the amendment unnecessary, obviously.
Only with the amendment can this all go forward. It is the only way that I can foresee this working out.
I think Canadians believe that if there are changes to be made to how the opposition functions—because these changes are meant mostly for us, for the official opposition and for the third party, and for other smaller party members as well, such as the Bloc, which is not a recognized political entity in this House, and for the independents, who serve on behalf of a political party—this would significantly change the work they do. Without unanimously agreeing to changes ahead of time, without the process by which we will come to agreement, and without agreeing to this at the very beginning, we do a disservice to ourselves as parliamentarians. We also do a disservice to Canadians and their expectations.
On this motion 6, at the time it was said that “the motion would have curtailed the ability of Members to move certain motions which they would have done largely for the purpose of delaying the progress of Government business.” That's absolutely true, but the delay is also an opportunity for us to deliberate and to make a point. That's the only time we have in the House of Commons to make that point, because otherwise the government runs the business. It's the government's orders of the day; it's the government's business.
As the member of Parliament for my riding, I can't rise randomly during debate and say that I'd like to talk about the Green Line LRT. As much as I would like to, I keep those conversations on the side so that I can go to the and plead the case of my constituents, who really would like to see this done and have the project funded. I've taken every single opportunity—I've found him in a lounge somewhere and on a plane—to raise this very briefly, just so he doesn't forget that it exists.
I mentioned this before, but I have a reference on parliamentary privilege that I'm going to be using here. As members, we have parliamentary privilege, but not from the Standing Orders. The Standing Orders exist to enable parliamentary privilege. I have a very brief list here of the rights, privileges, and immunities of individual members of the House, which we can categorize as the following: freedom of speech; freedom from arrest in civil actions; the exemption from jury duty; the exemption from being subpoenaed to attend court as a witness; and, freedom from obstruction, interference, intimidation and molestation. That last one is with regard to the breach of privilege that was moved last May during an unfortunate incident in the House.
Those privileges and the Standing Orders that impact them and encapsulate how they work in the House, and at committee as well, I think are really important. When the initial changes were done in 1969, and the committees became more formulated and strengthened and became the process by which we have substantive, deliberative debate, committees became the place where you could have an open debate among the different sides. You could hear all the different sides and the disagreements they had. There were legislative committees as well, to debate specific legislation, and you reviewed the main estimates, etc. Members made their points there. You had almost unlimited opportunities to debate. You could move a motion, you could move amendments, and you could debate. In the House of Commons, we were then constrained in debate, and “efficiency” was the original term used.
It's used again in this government document. Again, just for the committee's sake, it's called “Reforming the Standing Orders of the House of Commons”. It's a March 2017 document, which was made public on March 10, I believe. This document talks about efficiency, which, as I've mentioned, is all about speed and speeding up the process. We've done that already, but what they're talking about in this document, and what I fear will be done through this motion without the amendment, will be that we will look at pure efficiency, at how much we produce in a day and how much we hand over to the Senate for its consideration. I think it could be doing more work, I'm sure, and I've met a lot of senators and have spoken to them about the work they do.
I actually read Senate transcripts now to get ideas on what we could look at. Even after this, when this is done, I will go back and maybe read a Senate transcript from its foreign affairs committee that my staff will find for me. They will tell me that it is important for the work I'm doing and for my interest.
If at this committee and at any other committee of the House you limit the debate of members, of parliamentarians—and of you as well, as members of the government caucus—you will find opportunities to represent your constituents reduced when you disagree with the government. Kudos to those of you who are free thinkers and have voted against the government or with the opposition parties. It happens. I've done it as well. I have voted against what the majority of my party thought was the right thing to do.
You will find those opportunities reduced, or potentially reduced. You may not be here during an entire study. You may miss specific meetings where decisions are made and a report is finalized. You may not like the final product.
We're saying let's get it right from the beginning. Let's make sure that the tools by which this review will be done, that the format by which it will be done, are the right ones. Let's get off on the right foot.
When I helped the volunteer policy committees at the chamber of commerce sharpen their focus on some very specific issues that the membership there wanted to treat, we brought it through and created a new committee called the policy advisory council. We went through consultations with every single group to make sure they understood what this would mean. This new council would basically not so much direct the work they were doing but choose from the areas they thought were important and then bring it back up to the board of directors there to make sure that these were issues of immediate concern to the broader membership of the chamber.
That's a good model for the chamber. It's a consensus model. It's a model built on trust, in which staff members and members of the executive on the staff of the chamber serve as go-betweens to inform members. What I see in this document here, though, is an attempt by the government to dictate to parliamentarians what you shall consider and what you shall not. By omission, you can say what not to consider.
I've said from the very beginning that this is so broad, that there are so many substantive things to discuss, you could break this down into several studies. It could take two or three years, potentially beyond the next Parliament, for a new group of parliamentarians to consider whether this is something they truly want to implement.
Again, I would look toward the veteran members, the more experienced members who understand the traditions and customs of this place, who are in a lot of ways mentors to those of us who are new and who are rookies. Although we can understand the Standing Orders, we can read them and comprehend them....
Mr. Nater has probably memorized all of them. There are pictures of his kids memorizing the Standing Orders of the House. I'm sure that's their bedtime reading too.
We understand the Standing Orders in the way that you can read a book and understand what you've read, but to really comprehend them, you have to experience them. That experiential learning is not something that any new parliamentarian can just do with a flick of their fingers, a flick of a switch. At times I have depended on the committee chairs to explain the rules to me. I make a point of clarification. I ask questions. As I mentioned, is the chair of one of the other committees. He has explained to me how to be a good parliamentarian in committee. It's different from in the House, and I think that is important to remember.
Will those disappear in this model? How many of the standing orders will be changed at the end of this, and how will these potential changes impact the work we do? How will we experience the changes in the work we do, in the day-to-day activities? Will there be opportunities to talk like this, back and forth, or will it all be scripted again?
The House of Commons can be scripted at times. When I started in this House, I would write all my speeches, because I didn't have the confidence to speak off the cuff. Now I feel perfectly comfortable, as many of you have experienced over the last few hours, just talking off the top of my head. It took me about a year and a half to get to this point.
I did conferences before, and I spoke at rallies, obviously. We've all done that, at some point. It's different from speaking in the House of Commons, where you know that every single word you say is permanently recorded for the future. Some not very edifying things have been said in the House. If you look back far enough, you're like, “Wow, my predecessor said that? They were kind of a jerk.”
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
Mr. Tom Kmiec: There are many, many, many such instances. Just as it says in the Yiddish proverb I used, I weigh my words carefully, I don't count them. If I don't need to stand for 10 minutes to make a speech, I don't stand for 10 minutes. As I mentioned, we can do a lot of things in the chamber and in committee by unanimous consent and by agreement when we police ourselves. At different times we are better or worse at it.
Again, if I don't need to speak for the full 10 minutes, I don't speak for the full 10 minutes.
Mr. Arnold Chan:Read it in French.
Mr. Tom Kmiec: In French. If I can find a transliteration, I might use it.
It was far more dangerous before. In fact, I believe the first few Speakers who were elected by our parliamentarians to sit as Speakers—Mr. Chan is making the motion—did not keep their heads. They displeased the executive.
In a more symbolic sense, then, don't behead the opposition. We're not your opponents. We're not here to displease you. We're just here to raise the point that we're stewards, with you, in Parliament. You may be on this side, and then you may not find the rules as pleasant when it's someone else using them against you.
I would not be the one to want to use them against you. I think the best opportunity for us is to find a way to pass this amendment on the motion, to proceed with a study, and to build that trust, which I believe this committee did have before. It grants us then an opportunity to debate these things, potentially, but to come to unanimous agreement on what actually goes forward.
The committee is always free to take up afterwards another study or another series of studies. This is probably the most important committee of the House. The public accounts committee perhaps rates a very high second. The Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations has a disallowance clause....
The member for Perth—Wellington is looking at me with shocked eyes. I'm sure he has a favourite committee that he wants to reference.
You know, as another idea, we could always agree that if any member disagrees with a proposal that it be stricken from the discussion. I know that's been mentioned before. That's basically what our amendment says. I think we've covered off everything that may potentially be changed: “Standing Order, provisional Standing Order, new Standing Order, Sessional Order, Special Order, or to create or to revise a usual practice of the House”. We're just saying give us an opportunity to keep things as they are and consider it some more.
There's nothing wrong with further consideration. Delay is not a bad thing in Parliament. It truly is not. You want to get it right the first time you do it. I hope we get as close as possible to getting things right the first time we do it. A lot of the detailed work is then done in government regulations or passed by order in council. We give to the executive, to cabinet ministers, the ability to make very specific decisions. Our statutes are detailed, but they don't go down into the minutiae most of the time. We trust that the cabinet will make the best decisions on behalf of Canadians. We also trust that public servants will then implement those decisions, both statute and regulatory decisions, on behalf of Canadians. We hold the government accountable for the activities and the services rendered to Canadians by public servants.
Madam Jordan was here before. I used to sit on the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations. We had two witnesses, and I was told that it was the first time in eight years the standing committee had witnesses appear. Both times we were debating, and then asking the witnesses very specific and pointed questions about why the departments had not followed the orders given to them by the cabinet and given to them by members of Parliament through the statute. They had gone, we believed, far beyond a reasonable interpretation of the statutes and regulations.
There wasn't finger-pointing and blaming. There were Liberals there too, at the time. They outnumbered the Conservatives but they agreed with us, and I agreed with them. This had nothing to do with our partisan affiliations. It had everything to do with the fact that a deliberative body, Parliament, had decided, with specific wording in mind, that specific regulations were passed, and public servants were not following through. They were going beyond the letter of the law. It was an opportunity for us to question them, to debate back and forth, and to make the point to them that they had gone beyond what Parliament sought to do through a statute.
Will those opportunities disappear? Will they go away? How will these joint committees with the Senate work? That's my worry here. If we program too much of the activities at the committee level, will I have that opportunity, if I rejoin that committee, to question aggressively, if necessary, a public servant or a stakeholder group—perhaps because they've misled me, either on purpose or by accident—who comes to present before me? Those types of opportunities are rare.
Will I even be able to call them as a witness? That's an open question: will I be able to do that? I don't know. I've been on committees such as the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, where it's freewheeling and we add witnesses whenever we want to. There's a great deal of trust among us. There has not been a single dissenting report since I've been on the committee. I think that's a testament to our willingness to work together, back and forth, just as it should be, if we can pass this amendment to the motion.
A lot of the proposals the government is pushing for in “Reforming the Standing Orders of the House of Commons” would be termed historic. “Transformational change”, in fact, are the words I would use, because they would transform how this place works. I mentioned before that faster is not better; being more efficient is not necessarily something we should seek. We are a results-oriented organization, it's true, but it's also about the journey of how you get there, because that builds the public's confidence that we have considered everybody's opinions.
When you have time allocation and you shut down debate, that's one thing, and people get angry and unhappy. Governments have different reasons for doing it, but when from the beginning they say that you cannot do this because the rules say you can't express yourself to the point you may wish to in order to represent your constituency, it is going to have an impact on parliamentarians, both on this side and on the government caucus side.
What it will do is disincent members from running for office again. I'm sure there are organizations out there that will cheer that: fewer members of Parliament rerunning for office, and more rookies and new people. But here's where I think we will lose if we don't have these members who run again, who recommit to another four or five years in Parliament: we'll lose that experience. I can't pick up the traditions of this place by reading the Standing Orders. Nobody told me on the first day when I entered the chamber that you bow towards the Speaker or bow when you walk across the floor in front of the mace. They just told me not to walk across the box. It's like traffic light signals. It's very important. I saw a member of the Liberal caucus almost pass through it accidentally, not thinking, and I've almost done it once myself. I stopped myself.
Nobody explained that to us. You only pick that up from the members who have been here longer and who spread the news, almost like preachers of Parliament's traditions. That's how I've learned about the respect you should have for the mace, for the Speaker's chair, and for the institution we're in.
I'm worried that this motion is too reckless without amendments. I know that at the beginning I mentioned that I had only a couple of points, and that I would go through about three dozen sub-points for each of my main points. I'm about halfway through the first bullet.
The decorum in the House is governed by really just a handful of Standing Orders, if that, and they're very broad; they're up for interpretation. We rely on the Speaker and the more experienced members—again, the veteran members—to tell us. The clapping, the excessive standing ovations, the eating in the House.... It's not a cafeteria. It's where great men and women have debated substantive issues: whether or not to enter a war, how to conduct a war, World War II, World War I, the Korean War. Important debates have happened there.
I know that in other workplaces you can work at your desk because you don't have time to leave and go anywhere. On things like decorum, I was told that clapping was introduced in the early 1970s. It was introduced because members used to thump their hands on the desks and cause the microphones to pop out. Also, it was probably damaging to the desks. If you do it enough, they'll will go away.
Look at the Assemblée nationale in Quebec. There is no clapping. There is no heckling. There is no anything. It is stoic, maybe you could say, in its question time. I think “stoic” would be the nicest term you could use for it, but it can be boring.
I'll say one thing about our question period: it is not boring. Neither is question time in the United Kingdom. It is not boring. Questions go fast. You have to listen to the answers. A good minister or a good parliamentary secretary will be humorous, will give a direct answer and a substantive answer, and actually will answer the question.
I think that's all that opposition members are really looking for. We're not looking to catch you in an error or anything. What we want is a substantive answer. It can be a short one too. A simple no or yes would suffice at times. You don't have to use the whole time. You could police yourselves.
My concern is that with some of these changes that we may bring through, we may not think about these traditions or customs or conventions that we have. We may accidentally introduce something, or take away something else that made us want to work together, that made us want to reach across the aisle and maybe have a private conversation with another member over something they were or were not doing.
I know that the ruminations of the president of the Treasury Board at times can be interesting. I know that the Speaker has admonished him at least once for eating in the House. I don't eat in the House, because it is not just like any other place of work. It is Parliament. It's the House of Commons. It's the floor of the House of Commons. In many other workplaces, I ate and did everything at the same time at work, especially when I was an exempt staffer. Every single exempt staffer will appreciate this. You don't have time to eat your lunch somewhere. You stay at your desk and you prepare your boss for question period. You resolve the issues ahead of time. You have the meetings you need to have, and you resolve them. That was my experience.
This is not like any other place of work. That's why changing how this place of work functions should not be done by only one caucus, or one party, or a small group of people. Further, I would say that it's not even the caucus but the government that is looking to do this through this very short, slim document.
Reducing the speech lengths that we could have would deprive Mr. Genuis and Mr. Christopherson, who have spoken before, and deprive those who come after me from being able to speak to the amendment of this motion. Some things that could take five minutes to say should be said in 20 minutes to allow the translators to translate, potentially, but sometimes you need all the detail to truly understand. It could be vice versa, and something said in 20 minutes should be said in five. There is no reason to be verbose. I feel I need to be verbose today, but not on most days.
I know that the main motion discusses October 6, 2016, the day that was spent in the House to debate the Standing Orders. I think any subject matter taken up from those debates should have a more substantive study than the 45 or 60 days that would be allowed by this. As well, just because their ideas are being pitched here on the floor of the House,...they still should be unanimously agreed to. They cannot just be one member's idea, or a group of members' idea, like the executive council of the cabinet members, to push it through on the rest of us.
You are all parliamentarians, equal—equal to the chair, equal to me. I don't have any extra power than you. We should all have an equal opportunity on the Standing Orders, the sessional orders, and the rules of the House, as they stand now, that will help us do our work. Changing them or amending them should be done by unanimous agreement.
I now want to reference a few of the speeches and some of the ideas they've picked out of them. Some of them are about process.
Mr. Chair, you're the one who mentioned the semicircle, and as I mentioned before, the reason we sit across from each other is really an echo, a historical echo, from Westminster chapel, where the monks sat across from each other. The pews faced each other instead of facing the altar. We've continued that tradition down through the ages. The mace sits on the table. There's a calendar on the table that we don't really all need. There's a clock in there, but we all have smart phones. It sits there by tradition, as do all the rules. All the Standing Orders and all the procedural rules are in those books. The clerks sit there as well. They now have screens built into the table. We've adjusted technologically to changing circumstances and on different things in order to speed up certain mechanics of this place.
I remember 12 years ago, when I was here working as a staff member to a member of Parliament, that they still delivered the Order Paper and Notice Paper every single day. Now you need to get them online. They are no longer delivered, at least not in the Confederation Building. That's okay with me, because doing that was probably a waste of paper. All of us can get them online.
That's a mechanics change. It doesn't have substantive impact on the work I do. I check the Notice Paper every day. Every Monday, when I am back here, my staff has already printed it off and provided it for me. That allows me to do my work. I can figure out what's going to happen, generally speaking, over the next few days.
I also have certainty that when I go to committee, I will be heard and I will be able to speak. I don't have that certainty, based on the way I see this motion functioning, based on the non-commitment I see to this particular....
I see that the bells are going off, Mr. Chair.
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It comes out once in a while.
Mr. Scott Simms: Yes.
Mr. Tom Kmiec: Collectively, we know there has to be a government legislative agenda. The opposition's job is always to react to what the government is doing. You set the agenda. You, in a sense, are the executive—not you as individual members—because you are members of the government caucus. It's about ensuring balance, and about understanding which bills are considered controversial, which ones need more debate, which ones could use less debate, and how we can afford additional debate. What are the mechanisms by which both the government and the opposition can let it be known that they choose to have more debate on a particular issue, or want to have that debate? If you introduce the kind of programming that this proposal has in it without sufficient review, without sufficient study, and I believe without sufficient witnesses coming in, then I'm afraid you will not strike that right balance and you will lose as parliamentarians, not as members of the government caucus. It may not be in this Parliament, but in the Parliament after this one, and the one after that.
There are bills that are not controversial. We have seen our ability in the House to quickly pass bills, such as the Marrakesh treaty bill, because we were in agreement. We agreed with the contents and the principles. When we do that, we move it forward. Likewise, debate has collapsed at times on particular pieces of legislation, such as Bill in the House of Commons, because no member chose to rise and speak to it or debate it further. It simply proceeded to the next stage in the House.
We don't have to be geniuses to realize that a single member can cause a lot of havoc for any government or opposition on any bill. What we do need, though, is a sense of co-operation. We can build that co-operation at the committee level especially. That's why we didn't simply vote against the motion. We proposed a reasonable amendment that would improve the original motion, one that we could move forward with in terms of its contents. I still believe it's reasonable. The contents of our amendment are pretty reasonable.
We saw with Bill that the government used time allocation several times. On that particular bill, I disagreed with time allocation being used, because it was an issue of conscience for many of us. Our constituents, or many of them, thought it was an issue of conscience. That bill in itself was a response to a Supreme Court decision, so we as parliamentarians were being asked by the government to respond to it. That was their proposal, to implement what they thought would be a means of abiding by the strictures of the Supreme Court decision. We were free, then, to deliberate to the fullest extent possible on behalf of our constituents. I think it was an error to use time allocation in that situation. Again, that was the government's call to make.
There was some debate, and in my opinion not enough debate. At the committee stage, I'll give great credit to Mr. Housefather, the chair of the committee at the time. He made it possible for every member there to have their amendments considered. I know that he gave me consideration for my amendments that I proposed at committee. To his credit, he allowed me that opportunity.
I don't know what the outcome will be of this report, nor should I know. There should be a study of some of these ideas here. Our ideas on the changes to the Standing Orders have been debated before, but I would caution you about changing the way in which committees work too readily, too quickly, and surrendering your rights as parliamentarians to be heard at committee. We moved it from the House of Commons in 1969 into the committees to have freewheeling debates, to move from generalists to specialists on specific issues. If you allow the types of rules that exist in the House of Commons to be moved into committee, you will lose on that. You will lose the ability to differ with your party when you need to, to be independent thinkers in general, because potentially there could be limits on the type of debate you could have. There could be limits on the types of motions you could put forward. They could program the committee so that it works a certain way, so that when every member has spoken, it simply moves on to the next stage. I don't think we win when we do that.
All of us were elected within a political party. There are no true independents in this House. Even Mr. was elected as a member of the Liberal Party of Canada, although now he is free to pursue whatever objectives he has as a parliamentarian. That is his right.
I don't think it suits us to so readily and so quickly change the way these committees work without getting unanimous agreement among ourselves.
I see that Mr. is here for the New Democrats. I know they would agree with me that we fight hard at committee for the other members of our caucuses who may not be able to sit through the committee because of scheduling reasons. We do this on their behalf, not just for our constituents. There are also our fellow caucus members who may have an interest in a particular issue. We need mandates from our caucuses, because when we speak there, we don't speak just for ourselves and our constituencies. We also speak on behalf of our fellow caucus members.
Again, from the Debates, at one point, one of the members said, “Trust me, if a debate collapses on a particular bill, it might be because there is no one who wants to talk about it.” That is very true.
When we are allotted our 10 minutes in the House of Commons, you don't need to use the full 10 minutes. I've seen members use less than that. They rise, make an excellent point, sit down, and then do a Q and A with a member who chooses to pursue a line of questioning or make a commentary. If we policed ourselves more often, we could find opportunities like that to be faster and more efficient, but you won't achieve that by changing the rules just because sometimes people don't police themselves.
Here's what we should do. Let's try to get some substantial rule changes in our Standing Orders without resorting to forcing it past the opposition. We are opposed to making changes without being sufficiently consulted and without being able to say to not do A, B or C, because it will constrain us as an opposition from being able to fulfill our constitutional obligation to loyally oppose.
As I mentioned before—and will now, maybe for the benefit of some of the members who have joined us this afternoon—you are not my adversaries. You are not my enemies. You are fellow parliamentarians. I am not here to win political points at your expense. I am here to debate you and to deliberate with you. You will disagree with me and I will disagree with you. At the end of the day, in terms of your political affiliation, you will likely vote with your caucus. I accept that, but we can have that deliberation between us. Don't take away all the tools I have to make a point on behalf of my constituency, or on my behalf if I have an issue of conscience I need to raise, or on behalf of my caucus members who may not be able to sit around the table.
There are proposals in here to add members of other parties as ex officio members so they could question witnesses. Right now, we have two hours. Typically, most committees meet over a two-hour period. I've actually asked why the meetings are two hours. I don't know if anybody has ever wondered why we have two-hour committee meetings. Why are they scheduled in two-hour blocks? Is there something about three hours or two and a half hours that doesn't work? In the business world, a two-hour meeting would be called a two-hour waste of time, typically. It would have to be pretty substantial business to have a two-hour meeting with multiple presenters. Engineering companies may do it if there's a complicated project with drawings on the table.
What I have been told—maybe this is apocryphal—is that the two-hour scheduling was done before we gained the buildings that were added to the precinct, and the two-hour windows allowed for every single committee to be scheduled during the day. They would schedule them all in a row. There weren't as many committee rooms as there are now, so they scheduled them one after another and the two-hour blocks made it all work.
Do we need two-hour committee meetings all the time? I know that at times the chairs have finished meetings early. Chairs obviously have longer meetings at times. Small changes to the rules like that are worthy of consideration, but we should come to them by unanimous agreement.
Making this place more functional doesn't require us to surrender our ability as parliamentarians to keep the government accountable, which you want to do also. I've been told by many experienced members, veteran members, and even members of the government and previous governments, that sometimes when considering the main estimates, and even during debates on supplementary estimates, they have discovered things in the documents that they didn't even realize were contradictions or errors.
I remember doing estimates at the provincial legislature in Alberta. Sometimes there would be inaccuracies. There would be typos that would have to be explained. Sometimes the civil servants had not removed a certain thing that they had specifically been asked to remove because it was no longer part of the agenda of the government, and it was only realized through considering the main estimates. The committees are the opportunities to review those estimates. If we program the committees to limit how much we can speak, we'll lose that opportunity. We really do very little of it in the House.
There is a provision that the estimates are automatically passed at a certain point, debated or not and considered or not. There, we have already surrendered part of the core job of a parliamentarian, which is to review how the government spends money.
The is proposing changes to when and how the estimates are considered, so I know that it's already being considered by the government in its proposals to Parliament. This is something that parliamentarians have talked about in the past. The main estimates are done on a cash accounting basis. The government does accrual accounting. The fiscal years don't match.
I remember being at the chamber of commerce when we invited the deputy parliamentary budget officer to come to Calgary and explain this problem to us. He made a fantastic presentation to our tax and economic affairs committee and really convinced the people who were there, business people, about the errors and mistakes that could occur and the difficulty in tracking how government spends money.
Earlier, I mentioned the second chamber. I am moving on to page 5571 of the Debates. I won't go through all of them, because I'd like to move on to a few more articles and the debates from 1991, when there was an attempt to force through changes to the Standing Orders without unanimous agreement, and go through how adversarial it became at that time between members of the government and members of the opposition.
There are two last points I'll make on the debates. This concept of a second chamber, like they have in the United Kingdom, I think is unnecessary. What we need to do is fill the chamber with the members we already have. The best debates I have seen have happened when there were more members in the chamber who got engaged because there was an engaging speaker making a point that perhaps someone hadn't made, who was perhaps doing it in a tongue-in-cheek way, or who perhaps grabbed the attention of another group of parliamentarians. Then there is an easygoing back-and-forth, a flow of conversation and debate.
I don't believe that we need a second chamber. I know that it was mentioned by some members in the debate on October 6, and I know that part of this original motion is to consider what members have mentioned.
Here's what I signed up for. No one forced me to run. I wasn't forced into this by my wife—definitely not my wife—and I wasn't forced into this by constituents or by the local Conservative association. We've all signed up for a job that involves gruelling travel. We have all heard people talk of working 15-hour days and working on weekends. For some of us, it's a very long trip back home. We all campaigned for 78 days in the last election for people to grant us this: to earn the privilege to sit here as parliamentarians and serve in the House. I try to keep my complaining about the work-life balance to a minimum.
I campaigned vigorously against New Democratic and Liberal opponents in my riding who wanted to do exactly the same thing. They were signing up for exactly the same type of job. What I don't want members of the cabinet to say is that to save our work-life balance they're going to reduce our sitting time by 20% and reapportion the hours to another time. I don't think that would help this place work. I don't think it would improve debate. I don't think it would improve work-life balance. How about they let parliamentarians decide about their work-life balance?
If I remember correctly, it was this committee that did not pursue recommending doing away with Friday sittings, but it reappears here for consideration. I know that Mr. Simms has offered a different perspective, which is to do a full normal day on Friday. I've offered my perspective that perhaps what we could do is bring back committees of the House to take their debates to the House for a day. They would be automatically pre-scheduled so that everybody would know that the foreign affairs committee would come in for three hours and the members of the committee would be expected to be there, perhaps on a motion to debate a report or an issue.
It's an option, but I haven't studied it enough. I haven't considered it enough to understand the ramifications of doing that. I don't think you have enough time to complete a report by June 2 and get consensus at this table without passing our amendment to the motion. You will need that done in order to get that across.
There are many people who work in different occupations, such as the military, or who work in Fort McMurray, who travel quite a bit, are away from their families, and don't get a say in their work-life balance. It's imposed upon them by their employers. Our employers are our constituents, the taxpayers of Canada. In a group, they pay us to be here to work on their behalf as parliamentarians first, not members of our caucuses first.
I defend the interests of my constituents because nobody else here exists to do that. As I've mentioned, I have the second largest riding in Canada. Nobody else is going to represent it here but me. That's the best I can do on their behalf. Within five years—and likely within four years, because that's the law—there will be an election, and I will be held to account for my performance in the House. A great thing about our democracy is that individual voters can use whatever metric they want to rate us. They can ask us if we have missed a lot of votes, if we have been present in the House, or if we have spoken enough. I hope they will feel that I have spoken enough.
:
I just want to make sure.
Mr. Blaikie senior, in this case, the member at the time for Winnipeg—Transcona, continues on to say, and I think his particular experience is very valuable:
I had the opportunity to work on both of these committees. I wanted to reflect on the changes we have before us here, in light of the parliamentary reform process that I have seen unfold since I arrived here in 1979.
He actually worked on both of those committees, so his viewpoint as an experienced parliamentarian, as a member who has served on both of those committees, which reformed the Standing Orders not once but twice with unanimous agreement, is very valuable, and he's a New Democrat. I'm not even looking for a Conservative I can agree with. I actively looked for a New Democrat I could agree with and cite and quote.
He mentions here other members storming the chair at one point. I know that this was Harvie Andre, who was a member from Calgary, a very well-respected member, who actually did no such thing and would defend himself till the very end. I have the privilege of knowing his daughter Lauren as well, who lives in Calgary with a gentleman I worked with at the Calgary chamber, Craig Watt.
He goes on to mention other members, the types of work they've done, and how they contributed to committee reports on the McGrath committee and on the Lefebvre committee. He says here about the McGrath committee:
At the time we all agreed with the McGrath committee that delay is not necessarily a bad thing.
That goes to the argument of efficiency found in the government's document.
Delay is one of the features and functions of parliamentary democracy.
Delay is so we can consider the question put before us, either a motion or a report or private member's business. It is not a delay to debate. I have heard that mentioned by a current member of the executive, the .
Delay is not a bad thing. If I have an argument with my wife and I disagree on something profoundly, or she disagrees with me, and we sleep on it, we didn't delay; we just decided to pull back, sleep on it, and then decide the next morning, as opposed to deciding in the heat of the moment and then making a bad decision.
I think the same could apply to Parliament. We're all members seeking to find that common ground among each other.
He goes on to say:
They are providing crucial political time for the public to mobilize against something which they may or may not regard as something they want to oppose.
That is exactly what we as opposition members are trying to do today, and were trying to do yesterday and the day before. We are trying to rally Canadians to demonstrate to them that we believe the motion without the proposed amendment, and the contents of “Reforming the Standing Orders of the House of Commons”, the March 2017 document that the Government of Canada posted online, are bad for the opposition. We believe they will lead to an opposition that is an audience, able to be seen but not heard. I would think that would be a great loss to this Parliament and to parliamentarians on all sides.
Now, people can disagree on the other side. I know a person who disagrees with our interpretation of what's going to happen, but the fact is that we, the opposition—I think I speak for a great deal of members—have very little trust right now for members of the executive. I don't necessarily mean members of the government caucus here at the table. What I mean is members of the executive. We have very little trust for them right now. We could rebuild that trust if we could pass this amendment, and we would like to get to that point.
I have two more things from Mr. Blaikie's contribution here during these debates. It's from April 10, 1991, on page 19293 of the House of Commons Debates.
He says:
...and the use of delay as a primary parliamentary function would not be so absolutely crucial to the role of opposition, if there was more meaningful input. But that they have not provided in this particular reform.
He's talking about the 1991 reform, when they were rushing through changes to the Standing Orders, as I feel changes to the Standing Orders are being rushed here. This is a parliamentarian of years of experience, who is saying this in 1991, who was first elected in 1979, who had served on the McGrath committee and served on the Lefebvre committee—two times they were able to reach unanimous agreement on the types of changes they wanted to see to the Standing Orders—and was a New Democrat in those years, no less.
I think that is the—
I was worried for a moment that I would not be able to continue.
I have just a few more quotes from Mr. Blaikie on the idea of parliamentary secretaries on committee. While I value their work as parliamentarians, I really don't believe they should be on committee. They can come sit in as parliamentarians, but I find it difficult to believe that they are able to separate cleanly their roles as parliamentary secretaries, meaning spokespeople on behalf of their minister and the executive, from their role as parliamentarians.
It is an incredibly difficult and fine line to walk as a parliamentary secretary, because you are there to promote, advocate, defend your minister, go to meetings, propose ideas, and work on their behalf and on behalf of the executive. You take on that role. You volunteer for that role. Nobody forced it upon you. You took on the extra duties. Just like then, in 1991, as Mr. Blaikie references, this is the excuse used by the parliamentary secretary to the House leader, who said:
It is not for control, it is for information, contact and communications, et cetera.
It's just like the argument that's used today: oh no, by no means will they direct the committee to do certain things, or direct members of the committee to vote a certain way or to propose a certain motion.
We're all working as a team on our individual teams, and we'll always be doing that. There are only so many spaces on the committee to work together. Some of the recommendations here could and should be studied, maybe to grow the membership of the committees and to include others who are unable to contribute to it, but that can't be done without the unanimous agreement that we're proposing in our amendment.
I have problems with some of the content of the motion, but I could live with it, as long as we pass this amendment. I think the study period is too short to study all the substantive changes being proposed for consideration. There's not enough detail, in some cases, to actually go through with it. I've mentioned the themes before, theme 1 and theme 2. You could break those down into separate complete studies, and you would have ample work at this committee in studying that over two or three years.
I've mentioned free votes before, so I won't repeat the points I've made on that. I won't mention that Mr. Blaikie twice rose in the House on a point of order to complain that the government was interpreting opposition day motions as matters of confidence. I would hope that we would never return to such a situation, where members of the government caucus are forced to vote a certain way on opposition day motions because they're matters of confidence. The government can name something a matter of confidence.
I think some changes that were made in 1991 and 1985, and some changes, as I mentioned, that were done by unanimous consent over the past 20 years, were at times good changes. They allowed members of the government caucus, and members of the opposition as well, to be more independent. Not everything is a matter of confidence.
Mr. Blaikie mentioned that as well in his contributions to the debate. I think it's important to reference him in particular, because he was a member of both the McGrath committee and the Lefebvre committee, so his viewpoints, because of the time he spent there, provide insight. He was a 12-year member of the House of Commons at that moment. As I mentioned before, it's from the veterans that we learn about procedures of the House.
Another member I want to mention is a former Speaker, Peter Milliken, the member for Kingston and the Islands. He was very well known and I think well liked in the House. Amongst parliamentarians he was well respected. He says here as a member, not as a Speaker, that:
This time we have had the government say in House leaders' meetings that it had changes it would like to propose to the rules; here they are; tell us what you think.
That's not what we've been asked to do. We've been directed to do it, not asked for our opinions in a general sense. We haven't been asked to cobble together the original motion. That's why we're trying to get in our say through this amendment.
He continues:
I submit that it is contrary to the past practice of this House. It has denied the opportunity for public input on the changes that are being proposed which fundamentally affect the way this House operates. This House is, after all, the public forum of this country where citizens have the right to express their views through their representatives and, on occasion directly, in the committees.
I think this is a profound statement by a parliamentarian who later became Speaker of the House, adjudicating the Standing Orders. There may be members here who know Mr. Milliken better than I do. This may just be apocryphal, but I was told that he did his studies on the Standing Orders and on question period. He read the Standing Orders before he became a parliamentarian, so he understood them in a way that many of us are learning to understand them and appreciate them.
In another section that I want to reference here, he quotes someone else:
Mr. Andre says the opposition's planned fight against the rule changes is just for the sake of appearances, since the three party leaders have been actively negotiating the changes since December.
The House leadership was trying to negotiate a solution to the impasse. Our House leadership has been trying to do the same, I understand, trying to find common ground and increase trust so that we can find some type of agreement. That's why we spend meetings trying to reach that agreement among ourselves, which we've so far failed to reach.
Don't consider our continuation of this debate, my continuation of this debate, as being solely to obstruct you. I want to make some points. I hope I've kept my repetition to a minimum. I've introduced into the discussion new material—articles, ideas, past debates, the opinions and judgments of parliamentarians with decades of experience. I think they're valuable for this exercise and this consideration because they're germane to the discussion. We're talking about changing the rules of how we work.
Mr. Milliken went on to say, with regard to the government House leader, that:
I presume he meant by that that just because you have been negotiating means you somehow agree.
Just because we negotiate, it doesn't mean we agree with the intent of all this, which is to drastically change the Standing Orders of the House and we how we do our business. I know that members have said that it doesn't necessarily mean that. Well, we have no way of knowing that, because we weren't party to the original discussion on the motion. That's why we're proposing this amendment, to at least reach some type of common ground. At least on this little bit we were hoping to find unanimous agreement to proceed on the study.
This amendment isn't trying to gut the original motion. We're not trying to eliminate it. We're saying that we will proceed with your goal, but we would like to have confidence in you. We would like to build that trust and co-operate, but with the knowledge that you will not force this upon us. We can talk, we can debate, but that does not mean that we somehow agree—yet. Perhaps we'll come to an agreement later on.
There is another reference I want to make. It is to Charles Edward Selwyn Franks, a constituent of Mr. Milliken, a good friend of his, a former professor of his, who wrote a book called The Parliament of Canada. On page 5 it says this:
There are two further functions of parliament which are so important that they deserve to be identified in their own right, though they might also be subsumed under the general rubric of making a government work.
This is related to the efficiency argument that the government is making.
The first of these is the function of parliament as a recruiting and training ground for political leaders; the second is the function of political communication, where the processes of Parliamentary discussion, in Bagehot's terms, express the mind of the people, teach society, and inform both government and citizen of grievances and problems.
How will we be able to debate those things and get to the grievances and problems, to, in his view, teach society and inform both government and citizens, if we don't have substantive debate at the committee stage, since we don't have it all the time in the House of Commons? The mechanisms the government can use to proceed with time allocation reduce debate. This is the place where parliamentarians used to debate all the issues, used to propose all the amendments, used to go into committee of the whole to propose amendments there. Yes, it was a very difficult process. It was perhaps inefficient, but it was effective in ensuring that parliamentarians had full capacity to represent their constituencies.
Mr. Milliken went on to state:
Governments resent oppositions that look like a government in waiting because it is perceived that all the weaknesses of the government are shown up by a skilful and competent opposition.
I would hope that Canadians, in general, have found our caucuses, both New Democrats and Conservatives, to be skilful opposition. I hope the government recognizes us as that, and not obstructionist, not out to unnecessarily impede, but to skilfully demonstrate a point, which is that you have to seek unanimous agreement to change the rules of how this House works before you proceed with a study. If we can reach agreement on the amendment, then we can proceed with the study. I think that's been plainly evident.
I'm looking at my outline here and I've gone through about four of the points. I have two left to do. I see Mr. Simms giving me a thumbs-up. He's quite pleased. Eventually, the floor will return to him, but just not yet. I have a few more points to make.
Mr. Milliken went on, saying:
I will read from page 5 of the little work: “On the Role of an Opposition”.
This was something Mr. Milliken wanted to deal with, and he had been interrupted several times by other members.
He read;
Only a strong and alert opposition can hope to check and control the excessive control powers contrary to the Constitution that may be assumed or conferred upon governmental administration, the so-called bureaucracy.
Only an alert opposition can prevent the short-cuts through democratic procedures that cabinet ministers and bureaucrats frequently find attractive. It is only the opposition, functioning as a recognized part of parliamentary proceedings, that stands opposed to the degeneration of the governmental system into a form of arbitrary direction of public affairs by the executive and the bureaucracy.
I won't continue the quote.
The Standing Orders enable us to do these things. We are part of the parliamentary process. Part of proposing a bill should be considering how the opposition will react: whether there will be reasoned debate, whether it will pull the plug and obstruct everything, or whether it will say, “You are the government. You have the right. You have the mandate from the people to move forward with a piece of legislation, and you have recognized our right to oppose” within the rules that we have now.
If you choose to change the rules—and as members have said and members of the government caucus have said, you have a mandate to make this place more efficient and modernized, though I don't like the term “modernize”—I hope you will consider that we too still have a role to play here in these proceedings, at committee and in the House, through motions and, at times, dilatory motions or debatable motions or motions on committee reports. We have a role to play with you and we hope you will consider our viewpoints as well. However, unless you pass this amendment, we don't have faith that this will actually happen, because you can outvote us at this committee and you can have your way. There's just so little trust right now that we can't proceed on the basis of faith alone.
Later on Mr. Milliken made the point about 1969. I've had a very difficult time finding the Debates from the time and actually reading them all.
Mr. Milliken said:
The government finally used closure to get these rules through, after 12 days of debate. After 12 days of debate. I want to point that out to the parliamentary secretary. I can assure him that if closure is applied on this debate, he will hear about the 12 days of debate that went on in 1969. We are quite prepared to debate these for 12 days, I can assure the hon. member.
He was interrupted later on, but he was making a point that in 1969, again, the government of the day pushed through changes on the Standing Orders within 12 days, without that consent from everybody.
Parliament shouldn't be turning out legislation in quantity. My answer and the answer of many others has been that the mission of Parliament is freedom and the assurance that all the people shall receive justice. We're not a slot machine into which we drop a piece of legislation and then spin, hopefully not for no reason, and then a slug drops out at the end, and the legislation becomes law. We're not a slot machine. That's not what we're here for. You can't program this as you can a slot machine.
We're supposed to have open debate. We've chosen, I believe unfortunately, to move this from the House of Commons floor to the committee stage. We don't know how it will finish on June 2. We don't know what will be in this report, which is why we're asking for protection. This amendment is about protecting us. We're asking for protection. The weaker party is asking the stronger party, the government caucus, for protection, for certainty that it will not try to turn us into a slot machine as parliamentarians. That's all we're asking for.
I think it's a very reasoned debate.
I won't reference Mr. Milliken anymore. I'll put away the rest of his speech, but I highly recommend that members take a look at the debates in 1991 and his specific commentaries. Again, he was a member of the Liberal caucus at the time. He became Speaker, so I think he speaks from a position of experience and judgment, and he's also someone who actually studied the Standing Orders and has a deep appreciation for the traditions of this House.
Another member, David Berger from Saint-Henri—Westmount, quoted from the McGrath report:
We must strengthen the role of the House of Commons, and the key to restoring confidence in our central democratic institution is to enhance the involvement of the private member of Parliament in a number of areas.
He was talking about enhancing, but I can't tell whether many of these changes are enhancements for individual members or enhancements for the government. The two get confounded quite often, because what's efficient for an individual member is not necessarily efficient for the government. Having more deliberate debate is not efficient for the government. It says that slows it down. It wants us to be a slot machine. It wants to put in a piece of legislation, process it through, and then get it out the door within a fixed amount of time. It wants certainty.
Individual parliamentarians should say they can't give it that certainty. They need to consider this. They need to go back to their constituents and they need to go back to their caucus and they need to think about it. It's like buying a car: you're not going to buy it the first time you see it. The first time a piece of legislation is proposed, I may hum and haw. I will take weeks to consider it. I would hope people wouldn't buy vehicles based on an ad and then just walk into a dealership and buy the first Tesla they see, although I hear in Ontario you can get a heck of a rebate for one.
This particular parliamentarian then went on, and he was speaking to amendments to the Standing Orders, exactly the same thing that could potentially happen later on if this report becomes part of a government motion to amend the Standing Orders. He talked about question period. I have commented that question period is the one time of the day and during the week when we can uncover weaknesses in the government and disagreements, perhaps, with government policy.
He says that in the parliamentary system it's the government's responsibility to present a legislative agenda. We mentioned this before, but the agenda comes from the government. We don't disagree with that on this side. We accept the fact that the government will be setting the agenda, and it won't be us.
That's why the example in the reform to the Standing Orders of the House of Commons referencing the U.S. House of Representatives is just so odd. It's because in there, there is no government to represent. Every member proposes bills and pushes bills forward. Majority leaders debate among themselves and then figure out agreement on things.
I'll mention one more. The member for Saint-Léonard, Mr. Alfonso Gagliano, was a respected cabinet minister, a long-serving member with much experience to bring to debates.
I have tried to reference experienced members of the House who were Liberal caucus members to demonstrate the viewpoints that existed then. I value all members regardless of their political affiliation, but to me experienced members bring a thoughtfulness that takes time to accumulate. Mr. Gagliano had this quote:
A fundamental aspect of the principles on which the financial procedures of Parliament are based is that Parliament does not grant supply before the Opposition has had the opportunity to show why it should be refused.
So we don't say yes before we say no. All we're asking is this opportunity. Say yes to us, and then we can debate on the rest. Perhaps we'll say no, but we could say yes too. You can't automatically assume that our side will say no to any changes, because we've expressed an interest in considering changes. Different members have expressed different ideas. I hope I've contributed some ideas as well, ideas that I think would be interesting to study, although not to implement immediately, because they deserve some study.
I have just this last quotation here, again from Mr. Gagliano:
The role of an opposition party in a parliamentary system is to make the process more democratic by forcing the government of the day to be accountable.
The goal is to render passage of laws inefficient because of that need for accountability. It will slow things down, but it's a two-way street. One person's red tape is another person's accountability measure. Requiring a longer administrative form is meant in some way to fulfill a requirement to collect information and to assure yourself that the money is being spent in the proper fashion. One person will call it red tape. Another person will call it accountability and want you to show them the way you spend.
I am getting closer to the end, which I'm sure members will cheer.
There is a reference to the House of Representatives here—
:
I have a few books here I could maybe begin with.
I want to reference the ninth edition of Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process, written by Walter J. Oleszek. It is an American congressional procedures book that people who take university courses on congressional procedures of both the Senate and the House of Representatives in the United States are forced to read.
It goes through all the details of such things as committee mark-up procedures, which are very similar to our committee report-writing stage; how to bypass committees; the committee chair's role; committee hearings; and the scheduling of legislation in the House. There are many examples in here. There are sections on privileged legislation and minor non-controversial measures. There are examples on the amending process on the floor of the Senate, and on a lot of procedures like committee of the whole, which is very similar to our own. This is a book that is considered to be fundamental to read when you manage procedural process in the Senate and in the House of Representatives.
I bring it up because every time we discuss the Standing Orders, reference is made to Congress, to the United Kingdom, and to other legislatures and how they function. With a study as short as the one proposed in this motion, I don't feel you would have the opportunity to get the full contribution of enough witnesses from the United States, potentially, or to travel there to consider their process to pass laws.
We've all heard about the gridlock in Congress and about how slow their legislative process can be. I don't think it's necessarily true. You've seen in the past that they've passed massive pieces of legislation, and pretty important ones too, like the Affordable Care Act, which made substantive changes, and they used these procedures.
I want to focus a bit on unanimous consent agreements, because we use unanimous consent to get around the rules when we need to when we've consulted with each other and we're agreeing to co-operate. I bring it up as well because unanimously agreeing to change the rules sounds a lot like unanimous consent agreements. If the Senate strictly observed every rule, it would become mired in a bog of parliamentary complications.
We on this side—and the government caucus does this as well—when we have been able to find common ground to expedite a bill or find common ground to pass a motion recognizing a day, a place, a person, or a particular situation, we have done so. We've found the ability to seek agreement, which is why it's so surprising to me that we can't find agreement on this very reasonable amendment.
Senator Tom Coburn, a Republican from Oklahoma, informed the other 99 senators that he would object to any attempt to pass by unanimous consent a measure to increase the debt ceiling. If one member of their Senate can slow things right down so that it cannot pass a particular measure, that sounds like a very inefficient way of doing things.
Majority leader George Mitchell, a Democrat from Maine for six years, said:
I regularly propound unanimous-consent requests on the floor and...when Senators object we hear within seconds—within seconds. Frequently when I am in the middle of a sentence, the phone rings and staff comes running out to say, “Senator so and so objects.”
They actually negotiate them back and forth on the floor, and actually cobble them together as they go, in the debates of the Senate.
That happens here, too. We have an open call, “Does anybody object to a unanimous consent motion?” and typically a member within earshot of the Speaker will say, “I object” or “No, I don't want to proceed with that”.
I don't think, though, that they think that their system is wholly inefficient. There are obviously members of the Senate who continue to do it this way because they think it produces results at some point.
This book says:
Unanimous consent agreements are often the product of intensive and extensive negotiations....
They actually draft written agreements that are then tabled with the Senate. They're at the table, and any senator can go to review them. This is once they have actually reached agreement on them.
I don't know why we can't make amendments to the Standing Orders using the same or similar inspiration from this procedural method. We can find common ground. I'm sure that we can if only we can have a very clear list of what the government caucus or the government intended by the changes it has proposed here.
I also use the example because programming is referenced, and programming happens a lot in the House of Representatives.
In here, one senator guesses that in the course of a typical week, they would probably enter into anywhere from literally 10 to 200 unanimous consent agreements, with 100 senators agreeing to them.
Including you, Mr. Chair, there are 12 of us. I'm sure we could come to some type of agreement, but we would like it to start with this motion right here, to find agreement on this motion. If 100 senators can write complex agreements and then table them before the Senate to deal expeditiously with an issue to find that efficiency that they're looking for, I think we can too.
These complex unanimous consent agreements are like our unanimous agreements that we seek. Some of them can be very long. The broad purpose is to impose time limits on debate, which is partly the proposal for programming in here for committees, and to expedite the scheduling of the Senate's workload.
There's talk of the parliamentary sessional calendar and of establishing predictability and permitting flexibility.
The predictability they're talking about is for the majority leaders. They want predictability. A piece of legislation will come in, at some point go out, and be moved to the House of Representatives. Again, there is no government line to defend. It's 100 independent, freethinking senators who generally agree with each other but who can also dissent.
They also have whips to rely on. There are general features to these agreements. They're negotiated contracts, basically, and accepted by all of them. They're comprehensive or partial. They vary. They waive points of order, and they may require the relevancy of amendments, so they eliminate the possibility for some of them to produce amendments.
These are all things a committee can do today. A committee can go into one of these, to take an example from here, and agree that they will not accept points of order. When committees travel, I have seen motions passed, before the travel is accepted, that during a committee meeting there shall be no dilatory motions or motions that would make it impossible for the committee to do its work.
I served briefly on the OGGO committee. I travelled with them to Atlantic Canada, including Newfoundland and Labrador, although we actually were unable to go to Labrador, and we passed those motions by unanimous agreement. Everyone agreed. Nobody wanted to shut down the committee while it was travelling, because we wanted to consider the witnesses and hear from them and get their feedback.
How would it help us to have rules set upon us that so that when we travelled, these rules would follow us? Has that been considered? Has anybody considered whether or not there will be exceptions to the rules when we're outside of the precinct? Will there be exceptions to how those function?
Now, all of these unanimous consent agreements are filed or recorded with the Congressional Record, the daily calendar of business, and the Senate journal, so no senator can ever miss it. A congressional scholar wrote that “A dozen or more complex agreements are no longer uncommon for complicated contentious measures.”
As I mentioned before, why don't we look at all the unanimous agreements we reach right now, at committees and in the House of Commons, to find opportunities to amend the Standing Orders based on the idea that since we're agreeing to these things quite often, why can't we just make them part of the Standing Orders? I think that would be a nice starting point. Plus, because we've agreed to them in the past, I think we would find agreement with them in the present—within this Parliament, I am sure.
Here I want to paraphrase a knowledgeable Senate aide whom Mr. Walter Oleszek references with regard to these consent agreements. There's increasingly a leaning toward the comprehensive rather than the incremental. Comprehensive unanimous consent agreements are now used to manage the decision-making process on the Senate floor “to an unprecedented degree”.
On the idea of “comprehensive” versus “incremental”, we can't tell, as members of the opposition, whether the government is proposing comprehensive changes to the Standing Orders—and we're supposed to accept, on faith, that they will respect us as part of the parliamentary proceedings—or whether they are proposing incremental changes. We don't know, and the few things that we do know, we don't trust. There's a lack of trust right now. We just don't know. That's why we cannot proceed with this.
I'll move on to a different chapter. It starts on page 260 of the procedural manual. We can compare the House and Senate now—the House of Representatives is referenced in here—and programming. I want to reference this for programming. I have the charts here on the differences between the two. Those I've mentioned I will not repeat.
They do have a more expeditious floor debate in the House of Representatives. They do. Because they have programming, it goes much more quickly.
Power is less evenly distributed—and they admit to that—between the majority and the minority. The majority holds all the cards.
There's a “strict germaneness” requirement—as for my pronunciation there, that's probably my third-language English at work—for floor amendments. This strict germaneness requirement for floor amendments means very strict rules on what a member can propose and cannot propose. They are far more partisan, partly because of the programming. It creates an environment where there are very few opportunities to make a point of debate.
I'm worried that these changes will lead to more partisanship at committee and on the floor of the House. I think we have enough of it. I think it's at a sufficient level. Sometimes it exceeds the need that is required, I think, but that's on us as parliamentarians.
They have very strict limits on debate in the House of Representatives. We have limits on debate here, but we can speak at every single reading of the bill. I have taken advantage of that opportunity, especially on the budget bill. On the last budget bill, I spoke at every single stage where I was allowed to do so. I remember getting ready to speak again on a free trade bill one time and being told by our lobby and the clerk that I had already spoken on it. I had spoken so much on the free trade bill that I was about to speak again when I wasn't supposed to.
The Senate and Congress have unlimited debate on nearly every single measure, which was the state of affairs in the House of Commons before now. With programming, you can see that the House has had its influence drastically reduced in what it can and cannot accomplish. They adhere very closely.... They have a rules committee. All it does is consider the rules. They negotiate these agreements to try to set the bar for all members of the House of Representatives, and there are 435 of them. It's a larger House than we have now. We may get there someday, and there may no longer be space in the House of Commons for everybody to be there. Maybe some of us will have to sit on the floor, quite literally, in order to be present.
I mentioned that the power is less evenly distributed. That uneven distribution comes at the expense of those who are opposed to the measure being presented on the floor. I don't think that's a model we want to adopt. As stated:
...the 113th Senate's rules, standing orders, resolutions, and laws affecting the business of the chamber are contained in over 1,400 pages and its precedents in one 1,608-page volume.
The Senate in the United States maximizes freedom of expression, quite literally. The House rules “show a constant subordination of the individual to the necessities of the whole House as the voice of the national will”, because it changes every two years.
The House of Commons is the voice of our national will as parliamentarians, so we shouldn't necessarily be taking direction from the government on reforming the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. As I mentioned, this is like the executive team telling the board of directors what to do.
If we're going to proceed on the contents of this and the Debates of October 6, 2016, then we must have the assurance on our side that we do not finish like the House of Representatives, where the individual is subordinated to the common group. It would be a big problem for parliamentarians on all sides if that happened, and if we were to copy programming the way it's proposed there.
I think the study length is too short. I think programming should be studied over a longer period of time, because it's such a substantive change to how we function right now, especially if the committees are changed as well. In terms of changing all these successive things, it's simply impossible to know what all the unforeseen problems will be, in circumstances we haven't thought of, with new events that happen.
I've mentioned this dual-track method. I want to expound on it just a bit to explain what it is. It's “programming lite”, as I would call it. As stated:
Formerly, senators could arrive in the midst of a debate on a banking bill, for example, obtain recognition from the chair, and launch into a lengthy discussion of the wheat harvest prospects. Today, complex agreements and the track system prevent that from happening. Now, senators generally know what measure will be considered on a specific day and at what time, when they are scheduled to speak on that bill, and how long they will have the floor.
They've already done some of this through those consent agreements, but they all unanimously accede to it. They say yes to it ahead of time, so if any single member has a problem with it, which is exactly this amendment, this would make us equivalent.
The government uses the House of Representatives as an example, but the example they should be using is the U.S. Senate. We are much more like the U.S. Senate than we are like the House of Representatives, because we have more similar terms. They sit for six years; we sit for four years. We should be more individual. We are more individual. We are trying to seek that unanimous agreement on things just like those senators are.
When they choose to, they can temporarily surrender certain rules, certain powers that protect their privilege. As I said, the Standing Orders protect our privileges and rights as members, but we can choose to temporarily suspend those in the name of passing a bill, agreeing to a certain formulation of debate because there's an urgent matter or an emergency or whatever it is that we're taken with. However, we should do it by unanimous agreement, just as the Senate does.
I find it interesting that the government would choose the House of Representatives, knowing that we're not like the House. We are much more like the U.S. Senate. I think that's a much closer example to how it should be.
There's talk of scheduling in here, and I want to raise this point on the House calendar about potentially moving things around. The very first sentence makes a reference to “a more efficient week”. I don't quite know what a more efficient week could possibly be. We have ample time for debate. We have a caucus on Wednesday. They're really talking about Fridays. That's really the talk: it is to move Fridays and go to a four-day work week. I know Mr. Simms has said the opposite, that it's not necessarily so, potentially a full day, but how would this work?
I think there are other changes you could do to make the House calendar more efficient, and they do very similar things in the United States Congress. They have scheduling procedures, and there's a table shown on page 272 of their procedural book, table 613, a comparison of the House Special Rule and Senate Unanimous Consent Agreement. In general, this is what they're...and I will not read the whole thing. There are just a few I want to pick out to make a point. They are formulated on the House side by the rules committee in public session.
The exact meeting we're having here is where they would seek that consent among the members on the rules committee. Typically, very senior members of either party would cobble together an agreement on how to proceed. It permits or prohibits amendments. It specifies time for general debate. The effect is to waive the House rules, and it doesn't specify date and exact time for vote on final passage, so I think this is a very important thing.
Even though they have the ability to constrain members, to tell them they will vote at a very specific time on a very specific day on these measures whether they like it or not, they don't do that. They don't specify that. They don't go as far as to program everything down to the specific hour, saying they will have it passed by then. That slot machine idea I talked about—dumping in a piece of legislation and numbers churning and getting a piece out—is not necessarily the goal. They just want certainty here.
On the Senate side, again, the effect for these unanimous consent agreements is to waive Senate rules. The adoption is sometimes aimed towards prospective floor action. If somebody might want to raise an issue or a motion or a report or table something, it's agreed to by unanimous consent of senators. As I've mentioned, I believe we're much closer, and should be much closer, to how senators work in the United States.
It often restricts non-relevant amendments. I think it is reasonable to debate whether non-relevant amendments should be eliminated at certain stages of debate and procedure at committee. Sometimes I see amendments removing that from the beginning of a bill or removing the bill title. Some of those changes were brought in in previous Parliaments, again in the name of speeding things up and efficiency, but I think a great number of members agreed with it and those particular forms of amending motions were moved to other stages where they could be done in a different way.
Is it perfect? I'd say no, but it's good enough that it doesn't restrict my ability as a member to propose an amendment at committee. In the Senate, their unanimous consent agreements can set a date and an exact time for a vote on the final passage, which could include a 60-vote adoption requirement. Because they need unanimous consent, they can agree they will have a vote on this day, at this time, when all the senators who want to vote on it and want to be present can actually assure themselves of that fact, which is different from the House, where they don't do that. Again, it's that minimal amount of cordial respect as peers that they extend to each other.
That's enough on that chapter. I don't want to belabour the point on the schedule.
The legislative calendar that they have for the House and how they do their work and how it's regulated, the 24-hour day session they have, is quite similar to our own. If they choose to recess, the legislative day is carried over to the next calendar day. It's similar to the way Parliament can sit for as long as it so chooses. They can choose not to adjourn. Committees can choose not to adjourn and can continue. They can recess on to another day, and it becomes part of the legislative day. They do very many of the same things, but those many same things are on the Senate side, not on the House of Representatives side.
They have the same type of routine proceedings, and I see changes being proposed to routine proceedings here. They're just mentioned in brief, and I'm interested by some of them. I can see the wisdom of some of them, but I'd like to consider them more. I think they need more time, but we shouldn't change them without unanimous agreement.
As for moving the tabling of petitions earlier in those 15 minutes, it was in 1991 that they limited tabling of petitions, because what was happening was opposition members were accumulating petitions, as we all do, and were tabling them one after another. That was delaying other government business that needed to be done, so we've moved the tabling of petitions to an earlier point. I would be fine with it, because it's 15 minutes. It's a fixed amount of time that everybody knows about. We as members have petitions to table. I keep petitions in my constituency office and I co-operate with my local members of the legislative assembly, who keep petitions from me in their office. I've started to distribute them to my community associations, the residents associations, because in Calgary every community has its own residents association with its own building, and now they are hosting my petitions as well. It's a great way to work with the general managers of these community associations to distribute these petitions. I think it's a valuable way to have people's voices heard, because it compels the government to answer within 45 days. Typically, what I'm trying to do now is to have a petition and then have the response to the previous petition, so then constituents can pick it up. They don't have to drive to my office. They can go to the community association to get the response. I think that's an interesting thing that they have.
The U.S. Senate has the call to order, the prayer, the pledge of allegiance, the presiding officer they name in case the chair is not there, leader time, morning business, and new or unfinished business. It's pretty darn simple.
Under “new or unfinished business”, the majority leader might bring new business before the Senate through the use of two fundamental methods. One is unanimous consent. Otherwise, they make a motion to move up S-1 or S-2 or whatever it is, and then the Senate might resume consideration of unfinished business from the previous day. That's kind of the way they work.
We work in one-week blocks, which I think is a very efficient way of doing things right now, because I have some certainty. I know which bills are coming up next, and it also gives me an idea of what the government would like to see passed, what the government agenda is this week. I go week to week.
I know during caucus meetings there's something we all do. Our House leaders do it, and I'm hoping on the government caucus side they do this too. They show you what the intention is in terms of debating the legislation before the House and outline what will we do.
In the U.S. system they've also amended filibustering on measures that were not critical. It used to be the rule.... In 1986 the Senate had to amend the rules that permitted a non-debatable motion for the journal's approval from the previous day. It was as though every single day we would have to approve the Hansard of the previous day. It's like being at a non-political corporation board meeting when somebody disagrees with the minutes, and then the meeting is held up because someone disagrees with the contents of the minutes. I've actually seen this happen at an general meeting of a professional association when somebody disagreed with the minutes and it delayed the meeting.
They amended it and removed that filibuster tool. Then they proceeded to eliminate it everywhere, and this was obviously by unanimous consent. All the senators there agreed to stop doing that by unanimous agreement. All of them together said they should probably stop doing that, because it was a bit ridiculous, perhaps, or maybe it was being abused as time went on. Potentially the rule might have made sense 100 years ago or 200 years ago in their case, because the minutes might have been written with some type of felt or ink and it would probably be hard to read sometimes.
:
It's an autumn 1997
Canadian Parliamentary Review. The title is “Obstruction in Ontario and the House of Commons”, by Chris Charlton. It reviews the Ontario legislature and it reviews Parliament, five or six Parliaments, and the work they did on behalf of constituents. I think it is important to use that type of data. One data point is one data point; as I used to tell my staff at both the HR Institute and the chamber of commerce, it is interesting but it doesn't really tell any story. A trend tells you a story, because it can tell you if the rules or procedures or ideas you have are up or down, and whether they are declining or rising. Having multiple data points is how we will get to whether or not we need to change anything.
I haven't seen anything, because there are really no numbers in the government's proposal. There are only areas of study that they proposed—that Mr. Simms moved through his motion—which is why we have moved this amendment.
I want to reference another member of Parliament, Reg Stackhouse, who was a member of Parliament for Scarborough West. This is from a revised submission to the task force on reform of the House of Commons of March 1985. I don't know whether all of his ideas were included in the final report. This is in the Canadian Parliamentary Review, summer 1985, and I have only one point to make from this article:
Debate is the esse of Parliament, and debating is therefore essential to a member's fulfilling his role. The legislator is not intended to be primarily one who gets things done, but one who uses debate to assess, criticize, amend, resist as well as to promote, advocate, motivate and advance ideas.
This is a member of Parliament saying this, so at the end of the day, the result is what you make of it. I know that for the government, the result it is looking for is for its legislative agenda to pass, but we're not here to pass its agenda. We're here to pass Parliament's agenda, and we decide which bills should be taken up. The government can direct us that this bill should be debated today, but it should not be able to tell the committees that it will have six days, nine days, or 10 days, or that Parliament must pass this in 15 days.
That is what we saw with the national energy program when it used time allocation and got it passed within 15 days. What a disaster that was politically for members on the Liberal caucus side. It also had a profound impact on the political culture of Alberta. Up until this very recent election, there were no members of Parliament elected from the Liberal Party of Canada. There are some now, but the impact on the culture and the beliefs and the ethos and the myths surrounding the national energy program are still there. It has had a very profound impact on constituents back home, and on all parliamentarians back home.
I think this is worth reviewing by all members here. It's called “Reforming The House” by Reg Stackhouse, member of Parliament, in the Canadian Parliamentary Review from the summer of 1985.
Now I want to reference an Ontario MPP. I found the most material, surprisingly, from Ontario. It was the easiest to find, I think, because many members have written. A lot of members have also moved on to serve in the Parliament of Canada, so they offer the opportunity to compare the two. This is from Sam L. Cureatz, MPP, who was a member of the Ontario Legislative Assembly for Durham East. He had been deputy speaker since 1981, at the time of this writing in the Canadian Parliamentary Review in the summer of 1983, so he had at least two years as deputy speaker in the Ontario Legislative Assembly, which brings valuable experience. The Speakers are there to enforce the Standing Orders of the House, so obviously they have a better feel for what the Standing Orders mean.
The title of the article is “Some Thoughts on Parliamentary Debate in Ontario”.
In Ontario, when the Minister of Revenue attempted to introduce legislation in connection with the May 1982 provincial budget, a vote on first reading was requested.
I've never seen a vote at first reading in this Parliament. I don't think it would add anything.
The official opposition left the Chamber, and the bells range for two and a half days until their return.
They were calling the members to vote, and the members chose to show their displeasure and unhappiness. They did return eventually, because the opposition also has a certain amount of responsibility. If we just stop coming here and all return to our constituencies, or we sit outside on the lawn of Parliament, I think a great number of Canadians would find that type of activity reprehensible. They would say, “Go back to work. Cobble together a solution”, which is why we're still here at this table trying to find that common ground. That's the point I've been trying to make.
Filibusters or delay is a long-standing democratic practice. Lots of different assemblies use it. It's a common practice, but it has to be used judiciously and wisely. I don't believe we have overreacted and I don't believe we have gone out of our way to obstruct. We are simply trying to make our points.
We come back. Every time, Mr. Chair, that you suspend the meeting and return us, we return. We return to continue the debate. We return to continue making points, and substantive ones as well. I hope I have been substantive in my commentary and that I have made a contribution because I feel that this amendment that we have proposed to the motion is reasonable. It would ensure that all of the opposition members who are here, including my friends in the New Democratic Party, will have an opportunity to be heard.
On these changes to the special orders, the temporary standing orders that could be introduced, our concern is that a report could be produced by June 2 that will be voted on by the majority. We will lose our opportunity to be heard and then, simply, the process will continue and there will be no opportunity for us to get involved.
My last example is actually a Nova Scotia House of Assembly procedural change brought in by the government of John Buchanan, which proposed substantive procedural changes. In 1978 it was a Conservative government. The Liberal official opposition of the day and the New Democratic Party protested, and the government proposed and subsequently set up an all-party working committee to reach consensus. They admitted that they needed to reach consensus.
The government then presented its proposal for these new rules. While these proposals contained only minor modifications of the proposals made by the select committee, they immediately encountered strenuous objection from the Liberal opposition and from the New Democrats. A two-thirds majority was required to enact the new rules, and government supporters in the House were not that numerous. The government therefore decided not to proceed with its resolution. Instead, it proposed to set up an all-party committee to narrow the areas of disagreement.
That's what we're trying to do.
Nova Scotia has an example that we could use. If you pass this amendment, we could narrow down the areas of disagreement. There are things we simply will not agree to. We will not accept to have our voices silenced at committee. We will not accept to have our privileges of debate further restricted. It's not something that we can accept.
The reason they set up this all-party committee, a working committee, and they admit this, was to try to narrow the areas of disagreement. I am sure that during those in camera deliberations or public sessions that they held they found things they simply could not agree on and they removed them. They took them off the table. Perhaps they went through a document like this that was produced upon the advice of the Legislative Assembly of Nova Scotia and they said, “On these three items perhaps we can find agreement, but this one most definitely we cannot” and they simply moved on and found a way around it.
They found a way 35 years ago to reach a solution to the impasse, so why can't we do it here? This is why I'm still speaking to this amendment to the motion because I think we can find agreement and then find a way to work together. I don't think it's unreasonable. This is just an amendment that would protect the opposition from the majority. As many members have said before, this is a protective measure for us to ensure that we are heard, that we do have a role to play here.
On the actual proposals, just so I can make some final points on this, in this document in the introduction.... I've already mentioned my problems about adversarial and my problems about modernization. There is a section that says, “Societal changes have also brought about the need to ensure greater predictability in the House for at least two important reasons”.
There are two important reasons in here to seek more “predictability” in the House. I would substitute “predictability” with the word “efficiency”. I think that's what they mean. One reason is “to ensure Members have a better balance”. It doesn't say “work-life balance”, it just says “better balance”. Another reason is “to encourage under-represented segments of society to seek elected office”. You've heard me talk about this. Nobody reads the Standing Orders before coming here. I think it's a great shock to them how many rules there are.
It says in here as well, “Technological changes should also be considered as we look to ways to make the House more efficient.” Absolutely, and we have had technological changes. We have the ability to look up the Notice Paper, Order Paper, and pieces of legislation online. I read them mostly on an iPad, although I still like the feel of paper, which is why I'm holding this paper. I'm reading from it because I can go back and forth on it, something I can't do very easily on an iPad.
I think those are two bad reasons to go ahead and change the Standing Orders. Those are two very bad reasons to proceed. There would have to be something more substantive than simply saying we need a “better balance”. A better balance of what—between the opposition and the government? You already hold all the cards. You set the agenda. You can use time allocation. You have more members, so you can outvote us. All we ask is for the opportunity to be heard. Don't propose to somehow change the rules without explaining to us where you want to go. As parliamentarians, not as the executive or the cabinet, where do you want to go with these changes?
I would feel far more comfortable if I saw more experienced veteran members, potentially returning members as well—members who were not there in 2011 but who were there before and then returned—providing us their insight and their feedback on the changes being put forward by the government, not by parliamentarians.
Under “Theme 1: Management of the House”, again, you can disagree with me, but I feel that Canadians work five days a week, and some work more than five days a week, so we should too. I know that members say that we work in constituency offices as well, that we travel to our constituencies on weekends and we do substantive work, but constituents expect us to be here and to work on their behalf here. I honestly don't mind if Friday becomes a full day, the way Mr. Simms has proposed, but I also don't believe that 45 days is sufficient time to consider that type of change. I don't want to use the word “radical”. That may be going too far. I need a synonym for it.
This would impact members like you, Mr. Chair, who has to travel to the Yukon. I think you'd be able to spend maybe a few hours at the airport before you had to turn back. It would not achieve the goal it was meant to do.
There may be changes to the House calendar that could be done to offer members more opportunities to have back-to-back weeks in their constituencies. Perhaps we could avoid doing what we've done now, which is that we have one week here, one week off, one week here, one week off. It breaks up the legislative process too much. I still believe it's worthy to have five days, and we should keep it the way it is. Again, that is my personal preference.
In terms of alternating days, sitting days on Fridays, and having more private members' time on Fridays, again, reapportioning hours would not be family friendly in any way. A previous report unanimously agreed not to do away with this. I believe PROC was the one that said not to proceed with changes to Fridays. I could be corrected on that. There are members who sit on the committee on a full-time basis who may have different viewpoints on this.
I mentioned electronic voting before, and my thoughts on this. As I think I mentioned very early this morning, Bill is a perfect example of when “on division” should have been accepted by the government side, and the cabinet rose to force a recorded vote.
We have a lot of recorded votes. They do serve a purpose. Mr. Simms raised the point that they do serve the purpose of accountability on individual members. I agree with him on that, but I don't think every single measure needs a recorded vote. We have to police ourselves. Is the right number of members five? I don't know. I would say that 25 is not the right number. Let's not get excessive here, but maybe there's a way to change that to something more reasonable. Again, that would have to be considered in a substantive debate, but we can't agree to that debate if you don't approve this amendment. You could change it to 99 or 100, in which case we would not be able to get a recorded vote on our side. I would hope you would not do something so drastic, so radical. I'll use the word “drastic” from now on, not “radical”.
It's mentioned here, under “House Calendar”, that “The number of sittings could be based on the demands to sit.” Who will set and determine who demands to sit? Parliament should determine when it sits. The government should have to bend to the will of Parliament, not the other way around.
I know there is prorogation, which is a method used for.... It's mentioned in here too: “where Governments have prorogued early in the session to avoid politically difficult situations.” It makes a reference to “governments” that have prorogued, but my understanding is that the Governor General prorogues upon the advice of the Prime Minister. Maybe that's just nitpicking but the more we confuse these fine lines between the different functions in the different places, the more we lump it all together so that the executive, the cabinet, the parliamentary secretaries, the government caucus....
People start saying, “You're in the government”. I have constituents who tell me that I'm in the government, “You work for the government”. I reply, “I don't work for the government. I work for you. You pay me indirectly through your taxes, but I am an opposition member.” When I bring greetings to an event I don't say it is on behalf of the Government of Canada. I say it's on behalf of the Parliament of Canada because I am not a member of the government. In schools I go to, I make a point to explain to them that I am not there on behalf of the government; I am there on behalf of Parliament.
It is perhaps not as glorious or as edifying to say that, but it's drawing a line of distinction that we should all be responsible for as parliamentarians who should love this Parliament the way Mr. Diefenbaker did.
Just a little more on prorogation, there are some ideas in here that are worth studying. Some of the reasons for prorogation should perhaps be set out in the Standing Orders, which should perhaps constrain the ability of the executive to seek prorogation, or perhaps there should be debate on it before it happens. I'm sure that could be studied. It could be considered. That could be an entire study on its own, prorogation in Australia and in the Westminster Parliament as well.
Private members' business is where I find the most interest, honestly, because I think there are more opportunities there, as parliamentarians, to do the work we were sent here to do and to actually legislate and to act on behalf of our constituents. If we have more opportunities to propose private member's bills, I think it would be better. I have two private member's motions that I have tabled. I know members who have already passed their private member's bills, but I also know members—Mr. Chan was mentioning it—who may never get the opportunity to table a bill or a motion that could be debated in the House.
It is one of those things members actually look forward to, and it is a question I have heard at the debates I have been to in communities. Many members have told me the same thing. They get asked the question, “What is the first private member's bill you intend to table?” It has become a question the public now asks us: “What is the idea you are running on? What is the one thing you want to do here?” If we could find more opportunities to do that, it would be an interesting idea to pursue.
Our worry is that if you pass this motion the way it is written now, you—the government caucus, the executive, whoever is going to make the final decision—could choose to take away our private members' business time. We have that time on Fridays right now, but we also have extra time on Mondays for it, or you could move it around during the day. We don't know. Maybe there could be Q and A during private members' business for every single speech, which would require more time.
Regarding “Theme 2: Management of Debate”, as I mentioned before in a reference to the House of Representatives, programming was talked about on an experimental basis. It was introduced in 1998 in the United Kingdom. It was made permanent in 2004. It took six years before they made it permanent. They considered for six years whether to keep it or not.
I think we are moving too fast with this. I am sure they did not reach that point without consent, broad-based consent, among the different parties. If we guard our privileges jealously, parliamentarians in the United Kingdom guard them even more jealously. They have brought down prime ministers because they have disagreed with the way a prime minister, an executive, was leading the country. Voters brought down David Cameron's government on a referendum, but it was also a referendum imposed upon him by his backbenchers, who demanded it on behalf of their constituents. Right or wrong, they got what they wanted, and Mr. Cameron eventually resigned after losing what is now called the Brexit referendum.
Those are important points. Members there guard their freedoms jealously, and we should guard ours too against an executive that has gotten larger, more powerful, and more able to offer us incentives and opportunities that we may not have otherwise. I came here to be a parliamentarian, not to be a cabinet minister. Obviously I ran as a Conservative too, so that probably simplifies things as well. I am not working hard to join the cabinet. I am working hard on behalf of my constituents.
If I should find myself on the government caucus side, I would hope I would not be punished with an executive position in cabinet. That would be a punishment for my wife and my family. I think they do extraordinary work, with those extra hours. I don't agree with very many of them and the policy objectives they have, but I respect them. I would hope they would extend the same respect to us, on the opposition side, because we're not here to obstruct without a purpose. We have a purpose, and it's to be part of the proceedings of Parliament. We're trying to maintain that, which is why we've proposed this very reasonable motion.
Don't exclude us. Don't cut us out.
I've said this before, but we just don't have that trust right now. We don't trust you to follow through with that—“you” being the executive and some of the government caucus members who may be active on behalf of or in conjunction with. I don't want to cast aspersions unnecessarily.
Continuing on lower down here, it does mention that “New Zealand and the U.S. House of Representatives also have measures to plan the business of the House that are similar in principle to programming.” I have just shown you, using a congressional procedures book, that the Senate is far more similar to who we are, as parliamentarians here, than who the House of Representatives is when this programming subject is....
I think just this one section here could be its own individual study. It could be its own separate study, but this motion says that you may do this by June 2. That is a quick pace to introduce such a measure as took six years for the United Kingdom Parliament, the mother Parliament, to say it was going to take this on and it was going to accept it.
We don't even know what your goals are at the end. You may produce a report with recommendations that will go to the House, and then you will claim, as Mr. Christopherson said when he was here before, that you have a majority decision from this committee, PROC, saying that we should proceed with the following changes and we, on the opposition side, will obviously disagree and we'll have a debate in the House of Commons that I fear will be just as divisive as the 1991 debates, just as divisive as the 1969 debates, and will not build long-term trust. That is my great fear.
I think the government, when it pushed forward on electoral reform, bent in certain ways and made an agreement with some other opposition parties to have a multi-party committee to consider the issue. In the end, the executive chose not to proceed with electoral reform. I think that was the right call, personally. I know my constituents think that way. I know that, because I surveyed all of them and I got almost 2,000 responses.
I see Madam Mendès also shaking her head. A great number of Canadians got engaged in something that would be considered “inside baseball”. With regard to the Standing Orders, if there is inside baseball, I think we're in the dugout with this stuff. The vast majority of Canadians—
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You've been there, Mr. Simms.
Representatives of the government, or those who are spokespersons for the government, don't need additional time at committee. They have all the time in the world outside of the committee to meet with witnesses. The only reason to include that in this discussion document is to somehow be able to set the record straight, to change the line of questioning, to make a point at the expense of the other members here. I trust the government caucus members can make all of those same points, and the parliamentary secretary doesn't need to do that.
Whatever points a parliamentary secretary can make at committee can be equally made by a minister coming before the committee and stating their views. They could be made by a minister who sits through an entire debate on the subject matter affecting their ministry, which I have seen certain ministers do, and I feel it shows a profound respect for Parliament when they choose to sit through an opposition day on the subject of their ministry. I think it does, and I also think that, vice versa, it's profoundly disrespectful for a minister to choose not to sit through a debate day on a particular bill that affects their ministry.
A parliamentary secretary may stay behind. I know I've seen pinch-hit and be the standing voice of the government many times, and he serves that purpose well. He speaks on behalf of the government caucus very well, and he defends its position.
It says here, “Members are able to sow dysfunction in committees by filibustering proceedings either by refusing to yield the floor or by moving dilatory motions.”
It's not done on a regular basis. I cannot remember in this Parliament someone else having done so. The opposition is responsible. We would use this only in the most egregious of circumstances, like now. But by no means do I want to be here in two months still debating this. I don't want to do this at every single committee I go to, first, because I'd probably lose my voice, and second, because Mr. Genuis would probably lose his voice as well, because we would tag team until we got the job done.
We do not abuse that privilege we have. We do not abuse the Standing Orders that we have right now. We are worried that without unanimous agreement to proceed on this study, there could be a situation in which, at the end of this, the recommendation will be to take away all of those rights. The Standing Orders that enable the privileges and rights for us as members to be heard would be taken away. We on this side are truly concerned about that.
Being a good opposition member and being a reasonable opposition member are all about balance. We could obstruct the government at every step of the way, but we choose not to. We've done it now only because we're trying to make the point that we feel you are trying to do another motion number six. I don't want to overuse it as a euphemism in any way. I just want to reference it.
The last thing this document says is that, “The principle of deliberations in the House and in committees should be to engage in substantive debate on the merit of an issue, not to engage in tactics which seek only to undermine and devalue the important work of Parliament.” I agree. That portion of this statement I can agree with. If it's an important work of Parliament, then why are you trying to take away our ability to do important work in Parliament?
We can disagree. Mr. Simms and, I'm sure, others will say, “No, we're not trying to do that. You should trust us. We should proceed with the study as per the original motion.” Now, we could potentially proceed in the future without unanimous agreement, but that is cold comfort for opposition members who have no tools beyond this, because the other place we will then try to filibuster will be in the House, and the rules are already changed there so we will not be able to do it as efficiently as we might want to. We will not accept to have the rules changed on us so that we can't do anything and we would just become an audience. You've heard me mention that a few times. I don't want to become an audience member in a theatre. Parliament is not theatre. We are not passive participants in the proceedings of the House. We want to be active participants in the proceedings of the House and we will be. We will participate.
You've heard Mr. Christopherson speak with much passion about his mandate from his caucus. I believe that we on this side have a mandate from our caucus to represent our constituents, our caucus members, our supporters, and the people who believe Parliament is supreme, that we debate here as parliamentarians, that we respect each other, and that the standing rules exist in order to enable our privileges and our rights. We will not give those away. I refuse to give those away.
I simply don't know where the government intends to go. I don't know where the government caucus intends to go. This amendment to the motion would give me a lot of comfort in terms of knowing that if it were passed, we would be protected. There are tweaks to do. Multiple members have mentioned possible changes. Members who participated in the debate of October 6 mentioned possible changes to the Standing Orders. Those weren't rehearsed. Those weren't talking points. They were truthful and from-the-heart suggestions by individual members for our consideration.
Equally, for mine, I did not vet my suggestions through my whip's office or my . This has been a freewheeling debate, an offer of my ideas. Consider them or not. If you so choose to, I hope you will give them more a substantive hearing, with debate and consideration, because I think they deserve it. I think they actually require it. I personally believe that the length for the study that the motion has right now—June 2, 2017—is too short, unless you're trying to do a historical echo back to what happened in the Ontario legislature. Then maybe there is some reason for that. I don't think that's a good enough reason to do so.
I want to reference The Canadian Regime: An Introduction to Parliamentary Government in Canada, third edition, by Patrick Malcolmson and Richard Myers. I can't even tell in what year this was done, but on pages 130 and 131, there is a section on House of Commons reform. Every single time there's a mention about the “possibility” of reform in the House of Commons, it says—this is a direct quotation—that it would be “to increase the power and independence of legislative committees and thus increase the power of the backbenchers who make up those committees”.
There is no mention of government efficiency and passing legislation more quickly through committees. There is none of that. There is no mention of programming, of telling us how much we may or may not debate. There is talk about making us more independent and making the committees more independent, but I don't see that in the very broad language used in the government's proposal. What I do see there is the great potential for the opposite.
We've already seen the government's attempts at using time allocation sometimes, which they admonished us for during the last election, and we on this side will continue to admonish the government to live up to the high-minded principles on which they ran. As I tell many members on the Liberal side, “You are well on your way to using it 100 times, so what comes around goes around.” You will wind up using it that often unless you introduce programming, and then you won't have to, because everything will be automatically time allocated. You'll have specific times: 15 days for this bill, or 15 days for that bill at such a stage. This won't exist anymore, and I don't think that's the right solution.
Also, I don't think you are giving yourselves enough time to consider the profound changes that will happen to the work you do. I also don't think you're giving yourselves the mandate within the committee if you don't approve this amendment to your motion, Mr. Simms.
The authors also say just a bit later about Paul Martin, the former prime minister:
A large part of what he meant by “democratic deficit” was the perceived lack of influence of backbench [members of Parliament].
It just so happens that a great many opposition members are backbenchers, and we have what we perceive to be very little influence, so why would you take away what little influence we have to move motions, for instance, or to debate a committee report by a committee that we don't usually participate in? Sometimes we're trying to just make a point. We have an idea, we want to raise a point, and we want to hear from others what they think as well. Some will consider it delay, while others will consider it a reasoned moment of reflection. Again, there is nothing wrong with a bit of reflection. Some people of faith do it during prayer.
The authors continue:
At [Mr.] Martin's suggestion, then, the rules surrounding questions of confidence [have been] changed to provide government MPs with greater independence from the party leadership.
The authors go on to say that “House of Commons votes are now divided into three categories”: the three-line votes, the two-line whips, and that concept that we all have to vote together. I think that has been beneficial for Parliament. We are more able to vote our conscience, the way our constituents want, and to differ, to disagree agreeably.
It has been a good change, because it also helps along the notion that the votes we have are truly free. They're all free. I did mention the consequences from all of our votes. I'm willing to live with the consequences of all of my votes, whether that is failing at re-election, being admonished by my supporters, being admonished by caucus colleagues, being admonished by others, or being praised by others. I hope some people will praise me for certain votes I've taken.
I think the most dangerous thing you'll see, from episodes of Yes Minister, is when a minister is told, “That was courageous: that was a courageous policy initiative.” That's when everybody recoils. I feel the same way sometimes about some of the votes that members of Parliament are expected to take. A courageous vote will cost you votes or it will win you votes, but the worst thing that can happen is that you vote a certain way, and then someday, when you are older and you are no longer here, you come to regret the way you voted.
The best piece of advice I ever got, from a now former member of Parliament, was to never vote against your conscience. If you don't feel it's the right thing, don't vote that way, because then you can't look yourself in the mirror for years afterwards. You will regret it, and it will hang on you. It will be there on your soul, and it will be a regret that you will always have: “I could have voted differently. I should have voted my conscience. I should have voted the way my constituents wanted.”
Every single member of the government caucus here is free to vote whichever way they want. You don't have to listen to the voice in your ears or on your shoulder, or to the other members. You can represent Parliament. You can join us in these proceedings, and through this amendment we can find the rules that we can agree on. You can vote with us and experience the consequences of your vote, which I don't believe will be anywhere as severe as this being done poorly. The process might be set up poorly.
As parliamentarians, it's not just for you that you do it. It's for the generations to come, for the people who will have your seat after you. I know that for many of you that means not the person who may defeat you in 2019—the great hope of many parliamentarians is to be re-elected—but you should think about that next person who will hold your seat, whatever political affiliation they will have.
I don't want to use this book too much, but I thought it was worth reflecting upon, because this is sometimes used as a textbook for students of parliamentary democracy. It's called The Canadian Regime: An Introduction to Parliamentary Government in Canada. I think it bears a lot of relevance. It's germane to exactly what we're talking about here, which is our role and what we're supposed to be doing.
I want to talk to you just briefly now, as I'm concluding....
I think it's the fifth time I've said that I'm concluding.
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The honourable member doesn't believe me, but I will eventually because I'm not the Energizer bunny. I won't stop yet, though. I've only covered off the first point with my three dozen substantive subpoints. That's already off to the side.
I'd like to go back to the 1991 speeches. Again, as you've heard me say before, past members have already debated this issue. Past members have already raised the problems with proceeding on standing order amendments without having the unanimous agreement of the other parties. I have mentioned that we should not be looking to the past for situations that arose where governments proceeded to ram through changes they sought to obtain through the PROC committee but also on the floor of the House of Commons. That is not the right way to look at our patrimony, the right way to look at what we have been handed to steward on to the next generation. The right way to look at it is as an opportunity to learn.
Mr. Jack Whittaker was a member of Parliament for Okanagan—Similkameen—Merritt. He rose to contribute to the debate on April 11, 1991. The reason I raise what he said here is that he made a lot of the same points, having read the biographies of great parliamentarians like John A. Macdonald, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Tommy Douglas, Mackenzie King, “to name some of them”. He went through the biographies, and mentions here what great love they had for Parliament and the work they did as parliamentarians in this House.
Going on here, even in 1991, he said:
The government in its arrogance simply ignored discussions with the opposition and invoked closure. The matter was passed on a voice vote without the necessity, but Parliament was not meant to have these matters pushed through or rammed through without proper discussion, without proper airing or without the adequate ability of the 26.5 million Canadians being given the opportunity to look these bills over....
I feel the same way about the potential for this study on amending the Standing Orders to go through without having this unanimous agreement component. I think we've taken a good step in televising this portion of our debates. That's a good step forward. The next step is to then agree to pass this amendment, a very reasoned amendment. It's very reasonable. It's not radical. It's not new. It simply says we want to seek unanimous agreement before we propose any changes, any tweaks, to the Standing Orders.
He then went on further to reference, just as many members have already, the McGrath report and the unanimous consent of the McGrath report. I don't want to go through the report with you and read sections of it out, because Mr. Christopherson did that before. I've mentioned that there was the Tom Lefebvre committee, which also proposed amendments. Many times the Standing Orders were tweaked with unanimous consent. Those types of instances, in which we have sought common ground and found consensus, we should refer to more often. We should go back into the Hansard and look at those individual situations when we did find ground to work together.
Even back then, Canadians cared. They cared in 1991. There were Ottawa Citizen articles written in great volumes. It says here:
“It is interesting, in looking at a recent article in The Ottawa Citizen this morning by Frank Howard, that he refers back to when this government first took office in 1984. Having spent a long time in opposition, it was very aware of the difficulties of the opposition and the need to give opposition members a voice and to make them feel that they were responding to their constituents' needs and wishes.”
I'm not going to quote from the article, as he does. They would feel as though they had an opportunity. That's what this amendment is all about. We just want to know that you have our best interests in mind as well, that you will not try to shut us down. We don't have that certainty.
We're fighting right now to get that certainty from the government caucus. We want that certainty. Our constituents, the ones who made comments that I've read to you, want that certainty as well. They don't want to elect parliamentarians to come here and not be able to advocate on their behalf at the committee level or at the House of Commons level. Certain motions may obstruct....
As I mentioned before, I won't be rated on how much government legislation I vote on or pass. I don't think a government is rated that way. A government can be critiqued that way for being inefficient and ineffective at passing legislation or having things fall through.
I remember when this government, the government that many of these members support, almost lost its vote on the Air Canada bill and it was saved by only one vote. That's taking it down to the wire, but that's not the fault of the government caucus members here. That is the fault of the House leadership on the government side. I really feel that this motion, the proposed changes the government is pushing forward, are to cover for the deficiencies in the House leadership on the government side. I'm using the nicest possible language to define the deficiencies that I see in the House leadership of the Liberal Party, the Liberal caucus.
I think that all of these proposed changes will be, in essence, changes that will be created or proposed and then potentially rammed through this committee on into the House, and potentially rammed through there as well. They will see fit to cover for the inability of the House leaders, the House leadership on that side, to reach consensus and an agreement with those on this side of the House, both the New Democrats and the Conservatives, as well as with others.
We've seen it happen sometimes that unanimous consent was sought for a motion in the House of Commons, and nobody had spoken to the Bloc Québécois members on whether they were agreeing to the unanimous consent motion. You may disagree or agree that they should be there or not be there, but they were elected by their constituents to represent them, and they are trying to do that job as well as they can.
I don't agree with their philosophy. I'm still a committed federalist. I was a federalist, even though I was young, in Quebec. I survived the 1995 referendum. I remember my parents with their van packed, ready to go if the vote happened to be a yes.
However, I still think Bloc Québécois members represent their constituencies. Their perspective matters. It matters because they sought, found, and earned the support of their constituents to represent them here as parliamentarians. I know I've had my disagreements with them, with their anti-pipeline stances, for example, but they are still equal parliamentarians to me. They have the same vote, the same equally weighted vote. They have the same ability to move a motion. They have the same ability to be heard on a unanimous consent motion when consent is sought. The amendment would fix the motion and ensure that we all have a voice here, through our caucuses, through our representatives.
I know that when was here—Mr. Chair, you were kind enough to grant her an opportunity to speak—she made similar points as well.
With a lot of the changes proposed in 1991 and eventually forced upon the opposition parties, I'm convinced that both the Reform Party and Bloc Québécois opposition members came to regret them because they made it much more difficult for them to represent their constituents. To defend the interests of their constituents is one thing, but then to defend the interests of Parliament is another. That's a fine line. You may find yourselves, at times, in a situation where protecting Parliament is not the same as protecting your constituents and their interests at the end of the day. Sometimes they may come into conflict, and then it's up to you as parliamentarians to find a balance between the two.
That balancing of interests I spoke to at the very beginning is really important. For members of the government and members of the opposition caucuses, it's an important balance to reach, which is why we don't go over the top when we oppose something. We always try to find a balance in a measured way to show the government that we are unhappy or dissatisfied with the amount of freedom we are given to oppose in the reasonable way that we do.
Again, I'll be speaking about another member of the House, who spoke in the House on April 11, 1991—a different member, the member for Davenport. I'm not going to say the name right, but it was obviously a cabinet minister, Charles Caccia. If you read the Debates, he invoked the McGrath report and spoke to the number of times that closure was used, noting that between 1971 and 1984, a 13-year period that included minority governments, closure was invoked three times. In those years, when there were a lot of disagreement and a lot of changes in Parliament, with a lot of new members being elected, they only invoked closure three times. They were able to find consensus. They were able to find opportunities where they could have a reasoned debate, disagree, and vote against each other, taking the positions they needed to take, but in the end finding a way to go forward.
Finding a way to go forward requires us to pass this amendment. It requires us, including members of the government caucus, to agree that opposition members still matter to the proceedings and have been faithful to the duty we've been given by our oath of office.
That particular member, the member for Davenport at the time, went on to draw a contrast with the situation in 1991, seven years after the time frame he first cited:
...closure has been invoked nine times over a period of nine years. Do we not detect a pattern of management of Parliament that is pretty severe and pretty restrictive in resorting to such extreme measures?
With regard to this pattern of management of Parliament, what I think he meant to do in a very gentle way was to chastise the House leadership of the government for how it had chosen to manage the proceedings. I think you get a lot more with honey than a stick, when you entice members to take a reasonable stance and then proceed to defend their interests and their perspectives. That is okay.
The member for Davenport then goes on to describe the imposition he felt, which I've mentioned before, the imposition of the government constraining him in what he could do on behalf of his constituents, and the message it was sending to his constituents about his worth and his role in Parliament. This was quite a long speech he gave in talking about the different sides and the positions they had taken.
He went on to say:
We on this side of the House do not believe there is a bankruptcy of ideas on the part of elected representatives.
As for this “bankruptcy of ideas”, we on the opposition side have ideas for potential reforms to Standing Orders that the government caucus may want to consider taking on. Perhaps the government caucus has ideas that we could consider, separate from the ideas being imposed upon us by the Government of Canada. The only way we can proceed is by passing the amendment so that we can have the confidence that whatever the final product will be, it will be by unanimous consent, and the changes that we will have done will improve the functioning of Parliament, whatever that functioning is determined to be.
I believe it's about deliberation. It gives us more opportunities to debate and speak. As you know, there are the changes mentioned about potentially moving late sittings—and how we treat them—to the end of question period. That's not an idea that should be discounted so easily. It's an idea worth considering. It does have merit.
Especially on the face on it, it does have merit, but it needs further study. It needs in-depth study, and if it's to be changed, I think it should be changed by unanimous agreement. I don't think it could be changed simply because the government decides that it's a good idea and they're going to change the way late sittings work because it's easier for them to schedule in ministers to be in question period, to have them do this extended late sitting, an extended question period of four minutes on each side, perhaps, and to then leave for the rest of the day and not have to return for votes.
The member also talked about the work-life balance. This returns to the concepts about Friday sittings. I know that there has been disagreement on what actually is being proposed. We hear one thing in question period from the , but has offered a different perspective on it.
The member I've mentioned went on to talk about constituency work and what that looked like. He said:
Let me analyse for a moment the idea of having members in their riding longer every month...for one week.
That wasn't available yet. He continued:
This scheme is one that could be described as the steam-engine era scheme, coming from the time when travel was very slow and electronic facilities of the kind we know today did not exist. Fifty years ago, it took two or three days to reach one's riding. You certainly did not have a fax in your office or the telephone facilities and other ways of communicating quickly with your electors, constituents and the like. Neither did you have the capacity to travel back and forth by jet.
Almost the entire beginning of that no longer applies. I don't know if many of you still have fax machines in your offices. I have a perpetually broken printer, but I don't believe that I have a fax machine anymore. Now, with the advent of email, we are able to keep in contact with our constituents on almost a 24-7 basis. I answer my own Facebook messages to constituents.
Yes, it's a great way to keep in touch. That's what Madam Mendès is doing right now. It's a great way to keep in touch with constituents, especially when they know it's the fastest way to reach you. You can have that quick back-and-forth. Then the constituents know they've been heard, just like we will know that we have been heard if you pass this amendment and allow us to proceed to change the Standing Orders in such a way that we can all find common ground.
He goes on to talk about what the work-life balance was. He also talked about past proposals for these kinds of parliamentary reforms in asking these questions:
Has it packaged the product of the 1990s for our consideration? Or is it a product of the 1920s?
Where do you want to take us with these amendments? Do you want to take us back to where we were before, pre-1969, which would give us more time in the House of Commons to debate, to potentially filibuster, and to obtain more speaking time from the Speaker? We just don't know, because it's not in here. The only theme, the overriding theme of the government document that's been produced, is that efficiency matters more than deliberation and that we are too adversarial in the way we proceed with the business of the House.
I have mentioned that I don't agree with that assessment. It's wrong. You're not my adversaries. We have deliberative debate, and especially at the committees, with the added opportunities. It could be just as good to have this deliberation and this debate on the floor of the House of Commons.
Even in this time, it wasn't solely a conversation among members of different caucuses who weren't members of the executive, but they mentioned the concerning, far-reaching statements, declarations the Prime Minister of Canada made on environment and sustainable development—it goes on an on—declarations in abstract terms.
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Mr. Reid then placed his amendment, which was exactly the right thing to do at exactly the right time: wait a minute—the first thing we need to decide here is what the rules of engagement are. His amendment to the motion was that we agree, basically. I won't read the legalese, but the essence of it is that we agree that we won't make any recommendations that go into the report unless there is all-party agreement for those recommendations.
Suddenly, it starts to become pretty clear that the government has no intention of supporting this amendment. That's when the first real spark of trouble showed itself. Up until then, it had been the report, the motion, but no comment or context. We didn't really know what it meant. We didn't even know if it was coming up on PROC. As I say, it was a surprise thing. I won't use the word “ambush”, but it was certainly a surprise, unexpected and not explained ahead of time. There were no niceties at all.
The veteran of this committee, Mr. Reid, on behalf of the official opposition, tables a motion that says that if we are going to get into this discussion he would like to make sure that we all understand and we are all in agreement. We get the indication the government is not going to do that. What that means, Mr. Chair, strategically, is that there is a vote coming and if we lose that vote it has serious implications. In this case, what it means is that the government would then retain the right—or rather, take the right—to use their majority to ram through the things they want to do in their discussion paper, in spite of any opposition that the united opposition benches might have.
Just because the discussion paper was issued and there are things they want to do, that doesn't, by its definition, make all those things evil. But I think it's more than fair to say that if you take a close look, anybody who knows anything about parliamentary procedure will tell you that most of these things—let's just call it a round number, 100%—benefit the government. Under the plan that the majority government alone could force those recommendations through, the final report would be called the report of the procedure and House affairs committee. The government could legitimately say, “We are only carrying out the recommendations of our independent standing committee, which took a good look at this, and here is its report.” The government keeps saying, “Well, you can attach your dissension reports underneath.” Yeah, that's a little nicety. When have you heard anybody say, “What we are doing as a government is consistent with exactly what was in the report. Oh, and by the way, to be fair-minded, I want to point out that both opposition parties did put forward dissenting reports”? That doesn't happen. It doesn't have to. That is why it's so critically important that the report reflect all our opinions and not just the majority.
Trust me, the plot thickens here; that was the easy part. So, we have the discussion paper, motion, meeting, surprise, and amendment to do the right thing, and the government indicates that they are opposed to it. This means that what we have to do strategically is to make sure this doesn't get voted on. This was moved by the official opposition. Once you get an indication that the government is going to oppose it, and they have more votes than we do, it's simple math.
The last thing that someone of Mr. Reid's experience is going to do is allow that vote to happen, where we lose, knowing we are going to lose going into it, and thereby losing our opportunity to have a unanimous all-party report reflecting all our wishes rather than just the ham-fisted demands of the government running over our rights. That's the implication. That's fine. That is when Mr. Reid made it clear that he was going to do exactly what you would do in that case.
Most of us at one time or another have had to do it. That is, you sort of advise colleagues, “Settle in for the rest of this meeting because I intend to talk out the clock. The last thing I'm going to do is let the debate collapse and have a vote come forward that I know I'm going to lose.”
Mr. Reid did the thing that we all do in that situation: he started talking. His goal was to talk from 11:00 till 1:00, which were our regularly scheduled hours. Then, under normal sort of “skirmishes”—I'll call them that as opposed to the war we're in now—under normal circumstances, what would happen, Chair, is that at one o'clock, the scheduled time to rise, the committee would adjourn.
We would all then go about our business as normal, come back at our next regularly scheduled meeting, which would be the following Thursday, again from 11:00 to 1:00. At 11:00, you would gavel us into order and then give the floor to Mr. Reid, who rightfully has the floor under our rules, in that you can't force someone to end debate until they're done. Under our rules, you carry that right into the next meeting: “What's our order of business this Thursday? Well, we're going to continue what we were talking about on Tuesday, and Mr. Reid has the floor.” That's exactly what Mr. Reid and the rest of us expected to happen.
And then, things got dirty. Now, I'm sure it's happened before. I've only seen it once before. I've had it done to me once before, and you remember it.
What happened is that at one o'clock, Mr. Reid rightfully expected that he would conclude his comments and be ready the following Thursday to pick up where he left off and continue. It would be that kind of thing, which is why I call it a “skirmish”. It would be a filibuster, but it would be within the usual time frame of when that committee meets. “That committee happens to be seized up right now because we have this issue and we're dealing with it as we go along.” It wouldn't become what this has become, because of this one—and I'm going to call it a dirty trick because it is a dirty trick—ambush. I had exactly the same thing done to me.
What happens is that you find out that, where we all thought if the meeting—and this comes as a shock to members over and over, and it did to me.... We had a document that called this meeting to order, and it said that we were going to meet from 10:00 to 11:00. Well, I guess it wouldn't in this case because here we are in parliamentary la-la land; it's Friday, but we're still on Tuesday. Anyway, the fact is that you have a piece of paper that tells you what hours you're going to meet, and 99% of the time that's when you rise. You would expect that.
I think there was a member of the official opposition who said, “Chair, I would point out that it's a couple of minutes after one o'clock. We should adjourn this meeting and this discussion and reconvene on Thursday at the regular time.” The chair said, “Actually, no, we're going to continue.” Points of order ensued, and we had a discussion with the clerk about what was going on: “It said the meeting is over at one o'clock. It's now a couple of minutes after one o'clock. The chair has an obligation to end this meeting.”
Ah, but you see, that's the interesting thing about parliamentary rules: they're not always crystal clear. What's inferred at the one o'clock rise is that at least the majority agree with that. It, in and of itself, is not an ironclad law of parliamentary physics that the committee must end at its scheduled time. The committee ends when a majority says that the committee ends. Given that we are masters of our own domain and masters of our own destiny, that right remains sovereign, unless and until collectively we decide differently, or we get overarching marching orders from the House. Other than that, we control our destiny.
So when you apply that, what it means is, if the chair knows that the majority government members are not going to vote for adjournment, he has, in this case, really no alternative but to keep the meeting going. Now if need be, he can stop things and force a showing that there is a majority who want to keep going, but when there's a majority built in, it's implied and understood, and that's the way that rule works.
It was done to me, interestingly enough, on a very similar kind of matter under that good old Bill , the unfair elections act. I came in all raring to go. I came in and got my stuff. I got my speech; I'm ready to go; and I'm two hours, like Mr. Reid. I have two hours to go, and then I have a day in between where I can do my homework and get my next two hours of talking points so I can keep the floor and keep it going because, as you know, Mr. Chair, we can't repeat our arguments, and any argument we make has to at least have some kind of tenuous relationship to the motion at hand, and that is a discretion that you reserve as the chair as to whether or not something is germane to the point in front of us.
I had exactly the same thing. I had that two hours, exactly the same scenario, and the whole points of order, and, “What do you mean?” and shock on my part. I'm like, “What the heck?” Then suddenly I'm filibustering 24-7, and I have about two hours' preparation. That was deliberate. It was an ambush. Now for some of us—and I won't go long on this to my Conservative colleagues—some things leave permanent scars. My good friend Harold is laughing.
Now you might expect that kind of thing from a ham-fisted government that we had before. I'll leave it at that, Harold, okay? If you take that one, Harold, I'll cut it short. I don't want to go too far down that road because it takes the sting away from this government, and that's really where the play is, but it does need to be said that we are in this.
When I used the word “war”, it wasn't on the discussion paper, and it wasn't on the motion, and it certainly wasn't on the amendment. It was the governing Liberals using.... That was the government doing exactly what Harper did, as a vicious...legitimate.... I'm not saying we'll use points of order to stop it, so it's allowed, but that doesn't make it right, and it certainly doesn't mean it was fair play. There was never any intent for fair play. The government hoped that they would catch me flat-footed. At the time I was the only one who was keeping it going on the filibuster, so if I couldn't keep talking, that meant that the debate would collapse, and the vote would have happened, and I would have completely lost any further input into how was going to be dealt with. I won't say that I won, but we did get some concessions.
My point is that it is a sneak attack. It's an ambush. It's meant to catch members flat-footed by using an interpretation of the rules that is not done day-to-day. In fact, it's not even done usually year to year around here. Once every Parliament or so, this kind of hijinks is carried out. That is when this government decided that they were going to take this skirmish, and they were going to make it a full-blown war, and I just called it for what it is. That's what triggered us going 24-7.
It's really important for those who want to understand how we got here that this is not about the opposition going apoplectic, and all we've done is step forward, and we've hijacked the House and hijacked the committee, and that we're the ones who are forcing all of this. Not the case.
I thank Mr. Richards for that, because it shows there are not only the folks on the list that I mentioned but also a whole lot of others. In fact, a lot of the people who felt betrayed over the government's decision to back away from democratic reform are those in exactly the same demographic and part of the population who are very upset about what's being done here and the way the government is trying to grab power beyond what it is already legitimately entitled to. That just doesn't sit well with Canadians.
Again, that's why the politics of this thing is so crazy, Mr. Chair. You've heard me. I've been perplexed from the beginning as to, one, why the government is doing this, and, two, how on earth it thinks it's going to win. This is Canada. This is a government that ran on a whole platform of doing things differently, of doing the opposite of this sort of thing, of not doing this kind of sandbagging of the opposition members, or using parliamentary trickery, or ambushing people, and keeping them in the dark. All of that was supposed to have been swept away in the last federal election while we had a new dawn of sunshine, light, and transparency. Instead, we get political thuggery that in some ways surpasses what Harper did. That achievement, and then uniting the Conservatives and the NDP around any kind of issue, would be the two grand accomplishments of this government.
I want to come back again to why we're here, how we got here, and why, even though this is Friday, it's only Tuesday. It's because the meeting on Tuesday has still not ended; this is it. The chair has been very careful not to adjourn, which would then require a reconstituting of the committee and all the procedures we go through. The chair just suspends the meeting when we do suspend, but technically this is still Tuesday. The whole idea was that the government was going to force the opposition to die on this political hill. It did it the day before the budget, knowing that everyone was distracted by the budget; and they were. There was very little coverage of the use of this nuclear option by the government in the media, for good reason. It was focusing on the budget. That's why the government brought this in. It's no different from announcing bad news on a Friday afternoon. It starts to get reported on the weekend when many people have shifted their mind to their personal life, their weekend activities, and they don't really tune back in to the serious formal part of the world until Monday morning when they have to. This was the same sort of thing. It hoped that we wouldn't have enough material and that we would be afraid of a public backlash against us for being obstructionist. That's why the messaging of Mr. Simms and others and the House leader all along has been that they just want a discussion, that they just want to improve things, that this is about modernizing, that they have a mandate to modernize, and that that's all that's going on here.
Yet, what they wanted was for us to cave so that we would quickly get to a vote and come back again. That would force us to have that vote on the amendment that we will only make decisions by all-party agreement, and it would lose. That was its game plan, Mr. Chair. This crowd wants everybody to believe that they're so different with sunny ways, transparency, and accountability, and that we are all going to sing Kumbaya, and we are going to pass laws together, and we will do things only.... That was all just talk.
They came in here as ham-fisted and bloody-minded as Harper was on his most determined day, and used his same nuclear option. Poor Mr. Reid was just like me, practically apoplectic that now, suddenly, unexpectedly, that really is how we pass laws, by tricking and scamming one another. Suddenly what Mr. Reid prepared for, and he did an excellent job—if you go back to read that, it was a solid piece of two hours of discussion on that motion. He did his homework. He came and did his job. He had every right to believe that at the end of that discussion, at one o'clock, we would adjourn and he would go off and do the other things he does. In the interim, before he took the floor again on Thursday, he would do his homework again and make sure that he had another two hours of very relevant, germane discussion on the motion that's on the floor. That's what he had every right to expect was going to happen. Instead he got ambushed.
Now, tell me how sunny ways and ambush go together. I'm from Hamilton. I understand ambush; I understand getting along together. I understand transparency and sunny ways. This is not it.
Let me just say parenthetically, Chair, if you notice, most on the opposition benches, even when we get in full dudgeon, have been very careful not to in any way try to personalize and put ownership of this on the members of the committee, including you, Chair. No matter what niceties we have that this is Mr. Simms' motion, and Chair, you're being 100% independent and only have the interest of the committee...as much as we all know that's our narrative we also know why it is that the Standing Orders spell out that certain committees have to be chaired by opposition members. Let me just say that fact.
I'm not going any further on this, Chair. That's why I'm saying we live in this kind of suspended belief animation of what's real and what isn't, and you're in this awkward position where you are a member of the team. You were put there by the government. Mr. Preston was no different. He did the best he could to be as fair-minded and as independent as possible, but at the end of the day he was appointed there by the government. When it was time to do what needed to be done, Mr. Preston did what needed to be done, as did every other chair beforehand. The difference between a good one and a bad one is almost how much relish and delight they take in running over the rights of the opposition. Chairs who are deep in character and true parliamentarians actually will push back on their own government behind the scenes and say, that's not right, I'm not comfortable doing it, and that kind of thing will ensue.
I'm not going to go down that road, Chair. You heard what I said the other day. We both knew that it was all very nice and would fit nicely on a pedestal or on a plaque, but the real world is that you're there as a government appointee. We voted for you, but we all understand.
I'm going to do this once so I can move off, but I need to address it because I did deal with it the other day. When you made the decision last evening that we weren't going to sit next week, I'm just going to say that I understand you made that decision. We'll leave that there, but it's also what the government wanted. If anybody wants to refute that, I'm prepared to have that debate also. But the fact is that's what the government decided.
Therefore, why I opened up with my wonderful singing voice on What a Difference a Day Makes is that the government has blinked. They thought that, worst-case scenario, if the budget ruse didn't provide enough cover to slip and slam this through underneath the radar, at the very least they could hold our feet to the fire and make us go 24-7 over the weekend. Why could they see their winning that one? It just happens—purely coincidentally, I'm sure, total serendipity—that the Liberals are all going to be here this weekend because they're having a caucus retreat. My good friend Harold Albrecht knows very well how much easier it is to get volunteers to sit in on a committee when you don't have to schlep it halfway across the continent to do so, especially when you'd much prefer to be in your riding with your constituents, because during these times we don't get a lot of time there so we value it.
We would be struggling, in the opposition benches, to find volunteers to sit in a committee meeting that for the most part nobody's going to pay any attention to, and to give up time with their families and their constituents. Whereas the government, what's your majority? You have 180 members. You only need four or five. Easy-peasy. If the budget didn't give them the cover...it was very clever in the short term.
It wasn't very good in the long term, I have to tell you, but in the short term, I understand it. If the cover of the budget didn't do it, they'd get us on the weekend. The second we can't put up a speaker and the debate ends, that's when the chair can legitimately say that the debate has now closed and we will have the vote. The government will use its majority to carry it, and we will lose the right to have an equal say in what the rules are in the House of Commons.
But what happened along the way is that this was so outrageous, so egregious, so unfair, and, dare I say, so un-Canadian, that even the Conservatives and the NDP found easy common cause in fighting this evilness—and I use that term generically, not biblically. Actually, it's been quite enjoyable. I have to tell you Liberals that we now have created some networks and, regardless of how long we go forward on this, the next time we need to come together, it's going to be a lot easier. We'll be able to do it a lot more quickly. We had a great experience. There was the fun we had doing the budget thing and bringing the attention here. There was a small group of us from both caucuses meeting through the day. There was a lot of respect, a sharing of resources, and staff working together.
I never would have thought it possible that the Conservatives and the NDP could work that closely together in a respectful way and in common cause. I want to thank the government of the day. You did that, and you should feel proud, because that's not easy. There are good sunny ways in terms of this side.
From there, we were easily able to say, okay, we're in this together, because if the official opposition loses the right to have an equal say, obviously we do too, so we have common cause. We quickly got together and said, okay, let's make sure that between the two caucuses we have the weekend covered, because we know the Liberals can do it easily. Over the last 24 hours and 36 hours, we've been working together to coordinate a roster of members who would be here so that we could staff this committee for the entire 24-7 all next week, and the government could sit there and listen to the response to their abuse of our rules, wall to wall, all week.
I have to tell you, notwithstanding the fact that I want to go home to see my family and I want to be in my riding, that I was kind of relishing the idea of that kind of a pitch, because you know what? In my gut, I knew the government couldn't.... How can you win this? How? They can't. Given what's at stake and given what the government has done.... Remember, they caused this war. Normally we wouldn't be having this discussion until the Tuesday we get back, and it would be at the regularly scheduled time. We're only into this crisis 24-7 because the government wouldn't adjourn the darned committee meeting at the time it was supposed to adjourn. That was part of their ambush.
Then, last night, the government message—I'll put it that way—was, “Oh, we're not going to meet next week at all.” Now, I don't know what happened to make June 2 no longer the end of the earth or the end of the world. I guess maybe they delayed it for weather. I don't know. It certainly puts the lie to the argument that this needs to be done chop-chop. They just sold off a whole week of discussion, because when we come back a week Monday.... Are we going to come back at 10 o'clock, Chair, or at 11 on that Monday?
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We got there. You've been avoiding making that full sentence since Monday.
The Chair: Were you waiting for me to go...?
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. David Christopherson: You've got the gavel ready to go. There are a lot of Canadians who'd like to vote right now that you do that. However, with apologies to Canadians, we do have a process to follow.
The process at this stage is to try to force the government to see the light and understand that the wonderful discussion they want to have is one that we're eager to have too. The difference is that the government wants to have what they would call equal, fair discussions, but always reserving the right, if they don't like the way the negotiations go, to just opt out of sunny ways and suddenly use their majority to ram through whatever they desire, regardless of how everybody else feels.
That's where we are. Every time this committee suspends, that's great—we make no bones about it—because our purpose is to prevent that discussion from starting until we have established what the rules of engagement will be.
Again, the government is trying to have everyone focus on the idea that all we want is a discussion. That's all. We just want to talk about these things.
We are ready to do that, but we are not ready to do that while the government maintains that they have the moral right to use their overwhelming majority to smother the opposition and deny us an equal say in the rules that determine how we make laws.
It's unfortunate, because it's a bit like a strike. There are no winners. The second you go out, work is stopping. The company is losing. Wages are not being earned. There are no winners. But sometimes in this world there are certain principles that you have to stand up for and pay whatever price. We run the risk in the opposition that the public will turn, or that the media that informs the public will say, in their dispassionate evaluation, that we're just being obstructionist. That's always a risk.
Before I move to a letter that was just released a few hours ago, it has to be underscored that the reason we're here, at 20 minutes to five on a Wednesday, debating this motion, is that the government refused to adjourn the very first meeting. Again, here in this room, parliamentary la-la land, this is two weeks ago Tuesday. It's two weeks ago yesterday. We're still on that day because the government wouldn't allow the committee to adjourn at its regular time. It's supposed to adjourn at 1 o'clock. The government unleashed an unwarranted sneak attack on the opposition, who are the minority, by refusing to allow the committee to adjourn at its regular natural time, thereby thrusting Mr. Reid, in what was supposed to be a two-hour period of speaking, into unlimited.
If this were the regular process, the filibuster started by the opposition parties would only play out at committee Tuesday and Thursday from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. That's our normal business time. Filibusters happen all the time—“mini-busters”, if you want—where there's give-and-take at the committee. For some reason, the government's about to use their majority to do something that the opposition deems is unfair or unwise or unwarranted, so they quickly make the decision and say, “Look, I'm not just going to let that happen here. If I need to, I'll run the clock.” Running the clock means that you will just take the floor and keep going until the committee is over, thereby denying the government the opportunity to use their majority to ram something through.
Now, normally they, don't last very long. I've only been involved in one other major filibuster like this, and it's interesting that it was under the previous Harper administration, which pulled the same stunt. We were debating Bill , the unfair elections act, on changes to the election laws, and I indicated that I was going to hold things up. In that case, we were looking to get the committee to travel, to get input from people. That's all we were seeking: that element of fairness.
I indicated that until we got that, it was going to be a problem, and we were going to seize things up, and they did exactly the same thing to me that the Liberal majority government did to Mr.. That surprises a lot of people, because when they get the notice paper, a lot of people believe that if a meeting is called for 11 o'clock and is going to adjourn at one, it would, lo and behold, commence at 11, and then adjourn at one. A couple of minutes after one, as the committee Hansard will show, I believe it was a Conservative colleague of Mr. who made the point that it was a minute or two past one o'clock, the time that we usually adjourned. It was at that point that the chair had to advise that it requires majority support.
I learned that civics lesson the hard way too. It comes as a shock to a lot of people that a meeting that's scheduled, on paper, called by the chair, with all the proper format, layout, and language, and is supposed to start at 11 and end at one, doesn't really have to end at one. It is implied when the chair adjourns at one o'clock that a majority is in support. The government gave indication to Mr. , our chair, that this implied consent was not there. Therefore, the chair had no option, absolutely no option, other than to have the meeting continue. That's what thrust this into the big leagues. That's what made this a much bigger deal than we did at committee.
An hon. member: That's right. Absolutely.
Mr. David Christopherson: My colleagues are agreeing. We were hunkering down for what would probably be.... I don't know, but in my mind I was thinking, well, maybe a couple of or three—and if we really get in the ditch, four or five—committees will be lost to this, and then eventually the government will come to their senses, do what has been done in the past, and in fact do what we've done during this Parliament. That will be the next area I move to, Chair, after I read a letter.
That process, as I'll point out later, was completely done by consensus. There are so many similarities to what the government wanted us to do, and for the work that we did on this committee on that report, yet the approach is completely different. We can say names here; we can't in the House. The previous government House leader, Mr. , used a very different approach than the current House leader, Madam . It resulted in a report that we just accepted in the House on Monday, I believe.
That's what I thought would happen. There would be a number of meetings—as I said, five or six if we really got in the ditch and the government got obstinate—and eventually they would realize that, okay, that little attempted power play, while it would have been nice, was clearly not going to happen. The opposition was not asleep at the switch and wouldn't allow themselves to be lulled into silly arguments about what this is or isn't—we know very well what it is. At the end of the day, it became clear that the government not only didn't want to do what they had just done the year before, but they were going to launch this from a localized committee “squarmish”. I think that's the right word. I think it's a word. I'm getting close, anyway: “skirmish”? I think that's the right word. I'm getting close, anyway. Anyway, a “skirmish” is a little battle that happens all the time.
I've been involved in all kinds of those. In fact, as I did the one on Bill , oftentimes at committee all I would have to do is threaten that I was about to go into a filibuster and that would be enough to get something moving, because, boy, nobody wanted to hear me do exactly what I'm doing right now for any longer than absolutely necessary. Just having it there and the reference to it and that we were about to do it.... My colleagues do it all the time. Mr. Schmale, even as a new member here, has indicated along the way that, hey, folks, if this doesn't start going a little more clearly, I'm not going to have any.... Then we get over it. We get past that.
That didn't happen here. For some strange reason, the government members believed that it was in their best interests to launch this into the stratosphere, to have all of the national media become aware that a localized issue in a committee is now not only a major blowing up in terms of a 24-7 filibuster, but it's starting to spill over into the House.
I'll add parenthetically that I just thought it was so cute today. The apparently told his caucus that this was going to be fun, and it was kind of cute when he got up and de facto created a Wednesday Prime Minister's question period and answered every question. They were so clever. I'm sure they thought that.... Well, he didn't answer every question, because not every one went to him. Every question that went to the government, the answered, which, as I understand it, is their idea of what this Wednesday Prime Minister's day would look like.
I don't know, but I guess the brainiacs over there in the PMO decided to show Canadians what the benefit would be of having this kind of day when the is on his feet answering every single question put to the government. The problem is that they didn't take the next step and think it through just a little further, because Mr. and I, during question period, took great delight in thanking the Prime Minister for answering those questions but also pointing out that they didn't need to use their majority to ram through a change to the rules to get exactly what they wanted. They want a Prime Minister's day on Wednesday and—poof—de facto they got one, with no rules changed, no rights abused, no flexing of political muscle.
None of that took place. All that happened was that the answered the questions. All right? If you want to put a special fancy label on Wednesday, which is normally known as caucus day so that it becomes caucus day and “Prime Minister's question period”, fill your boots. Live it up. It was kind of fun.
The next time, we know that we'll be able to line up questions that are meant to go to prime ministers, because, of course, the questions for today were geared to the usual process in which the prime minister answers the questions of the leaders of the parties, out of respect.... Well, most of them. Yes, there's been a change there, too, which is interesting. It was pointed out in one of the articles today.
That's probably the easiest one he's ever going to have, because it was one that we didn't know was coming, but that's a whole other matter. That's fine. That's great. Let the politics of the day take over. If that's what's going to happen on Wednesdays from here on in, then our question period group that makes these decisions in each of our caucuses will take into account that the PM is answering every question today, okay, so our questions will be geared at that level.
It's a very different question if you're asking the prime minister. Even on the same subject, there can be often a difference in the question you would ask the prime minister. It can be a kind of a macro question, whereas a micro question, albeit important, would go to the minister and is sometimes answered by the parliamentary secretary, which is part of our process too.
I thought I would take a minute to point out that while it was very cute and almost clever to have that today, at the end of the day all the government really did was show that with a little co-operation, and sometimes even under the existing rules, they can get what they want. Their first option doesn't have to be the Harper option: “we're going in with a hammer because every discussion is a nail”. That's where we are, yet with a little co-operation, a lot could happen.
Chair, I would now like to shift gears a little and move to a timely piece of correspondence that is 100% relevant to what we're dealing with here today, and it's rather extraordinary. It's not often that you see the and the sign a joint letter addressing the government. It happens, but not every day. That just goes to show you how important this is and how big this is.
I remind everybody that it wasn't the opposition that made this the 24-7 filibuster that's taking over all of Parliament and looms over everything we're doing. We didn't do that. We were just going to have a nice little filibuster, a kind of respectful filibuster, that you would call a “battle”. I think that's fair. That's what we'd have: a little battle. The government is the one that decided, no, that they were going to take this and throw it into the stratosphere, and blow it up as big as they can. They didn't adjourn the committee, and here we are, over two weeks later, with it front and centre in the national media.
We finally got an awful lot of attention from Canadians. Thank you to the government, because it would have taken us months to do that if we were doing it only from 11 to one o'clock twice a week. I think you should be worried over there that maybe there is a spy working in our best interests. While you may have thought it was a clever move, because at the end of the day you have your majority, look where we are. Way to go. I'd like to know what your objective was, because it couldn't have been getting anything done. There must be some other strange Liberal-think about how this advances the Liberal interests and the government's interests in terms of its process. I don't know. At the very least, it does point out another broken promise, and that is the lack of respect for standing committees.
Again, I've said this over and over, and it sometimes breaks my heart to say it, but as you know, reality is reality. When we didn't win the election, which for a long time or for some time looked like it was going to happen.... I've got to tell you: those were great days. That was nice. I'd never been in that situation before.
I was part of the win in 1990, but nobody knew it was going to happen until election night, so there wasn't that anticipation, that “wow, we're ahead” thing. This time, that actually happened. It was wonderful and glorious, the highlight of my federal time here. It didn't work out in the end as well as I thought it might, and as well as it felt, but you know what, that's democracy, right? You win some and you lose them all. I don't know.
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. David Christopherson: When it comes to government, at least we're consistent. We've never failed to not form a government yet.
Mr. Jamie Schmale: That's the NDP way.
Mr. David Christopherson: Well, so far.
It's not deliberate, I want my friend to know. It's not deliberate, Mr. Doherty. It's not the way we'd like it.
Anyway, there we were, chugging along nicely and thinking, “Gee, we have a real shot at forming a government here.” That didn't happen. At least the second-best thing happened, and that was that the Liberals won. There were only two parties that were likely to form a government. The polls showed for a number of months leading into the election and halfway through the election that we were going to form it. It didn't quite happen that way, but we did end up with a change. If it couldn't be us, then certainly in my heart I wanted the Liberals to win. Yes, I know. It's hard to say, but there you are.
Some hon. members: Shame.
Mr. David Christopherson: I did, because we couldn't continue with what was going on before. That had to come to an end. I guess a minority would have been even better than the current one, for obvious reasons. Anyway, I won't get too much into what could have been. Those tears are gone.
I will talk about what did happen, and that was that a party got elected that said they were going to respect committees once again, because Parliament used to have respect for its committees. Of everything we do here on the Hill, I consider committee work to be my favourite part. My top thing, of course, is being in my riding, which is same for all of us, but here, I love committee work. This is where stuff happens. It moves quickly. You get a chance to be far more personal in interactions and to work together.
We still have our battles from time to time, but the whole idea was that committees would now be respected and that we wouldn't see this business of moving in camera, with vicious stuff happening in camera, and then having to come back out and not being able to say anything because the rules tie your hands. We were going to have transparency and respect. I was really looking forward to that.
In some ways and in some areas, they've delivered, but right from the get-go on this committee, the first thing I had to do—I think it was even at the first meeting we had—was to mount a mini-campaign of my own to get the parliamentary secretary off the committee, whereas the government had promised that the parliamentary secretary wasn't going to be there in the first place. You can talk about a voting member but where is he now? I haven't seen him for a long time, so it looks like message received.
You know what, Chair? The government members of the day argued. They were so incensed when I accused them of needing him to ride shotgun.
Of course, I was baiting all of you and you all rose, as I would have, too, and responded with —I'm paraphrasing, no names—“Hey, I can make my own decisions, I'm an MP.” That's fair enough. Mr. Graham talked about being here before too and how that was all insulting. Anyway, we got through all of that, and lo and behold, look around: we don't have a parliamentary secretary anywhere within earshot of this committee. But they had to be chased. That was a little disappointing.
I was hoping that it was a one-off, because they have done some other things that are important. They have increased the resources for the committee, which is the first thing. Of course, the previous government was slowly strangling the ability of committees to do their work. Certainly, they never left Parliament Hill, except on the rarest of occasions. Heaven forbid that Canadians would actually get a hands-on opportunity to talk to their own government.
Mostly it was going to be about tone and respect, and then you'll remember, Chair—it wasn't that long ago—that we went through the issue of the report from the Chief Electoral Officer regarding changes that he would recommend we make to the election laws, having reviewed and learned lessons from the election we had just had in 2015. It's a regular undertaking. We do it every year.
We were actually working very well together under your leadership, Chair. It's an in camera exercise, so I can't speak in too much detail, but it's certainly fair to say that we had a great esprit de corps and that we recognized that the election laws don't belong to the government, or the official opposition, or the third party, or independents. The election laws belong to everybody.
We were working our way through it. We were following a process that we've used before here, starting in other Parliaments. You can call it the “low-lying fruit process”. All it means is that where we can agree on things readily or with a minor change to wording, we would include that in a report and move on to the next item. We would go through those as quickly as we could. As soon as we got to an item where one of the caucuses or even one of the members said that they had a real problem with an item and it was going to give them real pause for concern, we would take that signal as meaning that it was not low-lying fruit and not easily agreeable, so we needed to set it aside. We had that second track.
It meant that when we got to those, a lot of the political give and take was yet to happen, but it's amazing how many things we could agree on that would then allow us to give an interim report to the House, which would then allow the government to consider the opinion of this committee on the changes recommended by the Chief Electoral Officer.
With the government having promised that they were going to treat committees with respect and give their work serious consideration in the development of policy and legislation, everything seemed to be going fine. Then I walked in one morning—I think it was a Thursday—at 11 o'clock, and within that hour, because the House usually starts at 10 o'clock, the government had dropped Bill on the floor. Now, Bill C-33 was about election laws. In and of itself, it's not a huge issue, other than the fact that some of the changes they wanted to make in Bill C-33 were items that either we were currently seized of or hadn't dealt with yet but were on our agenda to do.
Let's wait a minute. Let's have a look at this picture. The government says they're going to respect the work of committees. They're going to consider their work important input in the development of government policy.
Oh, I've just been advised that it's scheduled for debate in the House next Thursday. That should be fun.
Take the work we're doing. The government says they're going to listen to us, and then they drop this bill, which by its very existence is insulting to this committee, and they break their promise. How can you say on the one hand that you're going to respect what committees have to say and consider what they have to say in the development of policy and legislation and then turn around and drop a bill on the floor that deals with those very issues? The committee has not even finished with it and, in some cases, hasn't even started on it. Where's the respect in that?
To some of us, that was such an egregious action that it seized up the work of the committee. At that moment, we stopped reviewing the Chief Electoral Officer's recommendations, and for this simple reason: why bother? It would seem that, foolishly, all of us, including me, members of the Conservatives, the government members, anybody else who came by, independents who dropped by the committee, the Greens—I'll give you your Greens, Madam—the Bloc, the other independents—
Ms. Elizabeth May: They were nice.
Mr. David Christopherson: Don't confuse me. It's easily done.
They would come by and have input. We believed that it was meaningful, like it mattered that we would take the time. We struggled. We don't just agree with everything automatically. Usually it takes some kind of change, but really, with such positive work and a good combination of veterans and new members, so that we had a good mix, we were doing good work. I think every one of us would say that we were doing good work on behalf of Parliament and on behalf of Canadians.
Then, when they dropped Bill on the floor of the House, it was as if it was all a ruse, just a joke, a make-work project to keep us busy, or it was pro forma.
I just went through 10 years of that, of a government that looked at committee work that way, and I was really looking forward to getting back to a world where committees mattered, to the important work that the mother of Parliaments perceived when this kind of Westminster parliamentary system was put in place. The whole idea was that the real work would happen at committee. That's why we're a little looser with the rules. That's why we can call each other by our names and not just our ridings.
That's why at committee you can speak until you're done, so that if we're going to talk about water quality and my riding represents a good part of the Hamilton Harbour waterfront, I'm going to have a lot to say about it, or I may have a lot to say. The one nice thing at committee is that once you take the floor, you can go until you're done. That doesn't mean that everything is a filibuster, but it means that if you want to take your time and spell out an issue that affects your constituents as it relates to the matter in front of you, if you're going to build that case, it's complex, and you want to break it down so it's understandable, that may take 20 or 30 minutes or maybe an hour, or maybe a little longer depending on the subject matter.
That's one of the beauties of committee, and we don't have that time in the House. Remember that we come here believing that our main priority objective is to reflect the wishes and interests of our constituents. Because there is so much going on in the House, we all accept that there are going to be time constraints, as difficult as that is.
If I may say so, though, Mr. Chair, at least in the House in the early part of a new bill or motion, you at least get 20 minutes plus 10 minutes of questions and answers with colleagues, for a total of 30 minutes that you have to deal with an issue that your constituents consider important. I want to point out that under one of the proposals the government would make, that would be eliminated. That whole idea dies here: at committee, you get 10 minutes at a time. It doesn't matter how complex the issue is. It doesn't matter how much you need to break a whole lot of.... Nothing matters except that time limit, and now it starts to become a very different creature.
I again want to express how disappointing it is at that level that we're here. I'm trying to be fair-minded, but on balance I couldn't even give the government a fifty-fifty to say that they've honoured 50% of the commitments they made to committees. They've made some. They did honour some, but I have to tell you that when the rubber hits the road, when real politics start to take over and we have real issues in front of us and the government is feeling the pressure, whether it's from entities or the clock, they're acting more and more like the previous Harper government in terms of their lack of—
An hon. member: No, no.
Mr. David Christopherson: You know, Maj, the best thing you can do is just stay quiet there.
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. David Christopherson: I'm just giving you some advice. If you'll notice, your veteran colleagues, whenever I do that, just fade back and say nothing. Having been a former government member, I can tell you that discretion is sometimes the better part of valour. Just sit back—
An hon. member: I've been able to let that go.
Mr. David Christopherson: My friend would like me to let go of almost 10 years.
Mr. Todd Doherty: They're the real bad guys.
Mr. Jamie Schmale: Aim your guns that way.
Mr. David Christopherson: I know. I understand, but just because you, my Conservative colleagues, weren't here doesn't mean that you don't have to carry some responsibility for what your party did before. You like to brag when there are things you think were good, so you have to take the bad with the good.
An hon. member: There was a lot of good stuff.
Mr. David Christopherson: Again, my best advice would be to watch what your veteran colleagues are doing. As soon as one of us starts saying anything about the Harper government, suddenly they have very important documents that they must look at incredibly closely. Just let it go by, because it won't last, but it's going to be there. Anyway, that's advice to you, my friend, and it's worth what you paid for it.
I just point out that as we get into the detail of why we're here I again want to express how overall disappointing it is. The government started with a lot of optimism. The other thing is that this file itself, electoral reform or anything to do with rules and democracy, is not exactly a strong suit for the government right now. They might recall a slight U-turn that the government recently took vis-à-vis one of their biggest promises to change.... I believe there were words to the effect that the 2015 election would be the very last one that Canada would conduct under first past the post.
They made that promise over and over again. The personally owned that promise: the 2015 federal election would be the last one ever conducted under first past the post. What's going to happen in October 2019? We're going to have a federal election and it's going to be first past the post.
The new minister of democratic reform...or ....
We're the opposition. If the government says something, we go the other way. It's just a natural reflex.
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. David Christopherson: This is the second minister, by the way. We burned through the first one pretty quickly, which was too bad. I have to say, that really wasn't her fault. She was a brand new member. She came across very effectively, but the marching orders were coming out of the PMO. I feel very sorry for that MP, because they just drove that member right into the wall. She had no chance, absolutely none, given the way it was playing out.
Anyway, we have a brand new minister, and I'm actually quite proud of the fact that she is from Burlington, which is the neck of the woods that Madam Tassi and I hail from in this great country. Notwithstanding that she is a Liberal, it's still very good to see someone local. It's not quite what we would call a regional minister—if someone is going to be a regional minister for Hamilton, they ought to come from Hamilton—but it's a step up from where we were before. I've already had a couple of meetings with the minister, and I must say I'm very impressed, talking about both her file and some local matters and the doors she opened. That was a great move.
My colleague right across the way, Madam Tassi, the newest or one of the newest members on this committee, has been promoted to deputy whip. I'm very proud to see any Hamiltonian doing well, particularly this member, who is very honourable and has done a great job. I know that in her current position it will be easier for her to do her job, but also having the minister in Burlington is going to make it lot easier for Ms. Tassi, who is our go-to person in the committee. You would think it might be the former mayor member, but it's not.
I won't go any further on that, except to say that everybody in Hamilton knew that if you seriously wanted to talk to the government, prior to our having a regional minister, it was Madam Tassi you went to. I have complimented her publicly at events in Hamilton for the role she has played. There are lots of things for us to fight about, and we'll do that on the issues, but on some of these overarching personal matters I think it makes a difference in terms of how we relate in this place to be complimentary to a colleague from another party who has done well, or who has been given a great promotion, and to give them all the encouragement in the world.
The worst thing in the world now would be for that shiny new minister to fail, although I guess it might open up an opportunity for Madam Tassi, who is sort of on the warm-up mat for cabinet. Nonetheless, it's not very good for us when we lose someone who gets up on the issues....
Did I embarrass you? I didn't mean to, Madam. It was a compliment, and I hope you take it as such, meaning that you are clearly, from the viewpoint of the opposition benches, on your way to cabinet. The first move is the one you've made, and I expect it's only a matter of time before I will be addressing my friend Filomena as Madam Minister, but for now she remains in her otherwise still important position as the deputy whip, and that's all to the good.
The point I was making, Chair, was that this minister came in and attempted to unravel the ball of mess that the previous minister's orders—I won't say “her”, but her “orders”—had left. She asked us to accelerate some of our work on the Chief Electoral Officer's report, which I mentioned earlier, making recommendations on changes to the election laws following the last election. She asked us because she committed, as much as you could expect without an absolute oath, that the disrespect shown to this committee would stop, particularly as it relates to issues around the election laws.
She came in and asked if we would take a look at certain issues that we hadn't yet gotten to—whether we would pull that forward and take a look at it, and try to have a report for her by May 19. That was a tight deadline, and most of us were frantically thinking, “How the heck are we going to do that?” The point I'm making is that because of the way the request was made, because it was in our common interest, and because there was respect shown for the committee, our initial response wasn't, “Oh, great, we can make life tough for the minister.” Our first reaction was, “Okay, how can we accommodate this? How is that doable?”
I have to say to you, Chair, notwithstanding the weeks and days we have lost here, I didn't know how we were going to do it then. I have no idea how we're going to do it now—more important work that is not being done as a result of the government's actions.
They have now moved this report to the fall. That's fair enough, but when you look at what started all this, let's remember the components that made up the issue. The original motion—as far as I know, until we deem differently that motion still stands, because it has not yet been amended—requests that we be done by June 2.
Is that correct, June 2, or is it June 9? It is June 2.
We had May 19 and we didn't know how we were going to do that; now we're all blown up and not meeting at all. Then they come in, and the issue that has us all blown up has a deadline of June 2.
All the goodwill in the world can't create weeks and months that don't exist. We have a mess on top of a mess on top of a mess. It's layers of onion here, and every time you peel back one of the layers, you have another layer. That's our problem.
I believe I left off making reference to the bullet point that said that the committee shall have all the powers granted to standing committees in Standing Order 108. Then I talked about S.O. 108.
I know that if I attempt to revisit those arguments you're going to lower the boom on me, Chair, for repeating myself, so I won't even force you to do that; I'll just move right along knowing that you wouldn't allow it.
Let me continue, then, Chair, with another bullet point from the motion that is meant to be the example that our two House leaders, the official opposition House leader and the third party House leader—respectively Madam Bergen and Monsieur Rankin—have proposed as a way out of this.
Again I would underscore that here is the opposition trying to help the government get out of the mess that they created. You'd think at some point the government might have put something on the....
I mean, you suspended, Chair, and gave the government enough time. You gave them all of last week, the last couple of days, and all I know is that there were a couple of small meetings. Other than that, what the heck did the government do with the time they had?
When you suspended us on, I think, the Friday before the constituency week, the Friday or the Saturday, most of us on this side expected that the government would use that week—a whole week—to get some work done. In this case, the work being done would be to ask how do we get out of the mess we're in at PROC? What's our off-ramp? What's our exit strategy? What's our alternative to the government? What are we going to do to get us out of here?
You'd think they would have taken the week. beside me here is perplexed, wondering what you did with a whole week. On arguably the biggest issue, at least in terms of what's happening in this place, the government seems to have done nothing.
We came back here on Monday. I was all set to go. The next thing I knew, as I was taking my breath to start, you took a breath, Chair, and said we were suspended again until Wednesday at four o'clock. You didn't give any explanation, sir, but most of us assumed that four o'clock on a Wednesday, which is an unusual kind of time to start a meeting, was meant to provide the parties with not only the time to cut a deal but time to take it to their respective caucuses, have it approved, come back here Wednesday at 4:01, and we would be on the path to getting out of this mess. At least, that's what I presumed was on your mind when you picked that rather unusual time and provided another two full days.
I wasn't at the meeting with the House leaders, but I certainly had a detailed debriefing. I can't go into any great detail, but I'll tell you, there aren't many details to go into. It doesn't seem as though a whole lot happened. They had some discussions, but nothing positive, nothing that even entailed meeting further. It was just, okay, I guess we are where we are.
Again, it's so strange, given that the government is the one who's driving this whole thing. They drove the discussion paper, we believe, although Mr. Simms says different. I respect Mr. Simms, but we still hold that the direction in that motion did come from the PMO. It certainly had their sanction. We believe that.
Basically, where we are is by the design of the government, so you would think, when they were given free time to think about things, that they would have put at least as much time into getting out of this mess as they seemed to have put into getting us into this mess.
I don't believe for one minute that springing this meeting, the filibuster 24-7, which was the government's decision, was done by Mr. Simms or the members of this committee alone. I was part of a government, so I get this. I served two years on the backbenches before I was a cabinet minister, so I get all the dynamics. The government is the one calling the shots. In this case, it's hard to say they're calling shots when there aren't any shots.
It's almost like they're.... I don't know. Are they behind closed doors, clicking their heels three times and hoping magic happens? Are they hoping that suddenly Mr. Reid, Mr. Doherty, Mr. Nater, and I are all just going to fold, and say, “Oh, you know what? You were right. The government's right. We were wrong.”
What did they think was going to happen? If they didn't take the time last week to do it, then they're going to have to take the time going forward. Why they also allow a brand new channel on TV, the “beat up the Liberal” channel, to be aired 24-7 is beyond me, but so be it. I mean, we chased them long enough when we were back in room 112 north.
I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that the previous government would never have done anything like that. Once they decided they were going to be bloody-minded, at least they were consistent. They stayed bloody-minded at every single step along the way. They ultimately paid a price for that, which is why I'm looking at Liberals instead of Conservatives from this side, but that's what they did.
Here, we kept pressing them to take us to a room that has TV cameras so people can watch it, and they kept saying “no”. So we, of course, as you would expect, kept asking, because it's embarrassing for the government, “Why can't we be in public?” The government just said “no”.
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Those were the arguments that were made. Mr. Doherty is saying they didn't want anybody to know. That was the argument we gave, making it very difficult for them—as difficult as we could—to stay in a room in which audio was available but not cameras.
Actually, as it unfolded—I stand to be corrected—I think early in the morning I again, just as a matter of routine, raised a point of order and requested that we come to this room so that we would have the cameras and Canadians could watch this proceeding, given its importance. They did what they usually do and said “no”, which is what I fully expected, because they have been saying that for the last three days anyway.
Then my friend—I think it was Mr. Richards—requested the same thing a couple of hours later, or maybe three or four hours later, and they said “yes”. I was thrilled. I am so glad we're not in a basement room or like a tree in the forest, and if nobody is there to hear it, did it really fall? We're into that kind of world.
Instead, we're in this nice spacious room with all the cameras to allow people to watch; there are lots of members of the public. If anybody wants to come by, there are lots of chairs here, and we have coffee. We make it as civilized as possible.
I point this out just to indicate that this makes you wonder where the grown-ups are. Where are the people who should be thinking this through? It's a bit like the stunt today with the . Again, I can only go so far, because you're going to nail me on repeating myself, but I can at least refer to it as a “thing” without doing the “thing”.
Again, what was missing? Thinking it through. They thought to a certain point, and that's great, but they didn't take it the next step.
Around here, my experience is that those who succeed in politics are those who can see the furthest the clearest. That's why you hire smart people. That's why I have Tyler Crosby. I make sure I have really, really smart people around me to give me advice. When I was a cabinet minister, I had Michele Noble as my deputy minister and Darlene Lawson as my chief of staff. They were incredibly smart people. When we quickly ran to the limit of my thinking, I could turn to them and ask what they thought, and there were lots of great ideas. If we needed to, we could reach further into other offices—in my case it was the premier's office—and ask for that kind of input so that we had all the thinking.
This was a big deal. The second biggest government in Canada is the Government of Ontario. Like the Liberals, we had a majority government. If you get into certain situations or you want to take an initiative, there are lots of things to factor in. Governing is not easy. Governing Canada in particular is difficult. It's not an easy country to govern. It's governing a big chunk of a continent. We're a little bit like a somewhat smaller version of the European Union. We have so many interests backed with common cause, but that common cause is rooted in a different outlook—say in terms of the manufacturing sector—from my hometown of Hamilton versus that, maybe, from Banff or one of the coasts. The coastal aspect affects a lot of Canadians, but quite frankly, coastal fishing, except at the consumer point, is not something that affects my riding in downtown Hamilton nearly as much as, say, cleaning up inland waters, given that Hamilton harbour is right there.
I'm raising all this because I'm wondering, Chair, where the grown-ups in the PMO are on this file. It's starting to feel rudderless.
I have a couple of minutes; I could speculate a little on some stuff, and I think I'll do that. As I look at this, notwithstanding the good suggestions that I think we've made along the way—the very good suggestion in front of us, which I have yet to complete—here we sit, with no clear direction. It seems to me that at this point, if the government is not interested in....
Maybe they'll pick up on this idea. We're still hoping for a resolution. But if not—and let's assume there are no grown-ups over there, or at least that they're not on this file—that means that the government could completely fold on everything. That's not very likely. It could happen, but wow, it would be the second-biggest blunder they made since backing away from their commitment on electoral reform.
I think, though, that if it's not a capitulation by the government that we're heading towards, then the only thing left for them to do, if they can't find a resolution at this committee and a process that we can all live by, is to bring in a motion in the House that contains the things they absolutely have to have and use their majority there to ram through the changes. But wow, what a cost. What a price to pay. You'd have to want those changes really badly, because this is not only angering the opposition and angering people in the community. It's also leaving a lot of people perplexed as to why they're damaging their brand. The whole brand—I won't go off on it, but it's a reference to “sunny ways”, accountability, transparency—was the brand Canadians wanted, because it was such a breath of fresh air compared with what we'd had for 10 years.
I don't understand why they mess around on this file. It's like identifying a bruise on your leg and then going out of your way to have another family member give it another good kick so that they can do as much damage as possible. You got bruised badly on the electoral reform; it's done a lot of harm. That hurt the brand. There were many people who voted on that issue, but even those who didn't consider it a central issue in their support for the Liberals saw the idea of making that kind of promise for that kind of change as pretty big. Many people feel betrayed, because they moved from their regular party—in many cases, us—and other parties to go to the Liberals on that issue.
You'd be surprised by the demographics of those who recognize first past the post as not a fair system. We shouldn't be going through all of this threat from the power of a majority government that got less percentage of the popular vote than Stephen Harper had. The government didn't even get 40%. It was 39.8% and 39.6%, in around there; there were a couple of points of difference. This government, the current Liberal government, even though they have all those seats—that's part of the screwiness of our first past the post—did not get as big a percentage of the popular vote as the previous Harper government had.
We know that they tried to jig that system. They had their preferred....The thing was so poorly handled, and what it felt like was so similar: it felt rudderless. Normally after a while, once a government makes a couple of moves, just like the government watching the opposition, it's like a chess game: once you see a couple of moves made, if you have thought it through you begin to see which one of the identifiable attacks is under way and you're attempting to respond and defend in kind. As well, you have your own aggression plan in your mind, which you're trying to get to without your opponent seeing it.
That's not happening here. I've been around a long time; when things are obvious, I get it. There's nothing obvious about what the government is doing. It doesn't make any sense. It particularly doesn't make sense that they would do it on anything to do with rules or election or electoral reform or changing the way we do things—it's all the same thing—and they've done more damage to themselves on that one file since they've been here, arguably, than on any other, at least in one fell swoop.
For this, by the way, the Prime Minister took personal responsibility. The Prime Minister is saying it was his decision to make, and he made it, and so that promise is broken, as decreed by him, the same guy who made the promise.
The government knew they were going to pay a big price for that. They did their political calculations and figured it was worth it, but before they even got a chance to move on to another big issue, some other shiny object we could all be focusing on, they came along and did this nonsense—more heavy-handed, anti-democratic, Harper-like manoeuvres—on the issue of changing the rules. You would think if they were going to do that and light that fuse, they would have some idea of what the boom was at the end. So far, the only boom at the end of lighting their fuse is the sound of them falling on their collective rear ends and making a mess of this.
I emphasize again that the parties that have spent the most effort and the most time making suggestions for a way out are the opposition benches. Mr. Richards and I have sat back and tried to find out what else we can propose to the government that would get us all off this, because remember, the work that's being held up at the end of the day, the most important work in all of this, is not really our rules. That's not the most important thing. The most important thing is the bloody study of the Chief Electoral Officer's report on changes to our electoral system. We're nowhere near that. That's a number of layers in the onion down. We have all these other things.
It kind of reminds me, Chair, of back in the days when I was a negotiator. The same thing can be said on both sides, but in my case, it was a human resources director who didn't know how to negotiate, who did not understand the signals and nuances and indicators, the kinds of things that keep you from a strike. It was a short one, but we ended up in a short strike that need not have happened. It was a real lesson for me, a lesson I passed on to other union negotiators to make sure they weren't that, going forward.
I could name the negotiations, I could name the company, and I could name the person. I'm not naming the person, but it was the incompetence of the human resources director who was leading the company negotiations that caused us to strike.
The strike then focused the mind and got the company to see exactly where they had gone wrong. In short order, once we sat down and were focused in the right way, guess what? We solved the strike, got a collective agreement, and were back at work in no time, but that work stoppage happened because we had a counterpart on the other side who didn't know what they were doing, who didn't listen, who didn't read the signs, because negotiations for collective agreements are a lot like politics. It's the art of the possible.
Just for the record, I've also sat on the other side, when I was president of the local union. We had staff, and when we had negotiations with the staff, I was on what I considered to be the wrong side of the table, so I get this from both sides. I'm just pointing out that the ones who have the upper hand usually are the ones who have the better game plan. They are better resourced. They have more time. You're constantly trying to weave your way around and through a well-thought-out plan that's been digested and laid out by the other side.
In this case, with something this big and this important, particularly when it speaks to anything to do with electoral reform or reforming anything with rules, you would think they would be so cautious as to recognize that serious damage has already been done on this file.
Why would you do that? If you were going to do it, you would make sure you had thought it through to the nth degree, because the very last thing you want to see happen, if you're the government and you just screwed up your electoral reform file as badly as this government has, is exactly what we're doing now. For the government to have this committee where it is right now takes a really short meeting. It doesn't take much thought. That looks like what happened.
I'll try to give them some credit, Mr. Chair. The only thing I can think of—again, wrong assumptions are often where the problem lies—is that, if you recall, this started on a Tuesday, and lo and behold, the very next day there was a little thing called the budget. We were downstairs in room 112 north, with no cameras. We were not on the main level; unless you knew we were there and had a reason to go there, you wouldn't have even known we were talking—or not talking. You wouldn't know.
In order to get us to this stage, which is a full-blown parliamentary crisis—we're in the grown-up room, we have the cameras, and we're ripping the government, legitimately, on this whole approach—the only thing I can think of that makes any sense is that although it's a bad plan, there had to be something: they thought, with the budget coming, no one would pay any attention on the Tuesday and the Wednesday. That was accurate, because for the most part, nobody did. We were kind of doing our thing in silence.
We weren't actually into it all that long, to be fair, Chair. I think you suspended, and we participated in the reading of the budget and things. To be fair, then, we hadn't been here that long.
The only thing I can think is that they saw the budget coming. They thought this would get no attention. When it did get the attention of the media, they would immediately conclude that we were being obstructionist for the sole purpose of opposing and that we were causing all this grief. The combination of two and a half days of having to keep going 24-7 and getting very little attention because the budget soaked up all the media attention and all the oxygen in the room...and when the media did turn their attention to us, they would conclude that this was just being obstructionist, and maybe by the following Monday or Tuesday, in exhaustion and defeat, we would have folded and the government would have retained the right to change the rules unilaterally using their majority. We would have had these phony negotiations or discussions where it's nice when we all agreed, but not necessary to have agreement for something to be in the report, because the government would just slam through what they wanted.
Even if the two opposition parties have dissenting reports, we all know that no government minister holds up the report of a committee and says, “What we're doing is adhering to almost all the recommendations that came from the committee that studied this matter, and so we're being consistent with our promise to respect committees and to listen to what they say and consider their input”, and then adds, after that, “Oh, and by the way, both opposition parties submitted dissenting reports, and the majority report only actually represents the government members.”
That's why it matters who controls what goes into the report.
I'm going to be referencing something, Chair. I did this in the House the other day, but I didn't do it in the committee, so I'm allowed by the rules to revisit it. I'm going to talk about the report we did, our eleventh report, which we were dealing with on Monday, and talk about the process and how we went through it. That report is one concerning which the government could stand up—any minister, or the —and say, “We have the eleventh report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, and they've recommended a number of measures, and we're going to act on them.”
Chair, that would start indicating to people that the legislation is likely going to go through fairly quickly. Why? Because the eleventh report is the “Interim Report on Moving Toward a Modern, Efficient, Inclusive and Family-Friendly Parliament”. Again, it's related work and a completely different process. I'll talk about that difference. Right now I am showing the difference between having a report that all the parties agreed to versus one that has government support.
You know, Chair, better than anyone in this room, because you're a chair, that at end of the day, a majority of the members control what the report says. If that happens to be the government, then normally the opposition parties, if they're opposed and feel seriously enough and have good reasons for opposing it, will issue a—
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It's very amazing, Mr. Doherty.
It again speaks to thinking it through, but make sure you go all the way, because that one was only half thought through.
At any rate, if they ultimately have to withdraw everything and just go straight to a motion in the House, that's not going to be pretty either; obviously we will make that as difficult as we can and draw attention to it. As my passed-away friend Jack Layton used to say, it circles the stain. So that motion—you still don't have all the things you want. We still have some rights, and before those changes are made, we get to use the rights we currently have vis-à-vis applying them to the process of change. It will be the last hurrah for some of those rights that we have, but we will use them.
My point is that this seems to be the only endgame available if the government doesn't find a positive, co-operative way to deal with these issues, and that is a loser. You can just imagine what the speeches are going to be. This is all fodder for that.
Speaking further to the letter and to the model that was used in 2001 by former Prime Minister Chrétien, which is where I picked up at the beginning—I believe I ended with Standing Order 108—it says:
That the committee shall not adopt any report without the unanimous agreement of all the Members of the committee;
You'd almost think it was a misprint. How could that be? How could we have Liberal Prime Minister Chrétien, known for his sometimes unorthodox ways of creating efficiencies in his life, versus , who promised to respect committees and to listen to their work and take their work seriously? You'd almost think there was a misprint and that the name on the top of this motion in 2001 were actually to be that of this government. The kinds of things the Liberals are trying to do now would be more akin to some of the characteristics Canadians might apply to Monsieur Chrétien, given his combative style. That is not, however, the case, and ergo the dilemma for us in terms of trying frantically to understand what the government is doing.
We realize they want everything. They want everything their way. Okay, every government starts that way. But where's the thought into this? You seem to have thought real well on the substantive parts of the rules that the government wants so that they can control things—recognizing that this is already one of the most controlled Parliaments in the world—but zero thought went into the politics.
In the past, the accusation against the Liberals was that they used to be great at politics and lousy at substance. It amazes me, as well as angering and perplexing me. I almost wish I could flip to the back of the book to get a sense of how this ends, to kind of cheat, in a way. I have to know: how does this end up? Right now, I can't figure it, other than “complete white flag”, which I doubt. The only real alternative after that is to ram stuff through. It seems to me it would be worth their while, given the sensitivity around these kinds of files, to be turning themselves, not us, inside out to find the off-ramp. It's just that we actually think the work that's not being done is important to Canadians. I'm not really factoring it into the government, per se. We're listening to the government framework around the matter, but the issue at hand is the work of the Chief Electoral Officer, which is under the domain of no party. He's hired by Parliament, can only be fired by Parliament, and is answerable to Parliament through this committee.
As to how that ends well, I can't begin to say. You'd have to change so much: the national dialogue, the media coverage, and the understanding that Canadians are now having as to what you're doing. So much of that would have to change, and I don't know how you'd do it, if you were going to somehow come out of the end of ramming through the changes in the House by using your less-than-Harper's-majority to do so. How does that end well for the government? It's bloody-minded, it gives you what you want at the end of the day, but it leaves a lot of dead political processes in its wake. I can't imagine how much negative coverage there will be through that whole process.
As I say, you know that we're not going to make it easy. The government should be worried, because the official opposition Conservatives and the opposition New Democrats, believe it or not, are finding out how easy it is to work together when it comes to dealing with this government. I don't need to say beware, but beware. If you bring that motion in, it's going to make this look like the easy part. It's just going to get uglier.
Maybe one can only hope that as we speak now, they may have actually pulled together a group of grown-ups in the PMO who are going to look at this and start thinking through how they get out of it and whether there's a way they can do it without taking any more hits. That would be my starting point.
If you aren't approaching it that way and the only thing being looked at is how to get bloody-minded, what the steps are, what the research is, what the precedents are, and if that's the only thing being looked at, then there really isn't an awful lot of difference between the way this government treats Parliament and the way former prime minister Harper and his gang treated Parliament. The best-case scenario is that you look as ruthless as Harper without being nearly as efficient at it.
What a great victory. Let's see you run on that. I'd like to see you turn that one into an ad.
I don't know; for a while, when you guys first came out of the gate, it was looking like, wow, for at least the initial times, they have some magic touch over there. It was going good. Even when you had negative stuff, it didn't seem to stick, because everything else was going so well. No matter what's going on, there's always a good picture of the to go along with the article. You always seemed to do just fine in the early days. You always came out smelling like roses.
What happened? I realize that the realities of governing sink in, and that can be shocking, but some of you have been around for a while. One can only hope that as we read these things out and as we reiterate at least the problems the government is having, it may somehow be helpful in providing a way out of this.
I've pretty much exhausted everything I can think of, which I've shared with Mr. Simms. Mr. Simms has been kind enough to make himself available to Mr. Richards and me, as the two vice-chairs of this committee. Even during the break week, Mr. Simms reached out and talked to me on the Wednesday. One was a bit of a heads-up as to some stuff, and another was just to chat and make sure about the lines of communication. He's been great that way.
I have to tell you, though, that I'm getting a little bit exhausted being one half of the team over on the opposition benches that is coming up with ways of getting out of this mess and finding an exit strategy, when all the government does is continually put up roadblocks and refuse to budge even an inch. You can tell I'm getting old by “budge an inch”; let's say “centimetre”. I still look at centimetres and figure out what it means in inches. That's what happens. It's the same thing with kilometres and mileage.
If I may, Chair, this will take just 60 seconds. When that system came out, my mom said at the time, “I'm not doing it. I'm not doing it.” There was enough of a layover in the transition period that she hasn't had to. She has pretty much been able to stay with what she's comfortable with. My daughter, on the other hand, went through school when it was taught. I look at some of my colleagues here, and they have to give a thought to what the heck an inch is again, or a yard. What the heck is a yard? She was free and clear, because she was brought up and taught in the new world. Half the time she's looking at me, when I come up with my expressions, and asking, “And that's what, again, Dad?”, as I reinterpret English back into English.
But us, we got stuck in the middle. Some of us weren't real good at or didn't have an aptitude for making conversions. It's not that I'm looking for any sympathy. I'm sure there are many other boomers who realize that having to make that translation and formula adjustment in your head slows down talk.
Thank you, Chair. You're indicating to me that I need to talk about the subject matter, so I will.
The next point is:
That the committee may recommend to the House texts of new or amended Standing Orders;
Not only were they asked and willing to come up with some of the concepts, but also they were asked, if they wanted, to provide actual language; that's how much they were trusted. That's the kind of work they expected them to do and that they did.
The next point states:
That the committee may make recommendations for changes to relevant statutes and, if it does so, such recommendations shall be deemed to have been made pursuant to an Order adopted pursuant to Standing Order 68(4); and
Again, this speaks to the importance of the Standing Orders as a tool that we use in everything we do. The final point states:
That the committee shall present its final report no later than Friday, June 1, 2001.
Chair, I've introduced this by way of ensuring that our record of debate reflects everything that's happening on the issue in front of us. The letter, which I've read in its entirety, both sides, signed by the two opposition House leaders, outlining once again an off-ramp strategy for the government.
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Thank you. They do happen, those real points of order.
I believe I was making a final summary reference to this document. My friend has now asked that it be circulated to all members.
We forget how many people there are who follow these things and who care very much about these matters. They would want access, so I would hope that we could make that available if we get any public requests, given that we're in this unusual situation, Chair, and that if somebody did happen to contact the clerk of the committee you might feel comfortable in ensuring that a copy goes out, or at the very least, that it be.... Of course, they could always call any one of our caucuses, the House leaders for our caucuses, our caucus chairs. Any member, actually, would eventually find them a copy of it.
Again, I want to leave this subject on this one important point, that is, this at least represents the opposition benches trying to do something. Where's the government's suggestion?
The only thing we've heard, and it's not even formal—there's nothing on paper—is that there might be some consideration to move the deadline from June to sometime in the fall, but as I've said, without changing the fact that the government wants the unilateral right to ram through anything we can't agree on by consensus, it matters not to us whether that guillotine flies in June, October, November, or December. It's not the time of doing it that's the problem—it's the doing of it that's the problem.
To shift gears out of first, I would like to spend a little time talking about the report that was tabled the other night. Most importantly, this is a report from this committee, not one in the past, but this committee, meaning just PROC, in this Parliament, with this makeup of almost the same members. We haven't had too much change here.
You, Chair, have been the chair from the beginning, and the two vice-chairs have been in place from the beginning. That's important. This committee needs stability, because a lot of decisions made in the early part of the year can have implications later on, having set precedents for going forward later on in the year.
What's most edifying here is that the parallels aren't hard to find. It doesn't take a stretch to go from what this report is about to what we're talking about here, which is why the Speaker in the House last night allowed it to be discussed as a relevant part of the motion that was on the floor.
This report is the eleventh report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. That's us.
I might mention, Chair, just to give you fair warning, that later on tonight—much later—I'll be making a reference to the twenty-third report of this committee, which also is our interim report. I see you nodding your head. You know what it is; you presented it in the House. It's the interim report response. It was our first go-around of the low-lying fruit exercise that we had done, so I will be making some reference to that also.
Again, to summarize at the beginning where I'm about to go, I'm about to show that when this committee actually does work together, which we want to do and have a history of doing, we do good work. It's usually a little dangerous for politicians in a non-election period to be bragging, but I've been on a lot of committees in 30 plus years, and it's a good committee, and you're a good chair and we've done some good work. I think we could have done more good work. We were doing good work on the chief electoral report, which is exactly what this is about.
Here's what I want to speak to, Chair. I won't task you to separate where I might be crossing over and repeating things between two reports. I'm going to be talking about two distinct processes, and how one worked and how one is not. I won't go beyond that into any great detail on the one that is, except sufficiently to make the case that I'm doing. I won't go into that level of detail. If I start to slide in that direction, I know that I'll hear from you, sir.
As for that process, unlike this process, the other one started with respect. It started with an element of co-operation, Chair. You don't miss very many meetings, and I'm pretty sure you were here for that. If not, you would certainly be aware that not long into the new year, on January 28, 2016, the then , Mr. .... Again, at committee we have a little more latitude. That's why committee work is important. That's why it matters whether or not we have the right to talk until we're done on this committee. I've known Dom—Mr. LeBlanc—for a long time. He was here when I got here. Like a lot of us, he's part of the furniture. He's been around a long time. He's respected, liked, and well known. No one was surprised when he ended up in a senior position as the government House leader.
He was kind enough to come to the meeting. He sat downstairs in room 112, in that general location, and he asked us—I would even go so far as to say he asked nicely—with a lot of respect, to please, as part of the parliamentary process, undertake a review of how we do things. I'm paraphrasing. He asked us to take a look at how we do things here, such as committee work, caucus work, work in the House, and travelling between our offices. He asked us to take a look at all of that and make suggestions that would make this Parliament more family friendly. It's a big undertaking, one that you would think couldn't work, really, unless you had co-operation.
Those of us who have been on the opposition benches for many years very much appreciated that the government was asking this committee in exactly the way that was consistent with the election. This is my opinion now: it was consistent with what the government promised in the election, which was to show respect for committees, to listen to what the committees have to say, and to use the committees more as an integral part of Parliament, the real workhorse, rather than the view that the previous government seemed to have, which was that committees are mostly a nuisance, much in the way that they ultimately viewed Parliament.
Mr. 's request was taken so seriously and co-operatively by this committee that while he came to see us on January 28, on February 2 we started our work. There was no acrimony. There were no accusations, no troublemaking, and no filibusters. We started working.
We worked on the principle that if we didn't all agree, it wouldn't go in the report. That does make for tougher work down the road, because the easy stuff will have been done and you're left with the tough stuff, but it did allow us to generate this report. It was amazing how often we did agree.
I'm getting a little bit ahead of myself, because this report is worth considering.
To recap, on January 28 the newish government House leader came in for his first meeting with us. He asked us to co-operate to meet their objectives and their electoral platform. The first thing we said was “yes”. We respected the fact they had won the election and that they were a few months old. They had a mandate to do these kinds of things. There was a strong feeling in the House of members who wanted change, especially newer members, like those with young families. Unlike in the past. when that would almost always mean women, in this case right away it affected my new colleague Mr. Schmale, who is the father of a couple of young children and has a modern family. My sense is that, as much as his job allows, he is a hands-on dad, as much as he possibly can be, and he had as much interest in this subject as anyone else in the past, who might always have been women.
It wasn't gender-specific. There was a general sense in the House that we could do this better. We could make some changes that would make it easier for people with families, or, on the other end, for people who have some disabilities, or people who are older and can't go as long. There are lighting issues around danger, and distances. We still haven't dealt with a lot of that.
Just to give an example, Chair, I had a temporary problem with sciatica over the last few weeks. Anybody who has had sciatica knows how painful that is. I forget what I was doing, but it might have been one of these committees or something, and it was late. The buses only run until an hour after the House is sitting, no matter what else is going on. I walked out the door and it was really cold. I've learned that extreme cold adversely affects sciatica. All I could think was how I was not going to enjoy that walk. My office is at the justice building and my vehicle was parked beside the Supreme Court. That is an awfully long way to go. If I had any options, I normally wouldn't walk that far because of the damage it does.
I was so lucky that night. When I came out, one of the buses was there. Really, I thought I had won the lottery.
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—but that would be the opposite of what he did.
He didn't do that. He came in and was very respectful. What I am pointing out, Chair, over and over, because it is so important, is that at the cornerstone of everything here is respect. It's respect for the tradition of how we've done things in this place. It's respect for what those who came before us went through and how they dealt with these kinds of changes. More than anything, it's respect for each other as members of Parliament, worthy of having an equal say in the rules as to how we make laws in this great country.
And we were treated that way. It didn't say for the “Liberal” members, although it benefited Liberals. It also benefited Conservatives and New Democrats. More importantly, it benefited the multitude of people around us, aside from our personal staff, who don't have a partisanship. Their job is just to help us do what we do, even when we do silly things like this.
In the very next paragraph, Chair, after the reference to Mr. LeBlanc's mandate letter, it says this—and these are our words, all of us. Again, this is the committee report. It could easily be just the government, with two dissenting reports attached, and I would still be correct in saying “the committee report”, but in this case I am emphasizing the fact that it is a unanimous consensus report that we all agree on and we all supported.
Doesn't that sound like a better world to be in than the one we're in here? This is more where I was in 2012, 2013, 2014, leading up to the election in 2015.
Here's what we said in our report, Chair, after we referenced Mr. LeBlanc's mandate:
In its approach to this study, the Committee attached importance to reporting back to the House in a timely manner any findings and recommendations that could result in improvements to the inclusivity and work-life balance for members, along with seeking improvements to the predictability, efficiency and modernization of the institution, all while taking into consideration the impact of changes on members’ constituents.
Now, what I find particularly interesting is that we as a committee chose to make a reference to “improvements to the predictability, efficiency and modernization of the institution”. That's exactly what the government says when it talks about its discussion paper, that it's all about predictability, efficiency and modernization, which are some of its favourite buzzwords. In the election, it used to be “accountability”, but not so much anymore.
I find so interesting the parallels of what we were asked to do, how we did it, what our end product was, looking at the eleventh report, versus what we have now. Again, I can't go into it, because I would be repeating, but it is fair for me to make a reference that this process, unlike the other one in which a discussion paper was dropped in the public domain towards the end of a constituency week with no fanfare, no attachment, and not even a heads-up to the other House leaders that it was coming or a follow-up discussion about what it means, followed—I believe Mr. Reid has done the math—within a couple of hours, by Mr. Simms, in the same fashion, dropping his motion into the public domain.
When we get to committee, obviously the first thing we want to do is establish how the decisions are going to be made. We're back to the alleyway to playing scrub again. How are we going to pick the teams?
The government has one file with a number of different pieces and two completely different processes. When the government follows the process that's consistent with what they ran on, and they treat the committee with the respect that they said they would, what happens? What usually happens when you offer respect? You get it back. And that's what happened. Mr. came in, read his mandate, asked us to undertake certain work, very respectfully, and within a matter of days we were on it.
In this process, however, we had something dropped in the middle of a constituency week without any context, with a motion from a committee member a couple of hours later indicating, all but dictating, what the government wanted to do with the discussion paper. The first thing that does, as the critic for the official opposition, given the opportunity to have the floor, is put a motion that says, hey, before we do anything, we'd like a guarantee from the government that we're only going to do this by all-party agreement, that it will be by consensus, that we will agree to that.
It should have taken 60 seconds for the government to say, yes, of course that's how we're going to do it. We'd have had a quick vote. It would have been done and recorded. We'd have moved on, and be working toward a final product, just as this same committee did with the eleventh report.
Not only that, but as began to get the idea that the government wasn't going to support this, he started to settle in to fill out the balance of the meeting with what we call, and I've referenced this before, “running the clock”, which means exactly what it does in sports. You just keep doing what you're doing so the clock runs out and others can't do anything else in that time: run the clock.
That's what Mr. Reid thought he now had to do. That was bad enough, having now realized that the government was not going to agree that, as in the past, it would be by consensus, but when the allotted one o'clock adjournment of the meeting came along, lo and behold, found out that the government had a further surprise for us—a sneak attack. Mr. Reid may have been ready for up to two hours of time to talk in order to have one of those little battles I talked about at committee that happen from time to time, and that don't impact everything else that's going on. That's what we thought was going on there.
Then we got to one or two minutes after one o'clock. Somebody asked you, Chair, if we shouldn't be adjourned, to which you indicated there was not majority support for rising, and therefore the meeting would continue. That was two weeks ago Tuesday, and we're still on that date.
All of this has been because the government won't agree to what is the usual practice in a major review of Standing Orders—that is, if we don't all agree, it doesn't go in the report and it doesn't go to the House.
What a difference. It's the same government, but a different House leader. I was a House leader once for the third party at Queen's Park. You get to make a lot of decisions when you're the House leader, but if there are some decisions with your political life to make on your own, you'd better be checking from on high before you go telling the government House leader what deal you're about to cut. I get that it's not just the personality, and I'm not trying to make it about that, but I am pointing to the difference in what happened and the approach. I can't go too far on this, because we were not only in camera, we were, like, pens down. We were having a totally 100% informal, set this aside....
We had the minister in here the other day, and a few of us thought, okay, here's our chance, we have the minister in here. Do you remember how it unfolded, Chair? You'll stop me if I'm telling tales out of school that I shouldn't be from a confidential meeting, but we agreed to just set everything down and have a quick chat with the minister to see if she could help, because she was in a position to do something that could get us out of the logjam.
I cannot go into the cut and thrust. I won't attempt to. I won't play any games like that. I'll just say that it was not productive. I only say that—and that's all I'm going to say about it—as a comparison to what happened when Mr. LeBlanc came in when he was in public and we could have done anything we wanted to embarrass him. We had the cameras going. It was all there to us. But we didn't do that. That's not what we did.
I am so glad that we have this report to point to, to show the Canadian people the difference between how we deal with two parts of the same subject, one with respect and collegiality, which is what they ran on, and the other was just borderline political thuggery. We're still in the middle of that fight. What the heck happened? What happened in such a short period of time?
Maybe it's time to bring Mr. LeBlanc back, at least into the discussions at the House leader's office or something, because this is nuts. This is not where we need to be. This is not where we were the last time. For the life of me, I really don't know why we're here and why we aren't sitting down and finding a way out of this that we can all respect, because they are our collective rules of the House, not the government's. You can run on something, but that doesn't necessarily mean that word for word.... I mean, would you run on a platform that said, “MPs will never be able to speak again after we form government”? If you somehow still formed government, do you think you'd have the right to implement that? It would be an interesting debate. It would probably get about as far as this thing's going, I don't know.
I know that's silly, but this whole thing is so silly, it really is, and non-productive. I don't get where it goes. This is the underlying thing. I usually can figure out to some degree what the heck is going on. I have no idea, except I know that the government wants their way or the highway. We know from past experience how well that works, we know what kind of Parliament we end up with, and we know how Canadians feel about that.
Moving on, Chair, under discussion on page 2 in that report, we state—remember that “we” when I read this, because this is our report that we issued to the House—the following:
The right of the House to establish its own rules and manage its internal affairs is among the most important rights claimed over centuries of parliamentary tradition and possessed by the House of Commons. The House can set and change its work practices, rules and procedures, along with the resources and benefits provided to members, in order to ensure that these retain as their purpose to enable and support members in carrying out their functions as representatives and legislators.
That was us describing our collective ownership of our rules and procedures.
We didn't say in our report—
An hon. member: [Inaudible--Editor]
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Yes, unless somebody else wants to jump in.
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. David Christopherson: Feel free. I wouldn't want to cut anybody off. I don't want to hog the mike. Even I can't deliver that with a straight face.
I believe I was making the point that I suspect that back in the 37th Parliament, when they were doing the 2003 report, there were members and caucuses that felt strongly about things. I was suggesting that, the same as now, it's likely that much of the thrust was coming from the government. The government is the one that has to deliver. The government is the one that has to run on its record, and governments always want more control than what they have. It doesn't matter what the government is. Mine was no different. You'd like to have more control, especially when you start to see....
There was one thing that surprised me when I first got elected. I didn't expect us to form government. I thought I'd be in the back row of the third party underneath a burned-out lightbulb. Instead, there we were in government, and two years later I was a minister. Woo-hoo! However, I found myself on the House management committee. I had served on city and regional councils, so I understood council politics, but I really didn't know much about parliamentary politics. One of the things I learned is that one of the most precious commodities is House time, particularly government House time, because by the time you go through supply days, special days, all the things you're taught, you start to realize that there's a fairly narrow window of opportunity, given that bills rightfully don't just whiz through here, that they take some time.
So I get it. I get the idea that the government wants more control. I have no doubt that in 2003, in the 37th Parliament, there were government members who felt strongly, or were given orders from on high to feel strongly, about some important matters. However, as they told us in their report, their philosophy was that to maintain the respected House that we have, Parliament—not the government, not even us, in our time, but that which is bigger than us, Parliament—was best served when rule changes only happened when there was complete agreement. They recognized that. Is that the most efficient? No. Does it make it difficult and leave the government with some problems? Yes, it might. Does it mean that you actually didn't make changes that you could have because you couldn't come to agreement on words? Yes.
We have the benefit, in this 150th year, of celebrating how lucky we are to be in Canada, that Canada has been around that long, and we're facing that moral dilemma because it's a fair question: is it more important that the House operate efficiently or that there be buy-in for the rules that decide those things? Our predecessors consistently, being in exactly the same shoes as we are, concluded time after time, in different parliaments, in different decades, in different centuries, in the consistent analysis of thoughtful parliamentarians, that when it comes to changing the rules of the House, the only acceptable, positive way to bring change is to ensure that everyone has buy-in.
The Fridays that the government wants to change are absolutely no different than the issues that were dealt with by previous committees in previous reports. Many of those rules, Chair, are there now, as I speak, and we use them.
There have been exceptions. These things are never clear, crystal clear, black and white. There have been exceptions, but in the main, and where there has been thoughtful reflection on the dilemma, parliaments have consistently said that the element of agreement is crucial. What's really weird is that for the first half of the time the Liberals have been in power, they agreed. Guess what? It worked. We did good work. We brought in changes that made things better. We didn't have a big squabble over those changes because the only ones we recommended were those we could agree on.
Chair, you'll remember that we went out of our way to find that language. Luckily we have some of the best analysts you could possibly ask for, and they scoured the planet. They were there as our wordsmiths, listening to us, grabbing our ideas, reframing them. You know how we do this. A couple of words, and it's still not working. Sometimes we stand back and say, okay, let's try it from a different approach. Rather than saying it in the positive, let's see if we can do it in the negative, that type of thing—anything at all that would allow us, collectively, to get to a place, having different perspectives, that we could all live with.
That's not unfair to me. It's not unfair to anyone else I can see. It's not unfair to the government. If everybody kind of puts a little water in their wine, you get to agreement. That's how we got a houseful of rules that for the most part we accept as being “the rules”. You don't hear too often—now and then, but not too often—that members stand up and challenge the fairness of a rule. If they do, it happens to be with the instant case and how it's being applied in a given situation, as opposed to saying a rule is inherently unfair.
We don't have that. All that squabbling that I told you we did in the alleyway as we got our game of scrub going: we don't have that. We start with bills and motions that come into the House. We know the rules. Most of the rules advantage the government; not just the Liberals but the government, particularly in a majority, particularly in a massive majority.
But what it does consistently, Chair...and I've been lucky enough to be here in minority governments and in majority, as have you. I believe you were here for minorities. You will know that the rules, for the most part, are the same. Yes, the government often gets frustrated because they think the opposition is being obstructionist and irresponsible and just delaying things and don't really care about getting anything done and just want to score points on the government. We have that kind of thing.
I can tell you that in every single opposition caucus that I've sat on, and federally that's all of them, many times we're crying over the fact that there's nothing we can do in a given situation because the bloody government has all the power and all the votes and all the control. But that's kind of what makes it work, that we have enough rights....
We have fewer than most parliamentary democracies, by the way, if you look at it worldwide. We are on the tight end of what a majority government can do with a Parliament. But a few things are available to us that allow us to, at the very least...because you're never going to completely stop a government that has decided to do something. The rules are there. They can win this fight. If the only thing that matters is winning this fight, all they have to do is craft a motion, bring it into the House, get it through the system, and they'll have it.
When we have a vote, guess what? The government wins 10 times out of 10.
My friend Mr. Doherty is reflecting on...and he's right. Every now and then things go a little democratic on them, and it's a bit rough. But in the main, as a structure and as an approach, government House leaders....
That was on private members' business, by the way. On full-up business it's very, very unusual. It does happen, but for the most part, a majority government, a big majority government, wins 10 times out of 10. They win the votes. This is why we are trying to delay a vote on Mr. Reid's motion, because we know it is going to lose. That's the motion that says you can do this only if we all agree. They want to kill that motion to leave themselves the right to ram these things through.
Coming back full circle, Chair, I pointed out in the report that I've been focusing on for the last little while that one of the things we could not come to agreement on was the issue of eliminating Friday sittings. That didn't stop us from putting it in our report and acknowledging it. As I'm going to show later, in many cases we actually commit that we'll come back to it, that we're not done our struggle, but it's not going in this report because we're not there yet.
So it's exactly the same issue applied two different ways by two different parliaments, and by one government two different ways within the same parliament.
This was interesting. This said—and it doesn't matter what the time point was, I'm just making a point—the following:
At this time, the Committee does not have any recommendations to make regarding implementing a parallel debating chamber for the House; it may revisit this topic in a future study.
Chair, I think you'll recall that when we started talking about it, I was one of those who said, “What? A parallel debating chamber?” I did not know, and I don't mind admitting that, because I don't think anybody else on the committee did either. We did not know that.
It's an interesting concept, which I don't understand fully, because we didn't go too far down there. We didn't see enough relevance to push on it, but we did say we might revisit it because we had enough ideas, and it was an interesting concept. Basically, it creates a recognized second chamber in which some of the business of the House is allowed to take place, and it runs parallel to the House. There would be this other place.... The Senate would be a great place to have a House of Commons parallel debate format, but I will leave that for a future discussion. It's just like in Quebec. They turned their former senate into the most magnificent, beautiful committee room in probably all of parliamentary history. It's a stunning room. It used to be a senate. Now it's useful. It's wonderful. I do love—
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You're right. I appreciate that. People should know. That was done deliberately by colleagues who are not part of my caucus here, just making sure we can make this as humane as possible for one another. That does speak to the camaraderie that exists. It's a decent thing to do, and I appreciated that. It allowed me to clear my throat, have a quick chat with Tyler, get my fluids refilled, and check a couple of emails, so thank you. I appreciate that.
I want to address Mr. Badawey directly, because he was the one who generously did it, for exactly that reason, and made that clear. I wanted to say how impressed I was, in response to Mr. Badawey, because first of all he kept his word to me. He wasn't going to jerk around, grab the floor, and do things with it that we don't normally do when we don't have the floor in our own right. He kept his word to me.
Then, Mr. Badawey, you managed to get two great hits in about local, covered off your schedule for the weekend—magnificent stuff—managed to score a government talking point on the way, and ended up back where you began, talking about the local. When I heard you were a mayor, it suddenly made a whole lot of sense. You're going to do really well here.
Some hon. members: Hear, hear!
Mr. David Christopherson: I thank you for that. That was a tour de force. That is how you do this sort of thing, and I admire that. I'm glad I got a chance to get to know you a little better.
I would just say in seriousness that I thought your last comment was heartfelt and not in any way tongue-in-cheek, when you said, “This was a good discussion. Why can't we keep doing that?” I would like to say to you, through the Chair, that that's the kind of work we've been doing. When I pointed to that report, the one I've been waving around all night, that's how we got there. When I said we did good work, I didn't just mean we pulled together a report. It's like public accounts. We have a great dynamic at public accounts. I'm so blessed. Those are the two committees I sit on, and that is the way we work.
But Mr. Doherty is correct. The only thing stopping us, Mr. Badawey, from getting to that point is asking the government to withdraw its residual desire to make a decision alone. If that nice discussion, and enjoyable discussion, and positive discussion that you were part of fails, then under the rules we've been following regarding consensus, there would be a report that says something like this.
Given the lack of consensus the committee has heard regarding whether potential benefits of eliminating Friday sittings outweigh the potential drawbacks, the committee does not intend to propose a recommendation regarding this matter. In other words, we couldn't come to agreement.
Some will say, well, therefore, that makes this inefficient and ineffective, and yet I've pointed to other reports in the past, particularly the one from the 37th Parliament in 2003, that went out of their way to say to us that in their opinion—my words—Parliament is better served by not having rules that not everyone agrees to, than by resolving a problem.
Put another way, we all agree that there's a problem. We can all agree that Fridays could be used better. The question is, what is that “better”? We may or may not be able to come up with a consensus. If we do, it's in the report. If we don't, then it goes in the way this does, which shows that we took a shot at it. We tried.
I'm going to be making references to other decisions like this, where we actually say that this is important and we want to come back to it. We don't have a consensus yet, but we are putting ourselves on notice that we want to come back and work at this, because it's important for us to try to find agreement in some of these areas where we believe change should happen but we just can't agree on the details of that change.
That, Mr. Badawey, is respect. Then, when I'm listening to your opinion—I'm listening to Vance Badawey give me his opinion as a member of Parliament on behalf of his constituents—and your own life experience, and what you believe is in the best interest of this committee, I will listen to you, and I'll do my best to try to understand your perspective, especially if it's different from mine. But it is very difficult for me to do that if you reserve the right to use the power of all your buddies to overwhelm all of us, so that whether you win the argument by debate or not, you win because might makes right.
That's the problem. We have not had that.
I'm about to make reference to another report we did, which was on the Chief Electoral Officer's report. We, this committee, in this Parliament, since you've been here, did this for the second time.
This committee brags about the fact that everything in here is by consensus. That's the difference, sir. If you remove the threat that your government wants the right to use your majority to carry the day, when your arguments to me don't convince me, we can't have the same kind of discussion. We can't have the kind of discussion that got us these two reports.
That's what my friend Mr. Doherty was referring to when he talked about a lack of trust. It's hard to have a debate with someone when they say that no matter how this goes, my way will prevail; if I have to, I will use political force to make it happen; and now, as long as you clearly understand that, let's have a nice, free, fair give-and-take discussion about how this should be resolved.
That becomes impossible. That is our whole point. It's on that one issue. It's not whether we agree on Fridays, or Wednesdays, or all the other issues. At this point, it is a political fight. It is a war. Your government made a war by pushing it into 24-7. We are 100% prepared to stand down from it the second the government indicates that it's no longer trying to get the upper hand that it hasn't had even in this Parliament, let alone in previous Parliaments. The second that happens, we're into that discussion. You would be, any time you're here, a positive contribution to that, because the kind of discussion you saw happen here....
These mostly aren't even the full-time members of the committee. This is the kind of culture we've created. This is the kind of environment our chair creates. He provides a lot of latitude. He does have his limits. That's why I always keep an eye on him, out of the corner of my eye. At some point he decides his limit has been reached.
But that's the kind of culture we have. We do work together. I think you'd find it very stimulating. You obviously have a lot of experience in “hand on the ground” local politics, where it's real. We're not that far apart in our desires. You're probably getting to be a bit like me in that you've been around long enough in politics that the adversarial stuff really starts to get stale. What really can excite you is trying to bridge the difference when we have a common cause. We just have to figure out the details of how to get there, and then we all work together as a team.
That's stimulating. It's enjoyable. It's good work. It leads to reports that are accepted by the House, with recommendations that all members feel have been fairly considered. While it may not be everything they want, they can live with that rule, because it's fair-minded and it came from a place where fair-mindedness was the order of the day.
Right now you have managed to focus, with pinpoint accuracy, on what the problem is. It's not our lack of ability to talk. It's not our lack of ability to be respectful. It's not our lack of ability to work together. It's a lack of rules that allow us to do that where we're treated equally to you. I'd love to be having a debate with you, knowing in the back of my mind that if your argument doesn't convince me, I can force you to accept my way. That's a very different debate to have that tucked away in the back of my mind rather than the only way we'll get any change is that Mr. Badawey and I have to find some common cause here. We have to find that language.
That's where we start getting help. Our staff start helping. Our analysts help. Our chair helps. Then we get to two good reports: the 23rd report and the 11th report of this committee. In this Parliament, since you've been here, we've done that kind of work.
In fact, sir, colleague, this is virtually the exception. I can ask Tyler or anybody around me to remind me differently, but I can't think of anywhere else on this committee that we got so seriously in the ditch that the work we were expected to do was in jeopardy.
I don't think we've ever gotten to that on this one issue other than now, on the one motion where the government is refusing to agree that the only things that will go in the report are things we all agree on. That alone was going to be enough, and it did seize up the work of the committee and created all this problem. The government then of course launched—I focus on this a lot, because a lot of filibusters happen in committee and people don't even know they happen. Sometimes they happen for only 10 or 15 minutes, and the fact that one is about to happen causes someone to say that the last thing they want to do is listen to Christopherson going off. There have to be some words they can use to get past this. There have to be. I exaggerate a little, but that dynamic has a place.
Under one of the proposals you want, sir, and if you retain the right to pass it with just your vote, you will force it down our throats. Whereas right now as a local member, if you need 20, 30, or 40 minutes to explain an issue.... And obviously you know your constituency well. You're a long-serving mayor who leveraged that into a federal seat. You're obviously trusted and respected in your community. I don't know about you, but my community is complex, and very few issues aren't.
I need the time, because of who I am—and I talk a lot—to break it down into the components that I think are best reflecting where my constituents are coming from and why, and why this is either a good idea or a bad idea for my beloved Hamilton. Right now, in my entire time, whether at Queen's Park or here—let's leave it at my time here, I don't have to worry that—tick, tick, tick—I have to get that covered too as we do in the House.
By the way, the limitation in the House on the early debates is 20 minutes with a 10-minute Q and A. Under the proposal you put forward, it would be 10 minutes. You'd go from being able to take as long as you want to convey your point of view reflecting your constituency—which is just as important as mine, and just as important as the Prime Minister's, and just as important as Ms. Mendès'—and you take that time. That's why we have committee work. That's why the rules at committee are different from those in the House, because the House time is different. We're handcuffed with the times that are there. When we get to committee, we deliberately loosen up the rules a little. We call each other by our names sometimes. At least it's not out of order to do so. Most importantly, we can take the time.
The unlimited time is not just a weapon for the opposition to threaten to start a filibuster or to continue one, although that's an important element of it. It's also just the ability to come to a committee meeting and explain something in a way that can't be done in the House. If I can't do it at committee, that means I leave the Hill not feeling that I've fully represented my constituents, because nowhere did I have time to spell it all out. It all had to fit into somebody's preconceived idea of a fair amount of time. Since we accept that in the House but we don't like it, we try to make up for it by creating a lot more latitude. Those of us who have chaired committees know that the parameters of where you allow a member to go are much looser; they're not totally loose, which is why the chair still tells me to get back to the point, but there's a lot more latitude and certainly not the time constraint.
We can have a respectful, stimulating discussion about that, but we can't do it if you and your colleagues on the government side believe that no matter what happens, at the end of that discussion it's your way or the highway, might makes right, and you can use your majority and roll over us. You don't have to be on this side for too long to realize how that would make you feel and what you might do to prevent it. Ergo, maintenant, that's why we're here. That's what all this is about. All this, whatever you want to call it, is all about whether or not we're going to continue to respect each other the way we already have in this Parliament or whether we're going to completely shift and go 180 degrees in a different direction with a different culture and a different attitude that reflects far more the regime we just left than the one that you promised to bring in.
I feel confident enough in the righteousness of that position. Having been in both government and opposition, and identifying committee work as my favourite part of being here on the Hill, I am 100% resolute that it is not in the best interest of our beloved Parliament to go against the advice of our predecessors and to go against the practice of this very committee in this very Parliament. That's the issue.
I have so many places to go, I don't know which one to choose next. I think I'm going to go to this one.
I want to introduce something new. You'll like new. I know when I do something new, you like that, because it's pretty much guaranteed to be non-repetitive, one would think, by definition.
Chair, it is more of a walk down memory lane for you. I stand to be corrected, but I believe it was on March 6 that you tabled on our behalf the 23rd report of this committee. We've issued a lot of reports. We've done a lot of work, good work, co-operative work, work that we all agree on.
This report looks just like the other one. You have to understand the similarities in what we've done before versus where we are now. Literally, those are the two reports. This is the one that I'm making reference to now; and that's the one that I've been making reference to all this evening. They're the same. It's the same work, the same product, the same template. The only thing different is the subject matter.
The other commonality is the issue of consensus. I've already read to you from this report ad nauseam, and I'll forewarn you that I'll have to make reference to it again in the future, but only as a reference, not as a speech. It's a whole new report.
Colleagues, you'll recall that I mentioned earlier—
My point then, before I move on, to summarize, is that not only are we engaged in a battle to the political death, in a war that the government picked and started, but at the end of the day, my priority—and I suspect it's that of the official opposition, but I'll let them speak for themselves—is to get us past this and get back to work. This is screwing up everybody's schedule. It's costing I don't know how much money to keep this place going so that we can have this debate.
Again, had we had a different approach, we might not be here. There are no guarantees and I'm not saying that all would have been wonderful had it gone differently, but I believe there's a really good chance, if you look at the evidence of how we've been working as a committee since we got here, that with a different approach we would be in the midst of reviewing that very document, and probably entertaining some opposition ideas and laying out our time frame. There was a suggestion that we can always meet outside our regular hours. If we were committed enough, we could do that. How much do you think we want to do that if this is going to be the way that we're treated?
Had the government approached this in a way similar to that for similar projects and undertakings, there is every possibility—only a possibility, but a distinct possibility—we'd be in very different place. The proof is that we've already done it. We'll never know. The Liberal government never gave that a chance. They just went straight for the jugular, yet we keep offering options and ideas that are not stacked in our favour, the most recent being, as I said—and I'll stop referring to it now, Chair, and move on, because I'm seeing that look—
An hon. member: Again.
Mr. David Christopherson: Yes, the most recent being, as I've said, Mr. Chrétien's proposal. How could the NDP and the Conservatives pushing a Liberal model for change be us trying to “gotcha” you? I don't know how much more fair-minded we can be than to formally put on the table between the two opposition parties a model of dealing with exactly this issue that was used by a three-time majority Liberal prime minister.
In the eyes of the public, it has to be getting difficult for the government to convince people that we're playing some kind of game, especially given the fact that we didn't start it. Our intent, though, if we're going to turn into that “us and them”, is that we'll finish it. If this doesn't get resolved and we keep wasting money and wasting time debating 24-7 because having a filibuster inside the regular committee hours wasn't a good enough fight for this government, and they wanted to have the nuclear war, where you're a 24-7 filibuster or nothing.... The Liberal government did that, not us.
At some point, we're going to stop trying to help you get out of your own mess when you won't even stop digging, because the first rule when you're in a deep hole is to stop digging. You guys keep digging and we keep offering you ways to get out. Eventually, that's going to evaporate. Quite frankly, we're running out of ideas, since we're the only ones who are trying to be creative over here. With the Trudeau Liberals, so far on this issue, it's their way or the highway.
I was working my way through this document. I talked about the parallel debating chamber, and some of the discussions around that, but again, I was pointing out—and I'll leave this now—that because of the goodwill that existed.... I remember the discussion we had about this because, again, I had a particular interest in it. We meant it when we said that we may revisit this topic because it has some great ideas, that it may have some potential for giving backbenchers more of an opportunity to play a role. Every one of us agrees with that.
You wouldn't get that in a government-dictated report, because it would be meaningless. You might just as well say that the opposition will do whatever we make them do. Because of the kind of environment we have and the respect that exists, we put in that sort of thing to show that as a group this thing had some potential, and we wouldn't mind revisiting it to see if we can't tease that out a little further and come up with a viable new idea that might provide backbenchers with a greater opportunity to participate than now exists.
Moving on, I would draw another example from this report, Chair:
The Committee has no recommendations to make at this time regarding the implementation of proxy voting or electronic voting; it may revisit this topic in further study.
Again, to go to where Madam was, that may have led ultimately to a big crash coming, a slow-motion train wreck. We don't know.
As someone who was part of this, I can tell you that when we had the discussion, we exchanged some ideas on it and we said that we'd revisit this thing, because there are implications beyond whether or not you just like the idea. A lot of that has to do with going back to the lessons we learned from talking about the family-friendly Parliament and how it is a huge deal to come here just to vote, because we know one of the standards that we're measured by, unfair as it is, is how often you vote.
By the way, they should be looking at anybody who has a perfect voting record, because it does speak to what they aren't doing. Do they never go anywhere? Do they never do anything else? Is that the only thing that matters so that artificial number looks good?
Nonetheless, that aside, it is a real issue. A lot of people travel a long way and have some good arguments about why there ought to be some form of voting other than physically schlepping across the continent. A lot of us can give good reasons for why it's been like that and why that works, but nonetheless, there were valid points on all sides. Although we couldn't come to an agreement, we were sincere when we said that we may revisit this. If we weren't, we wouldn't have put it in. Nobody was forcing anything down anybody's throat; this wasn't foie gras. This is exactly what it says: that we may revisit it in the future.
I'll continue. This is always interesting:
The Committee has no recommendations to make at this time regarding decorum in the House. It does note, however, that a purpose of this study was to identify and remove barriers to attracting and retaining a broader spectrum of Canadians as members of Parliament. The committee, as such, may revisit this topic in a further study.
Again, that's not about deferring it to some la-la time. We recognized in our work plan, at least notionally, that we were going to come back to this stuff, if for no other reason than the members who cared about a lot of these things and who didn't see recommended changes in here weren't going to go away. They were going to keep advocating, and this is the place where we deal with this issue. We were going to be seized of this again one way or another, but in wording it this way we're being respectful of the fact that there are real issues here.
Again, it wouldn't be worded like that in a government-dictated report. If it were, that kind of thing would have been attacked for making the report resemble something it is not, which is a work of collaboration. In this case, we're all prepared to back up every word in here.
Again, Madam didn't agree with all of it and wished there were more in there. I understand that, but at the end of the day, I think that's a good sign of compromise. There was stuff in there that I didn't agree with and things that I'd like to have seen changed, but what really mattered was that we were willing to make those recommendations on the matters we did agree on. We put them in a report and we sent it off to the House, so at least where we do agree, we were willing to have it go somewhere and be of some use, as opposed to this.
I won't say anything about this one, but I'm going to read it for you. It's totally self-explanatory. It's from the report:
The Committee is interested in providing flexibility to members who are in the late stages of pregnancy, new mothers or parents, or who serve as primary caregivers. The Committee, however, does not have any recommendations regarding this matter at this time; it intends to revisit this topic in further study.
On that one, I'll just say this. Because of its importance, and because we heard from colleagues who made very sincere and heartfelt presentations to us about it, even though we couldn't come to agreement—yet—we not only used the respectful language that we used earlier in saying that we would revisit this, but we bumped it up to make this part say that the committee “intends to revisit this topic in further study”. Again, this is not the sort of language a government would use in a government-dictated report, because it would be laughable.
In concluding on this report, Chair, I would reference the fifth paragraph from the bottom, just above your signature. It has to do with the travel point system, just to give it context. The travel point system is the “current system” reference here. It reads:
The Committee would appreciate if the Board of Internal Economy could examine possible approaches to amending the current system with a view to encouraging members’ spouses and children to make use of travel points to visit their spouse or parent. The Committee suggests the Board consider blending the points allotted to designated travellers with those allotted to dependants. The Board might also consider creating a “family travel point” that could be utilized by a member’s whole family, regardless of its size.
You might wonder what would give rise to that kind of recommendation. Again, I won't go into any names or details, but in the real-world politics of where we are, the media, in their capacity of holding us all to account, report every year how much we all spend on travel. There are some members who have bigger families and a greater distance to travel.
I live in Hamilton. There's my wife Denise and me. Our daughter is 25 and off on her own. She just graduated from university, and she's off and living her full life. There are just the two of us, and it's Hamilton. When Denise comes here—it's not that frequent, because she's busy with her job as the CEO of the YWCA in Hamilton—it's not very far, it's not as costly, and there's only her. If it were a spouse with two or three kids who was from one of the far western reaches, the same number of visits would show a much larger dollar figure.
I will tell you this. It was the spouse of a member who made the point that they deliberately don't travel as often as they would like to do to be with the member as a spouse and partner and as a parent because of the politics of the reporting mechanism. I've never had to think about that. Up until recently, Kayla, my daughter, qualified for the travel. Whenever she travelled, I was just thrilled that she had a chance to be here in the capital with Denise and me. I never once had to think about how it was going to look back home, because it was two or three times a year at most.
A plane ticket from here to Hamilton, , is a very different plane ticket from one from here to Vancouver or Calgary. That's not even talking about those who go west and then north, like our chair, who did not make presentations. None of this is about him, but I think it's fair to say that, if you looked at the life that our chair has to live, this issue could come into play a lot more. If the chair were bringing three or four kids as frequently as many of us do from Toronto, say, or the Niagara Peninsula, where it's a non-issue for us, it would be a huge political issue for him. Once a year, they get this great big number, and of course people start thinking, “Oh yeah, there you go, living high on the hog on my tax dime.”
What's unfair is that we don't have to go through it. They might compare my travel to 's, or compare us to 's or to that o fother colleagues in the Hamilton area. That's the worst that it gets. In all my time, in the almost 15 years that I've been here, I don't think any one of us has been out of whack, and from Hamilton it's been a mixture of Liberals, NDP members, and Conservatives since I've been around.
I have to tell you: my heart broke. All I could think of was some five- or six-year-old who wants to be with mom or dad. We provide that means. One of the things that impressed me so much, coming from Queen's Park, was the amount of consideration that was given to family. It was greater than it was at Queen's Park. I appreciated it. Again, it didn't affect me in a big way, because I'm not that far and I don't have a big immediate family, but I appreciated that I was in a place where we have more respect, consideration, and sensitivity around the fact that, in addition to being MPs, we are still people.
When we leave office, we go back to being just people from whence we came. When I heard—in this case, from a mom—that there were deliberate trips when ordinarily they would have come to see dad.... Again, very rarely do I have to stay all weekend because of something I do in Ottawa. I'm so close to Hamilton I can usually get home—not always— and if I'm travelling or speaking, that's different. I know that there are members from the west, the north, and the east who will come here and, just out of self-preservation, stay for weekends.
On Monday morning or Monday afternoon, you can tell in my caucus who's from B.C.—I don't know about the rest of you—because their eyeballs are like this.... A lot of them come in on the red-eye. Not only that, they live in two different time zones. They live in this time zone, but they deal with their constituents, their family, and their office in a completely different time zone. I get all upset when I have to go to Africa and it buggers me up for about 10 days. These folks live like that all the time.
When I heard that, really, all I could think of was that a little five- or six-year-old wanted nothing more than to be with their dad, that we have the rules that provide it, and that they deliberately didn't go because of the reporting mechanism we have. Because of the nature of our dialogue—nobody was standing over us with a hammer saying “we're just about done this” and we were all treated equally—we framed it that way. The reason I know this is that I was the one who made that suggestion. I wanted to see something done. It wasn't right. Never once did my daughter not come to Ottawa because dad had to worry about the politics, yet there are other members whose kids do not come to see their parents because of the politics. That's not right. That's not fair.
We weren't able to completely revise the whole travel system. It's a big undertaking. It's complex. We have public staff whose full-time job is to deal with that one single part of our life, which is the travel we do. Given the fact that we were working together and that we did consider what was being said, we didn't have to worry about the politics of the day.
I'm going from memory, but I think when I threw that suggestion out there, it was one of the Liberal members who said that maybe we could send something to the Board of Internal Economy to bring it to their attention and ask them to take a look at it. I think that's how it unfolded. That's how this got here. That wouldn't have happened if it had been a government-dictated report; I would not have been in that mindset in which I didn't have to worry about the politics of the room. As it was, I could worry about what my colleagues and their families were saying as witnesses. I could take that into my heart. I could work on it and try to find a solution, knowing that I had a government in the majority that was at least willing to entertain these ideas. That's why it worked.
The process we're under now is not going to allow that, and it's unfortunate, because we could very well be in a different place. I'm hoping we still end up in another place, because if this doesn't work.... Really, the only way we can get out of this if we don't find common cause, as in referencing the Chrétien model or a couple of other suggestions that have been sent through Mr. , if we don't find some way to positively segue this committee into some actual positive work, what we're going to end up with is—however this ends ultimately—that the government either has to do a full 100% surrender or turn its guns on us and use 100% of its majority to run right over us. That's where we are.
Our preference, as you can see by the fact that this letter was just made public today.... It's not like I'm talking old politics and new stuff has taken over. It was this afternoon that this letter was drafted and signed by the and the offering the government.... Imagine that: we're the ones offering the government a solution out of a mess that they made.
That's what this does, and it provides a model that was good enough for Mr. Chrétien, who had his challenges in getting things through the House, as every government does. It's just that not every government is willing to change those rules by unilateral action. It's the last thing we expected from a government that had promised sunny ways, respect, and “meaningful” committee engagement.
This is pretty much the antithesis of that. Again, what's maddening is why. I could see it if there were a path where this was going to work. I could even see how you pulled together the first strategic plan. As vicious as it was, these things happen. I get it. No problem. If that had worked, you'd be okay, but when it failed, you should have.... Again, it failed. That didn't work. By the end of the week, we were starting to get the attention of Canadians, the media, and pundits, and there was a lot of support out there. I'm going to start reflecting that when I reassume the floor tomorrow morning at nine o'clock.
What happened, Chair, was that when you suspended on Friday—and I'm going to leave some parts out because we just don't need them—and said that we would reconvene a week Monday at noon, I thought, okay, the government tried their gambit, and I understand that. I'm angry at what they tried to do, I thought, but at least I understand what they tried to do. It failed, and they can see it turning now, and what they want to do now is give themselves a week to figure out how to get off this position and get this whole thing turned around.
Quite frankly, other than talking to —on Wednesday, I think, he and I chatted for a while—I really didn't think about this much. If anything, I was expecting maybe a contact from my , who would want to talk to me as we were formulating our plans moving forward. I would have been part of that. Both as a member of this committee and as the chair of our planning and priorities committee, I would have been consulted before anything would be locked in. Other than maybe half expecting that I would hear from , I didn't think about it. I thought, okay, the government tried something, nasty as it was, but it didn't work and they know that. They were smart enough not to live through a week of criticism for no reason when they know that when they come back they're going to be trying to get out of this mess.
It made every good sense to me that the adjournment happened and that the government bought themselves a week. Man, when you're in government, a week to think about something is a gift. That's a gift from heaven. You don't normally get that long, especially when new stuff comes up. You have a lot of time to think about what you thought of, but what's that old saying...? I can't remember the exact context, but it has to do with what it is that trips governments up. The answer is, “Events, my dear boy, events.” That's what happens. Eighty per cent of the time you're in government, you're dealing with issues that you never really paid a lot of attention to when you were in opposition, because the problem didn't exist.
Chair, you're either saying “Hi”, or I have five minutes.
:
You know, Chair, I keep giving these guys all this advice, and....
My extrapolation is that not long after we didn't follow up on that major platform promise, as I'm indicating to the government, guess what happened? We weren't the government anymore. That's what happened. I had to sit exactly where my friends are, except I couldn't even say I wasn't there; I was in the getaway car.
When the Cons of the day—Mike Harris' Cons, my first experience of that kind of change—
An hon. member: Hear, hear!
Mr. David Christopherson: Yes, my friend would like that. There is a point at which you and I will honestly separate, and that's why democracy is so wonderful: to allow us to do that.
I had to learn. That's why I'm passing on this free.... I have the scars to show how I learned this. When the new government comes in, for the longest time you're going to be elbowed, you're going to be reminded, because it's the comparison that makes the case. Over time I learned to stop being so sensitive about it, certainly stopped defending every little attack, and stopped owning it. As people took their shots, I wished I'd had a BlackBerry then: it would have been easier to disappear into, but as I said, suddenly there were very important documents that needed very close attention, and that's all I looked at until it was done. I waited until it was done and then I came back.
That's how I got through it. I strongly urge my colleagues to do that in the Conservative caucus, especially those of you who weren't here. Every time you say something, you take a piece of ownership of it. Don't do that. You still have lots of room to take credit for the things you want to brag about that the previous government did and, when there's any criticism flying around, get your head down. There's nothing to gain in defending a majority government that just went down in flames. In this matter I know whereof I speak, truly.
We shall, then, continue.
while we don't endorse the opposition
I keep repeating that part. I keep doing that, and it's not good.
While we don't endorse the opposition's histrionics, we do share its cynicism regarding the government's proposals. Some of them are clearly designed to make life easier for a majority government. And that is unacceptable.
Keep in mind the changes they want to make.
We haven't reached the part where there's a reference to the fact that the changes they want to make, they want to make unilaterally.
Any majority government like Mr. Trudeau's controls the House of Commons, which means it holds almost all the parliamentary marbles. It can pass the bills it wants, and cut off debate when it suits it. It typically also uses its majority to control committees, further ensuring that little gets in the way of its legislative agenda.
Again, Chair, I harken back to the fact that in two instances this committee acquiesced to the request of the government that we focus on something that was important to it. We did so willingly. The first time—and again I won't go to great lengths, but you'll recall—the former government House leader, , came here and very respectfully laid out his case, laid out what his government was looking for and asked us to join in making it a priority, and spelled out some of the things they were hoping our committee could achieve.
Within days, we were doing that work, resulting in a report that we all supported, which went to the House. You, Chair, presented it to the House on our behalf. That was without the government having to use power once—nothing. It didn't even have to look askance. It didn't even have to hint that if we didn't do what it wanted, there was going to be trouble. There was none of that. I was there.
I've been on this committee in other parliaments. I know the difference, and I know you do, Chair. Normally when a majority government, a new government, especially when it's a big change, comes in, there is some recognition on the part of the opposition that it won the election. We get reminded of that only 60 seconds of every minute.
To hear some of the government members tell it, you would think our purpose in being here is just to disrupt everything they want to do. Yet I can point to consistent evidence that we have done exactly the opposite, that this committee has worked well together even to the point where we're in this pitched battle, and yet Mr. Reid and you and everybody else was doing what they could shuffling around, coughing, looking at their shoes, to give me an opportunity to get in from the traffic and get in my place. That's how much residual goodwill exists in this committee. Even in this kind of environment that decency is still there. It gives you just a little bit of an idea of how effective we can be when we're all working together.
We've done some good work. I asked last night, and I ask again, if anybody can show me where this committee has been anything other than positive and moving forward and trying to work in tandem with the government, other than on Bill when it dropped that on the floor. I won't revisit that in detail, but you will recall, Chair, that it disrupted all the work we were doing because it was disrespectful of the committee's work. It basically made it a make-work project. It tabled a bill without waiting for our input into it.
This government promised that committees were going to matter, that it was going to respect them, and it was going to respect their input. I can't think of a better example than to reinforce the fact that within days—not motions, and squabbling, and off to the subcommittee, and fighting there, and taking forever, and us not wanting to give the government the benefit of succeeding at implementing its agenda—none of that was there. The evidence is in what we did. I will stand by the evidence that has to be there in Hansard to show how we approached this.
That's what the government can achieve just by asking. That's before we even get to the all but omnipotent powers of a majority government in the Canadian parliamentary system.
When The Globe and Mail makes reference to it having its majority on committees further ensuring that little gets in the way of its legislative agenda, that's again at the point where it has to actually use that power to force the opposition to follow in a direction it doesn't want to go.
Such was the goodwill on this committee. None of that was needed. In fact, we were quite pleased to do the work, because it did reflect some of the values and priorities coming out of the NDP caucus and, I suspect, also out of the Conservatives. We had lots of good reasons to want to do it, but my point in saying that is to show that when this committee, because of the nature of the work we do, is in non-partisan mode, which is probably 80% to 90% of the time, we do good work.
When The Globe and Mail makes reference to the amount of control that a government has at committee, that's before we even get to the part where it can get things done just by asking nicely.
An hon member: That's a strategy, asking nicely.
Mr. David Christopherson: That would be something new, wouldn't it, asking nicely?
I had pointed out why the new House leader came in with a whole different approach, dropping things out of the blue, followed up by motions related to a discussion paper that virtually tie the hands of the opposition 100%. There was no discussion with House leaders, just the exact opposite. Supposedly going from the old government House leader to the new government House leader was going to be an improvement. I guess in some ways it was to the extent that she didn't bring in M-6. She brought in this, another wolf in sheep's clothing.
It goes on, Mr. Chair.
Afterwards it says,
It typically also uses its majority to control committees, further ensuring that little gets in the way of its legislative agenda.
There is little except its own conscience, and its fear of voters in the next election, to stop a majority government from doing what it wants. Which is where the opposition parties come in.
This is a parliamentary system, not a congressional system.
They can prick the conscience of the Prime Minister and his cabinet in Question Period, which is well covered by the media and will often generate unflattering headlines for the government.
And as legislation moves through Parliament, opposition members can question, delay and filibuster in the House and on committees, and thereby force the government to use its majority to curtail debate in a unilateral fashion, which never looks good to the public.
This is standard procedure in parliaments everywhere. It is not always pretty, but it helps keep governments accountable. Mr. Trudeau, however, thinks it’s all a nuisance.
It's not the NDP that said that. It's not even the Progressive—pardon me, the Conservatives. That really was a mistake. It's not the Cons. It's The Globe and Mail. Its observation is that Mr. Trudeau, the Prime Minister, thinks it's all a nuisance. That's its interpretation of what Mr. Trudeau's opinion is of the House and committees. That didn't take long.
I'll go back to the editorial, Mr. Chair.
His government considers the opposition’s limited arsenal
—which, by the way, it's trying to limit even more in its discussion paper—
to be “tactics which seek only to undermine and devalue the important work of Parliament,” and which “sow dysfunction” and are not “rational” or “defensible,” according to a discussion paper it released on its proposed changes last month.
Those contentions are cynical bunk.
Oh, how I wish I had been able to deliver those kinds of quotes, but then, they probably would have sounded a bit over the top, both because of the way I would do it because that's just what I do—
:
It's what I do; I can't help myself, but also just because it would be sort of expected. Instead,
The Globe and Mail editorial, commenting on the government's view of our response to its discussion paper, is that, “Those contentions are cynical bunk.” I love it: “bunk”.
The Trudeau government is hawking a utopian vision of Parliament, in which members from different parties politely discuss the government’s proposed legislation on a schedule set by mutual agreement, and there are cheers all around when the House enacts laws that are a perfect reflection of the selfless compromises agreed to in a collegial fashion on committees and in the House.
I will say this much, though: the Liberal government's actions certainly have the NDP and the Conservatives as close to a utopian arrangement as we ever thought would exist in terms of how well we're working together to defend our collective rights, as little as they are now, from being further eroded.
And obviously they're being very sarcastic.
It is interesting how, when we are working well together, in the same way as at the public accounts committee, it almost does reflect that. And it does happen, and it did happen, and was happening in this committee while we were dealing with exactly this subject in two different studies.
I just got the hook from the chair. You saw that, too, eh? You're waiting to see how quickly I came to heel. It was really quickly, because I do know where the power is.
Moving on:
In this paradise of reason, the government has no hidden agenda and never tables politically motivated bills that are deeply flawed. There are no Fair Elections Acts, no bills reducing citizens’ privacy in the name of fighting terrorism–and no blatant partisanship of any kind. There are just sunny ways passing beneath crisp rainbows.
Sometimes, I have to tell you, the gives the impression that he really does see some things that way, but that's just a personal observation. It's not meant to take away from his obvious other skills, or he wouldn't be where he is right now, in New York as the Prime Minister of the country talking to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
However, these are interesting observations nonetheless.
It continues:
It would be very convenient for Mr. Trudeau if he could fool Canadians into thinking that Parliament needs a “recalibration of the rules to balance the desire of the minority’s right to be heard with the majority’s duty to pass its legislative agenda,” another line from the government’s discussion paper.
I love “bunk”. That's a great word for speech-making. It's perfect: bunk. I love it.
But this, too, is bunk. Is the Prime Minister really saying that there is an imbalance in favour of the opposition that is preventing his government from doing its “duty”? That the chips are stacked against him? If so, he’s being absurd.
Again, it's The Globe and Mail. They often try to be the grown-up in the room.
Look at the language it's using. Not us, although I would have loved to have some of that language. It's The Globe and Mail, and it's speaking on an issue in which the government is trying to frame what it wants as motherhood and modernization.
Mr. Alexandre Boulerice: It's a key word, modernization.
Mr. David Christopherson: That's it's buzzword. It covers a lot of political sins.
It continues:
But this, too, is bunk. Is the Prime Minister really saying that there is an imbalance in favour of the opposition that is preventing his government from doing its “duty”? That the chips are stacked against him? If so, he's being absurd.
For the record, the government's proposals include one to limit committee members' interventions to 10 minutes—an obvious attempt to reduce the opposition's ability to make a public display of its dissent by filibustering during hearings.
Sound familiar? Because that's exactly where we are right now. Fast-forward, if the government got its way a year from now, and it was doing something else that was denounced just as strongly as The Globe and Mail does here, there would not be the ability to do what we're doing now, which is to hold up the government.
That's it. We're not defeating it. We're not limiting its exercise of power in any other way, other than exercising—and remember, it's the government that made this a 24-7 filibuster instead of just a little mini-buster like what we have at committee, where you meet twice a week. The hours of this committee are 11 o'clock to 1 o'clock. If this had followed the way Mr. Reid and I thought it was going to go, we would still possibly be filibustering if we were still at this same impasse, but it would only be happening on Tuesday and Thursday between 11 o'clock and 1 o'clock, which is the regularly scheduled time of this committee.
That happens all the time on the Hill. There are something like 26 committees here, and I believe—I stand to be corrected—nine committee rooms. There are more meetings going on at any given time, and I guarantee you that during the course of a week there is at least one, if not half a dozen, threats or indications that if the government doesn't start getting a little more reasonable it may find itself in a filibuster situation. That threat or the mere hint that it may happen is often enough to prevent a logjam, and away we go.
Lastly, the ability to speak until you're done is not just about filibustering and doing the histrionics that I'm doing right now.
An hon. member: Fair enough. That's a fair comment.
Mr. David Christopherson: Not just that would be lost. One of the things we pride ourselves on is that no matter how limited we are in the House, when we come to committee, there's latitude from the chair. Often we call each other by first names when we're moving really quickly on issues and getting along, and there's a lot more latitude in creeping a little further away from the subject, as opposed to the rigidness in the House. There are still limitations, as the chair reminds me during the course of my filibuster.
It is also a matter of knowing that you can go to committee and unpack an issue. I talked about water quality being a big issue for Hamilton, and about the environment in Hamilton Harbour, not Burlington Bay. We have that eternal battle with our neighbours.
Partly because I like to talk—again, that's a fair criticism, and I accept it—but more importantly, often it's a matter, when you get to committee.... Many times on bills in the House, we don't even get a chance to speak, because there aren't that many speaking slots. There are 338 of us, and it's just not always possible for everyone who wants to speak on an item to do so, given the limited time, relatively speaking, that it's in the House .
That is offset by the fact that we can come to committee, and we can set up all our arguments, and we can dissect step by step the bill, the motion, or the matter that's in front of us and take the time to reflect in detail on the issues that our constituents care about and the perspective that they have on this issue that is important to their quality of life. Most of us accept that that's a fair trade-off, that we're limited in the House just for practical reasons and due to the laws of physics. There is only so much time. But at committee we have that opportunity.
During my time, if a government member wants to say, “Dave, can I just stop you for a second on that one? Can we delve into that a bit? We see that differently. Your version of that and how it affects your constituents is not the way we see it.”
I'm going to be like, “Sure. What have I got to lose? Nothing. What have I got to gain? Lots.” I have a government member who is listening to what I have to say, who cares about the perspective that I'm bringing on behalf of the people of Hamilton Centre, and they want to make sure that I'm understanding this correctly, or they want to ask questions or make queries about my position. I'm quite willing, Chair. It's very rare that we deny a colleague the opportunity to have the floor as an interruption to our presentation, because I know it's not coming off my time because my time is unlimited. We will be seized with me dealing with this issue until I'm done. Then my colleague from either the Conservatives, the Liberals, or my own caucus will then have an opportunity, and I will respectfully listen to them as they take the time to make the case and break down the issues that affect their constituents. That also would be lost if we had ten-minute time limits.
Other than favouring the government's ability to whiz things through committee more quickly and to have an absolute guarantee of when legislation will be through the House, that's their only justification. That's what this editorial is saying, that if you're making the case that the opposition has too much power, and you're not able to get things through, that doesn't wash. To the best of my knowledge, the right to speak your mind at committee without facing closure or the guillotine, as it's referred to in some parliamentary settings.... You have the right to speak your mind. Isn't that the fundamental right that we all believe we have as MPs?
To that degree, we are all sovereign to the extent that each one of us got here the same way, as flawed as it was: first past the post. We should have proportional representation, but the system is what the system is, and we all got here the same way. As far as I know, since the beginning, at committee, members have had the right to say their piece.
Continuing with the editorial, Chair:
For the record, the government's proposal includes one to limit committee members' interventions to 10 minutes—an obvious attempt to reduce the opposition's ability to make a public display of its dissent by filibustering during hearings.
I just pointed out some of the other things that would be lost if we had an arbitrary 10-minute limitation on what we can say at committee. Even if we can get on the list and go over and over, that's not the same thing.
It continues:
Another one is to implement “programming” motions in which the opposition and government jointly fix the time for debate on bills. This move would allow the government to avoid the stigma of imposing time-allocation motions unilaterally.
Another proposal is for Parliament to adopt Britain's famous Prime Minister's Questions, in which the PM stands in the crosshairs for 30 minutes on Wednesdays taking questions from opposition party leaders. Doing so could well lead to Mr. Trudeau attending only the one Question Period per week, and to diminishing the media's interest in the days he skips....
which we see a lot of, in terms of there not being the attention when the is not here, and he's not here more and more.
further weakening government accountability.
Now, again—to stay timely—we had that yesterday, where the de facto created the prime minister's question period by being the one who stood up and answered every question on a Wednesday. Cute!
The salient point is that not a single rule had to be changed. I won't go long on this, but I've heard an argument—I think it was from one of the committee members, or I might have read it—from a government member, saying that this is such a great idea that we should entrench this wonderful benefit for future parliaments, so that all prime ministers have to do this. Come along. Come along. That doesn't make any practical sense.
It was one of their best arguments for wanting the ability to make changes, and they found a way around it without changing a single rule, so it would seem that now Wednesdays are the question period. Okay, fine, as long as he's here the other days, too, not all of them, as the has responsibilities, but more than just one day.
To continue:
There are some useful ideas in the government's discussion paper, but they pale in the face of the Liberals' desire to make the life of a majority government even easier.
Somehow, and I'm not sure how, Mr. Chrétien managed three majority governments with these rules, and he managed to pass enough legislation to go back to the people and say, here's what I did with the mandate you gave me. Not to mention that the current father was able to repatriate the Constitution and bring in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for which he will forever be remembered as a critically important prime minister, at the very least, in the history of our country. Pierre Elliott Trudeau managed to do all of that with all of these obstructionist rules that exist on the part of the opposition. In fact, he probably had even less.
All those governments—Liberal governments—managed to survive the horrible threat to democracy that filibusters represent by every day, step by step, smothering real democracy and denying the majority government of the day the right to implement the mandate that it was elected to carry out.
Somehow, in the face of all that opposition power and obstructionism, it still managed to repatriate the entire Constitution. But those rules aren't good enough for this government. Maybe those previous Liberal governments had to work far harder than this government wants to, or maybe the nuisance factor has just grown over time, in terms of how the government—the Liberal government—perceives the opposition.
It becomes hard to believe, or pretty thin gruel for the government to argue, that they have to have these rules because the unco-operative opposition is using all the massive powers it has to thwart the will of a duly elected Liberal majority government, or that at the very least it sees a way, as a majority government, to find it, as The Globe and Mail puts it, “even easier” to govern.
That is what the parliamentary system is mostly about, of course: to make sure that the governing party has the easiest possible way in its time in government. We all know that's why Parliament exists: to make life easy for the government.
Of course, that's nonsensical.
To continue:
It is also disillusioning to discover that the Liberals have this all so backward. The imbalance in Canada’s Parliament is weighted entirely in favour of a majority government and its legislative agenda, not the other way around, as Mr. Trudeau’s party absurdly claims.
It's not just “claims” or “alleges”. These are wordsmiths.
We like to think of ourselves as wordsmiths. I would think that if ever anybody deserves the title—I would defer to Mr. Reid and his knowledge in these areas—or if ever there was an appropriate application of the word and the title wordsmith, it would be the editorialists for The Globe and Mail. In other words, they don't throw around words lightly. Their business is words and the meaning of words. They choose those words carefully. I suspect that sometimes they will even consult with each other to make sure that of all the English words available they find the one that is most applicable, in the greatest detail, to the point they want to make in a sentence.
I think it's important to note that they went, I would say, out of their way to put in the word “absurdly” because it is absurd to suggest that Parliament is skewed in favour of the opposition. You can hardly get the sentence out without bursting out laughing. Remember, this is The Globe and Mail using the word “absurdly”.
To continue:
That's because MPs, who were once elected to form governments, and oversee them, now mostly serve the wishes of their parties.
Again, Chair, I've enjoyed many interactions with Mr. Reid, who has a wealth of knowledge on the history of our Parliament and parliaments in general, and of political science. He's a very learned man. I enjoy the interactions.
It wasn't that long ago, I remember, that we were having a discussion about this very point, about how far away we have gotten from the concept of what a parliamentary democracy is really meant to be.
I'll just quickly hearken back to one prime example, and that is that in the Province of Ontario, back in the day, it was so fundamental that, when you elected a member of the provincial legislature, they were your representative. It was their job to represent you in the Parliament, and, collectively, they would form and exercise the powers that were given by the Constitution. That connection between the elected person and constituents was so strong and so well understood. If you were invited by the premier to join the executive council, the cabinet, meaning the crown, you had to resign your seat. Then you had to run again in the riding and get permission for your top priority to no longer be your constituents but the oath and duty you have in your obligations as a minister. That sounds almost like a different country in terms of that relationship, but when you go to the fundamental—
:
Just remember that you get the whole package. You can't cherry-pick the parts that you like, as few as they might be.
To continue:
Canadians embraced Trudeau’s positive vision and took hope from early signals. His openness...is a clear improvement over his predecessor. The un-muzzling of government scientists and the restoration of the long-form census, too, were steps in the right direction.
That's true. It goes on:
But in other important ways, the prime minister is falling short. His delays on access-to-information reforms, his stubborn reliance on cash-for-access fundraisers, his bogus promise of “open” nominations, his electoral-reform charade—all of these weaken democracy. The potential proposals for procedural reform would, on balance, do the same.
It means that they would “weaken democracy”.
Chair, you'll be pleased to know that we're at the last paragraph of this editorial.
An hon. member: More, more.
Mr. David Christopherson: It concludes:
The spike in public trust that Trudeau brought with him to Ottawa provides a great opportunity for a government with ambitions for an active role. But it also carries a risk. We are seeing in America and elsewhere what can happen when hope turns to cynicism.
You'd almost think I was reading an editorial from a House organ of the NDP. Wow. Those are your buddies...?
I have something new. I know you like new stuff, because that means I'm not repeating.
Who doesn't like listening to and hearing from Andrew Coyne? I thought there might be some people who would shout it out, but....
He's a fascinating guy. I always appreciate his honesty when he's on At Issue. You never know for sure: “boilerplate arguments are not us” would be one way to describe Mr. Coyne. You're never really sure ahead of time where he's going to go. My impression is that he's constantly trying to remove biases and be as fair-minded as possible in his approach and analysis, which is why people listen to what he has to say. Clearly, it's from a small-c conservative perspective.
The lenses he uses often have him arriving at opinions that certainly I didn't expect. Whether I agree or disagree, oftentimes I'm caught off guard. Nobody can ever accuse Mr. Coyne of being anybody's or anything's mouthpiece. We know that democracy is something very close to him. He of course is an advocate for proportional representation, from a conservative perspective, I would say, for the simple reason that it's hard to defend first past the post as being fair.
That's why the current Liberal government ran on a platform to get rid of it. They didn't commit to proportional representation. In fact, what they hoped was that they were going to get the ranked balloting system. They did everything they could to cook the books so that would be the outcome, but nobody was biting. Everybody knew that if they rammed that through, it was further evidence of them trying to fix the system in their favour. We know that it likely would have led to far more majority Liberal governments than any other outcome.
Mr. Coyne is one of those who is a fervent—I think I can use that word—supporter and proponent of proportional representation. On March 27.... No, he got into this earlier yet. You have to give him a lot of credit. That was with the budget going on, and they still managed to see this, through all the smoke and attention around the budget. That really is something.
Anybody who is around here on budget day and the day before knows that the whole place is upside down. You know the budget is coming. In the lobby area, they're starting to bring in all the extra equipment and the extra sets. There's a whole lot happening, so I have to say that for anybody who's a political watcher, saw through all that, and identified something else going on in a small committee room in the basement, in Room 112 North, you have to give them their due. They're doing their job.
What did the ever-interesting and respected Mr. Coyne have to say about this subject?
Now, we all know that the journalists—the authors—don't write the headlines. The headlines are done by editorial people, and they're part of the management. In many cases, the headlines reflect the most attractive aspect they can capture in terms of conveying a message. Oftentimes, too, it's just for cleverness. They must have competitions in the world where people get credit for interesting, unique, and creative headlines.
In this case, it says, “Andrew Coyne: Renewed attempt to rewrite House rules confirms Liberals are not to be trusted”. It has to hurt just to hear that.
Chair, this article reads as follows:
The 18 months of the Trudeau government have been an education in cynicism. Every time you think you have plumbed the depths, every time you believe you have pierced the many veils of their duplicity, you are delighted to discover still another con wrapped inside the last—usually delivered by some smiling minister tweeting variations on “Better is Always Possible” and “Diversity is Our Strength.”
The Harper government never bothered to pretend they were anything other than grimly determined power-seekers, realists of the Don’t Get Your Hopes Up, This Is As Good As It’s Going to Get school. The...Liberals went to some lengths to emphasize they were something different—as if a rare window had been opened for a new kind of politics, whether by the Harper government’s excesses, or the changing of the generations, or the sheer dynastic appeal of the Hippie King. But of course the idealism was just a newer, slicker con, or perhaps an older, slicker one: Trudeau as Kennedy to Harper’s Nixon.
The latest chance to refresh our acquaintance with how deeply cynical the Trudeau people are—not have become: are—is the clutch of grubby expedients the government is now trying to stuff down the opposition’s throats, in the name, prettily, of “parliamentary reform.”
“Prettily”: you've got to love it. That's quite a sentence:
The latest chance to refresh our acquaintance with how deeply cynical the Trudeau people are—not have become: are—is the clutch of grubby expedients the government is now trying to stuff down the opposition’s throats, in the name, prettily, of “parliamentary reform.”
It's poetry.
He continues:
Scholars of the Trudeau style will recognize the expression “reform,” like “merit-based appointments” and “evidence-based policy,” as a tell that some kind of humbug is afoot—
Isn't that great? Here we are in April and using the word “humbug”. It's just delightful. He continues:
—and this is no exception: this is no more aimed at genuine reform of parliament than the Harper government’s Fair Elections Act was aimed at making elections fair.
You would almost think that we were sharing notes with what the opposition is saying, what the Globe and Mail editorial is saying, what the Toronto Star editorial is saying, and what Mr. Andrew Coyne is saying. At some point, the government may need to realize that it's their little Johnny who's out of step. I remember the old joke. It can probably be done better than the variation that I can remember my Mom telling me, but it's something about a mother at the side of a road watching a military parade and seeing her son Johnny. Johnny is marching in a different step than everybody else, and Mom says, “Look at that: only my son is doing it right.”
No, this is not Johnny doing it right in terms of your government's one lone voice that this is the right thing to do. You really are out of step with the rest of the parade in terms of real democracy, real democratic reform, and real change.
He continues:
We had an early foretaste of this with the infamous Motion Six, when Dominic LeBlanc, that icon of new-age politics, was Government House Leader:—
I'm sorry, Dom, but that's funny. He continues, in reference to motion six, with:
a change to Commons rules that would have truncated Parliament's right to debate bills—that would, indeed, have allowed a minister or a parliament[ary] secretary to unilaterally adjourn the House—
As you'll remember, I was talking earlier about some of the powers it gave ministers. Wow. Talk about draconian. Indeed, that's what I was referencing. A minister could unilaterally adjourn the House—or a parliamentary secretary. Unilaterally adjourn the House.... That's the way King Charles wanted things to be. He liked that idea—very efficient. In a more modern context, not that he had them in his day, that kind of thinking does make the trains run on time. If you're concerned about something a little broader than just making sure the trains are on time, then you're going to have a problem with this.
The great democrats.... Yes, that's real change: we went from a democratic House to a parliamentary.... It's not that I'm putting down parliamentary secretaries. I used to be one; provincially, we called them parliamentary assistants. My first appointment was as parliamentary assistant to the Minister of Finance, and I held that position until I went into cabinet in my own right. I'm not putting down parliamentary assistants or parliamentary secretaries, but I am pointing out that they are rather low on the totem pole in terms of absolute power. Nobody ever mistook the powers of a parliamentary secretary and those of a full-line minister—nobody.
Yet this government, this sunny ways and respect Parliament Liberal government, was prepared to give parliamentary secretaries the absolute power to adjourn the House of Commons. That would have been just one part of it, Mr. Coyne says:
—while imposing severe limits on the opposition's ability to delay proceedings—had L'Affaire Elbow not intervened.
He can be very funny, can't he? He continues:
That alone ought to have signalled how sincere Trudeau's frequent protests of his devotion to democratic accountability are: as calculated, as fake—and as useful!—as his feminism.
Ouch. That leaves a mark. He says:
Well now the Liberals are back, with a new, more attack-proof House Leader, Bardish Chagger, and a new attempt to rewrite House rules in the interest of “efficiency.”
My editorial addition would be “in the interest of making the trains run on time”. He continues, Chair:
Officially it's just a “discussion paper,” but if so it's one the government seems peculiarly unwilling to discuss or even explain. Once again there are [time] limits proposed on time-honoured procedural tactics with which opposition parties might delay government business or otherwise express their unhappiness. So, too, there are new and more draconian proposals—
That's not just a word that I've used, but one that Mr. Coyne feels is aptly used in this context.
Again, Mr. , I think it's fair to say that Mr. Coyne would be one who would come under the heading of “wordsmith”: every single word matters and is thought about for its impact, and for style, but ultimately impact. He used the word “draconian”.
Again, my good friend John Baird would love to hear all this, because I used to throw the word “draconian” around when it was Mike Harris I was facing. I'd had experience, before Harper arrived, in dealing with right-wing autocrats. Anyway, I was forever using “draconian”, and John would have great fun with that in different contexts.
I'll move along. He says:
So, too, there are new and more draconian proposals to limit debate and scrutiny of government business, with fixed numbers of days set for each stage of a bill's progress through the House—thus sparing the government the unpleasant necessity of passing a motion to curtail debate—limits on speeches in committee—
I have gone on about that ad nauseam, at great length. The chair is nodding his head, because he has to sit here through all of that. It continues:
—and the elimination of Friday sittings.
Other proposals are more in the nature of missed opportunities. As in the British Parliament, there is a proposal that one day of question period each week be reserved for questions to the prime minister, which would be more worthy of praise if this were in addition to his regular daily question period appearances and not, as seems strongly probable, in place of them.
Chair, again it deserves focus that virtually every comment from every opposition member, from the Globe editorial, from the Toronto Star editorial, and now the comments of Mr. Coyne, mentions that whether or not using Wednesday for the Prime Minister to answer all the questions is a good idea or a bad idea is in large part dictated by whether or not we can expect that it will be the only time the Prime Minister is going to show up, in which case there would be a huge net gain for the government, with no more of that pesky, time-wasting effort of getting ready for question period every day.
Again, I get it. Question period wasn't exactly my favourite time of the day when I was a minister, that's for sure. I can remember that the sweetest sound that I could hear was at some time in June, when the Speaker would say that “the House now rises until September” sometime. It was like, “Ah, great.” That's the best time in being a cabinet minister: when you don't have that pesky question period. You don't have to spend all that time preparing. You don't have to deal with all the messy parts of your portfolio. You don't have to go through the stress of the follow-up scrums, which are often tougher than the actual questions in the House. There, all you have to do there is answer and sit down. It's not so easy in a scrum.
It was always a sweet sound: this House now does rise for the summer until.... You would have two months of governing without that pesky House and that pesky question period. I got a lot more done. My day was far more productive because I didn't have to carve out anywhere from three-quarters of an hour to two hours getting ready for question period.
Given the ministries that I had, which were Solicitor General and Corrections, meaning all police, all fire, all emergency services, and all the jails, and probation and parole, and, and, and.... They are the stuff of great headlines. You know the saying, “If it bleeds, it leads.” I can't tell you how many times I was the focus of the lead-off question from the official opposition and then from Mr. Harris, who was the leader of the third party. If that wasn't enough fun, Senator Runciman, over in the other place here, used to be my critic in that place, and if you've ever had Bob Runciman come at you, then you know you have been come at.
He was a great guy, by the way.
I'll tell you a quick story, if I may. We were getting close to rising in September near the end of the term, and we all had a fairly good hunch that the House might not come back, so some of the veterans were getting up and saying a few things they wanted to get on the record. As it turned out, the House didn't come back, and we had a general election.
Senator Runciman was very generous when he got up. We had gone through quite a number of Solicitors General, both Liberal and NDP. The ministry was kind of chewing them up and grinding them out. It was my turn on the conveyor belt, and Bob was nice enough to get up and say—I can't remember the exact quote—something about how I was one of the nicest and most effective in a given period of time.
It was something very complimentary that normally you wouldn't say, especially Bob. I won't say it, but if anybody knows his nickname, you would know that he's not normally given to giving out bouquets in the House to cabinet ministers, particularly those for whom he's the critic. But he did on that one occasion. It was almost half a sentence; it wasn't that much. With me being a politician, never one to miss an opportunity, guess what happened in the next election in Hamilton Centre provincially. There were great big letters with quotes from the minister's critics, even, saying wonderful things about what a wonderful job I did.
Sure enough, I was in the House a couple of days after the election. I looked up and there was Bob Runciman standing there looking at me, saying, “Thanks, Dave, thanks a lot.” You and I both know what he heard from the Conservative candidate in that election: “What are you doing? How is this helpful? Thank you ever so much.” That's not to mention that I came kind of close to breaking I think an unknown code. You don't do that, especially when somebody is getting out of character. The problem is that I learned about that code afterwards. I didn't do it deliberately. I knew it wasn't going to be good news in his camp, but I wasn't really worried much about him. The election was coming up, and I was worried about my election.
Anyway, I say all of that because there's a consistency to almost all of these arguments. Let me frame it this way. Do you notice that in the respected critiques and criticisms from The Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, and Mr. Coyne, notwithstanding that histrionics is a justifiable accusation and I wear it because it's true, there aren't that many arguments we're using or creating that are over the top and not reinforced by these other serious entities? They don't care about our politics. They deal with the issues as they see them.
I think it's edifying that those arguments in all three cases are so similar to the arguments we're making, and the absence of arguments we're making that they aren't reflecting also.... Again, Chair, all of these I'm raising to show that what I think was the government's reason for what they're doing, and to try to find some justification for all this, is at the very best a failed plan. These comments from editorial panels, editorial boards, and individuals of the stature of Mr. Coyne reflect the fact that there is something seriously wrong in the state of Denmark.
The blame goes nowhere else other than to the feet of the Liberal government, which to this second refuses to acknowledge the legitimate criticisms and critiques of the opposition and those of third party interests in our pluralistic democracy. It's very telling. It's also a bit unusual.
Normally what happens is that you throw everything but the kitchen sink into an argument, and many times you're throwing everything you can to see what sticks. There are all kinds of different techniques that we've used and that the Liberals used when they were in opposition. Many times when the grown-ups weigh in and give a dispassionate analysis of things, a lot of the stuff that we're off on flights of fancy with don't even get mentioned because it's more political and entertaining than it is germane to the point.
I think it's fair to say—and it's a bit of self-criticism—that is often the way it goes. It's very rare that the arguments of the opposition so finely focused and replicated in other arm's-length, third party opinions. That should be worrisome for the government. Well, a lot of this should be worrisome, but that should be very worrisome. There are no cracks here. It's not as if the government is going to take the floor in a minute and start giving, what, bigger editorials? There may be some that support the government, and I'd be interested in seeing which newspapers are putting their reputation on the line to back this sort of thing, but the government certainly can't get any of the biggies. Where there might be a compliment, it's more than wrapped in criticism. I'll go back to that in one second, Chair, but that has to be making Liberal backbenchers nervous.
I remind Liberal backbenchers of my experience and more of the scars when I was in government and then in re-election. We started with a big majority of 74 seats on election night. By the time the polls closed on the next election night, there were 17 of us.
An hon. member: Shameful.
Mr. David Christopherson: What's relevant in my message to the Liberal backbenchers is that, of the 17, only four weren't cabinet ministers, and I was one of them. On election night in 1990, we had six seats. There were six seats in Hamilton; we had six seats in our government. In the following election in 1995, when I looked around, I was the only New Democrat left standing, and I won my seat by less than 1,000 votes, as knows very well.
Was that the one you were in, Filomena?
Ms. Filomena Tassi: Yes.
Mr. David Christopherson: Filomena was my Liberal opponent and damn near defeated me. It was close. I'm going by memory, but I think I won by 900 votes and change.
Quite frankly, if the Cons hadn't done so well, I'd have gone down the tubes. But because it was a Harris landslide, there was enough spillover—they could never win Hamilton Centre—to save my rear end. That's the closest election I've ever had. I just barely won. I'd just point out to the government backbenchers that out of the 17 elected only four weren't ministers, which shows how hard it is to survive when the tide goes out if you don't have the added profile of having been a cabinet minister, with all the benefits of that. You can show that you've done things, yada, yada.... There were only four of that 17, so when government backbenchers—most of you—start to see these kinds of stars lining up, take a look at what's in front of you.
The Conservatives and the NDP are practically blood brothers over here. Do you know that once a day we hook arms and sing Kumbaya? If it were allowed, we'd have a little campfire and we'd wear team jackets.
An hon. member: Blue ones.
Mr. David Christopherson: Not blue, but blue and orange, which, by the way, happen to be the colours I used when I ran for mayor and went down in flames. That's a different story.
The first thing you did was what one would almost believe to be an insurmountable challenge, a politically impossible assignment, but the Liberals have done it: the Cons and the NDP are united in opposition against the government, to the point that our staffs are working with each other seamlessly. Some of us feel that we almost should have a chair with our name on it in the 's office, because we're over there all the time, with me partly reminiscing but mostly hatching up schemes against you guys.
Normally, the Liberals can expect that because the Conservative ideology and the NDP ideology don't tend to overlap too often, it's a great advantage, especially for a majority government that has all that power that we've talked about, as referenced in these editorials. What better than to add to that an overwhelming majority, with all the power you get, and divided opposition benches? It's the sweet spot. But in this case, the government gets to claim the trophy, because they have managed to unite the opposition benches.
How did they do that, Chair? By being even more anti-democratic than Harper. Now, I could be missing something. I'm not always the sharpest pencil in the box, and I don't say that I am.
An hon. member: Say it isn't so.
Mr. David Christopherson: Well, you have to be truthful. When you get to be my age, you have to do an honest reflection.
In my estimation, it seems that the backbenchers in particular should be paying very close attention to these stars lining up: the opposition is united; the major opinion leaders of the nation are calling out the government on a file on which they already broke a major promise and betrayed untold thousands of their supporters; and, drip, drip, drip, this committee continues to meet day and night with not very nice things being said about the government.
I don't know what they're thinking in the PMO, but if I were over on those government benches that I'm looking at and were one of those backbenchers, I'd surely be paying a whole lot of serious attention to this, because a lot of the people who voted for you wanted to get rid of first past the post. You promised that you would and you turned your back on that promise. Trust me: it's not as big a problem for the Attorney General to overcome that and get re-elected because, remember, “all politics is local”.
Mr. Reid, that said was by what American House Speaker? We both know it.
:
It was Tip O'Neill, absolutely.
All politics is local, so if I were these government backbenchers—on this committee in particular, but even as a backbencher in general—in terms of my own re-election, I would be paying great attention to how much traction the label “anti-democratic” has and is sticking.
We do know from certain little birdies that there were some interesting discussions at the Liberal retreat last weekend about this matter. It would seem, from some little birdies' reports, that some of you are getting the message that this could be a problem, that it is not something you're going to counter-spin with a ten percenter, and that the longer this goes on, as my friend Jack Layton would say, the more this circles the stain. The stain is the betrayal in regard to changing first past the post. It was an outright, flat out—there's no other interpretation—betrayal. Then, on a related file, this government decided to get even more anti-democratic than breaking their campaign promise to the very people who elected them.
It would seem that some of the brighter lights over there, according to birdie reports, reflected their concerns at the caucus meeting. Unfortunately, it doesn't seem as though anyone was listening. No one is listening. They're just leaving you out here, stranded in this lifeboat. You just float along, getting pushed by the waves of arguments—justifiable arguments—coming from the opposition benches. Boy, if ever there were a time to be on the transportation committee, the health committee, or the public accounts committee—anything other than PROC—this would be it. Maybe it wasn't such a gift, my friends, I'll just leave it at that, and it's getting worse every day.
I know that I'm starting to grate on some of you. That's fair, but the really bad news, well, the good news, is that eventually I do stop. That does happen.
An hon. member: It does?
Mr. David Christopherson: It does. At some point, I stop. I only got about three hours' sleep, so it may happen more quickly than I would prefer today. I was lying there last night, quiet, but with eyes like silver dollars. I couldn't get to sleep. I kept thinking about all the arguments I didn't make.
That's a little bit of good news, but really, is that as good as it gets? Is the best news you have for today that at some point Christopherson is going to shut up? Is that the highlight of your day? The bad news is that once I'm done, there are more than enough willing Conservatives ready to take their places and point out how undemocratic this government is being.
An hon. member: Amen.
Mr. David Christopherson: Aforementioned cabinet ministers are off doing ministerial stuff, important stuff, and being treated importantly, being on TV, being talked about, and being the focus of Question Period. It goes a long way to helping get you re-elected when you have all that extra attention for being a big shot.
To be an MP is to be a big shot, but it's a much bigger shot to be a cabinet minister, and the Prime Minister...? Well, I don't think he's too worried about your plight over here, because he's down in New York rubbing elbows with the Secretary General of the United Nations. I'm sure that no muscles are getting sore and that there's no dirt under his fingernails. He's doing just fine, thank you. He's taking care of international business, being the , and doing the selfies—all the stuff that he does. He probably has a good chance of being re-elected in his riding, too, all politics being local. It doesn't do you any good to be a big-shot cabinet minister if you don't have a seat under you anymore. You're no longer a big-shot anything.
They're all fine, but some of the backbenchers on other committees are starting to get a little concerned, especially the ones who've been around for a while. I won't say anything more, other than to just take a look at who's sitting close to the action and who's sitting as far away from the action as he can get and still be declared a member of the committee. There these members sit: sitting ducks come to mind.
You ought to be awfully worried. You really, really should be. That's not everybody. Some of you got elected on your own name, but let's face a lot of the votes that went into that ballot box and had an X beside your name were there because of the brand that presented the Liberals as. As both the Toronto Star and The Globe and Mail pointed out, that part of what they offered, at the very least, is not on display here now, today.
To the best of my knowledge, there are still no talks going on with the House leaders. Sometimes they happen quietly and quickly, so I'm not saying with 100% certainty that they aren't, but I am saying that in most cases, if there were any movement like that, Tyler and I would at least be given a heads-up, so that we would know in the back of our minds as we are going through this that there's something at play there, we should keep it in mind, and things could change quickly as a result. I don't have such notice.
Have you been notified of any meeting, Tyler?
No. Tyler is telling me he has not been notified of any meetings. It would seem the government is just going about its business, leaving the Liberal MPs to their own destiny.
I will continue with the excellent contribution of Mr. Coyne to this discussion:
The only limit on the government's power to prorogue the House, which Stephen Harper notoriously used to get out of tight political situations, would be a requirement for the government to explain its reasons for proroguing. (In fairness, the Liberals did not promise to limit this power, only that they would not abuse it.)
There is not a lot of evidence that we do not need to keep a standing watch on that one. He continues:
More encouraging is a proposal to give the Speaker the power to break up omnibus bills into separate parts, with separate votes on each.
Taken as a whole, however, there is much in the document that might legitimately alarm the opposition.
Do ya think...? I will say it again:
Taken as a whole, however, there is much in the document that might legitimately alarm the opposition.
He continues:
As if to rub the opposition's noses in it, on the same day the “discussion paper” was unveiled, a motion was put before the relevant House committee (on Procedure and House Affairs), ostensibly on the initiative of a Liberal member, demanding it report back with recommendations for changes to the House Standing Orders by June 2. The government has offered no explanation for the unseemly rush; neither has it indicated a readiness to entertain any opposition amendments, on a matter that plainly affects the balance of powers within the House. It is not unreasonable to call this Motion Six Redux.
I've already gone on about how vicious motion six was, and how rapidly the government backtracked when it became clear that just because they were the ones doing it, it would be no less odious or undemocratic. That's an argument that we've been making for some time, which is that this is like motion six all over again, even the part where you're going to ram it down our throats.
To continue with Mr. Coyne:
If all this sounds unduly suspicious, recall that there is a context to this. After the prime minister's insouciant refusal to admit fault in the matter of the cash-for-access fundraisers, after the charade of “open nominations” in ridings that had clearly been fixed to suit the prime minister's preferences, after the elaborate fraud that was Senate reform, after all the broken promises on everything from the combat mission against ISIL to the open bidding on the CF-18 replacement to—sigh—electoral reform, the Trudeau government has earned no benefit of the doubt.
An hon. member: Heavy sigh.
Mr. David Christopherson: That got the heavy sigh. You're right. That's what it should be: a heavy sigh.
To continue:
Whatever short-term advantage these and other ruses may have yielded them, they came with a price, and that price is very simple: as they are not to be trusted, so they are not, in fact, trusted.
Circle the stain. Damage the brand. How could you hurt the Liberal brand more than by having all these influential entities calling you all these awful undemocratic names? The biggest problem for the government backbenchers is that the criticisms are true, they are warranted, and they are justified, and your government is doing nothing to get you out of this mess.
They had a week to come up with a strategy. When they didn't use that time, the chair gave them another two days. They still did nothing except, to the best of my knowledge, one relatively brief meeting with the House leaders, and that was it—kaput. We came back here yesterday at four o'clock, picked up where we had left off, and went until midnight. We started again at 9 o'clock this morning. Nothing is moving out there.
I say to the government backbenches: we here on the opposition benches have more than enough fuel to keep this fire going for a very long time. It would seem that by the time your government figures out what they're going to do.... They've done the math, and you have such an overwhelming majority that they really can afford to lose a couple of handfuls of you. It doesn't even affect the majority government. Nobody ever believes they're one of those who's being thrown overboard, but I have to tell you that if I were a Liberal member of PROC right now, I'd be reaching for my life jacket just in case.
Chair, that would be the end of that article.
An hon. member: So close....
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. David Christopherson: The good news is—don't get too excited—that we have a new one. I know you like new, so I have new, lots of new. I have so many. Here's a great picture of Lawrence Martin, and I have another guy.... The names alone for what is out in the public domain should make the government shiver in fear, because so far I've read the.... It's just an embarrassment of riches, like manna from heaven. These new articles keep rising in front of me and affording me hours of material. I should buy a lottery ticket. It must be my lucky day.
I was pointing out the accumulated heft of those who have joined in public criticism of the government in addition to the loyal opposition benches, from which you would expect that. We started with The Globe and Mail. Then we went to the Toronto Star. Then we went to Mr. Andrew Coyne.
An hon. member: There's a fire alarm.
Mr. David Christopherson: Do you see how much material we have? It's now combustible.
It seems as if there's a fire, a real one.... No? Oh. It's like real change: a false alarm.
Voices: Oh, oh!
:
That's not how we roll, as David Graham just said, and I agree. When he said “we”, he means we MPs collectively—Parliament. That's my point.
Through you, Chair, to David Graham, it's at that fundamental a level that we can have so much residual respect for each other that even in the middle of this we can show that same kind of common courtesy to each other and to an international visitor. It's because that's the way we roll. That's who we are. And that's why this is so egregious.
Mr. Chair, I think I'll give the indication that I will relinquish the floor prior to one o'clock. I just want to give whoever's going to succeed me a chance to be aware of that.
Will it be you, David? Okay. This gives you a chance to get your thoughts together.
So I will conclude well before one o'clock and immediately ask that my name be put back on the list—just a future threat. I could keep going, because I have to say that I feel pretty good, but others are anxious to get a piece of this. It's not like the last time, when I had to keep going on and on because you guys abandoned me. I was all alone. It was either me or nothing. I wasn't getting any help. Now we have a whole team, and my own team.
By the way, between us we have every single slot filled for the coming week and a half until the next constituency week. By the time the constituency week rolls around, we'll have a new roster ready to go and more new stuff. We'll have lots and lots of new stuff to stay relevant and not repeat.
As I bring to a conclusion these modest, short remarks, which I began yesterday at 4 p.m., I again underscore to the backbenchers on the government side—I don't expect a reaction—that if it were me, I'd be knocking on somebody's door wanting to know how the hell they were going to get us out of this mess. Right now there's nothing in sight except more of this. We're about to get a fresh voice and a fresh perspective, in this case from the government benches. How edifying that will be, not to mention the great opportunity that will be for the person who follows him.
Will that be Mr. Reid? I'm just curious. It is Mr. Reid? Okay. There you go: blockbuster day.
I'm ready to hand off to Mr. Graham, who I'm sure, in one fell swoop, with the eloquence that he can bring and the perceptions that he brings to his comments, will completely convince all of us—all of this—how wrong we are, how the government really is being wronged in this, how they're leading with their heart, and how this is about Parliament and efficiency and modernization. He will somehow make people forget about the electoral reform betrayal.
You can do it, David. I'm sure it's there. Nothing else....
Really, now that I think about it, that's what makes the most sense, that we're completely missing it. In a couple of minutes we'll find out all the secrets, starting with June 2 and its great importance—this is hard to do when you're laughing—or the avoidance of June 3, which for some reason has to be avoided by this Parliament. We'll find out how this will help the opposition and we just don't see it.
I'm sure that's what's coming next, Chair. We'll have a broader, more succinct explanation by a government member about how we have it all wrong, and about how The Globe and Mail have done such a terrible disservice to the integrity of the Liberal government, not to mention their former friend and ally, the Toronto Star, saying such obviously untrue things in such a nasty way before we get to the indignity that Mr. Coyne brought to your motivations. I have no doubt that before all is done, we will hear from others, but Mr. Graham can head that off at the pass by giving us all the explanation we need so that we lesser, mere mortals can understand parliamentary democracy as it's viewed from the lofty heights of the Trudeau Liberals, and that really all that's happening here is that we just don't understand.
Obviously the Liberal government is so far ahead in how it sees parliamentary democracy that what we need desperately, in addition to not hearing from me anymore, is to hear the great wisdom that Mr. Graham is going to bring as he pronounces on behalf of the government how we've all got this wrong, that it doesn't want to hurt anybody, that it wants to help. “We're from the government. We're here to help.” It's that favourite expression that people love to hear. “I'm here from the government, and I'm here to help.”
It almost makes me want to stop—almost.
Mr. Todd Doherty: Close.
Mr. David Christopherson: We are getting close, Mr. Doherty. I feel it getting close, but not so much anymore. I've kind of convinced myself—it's what happens—that it's just that we don't understand it, and I and others here have been wrong. We see this as a negative thing. Losing rights that we have must be a good thing; otherwise the Liberals wouldn't do it, because they're Liberals, and by definition they wouldn't do anything anti-democratic, because that wouldn't be sunny ways. It sure wouldn't be keeping their promise.
If I'm right, it means that you are putting a circle around that stain. It must be that we have it wrong. It must be a good thing that we can't talk anymore, that we can't slow down the government, that we are forced to get out of its way so it can continue to do the good deeds that it was elected to do. So it must be that we're just not understanding properly how the Liberal government is actually helping our democracy.
I have no doubt that after Mr. Graham speaks, we're going to see front-page retractions—
An hon. member: We'll be enlightened.
Mr. David Christopherson: —and The Globe and Mail, saying, “Holy smokes, we're sorry. We didn't get it, but now we do”, and the Star is going to have to grovel even more—isn't it?—because they're buddies, oftentimes, and they said some pretty harsh things. Once Mr. Graham explains to it the wrongness of its perspective and how it is wrongly labelling the government anti-democratic, it too, maybe even in a special edition to curry favour back, with a front-page retraction of its editorial, will begin to realize, once it uses the decoder that Mr. Graham is going to give us, that actually this discussion paper is the greatest positive contribution to Canadian Parliament since we were blessed with the first Trudeau.
That must be it. That would make sense. They're doing it because they really are being democratic, and honouring their commitments, and respecting the opposition. We are just being so pigheaded and stubborn that we're refusing to accept that that's what's really going on.
Get ready, Globe and Mail editorial board. Alert! The same goes for the Toronto Star editorial board: emergency meeting, live stream!
Mr. Coyne, whatever you're doing, stop! Get hooked up!
Chantal, John Ivison, everybody, freeze! We've all been wrong. It's sad to say. It's hard to say you're wrong, but it would seem we are. We must be and I so look forward to relinquishing the floor. It's palpable. Mr. Graham is single-handedly going to use his secret decoder ring to interpret the discussion paper that we all wrongly thought was bad news for democracy. We're going to find out, like parents talking to children. We're going to be told what's real and we're going to be told how this is good for us.
My only regret is that we didn't let Mr. Graham speak earlier, but I'm sure that will be the beginning of the speech from Mr. Reid, who speaks after Mr. Graham. I feel sorry for Mr. Reid, who is one of the most talented members of this place, because, silly us, we entrenched ourselves in opposition to the document on this silly notion that it was bad for democracy. Poor Mr. Reid, because he's the guy who's going to have to 'fess all that up, because I got to do all the wind-up stuff last night, today, and a little bit last week. I got to do all the fun stuff, except as it turns out, as we're about to hear, I was probably misguided, as misguided as The Globe and Mail editorial board, the Toronto Star editorial board, Mr. Coyne, Madame Hébert, John Ivison, Lawrence Martin—all of us. We all got it so wrong and we are so lucky that we live in an era where “sunny ways” is the guiding phrase for us all, along with transparency and accountability.
He can't save you. I'm sorry, David. I see David looking at the Chair. He's almost imploring him, “can you not do something?” That's the thing of this. This is why you need to stop it, because you don't have to put up with this kind of abuse. You shouldn't have to put up with me saying these things to you. You're a Liberal. You're a member of the Liberal government. Who do I think I am talking to you that way? You're so right. Ah, the nerve. It's getting downright uppity and where's the House leader to put me in my place to say, you're getting a bit uppity there, Dave? That's the Liberal government. Where's your respect?
The next item in here is that a 30-minute Q and A be added to the time allocation process in order for the minister invoking time allocation or closure to explain themselves. The report recommends that a Standing Order 57 debate, and I'm not entirely familiar with what it actually is, ends at 8 p.m. instead of the previous practice of 11 p.m., and that after-hours take-note debates be created. This is something that we're all familiar with. We had one last sitting week.
The report also recommends that emergency debates be moved into committee of the whole instead of a full sitting of the House, that committee travel cannot be blocked by a single “no” in a unanimous consent motion in the House, and that at least 10 people must rise to prevent a committee from travelling. In practice, I still see this generally done by UC, but the rule is indeed there.
Another recommendation you may particularly appreciate is that the estimates process be adjusted to give the May 1 deadline for a committee of the whole debate and that opposition day motions be put on notice by the start—other than by the end, as has been the practice—of the previous sitting day. The report also recommends that opposition day motions only be amended by the agreement of the mover of the opposition day motion, that the practice of calling officers of Parliament before the relevant committee upon their appointment be formalized, and that reports from selected officers of Parliament be automatically referred to committee.
Then there are a handful of non-Standing Order recommendations, such as the creation of a schedule for committee meetings. Apparently committee schedules were a little less predictable prior to this 2002 report. It is also recommended that a second room be available to televise committee meetings. In my favourite, paragraph 54, the committee recommends that the administration of the House of Commons proceed with plans for enhanced use of technology for the House, its committees, and its members. This was the second time this committee had recommended that, and I think we're up to the third time now.
In the 2nd session of the 37th Parliament, they produced another five reports. Mercifully for my purposes, they were all a little shorter. The first report recommended the creation of a private members' business lottery and made almost all items votable in the private members' business process. This is a recommendation report, rather than an actual Standing Order draft. I don't know to this day what the mechanics were of turning those recommendations into a Standing Order study.
Personally, and I said this in my speech on Standing Order 51 last fall, I want to modify the process a little bit for Standing Orders so that at the start of the Parliament all returning MPs retain their place in the order of precedence, followed by exiting cabinet ministers or other previously ineligible members, followed by new members, followed up at the end of the list by returning members of Parliament who had an opportunity to present a PMB in the previous Parliament. I think this would greatly improve the fairness of the process.
The second report was simply the special committee giving itself a sunset date of June 13, 2003. The third report revisited the first report on private members' business, with a few more details. The fourth report rehashed all the previous reports and discussed things like technological upgrades and the need to replace the cameras in the chamber as part of the long-term renovation program, which, as you know, will be shutting this building down one year from now to punt us into West Block, where we'll be under a roof full of glass made at Fenêtres MQ in my hometown of Sainte-Agathe-des-Monts in my riding. Also discussed were things like adding plugs and network jacks to our desks, which we definitely enjoy today.
All of this came from the chamber technology improvement project, not from the committee itself. The committee only referred to the progress of this external study. The report also expressed its approval of the creation of ParlVu, on which I believe many people are watching this very discussion. The fourth report also recommended that portable lecterns be made available in the House, which gives me hope for fixing pocket-tearing chairs, and making sure the clocks in the chamber show the time we are pretending it is.
Some of my other non-Standing Order pet projects, by way of our discussion, are permitting House leadership team members from each party—that is, the whip, House leader, deputy whip, deputy House leader, and Kevin—to be exempt from Standing Order 17, which requires you to speak only from your own seat.
I digress on this, but the fourth report also made a handful of specific recommendations to change the Standing Orders themselves. The first is to reduce the first round of speeches at second and third reading on government bills from—get this—40 minutes to 20 minutes. That sounds merciful, to me.
Following a lengthy discussion of the need to simplify the petitions process, it was recommended that we make minor consequential amendments to the Standing Orders—namely, expanding to whom a petition can be addressed. It also added a rule of a one-year trial period to refer petitions unanswered within 45 days to a committee. It further modified the estimates process from its earlier changes to give 15-minute speaking blocks, or Q and A blocks, during the estimates and in the committee of the whole. Moreover, it made another cleanup of the earlier recommendation in opposition day notice period to permit opposition day motions to be added to the initial notice paper following recess, should the first day back be an opposition day.
Finally, it also added a rule withdrawing a notice for a late show if the member requesting it didn't show up. This passed as a penalty for missing it within the report.
The final report talked about electronic voting. I think perhaps an extract from this particular report will be very relevant to our conversation.
It states:
4. Members of the Committee have visited various legislative assemblies around the world where electronic voting is used. Most recently, we saw its operation in the Scottish Parliament. The general consensus of all of the legislators we have spoken to regarding electronic voting is positive. The technology exists and is reliable, and the results are accurate and readily available.
5. At the same time, we emphasize that technology exists to serve the needs of the House, and should not become the determining factor in making procedural decisions. We have rules in our Standing Orders regarding the taking of recorded divisions, the deferral of divisions, and determination of which matters are voted upon by the House. These matters will continue to be decided by the House and its Members.
6. The Committee believes, however, that the time has come to examine seriously the introduction of electronic voting in the Canadian House of Commons.
7. We note that the Chamber Technology Infrastructure Project, which will be implemented this summer and next, will ensure that the Chamber has the necessary infrastructure in place to permit some system of electronic voting, if and when it is approved. We believe that the House should take advantage of this window of opportunity to determine the details of any electronic voting system.
We recommend the approval, in principle, of electronic voting in the House of Commons Chamber.
We further recommend that the Clerk of the House develop, in conjunction with the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs a detailed proposal for an electronic voting system, to be submitted to the House for approval early in 2004, and that such a system, if approved, be implemented as part of the renovations to the chamber in the summer of 2004.
This all sounds very familiar. We are, of course, still waiting for all of this.
I think it is worth doing this particular exercise of reading all of these reports from the so-called Chrétien method. It made a significant number of small changes that apply to this day, and it did so by consensus. These changes were indeed significant, but were transactional rather than transformative changes.
Tougher issues like sitting days weren't touched. PMQ was not broached. On the process of debate, this report simply reduced the first round of speaking time by 20 minutes per speaker. Time allocation, to which this set of reports simply added a 30-minute question and answer period, did not seriously get addressed or reviewed. Committee structure and management was not really explored. Electronic voting was recommended, but not pursued. Not even the House calendar was addressed by any recommendation for change. Concurrence in instruction motions that can blow up short days were not discussed. Prorogation wasn't explored. Omnibus rules were not a subject to this process either. At some point, we have to ask tougher questions, have tougher discussions, and then figure out what to do with those discussions.
Just before we rose for the winter recess, we went over the 100-odd ideas that came out of the October Standing Order 51 debate on the rules. We didn't go through that on a consensus model. We went through each idea on the list on the record, and we each claimed items that we wanted to defend and bring forward to debate further.
We set up a discussion, without immediately killing off things that anyone was uncomfortable with—quite the opposite. We, as a committee, let each person defend their ideas, and had a real debate and discussion on each one. Perhaps we could actually convince each other that an idea is or is not good, and then figure it out from there.
We committed to modernizing Parliament, as you know. It is not my position to give anyone a veto on our platform commitments. Real change isn't easy, and I'm not interested only in making minor changes around the edge of this place, though those are important too. Keep in mind that people like myself and Minister Chagger—happy birthday, Minister—have been around a while in the shadows. We were in the staff seating around Arnold and Scott in the 41st Parliament. We know what it is like to be a third party, and we are equally aware that it could happen again. Indeed, I distinctly remember David Christopherson as a member of the official opposition defending the right of a third party to have a second round of questions in the question rounds, saying he had appreciated it when he had it. That is the perspective we come to this from.
I am really tired of hearing that we are trying to kill the filibuster, for example. Not at all. The way I see it, the wording could be something like this in the context of committee: When a member is speaking on a motion, or at any other time not otherwise provided for, that member may speak for as long as desired, provided no other member present has expressed a desire to speak. Should another member express their desire to speak—in other words, get on the speakers list, which itself is a practice and not a rule—the member speaking may speak for not more than 10 further minutes, but may express their own desire to speak again in order to resume at any time.
In other words, it is simply to ensure that not only can filibusters happen, but they're actually easier to conduct and are more inclusive of other members of the committee. The 10 minutes is totally arbitrary, based on the length of most speeches in the House. What the appropriate time is should be something that we—repeat after me—“discuss”, as part of our discussion, that we want to have.
Here at PROC, we are able to participate by unanimous consent, as our colleagues occasionally cede the floor as long as they can have it back, as Mr. Schmale alluded to just a couple of minutes ago.
I don't think anyone here would argue with the statement that PROC members have very good chemistry. We get along, quite frankly, and I believe we genuinely like each other as people.
We may be political adversaries, but we have tremendous respect for each other in every direction around this floor. That is not always the case at committees, and often—and we have seen it here—the only way to interrupt a filibuster without jeopardizing the meeting itself is to ring the division bells. Thus, the use of motions in the House with the support of colleagues—for example, “that a member be now heard”—and the 30-minute bells, and committees all across the Hill get blown up, witnesses get sent home at great expense and with little accomplished, and for what? So that a filibustering member be allowed to pee without endangering the filibuster.
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. David de Burgh Graham: We are not going after the right to filibuster, not in any way, shape, or form, but I would like to have a conversation about how to make filibusters “rest-of-Parliament-friendly”. Why should the whole House blow up because PROC, or maybe BILI or the scrutiny of regs committee, is having a family dispute?
The point of all this is that what I want—what we want—is simply a discussion. I want to call on witnesses. It was fortuitous that we had the Scottish here today, just before question period, and we learned that in that country filibusters do not and cannot happen. That's an interesting fact that we learned today. I want to see what the best practices are from around the world, have more discussion, and then see if we can formulate meaningful reform proposals around that discussion.
If we end up in a situation where we are going down the road to a report that you, my dear friends, consider to be unacceptable, your opportunity to object is not limited to minority reports, but then, there, that is the time that a filibuster might actually make sense. A report cannot, after all, go back to the House if we cannot get it to a vote.
That, friends, is all I have for the moment, but I would appreciate returning to the speakers list, Chair. I may want to respond again eventually.
Thank you.
:
I suspect the background noise is from the excitement of this discussion.
As an interesting note, what I have here is an autographed copy of Diefenbaker's memoirs, given to me by a constituent, a gentleman by the name of Lloyd Walkom. He said it was originally his father's, and his father used $50 bills as bookmarks. Unfortunately, I haven't come across any yet, but it was an interesting little anecdote that he told me about his late father.
However, I'll come back to where we are, to the manual on government procedure. This is Lester Pearson's legacy to his successors on the operation of government and the ideas, the concepts, of how you go about it. I want to quote from his letter of introduction at the beginning:
The Manual of Official Procedure of the Government of Canada has been prepared to fill a long-recognized need for quick and thorough guidance on the many constitutional and procedural issues on which the Prime Minister, individual ministers or the Government must from time to time exercise discretion and judgement.
I think judgment is an important concept there. He continued:
The Manual examines the principal elements of government, states the legal position in given situations, and identifies the considerations relevant to decision and discretion in particular circumstances. Precedents are described and evolution outlined. Administrative procedures are defined and representative documents are included as sources or examples. The Manual is designed to be expanded to cover additional areas of interest and new practices arising from changes in law or custom.
The Manual was prepared in the Privy Council Office and is the work of its Special Advisor, Mr. Henry F. Davis, assisted by Mr. André Millar, who are responsible for its form as well as its content.
I do not believe that a guide to procedure of this nature has been produced elsewhere and I am confident that it will be of valuable assistance to my successors in the office of Prime Minister and to all those directly responsible for the process of government in Canada.
It's signed “L. B. Pearson, Prime Minister; Ottawa, 1968”.
Members will see the extent of this manual. It's an extensive document, and this is only the main part of it. It has an almost equal amount of appendices as well, which provide some of the documents, some of the issues.
The manual deals with a whole suite of issues that a prime minister or government will deal with from time to time in the execution of the details involved, whether its the appointment of a cabinet, elections, or funerals and memorial services. It contains the protocol on the passing of an individual, depending whether they were a cabinet minister who was in office or a past minister of the crown, someone who was a member of the Privy Council. There is an entire section on dealing with issues surrounding the sovereign—in this case, the Queen, but any future sovereign as well—the Governor General, different honours and awards, things such that, as well as extensive discussion on Parliament, on both the House and the Senate.
I think it's instructive as we undertake this debate here in this place, which is also being undertaken down the way in the other place. Unfortunately, it seems to be that in the other place they're doing it in a similar forced discussion. I think this is unfortunate for both Houses of Parliament, when we're forced into making decisions, debating, and having things forced upon us. That's one thing.
I want to go back to the motion at hand. The motion, despite what laudable goals there may be, is nonetheless a motion with a guillotine of June 2. We can work with this. We can work with an amendment that provides for a consensus of the committee. That's the issue we have right now: how can we get to the point where we accept this amendment and go forward with the discussion? That is often being discussed.
I want to bring the attention of the committee to the discussion in the manual on the House of Commons itself, how it's dealt with from a government perspective. We have to recognize as well that the House of Commons is part of the legislative branch of government. We do operate in a system quite unlike a congressional system or a presidential system where there's a more clear division between the executive and the legislative branches. Certainly we've seen many situations in which a legislative member, a senator or a member of the House of Representatives in the United States, is appointed to the cabinet by the President. They are immediately required to give up their seat in the legislative branch because you cannot hold a seat in both branches of government at the same time.
In the Canadian example, we don't have that. We have a fused legislature. If we want to go back to Walter Bagehot—and I think most members would probably recognize the name of this British thinker, this British political philosopher—he refers to the cabinet as the “hyphen”, the link between the legislative and executive branches. They sit in both, but they're nonetheless still separated, separated by a hyphen. I think that's something we need to bear in mind when we're dealing with these issues.
When we're talking about the Standing Orders of the House of Commons, we are dealing with the legislative branch. I want to quote from the manual, because I think this is instructive of where we're going with this motion and the need for the amendment to ensure that we have a consensus report.
Point one, page 263, first position—that's how it's labelled:
The House of Commons is master of its own rules of procedure which are set out in the Standing Orders.
It's a single sentence, but I think it carries an exceptionally high weight. The House of Commons is its own master. We often say that committees are their own masters, and that's quite correct, and the House of Commons is its own master as well. We do have the situation, in a Westminster-style parliament, where the executive branch also sits as members of the legislature, but the executive is not the masters of the legislative branch.
This is what troubles me so much about the discussion paper. It has not been tabled, as far as I know. This discussion paper has never been tabled in the House of Commons. That's a troubling concept, as a legislative branch, that a document purporting to create a conversation on the Standing Orders hasn't actually been tabled in the House of Commons, the body that will have to, at some point, make a decision on changes to the Standing Orders. It has not been tabled in the House of Commons. I think that's unfortunate, and maybe that will be remedied before too long, but it hasn't been tabled.
Whether that is inadvertent or not, I think it's a slight to us as parliamentarians and to us as legislators that the document was emailed out and posted online but wasn't tabled in Parliament. I know that sometimes some of these procedural things, like tabling a document, might seem like undue process or something that doesn't have to be done in a modern society where we have access to email, but they are symbolic, and I think they are a testament to the value that ought to be placed on the House of Commons and the other place as well—but that's beyond the scope of this discussion.
The leader of the government in the House created a document. We'll have disagreements on that document, as is the case in many issues, but the fact is that there wasn't the courtesy of tabled it in Parliament, the place in which rests the ultimate decision-making on this matter.
I want to go back to this, that the House of Commons is the master of its rules of procedures, not the government. I want to take this one step further, because, again, this document is instructive in how we go about making these changes. I want to quote from the second part of the House of Commons section, subtitled, “Procedure in the House of Commons”, and labelled as point II, “Background”:
Although the Government may have a special interest in the rules of the House and a special responsibility as the major party the decision is of concern to the entire House. Preliminary agreement to any proposed changes is desirable to prevent opposition parties from blocking their adoption.
Again, this goes very much to the heart of our amendment, the heart of the discussion at hand. A motion has been tabled by Mr. Simms, as is his right, and an amendment has been made by this side.
What we're asking here is that we have this discussion without the guillotine of an end date of June 2, without the government party ramming it down our throats. Again, it goes back to what I mentioned when I introduced this document. This is a letter from a prime minister who served in troubling times—certainly difficult times—in minority governments, but prior to that, as a foreign minister as well. I always feel a little challenged when I try to heap praise on a Liberal prime minister, but I think we can learn from our predecessors in this place. Certainly, Lester B. Pearson is one of those great parliamentarians, equally with his counterpart at the time, Mr. Diefenbaker, as well.
Again, if we think of this as a letter of advice to his successors, this document is a treasure trove of advice and of opportunities to really lay the groundwork of how we ought to be proceeding, and that is by a consensual approach, by the ability of all parties to discuss it in a meaningful way, without the threat of a unilateral action. Certainly, this is the advice prime minister Pearson offered, and I think certainly in the vein of what Mr. Reid's amendment would have proposed on this issue.
I want to go a bit further into the second point on this same page, because it plays a little into what was presented yesterday by the opposition House leaders, both the House leader of the official opposition as well as the third party, the New Democrats. That is the idea of a Chrétien style of committee made up of representatives from the major parties, chaired by the deputy speaker.
This is actually what's proposed, in some manner, by the government procedure manual. Point 2, again on page 264, states:
Proposed changes in the rules of the House are examined by a committee set up by the House, usually on a Government motion. Action is taken to amend the rules on the basis of the report of the committee.
This is suggesting a separate committee. It doesn't talk about its composition, which is something that has been recommended in the House leader's document. That would allow the different parties to have the opportunity to have a discussion, have a meaningful opportunity to move forward and to develop proposals from a consensual standpoint. I think it's unfortunate that, to date, the government hasn't accepted that opportunity to go in that direction, but I'm hoping that, as we continue with this discussion tonight and in the weeks and, potentially, months to come, we might have that opportunity to have that.
I will be returning to this document a little later in my comments.
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There are these examples where parties don't exist, but where government and opposition nonetheless come to fruition and come to play a role.
Baker goes on. I'm not going to read it in depth. He goes on to present the proposals, how this document is structured. But I want to read this line, because I think it's pertinent to the discussion that we're having today, and perhaps it would be wise for the to take this under advisement in her pursuit of the proposals at hand. Again, Baker wrote:
While the balance of these proposals tends to be to the inconvenience of the government of the day, there are some changes in procedure which have long been accepted on all sides as necessary to ensure the efficient consideration of government business. A number are included in these proposals.
So again, Baker acknowledged in his introductory paragraphs that these are going to be a bit of an inconvenience to his government. Increasing the role of backbenchers and increasing the role of individual parliamentarians from both sides of the House, isn't going to be easy for the government. Giving individual MPs like me and like all members more power within the House of Commons is going to be a hindrance. It's going to cause challenges. It's going to result in issues that will have to be dealt with. But at the same time, he also said there was a growing acceptance among different parties that there were ways to make the House of Commons operate better, so it's a give and take, it's a negotiation, it's a discussion. That's why I like to refer to this document as a discussion paper in the real sense, for parliamentarians to come together and have a discussion.
I mentioned at the outset that this discussion paper was one that the government laid before Parliament. It did it as a reference to the Standing Committee on Procedure and Organization, the predecessor to our committee. There was also the opportunity to simply present changes to the Standing Orders. It did not do that in this case. It didn't change the Standing Orders because that would have hindered the discussion the government could have had. Instead, the government of the day placed this before Parliament. It put the position paper for the consideration of the standing committee in order to draw from its expertise of that of many numbers of other different groups. But this document then works through the different proposals, and as we work through these proposals, we'll find that many of them have been adopted, and I think most of us would agree that some of these proposals have over time been of great benefit to all of us.
This first proposal for us today probably seems fairly mundane, but at the time it wasn't. The proposal was to deal with the sessional calendar, to deal with when parliamentarians are here. The proposal was that there should be fixed adjournment times set aside for Christmas, Easter, and the end of June:
Before the time set an adjournment motion would automatically appear on the Order Paper. If the motion were not called by two sitting days beyond the time set for adjournment at Christmas and Easter, and 5 days beyond the time set for adjournment at the end of June, the motion to be put called for two hours and the question put.
So it gave a great deal of predictability to parliamentarians, the opportunity to know when the House of Commons would be sitting, when they would be expected to be in Ottawa, and when they might expect to return to their ridings at the key moments in the calendar: Christmas, Easter, and the summer recess as well. Again, today that's a given. We know that typically in any given year the timelines we'll be in Ottawa when the House is sitting; it typically works out to 26 weeks of the year. We know we'll have time in our ridings throughout the year in constituency weeks, over the Christmas break, and certainly over the summer months. But that wasn't always as structurally created as it is now.
There is always going to be some discussion around the House calendar, whether there's a constituency week that aligns with a certain school holiday or not, and those discussions are dealt with through the usual channels. I'm not talking about that back and forth—which I think is rightfully in the hands of discussions of House leaders—but having a basic structure on which to draw as we work on this.
I often reflect and, as much as possible, try to receive guidance from parliamentarians who went before me, whether local MPs or from neighbouring ridings. I'm reminded of a situation in the 1980s, shortly after the 1988 election. My predecessor was a gentleman by the name of Dr. Harry Brightwell. He was the MP for Perth-Wilmot, which later became Perth-Wellington-Waterloo and eventually merged years later to become Perth-Wellington.
Dr. Brightwell was explaining the story of the 1988 election, which was of course followed by the free trade discussion and debate in Parliament. At that time, they were debating and voting, and they did not leave Ottawa until Christmas Eve night, after midnight.
It wasn't until that point that the real discussion on changes to the Standing Orders to allow more predictability in the House of Commons calendar was really brought home for many people. They realized that there were parliamentarians from across Canada who were in Ottawa at midnight on Christmas Eve, finalizing the votes on the free trade agreement with the United States, an agreement that incidentally had just been run on in the election campaign.
It was that point that really brought that discussion to a head, and now it's seen as a given that we'll be home in our ridings well before the Christmas holidays and celebrate Christmas with our family. I would point out, as well, that at that point Dr. Brightwell told me that because they arrived so late at the airport—I believe it was in London—everything had been shut down. There was no way to actually physically leave the airport, because the doors had all been locked. They eventually had to find a security guard to let them out.
This document goes on.... I am going to leave the sessional calendar, because I think we all recognize the importance of that calendar and where it's provided for MPs to give us a degree of certainty.
The one other point I would mention—and this is a discussion that will be held in future years—is that in this coming year, in November 2017, there's a constituency week after Remembrance Day. For many of us in rural communities, most of our commemorative activities for Remembrance Day take place prior to Remembrance Day, so the fact that Remembrance Day falls on a Saturday this coming year means that most of those activities will take place in the week prior. However, we'll be sitting in Ottawa that week, rather than the week after. That's a discussion that hopefully will be attended to in future years by our House leadership.
I want to move on to some of the other proposals by Mr. Baker, under the rubric of daily proceedings. Again, they show some of the things that we now take as a given, some of the common-sense approaches that we now have. Proposal number two deals with question period. Again, the calling of the House is at two o'clock: “the House [should] be called to order promptly at [two o'clock].”
We now know that we are certainly called to order far before that, but the other point—again, the Standing Order numbers have changed, so don't pay too much attention to the actual Standing Order numbers—is that “Standing Order [43] should be eliminated, and the entire hour from 2:00 to 3:00 p.m. (11:00 a.m. to noon on Fridays) [should be] devoted to oral questions.”
Again, this is something that today, in 2017, we accept as the normal practice of the House of Commons—that at two o'clock on a Monday through Thursday, we have question period, and at 11 a.m. on a Friday, we have question period. It's now standard practice. It's now enshrined in our Standing Orders, but prior to that, that wasn't the case.
The interesting thing—and we've noticed this happening all the time—is that things happen in question period. They are things that we would ideally like to raise as points of order—sometimes questions of privilege, but more often than not points of order—during question period, but we will find as parliamentarians that we do not raise those points of order at that point in time. We wait until after the time for question period has expired. At that point, we raise the point of order, or we raise the question of privilege.
What I found interesting was that the authority for that was a temporary standing order, which had long expired by the time this paper had been presented. It was proposed that this should be a practice of the House of Commons and written within the Standing Orders.
The proposal that was presented by Mr. Baker was point number four: “By Standing Order, all Points of Order and Questions of Privilege should, at the discretion of the Speaker, be deferred until after the oral question period.”
Again, it's a common-sense approach. It allows question period to function without hindrance. It allows question period to go through, and any necessary points of order or questions of privilege arising from question period are dealt with immediately following it.
I think it's important to note sometimes the common practice or common courtesy that often occurs in the House. In the event that a member is planning to raise a point of order, where time and opportunity presents, the member provides the Speaker with a heads-up, with notice that you would be rising on a point of order immediately following question period, so that he or she is prepared to dispose of that or to deal with that immediately afterwards. Often in the heat of a moment that courtesy may not alway be extended; it's certainly not required. But often the Speaker will say that he has notice of a point of order or a question of privilege by the member for such and such a riding.
It's an important thing. Again, before a point in time, it was simply a temporary standing order. It wasn't placed there to any great extent. But then, again, eventually, because it was a common practice, a common-sense approach, it was enshrined within our Standing Orders.
Now, I want to move on a bit to a couple of other points. This one has to do with quorum. Our House of Commons actually has an extremely low quorum of 20 members, and that includes the Speaker or deputy speaker, whoever is the presiding officer at the time, so meaning only 19 members out of 338 have to be physically present in the House at any one time.
Anecdotally, there are other legislatures significantly smaller than ours that have a similar number. I'm not from Alberta, but I'm told that Alberta's quorum is also 20 members. Given their significantly smaller legislature, it's intriguing that ours is so low. Despite that fact, I'm sure that many of us have sat in the House of Commons at certain points, perhaps towards the end of the day, during private members' hour, or often over the lunch hour when some of us like to duck out and grab a bite to eat, when quorum in the House of Commons can often get perilously close to that number of 20, and could cause some challenges.
But going back to past Parliaments, it was a real challenge that Parliament would just adjourn at that point, and that was the case: when quorum was lost Parliament would simply adjourn. Despite it being a relatively low quorum, we still see situations in which quorum is lost. It's not always called to the attention of the Speaker. But if it were, and there were simply an adjournment, it would cause real problems for Parliament and the government—and the opposition, for that matter, just because there are days where the opposition has control, if you will, of the House calendar, including for supply day motions, designated days.
But the proposal put forward by Walter Baker, which was eventually adopted, stated that “There should be a quorum bell, allowing MPs ten minutes to reach the Chamber. Hours should be extended to compensate for any time consumed by this procedure.” It was a common-sense approach: if you lose quorum, ring the bells, get the members there, so you can carry on with the day. It was eventually adopted. It's now in our Standing Orders. I can't quote the exact number of the current Standing Order, but I know I have referred to it from time to time out of curiosity's sake. It's common courtesy, typically, in the House. It's rare for someone to call quorum when there is a good faith effort to engage in debate in the House of Commons.
This example allows for members to return to the House quickly if there is a case where quorum is lost, and typically it wouldn't be hard to find 20 members within a very short radius of the House. It would also allow a member, with some of the games that would have been played at the time, to quickly duck out, allow quorum to be lost, and see an adjournment of the House. In this case it allows that frivolous adjournment, if you will, to be dealt with in that way, and it also prevents the Sergeant-at-Arms from having to go from room to room to personally haul out the members, which could be the case in some of our present partner or cousin parliaments overseas.
As I mentioned, toward the outset of this paper there are some common-sense proposals, things that make sense, things that really would have had support from all parties. These are some of the ones I have touched on. There are also some that would help the government, and I'll touch on those a little later.
More important, there are also ones that help individual parliamentarians. In many cases it would more be opposition MPs, but a government MP certainly would be entitled and able to exercise many of these things as well.
One of the important ones is the concept of private members' business. Again, sometimes a good idea isn't seen as a good idea until many years later, and some of the ideas presented in here could still be good ideas. They weren't entirely adopted by our predecessor parliaments but nonetheless did provide a fascinating ability to discuss things.
One of the first proposals was that there should be designated cycles for private members' business and the ability to debate it. The proposal they made would be that on Wednesdays there would first be private members' bills considered. On Thursdays there would be private members' motions considered, and once those had been dealt with on a Thursday evening, there would then be a grievance procedure for challenges MPs might have had with rulings on their private members' bills. Whether they had been disallowed, whether they had been ruled out of order, it provided that procedure within the House.
There would then be a second cycle, in which another round of private members' bills would be discussed on Thursdays, then a second round of concurrence motions, followed by another round of private members' bills, and this would alternate throughout the process. Again, we haven't entirely followed this exact practice, but nonetheless it was a proposal to allow MPs to have a set schedule of how to undertake this.
Now in the current system—it's not a bad system, but there are opportunities to improve it—we don't make distinctions between bills and motions, and perhaps we should. However, as it is currently, that is not the case.
Another proposal I find interesting would be to use a suggestion from the U.K. Parliament, which is actually similar to the case now, though not entirely. It suggests that a bill should be debated for about two and a half hours and then should be disposed of—put to a vote—and if it weren't, then it would lose precedence. The way we deal with it now is that it automatically drops to the bottom of the Order Paper and then it works its way back up for the second hour. Here it is actually suggested that we have, in this case, two and a half hours and then it's disposed of shortly afterward or it drops off.
In the U.K. they have a similar way in which this happens, but in reality they don't have the same timeframe, I believe, so they actually just talk out the clock, and if you go to a certain point in time it then drops off. So parliamentarians need to be on guard and be ready to move a motion to deal with it and ensure they have a vote, and a minimum number of votes as well because it's often on a Friday, so they have to make sure there are enough people in town to actually deal with that motion.
Here is another thing I find interesting. Again, no one party has a monopoly on good ideas. It's on page 12, point 16(iii): The proposal was made that “A motion by the Government House Leader to transfer the bill to Government Orders is carried, with a guarantee that the bill will receive at least five hours further debating time under Government Orders within fifteen sitting days.”
I find this to be a fascinating idea. Then again, it hasn't been adopted. That doesn't mean it can't be adopted at some future point in time, but it allows the government to pick up a private member's bill as a government bill. We can think of examples of private members' bills coming through the House in this Parliament and the previous Parliament that were good ideas and that had the general support of Parliament. When they are unfortunately structured to a short period of time for debate, that doesn't always provide the fullness of a debate that you would have for a government bill, so by having this opportunity, a good idea brought forward by a private member could become a government order and there could be a more fulsome debate to undertake that. I think that would be a discussion worth having. It may not occur on a regular basis when we're dealing with an opposition private member's bill, but certainly it would allow an individual government MP that opportunity as well.
There is one proposal in this report—and I think, again, the general consensus on this is that it is now very much supported by all parties—proposal 21, that names of members rather than bills or motions should be entered into the private members' draw. The original case was that the actual bill number would be in the draw to determine the time of debate. Of course, now we do it by members' names. I believe I'm number 255, so I'll be a very old man by the time I get to debate my motion, but that is the luck of the draw. There's no perfect system, but I think the draw is certainly one of the fairest systems that could be undertaken, and in this case, the use of names rather than bills certainly provides some flexibility to an individual member to decide which bill or motion they may choose to bring forward. It doesn't restrict them, either, to making those changes as things change, as situations change, and as events happen, as they often do.
Those are some proposals that Walter Baker presented on private members' bills. Again, generally speaking, these were ways that could improve the opportunity for private members' bills to become law. Certainly I wasn't paying a lot of attention to private members' business in the 1980s. I was probably much more concerned with watching cartoons at the time, but in talking to colleagues who served in those Parliaments, I do recognize the extreme hardship and challenges of attempting to get private members' bills passed.
I think of my colleague Rob Nicholson from Niagara Falls. He has only just now, in this Parliament, passed his first ever private member's bill, calling for a national framework on Alzheimer's and other forms of dementia. He certainly never had the opportunity to propose private members' bills for many years because he was a cabinet minister throughout the last decade or so. As well, through the 1980s and early 1990s, when he was a member of the governments at that time, there were simply not the meaningful procedures and opportunities to undertake those debates.
Now, I want to discuss the next point, as well, and just as a bit of a heads-up, I'm going to speak for a little bit about committees. I know that my friend and colleague Mr. Lukiwski is just chomping at the bit to make a contribution to this debate.
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When I approached the Prime Minister—and I gave several other examples, as well, of where I thought the Standing Orders could be changed to improve the procedures of the House—he agreed, but with a few conditions. Some of the opposition members from that time may feel this to be a bit of a stretch, but I can assure you it's true. He wanted to make sure that it wasn't overly partisan and that we weren't doing anything to try to ram changes through. Consequently, when we established the all-party committee and I chaired it, I said the rules that I would like to abide by were simple. I suggested that all political parties and all representatives on this all-party committee could go back to their caucuses, discuss what potential changes they would like to see, and then bring them back to the committee for discussion, with one caveat: if there were any proposed changes to the Standing Orders that were opposed by any individual on that committee, those proposed changes were off the table, no discussion, because, as I pointed out, the Standing Orders affect us all. They are the rules by which we play, and they are to benefit and to assist all parliamentarians. My rationale was that if that is the case, how then can we possibly proceed unless we have unanimity? If these very rules that guide us are to be of benefit to all of us, how then can we arbitrarily, or by a majority, change the Standing Orders if they are not agreed upon by their members?
There were several examples. With regard to the NDP standpoint, I recall quite vividly when Joe Comartin said that he wanted to bring S. O. 56.1 to the table and to look at eliminating it from the Standing Orders. For the benefit of those at this committee who may not be familiar with Standing Order 56.1, or for those Canadians who are tuning in, what S. O. 56.1 does is allow the government to seek unanimous approval when it has already been denied unanimous approval. How does one do this? If the government asks for unanimous approval to, let's say, pass a motion or a bill and unanimous consent is not granted, it can then immediately invoke Standing Order 56.1, read the same bill or motion into the record, and unless 25 members in the House stand to oppose it, it is deemed to have been adopted. We used that two or three times between 2011 and 2015, and we used to do it normally on a Friday morning. Fridays, as everyone knows, are usually not that well-attended. Many parliamentarians go home on Thursday evenings so they can spend time in their constituency, so literally we would look for an opportunity when the opposition benches were depleted. The odd time, we'd even take a little tour through the opposition lounge to see how many people might be lounging back there. If we felt there weren't 25 members of the opposition present, we would introduce a motion, it would be defeated on a voice vote, we would reintroduce it under S. O. 56.1, and on two or three occasions it passed. I used to kid my colleagues on the NDP side to think of that as a teaching moment for them, but it had an effect because I think after the second time the opposition made sure that on Friday mornings and at all times they had at least 25 people in there. Mr. Comartin wanted to bring that forward and to suggest that S. O. 56.1 be stricken from the Standing Orders. Obviously, it didn't fly because there was opposition from us. It wasn't even discussed. It wasn't even debated. It might have been an interesting debate.
I can certainly give many reasons why S. O. 56.1 has a place in the Standing Orders, but because of the procedures, because of the rule that I put in place for our all-party committee, if anyone disagreed with a proposed change, it was off the table for discussion. That's how we worked. You know something? It worked well. We made a number of changes, most of them somewhat minor, but it worked well.
Everyone, I can assure committee members, was in complete agreement with my lead on that, namely, that we needed to have unanimity.
I can give you a couple of other examples of things that I didn't even allow to come to the table as a proposal. If you know Standing Orders, if you're familiar with procedures and practices of the House, if you've read O'Brien and Bosc, you will know that there are many opportunities for a majority government to invoke the tyranny of the majority through standing order changes.
Let me give you just one example. In the 2011 election, members of the Green Party, the Bloc Québécois, and other independents, if we can call them that—non-affiliated, non-registered, non-recognized parties in the House of Commons—had seen their numbers go down to about seven or eight. On more than one occasion, the three major parties—the Conservatives, the Liberals, and the NDP—had agreed that a motion, perhaps a motion to adjourn early or some other motion that seemed popular among the three parties, would require unanimous consent in the House. On such occasions, one of the independents would voice-vote no, which forced us to “stand five”. They only had seven or eight members among them, but they had enough numbers to “stand five” and force a standing vote.
Of course, they didn't have the numbers to be able to win that vote, but at least they could delay the proceedings and put the government in a position where it had to have 30-minute bells and a vote, so that debate on legislation would be delayed. It was an irritant, so there were some suggestions by a number of members who said that the “stand five” provision had been around for a lot of years. When it was first put in, there were far fewer members in Parliament than there are today.
One could argue with some justification that as an inflationary method we change the standing order from “stand five” to “stand 10”. If we would have passed that, those independents would have had no ability whatsoever to force a vote. I can tell members that I didn't allow that even to be brought to the table. Why? Because it would be impinging upon the rights of certain parliamentarians. It would be stripping them of their ability to act as an effective opposition. Even though their numbers were small, they still had rights. We could have taken those away in a heartbeat. That did not happen, because I and other members of our committee respected the rights of all parliamentarians, not just the tyranny of the majority.
Speaking of S. O. 56.1, the same suggestion was made because of the inflationary factor. Having to stand 25 people to stop a S. O. 56.1 from being adopted was done many decades ago and written into the Standing Orders. There was a suggestion—and we certainly could have done it had we wished, because we were a majority—that we change the number from 25 to, say, 35 or 40 or beyond, making it even more difficult for the opposition parties to block a S. O. 56.1. It didn't happen. We didn't even bring it forward. Why? Because it would be unfair. It would be using the tyranny of the majority to try to better our position politically. It simply didn't happen.
That's why I feel so strongly about what's being attempted here. If the government truly wants to make these changes, if it is sincere in its belief that these proposed changes will improve the functioning of Parliament, then they should do it. Introduce a motion and pass it. You have the majority. You have the ability to do this. The government, however, is not doing it, because it wants political cover from this committee.
They want the ability to say that a standing committee of Parliament recommended changes, and because it is an all-party committee, we will adopt those changes. It's a sham, and it is, at best, disingenuous.
We are here because we recognize what the government is attempting to do. They have the ability to do so if they wish. If they wish to do so unilaterally in the House, just do it. However, to try to make it appear that a report tabled by the standing committee gives tacit approval for them to do so is, quite frankly, deceptive, deceitful, and it shouldn't be allowed. That is why we're filibustering.
I also want to point out to committee members that while I was the parliamentary secretary to the government House leader for that length of time and our lead on the procedures and House affairs committee on many occasions, I had an opportunity to negotiate with members of the committee. If Mr. Christopherson were here, I know he would support what I'm about to say. I can assure you—on many occasions we were negotiating, whether it be a motion or the ability for the opposition members to bring forward an issue they wanted to discuss or a host of other issues that arise from time to time at committee—whenever I gave my word to a member of the opposition, my word was my bond. I never broke it.
An hon. member: Hear, hear!
Mr. Tom Lukiwski: I mention that not to try to lift myself up in the eyes of members of this committee, but to say that over the course of nine years, I had the opportunity to do a lot of negotiating with members of the opposition parties, and not every time did I meet counterparts who honoured their words. That promotes nothing but lack of trust. My colleague, , spoke of that a little earlier.
In our committee, I made sure that any time I gave my word, my word was not broken. I can assure members as well, from time to time, I was called on the carpet—let's say, by people with a higher pay grade than mine—because I had made a commitment that was not viewed favourably by others. However, I kept the commitment. Those others, who perhaps were a little angry at me, recognized the fact that I couldn't break my word because then the trust factor would have started to break down. Once that happens in this place, it is very difficult to achieve anything.
I only mention that because I say to you—and I'm sure others have said it as well—we, as an opposition, will not let this filibuster end. I will guarantee you that. We can be here as long as the government wishes to be here. We can be here past June 2. We can go to the next federal election, if you wish. We feel that strongly about his.
talked about the fact that we don't mind having a discussion. He's right. Neither do I. However, it has to be done in a manner in which we reach unanimous consent by all parties because of the fact that it affects all parties and all parliamentarians. Changes cannot be made just to benefit the government. I pointed out examples about how we had the opportunity to do so when we were in government, and we didn't do so. I have to be honest. Quite frankly, I don't see a lot on the other side of the House, on the government side of the House, that makes me think they are willing to enter into such an agreement. In fact, I see just the opposite. I see things, sometimes almost on a daily basis, procedures and attempts to shut down meaningful debate from the government, which makes me truly question whether or not they are willing to work with members of the opposition.
The most recent example happened this afternoon. We were having a debate on a question of privilege, a privilege that affects every single parliamentarian, the right for parliamentarians to come to the House in an unfettered manner and to be able to vote. Two of our members had that right denied most recently, and they raised a point of privilege with the Speaker. The Speaker quite rightfully said he found a prima facie case of privilege. This is not new. During my nine years on procedure and House affairs, I believe we dealt with the same issue on three separate occasions. Separate members were denied access to the Hill for various reasons. Sometimes it was because there was a motorcade. Sometimes it was because a security official didn't recognize the individual as a member. There were times, though, when members were denied access to come to the House, and they missed votes.
In each of those cases, the Speaker found a prima facie case of privilege. Debate ensued in the House. A vote was put forward. The House approved a reference order to be made to send the question of privilege to the procedure and House affairs committee. That's the appropriate method. That is the appropriate course of action. What happened today? The debate was ongoing, and the government shut it down. They didn't postpone it or delay it. They shut it down. That has never happened before.
Unfortunately my colleague and friend , who is not here right now, earlier said that we Conservatives did that in the last session, the last Parliament. It's not true. Granted, there was a debate on privilege and we invoked closure, but a vote was held. Parliamentarians from all parties were able to vote on that question of privilege.
This did not happen. This government shut down debate, and the vote will never be taken. Individual members—backbenchers, frontbenchers, members of the government, members of the opposition—were denied the right to vote on a privilege issue that could impact each and every one of us sometime in the future. It impugned and impinged upon the democratic right of parliamentarians. A vote was not even allowed.
Trust me on this one, and you all know this: governments come and governments go. You have now set a precedent, so one day, perhaps not in the not-too-distant future when you're sitting on the opposition benches, the government of the day may have a majority and will be able to say that there has been precedent and it doesn't have to allow members to vote on a privilege, even though it's been viewed as a prima facie case, because the previous government denied that vote.
This is dangerous ground that the government is treading, and there is an easy out.
Mr. Chair, I see an intervention coming, so I'll certainly cede my time for that intervention.
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The reality, however, with all due respect, is that debate was shut down. On one hand, you say you don't want to shut down debate, but you did. The government did. It brought in a motion to return to government orders. It shut down debate, and now it is impossible for the opposition to bring that privilege motion back for debate. It is shut down.
It is not postponed. It is not delayed. It is gone.
The members who brought forward the motion of privilege, which was found to be prima facie, are denied the ability to further discuss it, debate it, and vote on it in the House. That's what the government did. Again, I go back to my most basic point. Why are we even here?
Mr. Chair, you're doing yeoman's work just having to sit there for hours upon hours each day to listen to a debate that could be, quite frankly, close to endless, because there is no will on the opposition benches to allow this debate to stop, because you know what the result will be. As soon as that happens, there will be a vote on the discussion paper, on the proposed changes. The government members in the majority will pass it, a report will be tabled in the House recommending proposed changes from the procedure and House affairs committee, and the government will use that as its cover, saying, “They are recommendations from committee. We're not doing this unilaterally. We're not imposing our will on Parliament. This was a committee recommendation.” Right. That's something I just don't think any fair-minded person could possibly agree to.
Governments are elected. I said that before. Governments have the right to bring in their own legislation. Governments have the right to try to create a Canada they believe to be the right course of action, but opposition members are here for a reason. We are here to point out government shortcomings, at least in our opinion. There are shortcomings. We are here with a right to debate, and at times to delay, if we feel it is necessary, motions and legislation, but this is different from that. This is not a piece of government legislation we're debating in this committee. We are discussing the very rules that guide us and that are so fundamental to parliaments across the world.
I made reference to the fact that many learned authorities on procedure, such as Mr. Holtby, such as Mr. Yanover, would be dead set against any changes to the Standing Orders, except for the most minor tweaks, because they feel that those Standing Orders that have evolved over time are there for a reason. The government suggests that it wishes to modernize Parliament to make Parliament more efficient. Well, if it truly would benefit all parliamentarians, if it truly would make Parliament more modern, if it truly would make Parliament more efficient, then there shouldn't be any difficulty getting unanimity among all parties, because if they would benefit all of us, why wouldn't we approve changes to the Standing Orders?
Some of the ones we changed in the last go-round, when I was chairing the committee, were very minor. I want to give you a couple of examples, because they were easily agreed upon unanimously. A few were actually references to arcane situations that perhaps meant something back 100 years ago but mean nothing today.
For example, there was reference in the Standing Orders to the supper hour. There used to be a supper hour in Parliament because Parliament didn't meet as early as it does now. It opened in the afternoon and met into the evening, so there was a designated supper hour where committees would stop. Parliament would stop, and members had a chance to go to the Parliamentary Restaurant, or go off the Hill and have something to eat and then come back. There is no supper hour now, so we just deleted that from the Standing Orders.
There are also references to $5 fines administered by the Sergeant-at-Arms if a transgression took place. We deleted that and issues like that.
There was no question that all members agreed to those, because they made sense, but if there was any suggestion the standing order could adversely impact either a political party, and its ability to do its job, or an individual parliamentarian, those changes were never even discussed again.
Where does that leave us? It leaves us in a position where we're going to continue to filibuster unless saner heads prevail, and there can be some agreement among House leaders. I agree, my colleague talked about the fact that the House leaders are the ones who make these types of decisions. They give, frankly, the marching orders, and that's why they're in the positions they are in, but I also realize, having lived it—and anyone who has been in government lives it—there are other forces at play other than just House management. I'm specifically talking about the PMO.
Without question—and I'm not asking any of my colleagues on the government side to acknowledge this or to even say it's correct, but we all know it is—the PMO gives not just the suggestion but strict marching orders on what committees are to do. My good friend, Mr. Simms,—and I say that not lightly, he is a friend, I consider him to be a friend and one of the good guys—has stated that the motion that he brought forward, the motion we are now discussing, the motion and the amendment, was his doing. With all due respect, I believe there were other forces at play there. I simply do not believe that a discussion paper was forwarded, and mere hours later a motion fully translated came before this committee. I believe, without question, there was a decision made at a higher level than this that is instructing government members to follow through on this course of action.
That happens. I get that. It happened with us. It happened with previous governments. It will happen with governments after your government is long gone. That doesn't mean it's right.
If the government is so firm in its belief that these changes are necessary, then it has the ability to do it right now, but do you know something? I believe—and I may be wrong on this—that most of the suggested changes are in themselves a bit of a cover for the one change that the government really wants to have occur, which is on the estimates process.
Let me give you a little background on that. I am the chair of the government operations and estimates committee. That committee has a responsibility. When I say responsibility, I mean it deals with several government departments, one of them being Treasury Board. , another individual I like very much and whom I respect greatly, has come before our committee on several occasions trying to convince the committee to change the Standing Orders deadline for estimates to be presented not by March 31 but May 1. He said he ultimately wants to better align the estimates process with the budget process. Frankly, it's an objective with which I agree.
Right now, as we all know, if you have any knowledge of how the system works, it's just the reverse of what should happen. A budget is presented, and afterwards the estimates come in, rather than estimates of what might be in the budget discussed first and then the budget follows the approval of the estimates. It's ass-backwards. Other jurisdictions have changed the system sequentially and gotten it into better alignment. That's what this government is trying to do.
I applaud the government for trying to do that, but is trying to do so by changing the Standing Orders to allow him, for a two-year period, to change the timing of the estimates and when they're presented to committees. The difficulty with that is that once you change the Standing Orders, there's no guarantee they'll ever be reversed.
The government doesn't have to change the Standing Orders. It has a number of options at its disposal to achieve its objective of better alignment. It has the ability to present financial information at any time. It's not restricted or constricted as to when it can do so. It's certainly not forced to bring down a budget in March or April. It can bring down a budget in January, should it wish, which would solve the problem entirely. However, has stated that he wants this to happen, and he has stated that if he can't get it by going to the government operations and estimates committee and getting its approval, he will find another way. My belief is that he's trying to find another way in this package of changes.
Just look at the big four. My understanding, and I get this only from reading articles in the media, is that there are four primary changes that the government now has said it would like to see enacted in the Standing Orders.
One is having a Prime Minister's question period once a week. They don't need to change the Standing Orders for that. We saw that the other day. Frankly, I applaud the for doing that. To my knowledge, it's the first time it has been done. He didn't give any answers; nonetheless, he got on his feet and he said something to each question. I give him credit for that, but you don't have to change the Standing Orders for that.
The second thing is on proroguing Parliament, having to change the Standing Orders to force governments to give justification for prorogation. You don't need to change the Standing Orders for that. In fact, any prorogation that I can recall has always been justified and some rationale has been given. There has never been dead silence and just prorogation occurring. Whether it be provincially or federally, there has always been a reason, so you don't need to change the Standing Orders. If it wishes to prorogue, and I understand the government is probably contemplating prorogation perhaps this summer, that is its right, obviously, but also it would make some sense at the halfway point of the four-year term of this government that it might want to hit the reset button. Prorogation would make sense in that regard, to come back with a new Speech from the Throne sometime later in the fall. That makes some sense. I can understand that, but you don't need to change the Standing Orders. Just prorogue and give your rationale.
The third change in the big four is no more omnibus bills. That's fine; just don't bring one forward. Some might argue, well, we can do that, but we want to make sure that future governments don't do it. The fact of the matter is that you do not have to change the Standing Orders today to stop the use of omnibus bills. You have the ability to do it yourself.
What does that leave of the big four? It only leaves changing the Standing Orders to deal with the estimates process and the timing of estimates. That's the only one left, and even though the government has the ability to deal with it without changing the Standing Orders, for some reason the feels that he has to do this, that he can't do it any other way.
That's why I believe that is the true motivation behind this so-called discussion paper. The rest is almost like a bit of a subterfuge. “Let's throw a whole bunch of things in there and slide this point in, this standing order change, in a package of other proposed changes. We don't care about the other ones but we really want this one.” I think that's what's happening here.
If you want to have a discussion about better alignment of the estimates and the budgetary process, that's great. We're having that at government operations. We members, other than the government, have stated at committee that we are in favour of a better alignment process. It would make sense, and it can be done. It would take a couple of budget cycles to get there, but it can be done. However, the way in which the minister is proposing it has not been received well, and there has been opposition. You can understand why. It's because it would require a change to the Standing Orders.
Even though I take in good faith—and as I say, I respect him greatly and like him as an individual—once you change the Standing Orders, there is nothing to stop future presidents of the Treasury Board from abusing the situation. There is nothing to say that the Standing Orders would be changed back to their original March 31 date in two years.
Once the government changes the Standing Orders with a commitment to revert back to the old dates or the old ways, there is nothing to stop them from keeping the standing order changes as they see fit. As for the precedence that is being set, I cannot stress enough that it is extremely dangerous. I can certainly see a time when some government in the future would take the changes that are being proposed here and try to manipulate them to their own benefit.
Let's have a discussion by all means, but having a discussion in a forum in which the government has the hammer and the sole right and ability to make changes is meaningless. It's pointless. It's not a discussion. It's lip service to the opposition to try to keep them at bay and to say, “Well, you know, we consulted.”
No, you didn't. All you did was report a sham. Meaningful discussion means unanimity on changes to the Standing Orders.
I would suggest to my friends and colleagues on the government side that this is eroding whatever trust is left between opposition members and government members. It's no secret to members of the government that their failure to follow through on their commitment on electoral reform has eroded a lot of the trust and goodwill in this Parliament.
I would also point out, while I'm speaking of electoral reform, that the government is now taking the position of saying, “We made a campaign commitment to democratic reform within Parliament, so that's why we're bringing this discussion paper forward.” It seems a little hollow to me.
Not only was there no specific discussion about many of the proposed changes in the so-called discussion paper. There was a firm commitment in their campaign platform prior to the 2015 election to change the way in which we vote in this country, specifically, “This will be the last first-past-the-post election,” definitively, period, full stop.
What happened? We didn't see that happen.
If you break a campaign commitment and a campaign promise, how can you then possibly have the chutzpah to come back here and say, “We have to do this. We have to make these changes because we made a commitment in our campaign platform”?
No. There is absolutely no reason for the government to attempt to do what it is attempting to do with these proposed changes. There is no rational thought that I can come up with that makes me think they have justification to do what they are doing.
Consequently, we are where we are, but I hope, and I mean this sincerely, that there's an opportunity for the government to perhaps draw back just a little bit. They could agree to either setting up an all-party committee within PROC with equal representation from each party and a commitment that unanimity must be achieved before any standing order changes are implemented, or to accept the suggestion from my colleague, , to establish a special committee on parliamentary reform requiring unanimity, which has been done before by a previous Liberal government.
I know my colleagues on the government side are all aware of that. Prime Minister Chrétien made the provision that an all-party committee would be set up, and it was, and it would have to have unanimous consent before any changes were made. It worked well. It has always worked well. This was the first time in my recollection that—although I stand to be corrected, but I believe I'm on solid ground when I say this—in the history of the Canadian Parliament, where a government is attempting to have a committee discussion of parliamentary changes and recommend them without unanimous consent.
Governments have done so unilaterally, but they haven't done it through the committee process. They have never done it through the committee process, so why now? It's simple. They're looking for cover. They want to be able to say to Canadians that these changes were discussed, debated thoroughly, and the committee recommended these changes, even if there's a dissenting report.
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Thank you, Mr. Chair. It's great to have the floor back.
I, too, thank Mr. Lukiwski for his comments and his learned experience from many years as parliamentary secretary to the government House leader.
I know members of this committee were waiting with bated breath to see what next would come in the report of Walter Baker, and I won't keep anyone in suspense much longer.
Where I left off, we were talking a bit about committees, and there have been suggestions in the past about the actual shape and structure of the House of Commons itself. Ours is set up in the traditional Westminster system with the opposition and government on either side facing each other. There are other methods of doing that as well. Often the structure of a building, the structure of an institution does play a role in how that institution functions. Sitting here at this committee table today, for as long as I've been following politics, this has been the structure of a committee room. We have the government, the opposition. We have the chair, analyst, clerks, and we have a location for witnesses; and that frankly makes sense from an intuitive standpoint. However, that's not actually the traditional structure of the committee room.
Prior to this report the committee table was in a U-shape. There was no table at the far end for witnesses. In fact, the witnesses at a committee would sit beside the chair, so certainly that would change the committee structure of how that business interacts. The questions that would be put, how they're put, and how the discussion unwinds are certainly going to be different when you're speaking towards the chair, rather than when you're speaking to witnesses themselves.
This report, in point number 24 of the report, suggests that “Witnesses called by a committee should sit at a different table, facing the committee, rather than beside the Chairman. The present “U” set-up could be utilized with the table for witnesses at the top of the “U”.” Then it goes on to say, “Departmental officials should, as required by the Minister, sit at that table with the Minister.” So when a minister would attend a committee they would sit there as well.
Again, it's not clear in this report what the motivation for this recommendation would be, but I suspect that it would deal a bit with decorum. When you're facing the chair and addressing your questions to the witnesses you're more inclined, I would say, to address them directly to the witnesses because you're facing the same direction. As is custom we address questions through the chair. Having the chair and the witnesses at different ends provides a bit of a distance to ideally address the questions through the chair. In practice that hasn't been the case, at least not in all cases, and more often than not questions are posed directly to witnesses.
In the great scheme of things, I don't think it's a major catastrophe for a committee, but it is an interesting dilemma in which the way the committee is structured, the way the actual tables themselves are put together, changes the dynamic of a committee and how it's structured.
Another proposal is actually the membership size of committees. Their recommendation is that membership should be reduced to a maximum of 11 to make it a more manageable size of committee. Ours is currently 10. Arguments can always be made for different sizes of committee. I think it lends itself to some discretion depending on the issue, depending on the debate, depending on the types of issues being discussed, how large or how small a committee ought to be. That's recognized, I think, by this discussion paper.
Another important topic when it comes to committees is how they interact with their client departments, how they interact with the information that comes to them from a department, whether it's an annual report, as they were called.... Now, in current Parliaments, it would be a departmental performance report, reports on plans and priorities, any other number of reports that come from the respective departments.
A recommendation made by Walter Baker in 1979 was that the annual reports of all departments, agencies, and crown corporations should be referred permanently and automatically to the relevant standing committee. Again, it's a common sense approach. If you know these committees are responsible for a specific issue of a department, they shouldn't necessarily be referred to that committee. By structuring it and by including it in the Standing Orders, that allows this to happen automatically when it happens.
Again, it's an idea that isn't groundbreaking, but it makes good common sense. As I've mentioned before, there are a number of ideas represented here that were adopted. Certainly this is one that has been adopted.
There are others that haven't been adopted for any number of reasons. This next one I find interesting because I can see some common sense in it, but at the same time I can also see how it could be abused. It's recommendation 28 from the Walter Baker report. The recommendation is that “No more than five such committee studies may be underway at any time”, referring to a previous comment. I find that interesting. From an efficiency standpoint, we can probably think of examples in past Parliaments, or even from the current Parliament—I'm not aware of any currently—of committees getting bogged down with multiple studies, jumping from one study to another, and trying to schedule an hour of discussion on one study, another hour on another, to the point that a committee can't really function in any meaningful way. I'm not aware of any currently, but you can see where that could potentially come into play.
Having an upper limit on the number of studies that can take place at any one time would make sense from an efficiency standpoint. I can buy that argument, and I think it can be sold from that perspective. At the same time, when you're putting a limit on the number of studies that a committee can undertake, it is potentially unduly interfering with those committees. If a committee decides to undertake six studies or seven studies at any one time, I suspect they should be provided with that flexibility and opportunity to do so. Sometimes, as witnesses go, it's not possible to have a particular witness available at any given time, so you may let a committee study sit and slide for a number of weeks, potentially even months, until a specific witness or information is available.
There's an argument to be made on either side. In this case, it wasn't a suggestion that was adopted, for whatever reason. I was not privy to that specific issue, but it provides that point of debate. Going back to the motion and the amendment at hand, it goes back to that concept of agreement from multiple parties, agreement from those who are sitting around the table. Obviously, for whatever reason, this one did not have that agreement.
Another issue is government bills and the priority in which they come to committee. Again this is one that would be more beneficial to a government, and again it has to do with give and take. When you have a discussion paper, when you have a discussion being put forward by a government, immediately, if it's all one-sided, if it's all a heavy-handed approach by the government, it's going to be seen that way. If there are proposals on the alternatives in allowing members, private members, backbench members.... I don't like the term “backbenchers”. I think it's somewhat derogatory, somewhat negative, but we use it because it's common parlance. I know I use it frequently when I write documents. I don't like it, but I don't think there's a better alternative. Anyway, that would provide all those with the opportunities.
This is one such proposal that is actually to the benefit of the government. That's providing the priority that, when a government bill comes to a committee, it takes priority over all other business of that committee. It's something that certainly benefits a government, from an efficient, progression-of-business standpoint, allowing them the opportunity to make sure that you don't get bogged down by another study or another issue that's before a committee that would very likely prevent a bill from coming forward for any length of time, especially when we all sit on parliamentary committees.
This isn't my own committee—I sit on the official languages committee—but we undertake a number of studies, and sometimes they, too, take several months to undertake. If that delay happens with a government bill, we can certainly see the concern, from a government standpoint, that their legislation could unduly be hampered by committee business of other studies. Having that mechanism in place would certainly benefit a government, potentially at the expense of a committee. That's one of the trade-offs, certainly, that would have been debated, would have been discussed, and would have come to some form of resolution at the time.
There's another thing that we currently take for granted. I mentioned at the outset of my comments my thanks to our committee staff, the researchers and the clerks, and we somewhat take for granted that they're there. They provide guidance, they provide expertise, they provide advice, and we assume that they will always be there. That hasn't always been the case. That research ability, that research function, hasn't always been there, certainly not to the degree currently provided by House of Commons staff and the Library of Parliament.
The recommendation Walter Baker put forward was that research staff should be provided to the committees in addition to the staff from the parliamentary library and through special research budgets for individual investigations, as considered appropriate by the commissioners of internal economy, which is, again, the Board of Internal Economy as we know it today. Further, the research staff should be administered by the committee clerk on behalf of the House.
Again, it's something we take for granted today, the expert opinions and advice we are provided, but that hasn't always been the case. Certainly, I'm fairly confident this is something that would have received wide approval from all parliamentarians at the time, and would have certainly been approved at that point. Again, something that makes sense hasn't always been the case, and sometimes it does take time.
There are arguments, even in the current day, that we should see an even greater extension of research abilities given to parliamentary committees. That's a worthwhile discussion. The structure of committees has changed over the years, and perhaps it is an opportunity to have a discussion on whether more independent research guidance is to be there.
I did make mention a couple of minutes ago of the point about the government proposing to have all government bills take priority at committee. That's certainly to the benefit of the government. Again, you can't have a discussion paper if you don't go the opposite direction as well.
Another proposal by Walter Baker was number 33, which was that the government should be required to table a response to all committee reports within 21 sitting days. Now, 21 sitting days is no longer the case. I'm trying to think of the number off the top of my head, but it's sufficiently more than 21 sitting days. Again, this is a proposal that the government House leader makes that would bind his cabinet colleagues to respond to committee reports within slightly more than four calendar weeks, 21 sitting days. This is not a short process, and not an easy opportunity to respond to comprehensive committee reports, but nonetheless, an opportunity for committees to not only submit a meaningful contribution to a discussion, to a debate, but also a requirement that the government respond, and take action in response to those committees.
This is a very significant process, and a very important discussion, where we have this back and forth in an actual discussion paper that presents options on both sides that would benefit more than just the government, in the same way that you wouldn't want an opposition discussion paper only benefiting the opposition.
We often think that we'll be in office forever, I'm sure. I've never served on the government side, and have only been here a year and a half. I would hope that at some point, and we'll see what the next election brings, we would someday sit on the government side. The government members, I'm sure, would prefer to stay on their side of the House as long as they can, but as is the joy of democracy, we do lose elections from time to time, and we do take our opposite sides. We need to be sure that we have the opportunity to see ourselves in a position on both sides of the House.
It makes me think of some of my university days sitting through some of the lectures, which I'm sure were far more exciting than my current lecture I'm giving right now. I remember political philosophy classes, and there was a scholar by the name of Rawls who had the concept of the veil of ignorance. If you were going to be born into a society with a veil of ignorance, not knowing into what situation in life you'd be born into, what type of world would you like to see?
I think of that in relation to this. In any given election, you cannot be sure in what position in the House you will be sitting. You can't be sure you'll be a government minister, government backbencher, opposition frontbencher, critic, opposition backbencher, potentially a third party, or an independent. You don't have that knowledge.
As Rawls would write, being born with a veil of ignorance is like being elected with a veil of ignorance as well. What type of House? What type of Parliament do you want to enter into when you're not sure what side of the House you will be sitting on? As I've gone through this report, I think we've illustrated that. Let's have a discussion where we can see either side from either perspective, not one that's going to be unilaterally to the benefit of the opposition or the government.
My colleague , who has now been replaced by and as well, did talk a little bit about the estimates process.
The estimates process is a fascinating beast. It truly is. Members may recall that, during the last supply bill, I raised a point of order. I had some significant concerns with the way in which that supply bill was being used to legislate by means of the estimates. The Speaker ruled against it, with some precedent, as is his duty, but it was nonetheless an important discussion on the important usage and in some cases potentially misuse of the estimates process.
The estimates are a long-time challenge for a government and for an opposition. Some colleagues will know a gentleman by the name of Hugh Segal. He served in the Senate, the other place, for a little over 10 years I believe. He is now the master of Massey College in Toronto.
I knew Senator Segal as a professor at Queen's University. I had the privilege of taking a course with him when I was doing graduate studies there. He had a distinct interest in the estimates process, especially what's called the deemed rule, which says estimates are deemed to have been reported back to the House by a certain date if the committee hasn't done so.
His concern with that rule is that it goes against the principle of parliamentary supremacy over the purse, the principle that all government spending must have parliamentary approval. Of course, being far more knowledgeable than I am, he would go back to the Magna Carta, which I think has discussed in past meetings. I'm not nearly as familiar with the Magna Carta as my colleague Garnett would be, so I won't go into that, but Senator Segal would highlight the fact that the deemed rule, the deemed principle, goes against some of that primacy of Parliament having that authority over the purse.
Certainly, it was under a Liberal government that the change was made, and I would point out that it was with opposition agreement. It was the opposition Conservatives at the time under the Right Honourable Bob Stanfield, as he was named after leaving politics. That's an example of a situation directly related to the estimates where a significant change was made, one that by some arguments could offend the principles of parliamentary supremacy of the Magna Carta even. It was, nonetheless, made with the consent of opposition parties, with some discussion, with some give and take.
That change was made in the early seventies. I believe it was 1972. I believe it was actually a minority Parliament at that time post-1972, a time in which the then prime minister Trudeau's minority had about two seats more than Stanfield's Conservatives at the time, but nonetheless that was in the early seventies. This paper we're discussing right now is in the late seventies, 1979.
The proposals that are made in this paper in relation to the estimates are interesting because we will recognize some of these changes from our current operation.
The first proposal under the subject of supply—“supply” being another word for the estimates concept—is at point 37. “At the nomination of the Leader of the Opposition, two departments should be exempted from the end of June deadline, subject only to the Government's right to move closure”. That provides an opportunity to have a little more discussion, a little more debate that can occur on those issues.
Another point is that the departmental estimates should be debatable on allotted days with questions put 15 minutes before adjournment hour.
Allotted days, in current form referred to as opposition days, are very much a function of the supply process though, of the estimates process. In traditional debate, it would be focused on the estimates and the processes within them. Now we see that process moved to a far more policy or political standpoint rather than one based on supply. That certainly has changed the functioning of those days and certainly hasn't seen a rule change associated with our Standing Orders change but has nonetheless changed how those operate.
Another point, the third recommendation on the subject of supply—and again it's one that we're aware of and we've seen not in the most recent supply period but in the previous one—is that notices of opposition or committee reports eliminating part of an item or vote should be procedurally acceptable and put to a vote in the House. These are opposed items that we see from time to time in the House of Commons in the supply process when that happens.
It's basically making a disagreement with an element of supply, and incidentally as well, one cannot increase the supply to a department, one can only decrease it. There have been situations in the past where symbolically a department's estimates have been decreased by $1. That certainly has no meaningful impact but it's an argument made that there's a disagreement by the committee, a disagreement by the House, with that particular department for one reason or another.
It could be that the funding is actually too low in that department. That has happened in the past where committees have actually decreased a department's estimates by $1 but with the argument that it's a symbolic gesture.
I know in the past, two former Governor Generals ago, I believe it was under Governor General Clarkson, the committee decreased the Governor General's budget by I believe around 10% as an argument against spending that was undertaken at Rideau Hall at that time. It received great coverage in the media at the time but it was significantly more of a symbolic gesture, although that decrease would have affected the operation of Rideau Hall at the time.
Another issue is that whenever you have a long report you always need a miscellaneous category at the end, and this report is no different. You can't always have everything neatly in one or two categories, so having a miscellaneous category is always a good option. He makes the observation in his introduction, “Many observers have concluded that speeches in the House of Commons are too long, and frequently too repetitive and without a strict regard for relevancy.” I'm sure some people are thinking that may apply to me at this very point.
The recommendation was made by Walter Baker at the time to limit the length of speeches in the House to 20 minutes from the present 40. Of course, we know that was eventually adopted.
What I think is perhaps missing from the discussion is the additional time that's included in those debates as well with questions and answers. A 20-minute speech does provide an additional 10 minutes, a 30-minute contribution to the House. I know there are some who would appreciate the opportunity to speak significantly longer than 20 minutes in the House. I know one colleague from my side, and I can think of a certain colleague from the Liberal side, who have meaningful contributions that could significantly take up longer than 20 minutes, and if given the opportunity, I think they would enjoy that.
We do have some mechanisms in the House that allow for unlimited speeches in the House and I think that is an important note we need to make. For example, the Leader of the Opposition or the Prime Minister on a matter can speak for an unlimited period of time. There are situations where the first speaker to a bill or a motion does have the opportunity to speak to an unlimited time.
I think those things are important to have, and again, it represents a bit of a back and forth, a bit of a discussion, in which both the government and the opposition have the opportunity to have their say.
The second point that's made within this miscellaneous category is that.... It's point number 42. I think this is interesting because it makes a recommendation but then it doesn't provide a lot of further information to go with it.
It's on the rules of relevancy and repetition. The recommendation is simply, “The rules of relevancy and non-repetition in debate should be enforced.” It doesn't spell out how and under what circumstances something is repetitive. Is it repetition within a single speech? Is it repetition by one's self from a former speech in a current speech? Is it repetition within the House as a whole? Is someone putting forward new points or not?
It doesn't clarify that, and I think, in the current day, we could still have that debate. If I want to give a bit of a spoiler alert going forward, one of the next things I want to talk about is Standing Order 11. Standing Order 11 includes the component of relevancy and non-repetition. I'm going to be talking about that a little bit more, not specifically on that side of things, but on the other half of Standing Order 11. It's one of those issues that we should have a debate on and we should have a discussion on. What does constitute this?
I think we've probably all sat in the House on some matters that may be seen as routine, may be seen as a little bit mundane and a little bit grey. Why are we debating this time and time again? We may see some elements of repetition, some relevancy, called into order there. Perhaps it is worth a discussion on how we can change Standing Order 11, how we can change the interpretation and the application of it.
As it stands today, the Speaker and former Speakers for many years have ruled with great latitude, both in repetition and relevancy, to the point that in almost every situation it's simply a nudge or a stern warning to return to relevancy and to the question at hand, rather than a meaningful impact. There's a discussion that could be had there. Again, this was 1979. We're here nearly 38 years later, and we're still having that. It doesn't mean we shouldn't have the debate. It just means that it has been a repetitive debate for a period of time.
Before I move on from the position paper, I do think it's worthwhile to talk about the conclusion and the final comments that Walter Baker shared in this position paper:
Most of the procedures represent added opportunities for the House in general and the Opposition in particular. The time available for government business would, in compensation, expand slightly with the shortening of speech timing and a reduction in the number of Opposition Days. In general, it is hoped the changes will make the House of Commons more searching in its enquiries, and more focused in its debates.
There we have it as a real summation of the purpose of a meaningful discussion paper. Yes, the government is seeking something. The government in 1979, under the Honourable Walter Baker and Prime Minister Joe Clark, is seeking something. They're seeking a little bit more efficiency with debates, a little bit more time that they can have government orders in the House, whether it be government bills, whether it be government procedures. In the alternative, they're opening up the process, whether it be for private members' business or whether it be for committee work. They're making it harder on themselves, in a way, but they're also getting something in return. That's the point, I think, of an effective discussion paper; it's an effective opportunity to really have a meaningful contribution. That's where I hope we can go with this committee. That's really where I hope we can go with this study.
I'm not going to repeat what Mr. Christopherson said yesterday, but I would note that even the delivery of the discussion paper makes it challenging to go forward in a meaningful way. If we can at least come to an agreement to moving forward and have a discussion without the threat of a guillotine cutting off debate on this matter in favour of an individual proposal that would benefit only one party....
I'm going through my notes here, and I notice that I included another quote.
My riding is Perth—Wellington. Beautiful Perth—Wellington is home to the Stratford Festival, which I would encourage all members to come and visit. The Stratford Festival is kind enough to provide two complimentary tickets to parliamentarians. I would encourage members to take advantage of that.
I'm reminded—I think my staff threw this in here—of a quote from the Bard:
Therefore, since brevity is the soul of wit,
And tediousness the limbs and outward flourishes,
I will be brief.
Perhaps.
I did give a bit of a spoiler alert. We all have our favourite standing orders. We all have a standing order that, from time to time, we like to read, do research on, and look at when we can't fall asleep at night.
I'm sure that goes for everyone and not just me, right?
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Exactly. I got distracted by my dear colleagues.
There is an interesting thing about the concept of naming. We talked a little bit—and I appreciated the interventions from my colleagues—on how these types of things can be used in provincial legislatures to basically cause, if not a disruption, at least an awareness to an issue at hand. No one is going to disrupt the proceedings, disrupt the flow of the House of Commons for no purpose whatsoever. That doesn't benefit anyone. That doesn't benefit the perpetrator or the government; it's simply not the case. There's always a reason to do so, whether it's to delay legislation, or to bring the media awareness or the public awareness, which I think Mr. Blaikie noted very well there, as well.
One of the challenges I think with the specific issue of Standing Order 11, with the concept of naming and removing MPs from the House of Commons in the way it's evolved and developed, is that public awareness side of things. We talk a little bit about the relative disuse of this concept in the early part of Confederation. It peaked from time to time with some exciting process, but something happened in the 1970s that really caused this issue to spike. Between 1978 and 1986, a total of 23 members of Parliament were named during that eight-year period, a significant increase from all the years prior combined. A significant number of members were named, beginning in 1978. This then begged the question of, what was so significant about the late 1970s that all of a sudden we saw a significant change?
CPAC, the televising of Parliament, was happening around that exact time. One of those things, when you're making these changes, is the law of unintended consequences. This is one great example. Opening up the doors of Parliament and bringing in the cameras was not an uncontroversial thing at the time. It was a significant controversial issue. If we look to the other place, the other place still isn't televised, and here we are in 2017. It shows the controversy that can go with making changes to the way the government operates, the way the House of Commons operates. The change in the late 1970s to televise has certainly provided members of Parliament with the opportunity to get a bit of publicity, to get a bit of opportunity to make the local news that night, which is one of the reasons why we saw so many members in this eight-year period being named by the Speaker, being removed, forcing a vote and disrupting Parliament—it was good TV. If we look at regular debate on CPAC outside of the one hour period with S.O. 31s and question period, there's some interesting information being shared, but I suspect that CPAC's viewership is somewhat lower at all times outside that period. Don't take this as gospel, but I believe from a past committee appearance that CPAC has about 90,000 viewers during that one hour of question period, which is by far its highest viewership of the day. It does show that people are tuning in to a very specific aspect of parliamentary debate. If there's an opportunity to cause a bit of excitement, members will be inclined to do so. I think this is the case with that we saw beginning in 1978 to 1986; this was being used as a tool to draw attention and to draw a bit of publicity.
It's interesting how so many things that we discuss in this committee dovetail. This discussion of the concept of naming was then addressed by the McGrath report in 1985. The recommendation that it made was that the need for a vote, the need for a minister of the crown to move a motion, should be removed. That change was implemented initially on a temporary basis in the Standing Orders. We see this from time to time: a standing order is amended and given a sunset, given a temporary status, to see how a standing order works, to see how a change works. That was what happened with the naming, as recommended by the McGrath report. At that time—June 3, 1987—the changes were made to the current wording that we today have in the House of Commons.
In the temporary period, there was only one MP who was named at that time. We already started to see a bit of a decrease. Those changes were made in 1987. We're currently in 2017, 30 years later. There have only been 12 namings in that period of time, so they're relatively rare in that period.
Even more interesting is that, in that 30-year period, all the namings took place in less than 10 years, in a relatively short period from March 1993 to December 6, 2002. In each case, the reason for the naming was the same, and it would be the same in pretty much any case, and it was for defying the authority of the Speaker. We as parliamentarians elect our Speaker. Even before the Speakers were elected, when they were effectively appointed and then moved on a voice vote, the Speaker was the ultimate authority in the House of Commons.
Speakers are put there to maintain order, yes, but also to serve as the defender of the rights of parliamentarians. Sometimes I think the Speaker gets unfairly painted as a referee, and people in the public, people watching on TV, see the Speaker as a referee, as someone who is trying to maintain order in the House of Commons. Really, the Speaker's role is so much more than that. The Speaker's role is to defend each and every parliamentarian, defend our privileges as MPs in the ability to do our duty. We've seen that in the past when the Speaker has ruled, made comments on questions of privilege, even on points of order as well, his duty is in that exception.
When we put the Speaker into that position, we elect him or her—and we have had a female Speaker, Jeanne Sauvé. It would be nice to see more female chair occupants, in politics in general but in the House of Commons speakership position as well.
When we put the Speaker in there, we invest him or her with a certain degree of authority. When members defy that authority, it is a blight on members as a whole and on the entire House. When members defy the Speaker, as in the example cited in the naming convention, there has to be some form of issue to be had. That's what happened in this case. There were 12 different examples, and in each example, the member was named for defying the authority of the Speaker.
I always like numbers. I always like to point out party affiliations and where these MPs came from. There were 12 MPs. Half of them, six, were from one political party, the Bloc Québecois. Of the remaining six, four were from the Reform Party and the remaining two were from the New Democrats. It is an interesting distribution. At the time, they were all opposition MPs. There were never government MPs named. Again, that makes sense from a procedure standpoint.
Many of the specific issues don't really necessarily have defying the authority of the Speaker as a starting point. No one is going to get up and simply defy the Speaker without a reason to do so. Going back to some of this conversation of dilatory motions, about disrupting the flow of the House of Commons, we have a reason for it. In each of these cases it typically linked to unparliamentary language, but there's a reason for that unparliamentary language.
The first example in this 10-year period was on March 24, 1993, in the 34th Parliament under the speakership of John Fraser, who incidentally was the first elected Speaker in the House of Commons. He was fisheries minister beforehand. I wasn't around in 1986 when he was elected Speaker. There was an argument that he was elected Speaker because he was seen as one of the people least likely to be favourable to the government of the day. There is some gamesmanship that can happen from time to time.
What happened in the first example, under the current Standing Orders, was that an NDP MP by the name of David Barrett, whose riding was Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, was heckling. He was implying that the House leader of the day Harvie Andre had lied. He used unparliamentary language, and that's not a word that parliamentarians can use in a debate. He implied that the government House leader did so. That was uncalled for, and Speaker Fraser demanded that the word be withdrawn. Mr. Barrett, refused to do so, was named, and was suspended for the remainder of the sitting day.
The interesting thing is that it wasn't that he used words that were unparliamentary. From time to time we sometimes slip up, and we sometimes say things that we ought not to say, both in the House and outside of the House. Typically, if we do so, and we're called out on it, we apologize. We withdraw the comment. The question is, why wouldn't you? Why wouldn't you, in some of these cases, do that? Often there's a reason.
In this particular case, he was making a point regarding NAFTA. The House of Commons was debating, at the time, the ratification of NAFTA, the member was referring to guerrilla tactics regarding the legislation, and it was one particular way that he wasn't going to be able to stop the legislation from going through. The PC Party at the time had a majority. He was using the concept of naming, the concept of causing a disruption, to disrupt the flow. It's an example, again, of the unintended consequences of an effort to increase decorum, but at the same time it gives the opposition, any member of Parliament, the opportunity to make a point of something.
In 1993, of course, we had the famous election in October. I was in grade 3 at the time, but I remember that election well. That was the first election I remember watching on TV. I became interested in politics incidentally in June of '93 watching the PC leadership convention on TV, and watching Kim Campbell beat out Jean Charest as leader of the PC Party. That was my first hook into politics, and I have been interested in it ever since. That was in June. Later in October, being a young expert on politics, as I thought at the time, I watched the election results come in, and saw the PC Party be reduced to two seats, Elsie Wayne and Jean Charest, at the time. We recently lost Elsie Wayne; she passed away not too long ago.
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I wasn't encouraging an intervention. I was just making note of the controversial nature of the Wheat Board to our western colleagues. Of course, from an Ontario MP it was not an issue. Again, the purpose here is that it's an example of the use of a standing order to cause challenges to the House.
The next example is probably one of the most emotional, I would say, and that would be on November 2, 1995. We all know that three days prior to that was the Quebec referendum. It was an extremely emotional time in Canadian politics and Canadian life for all colleagues, whether they were Quebec members or not. It was an extremely controversial and emotional point in time.
On that date, November 2, 1995, there were two Bloc MPs who were named at the same time for basically the same issue, which was defying the authority of the Speaker, and more specifically, accusing the deputy prime minister of the day, Sheila Copps, of lying to the House. Again, it was a very serious charge in the House, and something that we do not do. Both members were named for the same reason. They were only given one opportunity to withdraw, and after that they were quickly removed.
The MPs were Gilles Duceppe and Michel Bellehumeur. Monsieur Duceppe, of course, wasn't leader of the Bloc at the time, but he was nonetheless a prominent parliamentarian as the first Bloc MP elected. He made note of the emotion of this challenge. He said, and I quote, “We are in pretty tense times for our nation. If it surprises you that I am going to act as quickly as I am, I do so knowing full well that my primary responsibility in the House of Commons is to see to it that the institution itself is respected by all of us.” That's a pretty serious accusation.
The response this time was certainly well picked up by the media, which I think was part of the reason this happened. All MPs of course have parliamentary privilege. We cannot be sued or held accountable for words that are spoken in the House of Commons in criminal or civil proceedings.
Certainly, it was not lost on the media at the time that a lot of the comments that were being made directly to the then deputy prime minister would have been seriously libellous had they been said outside the House of Commons foyer. It's something that is very controversial, but allowing it to be done in the House of Commons means that it can be picked up by the media and reported in the media, and it means that the immunity of the member having said the offending statements is protected. I think that's another interesting situation in which we have a standing order rule of the House being used for alternate means.
Moving forward, on April 24, 1996, a Reform Party MP by the name of Randy White accused the prime minister of the day, Mr. Chrétien, of lying to Canadians on the subject of the GST during the 1993 election campaign. Once again, it was used as a tactic by the opposition party—they were actually the third party at the time—to bring about an issue. The point at the time was to focus on all the reversals of the then-government, from their election promises to what was actually happening. They were a couple of years into the mandate, and they were demonstrating what was happening at the time. That was the example involving Randy White.
Another example, and one that I find interesting because I have a great deal of respect for the member who was named, is that of a gentleman by the name of Chuck Strahl. We know him from his lengthy service in this House. His son, Mark, is now a member of our caucus. He is certainly a well-respected gentleman and someone for whom I have a great deal of respect.
It was interesting.
It's an example where a rather innocuous comment initially uttered by Mr. Strahl kind of built on itself, and eventually it got to the point where he was therefore named. We know it's not in the Standing Orders, but in O'Brien and Bosc there is a comment that you can't do indirectly what you can't do directly. That's kind of the challenge that Mr. Strahl found himself caught up in.
He was questioning the Minister of National Defence on the Somalia inquiry, which was a very controversial issue back in 1997, and he used the words “cover-up” and “whitewash”, the implication, of course, being that the government and the minister had covered something up and had whitewashed something. It's not as bad as some of the words we'd use from time to time, such as “lying”, accusing someone of lying, but nonetheless these wouldn't be the perfect words to use.
The argument expressed at the time by Mr. Strahl was that they weren't really his words and that he was actually quoting from Justice Létourneau. The full quote was, “I won't be the instrument of a whitewash in this way. It will be impossible for us to delve into this issue”. He was quoting a third party, but again, the rule of not doing indirectly what you can't do directly comes into play.
For those who know , I think he and his father are very distinguished people. Mr. Strahl, senior, made the comment that he would “reluctantly withdraw” his comments, but interestingly, that wasn't good enough for the Speaker at the time. He felt that the qualifier “reluctantly” wasn't appropriate given the severity of the comments, so the Speaker at the time, Speaker Parent, took a very rigid approach. Since Mr. Strahl was not willing to fully withdraw the comments, but only did so reluctantly, he was ordered removed from the chamber, and he was—again, signifying the challenge of navigating some of these parliamentary reasons.
The eighth example of a naming during this period was of a New Democrat MP, Svend Robinson, member for Burnaby—Douglas in British Columbia. Sometimes, when we hear words in the House of Commons, we sit back and think, “Is that parliamentary or not?” Often, it's pretty clear that the words are unparliamentary, and they are dealt with very quickly. In this case, Mr. Robinson referred to the concept of “treasonous”, a pretty loaded word. It's pretty clear right off the bat that that's going to be considered unparliamentary language to be used in the House of Commons. In fact, this is one of the few examples where the implication of lying or not telling the truth is something different being used in this case.
In this case, it's more interesting. The media didn't actually pay much attention to it. The suggestion, from the small number of media that did pay attention to this exact issue, was that the member in question was more prone to these types of accusations—“theatrics” was the word that was used in one article.
You almost have to wonder whether, after this relatively short period of time, it's becoming less common, because its usefulness is being used up.
The ninth time the naming happened, it was a Bloc MP by the name of Michel Gauthier, the MP for Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean. I think it was actually a rather clever exchange between MP Gauthier and the Prime Minister. Mr. Gauthier probably found himself a victim of just not knowing when to stop and when to sit down. Prime Minister Chrétien and Mr. Gauthier were both warned by the Speaker to stop using the word “hypocrite” in their exchange. They were both using it back and forth, despite interventions from the Speaker. Prime Minister Chrétien eventually did stop saying “hypocrite”; Gauthier did not. The Speaker pushed him on it and asked him to withdraw. He didn't, and he was named.
This actually got an interesting little reaction in different places. Had Twitter been involved in the 1990s, it would have been a bit of a Twitter firestorm when these things happened, but it wasn't, so we rely on print media to get an impression of how these types of things were happening.
Paul Wells wrote a little bit about it in an article in the National Post at the time. He wrote, “It appears Parliament is falling apart.” He said, “It was the ugliest Question Period in 20 years”. I'm not sure you can objectively state how bad a question period was and state definitively that it was the ugliest in 20 years. Nonetheless, it was a bit of an acknowledgement from the media that this could well be seen as a negative rather than a positive opportunity to bring attention to an issue.
In this example, why it may have seemed more of a negative response was that there wasn't a key policy issue. There wasn't a real purpose in Mr. Gauthier being named. There wasn't any benefit to him to bring the public's attention to it.
Moving on the 10th example, it's the same Speaker. We see most of these names under one Speaker, Monsieur Parent, all but two. The first was Mr. Fraser, and the last was a Deputy Speaker.
The 10th example is Jim Abbott, the member for Kootenay—Columbia, in British Columbia. I think it was last week we saw Mr. Abbott taking in question period from the gallery. It was nice to see him join us on the Hill a few years after his retirement.
In February 2000, the House was dealing with a rather controversial issue dealing with an HRDC program. The Minister of Human Resources Development Canada at the time was Jane Stewart. They were asking her about challenges with a program. The minister said:
Members of the party over there say they would like to kill these programs, but yet, as I pointed out individual members, the member for Skeena, the member for Nanaimo-Cowichan, and even the member for Kootenay—Columbia, keep calling my office saying “Can't you please hurry and approve the application?”
Mr. Abbott, of course, didn't like the fact that he was singled out and didn't agree with the minister's statement, so he quickly rose and accused her. He said, “That is a lie.” Again, it was a pretty clear example of unparliamentary language, so quickly, the Speaker rose and ordered him to withdraw the comments. He didn't and was quickly ordered to go out, and he left.
What I find interesting about this example is that in retrospect, the minister actually noted to the House that she had misspoken and that the individual member hadn't ever contacted her on that matter. There was a bit of discussion in the media about the fact that if we wanted to parse words, what she said was not true. It was a lie, so to speak. Again, it went beyond the veracity of the statement and reflected on decorum in the House. It didn't have to do with whether something was factual. It had to do with the words used and how they were dealt with in the House of Commons.
The 11th example comes from Madame Suzanne Tremblay, a Bloc MP from Rimouski-Neigette-Et-La Mitis. It's interesting, actually, to see some of these riding names and how they have changed over the years. Her issue was the appropriateness of how these things come apart. She was threatened to withdraw her comments about implying an untruth.
She went on to say, “This is the 21st century and we are entitled to the truth in this place.” Even that wasn't really using unparliamentary language, but the phrase that went with it was deemed unparliamentary. It warranted her being named and withdrawing for the remainder of the day.
Again, at that point there was no real significant policy issue that was associated with it. There was no media coverage, and as an effective deterrent it, obviously, simply wasn't happening at that point. It was an example of the way in which the usefulness of the traditional technique waned over the period of time, to the point that the very last time that an MP has been named in order to be withdrawn from the House of Commons was on December 6, 2002. The MP in question was Yvan Loubier, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, a Bloc Québécois MP from Quebec.
It's interesting because it was actually Deputy Speaker Kilger who had the opportunity to name the member. Again, it related to unparliamentary language, the word “liar” in this case. It was, from a national perspective, a relatively non-issue, but from a local perspective, it had to deal with an important issue in his riding. It had to do with the accreditation of a college in Saint-Hyacinthe, and it had to deal with the Minister of Agriculture basically certifying that college in his riding, so it was not a national issue.
In this case, it gave the member an opportunity to really raise a significant profile for himself defending a specific issue back in his riding. He used the standing order to raise the issue to get some coverage and to make it happen.
As I mentioned earlier, this is certainly at odds with what goes on in the Ontario legislature. The Ontario Speakers, Mr. Levac and Mr. Peters before him, were very strict in terms of these types of instances. When a person is named it is expected that he or she will be removed quickly and that it is done quickly. This happens on a relatively regular basis, so much so that in the last couple of weeks we did see an example.
One of the most famous provincial examples, though, is the one where an individual member using a standing order, using a technique at his disposal, made a significant change to government policy, to government legislation. It goes back to what has been raised before about how the Standing Orders, how the privileges of our Standing Orders and the privileges of this procedure, allow us to do certain things.
The MPP in question was Alvin Curling, who was a well-known Liberal MPP in Ontario. It was the Mike Harris government of the day. If Mr. were still here, I'm sure he would remind us that he too was in the opposition at that time, and significantly opposed some of these measures.
The opposition members were trying to prevent Bill 26, an omnibus bill, from passing. Basically, MPPs were refusing to vote, and were being, one by one, escorted out by the Sergeant-at-Arms after being named. The idea from an opposition standpoint was to delay the vote as much as possible. As each MPP refused to rise to vote, the Speaker would order that they be named, and the Sergeant-at-Arms would remove them.
The problem was that, at the time, his Liberal colleagues neglected to tell Mr. Curling about the process. They neglected to tell him they were planning a procedural game, and that they were planning to refuse to vote and be escorted out. At the time, if you didn't vote you were offending the privileges of the House.
As his colleagues were all refusing to vote and being named, it got to him, and he simply sat there and would not move. When the Sergeant-at-Arms came to him and asked him to move, he simply would not move. The process at the time was that the Sergeant-at-Arms would then inform the Speaker that force would have to be used to remove the member. The challenge was that force had never actually been used in the Ontario legislature to actually remove a member.
Here we had an example of an MPP—a distinguished, long-serving MPP, Mr. Curling—who was sitting there and not moving. The Sergeant-at-Arms honestly didn't know what to do, so they actually called over to Westminster in the U.K. to get advice on what ought to be done. Apparently, the suggestion at the time was not to physically remove a member, but simply to wait it out and eventually, he would be removed.
The outcome was that eventually, he did leave of his own volition several hours later, but not before there was a significant amount of public attention. This was used by the opposition parties as an opportunity to raise awareness and to get some small concessions from the government on that particular omnibus bill that was being offered by the government at the time.
Again, another provincial example of the same idea happened in 2009. An MPP from Sarnia-Lambton by the name of Bob Bailey, a very soft-spoken but thoughtful MPP, made the mistake of calling the premier a liar. He then provided the further explanation that he wasn't just a liar, but that he was a cowardly liar, which served to add fuel to the fire. The Speaker named him and ordered him withdrawn from the legislature. It was interesting that it was actually the acting Speaker at the time, who was also a Conservative MPP, so there was an example of a Conservative MPP naming a Conservative MPP. Again, it was very much an opportunity for an opposition MPP in a majority context to raise an issue and have it brought forward. In a newspaper article afterwards, he wrote:
I took the drastic step of being kicked out to make my point that people need to be heard on the issue. I have heard citizens in my riding loud and clear on what they think of the HST. I strongly believe that members of government need to take the tax bill out of Toronto and give Ontarians a chance to comment.
Again, the issue is not so much about the issue at hand—the HST, which of course, eventually went through—but the opportunity to actually raise awareness and make something happen.
What we've seen here is a bit of context from the provincial standpoint, which is again a more regimented context from the federal standpoint. It brings us back to the discussion at hand. We're talking about the Standing Orders and our procedures in the House and we're looking at them from a variety of different standpoints. The naming convention, or the opportunity to name an MP, is still on the books, but it's not being used and it hasn't been used since 2002. I think we can all think of times when there's been no doubt that a Speaker could have applied the naming convention, whether it was the current Speaker or former Speakers. We've now gone through a period of three separate Speakers, Mr. Speaker Milliken, Mr. Speaker Scheer, and Mr. Speaker Regan, who have all had the opportunity to use this tool, but they haven't.
Why haven't they? It's in the Standing Orders. It's a significant tool, but this raises the question of whether it has simply fallen into a practice or a convention of misuse. That's what I would argue is happening and it shows the way in which our Standing Orders evolve, often without a conscious effort and often without MPs actively debating and amending them.
I would cite David Docherty on some of this. He has written a book, Legislatures, for the University of British Columbia Press series on the democratic audit. He wrote that evaluating a Speaker's success depends largely "on whom any decision favours”.
I find that interesting because a Speaker who is shown to be too favourable to one side or the other will quickly lose authority. Therefore, when we're evaluating these different tools that are being used, we have to see how they're implemented, how they're used by different Speakers, and whether they're used in a positive or a negative way. Some of the challenges with a standing order provide more full challenges as well.
Earlier today in the House, we debated the challenge of two MPs who missed a vote in the House of Commons about whether their privileges should be affected.
If we bring that back to our Standing Orders, and to this particular one, if an MP is ordered withdrawn from the House, their privileges cannot be exercised. An MP cannot vote after being removed from the House of Commons.
Therefore, we think of examples in minority parliaments where this could be abused, potentially, in terms of having an MP removed from the House in the wake of a very significant vote, a confidence vote, for example. It could be a significant challenge to the proper operation of the House but also to the privileges of individual MPs.
Being in Standing Orders, it would be a tough argument to make from a privilege standpoint but at the same time from a political standpoint and from that of a member. It's a challenging thing, and it could also be an example of why some of this doesn't necessarily happen from time to time.
When we look at the other tools available to Speakers, they may find those opportunities more useful. For example, Mr. Speaker Milliken, who to date is Canada's longest-serving Speaker, had a unique opportunity to serve as Speaker in minority and majority contexts as well as in an opposition context as an opposition MP serving as a Speaker.
When an MP refused to withdraw an unparliamentary comment, he failed to recognize him or her going forward. When an MP would rise to speak, whether it was in question period or debate, he simply didn't recognize the MP. Again, a pretty significant deterrent, I would say, especially when MPs are eager to stand up in question period to make things happen.
Mr. Speaker Fraser, in the Mulroney years, used it only once. His argument was that he saw it as a challenge of allowing MPs to grandstand in the hope of gaining publicity. We've seen that throughout the years, and we're seeing this example going forward.
The final point I might make on this as well is that when we're looking at the specific issues in this case, it all had to deal with unparliamentary language. This was then dealt with...the authority of the chair and disregarding the authority of the chair.
The subject of decorum is much greater than simply unparliamentary language and whether or not some of these tools available for parliamentarians and the Speaker wouldn't serve an alternate purpose in decreasing decorum in the House of Commons.
I would also point out, before moving on, that in every case the Speaker never acts unilaterally. He or she—and, again, they were male Speakers—always gives the opportunity to withdraw. I think that's an important concept from a parliamentary democracy. We are all equals in the House of Commons. We are all elected independently, and we all make mistakes. It is important to provide the MP in question, if they have offended the rules of the House, offended the individuals in question, the opportunity to withdraw.
Going forward, I wouldn't want to speculate whether Mr. Speaker Regan will ever go down the road of using this tool. I think it's still on the Standing Orders, or it's something that would allow them to go that route if the decision is made.
I want to work through that specific issue because it's an example of a standing order that has evolved over the 149, almost 150, years of Confederation. It's evolved in written form in terms of the way it's structured; it's evolved in the usage in how it's applied; and it's evolved in the disuse in most recent years. It's an example that we need to be aware of when we're studying the issue at hand in that we don't go about changing standing orders without properly reviewing all the context, without properly viewing all the challenges that could be created in a change to a standing order.
I'm going to move from this point to another issue I have a personal interest in, and that's the election of the Speaker, which, again, is laid out in our Standing Orders.
It's been cited before by Mr. Blaikie and others coming out of the McGrath report. Even before that, I believe, a former Speaker actually recommended it in the 1970s, as well. His name escapes me at this point, but I wanted to cite a bit from an article.
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That sounds good. I look forward to this.
I want to thank the committee members for the introductions. I think it was a worthwhile discussion we just had. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for enabling that. I think it does give us a glimpse of where we want to get to by giving this committee the opportunity to actually have this discussion. Going back to the motion and the amendment, I think we can get to that point. Whether it's through the amendment to the motion or through alternative means, such as the special committee that's been proposed by the opposition and third party House leaders, I think we can get to that point. To enable this type of discussion is absolutely essential. I've enjoyed the discussion that has taken place.
The comment from Mr. Johns about question period and the ability to have that discussion goes back to one of the issues that we have regarding Parliament.
Parliament is both the building in which we currently sit but it's also an institution. It's an institution that has certain norms, certain practices. How those norms and practices evolve affects how we operate.
If we look at times past when MPs used to travel on the train together, there was a great deal of collegiality. For several days, MPs would be on the train together and they had that opportunity to interact. We don't have that opportunity anymore. We have short flights. We have individual car rides. We don't have that opportunity to interact.
Mr. Johns' point is that it is essential to have the opportunity to go to question period and to flag down a minister. I can think of at least two examples, one an immigration issue and one a public service issue, where we've had that opportunity to speak with ministers. I really appreciate that insight.
I want to bring us back to the concept of the election of the Speaker of the House of Commons. It's one of those issues that has peaked my interest.
Just as many academics look at different things to study, I like to look at issues that don't have a lot written on them, the gaps in the literature, things that may be tangentially touched on but never actually directly discussed or reviewed.
In 2013, I co-published an article entitled “Legislative Dissent Without Reprisal? An Alternative View of Speaker Selection”. For those who wish to read the article in its entirety, it's published in The Journal of Legislative Studies, December 2013, volume 19, issue 4. It is available online. It's available for free download as well.The Journal of Legislative Studies provides for that.
Incidentally, The Journal of Legislative Studies is an academic journal, but it's actually edited by Lord Norton of Louth, who is a member of the British House of Lords' constitution committee. Later, I may touch on some of the United Kingdom examples of that.
The election of the Speaker is a fascinating concept and a fascinating procedure. Traditionally, the Speaker was elected on the nomination of the prime minister, or by the premier in a provincial legislature. That has been the case for a lengthy period of time, since Confederation.
At the federal level this was changed in 1986, following the McGrath report, and when Speaker Bosley gave up the position, Speaker Fraser was elected. In some of the provincial legislatures it took a little more time to get to that point. In Ontario it was first implemented in 1990.
My interest, however, is not only in the procedural element of the election of the Speaker, although that's important and certainly we'll touch on that, but in the issues that surround the election of Speaker and how the election of the Speaker is really dealt with in different examples.
One of the things I like to do is to look at provincial versus federal examples. I think the provincial example in Ontario of the election of the Speaker of the Ontario legislature is informative of how we can see this procedural process really affect the way in which MPPs function at the provincial level.
Very little research has ever been done on the election of the Speaker. It's largely dealt with in textbook format. It's mentioned that the Speaker is elected, but there hasn't ever been an in-depth study of the election and how it's undertaken.
For my interest, I think we need to see the election of the Speaker as more than simply a procedural, individually focused exercise, but rather as a collective exercise by a legislature. Specifically, I make the argument that the election of the Speaker through a secret ballot can actually be seen as a form of legislative dissent against the governing party by the party's own individual members of Parliament.
The example of the Ontario legislature is informative about this. I'll cite some federal examples as we go through as well. The process that the provincial legislature follows is informative about how we go about it.
To structure our thinking on this, we need to think of some of the thoughts and considerations that go into the election of the Speaker. From a government perspective, the government is eager to see a Speaker of the House of Commons or the Speaker of a legislature who is somewhat loyal to the governing party or at least open to working with the governing party. The opposition, of course, would prefer to see a Speaker who is perhaps more aggressive, perhaps more open-minded, and more eager to work in a maverick way.
In an ideal scenario, an opposition party would like to see an opposition MP as Speaker. There is no question of that. That would be the best scenario for an opposition party. In a majority government, that's very unlikely to happen. The next best scenario is seeing which of the government MPs or MPPs would be able to fill that role of being a more maverick Speaker.
The election of the Speaker is very important because of the format by which the Speaker is chosen. When we cast our votes for Speaker, we do so by a secret ballot. A secret ballot in the election of the Speaker is really the only time in our parliamentary careers when our votes are done by secret ballot. We don't vote on legislation by secret ballot. We don't vote in committee by secret ballot. It's done publicly, even if it's not always recorded. Typically on recorded division, names are recorded in the Journals. Sometimes we have voice votes when we don't force a recorded division, but typically even then, it's a pretty good indication of who is voting for whom, whether the opposition is voting in favour or against. For an individual MP, whether it's an opposition or a government MP, to vote against his or her party on a serious matter of government legislation is rare. We've seen some examples of it.
I haven't seen the statistics yet for the current Parliament. In former parliaments, we've seen different research done about which MPs are most likely to dissent from their party and what the loyalty index is for each example. In the last Parliament, there were actually some Conservative MPs who were highest on that list. In the current Parliament, I suspect there are a couple of Liberal MPs I could point to who are probably fairly high on that list, which is to their credit. However, we can see that because it's recorded in the Journals. It's recorded in the records of the debate. We know who votes for what piece of legislation because they rise in their place and do so.
When it comes to the election of the Speaker of the House or the Speaker of a legislature, we don't have that ability. No one but the individual member who marks their ballot—I was going to say “mark an X”, but now it's a ranked ballot, so it's to mark numbers—knows how they voted and no one knows the outcome. In fact, we don't even know the total numbers. We don't know what the first ballot or the first preference was, or the second ballot, or the third ballot. We don't know that and we don't know how many ballots it would take in the current situation, in which we don't have multiple ballots and we have a single alternative vote.
We can see the election of the Speaker as potential for a private act of dissent in which an individual parliamentarian, whether at the federal level or provincial level, can vote against their party's preferred outcome, can vote against what their leaders would ideally like to see.
I want to walk through the Ontario example. The federal example has some great opportunities and I'm going to discuss that at the end to see this standpoint, but the Ontario example is better. There are a few reasons I say that.
I don't know if I could consider myself a political scientist, using the word “scientist”, because I don't think political scientists are actually scientists but it's the word we use. However, wherever possible, trying to conduct a natural experiment in the real world is tough unless you can control some of the variables. Ontario provides a unique example for a number of reasons.
First of all, in the years since the secret ballot for the election of Speaker has been introduced, we've seen only majority governments in the years we studied in this article.
Second, it also provides us the opportunity to look at each political party having held government in Ontario: the New Democrats, the Ontario PC Party, and the Ontario Liberal Party. It provides us an opportunity to compare and contrast the election of a Speaker under each of those scenarios.
Third, Ontario has one of Canada's largest legislatures, second only to the federal House of Commons. It allows us to look at a large parliament, a large legislature, which will allow us to see the challenges going forward.
Finally, it allows us to see a natural experiment in the legislature in the fact that in 1996, in preparation for the 1999 provincial election, the then Mike Harris government introduced what was called the Fewer Politicians Act. It was an act that decreased the number of MPPs in Ontario from 130 to 103. It allows us to look at the size of the legislature, caucus, and the cabinet to see whether that's a variable in the election of the Speaker, how we might see that dissent play out in the election of the Speaker.
Ontario wasn't the first legislature to move to the election by secret ballot. That lies with our federal Parliament. At the time that I published this paper, P.E.I. and Newfoundland had not had contested Speaker elections. I'm not sure if that has changed in the last three or four years, but I will double-check and report back to the committee so it has that information.
The introduction of the secret ballot changes the dynamics. We can test the likelihood that different issues would have on the dissent of parliamentarians. One thing you can look at is party popularity at the time of the Speaker's election. We can look at the size of the cabinet and whether that has an impact. The likelihood of joining cabinet would affect the determination of whether they even seek the position of Speaker, and the percentage of new MPs entering a legislature at any given time would certainly have an impact on it.
A secret ballot, though, is not a normal part of a Westminster parliament. It's somewhat foreign to our system. It's not something we would find anywhere else in the Standing Orders other than in regard to the election of the Speaker. We were starting to elect our Speaker by secret ballot in the mid-1980s, but we'd have to wait until 2009 in the United Kingdom at Westminster to see them elect their Speaker by secret ballot. It's not a common approach.
Speaker John Bercow was elected by secret ballot after a fairly significant expense scandal in the United Kingdom saw their Speaker resign. It was a fairly significant break from tradition to move to that approach in the United Kingdom. We are ahead of the times in the sense that we've had this experience for nearly 30 years in Canada, as opposed to a very short period, a single data point, in the United Kingdom.
Even initially when we moved to this approach in Canada and we saw the election of Mr. Speaker Fraser in 1986, it was kind of seen as a fluke. It was kind of seen as that okay, we'd done this once, that we'd had the show, but now we should move on. We'd go back to the normal process later on, that even if it were a secret ballot, there would only be one candidate put up, and the government would still control the process. That was very much the sense of what would happen. At the time, different academics and former parliamentarians conducted reviews of this and they very much said that this wasn't something that was going to last. It was not going to be something that took hold.
One individual reviewing it at the time, Ned Franks, or C.E.S. Franks, originally from Queen's and now professor emeritus there, wrote:
I have every optimism and every hope that in the future, the House, regardless of party stripe, will choose as Speaker somebody the House trusts and wants to have.… I think the Speaker enjoys the confidence of both sides of the House and has a power over the House through this method of election that the Speakers never had before. Therefore I consider that a real plus.
Of course that was tempered by the pessimism that it wouldn't continue on very much past that.
The introduction of the secret ballot did stick around. It did last, and then it was slowly adopted at the provincial legislatures as well. In Ontario, 1990 was the first example of the Speaker being elected by secret ballot. In previous times, the Speaker would be nominated by a government minister, typically by the premier, would be seconded by the leader of the opposition, and then would be unanimously voted on by the House. That was the usual practice of the House.
The last Speaker not to be elected by secret ballot in Ontario was a gentleman by the name of Hugh Edighoffer, who was coincidentally the MPP for Perth, my home riding at the time, a Liberal MPP who had served many years, but he was unanimously selected. There was no indication that he was a poor Speaker. In fact, he was very well respected as Speaker. He opted not to run again in 1990 and retired with great credit from his fellow parliamentarians. But there was a growing sense of a need to democratize the process. So, when the NDP was elected in 1990, it was certainly top of their agenda to see that democratization of the legislature.
I wish Mr. Christopherson were here this evening because I will actually quote some of his comments later from this article, and I think he would have appreciated that.
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That's good. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
As much as I have been looking forward to the opportunity, I'm also disappointed that Mr. isn't here. I thought he was providing us with a lot of great points. It has been a little while since I've had a chance at this. I think it was actually March 21 or whenever when I last had a chance to come up on the speakers list. I've had a chance to intervene and say a few words here and there, but this is the first chance I've had to take the floor.
This is great. I have some things I've been waiting to share with the committee in regard to some of the stuff that we've been hearing from Canadians in particular. I'd like to start by recapping a bit of the history of where we are and why we're here.
I think that's important to remember at this point, Mr. Chair. We've been through a number of iterations of this meeting, and I feel that we're stuck in the same place. I guess it's important for people to understand why that is.
When we started this meeting.... Was it March 21? Is that the right date? Yes? It was March 21. It was to be a two-hour meeting, right? It was at 11 a.m., and when we came in, we had the Elections Canada officials sitting at the end of the table, because we had been studying the Canada Elections Act and some of the changes that the CEO of Elections Canada proposed.
We were looking at those changes, trying to determine whether those were appropriate, and having what I would say was a good conversation and a good discussion about those changes. I think we were being quite productive and were working in a consensual fashion, where we were all coming to agreement on something and then moving forward. If we couldn't agree on something, we understood that maybe we'd set that aside. It seemed to work pretty well. It also seems to have been the practice that we've followed in this committee.
I've been here for I think coming up on four years now. It has been three or four years, for sure, and that's the way we've done things. I've been speaking to the members who have been on the committee a lot longer than I have. Mr. has been here for some time, and so has Mr. . Mr. , obviously, was a member from this side for some time. I sat with him on this committee. He has been here for some of this debate as well, and I think has contributed to it in an exemplary fashion and offered some great points and advice. In speaking to them, they've told me that for as long as they can remember as well, which is far longer than I can, that it has been that way, and it always seems to have worked.
When we came into this meeting on March 21, there had been this discussion paper while we were on our constituency week that had come out from the , which was seeking to make some of the changes that they had failed to make a couple of times before, with some other new ideas that no one had really seen.
As I outlined when I spoke earlier in this committee, I think I spoke for a couple of hours at that time..... That's not normally considered brief, but in terms of this meeting it might be the briefest intervention, or one of the briefest. What I outlined at that time in looking at the standing order changes that had been discussed and suggested during the take-note debate in the House of Commons on the Standing Orders—I believe it was a take-note debate—there was very little correlation between that document compiled by our clerk about what was suggested there and what was in this so-called discussion paper from the .
We've still never had a real explanation of what the basis for that is. We were told that it was election promises, somehow. I didn't see very many of those things in their election promises either. It just came out of thin air.
We went into the meeting to discuss Elections Canada. We had the officials sitting here for some time. I finally asked Mr. Chair if we felt we could maybe allow them to go and get on with their day if we were just going to be discussing something that had no relation to them.
Obviously, the government had an intention of raising this at that meeting but didn't see fit to inform anybody prior to the meeting. As soon as we came into the meeting, within seconds, this motion that Mr. Simms had been asked to put forward by the government was put on the table, to just sort of ram this through in a very expeditious fashion without having to have the consent of the opposition parties, without really having to.... Although they claim they want to have a conversation. I've heard that over and over. When I say “they”, I mean the government. I'm not talking about the members on the other side of the table per se.
We keep hearing about this conversation or discussion, and we want to have this. I think the members on the other side of the table are sincere about that, but I don't know that I can believe the same of some of the other people who are saying it. The , in particular, is one who comes to mind. You can talk about wanting to have a discussion, but there's actually an ability to have one, so let's do that. I'll get back to that in a second.
The point I was making is that if there really were a desire to have a discussion, and that was supposed to be the starting point, one would have thought that they'd have said, “Okay, look, this is what we want to do, and we're going to raise this at the meeting.” Instead, it was, “Here it is: we have a motion and we're going to ram this through.” Then we in the opposition were left sitting there and asking what's going on.
You can imagine that right off the bat there would be some suspicion about what the agenda is. When words don't match actions, it is always something that sets off alarm bells. That was the case. The words weren't matching the actions.
This is fairly typical of . That seems to be the way he operates. That's his modus operandi. He says a lot of words that sound wonderful on the surface if you don't really think about them.
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. Blake Richards: It sounds great, and it's this nice package. It says all the right things, but it's really just like one of those dolls: you pull the string and it has a few things that it says. There's not really much substance behind it, and there isn't much action. That's kind of how it works with this government. It's pretty frustrating, to say the least, to have to try to deal with that.
Here we are. We got this dropped on the table in front of us. They want to ram it through. The opposition says to hold on second, that this is not the way it's done. It has never been the way to do this. This is highly unusual. It doesn't really seem to be in keeping with the spirit of fairness. It doesn't seem to be in keeping with what's in the best interests of Canadians. If that were the real intention, one would think that there would have been someone saying, “Hey, we're thinking that maybe this needs to be our priority list, and we're going to raise this.” They could have said that they were going to bring it forward, and they could have let the Elections Canada officials know, saying to them not to waste their time, not to come by, that we were going to have this discussion that day.
Rightfully so, my colleague Mr. brought forward an amendment, quite a reasonable amendment. For the life of me, I still cannot understand why members on the other side would not want to approve it, go along with it, and work from that basis. It's the way things have been done. They seem like reasonable people. I would think that in their heart of hearts they probably want to proceed with us in that fashion. I do think that. We've heard that from them. I think they would like to do that. The amendment would allow that to happen.
Yet from somewhere above, I think they're saying they're not going to accept that, because that way they don't get to do whatever they want. They don't get to ram this through. They don't get to make any changes they want without the opposition having a say. This way means doing it without Canadians having a say. If one party gets to do whatever it wants, that means Canadians are left out and are not a part of the process.
I hear a phone ringing.
An hon. member: I apologize.
Mr. Blake Richards: Is that calling to let them know not to cave in, not to give up, not to let the opposition have any say? I don't know. He called the wrong number, though, because I don't think Mr. is going to have much sympathy for that point of view.
Mr. Jamie Schmale: I can report back.
Mr. Blake Richards: I don't imagine you'd have much sympathy for that, Mr. . Maybe they need to call someone else. I don't know.
Anyway, at the end of the day, I guess one would hope for, at some point, the sincerity from them that I hear from the members on the other side of this committee. We've seen and witnessed in action in the committee the way they like to function. We know that's the way they operate.
The conversation and the chatter that I hear in the hallways around here from other Liberal backbencher MPs suggests that they're pretty frustrated as well with the approach this government has taken. I've heard the chatter in the hallways. I've heard them complaining about the 's Office and asking why the heck they don't have a conversation with the opposition. Why don't they try to work this out? Why don't the House leaders have a conversation? We hear all of that.
I wish that and the would listen to the Liberal MPs who are saying this; the ones I know do feel that way. I wish they would listen, because we could have a conversation. We could move forward and have discussions about the Standing Orders. I think it's an important exercise, and it happens in just about every Parliament that we have a look at the Standing Orders. In the discussion paper, there are some things that are worth having a discussion about. I can get back to the substance in a second, because there are some things I have concerns with, too, no question, but there are also some things that we could certainly have a discussion about.
I guess one would wish that maybe some of the members on this committee who are reasonable.... I think they want to try to move forward. If one of those people were in the 's position, for example, or were , maybe we'd have someone who was trustworthy and capable of having that discussion, and we could do that. Right now, I don't feel that those positions in this country are filled by people who are willing to really live up to their words and actions and capable of actually performing the job that's needed. That would allow us to move forward.
I was told last night—I was out of the room for a bit—that the came by. I understand that she brought some birthday cake for members and there were a lot of smiles. That's all wonderful. I think everyone felt great about that, from what I hear, but what didn't happen, from my understanding, was a discussion, and that's the very thing that we hear over and over again in question period and elsewhere. The government House leader says “we want to have a conversation, we want to have a discussion”, but that didn't occur.
I suspect that it was probably the last time she came here that we said, okay, let's have a discussion. As opposition members, we raised some very substantive ideas on how we could move forward and were met with, “Well, let's have a discussion.” We said that we were trying to have one right then, but discussions can't be one-sided. There has to be some give-and-take. That means the other side has to want to participate beyond talking points and platitudes. That's one thing this government—the and others—is really good at: talking points and platitudes. They're good at that. I'll give them that, but that's about it.
That's why we are where we are. If they would just say, look, let's have a conversation, a discussion, and mean it and actually do it, we could probably figure out a way to arrive at some consensus. Maybe we could get this amendment passed, because at the end of the day, if there were anything else to this besides the government wanting to ram through whatever it wants to do and whatever its changes are, they would agree to that. There's no reason not to. We've heard them say, well, the opposition can block us from putting in our election promises. No one believes that, because these things in this discussion paper were not in their election promises.
Here's what I wanted to speak about. I spoke to it last night, but it was late, about 10:30 p.m., and I'm not going to fool myself and pretend there are millions of Canadians watching right now this morning, but there are probably more than were watching at 10:30 last night. There are a few more who would be watching now. I think there's something that's worth reminding us about, and it's this discussion about the Fridays.
For the Fridays, the current claim is different from what they've tried before. They've tried two or three different ways to get these Fridays. For some reason, they really want to get rid of the Fridays. They don't want to have Parliament sit on Fridays. I've heard it described in a lot of different ways, such as shutting out the lights in Parliament on Fridays. I've heard it described as taking a day off on Fridays.
We got into that a bit last night. I'm not going to say that anyone wants to have Fridays off so they can sit at home and watch TV and eat bonbons. I would agree that I don't think that's anyone's intention. I think people would be in their constituencies working or doing other things, but it's one day less each week that Parliament would be sitting, one day less that there would be a question period, and one day less that there would be private members' business.
I understand there have been arguments made to add hours to other days. As a set-aside for the moment, I'm personally not sure that works. I think that eliminates some flexibility for MPs. I think it makes it difficult. For example, if you were to start earlier to replace those days, if you had to start an hour and a half earlier, say, which would be about what you'd have to do to replace the Fridays, you'd be starting at 8:30. We all know that there are a lot of things that go on.... Actually, it might be even earlier, because we wouldn't be able to start earlier on Wednesday; it might even be eight o'clock.
Whatever it is—for the sake of argument we'll say 8:30, because it doesn't really matter—we know what happens before the House sits in the morning. That's the time when people do their preparatory work. If there are people who want to meet with you, say, and you're on House duty that day, that's the time when you can do that. That's the time when there may be a breakfast meeting.
For example, I wasn't able to be here for the first bit of the meeting yesterday. I had a group that was in Ottawa. They're people from all over Canada. You don't get that opportunity every day. I've been working on an issue with them, and they wanted me to speak to them at their breakfast. That was an opportunity to do that.
What you would do is that you essentially almost would take those opportunities away, because you would make it so that they would have to happen at 6 a.m. or whatever. That starts to become a little bit.... These things often start at 7:30, and that's a reasonable time, but 6 a.m. starts to become unreasonable.
There's the other thing you could do. You could talk about lengthening the day. You could add an hour and a half or two hours at the end of the day, and then it's 8 o'clock or 8:30, if there are no votes, before Parliament finishes for the night. I know that for some of us.... I think this was raised last night. I think Mr. from the NDP raised it. He had a good point. It's what I often do as well as an MP from out west. There's a two-hour time difference. At 6:30 or 7 o'clock, the House wraps up.
An hon. member: It's three hours for some.
Mr. Blake Richards: Yes, it's three hours for some. For me, it's two, but for a B.C. MP, it's three hours. That's correct, so it's even more of an opportunity for them.... Also, it does speak to that morning thing too. Because we are going back and forth, it can be difficult for some from out west. With a two- or three-hour time change when you have a 7 a.m. or 8 a.m. start, it could be like 4 a.m. for someone, because when they go back to their ridings, of course, that's the time they're on.
That can be difficult for some people. For me, it is. I find that a bit difficult. I'm not really a morning person per se, so I find getting up at what is equivalent to 3:30 or 4 o'clock my time a little difficult, I'll be honest. I am a night owl, and I like to work into the evening. If Parliament is to sit—and this is the point I want to make about that—until 8 o'clock or 8:30 in the evening, some of the opportunity you get to catch up on things in your riding gets lost for those people from out west as well, because what happens is.... It's even worse for those in the east because then it's almost too late to even make any calls to anyone, even if they're at home.
Often the House will wrap up with still a bit of the workday left, so what I'll do is that for the people who I have to try to catch at work or those kinds of places, I can still make a few of those calls. Maybe I can have a little dinner or get in a little exercise or something and come back to the office, and then I'm able to catch the people after they've had dinner at home. If we start to sit longer in the House, it eliminates some of that opportunity as well. It starts to become more difficult. I know people say that if they could just get to their ridings on Fridays more often, they could do more for their constituents. I want to argue that it actually might do the opposite. I know that sounds funny to begin with, but when you think about it, you lose those opportunities with constituents before or after the House sits if you lengthen those days.
Another way you might get more time, if that is what you are seeking to do, would be to actually sit on the Fridays. I would say that if you want to make them a longer day, well, that's fine, and I could see the merits in that, but I don't see the merits in getting rid of them. I'm going to get back to the question period thing in a second, but if you want to lengthen them out, say, even if they went.... Some people said that to be able to get home to their ridings on a Friday night, they would still need to.... But let's say that Parliament wraps up at 5:30 or something. You could still do that. That's adding a few hours to the day.
As for what would happen then, if you were to add up those hours for 26 weeks, there probably would be a couple of weeks of time that you'd be making up on those Fridays, so maybe, as an example, you could give people an extra couple of weeks in their ridings each year. I'm just throwing this out. I'm not saying that this is a proposal, necessarily, but it's an example of what could be done. I would be willing to argue that if you had that time at the beginning and the end of the day, like you do now in Parliament, to catch up on constituency things, and then you had another couple of weeks when you could spend a block of a week in your riding, you'd get a lot more done that way than you would by just being home for a Friday, when you're a little bit tired because you didn't get home until 2 a.m. or something and you've been flying. You'd probably get more done that way.
I think those arguments that somehow this is better for your constituents are disingenuous.
At the end of the day, what it really does is take away one question period each week: 20% of the question periods. It's a pretty significant number. Taking away 20% of the question periods is really taking away 20% of the accountability. That's what it really means. It means taking away 20% of the accountability that the government has to provide to Canadians through the odd opportunity that opposition members have in question period to raise substantive issues, to raise their concerns, and to raise the issues of their constituents, etc. That's what I think it's really about.
They brought forward the family-friendly initiative and said that we have to get rid of Fridays because that's family friendly. A lot of people spoke out and said that they didn't really see how that was family friendly. Some people probably thought it was, but there were a lot of people who didn't, so they said, “Okay, well, we'll back away.”
If you look at the report that we put out—I don't have it in front of me, so I can't remember the exact wording—you will see that we essentially reported back that we didn't feel there was a need to get rid of Fridays. That was the decision of this committee. It was done the way they're usually done. It was a consensus decision. We agreed unanimously that would be the way that this would be done.
:
Yes, they certainly have done that. It's something that I was talking about last night. Mr. and I were making some interventions during Mr. 's speech, and we were agreeing on everything. As I said last night, I quite like Mr. Blaikie as a person. I turned to him last night and said, “I don't know if you're a drinking man, but I think we could have a beer sometime and we'd get along pretty well.” He kind of nodded his head. I don't know if he wanted to have a beer with me or not, but I think he was saying that he does imbibe one or two occasionally.
I'm sure that if we did have that beer, we'd probably have some disagreements about political issues. We generally tend to disagree on those, I think, but where we don't disagree is on this issue. I can't understand why anyone would not see the need to have consensus and the need to work together. When you change these rules of how Parliament works, there can be a lot of unintended consequences. To have the different perspectives of different parties, and of different people with different experiences, is very valuable in that conversation, I think. They're important and needed. That just doesn't seem to register with the government.
Interestingly enough, while Mr. Christopherson had the floor, I was in the hallway, and who do I bump into but the ? She was giving a tour to a small group of her constituents. We said hello and exchanged some pleasantries. I quite like her as a person. We've always gotten along well. Prior to her being government House leader, which she still is, she had the position of Minister of Small Business and Tourism. She now has both positions. I'm the tourism critic, so we've obviously had a lot of discussions and have gotten to know each other fairly well, I suppose, at least on the level of small talk.
I quite like her as a person, but it's almost as though she lives in a different reality than the rest of us here. I told her that we were in the middle of our committee meeting and I had to get back in there, and she told me to keep up the good work I was doing in there. It was almost as though she didn't get that this is a complete and utter waste of time when we could be working on substantive issues right now. Why are we doing that? Because she won't have a conversation to figure out a way to work on this together. It's like she avoids the reality of the situation. As I mentioned earlier, she came in last night and brought birthday cake and it was “let's have smiles and chuckles”. No. Let's actually sit down, have a conversation, and figure out how we work together to get this moving, in a way that ensures nothing gets done without the agreement of all the parties in Parliament. That would make some sense.
As I mentioned, I wanted to recap, so that's where we're at. If you look at it, I think it's clear that there really can be no other reason why they want to try to force this through other than to try to avoid accountability of the government and of the . They want to avoid being held accountable in question period and in other ways; everything is designed to do that. That's what it's about. That's pretty sad. I think it's terrible for democracy and terrible for this country that they're trying to do that.
What I'll tell you is that I think there are a lot of Canadians out there who agree. I know that there's a petition out there. I'll ask some of my friends here behind me at the back of the room to have a look and let me know, and I'll give the number of how many people have signed the petition. I know that tens of thousands of people have signed this petition calling on the government to do exactly what we're saying, which is to work together and do this with unanimous agreement.
Canadians have signed this petition, but they're also sending emails. If you'll allow me, Mr. Chair, I would like to read some. I've had thousands of them. I'm sure you probably have too, Mr. Chair. I think the Liberal members of the committee have. I'm sure other members of the committee have as well. A lot of them have been sent to me and to the Liberal members as well. It even looks like some of them have been sent to all MPs, potentially. I have one in front of me now.
I'd like to spend a bit of time sharing with the committee the thoughts of Canadians. This is where they're coming from on this. I'm going to say before I read these that there are probably going to be things in them that I won't necessarily completely agree with, but I certainly do agree with the sentiment in what people are trying to say. I certainly agree with that sentiment, which is that they're concerned about the way this government is trying to proceed and the way they see their democracy being eroded by this government through those attempts.
I will kind of read from those.... The way the first one is addressed is pretty interesting. It looks like it's addressed to all the Liberal MPs on the committee, you included, Mr. Chair, and it is copied to a couple of Conservative MPs.
The subject line is “PROC committee: This bill is not—“not” is in capitals—Canadian”. There are several exclamation points after that. I think that speaks pretty well to it. Also interesting is the way it is addressed. It says: “To the ones attempting to destroy the fabric of our country.” That's how serious this person feels this issue is. I'm going to read this email. As I say, I may not necessarily agree with everything in it, but the sentiment and the idea that this is an important issue and one where the government shouldn't be trying to force and ram through things, is something that I agree with. I'm going to read some emails and provide some commentary as well.
This one says: “Tabling a proposal to limit debate in the House of Commons and fundamentally change our Canadian democracy is an absolute abuse of power. I am floored at what you are trying to get away with. You must really think Canadians all have their heads in the sand while you do as you please. This backdoor law-changing has to stop.
“I'm curious if your advisers are actually getting paid to bring you this advice. I've been teaching my children about how very blessed they are to live in a democratic country. How does imposing a time limit on the opposition parties exemplify a democracy? How is there any accountability at all for leading the party if no one is allowed to have a chance to oppose them?
“If the Liberals are pushing for a four-day work week, and they continue to get paid the same salary, then Canadians demand a four-day work week and continue to receive the same salary for work not done. Do you see how ridiculous that is? Sometimes if you read something out loud, it registers differently. Take a moment and say out loud that you want to have a four-day work week and shut down Parliament on Fridays and continue your same salary. I know what would happen in my workplace if I demanded a four-day work week with the same pay. I would be fired. Does this mean that every MP that does not show up for work on Fridays will have the same demise?
“I am absolutely appalled by what your party is trying to do. At what point did we stop being a democracy in this country?”
There are several question marks and exclamation points following that. Next:
“In the words of ”—and it's a quote—'An attack on the symbol and the seat of democracy is...cowardly and reprehensible'.
“ spent $127,000 of our money on his Christmas family vacation. Justin Trudeau sits in the House of Commons and on several occasions has been questioned by the opposition on his ethics and his spending. His only response? A smug face. The only way this can be interpreted to the Canadian people is that our Prime Minister is not liking being questioned and challenged in the House. He is not up to the task, so he would rather change our laws than have to be accountable for the decisions he makes.
“There will be an election price for all of you doing this dirty work. Are you not seeing the outrage around this country of people sick of our government not being held accountable for every penny and every action? This is wrong. This should be a non-partisan issue.”
“The filibuster will hold. Canadian voices need to be heard. If a huge decision like changing democracy is going to be brought to the House, then the Canadian people need a chance to hear this and vote on this. Why is the media silent? Every political party believes this is wrong, including the Liberal backbench.
“When all parties agree on something, you must be doing something really wrong.” The word “really” is all in capitals. “The tactics are disgusting. The day you were supposed to be dealing with the new budget, you were sneaking this in so that you were even less accountable to Canadians than you are now.
“If my memory serves me correctly, was this not the same thing the Liberals tried to pass last year? And when it got heated, Justin Trudeau walked across the floor and physically assaulted a woman on the opposition. Interesting this is being reattempted. We notice, Liberals. We require your accountability. Why are you doing dirty work for Justin Trudeau, just because he is too scared to give account for his actions? This is deplorable.”
It's signed by a very outraged citizen.
The Chair: They didn't sign their name?
Mr. Blake Richards: Oh, they did sign their name, but I don't have their consent to give their name, so I'm not going to do that. I didn't seek consent from this person, so I won't give their name, but they did sign their name, yes. It's an email, so obviously their name is attached to the email as well.
At the end of the day, as I said, I don't necessarily agree with everything in there. I mentioned the four-day workweek. I acknowledge that probably not too many MPs are looking to try to go home to put their feet up and watch TV on a Friday, but and others are trying to avoid being held accountable in question period, certainly, on Fridays.
I think the sentiment of the letter says a lot. This person has very strong feelings about the fact that this government is trying to avoid being held accountable. It's the point I'm making, but it shows that Canadians are seeing that as well.
I'll read another one. Someone from Surrey, British Columbia, wrote this one. Again, I haven't pre-screened these. I'm just picking out of a random pile of thousands of these things I've received. This one says: “Good day, members of Parliament. Thank you for your service to this great nation of Canada. I appreciate your sacrifice for democracy. I'm writing you concerning the motion put forth by MP Scott Simms to change the House rules. I ask that you protect the freedom we have within our democracy and put a stop to this bill.”
There's a different tone to this letter, obviously, Mr. Chair. This one is asking the members to protect democracy rather than expressing an outrage at what's happening. I think it's meant from the same place, but just takes a different approach.
The writer goes on to say this: “Under the guise of efficiency, this motion will limit and restrict accountability in our government. Perhaps the energy for efficiency could be channelled to the budget. I appreciate the creativity this government has put into finding ways to get more money out of my pocket. Perhaps we should focus that excellent ability to lessen its spending instead of increasing it and seemingly dodging work.
“I do not agree with the House not sitting on Fridays. There are a lot of important issues to be handled by our government, so working one less day in the House limits the ability to deal with them. I understand that your role is taxing, and I thank you for your service, but this is what you were elected to do. It is a tough job. I also believe the must show up for more than one day of question period per week. Does he have a problem with accountability? He is the leader of this country and should be there to run it, and be held accountable to its due process.
“I do not agree with limiting debate time within committees and debate time within the House. This, to me, represents a clear attempt to avoid accountability. You have an opposition for a reason. You are not a dictatorship. The seats belong to the people and not to any one party. Not every idea you come up with is a good one, and that is why we have MPs in place to question them, like this very issue.
“How are my concerns as a citizen being heard when you limit my voice? Written questions submitted to MPs should have a time limit on response: 45 days seems fair. Having no required response time would allow for MPs to disregard questions they don't want to deal with, as you are to represent all of us and deal with questions you might not want to.
“Lastly, the approach with which this motion has been tabled seems deceptive. I am all for efficiencies and accept modernization with caution, but the week of the budget seems not the time. What do you have to hide? Why has there been so little information provided to Canadians about this? Canadians should be made aware of an issue like this, a fundamental change to our democratic process. It should be wide open for debate and discussion. I ask that you stop this motion. I ask that you uphold accountability and transparency within our government.
“Thank you for your representation in the House of Commons.”
This one is signed “respectfully”.
Again, it has a different tone but makes the same basic point. There's a feeling here from this citizen as well that the government is trying to avoid accountability, that the Prime Minister is trying to avoid accountability. That comes across very clearly in this letter, with things like, “How are my concerns as a citizen being heard when you limit my voice?”, and “Not every idea you come up with is a good one, and that is why we have MPs in place to question them, like this very issue”, and “I do not agree with limiting debate time within committees”.
It talks about Justin Trudeau: “He is the leader of this country and should be there to run it, and be held accountable to its due process.” It asks, “Does he have a problem with accountability?” It's clear. Then she closes with, “I ask that you uphold accountability and transparency within our government.”
That's what she's asking for.
I appreciate that.
We'll return to where we were. I would just point out, as I've indicated already, that I don't necessarily subscribe to everything that is being said in these emails. I don't question anyone's sincerity, I guess. They would be working on Fridays, doing other things. It's not about that, for me.
I believe there's already a provision in place that if an MP isn't here on any day that Parliament is sitting, unless—and they have to sign off on this—they are conducting official public business, their pay is docked. If they're not here and are not on public business, not attending something, a meeting somewhere else, their pay is docked.
What I can say is that I've always, every Friday, either been here or been working on some kind of public business elsewhere in my constituency, or elsewhere. But the point I'm making here is that when you cancel the Friday for all of Parliament, what you're doing is you're cancelling question period. You're cancelling the sitting of Parliament. That's very different from some MPs not being here on a specific day. Obviously, we all know that on a Tuesday, maybe, you've been asked to go give a speech somewhere else in the country, and you do that. It doesn't mean we should shut down Parliament because one or two MPs can't be here. That's a disingenuous point.
I'm going to read some more of these emails. I think it's important. These are different perspectives from different people, but they all seem to come back to the same point, from what I've seen so far. What I'm reading hasn't been pre-screened. I haven't necessarily read these particular emails in advance, although I have read some.
This one says the following: “As a Canadian citizen, I strongly disagree with the Liberals' proposed changes to permanently shut down Parliament on Fridays and limit debate time. Canada is a democratic country, and democracy stands for freedom of speech. I've been following up the Parliament's debates, and it is very obvious that the Liberal government is struggling with providing honest and informative answers to MPs. It seems like everyone from the Liberal Party has memorized the same phrases that talk about middle class and have no meaning.
“Justin Trudeau either does not show up for questions or, if he does, and decides to take a question, he cannot answer it. This is disgrace to the Canadian government. A good leader leads by example. Liberals want Fridays off when the whole nation has to work on Fridays. On top of that, they want to keep their salaries. The message I am getting from the leaders of my beloved Canada is that they don't want to work. They don't care about people. They are lazy and not accountable for their poor performance. They betrayed me during the election.”
I think this person meant to say “lied to me during the election”.
The email continues: “They left us people alone. This is not the government I wish for my country. Justin Trudeau wants less time in Parliament to avoid embarrassment. My advice would be to do some homework. Learn how to be a leader, truly listen to your people—and I mean all people. You need to listen to all....For a country to succeed you need wealthy businesses and a strong middle class. With the current politics, wealth is going everywhere except Canada. Selling Canada to China is not going to help our budget.
“I've been living in Canada for the last 30 years. It took me a while to feel at home here, but Canada was very good to me. I built a great life for me and my kids. However, this is starting to be harder and harder since the Liberals won the last election. I hope for Canada's great future, and can't wait till the next election. I will vote Conservative, which over many years, and most of all now, shows determination in making Canada strong and a land of many opportunities, as it used to be.
“I have been listening to how you plan to change Parliament to suit the Liberal caucus. As a voter, I am afraid I am strongly against this. You were voted in to show up five days a week, with many weeks available for you to be in your constituency. You voted yourself a raise and now want less hours. Not on my dime.”
Now, I don't think anyone actually did vote themselves a raise, so that person obviously misunderstood on that point, but so be it.
The email continues: “I do expect the PM to be in question period also, as many have been before him—not that he ever answers anything that is asked, but it is his job to be there. You are also trying to limit speech in the House—unacceptable, I am afraid. Debate is the foundation of any democratic nation. How dare you take that away? The Liberals are trying to make Canada into a dictatorship. Well, not on my dime. We the people pay your salary, and with the amount of discontent that's building you'd better line up for another job. We the people will be sure you do not get a second term. I will expect a 'no' vote on this ridiculous change. Grow up or find another job.”
Again, sometimes there are things that I don't completely agree with, but I think the point that people are making here is that they expect the and the government to be accountable. They expect them to show up to do their job. They think that this is really an attempt to avoid accountability. When you start using words like “dictatorship”, that obviously is going a bit far, but I also understand the sentiment, in a way. It's avoiding accountability, right?
This is a fairly short one here. It states: “Ladies and gentlemen, I am absolutely disgusted with the sheer arrogance of the Liberal Party. Considering the amount of taxpayer money that Justin Trudeau feels completely at liberty to spend as freely as he so desires, I, for one, believe he should be at work Monday to Friday, unless of course his spending habits and paycheque are going to reflect his proposed, one-day-a-week proposed work schedule.
“As for the rest of the Liberal Party, who would like to lessen their load by permanently taking Fridays off, I, as a Canadian taxpayer, am your employer. If you feel the scrutiny that you and your colleagues are experiencing because of your poor decisions or your unwillingness to listen to the people, who placed you in the offices you now hold, is too much for you to handle, why don't you submit your resignation and take the rest of the week off as well? You're paid to be in Parliament and make yourselves available to answer for your decisions that were completely unilateral. How dare you try and take away my right to hold you accountable? Billions of dollars are at stake—billions—and you, as a group of people, have proven yourselves lacking.
“I am proud to be a Canadian. I am not proud to have Justin Trudeau as the leader of our nation. He is not worthy of the position he holds. He and you, ladies and gentlemen of the Liberal Party, promised a transparency that you said was not seen in the previous government, yet here you are collectively and actively trying to make it impossible for Canadians to get real answers. This is not because you are hiding behind pretty words, which you were already doing. No, you won't be answering the questions Canadians have about your leadership because you just won't be there.
“Trust in these words right now. Your actions will have dire consequences in 2019 if you continue on this path with Justin Trudeau as your incompetent leader: 2019 will be a reckoning.”
Again, I think some of that is amped up a bit, but it points to the fact that there's a feeling that there's not an example of trying to be accountable from this Prime Minister and this government.
This next one I haven't read, but it starts with, “I'm a member of the Parti Québécois”. I'll read it, because it's a good way of making a point. I think there could be some reason for people to believe that maybe it's just a bunch of members of the Conservative Party who are not happy with the Liberal Party, and that's why they're writing these letters, but it's clearly not what this is. This is just Canadians spontaneously writing and showing concern.
She's from Montreal, Quebec, and says the following: “Hi. I'm a member of the Parti Québécois. I heard about the motion concerning the shutdown of Parliament on Fridays and other changes about rules and debates, a change that would permanently limit debate and scrutiny on their bills. I'm outraged to see this clandestine initiative asked by you. We are living in a country with democracy, and not in a dictatorship regime. What are you trying to do, by the way? Are you changing the regime to a dictatorship where democracy will be gone? I object to everything that you will try to do concerning the shutdown of the Parliament, and about changing the rules and debates, and about the sneaky reversal of our democracy.
“As a Canadian citizen, I object to such changes, which will only create negative impacts on our democracy for which we fought so hard. I'm asking you to abolish that motion that indicates these changes.”
Obviously she is expressing concern about accountability, and doing so with some pretty strong language. She is making the same point that all the other emails that I've been reading are making. They all feel that the Prime Minister and the government are trying to avoid being held accountable.
Here's another one. It states: “I am saddened and disappointed to hear that the Liberal Party is secretly trying to change our democratic processes, and in such a way as to reduce Canadians' ability to hold the government to account.
“For example, the Liberals are quietly seeking to: eliminate Friday sittings, or to make them a full day rather than the current half day; set only one day aside each week for the prime minister to answer questions during question period; lengthen the time the government can take to answer MPs’ written questions to 65 days from 45 days; prevent opposition members from filibustering by bringing forward debatable motions; prevent filibusters and possibly shorten debate time on government bills by having pre-set times to discuss and pass legislation through in the House; allow omnibus bills to be debated and studied despite a Liberal promise to the contrary, but hold separate votes on the unrelated subjects included in the bills; allow parliamentary secretaries to take on a greater role at committee; prevent filibusters at committee through a 10-minute speech limit; introduce electronic voting in the Commons; and allow more time to debate private members’ business.
“I ask that you reverse your decision on this matter so that Canadians can still feel confident that our rights aren't diminished. Moreover, if the Liberal plan to reduce our democratic rights is implemented, I will remember this come election day.
“You are elected by the people and for the people. This attempt to subvert our democratic processes, in my opinion, is not what the people want. If you do act according to your own interests, we can certainly make the necessary changes come the next election, so again, I request that you stop”—the word “stop” is in all capitals—“this plan to restrict the democratic process and leave the processes we already have in place. I request your urgent attention to this matter.”
Again, it raises the ideas of subverting the democratic process and avoiding accountability. It makes the same threat—and “threat” is not really the right word, but I'll use it, because it's the best I have—to get rid of these Liberal MPs in the next election if they don't do what the author feels is appropriate in terms of democracy and holding the government accountable.
This next one focuses on Fridays, wages, and so on. I agree with the comments that were made that people can do other work, but question period is the point here, and the ability to hold government accountable. I'll pass that one by, because I don't feel it's fair to continue to read that sort of stuff as a stand-alone.
The next one reads as follows: “Dear Liberal MP leaders, I am embarrassed to say that I wanted change in the last election, so I took a chance on the Liberals and voted for Justin Trudeau. It has been something that I have regretted for well over a year. Justin Trudeau is not working for Canadians, he is working for himself. He doesn't care what Canadians want, and he is trying to change our respected democracy into a dictatorship.
“As Liberal MPs you have a choice to make. You can continue down this path with Trudeau, be hated by the Canadian people, and never be voted in again; or you can stand up to Trudeau and do what you were elected to do: stand up for the people of Canada. After the lies, increased taxes, and billion-dollar debt, many Canadians are vowing to NEVER”—and “never” is in capitals— “vote Liberal again.
“What you are trying to do right now in the House of Commons is wrong, sneaky, and not what is in the best interest of Canadians. A dictatorship government is not what anybody signed up for, and talk about going backwards. MPs should be working five days a week, as many Canadians have to work, and even more now to try to pay for our over-the-top high bills.
“Motions and bills need to be debated in the House of Commons. It's part of our government and part of being a democracy. You can't just change the rules because the Liberals are in power. Canadians do not want this, and we were not consulted or asked about these changes to the way our government runs.
“Polls are showing that Liberal approval is continuing to plummet. Canadians do not trust their majority Liberal government, no matter what party they belong to. Stop this back-dealing in the House of Commons. I can vow today, in how Trudeau is behaving, and the Liberals, there is no chance I would ever trust a Liberal politician to keep his or her promise or to ever do what's right for Canadians.”
It's just signed, “From Ontario”. It doesn't say where in Ontario, but somewhere in Ontario.
I think it's important to note something. When I started to read these emails, I'm sure there were some Liberals MPs—I could see a lot of activity happening on that side—uncomfortable with it and I think trying to find a way to stop them from being read. They are pretty damning and critical. Some of them may be even over the top, but they are certainly very critical, and all with those same themes.
I'm sure there was probably some, “Well, gee, they're probably all Conservative members. Maybe Mr. Richards asked them to write these letters.” But I can tell you that from the names I've seen so far, there hasn't even been one from my province, that I've seen, not one from my constituency. I don't recognize any of the names. They are not people I know. So that's not what it is. I would like to believe I have lots of friends, but these are in the thousands. I don't know if I have that many friends.
One was from the Parti Québécois. This one obviously indicated that even though she had voted for change, for , in the last election, she was now embarrassed, and it was something she was regretting. She was saying that she doesn't really think Justin Trudeau is working for Canadians; he's working for himself. But she did vote for him in the last election, so she has obviously had a real change of opinion.
I understand that. I get why people.... As I mentioned earlier, the has some phrases you kind of remember. He pulls the strings and he says the things that sound wonderful. He has nice hair and all these things. People like him. Then they watch him in action and he doesn't really accomplish much. He doesn't really do what he said he was going to do. His actions don't match his words. They start to feel disappointed.
Mr. Scott Simms: Do you want a Timbit?
Mr. Blake Edwards: Oh, boy, Mr. Simms is a wonderful guy. If only all the Liberals were like him, maybe we wouldn't get these kinds of letters.
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. Blake Edwards: Thank you.
I hope everyone will indulge me. I'm going to do this on TV. I guess it's like an endorsement for Tim Hortons.
Mr. Scott Simms: Here, I'll have one with you. Here you go. Cheers.
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. Blake Richards: What a Canadian thing to do, right? Here we are in our Parliament, and we're having a Timbit.
Mr. Scott Simms: Let's play hockey.
Mr. Blake Richards: Yes, really. If you could just bring my hockey equipment, Mr. Simms....
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. Scott Simms: Sorry to interrupt.
Mr. Blake Richards: No, that was a nice break. I appreciated that.
I'm taking a quick look at this next email. It looks like it's just really about the Fridays, so I don't want to get into that point again.
This one here is short. It starts with the following: “I would like to voice my objection to the bill that was introduced this week with regard to new parliamentary rules.”
Obviously, I'm reading these things as they are. Canadians don't necessarily follow as intimately as we do the parliamentary process. They think it was a bill. It's obviously not a bill at this point. I'm just reading it as it is. I think everyone understands that people know the subject matter. They know it's being brought forward to Parliament. They just assume it's a bill. I don't think we have any concern there, but I point out that I'm reading it as is. The objections and the basic sentiments remain the same whether they get that it's a bill, a discussion in committee, or whatever it might be.
It reads: “I would like to voice my objection to the bill that was introduced this week with regard to new parliamentary rules. You, Trudeau, and your party members, need to understand that you work for Canadians. Your policies need to be scrutinized on behalf of all citizens. The Prime Minister needs to stop acting like a privileged celebrity and get back to work. I will not stand for you blocking the people I elected to representing me from making you accountable to me. You need to drop this and get to work on saving middle-class Canadians from your uncontrolled spending. If this bill goes through, I will work hard to be sure people do not vote Liberal in the next election. I trust that you will do the right thing today and vote for the rights of all Canadians, not just those of Mr. Trudeau.”
It's short and succinct, but it sums it up. It says they won't stand for this. It says the needs to stop acting like a privileged celebrity and actually do some work. It indicates that it's not acceptable for there being an attempt by the Liberal Party to block the people who represent this individual—obviously, there must be an opposition MP in their riding—from being able to hold them accountable on her behalf.
This shouldn't be the priority is basically what she's saying here. The priority should be saving middle-class Canadians from the Liberals' uncontrolled spending. It gets at the heart of the whole “we're working for the middle class” kind of thing.
It sounds like this person feels that maybe, if they cut their spending a little bit, that would help the middle class a lot more than any of these other claims they're making. It goes on to say that she will actively work to ensure that people do not vote Liberal in the next election if this is put through, so she's asking for them to do the right thing.
I mentioned earlier I hadn't seen one from my province yet. Here's one from Calgary, Alberta. The area's close to my riding, so I wouldn't want my province to feel left out. I don't know what it says, but I'll read it, as follows: “I do not want any changes made to the debate process in Parliament. Limiting the time to debate is no longer democratic. Issues need to be heard thoroughly. The pros and cons, ideas, stats, and figures need to be hashed out. There are arguments to be made and impact statements to be heard. This does not happen in 10 minutes. This is crazy-making and will not allow our representatives to make sound decisions on our behalf, because there will not be enough time to deliver the required information to make a proper decision before a vote.”
This next part is all in capitals, with exclamation points after each sentence: “Stop this action. It is not in Canada's best interest. We do not want the change. Do not do it.”
Then it says, “And we all want Fridays off. You were hired, voted in on the terms you have. Now get to work.”
Again, it says it pretty succinctly. It's saying that debate needs to occur, and that sometimes 10 minutes isn't enough. I probably have proven that today, and I know other members of this committee have proven that. Sometimes 10 minutes isn't enough.
This next one is from Imperial, Saskatchewan. I don't know where Imperial, Saskatchewan, is, but it's somewhere in Saskatchewan, anyway. The email states: “I understand that you work currently on the PROC committee. I also understand that you and your committee are trying to change procedure in our House of Commons—i.e., allowing bills to be passed with no debate, having no sittings on Fridays, allowing the PM to be in office one day a week.
“The last I heard about our country prior to the most recent election is that we have a democracy.” The last word there was all in capitals. “It is sounding very much to me like the Liberal government would like a dictatorship—their way or no way. Unfortunately, there are a lot”—that's capitalized as well—“of disgruntled taxpayers in our country, and your government is not helping the situation in the least. Who do you expect to pay for the foolish spending that is taking place, for one thing?
“Our government officials are elected by the people for the people, and I don't believe you have asked the people their point of view on the issue at hand. Our country's founding fathers would roll over in their graves if they knew what you are trying to push through today.” This next sentence is all in capitals: “ This is very wrong. You cannot pass bills in our Parliament without proper debate. I implore you to rethink what you're doing.”
This was signed, “A concerned Canadian citizen”.
I don't know if that needs much comment. It's pretty clear that they don't feel it's appropriate for the government to just ram through whatever the heck it wants, not listen to opposition, not have proper debate, and not hear from Canadians.
This is from someone from Lake Country in B.C. The subject line of the email is “Backdooring proposals”. This was sent to a number of Liberal MPs, including their local Liberal MP in their riding in Lake Country, B.C., and copied to some Conservative members of Parliament. It states: “To the list of those it concerns above, I am writing to you this afternoon on the proposal you were all putting forward and taking part in. 1) Fridays off. This would require a compensation of taxes to the Canadian people through your reduction in salaries, pensions, and benefits. You do realize this, right? 2) Place a time limit on questions and debates with MPs. So how will our MPs be able to accurately hold the House of Commons responsible? This is not a free-for-all. Actually, this is fascism in disguise. May I take this time to remind you that you all work for the Canadian people and not just the best interests of the Liberal Party and their supporters?
“You can use colourful charts, graphs, words, and excuses to try to explain how this is beneficial to all Canadians, but that doesn't mean it's truth. In fact, what you all are trying to do is wrong and deceitful. This needs to stop now. Stop trying to change the rules to suit your party and followers/supporters. This is not transparency, not at all. Is this not your platform that you will all say you stand for? I think not. You have absolutely no right to change the rules of our democracy and then tag this as beneficial to all.
“This is a disgrace, and our country is becoming a sad state of affairs. All of you who are choosing not to stand for and turn your heads from the truth, let me tell you all this. If you push this through, you are destroying our democracy as we know it. Although you may feel you will have gotten away with it in not having to answer to the people of Canada, I assure you there will come a day when you will all answer to something much higher. That, my federal Liberal MPs of opposition, is the truth.”
This is signed, “A very concerned Canadian”, from Lake Country, B.C.
Again, it's pretty amped up in terms of the comments being made. Using the term “fascism” is an example of that. Calling what's being done here “wrong and deceitful”, calling it “a disgrace”, saying that Canada is becoming a “sad state of affairs” because of what this government is doing, saying they're turning their heads from the truth, saying that it would destroy our democracy as we know it, that there's going to come a day when these Liberal MPs will all have to answer to something much higher—that's pretty serious commentary. That's someone who feels pretty strongly about this being wrong. That's what that is.
The next one I have here says the following: “I understand that Liberals are trying to secretly put through a backdoor change whereby our embarrassment of a Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, would only have to attend the House of Commons once per week. What and who does he think he is? Also, I understand that the Liberals wish to permanently shut down Parliament on Fridays. Not acceptable.” Those last two words are all in capitals, with two exclamation points at the end. “Why are the Liberals trying to do this covertly? Where is the media on this? Why is this being allowed to happen?
“I do not support this in any way, and this is not acceptable in our democracy. Please know that as a western Canadian, I cannot believe our amazing country is being led by such a group of out-of-touch, self-absorbed, and inexperienced fools. You must stop this, and stop lying to the Canadian people.
“A very frustrated and fed-up Canadian who will never support Liberals again.” The last part is all in capitals, followed by an exclamation point.
Again, that's pretty strong language, talking about the as being an embarrassment, asking why he would have to attend the House of Commons only once a week, calling them a bunch of “out of touch, self-absorbed, and inexperienced fools”. This is strong language. Obviously, in some of these cases it goes too far in terms of what it's saying, but I think what it does is signify that people are very concerned, so it's important to hear from that perspective.
A few of them have mentioned wondering where the media is, why the media is not reporting. I will say this. I think this email I have in front of me is from March 22, and the next one is from March 23. They're from the first couple of days when this was happening. There really wasn't a lot of media attention at first. It took a little time. The budget being delayed and things like that got some attention as well. Then the media started to write about this and make their comments.
The media's comments are of a similar nature, that this needs to be done in a different way, that this is not really something that's about keeping accountability and these kinds of things. Maybe these people's concerns were based more on the fact that it hadn't been, at that point. Probably if they were to write these letters today, that wouldn't be the case.
This one is addressed to one particular member of the committee, one of the Liberal MPs, whom I won't name because I don't think that's fair to do.
It states: “Why did you and your committee move the motion on behalf of Prime Minister Trudeau to limit debate in the House of Commons, which fundamentally changes our Canadian democracy? It is appalling and very shady that you and your committee are trying to sneak this through the day before the budget announcement and hope that no one would notice. This is so wrong.” The word “wrong” is in all capitals, with four exclamation points. They're pretty serious about it being wrong.
It goes on to say this: “It sounds like a dictatorship to me, and undermines democracy in this country. The members of Parliament must always have a voice for Canadians. That is their job. Sounds like you and the Liberals want to be able to do what you want with no accountability.”
It's short and succinct, that one. They sort of see the same point I do, that the and his party want to be able to do whatever they want and avoid any accountability for it.
This person here says that he or she represents 71 other taxpayers in eastern Canada. It says: “I'm emailing and I represent 71 people in my circle. Straight to the point, we do not want you Liberal MPs listed above, or any other Liberal member, to tamper with the way our parliamentary process works, specifically shutting down Friday completely so you may have the day off. The ones of us that have a job work five or six days a week; 27 of us are not able to find full-time work. How dare you try in the basement of Parliament, behind closed doors, to try to make these changes?
“Also, the Prime Minister will not be allowed to work one day a week in question period. Just because they do in the U.K. does not mean that he can. We say no. Also, do not vote to limit debate time. All members must have their say. Also, we say no to your discussion paper on House reform, which includes the above and other sneaky ideas that you have.
“We and the majority of Canadians are against what you're attempting to do and stand by our respective MPs that continue to fight against your devious and shameful secret debating while other issues you think may keep us busy. Do not set back Canadian democracy. Do not think we are not watching. The silent majority will ensure you're out of power in 2019 and you lose your riding as well.”
Again, it's signed by the individual and it's saying that they represent 71 more taxpayers in eastern Canada who are citizens of Canada.
I've read all the parts, because I don't believe in censoring one part out of the email, talking about the Fridays off and that people should work five or six days a week. I know that most, if not all, MPs do that, but it's about the point of the question period and the actual Parliament sitting, and that's a different story.
Then it goes on to talk about some of the other concerns they have. It's asking not to see Canadian democracy set back. It's saying that Liberal MPs shouldn't assume that people aren't watching and aren't paying attention—again, sort of making the threat that this could cost them their government in 2019. It could cost them their seats.
Here is the next one: “It is my understanding that the Parliament of Canada is trying to backdoor a change that would permanently limit debate and scrutiny on certain bills. This email pertains to proposed changes to have Parliament permanently shut down on Fridays.
“I'm sure that you are all aware that Canadian companies have cut thousands of jobs and scrapped projects in a drive to cut costs. In some cases, Fridays off were targeted, as firms had to dig deeper for savings after eliminating thousands of jobs. If this Liberal proposal to not work on Fridays is legitimate, it seems quite ridiculous. And to try to run it through on budget day? I haven't seen the budget numbers yet”—this was written before the budget, I guess—“but it sure seems that the grim reality of what the average Canadian is dealing with, many working more than one job, is pretty far from each of your minds.
“The reality is, this is just another example of what becomes part of the Liberal entitlement mentality, and it just isn't affordable in this new world of significant Canadian debt. I'd be happy to support the proposal if you were going to take a pay cut or work additional hours every day to make up for it. And your approach is less than transparent. You have been provided a great job at Canadian taxpayer expense. Get a grip. I suggest that you think about what you actually deliver to the Canadian taxpayer before you vote yourself what is in essence a pay raise.”
Now, there is other work that's done by MPs, but this makes the point that MPs should be here, that the government should be here and be held accountable on Fridays, just like other days.
The following one is addressed to a couple of particular Liberal MPs. I'm not going to name them, because I don't believe in trying to shame an individual or anything. I don't think it's directed at them, per se. I think it's directed more broadly at the Liberal government.
It says: “I'm a proud Newfoundlander, albeit living in Alberta. I know you guys are proud Newfoundlanders as well.” I guess that narrows it down to who it could be, and I apologize for that. “So I want you to take a bit of your valuable time to read and consider my thoughts.
“I was born in St. John's in 1954 into a hard-working family. I spent my childhood growing up in what I still think of as the most beautiful city in the world. I'm a true east-end townie. I met and fell in love with a member of our fine military, a search and rescue technician, whose hometown is Comox, B.C. We married in 1978 and had the time of our lives living from coast to coast, as my husband proudly served our country for 25 years, 21 of which were in the SAR world.
“We have settled, retired in Rocky Mountain House, Alberta”—that's quite close to my riding, not in it next door to it—“because that is where our travels took us. I do very much care about this country from coast to coast, and on a daily basis I worry about where it is going.
“What I want to convey in this email is specific to something that I read about today. We are just two people from each end of this country who have been around long enough to realize that the fundamentals of our democracy should not be changed for the sake of change, or to satisfy a man who seems to be self-centred. But that is another email for another time. What does it prove? Not a darn thing. We feel that this country needs and deserves all the time it takes to get things back on track, because, in case you haven't noticed, it is going off track, really. We need all our representatives to be there working hard for us, for the money that we pay them, and that includes our 'esteemed' Prime Minister. We deserve better than this, and that includes all Canadians. No one is better than the other. The families who have been here for generations, and yes, the people of the world who are trying their darndest to become part of this great country, deserve this.
“So please do not let your Liberal government do this to our democracy. Give your heads a shake, and please do not let this happen. Thank you for your time, and good luck in doing the right thing.
“Sincerely, from a 62-year-old female who has never written her members of Parliament before. This just seemed like as good a time as any.”
I think it speaks for itself, asking the government to be held accountable and feeling as though the is trying to avoid accountability.
Another one here is from Millgrove, Ontario. It states: “As a taxpaying, middle-class Canadian, only now after more than a year of Justin Trudeau in office do I feel compelled enough to write the federal government expressing my grave concerns for our country and wanting answers. What am I referring to exactly? It's a bit of a list, but I'll bring it all together, so please hear me out.
“I was recently made aware of a Liberal motion to permanently close Parliament on Fridays. Is that true? In addition, motion to limit debate and scrutiny of proposed bills and reducing the Prime Minister's Parliament attendance to one day a week? If it wasn't for this Facebook post informing me of these motions, I would mistake this for fake news. Amidst our Prime Minister's extravagant vacation spending—a $127,000 vacation, seriously?—MP pay raises.”
I'm not sure where they got that one from. I haven't seen it, anyway.
“Higher goods, taxes, carbon tax, massive multi-million dollar foreign aid handouts, all leading to yesterday's $27-billion federal deficit—presented with a smile, I must add—now a motion for Fridays off and reduced spending scrutiny. That's the straw breaking the camel's back, for me. This can't be real. You want to tax more, work less, give yourself a raise, and reduce the scrutiny regarding it.
“Here is a real world parallel for you to compare, because it seems there's confusion in Ottawa on how democracy works. I'm quite certain there is not a single corporation in existence that would allow an employee to take Fridays off, give themselves a raise, hike their expenses and stifle their employer from questioning it. Yes, I am one of the millions of your employers that are being forced to pay for this.
“Mr. Morneau said it correctly yesterday when presenting the budget: 'It's aimed at putting Canadians to work.' You bet it is, and I fully agree. All taxpaying Canadians need to work harder to pay for the gross mismanagement of this federal government and take home less money while you ask for time off and try to put a lock on the Liberal door of governing.
“This doesn't sound anything like democracy to me, but if you seriously compared it to the definition of totalitarianism, where would it fit? As one of your employers, I want an answer. I'll be waiting for your response. Hopefully it comes today, because something tells me I might not get one on Friday.”
I guess that's a bit of humour there.
Here's another one, which again looks to be addressed to most of the members of the committee here: “Good morning, all. A couple of comments regarding the proposed changes to parliamentary procedures. First, let's call a spade a spade. The Friday closure is to accommodate Mr. Trudeau and his friends....”
Actually, I'm not going to read that part, because I think it's inappropriate.
“Secondly, restricting his attendance to one day per week reduces his exposure to critical comment and difficult questioning. It also allows him to campaign and show off his beautiful hair to his adoring fans. The Prime Minister is displaying a dangerous dictatorship-like behaviour in pushing to implement a purely selfish agenda to change our parliamentary procedures without the due process of debate and discussion.
“Why is Mr. Trudeau trying to silence debate with a very sneaky, backdoor plan to change Parliament? Why are you Liberals trying to silence voices and blindly do his dirty work? When will you wake up and put Canada first and call your Liberal government to account for their dangerous and reckless behaviour and actions? Our democracy is at stake here. Can you not see that? Are you all out to completely destroy Canada? I expect Parliament to be open on Friday, I expect Trudeau to stand and answer questions in the House, and I expect you to have a backbone and take a stand.”
There is not much comment needed on that one.
Here's a very short and sweet one. I don't know if it's sweet, but it's short, anyway: “I must say, I'm very disappointed to hear of what's going on in Parliament. I expect Parliament to be open on Friday. I also expect Prime Minister Trudeau to answer all questions directed to him in the House. He cannot limit the right of my MP to scrutinize the Prime Minister's legislation. This country cannot be run as a dictatorship. What on earth do you people think you're doing? God help us all.”
Here's someone from Oakville, Ontario. This is very short: “I would like to submit my concern about shutting down the Parliament on Fridays. I am fully unhappy with this. I got frustrated for decreasing the Canadian matters' discussion time which should lead to the best interest of Canadians.”
This next fellow is a medical doctor. He has a very short email here as well: “I'm writing this email to express my concern over the Liberal move to hijack our democracy through the proposed changes to the House of Commons rules. I also believe that giving part of an extra day off is irresponsible and a misuse of our tax dollars.”
The next one is from a retired member of our military, a veteran. He's from Fort McMurray, Alberta. The email states: “It has come to my attention that you and a group of MPs, at the direction of our Prime Minister, are attempting to pass legislation that would fundamentally change the rules of Parliament to adopt practices that go against what Canadians expect from our elected officials. This is unacceptable. There are few enough days in Parliament and backlogs of issues that need to be resolved that to reduce your workweek by a day is ludicrous. For example, your government needs to stop dragging your feet on veterans' issues such as suicide and lifelong pensions.
“I served 25 years in uniform defending Canada, her systems, and our values. I put my life on the line for a total of three and a half years on seven different operational tours, four in the Balkans and three in Afghanistan. You may ask why I and others like me would do such things, but we did not ask why. We were given orders which come from our system of democracy whereby our missions were clearly defined and for the most part, supported by the public.
“The support of our government during those tours and after was questionable and continues to lag, so Parliament must stay open on Fridays to address these and many other pressing issues. To have a Prime Minister whom is not required to answer questions in the House of Commons is bordering on a dictatorship and that too is unacceptable. My elected MP regardless of party affiliation has the right to scrutinize proposed legislation and ask questions until answered.”
I'll interject here. Boy, if we had to ask the questions until they were actually answered, we could be there a long time based on my experience with this government so far.
But I'll continue with the letter: “If the questions were actually answered the first time, and I mean really and meaningfully answered, and it certainly wouldn't take so long.... Continuing to talk in circles doesn't fool anyone, it's just blah, blah, blah, and we as Canadians deserve answers. My MP is representing me. You as an MP are also representing Canadian citizens as are all MPs. It is your duty to represent our will and our wishes not to support a government that uses deceptive and underhanded practices to make changes that contradict our collective will. I demand that these deceptive practices stop immediately.”
First of all, in terms of his comments, obviously I want to thank this man for his service to our country. He served, as he said, on seven different operational tours. He served our military for 25 years, put his life on the line for our country and our democracy, and I thank him for that. And I know that all members would thank him for that.
But he feels that the risk he took with his life, the sacrifices that he made, are not being served by what's being done right now. He doesn't feel that his democracy is being respected. And he says there are issues that need to be dealt with for veterans, and for other reasons. He's saying that what he's seeing from the Prime Minister is bordering on dictatorship and is unacceptable. And he said that all MPs regardless of their affiliation have the right to scrutinize legislation and ask questions until they're answered and that Canadians—and “Canadians” is all in capitals—deserve answers. So he's saying that his MP is representing him and that through him, through that MP, he deserves to get answers from a government that he says is using deceptive and underhanded practices to make changes that contradict our collective will, and he's demanding that those practices be stopped immediately.
Here's someone from Nova Scotia, who says, “Just a quick note to voice my disagreement with the motion put forward to shut down Parliament on Fridays.”
I'm going to interject here because I notice that what I'm seeing in some of these emails is a greater recognition than simply that MPs wouldn't necessarily be working, but that Parliament would be shut down on Fridays, which means that no MPs would be here, which means that there would be no accountability in Parliament to Canadians for what the government is doing. That's the point I'm seeing from a lot of these people in these emails, and that's a good thing, that people are recognizing that the issue here is that Parliament needs to be sitting so that the Prime Minister and others can be held accountable. So they're talking about shutting down Parliament on Fridays.
He says—and I want to read this—“I'd be in favour of shutting down the Liberal Party for as long as it takes them to come around to our way of thinking.”
I'm thinking that would be a very long time. Obviously it's expressing frustration. That's what it is. I don't think they really want to shut down the Liberal Party and I don't subscribe to our doing that, but it says: “Don't kid yourselves. You may have a majority government for now, but that doesn't mean you have the backing of the majority of Canadians. I'm sure most Canadians right now are as upset as I am and are reeling over the debt this sitting government is wracking up for our further generations to be left on the hook for. I've seen nothing but recklessness by this administration when it comes to wasting hard-earned tax dollars. It's time we stopped already with this great global vision and focused on the real issues here at home, and doing this one day less per week is not the right approach to fixing our problems. For heaven's sake, listen to the people, and that includes those who don't agree with you, not just those who do.”
Obviously this idea of shutting down the Liberal Party was just that person expressing his frustration. I'm sure the person didn't really mean that, and I certainly don't subscribe to it, but it points out that there's a real frustration with what this government is doing.
These are ones about MPs not working five days a week; I'm going to pass them by.
This email sums up a lot of what we've heard from people. It's from Lethbridge, Alberta. It says, “I'm saddened and disappointed to hear that the Liberal Party is seeking to change our democratic processes and in such a way as to reduce Canadians' ability to hold the government to account. For example, the Liberals are quietly seeking to—”
Here it lists off a number of things from the discussion paper. I probably don't need to read those again. It continues, “I ask that you reverse your decision on this matter so that Canadians can still feel confident that our rights aren't diminished. Moreover, if the Liberal plan to reduce our democratic rights is implemented, I will remember this come election day. You were elected by the people and for the people and this attempt to subvert our democratic process, in my opinion, is not what the people want. If you do act according to your own interests, we can certainly make the necessary changes come the next election. So again, I ask that you stop this plan to restrict the democratic process and to leave the processes we already have in place.”
This next one doesn't indicate where it is from, but it's the 204 area code, which might be Manitoba. I could be wrong. They list the phone number, which I won't give out in committee, because I don't have permission. It says, “Thank you for serving our country. I thank you for your sacrifice. I thank you for your dedication. I thank you for your commitment, but I am concerned with what I've been hearing about legislation that has been put forward in the House of Commons.”
I'll add a side-note here. Obviously, people believe it's legislation. That's really not significant to the arguments they are making. Whatever it is, they are against the proposal. It goes on, “As a Canadian taxpayer, citizen, and business owner, I work six or seven days a week. I constantly assess my business to make appropriate adjustments. I am accessible to my associates, because everyone has a unique contribution. I am in contact with my clients so that I hear their needs and concerns. I do not make hasty decisions. They are too costly and damaging. I do this because I believe in being responsible. I do this because I believe in this country. I do this because I believe that we must all work together to build a strong democracy. I must insist that our representatives in Ottawa do the same. Work hard at least five days a week. We cannot move forward by working part-time. Be available. I expect my Prime Minister to be involved in the running of my country, all the time. This cannot and must not be done remotely. Be aware. Know what all representatives are saying. After all, even if they are sitting on the other side of the House, they do represent Canadian voters. Hear them. Use wisdom, giving careful consideration to the decisions you are making.”
The email continues, “This can only be accomplished by allowing enough time to gather all viewpoints and information. To be clear, I do not support the House of Commons being closed on Fridays. I do expect our leader, the Prime Minister, to be present in the House. I do expect the House to discuss legislation as fully as is required to make wise decisions. This is not about us and them. This is not about being overworked. This is about building a strong and vibrant country.”
I'll quickly comment on this, Mr. Chair, because I think this person makes some good points. He talks about how he runs his business. He hears from all his employees. He takes the time to make sure he's not making hasty decisions. He wants to make sure they're not costly and damaging—
:
Outside of that, when you look at this email, it says we do not live in a dictatorship and says “as of now”. Those are strong words meant to imply, obviously, that what they're seeing here would lead in that direction. They say they would never stand for that.
They're talking about things like the only wanting to answer questions once a week. They call that outrageous. They talk about closing down Parliament on Fridays and say that it's just not acceptable. They're raising the issue that this is something all parties need to consider, and it needs to be done with say from the opposition and the public.
They make the point that this is not a partisan issue, and they're right. It's not a partisan issue. They say it's one of basic decency and integrity. That's a good point.
The next one says, “There is some shady business happening up on the Hill. It would seem that your government is trying to sneak through some changes through Parliament and how Parliament operates. I cannot in good conscience let this happen without me at least standing up and letting my voice be heard. It is important to any democracy that it have a strong opposition. That's how we keep the checks and balances to ensure that the government of the day is held to account for the things it does. We need to have our voices heard, and the idea that the Liberal government is finding new ways to stifle any opposition is disturbing.
“Putting aside Mr. Trudeau's dismissive attitude toward Alberta, what he and his government are doing is affecting us all—racking up more debt every year, meaning more money to service debt, taking away money that should be paying for programs for Canadians. But the fact that he wants to spend less time in the House of Commons in question period, to do what? What is more pressing than answering the questions of MPs that were elected by Canadians? I did not vote Liberal, but I did vote, and my representative needs to be heard. That is democracy. Perhaps the Liberal Party needs to look it up”.
There's a quote here she's given: “A system of government by the whole population or all the eligible members of a state, typically through elected representatives.”
She continues. “Absolute power corrupts absolutely. No party, including my own, should be stifling voices from people that oppose their views. The fact that the Liberal Party wants to do less and have less opposition to the things they are doing doesn't surprise me. What can you expect from a party who have self-proclaimed themselves to have the divine right to be leaders of Canada? What you are trying to do is stifle my voice, stifle my rights. We are not insignificant or not worthy of having a government that works for us, because you do, after all, work for us, all of us. You should remember that. Rant over. Time for a selfie.”
It's obviously someone who's frustrated. It wasn't a Liberal voter, so again, there are people here who support all different stripes of political parties, but they all seem to be united by one common thread. That is, they see what's being done here as, in the words of this person, disturbing.
She calls it shady business. She calls it trying to sneak through changes to how Parliament operates, saying she can't in good conscience let it happen without standing up and letting her voice be heard, saying that this is trying to stifle her voice and her rights. Those are pretty strong words, and understandably so.
The next one says, “Shutting down Parliament on Fridays is not in the best interest of Canada. Many Canadians like me expect to see all of Parliament at work with a full House every day of the week, including Friday. As for the Liberals' back-door change they are attempting to slide past Canadians, legislation that would permanently limit debate and scrutiny of bills, Canada is not a dictatorship. This is Canada, with a democracy, and we the people demand Liberals stop their back-door ways. I expect every bill or legislation put forth to be scrutinized by all parties in Parliament, any and every day of the week. I have also noticed that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau needs to attend the House way more than part time. Canadians deserve a full-time prime minister that is in the House to answer our MPs' questions every day. Tell Justin Trudeau we Canadians want the questions of all MPs answered by the Prime Minister himself on any legislation or bill Justin Trudeau's Liberals try to impose on Canadians.
“Take these words under careful consideration and stop doing Justin Trudeau's dirty work, and respect Canadians first and foremost.
“If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me and I will be happy to answer anything you are unable to understand.”
In that one, I think they were pretty clear. They're saying this is something that they consider Justin Trudeau's dirty work and they think it's inappropriate, and they're asking for Canadians to be respected first and foremost.
The next fellow here says, “In order to preserve democracy in this country, I demand that Parliament be open on Friday and I expect Trudeau to answer questions in the House. It's his job to be accountable to Canadians, and our elected representatives are to question his actions and he must be present to answer their concerns.
“Parliamentary procedures are not to be changed solely at the discretion of Liberals, as this is not the democratic way in which we operate.
“I also object to having a time limit imposed on MPs to challenge proposals that your government wants to make. If you're trying to jam changes through by limiting objections, then your government will be defeated in the next election, which can't come soon enough.
“Where are all the jobs that Trudeau promised to create when he was campaigning? We Canadians are having to learn to survive on less money and I have not seen where government has tightened their purse strings. Is this what you call responsible government?”
That individual is saying, man, you guys are going to pay the price in the next election. You'll be defeated if you do such a thing as to change this without the consent of all parties, and he's saying, if that's the case, it certainly can't come soon enough.
The next one says: “Good day, everyone. I've taken some time today to review the discussion tabled regarding proposed changes to the functions of the House of Commons. Upon review of these changes, I was very disheartened to see such a high level of support from the Liberal Party for processes that would, from my understanding, ultimately limit the voice of the Canadian people.
“Our House of Commons is an extremely vital component of our ability to function as a diverse yet collaborative community here in Canada. I do not support the prospect of limiting our elected voices from the ability to speak on our behalf, nor do I support the prospect of any federal government having the ability to deny the opportunity for debate.
“I cannot grasp the benefit of the House of Commons not sitting on Fridays. I would love to have a greater understanding of how this change would benefit the Canadian people. Without a direct benefit, I cannot see a purpose to this option.
“At this point, I do not feel that members of Parliament, nor the Canadian people they represent, have had the appropriate explanation or amount of time to process the potential implications of the changes put forward in this discussion. This is not the way of my Canadian political platform.”
That person was using some reasonable language, talking about being disheartened to see Liberal support for this thing that they would see as limiting the voice of the Canadian people. They say they don't see the benefits and they really don't think there has been an appropriate time for discussion about something such as this, and they're certainly right. There has not been appropriate opportunity for that. It's just being brought forward and table-dropped in front of the committee as a motion.
This one says, obviously addressed to the Liberal members of the committee, “I think your motion on behalf of Justin Trudeau to change the debate rules in the House, as well as other items to limit accountability, is self-serving and shameful. Further, your attempt to sneak this motion through on budget day is quite pathetic. The only conclusion that can be drawn by rational observers is that the Liberal government does not want to be held to account by the citizens.”
It indicates that it's copied to other MPs, and then it says, “as well as Kent Hehr, who is my MP.”
Then it addresses him specifically by saying: “Kent, I'm quite curious to hear your exact position on this motion and I'm surprised that you appear to support it. Rest assured there will be a steep price to be paid at election time for those who proposed and supported such nonsense.”
It's making it quite clear that although they may have supported in the last election as the Liberal MP in their riding, they certainly would say there would be a steep price to be paid, which I would assume means their vote would certainly not be going there and they believe the vote of others would not be going there if they were going to support what they call such nonsense, saying, “The only conclusion that can be drawn by rational observers is that the Liberal government does not want to be held to account by the citizens.”
I think that's a pretty fair conclusion to draw. It seems that what's behind this is an attempt to try to find a way to avoid being held accountable. Think about only being in question period one day a week. Think about removing the one day a week when there's question period now—that's 20% of the question periods. This certainly would ensure there is less ability to hold them accountable. When you talk about changing the way committees work so that things can be rammed through in a very quick fashion, that is taking away accountability. It is also taking away the ability for the opposition to shine a light on things so that the public can become aware and make a determination on whether they think it's appropriate for Parliament to proceed with such things.
The next one says, “I'm writing to add my voice to speak out against the changes that have been proposed by the Liberal government to change the rules of the House of Commons. The rules of Parliament were established to ensure that all Canadians have a voice that is represented by their member of Parliament. You are not 'modernizing' the House of Commons by shutting down sitting days on Friday. You are not 'modernizing' the House of Commons by limiting the days that the Prime Minister needs to attend question period. My voice is not represented if the number of sitting days is reduced by 20%. My voice is not represented if members of Parliament cannot ask the Prime Minister questions every day. On a day when the federal budget is being tabled, this is a transparent attempt to sweep criticism under the rug. Governments do not last forever. There will be a time when you will be sitting on the other side of the House and your job will be to hold the government to account. Keep this in mind as you make changes that will have an everlasting impact on how Canadians are represented in their Parliament. It was not long ago when similar attempts were made to change the rules via Motion 6. The outrage from people who do not ordinarily pay attention to procedural matters in Parliament was resounding. You may think that Canadians do not follow these matters, but they do. I hope you will listen to the voice of reason and accept that these changes do not benefit the Canadians who elected you to represent their best interests.”
There were some really good points made here. I think it was the first email I read that recognized this. it was obviously someone who must watch question period. They hear the government House leader and her responses, because there's often been this talk that somehow this was modernizing Parliament. I noticed they said that we were not “modernizing” the House of Commons, and I noticed they used it in quote marks. They're absolutely right. This is the exact thought I've had a number of times in question period as I listened to that bogus answer that somehow shutting down Parliament on Fridays, that somehow limiting the Prime Minister's attendance in question period to once a week, was modernizing Parliament. I mean, what a load of BS. This person goes on to say that if you reduce the sitting days by 20%, if you only expect the Prime Minister to be there to answer questions once a week, what you're actually doing is making sure that their voice is not able to be represented. It has come up in a number of the letters I've read that the government needs to think this through, because I think what they're trying to do is make things easier for themselves. They want to make it so they can push through their agenda quicker, but what they're doing is changing the rules for all time. They're changing the way this Parliament always works. I point out to them that they will be in opposition some day, and that could be a lot sooner than they expect if they're going to continue to do these kinds of things that show them to be unaccountable. At some point, they'll be in opposition, and they'll be the ones who will be sorry that they made these changes. That's true.
The next one says, “I am an angry Canadian. I find out through social media that there is an attack going on in a hidden room in the House of Commons, an attack that was tried before and failed, an attack on my rights as a Canadian to have representation in the House, an attack on holding this sitting government to account, an all-out attack on democracy. Shame on you all. Shame on you for thinking the Canadian people are just going to lay down and take this. Shame on you for the devious way you're going about this. Shame on you for thinking all of us in the middle class and those working hard to join it cannot see exactly what you are trying to pull here.”
It continues: “Shame on you for thinking that Canadians are stupid. I mean, you must think we are all stupid by thinking you can get away with this. By the way, you all respond to every question asked with the same old talking points over and over again.
“Shame on you for so-called transparency you were supposed to be bringing to the House. Shame on you for the non-accountability you have shown the Canadian people thus far. Shame on you for campaigning on being present and accountable to the Canadian people and then pull this garbage. Shame on you for taking the money and not wanting to put in the time or effort to make Canada a better place. Shame on you all.
“Come to your senses immediately and drop this attack. Have some decency and let democracy rule. Let the people of Canada keep their voices and fair representation in the House of Commons, the House you are a temporary guest in—remember that.”
“Hoping that you will put Canada first and stop the madness.”
This person is obviously quite upset. The subject line they used probably said it all. “We have had enough,” they say, and they're saying shame on this Liberal government for what it's trying to do to eliminate accountability.
The next person says, “Hello. I'm writing in regard to your attack on our Canadian democracy. What are you people thinking? This is an attack on every Canadian and the only way we have our voices heard in Parliament. campaigned on being present, accountable, and transparent to us. You know us, the Canadian people you all keep claiming to be working for. I cannot believe you are trying to change the rules and kill democracy as we know it in the House. That does not belong to you but belongs to the people of Canada. Unbelievable, to say the least, and shame on you again. Don't think I have forgotten the talk of this nonsense before. I guess that's why you have chosen the path you have to ram this attack on democracy through.
“Once a week question period for the ? You've got to be kidding me. This is not a vacation. This is his job. Get in there and answer the questions, and enough with the talking points over and over and over again. Questions deserve an answer, not a talking point. We, the people, want real answers and be held accountable for his government's actions.
“Limiting debates? You've just cut off the Canadian people's voices. Unacceptable. Our representatives are just that. They represent Canadians. To limit time is to limit our voices, not theirs. This is our time, the Canadian people, for consultations that you are trying to limit and avoid hearing. This is us, the people, talking through them. Why do you people not get this?
“No Fridays? You all signed up knowing the work week is five days. How dare you change the contract between us, the Canadian people, and yourselves?
“Then to add insult to injury, I have to find out about this on Facebook? Where is your accountability and transparency when you hide in a room and push to get this nonsense rammed through without the public knowing? Shame. Our tax dollars pay for you to rent that seat five days a week. You do not own it, nor do you own the House. Stop this madness right now and start doing your jobs, which, by the way, is to work for us, the Canadian people, not against us.
“On a side note, if you feel there is not enough work-life balance in the positions you hold, then maybe you're not the right fit for this role.
“Hoping you will make the right decision and stop this madness now, and never, ever bring this to light again. Signed, a very concerned Canadian who helps pay your wages.”
Welcome to the two former members, who obviously both served this place and the Canadian people for a very long time. We celebrate and congratulate them and thank them for that. I wonder how they would have felt about this had this come forward while they were in opposition. I wonder whether they would have enjoyed having their rights eroded and taken away, as members of Parliament on behalf of the citizens they represent.
Mr. Chair, now I'll get back to some of the concerns that Canadians have about this.
The next email I have here says, “I am absolutely disgusted with this. Who exactly does this committee work for? I thought all parliamentarians worked for the benefit of all Canadians. Anyone who votes in favour of changing the policy on sitting in the House in order to allow a self-serving and his cohorts to avoid scrutiny doesn't deserve any support from Canadians. I'm hoping that there are millions of others who feel the same way. The Liberal Party and its members have lost their way. Perhaps it's time to retire them all.”
It's short and simple. The point is that they feel like they've lost their way. This is a government that has only been in power a year and a half and people are saying that it's lost its way and maybe that its members should all retire. They see the Prime Minister as self-serving and trying to avoid scrutiny and they say that he doesn't deserve any support from Canadians.
This next one looks like it's been sent to almost every MP, or very close to it, and it's from someone in Saskatchewan.
It says, “It's time for the Liberals to start working for Canadians and not for Trudeau. Trudeau is not your boss, but the Canadian people are. Trudeau loves dictators, while Canadians hate dictators. Trudeau is acting like your puppet master and you are letting him. You were not elected by Trudeau. Your responsibility is to Canadians, particularly those lost souls who elected you in their constituencies.”
I guess we know how they feel.
It continues, “Canadians hired you to do a job with specific rules, a job description, working conditions, and hours of work. Canadians have the power to fire you and unless you are deaf, blind, and totally ignorant of the rage building across this country towards the Liberals in power, you should be thinking about your future job security. If you don't like your job anymore, if you find the working conditions unbearable or find attending committee meetings just too hard on you, if you don't like listening to opposing points of view in meetings, if you cannot abide anyone who doesn't agree with your puppeteer's ideas or dangerous plans to dissolve our democracy, and if you cannot handle five days a week of having to be accountable for your actions, then I have one suggestion; resign right now. You were hired to do a job with set rules, hours of work, working conditions, etc. So was...”.
I won't use the words they use here to describe Justin Trudeau, but they aren't a very big fan of Justin Trudeau, clearly.
Furthermore, “If you are not prepared to accept those terms any more, then that's tough luck. You do not have the right to change the rules by which our Canadian democracy works. You are not part of a dictatorship yet. We will fight you to the death on this matter. Trudeau may have you all convinced that he walks on water and that you are close to accomplishing that feat too. Wake up. Start paying attention to what Canadians are saying about the puppeteer who is pulling your strings. You are making a joke of our democracy and of the work that is supposed to be done in the House of Commons and at the committee level. Who do you think you are? We know that Trudeau has no respect for the lowly Canadians he lies about wanting to help. You and the Prime Minister can help us by quitting. Walk out or resign. Let's get this over with now, rather than waiting for 2019. If your puppet master is so confident that he knows what Canadians want, I challenge you to tell him, “Call an election right now”. I have never been as disgusted and outraged at any sitting government as I have been with Trudeau Jr. and his band of merry thieves. They have lost their way and have drunk the toxic Trudeaupian Kool-aid once too often.”
I've never heard “Trudeaupian Kool-aid” before. That's an interesting term.
The person continues, “His incompetence, immaturity, and unsuitability for the job is now fully in the spotlight. He can't cope with being challenged or questioned in the House of Commons, so he wants to be there only one day a week? the country or the world, handing out our money to other countries is his idea of what his job should be. Canadians have a very different opiniFlying around on. Time for Justin to grow up and work full-time for the first time in his life.
“Redeem yourselves. Save your reputations and do something for a change. Stop this nonsense now. End this fiasco now, and he might earn some respect from Canadians who are watching in horror at the games that Trudeau and his advisers are playing with no respect for any of us.”
That person certainly didn't hold back on their feelings. People are angry. The subject of that was, “Concerned with Canada's future”—probably the least strong words they used in the whole email.
The subject matter of the next one is, “In protest to the lack of accountability”. It says, “I am very upset and concerned about how this government is trying to sneakily make these changes, changes that are no small deal. I can't believe that Canada's leaders of the Liberal Party don't understand the value of being leaders.
“The fact that you want to shut down Parliament on Fridays and take away the accountability that every government should be subject to in the form of plain and simple questioning astounds me. It doesn't matter what you are leading. Whether it's a federal government or you are the reeve of a small rural municipality, leaders need to be able to answer questions from those that they are serving. They have a duty to answer to the best of their ability and to subject themselves willingly and openly to scrutiny, because running a country is a big deal. Trying to actually do it well and with honesty is a big deal.”
Then, they have the next part in bold: “Please step up and be an example of good leadership. Show that you even believe you are to be serving the citizens of this country and that you even care what we have to say. I really don't believe that you do.”
I'm sure that person hopes that they will be proven wrong, that there will be good initiative shown, that the Liberals will show that they want to serve the citizens of this country, and that they actually care what people have to say.
The next one says, “To whomever this pertains in the Liberal Party, you cannot amend the rules in the House of Commons just because you feel like it. Are you going to change the name 'Robert's Rules' and call it 'Trudeau's Rules'? Rules in the House of Commons have been there for a reason, so that each everyone can debate and voice the opinion that represents the people of their province. Taking that away is truly insane.
“Liberals, sorry—not sorry—to burst your bubble, but the House of Commons is not about you and what makes it easier for you. It's not supposed to be easy. It's about decision-making for the betterment of the country, even if it takes all night. Even if one person in that room doesn't have a chance to voice their right to speak, how is that anywhere fair?
“I don't understand how you don't see that. What if the Liberals' voice were taken away? You would be”—and I won't use the word they use, but “angry” is what they're getting at—“and frankly”—and again, I won't use their word—“I'm angry, along with many other Canadians. This is not okay. I cannot believe we have to fight for ridiculous stuff like this when there are so many other important things we could be talking about.”
Again, I won't use the language here, but they essentially say that if Justin Trudeau thinks it's too much work to answer questions and wants to take a day to limit that, he shouldn't be in office at all.
Finally, “I'm so disappointed in your representation of this country that my heart hurts.” That's someone who's pretty disappointed.
The next one asks, “How in any way do you think that what you are doing is honouring this great country that we all live in, let alone while our 'wonderful' Prime Minister is putting us in more and more debt because of his outrageous expenses and luxurious vacations? Do you honestly think that granting him more days off will in any way help this country? Frankly, it will more likely put Canada into more debt than we are already in now, not to mention the headache this will cause for years to come, and the financial stress that it will continue to place on this country and on taxpayers like myself. If you think that this will win the Liberal Party more votes at all in the next election, you are mistaken.”
It continues, “I, for one, will not be voting in your party's favour in the next election due to things like this. As men and women who are paid to stand up for the people of this country I feel as though you have outrageously failed us. Sincerely, a very disappointed young voter.”
The subject of this was actually “Weasels in Parliament”, so they're pretty upset, saying they won't vote for the Liberal Party. They're a very disappointed young voter because of what they're seeing here, a young person who's paying attention to what's going on and saying, this is not appropriate.
The next one's addressed to Liberal MPs, although copied to others, obviously: “Dear Liberal MPs, you can't change the rules of how Parliament runs, without consulting Canadians. You do not own your seat. You were entrusted with it by Canadians. Stop trying to push through these changes without due course. How dare you tamper with democracy in our country like this? You are trying to escape accountability, and you need to drop this motion.”
Then they indicate they're looking forward to a reply.
The next person says: “I expect Parliament to be open on Fridays and hard work to be done. I expect Trudeau to answer questions in the House, and that he can't limit the right of my MP to scrutinize legislation. I really expect there to be more respect for my tax dollars. The rest of us Canadians would never dream of wasting money like this government is doing, because we know the value of money. We have to work hard and make tough choices to support our families, and it is extremely disrespectful to take our money in taxes and then sit in your castle and show all of us peasants how powerful you are to oppress us with your wasteful spending. It's just sickening.”
This person, besides thinking that this is a sickening attempt, I think really summarized quite well in their first paragraph the thoughts of many of the people writing these letters, in saying that they expected Parliament to be open on Fridays and expected Justin Trudeau to answer questions in the House of Commons, and that the government shouldn't be limiting the rights of MPs to scrutinize legislation. That sums up, in a very brief way, what the problem is here. I think that for many of these people it's really hard to believe that's what's happening here, that the government is trying to take these rights away from Canadians and the people who represent them.
The next person here is from Toronto, Ontario, and they've written to the Liberal members on the committee—obviously it must have been copied to the rest of us—but it says, “We, the taxpayers, have serious concerns regarding”, and then they have a number of bullet points here. It says: “With the high budget deficit; the $127,000 vacation expenses by the Prime Minister; the gifts to Bombardier, with no apparent benefits to taxpayers; the secretive dealings with Aga Khan; the change to parliamentary rules; the waste of billions of dollars with UN irrelevance; the low GDP numbers and what the Prime Minister is planning to do to resolve it; and many more. Certainly, the Prime Minister has the time to travel the world and he has time to show up for work on Fridays and answer our questions and concerns.
“I think what they were trying to say there is if he has that time he should be able to show up and answer the questions and concerns. Obviously, they had a number of concerns themselves.”
The next person is from Hamilton, Ontario, and says: “Good afternoon, members of the PROC committee. Respectfully, today I'm writing to voice my dismay regarding the proposed changes to the Standing Orders and the process by which Parliament operates. Why did you move this motion? Did these changes originate with you or with the PMO? I've copied my MP on this”—I guess I'll use his name—“and urge Mr. Christopherson to say 'no' to shutting down the House of Commons on Fridays.”
I won't speak for Mr. Christopherson, but based on what I've heard from him, I think you can count on his saying “no”. Obviously, I think the hope is that other members of the committee, particularly the Liberal members, will choose to follow that example.
The person goes on to say: “Hard-working Canadian taxpayers deserve a working government. Please remember that you are elected public servants with a mandate of representing the people in your riding, not the whims of the party in power. The citizens of this country depend on you to show up for work, represent them, and thoroughly debate all issues. Kindly maximize the time that you, as MPs, are in Ottawa. There should be no limit to the amount of time debated on issues. Canadians are diverse in our opinions and all voices should be heard. Governments should always be scrutinized and the Opposition MPs represent the majority of Canadians. Furthermore, the Prime Minister should be expected to show up in the House and attend question period more than once a week. Taxpayers shouldn't be funding vanity trips for the PM when the business of the country is being carried out in the House of Commons.”
I have a few more that I want to read today, Mr. Chair, and then I'll probably turn the floor over to one of my colleagues—whoever is on the list there, so they can be prepared.
:
All right, nothing tripped. Presumably when we're over in West Block, we will have fewer of these sorts of issues.
At any rate, returning to the subject at hand, the cycle is to go through the Chief Electoral Officer's review, our recommendations on the CEO's review, and from there move to the minister then designing legislation.
The ever-vigilant Rachel Aiello, who is sitting over at the media desk right now, along with her colleague Laura Ryckewaert, has written a number of articles for The Hill Times about the progress being made on that file. It's slow progress, but that's the nature of a detailed discussion on detailed legislation.
Although there is a minister responsible, as there must be under our Constitution, this one statute, unlike all other statutes in Canada, is not dealt with by the minister and his or her public servants working on developing the first draft of legislation internally and then revealing it. Rather, we assume that essentially the people who would fulfill the role normally fulfilled by those public servants is this committee. When we act collegially and as a whole, we are collectively fulfilling the role that the minister has in terms of providing material for new elections legislation.
That wasn't the whole basis, but it was part of the basis for the objection that a number of people had—Mr. Christopherson most volubly—on the subject of Bill , which popped out before we'd finished our review.
We have a process that was violated by introducing Bill in the manner in which it was introduced. That is without regard to the issue of the content of Bill C-33, to which I think Mr. Christopherson had less in the way of objection. I know certainly that was true for me. While I don't agree with everything in Bill C-33, I do think that the way in which it was introduced, too early in the process, was itself an issue.
It was introduced in December. That was too early. However, in all fairness, there's comes a point at which it is too late to put in place some of the changes that need to be made to the Canada Elections Act, because it just takes time to implement some of these systems.
That, of course, was the very same issue that existed with regard to the electoral reform legislation. It was always a question of whether we could we get a new system in place in time for the 2019 election, given the amount of time it takes to do all the different things that would have had to be done on that issue.
I'm aware that we're not discussing electoral reform legislation here. I use this merely because it is an analogy that I am very familiar with from having sat on the electoral reform committee for a number of months. I got the chance to ask the Chief Electoral Officer and also the former Chief Electoral Officer, Mr. Jean-Pierre Kingsley, quite detailed questions about the amount of time it takes to engage in various processes that would be engaged were we to change to a new electoral system. Some of the changes they pointed to, some of the ones that take the longest, are not, strictly speaking, relevant. They're not relevant at all to the kinds of changes to the Canada Elections Act being contemplated here. The longest and most complicated was undoubtedly the 20 to 24 months required to engage in a redistribution. That was the hard limit, the outer limit that they faced.
Then I asked them a series of questions at the various meetings of the electoral reform committee and also of this committee. I asked both those gentlemen about other issues that might arise: designing ballots, designing manuals, and so so. These issues, while they are less time-consuming than that of the actual electoral redistribution, are the areas in which we see direct analogies to what is going on with the proposed changes to the Canada Elections Act.
That takes some time to implement. Everything, of course, has to be prepared by Elections Canada for distribution to all 338 of our constituencies, some of which are quite remote. Any new procedure has to be worked through, and an education process has to happen—all before the writ is dropped—with one returning officer from each riding. They then, of course, during the writ period or in the immediate period leading up to it, have to educate many deputy returning officers and poll clerks, so that this can all be executed seamlessly in literally tens of thousands of polling stations across the country.
Not every procedure has to be executed at every polling station. Some are done only at, for example, the 338 locations where advance polls are counted, or the smaller number of locations at which ballots are being mailed out for those who are voting overseas and so on. There is a lot of work. It's all being done in parallel, and it all takes time.
With these considerations in mind, Minister approached this committee on March 10 and asked us to try to wrap up our work by June. She actually said preferably by May 19. This is referring to our work on the Canada Elections Act. I guess it depends who you're asking, how difficult it would be to accomplish this.
Mr. Chair, in speaking of The Hill Times, you indicated that we've picked the easiest things and have already dealt with them, and we're actually getting into the more difficult work. You didn't say the following, but it implies that the more time-consuming work—in trying to get through the remaining areas of the Canada Elections Act that we haven't yet dealt with—is still to come.
My own view is that we are getting educated and are therefore building up a body of expertise that allows us as a group to move more quickly, so we might actually make some unexpected progress. Those are my public remarks, which have been published in The Hill Times.
Additionally, my private thoughts have been that we also could go through a triage process, in which we say here are the things that really need to be studied by the committee. There may be other things about which we can say, if we don't get to this, it's actually not as critical. This allows us potentially to deal in more depth with some of the areas in the Elections Act and not others, or deal with some in more detail and others in less detail.
The reason I say this is that we are confronted by deadlines that are increasingly difficult to meet. The minister recognized at the time—I don't have her remarks in front of me, but I hope to get them and bring them back to the committee and share them with you in greater precision, because what I like about her is that she is very precise in her thoughts. You have clearly defined deadlines to work towards, and that's a valuable asset when one is trying to deal with the problem we ultimately have of limited time, limited human resources, and an important area of subject matter. She actually went off, saying we have x number of items to deal with subsidiary to our review of the Elections Act. We have, ideally, from her point of view, May 19 as the deadline.
I think we'd have to concede that the May 19 deadline could not be met by this committee under any circumstances. If we were, for the sake of argument, Mr. Chair, to resolve to cease all activity on the matter of the Standing Orders and set it aside until after the review of the Canada Elections Act were done—something I actually think would be the sensible way to go—and we were to just stick with our scheduled meetings, we'd have, of course, a two-week break beginning.... I guess we'd get one meeting in on Thursday, we'd then have a two-week break, and then we would reconvene and it would be May. It does take some time, typically two meetings, to get the actual report written, as opposed to putting together the recommendations.
So getting the report written and out the door to the House by May 19.... What have we got? We'd have four meetings I think before May 19. It might be six. No, I think it's four, Mr. Chair, and two of those would be eaten up with something that is not really adding to our subject matter—designing the report. I think the May 19 deadline is already not achievable.
She also said, “but I could live with June”. I think that's what we're talking about. Getting that done by June would involve a very substantial amount of work. That is the first item we have to deal with.
A second item we have to deal with, Mr. Chair, is Bill itself, which deals with some of the same subject matter. What the minister now has to do when she's designing her legislation is to work around Bill , and it's by no means certain that Bill itself exhaustively with the sections of the act it is amending.... It was designed to deal with certain problems that the government felt had been introduced to the Canada Elections Act by the previous bill that had been introduced in the wake of this committee's hearings in the last Parliament, that is to say the Fair Elections Act.
The way Minister described this was that it would be dealing with what she characterized as the unfair features of the Fair Elections Act. I think from her point of view that was a sincere characterization, because I noticed in looking at Bill that there were aspects of the Fair Elections Act that it did not repeal. That suggests to me that Minister and the whole cabinet, which I assume had to agree to this bill, felt these were fair aspects of the Fair Elections Act. This deals, for example, with a number of areas regarding overseas voters and there are other areas as well that have been left intact, but it went through in an order that is different from the order in which we're approaching things.
The new piece of legislation would, presumably, have to be crafted to take into account the areas of the Elections Act that have been dealt with in the Chief Electoral Officer's report and have become the subject matter of the reports this committee is working on, but that have not been dealt with through Bill .
There's the question—which we haven't really dealt with yet—of what we do with areas that the Chief Electoral Officer's report does deal with and that have also now been dealt with by Bill . That's possibly one place area where you could engage in the triage exercise and just say, look, given our limited time, given the fact that the government has already dealt with this in Bill , maybe we should just excise these areas from our study. That would allow us to somewhat compress the time we need to go through the Elections Act.
Here you are, the minister has got the new law she's working on, Bill , which will go before the Commons this Thursday. If I might add, Mr. Chair, this raises a point that is of some concern to me. I think the hours we are scheduled to meet on Thursday may overlap with the period when that bill is before the Commons. I'm not sure that's correct, but given that Thursday's hours have been changed—
Yes, thanks for at least thinking about that. You have Bill . It's got to go through second reading, and then it will get referred to this committee. It is conceivable that the bill will wind up before we've gone into the summer, and that could be an issue. I'm not saying that will happen, but it certainly is feasible.
I assume that the House is going to vote in favour of Bill at second reading, which inevitably sends it back to us, and that creates an issue, given the fact that we're talking about the Standing Orders right now.
There's a third piece of legislation from same minister that is highly relevant. indicated some time back—about a month back or perhaps a bit longer—that she would be producing election finance legislation to change aspects of how financing is done. We don't know all the things that are going to be included in this legislation. We do know certain things that won't be contained and certain things that will, but we don't know all the parameters of the legislation. I only know what has been reported in the media. It will not, for example, change the donation limit currently set at $1550—or $1500 set for inflation, which puts it currently a $1550.
It will deal with a requirement for the public reporting of fundraising events at which a minister is present. The logic there for the advance notification is that this does not serve... I think I'm characterizing Minister Gould's comments correctly when I say this means that fundraising events at which a person has paid, let's say for the sake of argument, $300 for a ticket, will not involve confidential access to a minister who is present. You still get access to a minister, but you wouldn't get access that the public doesn't know about until after the fact. You'd be able to know in advance.
My understanding is that the Liberal party has recently adopted this approach voluntarily, and, indeed, it looks like the attempt is to take a process that the Liberal party has adopted and codify it to make it required of all parties. Now, of course, only the Liberal party has ministers at the moment, to state the obvious, so I have a suspicion that this would also involve all members of Parliament. Anyone who is paying for attendance at any event at which the MP is present will be covered—except that they say purely local events won't covered. I don't know how they're going to do that exactly. Maybe it depends on whether the funds are going to the riding association or to the party. That's not clear to me. At any rate, last week I saw a newspaper article saying that this legislation was coming forward this spring and that the minister was in the process of consulting with the other parties about it.
I had somehow managed to get the idea in my head incorrectly that this legislation would be coming forward this autumn, not this spring. So I took the newspaper article and buttonholed the minister in the House, sat down beside her, and started chatting. It was meant to be brief chat. It wound up being a very awkward period for me because, almost immediately after I went over to sit with her, Kevin Lamoureux stood up, and I was in the camera shot. He proceeded to give a talk that was harshly critical of my House leader, so I had to sit on the floor and try to keep my head hidden behind a desk, but none of this is Minister Gould's fault. It was just bad timing on my part.
What she said was, yes indeed, she was planning on introducing that legislation this spring. She indicated that she had already consulted with one of the parties and was trying to line up a meeting with representatives of my party. I know that meeting hasn't happened yet, because I would be present at it as the relevant critic, but she then went on to lay out a bit of her timeline. She said, “You know, I don't control the times on these things exactly; it has to go to cabinet for approval.” I'm assuming that the cabinet process she has to go through is like the cabinet process that governments in the past had. It usually goes to the cabinet committee first, which meets and approves it, and then a presentation is made by the chair of the cabinet committee with the relevant minister present. Then if it gets approval, it comes back and is introduced in the House—but that happens this spring.
It could be that it will simply be introduced this spring, have first reading, and not get second reading until the summer is over. We did not get into discussing that, and I think in all fairness she doesn't know. However, in the event that it does, we could find that piece of business before this committee. It's not beyond the realm of possibility that this item of business would be before this committee this spring, and I say that for the following reason, because as a piece of legislation, it has to go through this House and then through the Senate. As you know, one of the complaints that the government has been making is that the Senate does not move with alacrity. Indeed, this has been a complaint of all governments through the entire history of our confederation. If you go back and read debates from the 1860s about what it was like before Confederation, we had the Legislative Council of the Province of Canada, and you realize that they had the same complaints about that body too. So this has been going on since time immemorial, or at least since we have had Hansard records.
There is a legitimate worry that what would happen is something such as this: if this committee and the House don't deal with this particular item until the autumn, and the House comes back in mid-September, we will deal with this item of business, this new piece of financial legislation, through the remainder of the month of September. Yet if we don't start dealing with it in this committee before September, it would be optimistic to hope to get it out of the House of Commons before the end of September. It would be hard to imagine its getting out before the October break, the Thanksgiving break. So we're talking now of mid-October when it would come back. It would go to the Senate, and the chances of it getting that legislation through so that it would get royal assent by the end of 2017 are pretty remote. That means the financial rules, which are set on the calendar year, will remain in effect for all of 2018. So I can see her wanting to get this legislation through promptly, which means that it could wind up on our agenda in June as well. That is a realistic scenario. So you now have three pieces of legislation all coming from Minister Gould to us, all of which have to be dealt with by us this spring.
I should take a step backwards and concede the point that, in terms of the recommendation we are making vis-à-vis the as-yet-unwritten legislation that will respond to the review of the Canada Elections Act, it's not a legislative process that we're talking about. It is a practice that has arisen in this place to deal with elections act reform. So we're not trying to get legislation through by the end of June; we're trying to get a study and recommendations through, which then lead to her introducing legislation in the autumn. She was quite clear about that in her March 10 meeting here. She's not talking about introducing that piece of legislation this June; she's talking about having the summer free to design, with her officials, legislation that conforms as best it can with our recommendations. However, she has the right as a minister of the crown to disagree with some of the recommendations and say either, “I think the CEO was right to recommend X, while the committee recommended not X, but Y”, or “I disagree with both of them and I'm introducing something else.”
It is very likely, and I'm certain that this is the case, as it has been the practice in the past, that she would take our reports, read them thoroughly, as I'm confident she does, and would go with her officials to meet with the Chief Electoral Officer and the officials at Elections Canada, presumably on more than one occasion, to discuss whether what she's drafting in response seems workable from their point of view. Actually, there is no Chief Electoral Officer at the moment, so it would be the acting CEO.
I can see how that would take a whole summer. That's really easy to imagine. So she comes back, the House reconvenes around the 8th, 9th, or 10th, somewhere in that range, and she could introduce that bill at first reading immediately. In fact, I'm virtually certain that this is exactly what would happen with that piece of legislation. She went through with us on March 10...a discussion of some of the things that she would try to achieve. It's clear that she was hoping to get that legislation through the House and the Senate, and to have royal assent by December 31 so this, too, could be in effect—although, in all fairness, when it comes to that legislation, actually having it in effect is not as important as having a certain message that it will come into effect. If Elections Canada can be confident that it is going to go through, the legislative process on this issue being generally non-partisan.... I think that, on a technical piece of legislation like this, it's likely to be largely non-partisan. The things we would be doing would be picking up on technical errors. We are now reviewing a piece of legislation designed by the minister and her staff in co-operation with the CEO, after we've done a review and after the CEO has done a review. Presumably, the really big bugs have been worked out of the system by that point, so hopefully we can proceed with more speed here, and in the Senate.
That would hopefully make it possible for this to move through with some speed, but we still have to deal with it. It still has to happen. We have no control whatever over how things happen in the other place. Complicating all of this a bit, as I mentioned, is the fact that we don't currently have a CEO. We do have a CEO hiring process under way. It's a public hiring process, which moves at its own speed, so there is an additional wrinkle there in terms of how fast the response of the CEO will be. Not having a permanent CEO, and then having a new CEO presumably by some point midway through this process, will not speed up the adoption by the Chief Electoral Officer and Elections Canada of the recommendations made here, which encourages us to have greater speed. Certainly, I would think that no interim CEO would be comfortable putting something into effect, knowing that it doesn't have the approval of someone who will be appointed shortly and who will be the boss. If I am on the staff of Elections Canada, I would not want that person to walk in and discover that there have been a bunch of faits accomplis that the new boss might not approve of, which have been done, in a sense, in order to push that person into losing their decision-making authority over those changes. Those are some of the practical issues that exist.
With all of this in mind, all of these problems that relate back to the and the workload that she has given us, I drafted a letter to the minister, asking her how she ought to deal with this and also encouraging her to consider dealing with some of her colleagues in the cabinet to cause them to shift the direction they are taking with regard to the high importance they are placing on reviewing the Standing Orders by a June deadline so that we can deal, in as businesslike a manner as possible, with the matters that we were dealing with and that we are going to have to deal with—the workload that was already great in margin and that has grown, depending on how you measure it, threefold since that time.
This is a letter being sent off with today's date on it. I'll just read it verbatim. I think it would be helpful for members of the committee to see exactly where I'm coming from so that they'll know what she is receiving. If they want to communicate with her—either because they agree with what I'm saying, or because they disagree—they can do so. I think that makes this germane to what we're doing here.
Thank you for your invitation, sent to my office on April 3, 2017, for an in-person meeting. I appreciate your regular and continuing openness to meeting with me to discuss your portfolio and matters pertaining to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC). Both of those things are germane to my letter today.
During your last appearance before PROC, on March 9, 2017—
Mr. Chair, I have to stop here. I think I've been saying all along “March 10” for Minister 's appearance. It was March 9. That was a Thursday. March 10 was the date for Minister 's discussion paper being introduced and Mr. ' motion. That's right.
I'm going to make a note to myself, because I want to return to the dates on those. I think there's a point of significance that I had not realized earlier in our discussion, which I think helps explain some of the problem we're facing here. Sometimes the left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing, and it can lead to problems further down the line. I think that may have occurred here through no individual fault.
Okay. To go back to the letter:
During your last appearance before [the Procedure and House Affairs committee] on March 9, 2017, you asked the committee to provide our next report on the Chief Electoral Officer's report entitled, An Electoral Framework for the 21st Century: Recommendations From the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada Following the 42nd General Election—
I then give a quote from the minister about reporting back, as follows:
—“before the House rises for the summer, preferably by May 19” so that you would “be well positioned to advance some significant reforms that would improve the electoral process for Canadians”, namely through legislation that you hope to introduce this coming autumn.
So far, PROC has spent 16 meetings to produce two reports on the Chief Electoral Officer's report. When you asked [the procedure and House affairs committee] on March 9 for a further report by May 19, [the procedure and House affairs committee] would normally have had 12 additional meetings in which to prepare that report. [Four] of those 12 meeting times have elapsed without further progress on the report having been made.
Seeing as I'm sending this letter off today, I'm going to have to change that to five. Let's see: is that right? Yes, today's meeting would be five. I'll continue:
At this time, it is uncertain how many meetings [the procedure and House affairs committee] will be able to devote to this report, or whether the committee will be able to provide you with a report at all by the date you identified.
I won't repeat my comments. I'll simply draw attention to them again, which is that I already think that we have to accept that May 19 is a lost cause, although I think June is still achievable for a report back to the minister if we do some triaging.
To go back to the letter:
This uncertainty is on account of events precipitated by your cabinet colleague, the Government House Leader, [Bardish Chagger] on and since March 10, 2017, the day after your last visit to [the procedure and House affairs committee]. ...These events have brought to a halt the committee's ability to work on the Chief Electoral Officer's report.
The letter continues:
In light of the situation presently unfolding in [the procedure and House affairs committee], I am writing to ask you whether you could give [our committee] indications on a number of questions, namely:
1. Whether the May 19 date for a report is flexible;—
I actually think the answer to that from her was that yes, it was—that it was a preferred date—but I'm hoping her response would give some indication of the degree to which there's flexibility and at what point she has what I think of as a drop-dead timeline.
For example, you mean to go and cast your ballot at a certain time. You mean to do it in the mid-afternoon and something comes up—you have to take the kids to day care and then something else comes up—but we all know that there's a point at which the polls close. That's your drop-dead deadline for voting. Well, there's a drop-dead deadline for getting this thing back to her. I'm hoping to elicit a response as to what that is. Or if she wishes to give a more nuanced response about which parts should come first—if there are going to be multiple drop-dead deadlines—that would be just fine.
That was number one. I'll continue:
2. Whether you would still accept a report before the House rises for the summer, as you indicated;
3. What alternatives you might suggest in order to provide you with feedback in time to be considered for your fall legislation;
4. Your view of how [the procedure and House affairs committee] should prioritize the business it has in front of it, or will have in front of it, to the extent that those items conflict. Those items being:
a. the CEO recommendations report;
b. Bill C-33, which...[at time of this writing] is at second reading stage in the House;
c. your planned bill this spring on [the financing of political parties]; and
d. the on-going discussion over proposed changes to the House of Common Standing Orders, based on [the] discussion paper released by the Government House Leader on March 10, 2017, and presently subject to a motion calling for a report to be completed by June 2, 2017.
As you know—
:
That's right. The subsequent part, of course, is that he did not get re-elected.
While it's an interesting discussion, I think it reflects a kind of election that existed in the 18th century in the United Kingdom, one that has not existed in a very long time either in that country or this one, in which people were elected as individual members with very loose ties to any party. The parties we talk about from those days—the Tories and the Whigs—were not parties in the sense that we use the term. “Party” was essentially.... Sometimes the word used in its place was “faction”, and that's the best way to understand them.
It was a bit like how people talk about Red Tory and Blue Tory factions within the Conservative party, for example. Also, there was talk at one time of a Chrétien faction and a Martin faction in the Liberals. Within the NDP, there was the Waffle movement, and now there are the people behind the Leap Manifesto, and others who are part of different groups.
That was how it was seen in those days. In the 18th century, Parliament itself was a single deciding body. Of course, in those days it was largely independent of the executive, and the executive was independent of Parliament. That window was starting to close. There was a prime minister by about the year 1720 or 1725. Walpole was the first prime minister, that is to say, the first minister who was primus inter pares, who came to the king speaking for the cabinet with a single voice, saying that “all your ministers advise you this way”.
Parenthetically, this was something the king wanted. King George I was actually a very unpleasant individual, but he was also very much wrapped up in the affairs of his small kingdom of Hanover in northern Germany. He was fighting wars with all his neighbours, and he learned that he had been chosen as king of England, so he sailed across the North Sea, was crowned, and went back to Germany, where he spent the rest of his life. There was no further direct involvement by him in British affairs.
When I was in Australia, they were having a debate over becoming a republic. People would say that you had to have a resident as your head of state, that you can't have someone who lives in a foreign country, and that the British would never stand for that if the roles were reversed. Of course, the appropriate response was, well, actually, the British were the ones who pioneered this. They had a German for their head of state for some time. George I was actually buried in Germany.
Anyway, the result of this was that he was not in close proximity to his ministers and couldn't ask each of them for individual advice, so he got a single minister to compile everything, all the advice, and present it to him in a single package. I want to say that person was Horace Walpole, but that's not right. Horace Walpole was the nephew of the prime minister. He went on to become a famous author of gothic romances; that's “Gothick” with a “k” at the end. He was the architect of Strawberry Hill in the beginning of the Romantic revival of gothic architecture.
Prime Minister Walpole would summarize these things. The media didn't like it. They felt that classical government, what they were familiar with at the time, was that the king took his advice from all his ministers and then made his decisions. That's how the king's predecessor, Queen Anne, handled things. She had a number of ministers selected from the various factions or parties in the House. She would then make executive decisions based upon their advice. The idea of one minister reporting to the king and nobody else was seen as an infringement of the collegial style of government that had existed. The term “prime minister” was actually a term that was used as a term of opprobrium; it was a term of disapproval. At any rate, by the end of the 18th century, that convention had solidified, but parties themselves were still informal bodies. They were thought of more as factions than as parties.
It was in that context that Edmund Burke made his comment in essentially answering a question about whether he should come back to the electors of Bristol between elections and ask them how they felt about this or that. He took an approach that is different from the one I've taken. Every so often we find ourselves acting as independents when there's no party discipline on some issue and, if there's enough time, you can go back and consult your constituents. It's something that I have done a number of times, most recently on the assisted dying legislation, when I asked my constituents whether I should vote for or against the legislation. About two-thirds of them instructed me to vote for the legislation.
He could have done a version of that, but he was saying that he didn't do that. He said that what he did was to use his conscience and his judgment, and his judgment in particular. He said that people should regard him in the same way they would regard a judge. He went to Parliament with that same sense of impartiality, and with better access to the available information, something that was actually quite a valid point in those days. It would be hard to get information back to Bristol about one of the great issues of the day without a considerable lag. Communication moved at the speed of the stagecoaches that carried letters and the newspapers, but that's obviously not true today.
In the intervening 220 years—in round numbers—between Edmund Burke and the present, parties in a more modern sense emerged. The whole history of the early 19th century in Britain is the history of the firming up of party structures, something that really comes to its maturity, I think, in the era of Gladstone and Disraeli leading two clearly defined visions of the nation at the head of respective parties, with Gladstone at the head of the Liberals and Disraeli at the head of the Conservatives, and with a very clear manifesto, as they would call it in Britain—or platform, as we would call it in Canada—being produced by each one. A clear understanding was developed. Prior to that, it had not been clear at that time, although the convention had been developing, that if you were defeated on a key item in the House of Commons, the government would fall, and the expectation would be that the Prime Minister would proffer to the Queen the advice to call new elections. That was when that solidified: during the Disraeli-Gladstone period in the 1860s through the 1880s.
It is out of this that the idea of a mandate developed: a collective mandate that the entire government consists of people who were elected based upon the manifesto or the platform that was produced in the previous election. Thus, we developed what could be called the mandate theory, the theory about what a mandate can entail.
Do you face a situation in which the government has simply indicated a general direction, such as that it will practise fiscal probity or that it will have small deficits without defining what a deficit is? Or do you have a more detailed expectation, such that if the government said it had absolute authority to go forward with its proposal but then failed to articulate it, then it really ought not to move forward at all? Or is it the case that you have some freedom in the areas where you did not expressly articulate a policy?
I would submit that when we look at this, there are several answers to those questions.
First of all, how much of the vote did you get? I don't want to endlessly revisit the electoral reform debate in which people argued that the Liberals got 39.5% of the vote, and they have 55% of the seats, and therefore 100% of the power. In the arguments of those who were in favour of proportional representation, this suggests that they have a very limited mandate. The same thing could have been said about the government of which I was a part, which was elected in 2011 with an identical percentage of the vote.
One could argue, therefore, that no one really has a full mandate, but I don't see any evidence that this is how Canadians regard it. Canadians expect those who are elected to govern. They understand that it is not the preference of the elected party to get fewer than half the votes; it's the way things come out. Obviously, no party says that it will deliberately try to keep its votes below 50%, so you can't blame for not having 50% of the vote. If he could have found a way of doing it, I think we all believe that, in all sincerity, he would have tried to get 50% of the vote. Nobody's going to question that.
Do we say, then, that we are prepared to govern as if we have minority governments all the time, even though we have a majority? I never saw that argument presented. I think the Canadian convention, or the practice, or the understanding of the Canadian people regarding mandate theory is that if you get a majority government, something that is to some degree determined by chance—and that when you stick with 39% and move it around somewhat, you get a minority government—it is reasonable for you to attempt to act upon your election mandate.
That is what Minister was articulating. She was saying, look, this isn't a minority government. It's a majority government. We hold the majority of the seats and the people have voted for us to act on this platform. Had it been the Conservatives who had a majority government, they would have acted on their platform. None of us is expected to say that we're setting aside our platform and governing as we would if we had only a minority.
There's obviously a vast gulf between the way you act with a minority and the way you act with a majority government. Having been on both sides—minority and majority—in government, and having been on both sides of it in opposition, I can safely say that you act in very different ways. The opposition behaves in different ways too. The opposition actually is more restrained, in some respects, during a minority government, because it recognizes that it could defeat the government, and hence it has to be careful not to defeat the government when it didn't intend to do so. This allows the government a certain degree of freedom to say that it's going to act a certain way, and that if it is defeated in that, we'll have an election. Depending where the polls are, that can be a considerable barrier to over-eager actions on the part of the opposition.
I thought nobody understood that better than Stephen Harper, who managed to govern with two successive minorities. If you look back at Canada's history, you'll realize that, amazing but true—it's pure fact—no previous Conservative minority government had ever survived long enough to actually put its budget into effect. There had never been a Conservative government that actually produced a budget that made it through the House of Commons and was enacted.
There have been Conservative minorities, one in 1957 under Diefenbaker, who called an election unexpectedly and early in 1958. There was Diefenbaker's second minority, which failed very quickly in the early 1960s. In 1962 he was elected to a minority and lost in 1963, over his budget, I believe. There was the Clark minority, which fell over its budget as well. After that, we're all out.
This was, then, a significant accomplishment. There have been numerous Liberal minorities, and the reason they work is that since we developed minority.... We never had minorities before the 1920s, but since that time, the third party with the smaller numbers has always been on the left, so that when you divide up the spectrum, it's possible for the Liberals to govern. It doesn't always work out, but if you are a gifted political operator, such as Mackenzie King, for example, who governed through the entire 1920s with minorities and didn't get a majority until 1935, it can be done.
Indeed, as Pierre Trudeau pointed out, it can actually let you get through parts of your agenda. If you're on the progressive wing of the Liberal party and your own party is resisting, you can say, well, our NDP colleagues are demanding this or else they'll defeat us, and hence we need to move a little bit left. He actually made a point of stressing that he had managed to accomplish some policy objectives in the 1972-74 period that would not have been available to him had he had a greater number of seats in a majority. I learned about that by reading David Lewis's autobiography. He was the NDP leader in that period.
:
That's right. It has a name, the Simms procedure, after our colleague , who pioneered it. This all revolves around the long-standing rule that nothing becomes a precedent if it's done by unanimous consent, and you can do anything by unanimous consent.
We all agreed on one occasion to allow Mr. Simms, who was the first person to intervene this way. It's a useful tool. We've kept it up to the point where Ms. last Thursday or Friday—I can't remember which now—wanted to ask Mr. a question. He was reluctant to cede the floor temporarily until he could confirm that her question was indeed in conformity with the Simms procedure, and it required Mr. Christopherson to intervene and establish that information.
In other words, we have developed our own set of practices right here in the space of a series of meetings that have been going on for only three weeks, that allow us to function and re-establish effectively the rules of a normal form of parliamentary debate, even though the formal rules actually don't leave any room for it. On the one hand, this is a testament to the ingenuity of a system that no one actually designed, our parliamentary system, of which we are a tiny branch way up high in that tree that has its roots down in the first parliament that met in medieval England. But we are doing the very same thing and we are being pioneers in our own way.
This all goes back to the 's question period and the rules around our question period, which are primarily conventional. They are conventions that are so deeply rooted that we don't have to write them down until someone tries to violate them, at which time either they are just unanimously punished by everybody...outraged that they would do whatever it is they've done, or we say that we'd better write down a particular rule. Conventions can remain unwritten, as they have on question period, until someone changes them, or they can be written down, but they need not be written down.
I guess it will be an open question tomorrow whether the once again takes all the questions. It will be somewhat different from last Wednesday in that we are having a very esteemed guest speaking to the House of Commons, which is something that perhaps occurs only two or three times in the life of the Parliament. The last person to do so was the president of the United States. It's not just every day one has an occurrence of this sort, and that may change the nature of question period. We'll find out.
At any rate, what the demonstrated very dramatically is that you don't need changes to the Standing Orders to achieve this promise, which relates us back to 's assertion that we cannot let the opposition have a veto over a government election promise. No veto has been exercised, because no promise requiring a change to the Standing Orders was actually made.
For the next item, I'm quoting once again from the Liberal election platform. Right at the very top of page 30, it says, “We will also empower the Speaker to challenge and sanction members during Question Period, and allow more time for questions and answers.”
I pause there to say that in terms of sanctioning members during question period, again, that is something that requires no changes to the Standing Orders. There are a number of powers at the disposal of the Speaker from which previous Speakers have chosen to refrain. My own parliamentary career goes back to my years as a staffer, to the late 20th century. In that period the Speaker would, from time to time, name members who had been acting in a particularly disruptive manner. Once named, the member would not be allowed to enter the House until such time as the member had appeared before the bar of the House to essentially plead forgiveness.
We don't even think of the bar of the House, but members actually pass it. It's that metal bar we pass as we come in.
Once you've been sanctioned, once you've been named, the privilege of being referred to by your riding has been stripped from you, and you are now outside the House and must seek its collective will to re-enter. That power was there, and it hasn't been removed.
What happened was that Speaker Milliken, our longest serving Speaker—and for what it's worth, he's a constituent of mine; he lives in my riding of Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston, in the rural part of Kingston, the very beautiful rural part of Kingston I represent—developed the practice of never naming a member. He exercised a milder, but I thought more effective, power. Speaker Scheer followed this example.
If a member was being particularly disruptive, heckling to excess.... We all heckle a bit, but there is heckling and there is really disruptive heckling, and it's the disruption that's the problem, or being disrespectful of other members or of the House as a whole.
I remember Speaker Milliken saying this so clearly vis-à-vis a member from Saskatchewan, whose name was Jim Pankiw. You've been here as long as I have, Mr. Chair. You will remember Jim Pankiw from northern Saskatchewan.
He was being disruptive in some respect or other—I can't remember what it was—and the Speaker stood up, cutting off the member's microphone, and then before returning to the business of the House, he said, “The member may find it difficult to catch the Speaker's eye the next time he tries”, which was his way of signalling Mr. Pankiw and also the table officers. At the time, it was the Canadian Alliance table officers in the lobby. He was saying, “Take your member aside and explain to him that he can stand up, and I'll just pretend he's not there, and therefore, you can't put him up in question period. I'll simply ignore him as if he's not there, so you have to restructure things.” He was essentially kicked out of the House for many purposes. He couldn't even present petitions as long as that applied.
That gave Mr. Pankiw the option, which he exercised at some point—I don't know how long it took—of going up to the Speaker, either approaching him in the House or more likely approaching him by going to his office and having a sit-down chat about this kind of behaviour being unacceptable, and he got to do it without the humiliation of going before the bar of the House and without wasting the time of the entire House.
Do you see what I'm getting at? There is a very powerful tool that is already present in the hands of the Speaker, which our current Speaker has not had to exercise, although he has hinted that he might. A hint is enough. Everybody wants to play, so getting compliance from us requires merely the thought that we won't be allowed to play the game. Speaker has only had to hint at it. Speaker Milliken actually had to act on it a few times, but this worked much more effectively than the method employed by the prior Speaker of actually naming people.
Once you actually get taken out of the House, you can make a big deal about saying, “I'm the people's voice.” Being dragged kicking and screaming from the House is actually a very useful publicity gaming device.
A friend of mine, who is a Newfoundlander, told me about the antics of Andy Wells, who went on to become mayor of Saint John's, if memory serves. He was in the House of Assembly in Newfoundland. He'd get kicked out regularly, and he would be dragged from the chamber, yelling as loud as he could, “The people will not be silenced”, and that became his stock-in-trade. I can think of other members who have done the same thing.
I would simply submit that the powers to challenge and sanction members during question period don't require changes to the Standing Orders. They're already there. The blunderbuss approach of kicking someone out exists. It isn't used, because there is a scalpel available, and that has been used by successive Speakers. They've been able to cut ever more finely with it and maintain discipline.
I have to say something else in this vein, Mr. Chair. I used to be in the media. I used to write articles for Western Report. I would file from Ottawa for Western Report, which was published out of Alberta. I also wrote for the National Post, but that was different. They were editorial pieces.
For Western Report, I had to write articles. There was a deadline. You had to produce x number of words every week. They had a certain amount of column inches, as they called them, to fill, whether you had a story or not. That's weekly, let alone daily, and the deadlines associated with print are not nearly as brutal as those associated with electronic media where you have exactly x number of minutes or seconds to fill, and if you have more to say and write about than the time will allow, that's too bad. If you have less, that's even worse.
Truly it's a Procrustean bed, and faced with this problem.... I'm an editorialist, and I must produce an intelligent and thoughtful opinion that is between 800 and 900 words long every three days, twice a week, once a week, or whatever it is. I'm not sure what it is. It depends on the publication, I guess, but that's me. If I were Chantal Hébert, Andrew Coyne, or any of the other columnists out there, this is what I'd have to do. It is hard to come up with something every time, so what reporters do....
I'll come to this. This is relevant, Mr. Chair. I just have to give the background information.
Reporters produce stories that are called evergreens. An evergreen story is not linked to any particular time, but it could be dropped in when you don't have anything to fill in the space. Christmas holidays are a problem and that is when evergreen stories help out.
In the summer there is what we call the silly season. The silly season is when we're out of serious stories because people who generate serious news are on holidays. That's the time of year when the reliable story for the local reporter is about how the bylaw officers have shut down some lemonade stand run by kids trying to raise money to help out third world hunger or something like that. You just know, a line of stories like I'll go out and find, or you can pre-write stories. It's just like Steve Martin in the movie L.A. Story where he's a weatherman who pre-writes his news forecasts because the weather is the same every day in Los Angeles.
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Yes, it is time to move forward.
I know that there was an issue of trust brought up previously, and I did mention at that time, too, that trust goes both ways. If everyone was coming to this issue from a genuine spot and every member of Parliament was perhaps able to submit their idea, such as the debate we did on the Standing Orders previously, we can learn from that debate. That is what this committee was tasked to do. We have a study on the Standing Orders that this committee is engaged in.
This would be the perfect place for us to come up with other solutions to the Standing Orders, those proposed by our colleagues and others that we come up with here at this committee, and even those suggested by the government. There's nothing wrong with that, as long as they're good ideas. If they're bad ideas, we can talk about that too, but there's nothing wrong with the ideas being put out there for us to talk about, because they're ideas that the government is interested in implementing. That's putting yourself out there.
It could have been approached in a different way. Let's say that the government or the House leader had never mentioned some ideas in a discussion paper for you to talk about. We could have just gone on our way. We had made that start, but what's wrong with having inside knowledge or a bit of an idea of what things interest them? They might not be things that we agree on at this committee. It happens all the time in other committees as well. Legislation is sent to committees. There are amendments made at committees. That's the work that committees do. In legislation, you know what the intent is, what the government wants to do.
Similarly, this isn't even legislation. It's just a discussion paper for us to get things started. I think it's a good discussion to have. I really feel that yesterday I had another wake-up call. Had I chosen to bring my family up here, that would have been the wrong choice for me, at least. What would be the point? Even if you have them up here for a day for an event, things can get crazy and it's hard. How do you find child care with five minutes' notice? If you're doing something and you think, it's six o'clock or seven o'clock, and you have something planned, how do you do that? That's not easy for people to do who don't have the supports that parliamentarians may have traditionally had. That's not to say I don't have a lot of support. I wouldn't be here without it, but I just had the realization yesterday again that it's very difficult when you find yourself in that position.
I want to serve. I want to do a good job. I've been sent here to vote, so I understand that we need to be in the House for votes and we need to be performing our roles on committees. Do we need to be doing that 24 hours a day on committee if we're just spinning our wheels and we're not getting to anything productive? I don't know if Canadians necessarily see that as a good use of their taxpayer dollars. What they want to see us do is progress. Whether it's the rules of procedure, whether it's legislation that they voted for, or whether it's the brilliant studies that committees do, they want to see us put those studies out and put those recommendations to the government to see if they'll act on those recommendations or not. That is our job as parliamentarians here, and I'd really like to get back to work and do our job.
There's no guarantee that any of these things will happen. I know there's some fear that these things will be implemented. They could be implemented anyway. What's the harm in discussing those ideas here in committees that have been created for that very purpose, to discuss ideas and to make recommendations? The fact that we have some direction, some ideas about what things the House leader might be thinking about, is a good thing. It gives us some focus, but there's nothing stopping us from including a slew of other things that the opposition thinks need to be done.
I know that the opposition benches and everyone wants to recruit new young Canadians to run for their parties and to be parliamentarians, as do we.
I understand that a lot of times people have said, “Let's not talk about Fridays. What's the big deal? You can trade them off. You can do this or you can do that.” It's true. As one of my colleagues said before as well, I do that often. I trade them off so I can be in my constituency office on Fridays. That last Friday when we were up here, I had to cancel about 20 appointments, and boy were people angry, because they think that you're not working when you're not able to meet with them, whether it's an immigration matter, a CRA concern, or whatever it is that they need their services for.
They want to be able to meet face to face with their MP. Sure, I can try doing it, and I do—I moved all those meetings to Saturday, and then I had my events and other commitments Saturday and Sunday. We all do that, and we are willing to do that, but should we have to always carry on that way? Should we not be able to meet with our constituents once a week? Should they have to wait two or three weeks before they can get a hold of us?
I think that's important work, and I think the work that we do here is important as well. We should continue to do it, and I don't think we should sacrifice any of the hours. There are a lot of things that can be done to move the hours around, and there are a lot of ideas. Even if those aren't the best ideas, and even if we feel, at the end of the day, that we must have those four hours that we spend on Friday and there is no other way for this Parliament to move forward on that recommendation or that idea, that's fine as well. Let's have that honest conversation.
I know that this is probably not going to convince anyone on the opposition benches, to have that conversation at this time, because everyone is so wrapped up in winning and losing in this Parliament, not what's right or what's wrong. I've noticed that sometimes parliamentarians are also scared to do what's right, because they learn after a while that it may not be in their best interest, necessarily. Sometimes you try to do something good for people and it might come back to bite you. You never know. After a while, you start getting standoffish. You don't want your name on this, that, or the other thing because you may be called out for having stood up to somebody and said, “No, I think this is a good idea, even though it came from another party” or “I think this is a good idea, even though it came from a group that may not be commonly recognized. I'm going to be their voice, and I will take a stance and talk about these issues, whether it's in this committee or another.” For the most part I think we do a really good job working together. I'd like to see that continue, and I'd like us to put aside the partisan issues.
I don't think this is a Liberal issue or a partisan issue. It's an issue of how we make this House work better for all of us, and as a result of that, how we work better for Canadians. Those changes can allow us to do so much more. Many countries have been able to do it. It shouldn't be politicized, and I don't think it is. I don't think it would fundamentally change everything about how we function in this House. I think we can do good work and still have some tweaks here and there when it comes to our Standing Orders, have some changes made—a bit more than what we were able to agree on last time. Last time in our interim report we were able to come out with only four recommendations. It was a little disheartening to know that we had had so many great witnesses and so many interesting ideas that came before us—such as the idea of a parallel chamber, which was a really new idea that a lot of us did not have much knowledge about—but at the end of the day, we spent most of our time talking about buses and things that were already being done and implemented.
The House of Commons has already taken the initiative to provide members with a nanny service that they can call up and pay for on an hourly basis. I think that was a great initiative. I haven't been able to make use of it yet, but we were told by officials that it was already under way. Lo and behold, that was one of the recommendations. It's a great job that the administration is taking action on that. We approve as a committee. I just wonder whether, if they hadn't taken that initiative and started that program, this committee itself would have ever been able to come up with such a recommendation.
I'm very skeptical. I don't think we would have been able to. We would have politicized it. We would have said, “Wow, what does that sound like to the Canadian people?” We wouldn't have talked about the issue as it needs to be. I think sometimes people are playing to their base, or constituents, or to how they feel, rather than just being true to themselves about what we're really discussing and laying the facts out on both sides.
There's a lot of talk about everyone wanting a free day. No one wants a free day. People want to work for the people in their community. Nobody is looking for a day off. No one here has a day off. Very rarely does anyone take a vacation. If anything, I work a lot less here than I do in my riding. Here, I'm able to get away with sitting in a room day in and day out. Today is our anniversary. For three weeks, we've done almost nothing. Would I get away with that in my riding? There's not a chance.
In a way, it's sometimes a break to come to Parliament. Because things move so slowly, we get the opportunity to have some time to think about issues while we're sitting in the House. Maybe we're not as engaged in debate as we all should be if the debate were formulated in such a way that we would have that back and forth discussion, but that's not what this House has become.
As a child growing up, I watched question period, and it was riveting. It's very interesting when you're watching it on TV. Then when you get in there and you see what's happening day in and day out—you can't even hear each other, and the yelling and the screaming—it's not so riveting anymore. When people come to see it live, they're probably not too impressed either. But I was always impressed with it on TV. I think that was something a little different about me. I enjoyed that back and forth fighting to some degree.
Coming from a background as a lawyer, I definitely thought debate was one thing.... You have to make arguments based on facts. You have to make arguments based on proof and evidence; otherwise, the judge will call you on it. You can't just go into a courtroom and make emotional arguments.
That's been definitely a big change. People ask how a life in law prepares you for life as a parliamentarian. While there are a lot of good skills you bring from a life in practising law—not that I spent a very long time practising law, but I hope to continue that one day—it's extremely different. You get a lot of good skills from it, but it's very different.
You're not focused on a point and refuting that point. Maybe every now and then a good parliamentarian does that. I think most people think it doesn't matter what the issue is, they just want to talk about it in a way that pulls at someone's heartstrings, or they can make some kind of emotional appeal out of it, rather than an argument based on numbers, facts, and some research, which is what a judge would hold them to. It's a good standard, I believe. I don't think it's necessarily a high standard. When you're debating, you should be talking about issues you can prove to be true, on both sides. Usually you can find that in any debate. You can find valid arguments on any side.
I definitely find that here in the House we occupy a lot of airtime not necessarily talking about facts, figures, and valid arguments, but sometimes working on people's emotions. I think we can do better, and the Standing Orders are a start.
I took a lot of time. My role with aviation was actually to promote Canada on the world stage, as well as to promote the groups with which I was working. I worked very closely with provincial governments, as well as industry groups, and I had a lot of fun. I got to see some incredible sights and I got to do things that most people would only ever read about or see on the Internet. I feel very fortunate, and it has given me a different perspective.
There are things that I would definitely do better. I'll stand up and say that I chose my career over family oftentimes, my obligation to the companies for which I worked. I think I could do better at that. I have spoken about this in the House, so it's on the public record: I hearken to the time that my brother-in-law was discovered deceased as I was loading my suitcases into the back of my car. I was scheduled to speak in Kuala Lumpur, and at a time when I should have been there with my family, I chose my obligation to the people in my occupation. I hugged my wife and got into the car, got on the plane, and went and spoke at the conference. These are things that we can't get back.
My point is that we must do everything in our own power to be better at what we do and how we manage our life.
Mr. Jamie Schmale: Better is always possible, buddy.
Mr. Todd Doherty: Better is always possible. It is not on all of Parliament to be better and to make things different, it is on us. I say that because of the comment that was made that if we don't modernize, we're not going to see more reasonable people such as Ms. Sahota or we're never going to break that glass ceiling.
I always want to look for role models for my three daughters. I know I've mentioned this already, but I have three incredibly strong, very strong-willed daughters, and I always look for positive role models. I want them to be leaders. To me, it doesn't necessarily have to be a female role model; it has to be leadership role models. I don't want to make things easier for them; I want them to earn what they do. What we should be doing is creating the environment in which they can be successful.
I'll bring this back to one of my daughters, since we're going down this path. I have an adult daughter who is challenged. Her name is Kaitlyn. We have never treated her any differently. We have never made excuses for her. She doesn't know she is any different. She still has the same expectations as all our kids. She has to do the chores, grudgingly, as all my kids do. She has to do the things she needs to do to be successful. She goes out to work and she is one of the best employees. Let me tell you, every day I am so proud of her. She will live with us for the rest of her life. She gets up and trudges through the snow or she gets a ride from us or takes the bus, but she is punctual. She has done some incredible things. She could be sitting here today and you would never know that there is a disability there. She is smart as a whip in terms of working on a computer and the things she can do, but the issue is that there are things she will never be able to do. We know this. It took a long time for us, as parents, to come to terms with that.
My oldest daughter, my first born, may not ever get married, may not ever have kids. Our challenge was this—and I get teared up with this. As parents, it's not our job to make lives easier for our kids, but it's our job to teach them the ways to be successful. It's our job to guard them against people who are trying to bring them down and attack them and do those things.
I use that as a preface to this point where we talk about the gender balance and breaking that glass ceiling. I sometimes take offence at that. It's not because I don't believe we need to do everything in our power to make sure we have strong women, more women in politics. I'm going to give you the same answer I gave when I was asked at the time: there are strong women who are out there who would make incredible members of Parliament. I'm surrounded by them. We have women MPs in this House who are incredible people. My colleagues who are right here; I'm continually amazed at our members of Parliament, our female members of Parliament who have broken that glass ceiling, Mr. Chair, without the need of being propped up.
I don't want any of my kids or anybody else's kids to say they were given a pass to get into this. We have some incredible people on all sides who are strong fighters. I apologize, Mr. Speaker, because I've gone down the path here where.... I wanted to make a comment on this because Ms. Sahota said that if we don't change this, if we don't modernize this, we're not going to see more reasonable people come through those doors, and we're never going to break the glass ceiling.
I think there are other things we can do rather than take away debate or ram things down under the guise of modernizing. If that's truly what their idea is, then perhaps they should have said something, because I don't believe that was actually mentioned in the discussion paper, but I'll get back to that in a moment.
The other comment that was made was that the discussion paper was to ensure that every member's role was important. Mr. Chair, I would hazard that every member's role is already important. It's important that we keep the voice of our electors who chose us to come to Parliament and be that voice, not Ottawa's voice in our riding but the other way around.
She mentioned also that we don't want to see things change. I think that's wrong. Again, that's an incorrect statement. It's not that we don't want to see things change. I think, as my colleague mentioned earlier, it's not about not wanting to see things change.
An alternate fact that's thrown out there is that the Conservatives or the NDP members are afraid of change and that we are putting up the guard because we don't want to see anything change. That is not the truth, Mr. Chair. The reality is that there are things that should be done, but negotiations or discussions should be a two-way street.
I always bring this back to dealing with my kids or dealing with hockey players, because I'm a coach as well. I've coached sports for ever and a day. If I told my kids that they couldn't do something, they would skirt the issue and go to their mom to see if they could get something done that way. There is that trust issue there. We always told our kids that no means no. My wife and I have to be a team on this.
The reality of how we got here today is that the government members decided they were going to put forth a discussion paper. They didn't put it forth to the opposition for a true discussion. They tabled it through the media, “Let's have a discussion through the media.” There was no respect in that. Respect is earned; it's not just given. If it were truly a discussion paper, it wouldn't have been done through a presser and then, three hours later, through a motion put forth at a committee to review this.
Mr. Chair, I'm sure you can understand how that would get things up in arms and make us have a bit of mistrust, but it goes a little further back. Let's talk about how we can diminish trust. I'll go back to the conversation we had that night. Mr. Badawey said, “How come we can't just have this discussion?” It was a great question.
I think I answered with two things. Number one was trust. We can't trust that what is being said is going to actually be followed through and that we will actually have a discussion. Again, you shouldn't have to negotiate or discuss through the media. I think that was one of the things that were brought up. This all started with the presser and with issuing it through the committee. Another comment that was made was that it's all about winning and losing. I would disagree with that wholeheartedly. I think where we're at today is that we are all fighting for the voices of our electors.
It was also mentioned that we have gotten nothing done in the three weeks. Mr. Chair, to our colleagues on the committee and those who are sitting in, I would say that we have done quite a bit. We have defended democracy. We have stood up for changes. We have done exactly what those who elected us have asked us to do—to defend their voices, to make sure their voices aren't silenced. I think it's so important, as we move forward, to remember what got us here today. It was trust.
I went away, Mr. Chair, and I looked at how we got to this point. I was doing some research, if you will. There are so many different ways to diminish trust.
We all know that lying is probably the number one behaviour that diminishes trust. It also tops the list of what people say when they think that trust has been betrayed. There are things we can do, however, that do not involve lying; we don't need to deceive or manipulate to diminish trust, but can do it with simple, ordinary, everyday behaviours. I think it's important that we recognize that every government, every member of Parliament, every person wants to be perceived as trustworthy. I think again, to address Ms. Sahota's comments, that we all want to be able to work back and forth in a trusting environment. We want to operate with trust, such that if the government says they're going to do something, we can trust they're going to do it; yet we've seen that it hasn't happened on other occasions.
Often, we are blind to the impact of our own actions; we operate with an impaired self-awareness, if you will. We can diminish trust without even knowing it, if we blatantly believe that we know best.
I want to go back to the comment that was made earlier on about this discussion paper. Following media reports on the discussion paper that was tabled, the House leader said the more time she spends in this House, the more she feels its need for modernization. Well, I'm going to go back to my earliest comment; that far be it from a newbie who has spent 18 months in the House....
I don't know whether you've seen it or not, but often, even when it's not my House duty, I sit in and listen to the debates. I do truthfully want to hear all sides of the debate. I have suggestions. I think there are things we can do better, but I'm not quite sure that the term for them would be “modernizing”. I would not be so bold as to author a paper. I'm not quite sure that.... While she takes credit for authoring this paper, I would be interested to know that, for somebody...unless she has studied parliamentary procedure in a.... I'm sitting here not knowing what her background is, but I'm not quite sure that she studied parliamentary procedure in her former life. Perhaps this is something she may have had just sitting in the wings, so that at the time she was elected she could come in and—hallelujah—modernize Parliament.
It baffles me. She has a pretty weighty role, being a House leader, to have actually had time to author something like this. I know my schedule, in terms of the committees I sit on and the issues we deal with, and with our constituents. I've done some pretty incredible things, I would think, as a new member of Parliament. I have tabled four private members' bills, one through very collaborative efforts and with all-party support.
I'm very happy to see that my Bill was voted on at second reading and passed unanimously. I think we sent a strong message to our brave men and women who put uniforms on every day to serve our country and our communities and who are suffering from PTSD or mental heath injuries. I would challenge the government that it's been three weeks now since we all voted unanimously, and we need to get it to committee so that we can move this project forward, because we've done nothing, with the exception of actually creating more hope.
My point is this: that while there might be some good things in this paper—and far be it from me to pick at some of this stuff, and I'm not going to call her a liar, Mr. Chair, and far be it from me to say that—I can't honestly believe that these are actually her words that she has put onto paper here.
On that note, I do appreciate Mr. Simms' comments in the House last week or the week before where he talked about the time lag in seeing this. He admitted that he actually saw it beforehand. We've done a lot of work with Mr. Simms on our fisheries committee. He is chair of our fisheries committee, and I enjoy him and his self-deprecating humour.
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There is relevance. What I'm saying, Mr. Chair, is that there are things we can do away from the House, when we're having conversations with our friends about discovering best practices, and I think they're really important. When I have a conversation with Scott or some of our other colleagues talking about how they deal with such and such an issue, there is so much that we can learn from.
One thing I don't know that we've had yet, outside the interventions of Mr. Reid, perhaps Mr. Simms, Mr. Masse, who has been on the list here—I don't know whether he has been able to speak yet.... Mr. Christopherson spoke, and I listened intently to his very animated, very long, but very well thought-out speech. There are things we can learn from those who came before us, and I think that is very important.
I'm looking around the table. Apart from Mr. Simms, Mr. Masse, Mr. Reid, and you, Mr. Chair, I don't know whether there's really much parliamentary history at this table.
The value we have collectively as Parliament is that those who came before us, that which has worked...and not deciding that we know best. I think that's what we've seen with this discussion paper. It's not really a discussion paper; I think it's actually a plan to move some things forward dressed up as a discussion paper. As much as they'd like to say it's a discussion paper, I don't think it truly is a discussion paper.
I'm going to go back to trust, Mr. Chair, because this is the reason we're here. We've seen many things over the last while. I'll tell you that I'm not here to defend things that were done before. I'm a new member of Parliament. I don't have the privilege of having been part of the last Parliament, but I can tell you what I've seen in the last while.
I'm going to go back to May 17 of last year, when things weren't moving well, or it wasn't felt that they were moving well. We saw a motion, motion six, put forward by the government. The way it was done was very heavy-handed. I really think it was at that point that things went sideways. Some would argue, probably some even in my own team, that they went sideways even long before that. I think motion six was one where the term “draconian” was used.
I'm not a parliamentary history buff, so I can't say with any certainty that this has never been done before, but I believe words were used such as that “it has never been done in parliamentary history” that motion six was levied. It was all about taking away any of the perceived powers the opposition have. What they were going to do, if the government didn't like the way things were going, was just ram it down our throats.
Essentially what we saw was a very angry Mr. Trudeau, who didn't like the way things were going, and so he was going to show us. Whatever happened—I think it was called “elbowgate”.... Anyway, there was much ado about nothing, but the point of the matter was that the government decided they were going to deliver motion six, which was going to take away any of the powers or perceived powers that the opposition had. They were going to show us that if we were not going to follow their rules, they were just arbitrarily going to deliver them and impose them on us.
Mr. Chair, I was right there when the whole whatever happened, and I was asked to speak the very next day about what I saw and about intent and what have you. I guess my comments were these: that it was not for us to describe what the intent was. How would we know the intent of the person who committed the actions at the time. I'm not a mind reader. It's not for me to explain; it really is for the person who did it to explain their intent.
I think we saw a number of things from that point forward that really have led us to question this government's integrity in some things. That's not to paint all of our members of Parliament on that side with the same brush. We have some incredible members of Parliament there.
I'll go back to this. I don't think that Ms. Chagger actually authored this paper. I think this is coming from other places, and I think the actions we're seeing out of the PMO are what is leading people to mistrust it. We're even seeing it in the media, where much was being said about our previous government. The one thing the media said, however, was that at least with Prime Minister Harper you knew where you stood.
Forgive me, I can't remember the exact quote, but it was the one thing that remains true: “the Liberals are not to be trusted”. Those are not my words, Mr. Chair; that comment is from the media, which for the most part have been very kind to the government. It could be argued that they are very, very kind.
Even the people in the media, who have in the past while been very favourable, are asking what is going on. They're even questioning this as well, so it's not just the opposition. I would think that probably the majority of Canadians don't even know what we're debating, but the media are actually taking notice of some of the things that are going on.
One of the news clippings I have says that Mr. Trudeau's legacy will be that of arrogance. It speaks to the other point that I wanted to cover. What we're seeing, in terms of this discussion paper, of motion six, and of some of the actions that we see every day, is that there is a real contempt for the House and the opposition. There isn't respect.
I can't say how things were when I wasn't here—I think that will be spoken to as we move forward—so I hope you don't fault me on that. I will be the first person to stand up and say, when we were wrong, that we were wrong. I think that's very important. What we've seen out of at least the PMO, however, is that there's a real contempt for the opposition. Whether it's motion six or this discussion paper, Mr. Chair, “This is how it's going to be.”
I guarantee that this is more or less the way it was discussed: “Listen, we know that the media are on our side—they love us—so what we're going to do....”
This is probably the way the workings went: “I know what we're going to do.” They had all the people huddled together and they said, “Listen, we're going to get their goat. How about this? We're going to call a presser, and because we're all about reforming things and getting things better, we're going to issue this paper. We're going to get the public on side with this, and then the opposition is not going to have any say, because we're just going to kind of ram it through.”
It fell short, it backfired, for the first time, because the media are not as silly as we think they are; they're very smart and learned people. They can see straight through this. I think that this is the kind of backlash we're seeing. It speaks to the overall theme in the House, which then leaks into these discussions in the committee.
You know, Mr. Chair, if you and I were riding on a bus, and you told me that the sky was blue and it looked as if we were going to get showers later in the afternoon, I'd believe you.
If all of a sudden we come through the doors and you tell me that the sky is blue, I'm automatically going to say that, no, it's black. We don't have that trust. We've broken that trust. Somehow, whatever it is, we've broken that trust. I'm going to tell you this, Mr. Chair, with complete sincerity. People are probably going to laugh at this. I'm very proud to be a member of the Conservative caucus, but I'm probably one of the most non-partisan people you'll see when we're away from this House.
See, I told you people would laugh.
When I was elected by the good people of Cariboo—Prince George, what an incredible honour that was. Some people even brought up to me why they didn't vote for me, but I told them it was okay. Whether they voted for me or not, I represent the entire riding. Whether they vote for Liberal, the NDP—shame—or the others, I represent all people. I represent everyone. The media was saying, wow, the national result wasn't what you.... How's it going to be? What are you going to do? Now you're going to be in opposition; oh, heaven forbid.
While I was disappointed at the national result, I was looking forward because I think, if you talk to anybody I worked with in the past, you'd see that the best work we do is when we can find a common ground—whether it's in aviation or other areas. It's not about winning or losing. I think in a healthy relationship—I've been married for a long time—there's a give and take, and we have to recognize that.
The government has a job to do. Opposition has a job to do as well. I came here bright-eyed, very altruistic, and I said I'm going to do everything in my power to build those bridges, to work collaboratively. I had the background for my bill already built. I knew what I needed to do. I was disappointed, but I saw this as an opportunity.
I think a lot of our new colleagues were the same. We brought energy, and we all said the same thing, probably like that puppy dog. That's the great thing about puppies and dogs. Somebody said you could lock them in the back of your truck for an hour and then when you come back, they're still wagging their tails, happy to see you. I have a great black Lab that I don't get to see as much as I would love to, but that's my choice. I tell you this, Mr. Chair: every time I arrive back, it's as if he knows when I'm coming in. They probably wind him up for me just before I get in. He is so happy to see me, and he's raring to go.
It's probably how we were. The senior members of our caucuses probably saw us as being these bright-eyed and puppy-dog type of people. We were very eager to try to make new friends, even though it was across party lines.
Let me tell you this. I don't think we would be able to do what we've done with my Bill if we didn't have the kind of attitude that we would work very closely with others from across the floor. We've seen other government members who had private members' bills that have moved forward. The member from Coquitlam—Port Coquitlam, Mr. McKinnon, I believe put forward a great bill. I think that sends hope to Canadians that we are able to work together.
My point, going back to it, is that I've become a little bit frustrated. If I can say it, I think the let me down, and let us down, with his actions that day, May 17 last year, and the subsequent actions that went forward. I expected better. I think Canadians expected better. I think, indeed, that those in your own government, in your own caucus, although they might not say anything publicly, would privately say they expected better.
Indeed, I've had conversations with members from all parties. Privately I think they were very forthcoming with some of their comments about some of the promises made during the campaign that were subsequently broken once you got into office. I remember one member actually saying, “I essentially lied, on the doorsteps, to my constituents, because I believed this was something we were actually going to do and be able to follow through on.” They bought in. I think Canadians, for the most part—as we saw, 39%—bought into the change was putting forth.
That brings me back to another comment I wanted to make. Governing is hard. It requires a plan, but it also requires that the person delivering the plan, if there is a plan, or the person who's in charge—I think we all agree that regardless of where we are, there always should be somebody in charge—not rule with emotion. There should be principled leadership and a plan. I think Canadians also want to see that there's a plan. We haven't seen that. We've seen a lot of big things, but no real plan.
I think what we're seeing in some of the scrambly manoeuvres, the reshuffle, the new House leader, and the moving things around is that while they campaigned on having a plan, there really was no plan. Maybe even, Mr. Chair, if I can boldly pronounce.... I don't think they expected to be elected. They thought, this is what we're going to say, and we'll see if people actually buy it. When it got closer, perhaps they were like, “ Holy crap. I think we're actually going to be elected. How are we going to do this? Don't worry about it. Budgets balance themselves, right?”
We've kind of proven now that this doesn't happen. We've made some promises to Canadians from coast to coast to coast, and we have done some big things, but we're spending beyond our means. I think that's the challenge. What we're seeing right now, perhaps with the PMO, is that they are scrambling. There's no plan, so they are ruling by emotion.
Again, going back to this paper. I doubt very much that actually had anything to do with it. Perhaps she was in the room when some ideas were being put out. I don't know. I'm just putting words in people's mouths. I'm just speaking from the heart. That's all I know how to do.
Let me take you back, if I can, because it does have relevance, Mr. Chair. I never debated prior to being elected. I can argue like the best of them with my wife. I always lose, which is okay. I always lose with my kids as well.
We had a debate. I thought I was very prepared. I had every document on every issue that was going to come up, and I was very prepared. I was ready to go, kind of like right here. We got to the venue where the debate was, and no papers were allowed. You were not allowed to have any supporting documents with you. You were on your own.
I'm not ashamed to say that I bombed miserably. As a matter of fact, the next day I was waiting for feedback—this was one of the biggest debates—from my campaign, and I knew the feedback already. As I said earlier, I'm my worst critic, so I was waiting for it. I was waiting for the feedback to say, “This where you went wrong; this is what you should have said”, all this stuff. It never came. The next day, as you and others here are probably aware, Mr. Chair, from your own ridings, we had debates. Every riding had tons of debates. The very next day I had three debates from one end of my riding to the next. I needed the feedback. I wanted to know where I went wrong.
My campaign manager, who I had been feverishly texting, never got back to me. He finally got back to me on October 9, 2015, which happened to be my birthday, at about one o'clock. It was just before I was about to leave for the third debate that day, and he came in with a sticky note and he slammed this on the desk. That's it, and he turned and walked away. That sticky note said, “Speak from the heart because if you speak from the heart you can never go wrong.”
I think others from the other side have mentioned a few times that it's important we don't get caught up in “he said, she said” and “winning versus losing.” We have to speak from the heart. All I know how to do is just tell them how it is. Whether we like it or not, that's how we do it in the Cariboo.
You know, the Cariboo is a great place. It is unbelievable. I'm very proud to be from the Cariboo. Mr. Chair, it is a place where we look you in the eye, we ask you how you're doing, and we mean it. We say, “Bless you” when you sneeze. We say, “Gesundheit”. We open doors for people. I have some incredible constituents. I worked a lifetime overseas, as I mentioned earlier, representing my region all over the world. I got a little feisty when we would be in a boardroom somewhere across the country, and somebody would ask where I was from, and I told them, and they kind of wrinkled their nose asking, “How is that working out for you?” I'll tell you, we have salt of the earth people. We have hard-working pioneer folks in the Cariboo.
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I appreciate that. That's actually on here. I will go back.
Mr. Robert-Falcon Ouellette: Okay.
Mr. Todd Doherty: I just want to go to this point about politicizing an issue. You know, there are times and situations when all sides have gone to the media and have done our negotiations not across the table but perhaps through the media. There are times when that happens.
I find it interesting that this would come from the other side, about politicizing an issue, because it wasn't us who politicized this.
I'll go back to the comment I had about how we diminish trust. I'll use this as an example. Have you ever gotten mad at someone, whether it's in your caucus, or maybe in a previous lifetime, and instead of trying to work it out with each other, you escalate the issue by hitting “reply all” or copying everyone, your boss, their boss, or your boss's boss? That's how you escalate an issue. I'm using this as an example because I would say, with all due respect, the government House leader escalated this issue and maybe miscalculated it by going to the media.
I'll go back to the document I produced here. You're bypassing the person or group involved. What you're choosing to do is trying to skirt the issue....
Maybe I'm talking too much. It looks like the hook's coming in.
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. Todd Doherty: I'm here now. I've waited.
Let me tell you what happened last week when I was supposed to be here. Little did you know—
An hon. member: You still have three bills to talk about.
Mr. Todd Doherty: How do we diminish trust? That was a question that was brought up last week. A number of different things were done that have diminished the trust. It goes back to my comment that I and others arrived here with the best of intentions. We weren't jaded when we got here. We're not jaded now, but trust has been broken.
This goes to the point where I said that you bypass all the people there. You choose to email, text message, or delegate the delivery of a difficult message to others. Whether Ms. Chagger wrote this or not, I think it came from the PMO and was delivered to her to delegate that message. I think that's a big one. You tell half truths, use spin, avoidance, weasel words, and communication not grounded in integrity, forthrightness, and honesty. That impacts trust.
That's where we sit today. When one side is deliberately opaque or evasive and uses evasive communications, it offers a different kind of transparency. Now, there's a word we've heard quite a bit over the last 18 months. This government was going to have a new, open, and transparent way of governing. Perhaps as things have gone on, they've had the best intentions that this was going to be the way, but maybe there wasn't a plan on how they were going to deliver that, so they're making it up as they go. As a government, we have a very effective opposition, one of the strongest we've seen in a long time. Maybe what we're seeing on the other side is scrambling because we have been so effective in what we're doing. Ms. Duncan is nodding her head. I think that's perhaps...or maybe that's....
At any rate, here's another way you diminish trust, Mr. Chair. You over-promise and under-deliver. Some call it hype. Others reference it by saying, “all hat, no cattle”. That's a saying we use back in the Cariboo. The yield is the same, that if you don't take your own words seriously, why should anyone else trust them? That's what we've found over the course of the last while.
Again, budget 2017 was tabled....
You're going to ask me why I'm saying this, Mr. Chair, and getting to the point of asking if this is relevant, really, to what I'm saying. It absolutely is, Mr. Chair. For the reason as to why it's relevant, I'm going to go back to why, in my opinion, this paper was tabled at the time.
What happened the very next day? The budget was tabled. The government knew that things were weak in that area, that it probably wasn't going to be the flash-bang, whiz-bang budget they were looking at. They needed a diversion, a smokescreen if you will: whiz-bang. It was a diversionary tactic.
I would offer this up, Mr. Chair. Again, I don't know whether this is true or not. Who knows what goes on behind closed doors? That's above my pay grade. But I would think that the diversionary tactic of tabling this paper is taking away the discussion about the budget, and how it maybe fell down in areas. What are we talking about instead? We're not talking about how softwood and forestry companies weren't mentioned, not even once, or a plan to get a softwood lumber deal, which is so important to my riding of Cariboo—Prince George.
Mr. Chair, I don't know whether you've heard me speak in the House about this. There's relevance here. Over 140 communities in the province of British Columbia are dependent on forestry. These communities were waiting for budget 2017 to come out in order to see what the plan was to hopefully get either some relief—I don't know what that looks like—or get a deal done. They never saw that.
I know you're leaning into the mike about relevance, but trust me, it's all structured.
The reason this paper was tabled was to really steer away from what the budget was or was not going to do for Canadians. For the last three weeks, this has really monopolized a lot of the discussion in the House, and here in this committee.
I'll go back to the document that I built here. It's interesting, because as we talk about trust and perhaps why it was broken, we play the blame game. We've seen that a lot. I don't know if that was done in previous governments, or what have you. It's, “Well, this government did this, and Conservatives did that, so we're going to continue doing it this way”, or “We're not as bad as those guys; the reason we're not getting something done is because these guys left it behind.”
I offer this: if you truly had a plan to govern, you wouldn't need to play the blame game. You wouldn't need to play that game. There is a time when you need to lead, but there's a time when you have to build consensus. True leaders build consensus. They're really consensus builders.
Think back to some of the best leaders you've ever had, the best coaches you've ever had. I don't know whether you've played sports at all, Mr. Chair. As I mentioned, I coached for a long time. There are times when you have to lead, but you have to have a plan on what the goal is, on how you're going to move forward. Then you have to build that consensus as you move forward.
To go back to what I said earlier on, the Standing Orders are the rules of the game. You can't just arbitrarily change the rules of the game because you don't like what's going on. It's not for you to do that, to arbitrarily change the rules, take away the voice of Canadians, silence the opposition, because you don't like that the opposition is actually holding your feet to the fire, and actually standing up for the electors. Fundamentally, it's wrong. That's why you're seeing our backs up against the wall.
Mr. Chair, I don't know how many hours you've sat in that chair over the last while, but when you look to point blame.... I don't think we should have blame anyway, but there's been a lot of blame shuffled our way. We're here doing our job, and that's being the voice of the electors. If I take you back to O’Brien and Bosc, our House of Commons Procedure and Practice, it brings you right back to what it is we're talking about.
I mentioned freedom of speech. It's not about our being able to stand up and say the things we want. It's about being the voice of our constituents. We are fighting for our voices and for our constituents' voices. I think that it's interesting when you have leadership in the House from the government standing up and saying that we could be getting on and doing better things and more productive things. I'll tell you this. My electors, my constituents, expect me to be a strong voice, to fight for their voices here in Ottawa, and to make sure that in no way are those voices silenced or lessened—and that is what we're seeing with this discussion paper.
I've gone on a bit about how we build trust and how we've diminished trust, how that happens. I want to talk about how trust flourishes. I think it's important that leaders who build trust operate with three trust basics: they give trust first; they communicate effectively; and they authentically show up. Isn't that amazing? They authentically show up. I think that's important, because it goes back to my comment about contempt for the House.
Again, I can only speak from what I know. Sometimes it feels to the opposition that QP—or, as Ms. Duncan would like to call it, AP, answer period—is almost like an inconvenience for our to be there, and perhaps for some of his ministers. They have better things to do, rather than be held accountable to the people, which, again, is what we were elected to do.
It's very interesting. I'll go back to the comment that they authentically show up. Leaders who build trust operate with three basic trust elements: they give trust first; they communicate effectively; and they authentically show up. If we are truthfully going to have a conversation and be relevant, here's a novel idea, Mr. Chair. If we are going to modernize the House, how about our showing up and being truly engaged? That's a novel idea. How about our ministers showing up? I'm not going to say “all” ministers, because I think there are some ministers who, as I said earlier, actually answer some great questions. They don't need speaking points to actually answer; they know their files pretty well. But if we are to be better, let's have true engagement. Let's not look at it like they're bored, like we're beneath them. I'll remind them through this, and through you, Mr. Chair, that they were once in our position. Again, going back, I've seen some comments from those who were in opposition previously, and some were pretty good hecklers, too, if I do say so myself. How soon we forget what it's like to be on the other side.
Second, effective leaders understand workplace trust that thrives and creates these pockets of excellence. It goes beyond the basics. Here is another way we can make trust flourish in this area: we become really good at what we do. I always said to my team, when I was in aviation or when I was coaching, “Look, if you're a goal scorer, be the best goal scorer you are. If you're a fighter, heaven forbid, do what makes you famous, but be the best at what you're doing.” My thing is this. Whatever file I'm on, whether it's the fisheries file or our work with PTSD, which my Bill is about, I want to become an expert on what I'm doing. This is the greatest compliment I can get.
To give you an example, I'm overseas and I'm meeting with FedEx. I'm sitting there with FedEx VPs across the way from me. I'm a lowly Canadian aviation executive, and I'm having the conversation with FedEx.
Mr. Chair, regardless of what is being said across the way, I'm having a conversation with you. If they choose to listen to it or not, it doesn't matter.
The greatest compliment I had was that I knew their industry. I knew their business. I knew FedEx inside and out. I think that's incumbent on us, as members of Parliament, to be the best members of Parliament we can. Be interested, be relevant, become the experts, and be good at what you're going to do.
To go back to the comment I made earlier on, about sometimes our seeming disinterested, I don't know whether that's true or not. I really don't. I've had some constituents who have been here and who have wanted to meet him. He's been gracious. He's actually met with them, or taken a picture with them or what have you. Honestly, he is.... I'll give compliments where compliments are due.
As I mentioned, just being a kid from the Cariboo, I'm not one to follow procedure. I don't know the politically correct thing to say or do. I had my mayor from Prince George here. I'm very proud of our communities and I'm proud to show them off. It was funny, because I said that it wasn't so much I wanted them to meet the , I wanted the Prime Minister to meet my mayor. That's really what it was.
So I knocked on the door. Like, who am I to barge past the security? They asked me what I was doing. I told them I was a member of Parliament—“Don't you see the ring?”, that type of thing—and talked about privilege and what have you. To the 's credit, he took 10 minutes out of his busy schedule and he actually met with my mayor.
I don't know whether he's disinterested. I don't know whether he is...if this is above him or not, but that's the look that we get on his face.
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Well, I'm just saying. I've spoken to members on all sides. I think this committee has done some great work, and I think you're doing good work here, now.
As I said, I was not expecting this type of filibuster. I was prepared, when I came last week, and I was shocked when Mr. Badawey made his intervention. I was like, “No, we're not going to do it. What are we doing letting this guy speak? I'm not ceding the floor.” But we had a great discussion. I think perhaps that's a great way that we're changing the way things operate.
Who is the House leader to tell the 337 other members of Parliament that she knows best? I have a hard time with that, obviously. I'm not saying anything about her ability. I don't know what her education was. She wanted to be a nurse, I think.
I would just never march into Parliament, say, “I have all the answers, here they are”, and then have the nerve to actually stand before the media and say that this was the way they were going to bring Parliament into the 20th century.
Is that what they said...?
An hon. member: The 21st.
Mr. Todd Doherty: The 21st century.
That's what Mr. de Burgh Graham said. Actually, I wish I'd been here to hear his intervention last week.
It's interesting when we see the suggestion about making electronic voting. I think it's important that we have members of Parliament in the House. We're doing it right around the clock and we're having votes. I think Ms. Sahota said that it was a good thing she didn't bring her family, because it would have interfered with her family time.
I understand what it's like to have your family nearby and get a vote called or whatever. But this is what we signed up for. I never want to take away somebody's family time. I think you heard earlier how passionate I am about my kids. I did things differently in my previous role. This job has allowed me, has afforded me, to be a better father, as a matter of fact. Regardless of whether I'm away from home or whatever, I think we know what we're getting ourselves into when we're doing it.
Getting back to the votes, electronic voting may be a way to modernize it, but there has to be a different way. I think you have to stand to be counted. I think members of Parliament have to be able to stand, on the record, whether they are for something or against it. That's what the electors want us to do.
One thing that my electors asked me on the doorstep was this: “If something's against your party policy, but we in Cariboo—Prince George feel very strongly for it, how will you vote?” You have to vote your conscience. You have to vote your electors. Ultimately, it's not me.
I want to bring you back to Bill , which dealt with physician-assisted death. We spent a lot of time debating other things, considering the amount of time we spent on a piece of legislation that I feel is probably one of the most important pieces of legislation our Parliament would see. Do you want to know why? It was because closure was invoked on it, which I think is sad.
People asked me how I was going to vote. Regardless of my personal beliefs, I listened to my constituents.
I consulted a good friend of mine who is a minister, and I said that I didn't think there was enough time for me as an elected official, that I didn't think there was anything to prepare somebody to be able to really understand the magnitude of voting on something such as that. I was struggling with it, so I went to my minister and asked for guidance.
I heard from our constituents loud and clear, and it varied, but overwhelmingly I heard that.... When we're talking about invoking closure on important debates, I think it's important.... I don't know how many days we debated the question of changing the words to our national anthem. I think we debated that longer than physician-assisted death. To me, for fundamental pieces of legislation such as that, invoking closure on something because you don't like the way the conversation is going.... We heard on the other side that they were indeed twisted in how they were going to vote as well. We've seen that a number of times.
Mr. Chair, I can't talk about what we did as government, but we have seen that over the course of the last 18 or 16 months this government has invoked closure a lot of times because they didn't like the message they were hearing. They didn't like the fact they were getting, perhaps, even some opposing views within their own caucus. I think that is shameful.
We need to make sure that the voices of our electors are never silenced, that we have the ability to bring those forth. Whether we like the answer or not, I think that is important to do. There are things I may not always agree with on the other side, or even within our own caucus, but I listen and respect those views, recognizing that they are the constituents' views of the members. I do my very best to try to educate myself on why somebody feels that way, and I think that's important.
I read paper. As I said, I try to understand all points of view. I can honestly say that, while I may not always agree with Ms. May, there are some things that she says in here that really resonate with me. On electronic voting, she states, “For my part, as the leader of an unrecognized, but nationally engaged parliamentary party, I find the current voting system valuable in many ways.” I agree with this. It is important that members be physically present. Voting from our offices or our home ridings is not an acceptable option, and it is a dereliction of duty. I truly believe that. It opens it up for manipulation.
This is my saying this. I think what we need to do is to make sure that members of Parliament can't absolve themselves of the responsibility of voting. We must not make it easier for them to say, “I wasn't there, I didn't vote on it”, or “somebody else pressed the button”. Instead, stand and be counted. If you are truly there to represent your electors and your riding, find a way to get yourself to the Hill and vote, and be on the record for how you feel.
I want to go back to some of the comments that we've heard regarding the opposition. Again, I don't know the history, but has there ever been a time when the Conservatives and the NDP have co-authored a paper and signed it, and the leaders have stood together on something and had a unified voice? Probably not in the last 10 years, anyway.
This is what the government of the day has done. It's managed to actually unite, for the most part, the full opposition. We've got a letter here from last week written by the Honourable Candice Bergen, our opposition House leader, and Murray Rankin, the NDP House leader, talking about modernizing the House. It brought forth a 2001 motion to create the Special Committee on the Modernization and Improvement of the Procedures of the House of Commons. I'm not going to go into this because I think it's been read to death. But what I'm going to say is that I think it's interesting that I see a lot of kind of grumpy people, angry at what the opposition is doing. They say, “Can you imagine the gall of the opposition to do all these different moves and manoeuvres, and shame on them”. Well, who started this, Mr. Chair? All you've done is galvanized us on this, which is great because for once the guns are pointed squarely across the way and not askew a little bit, because I see that sometimes too. I think it's important that it this on the record as well.
Mr. Chair, it's interesting when we go down the path that we've gotten to at this point. I'm sure every member of the government or the Liberal Party.... And it's all backbench; we don't see any ministers here. Of course, they're busy doing whatever they're doing. Far be it from them to come to talk about their ways, what they think would change or modernize the House. I know they're busy doing things. I'm being facetious. It has been the backbench folks, the newbies who have really been holding up the end for the government—and you, of course, Mr. Chair, who have been doing a great job. I think it is very commendable.
I would love to be a fly on the wall in your conversations behind closed doors. I really would. I'm sure it's not all roses, bouquets, rainbows, and unicorns, because I know that you've got some very strong, well-meaning, very smart, very capable members of Parliament who perhaps don't get a chance to say as much as they would like, or don't get a chance to be the voice of their ridings as much as they'd like. As a matter of fact, just before Christmas, there was a member of Parliament who stood up—and forgive me, because I don't know his name; I should know his name—and was heckling me, and I was looking across the way. It was the first words I think he had said in the House in the 14 months after being elected. I thought, “Is that the best you've got after being elected for 14 months?” It was the first time he was able to stand in the House and be on record. That's the point that we've said. I've stood up a number of times in the House to say—and I'm saying it over and over again here—that the 338 members of Parliament, incredible, strong, well meaning, capable, elected from all walks of life, bring differing points of view and perspectives to this House.
I'll use the Prime Minister's words against him here, that “Canadians know our country is made stronger because of our diversity, not in spite of it.” Does that ring true, that everyone around the table has a say because we come at it from different vantage points? We've probably got people who have been CEOs of major corporations. We've got scientists and microbiologists or marine biologists, and we've got people from all walks of life. We've got ministers. We've got an astronaut, for heaven sakes. So we've got people around the table who are from all walks of life, who bring us different points of view. Can't we come to some form of consensus or be trusted to sit around the table and come up with something or find ways of making things different and better?
It's interesting, too, Mr. Chair—
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Yes, he certainly did, and I think that's probably a wise cautionary tale for us as parliamentarians.
Look at different issues. Certainly, being out of step with public opinion and with our constituents is often to our detriment. We found that in the past, on any number of social issues. Capital punishment is one that would probably apply.
Certainly, we've gone several decades now with capital punishment officially outlawed in Canada. We went for a period of time, a decade, when it was temporarily banned, but then officially banned in the 1980s.
Even to this day, we see public opinion polling that shows that the public does have a degree of support for capital punishment. In a lot of ways, as a Parliament we can often find ourselves out of step with where the Canadian public is. It's not to say that the public won't eventually catch up with us; they often do. It's just a matter of time before we get there. We see that often in different matters.
Some members may have read different articles by a gentleman by the name of Rainer Knopff, a political scientist who often wrote together with Ian Brodie, whom we know around this place from his service as chief of staff to the former Prime Minister.
They wrote on that a little bit, in the context of the Supreme Court and Parliament's reaction to it, suggesting that Parliament and the Supreme Court often get ahead of where public opinion is on a certain matter without giving time for the public to think of the matter and to have it percolate within the public sphere. Often we get ahead of ourselves when we undertake certain matters, rightly or wrongly, and there's a debate.
That's a suggestion they make on that matter. It certainly goes back to Burke's comments as well, on where we stand on a certain issue and how we reflect our constituents' views.
I make no excuses. I don't deny the fact that I was only elected with 40-some-odd per cent of the vote. I did not have 50-plus per cent, as my friend Mr. Richards had in his constituency.
I recognize, nonetheless, that I have a duty towards 100% of my constituents. As hard as it is sometimes, I have a duty to reflect their views in this place as best as I can, as we discuss important matters. Like Burke before me, we'll wait to see the election results in a few years' time to indicate whether I've been successful in that or not, but certainly it's a consideration to have in mind.
That was a brief discussion of mine in regard to Bob Stanfield's commentary. Now, I want to go a little bit further back and look at an article from 1978. This was prior to some of these debates we've had about the Lefebvre and McGrath committees.
There was an MP by the name of John Reid, who was the MP for Kenora—Rainy River. He delivered a speech at the University of Victoria to a national conference on the legislative process. It was reprinted in the Canadian Parliamentary Review, volume 1, number 1, June 1978. He was a Liberal serving in government at the time. He talked about the responsibilities of legislators, the responsibilities of members of Parliament. He writes that it's a fairly considerable one that penetrates the day-to-day existence of a backbencher. He went on to write:
While some Members come with causes or interests to advance, it is by no means clear that they will be able to participate most effectively in the legislative process. That educative experience, however, is the subject of another paper.
He talked about the legislative process and how MPs can participate in it, and about the committee system. I raise this because we talked about it before.
If we look at all the different reports that come before us and that we've read in the past, committees are often talked about not as a panacea but as a strong opportunity for meaningful discussion, a meaningful opportunity, but also as a source of frustration. We're looking at an older day, an opportunity that existed before many of these changes might have been introduced. He does write about the frustration that members have with committees. He focuses on it.
I know this has been raised by the other side with the estimates processes, as an example. This is going back to what I talked about a little earlier in my brief response to the intervention. This has been an issue with the estimates for many years. There isn't one perfect response. Certainly the efforts that were made in the early 1970s to introduce the deemed principle, in a way, made it easier for the government. That was supported by the opposition at the time. There's no question that it's entirely legitimate because all three major parties of the day supported it. They did go down that road.
I raise this because, as is discussed in this paper and has been discussed elsewhere, the estimates process is a massive challenge. The current parliamentary budget officer has acknowledged some of the problems with it and some of the problems with the that Minister Brison has brought forward as well.
Mr. Reid—I believe John is his first name—talks about the estimates process. He says:
[According to the Standing Orders, the government must bring down its] spending estimates for the year and have them referred to the various Standing Committees by 1 March. The Committees then have to 31 May to deal with them. At the conclusion of the process, an appropriation bill based on these estimates is presented to Parliament in late June, and dealt with. In conjunction with the supply process, the opposition parties have 25 days in the House of Commons, spread throughout the Parliamentary year, but concentrated in May and June. During those days, they choose the topic for consideration. In addition to attacking the government, they can and do advance ideas requiring a legislative solution.
I think we often forget that opposition days, supply days, allotted days, whatever we choose to call them, are linked to the supply process. They are linked to the estimate process. Over a number of years, the process has strayed away, I would say, from using them to deal with government supply and to discuss more generally policies and issues of the day, and motions of varying degrees of consequence in terms of House business. We have gotten away from that, which is not to say that the current discussions aren't valuable. They play a role. Going back to my opening comments, they certainly fulfill Franks' third principle that the government ought to be held to account. Certainly the supply days, the opposition days, whatever you call them, perform that function.
They also perform the function of the supply process. We notice that when we get to the point in the supply process of the final opposition day, the final supply day, when the supply bill is introduced. That's when we'll sit in the committee of the whole for a time. We'll do clause-by-clause of the supply bill. We report it back to the House. We go through the entire legislative process in one evening.
I find it interesting that when we first come to this place, we often think that we know what we're doing. Then we get here and realize that we have an awful lot to learn. Certainly I found that on many occasions.
In this process, typically the Treasury Board critic stands and asks the president of the Treasury Board whether the bill is in its usual form. Now we found out once in the government's early history in office that the bill wasn't in its usual form. We had a challenge with getting that corrected in the other place. At the time, I wondered what the point of this question was. What was the point of it? It didn't seem like a logical question. Why would you ask the Treasury Board president if the bill was in its usual form?
Of course, I found someone who could answer the question for me. In this case, it was John Holtby, a long-time friend of this place, a long-time friend of Parliament whom I would consider one of the foremost experts on Parliament and parliamentary procedure, and a co-editor of Beauchesne's, 6th edition. The way he explained it to me was that Parliament doesn't have a great opportunity to review a supply bill, because it is provided in advance that day. It's passed through all the readings. It's not provided with a great deal of time for discussion or debate, to read through it when it goes through all three readings within a single sitting of the House—frankly, within about 10 minutes' time. The Speaker takes the chair, he leaves the chair. The Deputy Speaker takes the chair of the committee of the whole, and you have the debate. So having the assurance from the President of the Treasury Board in response to his or her critic, depending as the case may be, is an assurance to the House.
We're taking the minister at his word. We're taking the member at his or her word that the bill is in a form that is acceptable and has been in the past. Often the president of the Treasury Board will respond as such, saying that it is in the same form as was passed on such and such a date during the previous supply debate. You take the government at its word. It is a precedent the government undertakes during the supply period. Of course, in the next supply period, we'll have a similar process once again. We look forward to that as well.
We have to link it back to the estimates process. There is no question that there is a need to have a discussion about it, but to simply make changes to the Standing Orders to deal with some of the problems and the accounting methods of the government isn't a plausible solution. It isn't a realistic solution. Treasury Board and the appropriate ministers and their departments ought to first fix the problems in their own departments and their own houses prior to changing the Standing Orders. Simply changing the Standing Orders for the estimates process does nothing to deal with the internal problems in terms of the accounting system the government is currently experiencing and has been experiencing for some time.
I will point out that the estimates allow committees a small peek into the operations of a department. Ms. Kwan has mentioned that the seven-minute opportunity to question the minister isn't sufficient. I think we acknowledge that to get an in-depth analysis, an in-depth line of questioning, in seven minutes is simply not reasonable and doesn't happen. I think we would certainly be open to seeing more in-depth analysis. We can do some of it in committee of the whole, when two departments are allocated a longer time in committee of the whole, but it isn't sufficient.
I happened to be at the government operations committee when testified the one day. One of the proposals he mentioned was that ministers would be made available on two occasions to testify before a parliamentary committee. I found that interesting, because it's putting a limit on the number of times a minister ought to appear. A minister should, in theory, be in a position to attend committee at any time, on numerous occasions, if the need arises. Certainly in the estimates process, I think most committees would welcome the minister for a significant period of time to discuss the department's spending plans and the estimates process.
There are also opportunities throughout the course of our duties here in this House to hear from ministers on matters before the House, on pieces of legislation, on parliamentary business, and on the budget, for that matter. To artificially have a limit of two appearances I think is unfortunate. That was, unfortunately, the method that seemed to be proposed by the minister at the time.
One point Mr. Reid makes in this article is about the public accounts committee. Again, it's John Reid,from Kenora—Rainy River, not , though I'm sure Scott Reid would have plenty to say on this subject as well. We learn things when we come to this place, and I found it interesting that the public accounts committee was, in fact, chaired by an opposition member of Parliament. That's something we learn when we come to this place. There were a couple of other committees as well, but I found it interesting that the public accounts committee was chaired by an opposition MP. Mr. Reid writes in his article:
Public accounts is a committee which works closely with the Auditor General. It has had opportunities to influence legislation as a result of investigations carried out following suggestions in the Auditor General's report. For example, the recent background paper on Crown Corporations resulted as a direct consequence of the Public Accounts Committee's investigation into Atomic Energy Canada.
When we look at different committees, I think the public accounts committee is one of the more unique creatures of this place, because it has great publicity, as we have seen it in the past when the public accounts committee undertakes its studies. We talked a little bit earlier about questions going to chairs of committees and so on.
Again, as I mentioned, I was an avid viewer of parliamentary proceedings as a kid, as a student, and as a university student. I can remember that during the times of discussion leading up to the Gomery report about the sponsorship scandal much of the investigation was being undertaken on it from a political standpoint by the public accounts committee, based on the Auditor General's report at the time. Sheila Fraser was the Auditor General at that time.
One of the techniques employed at the time from an accountability standpoint was that questions were directed from the then leader of the opposition, Stephen Harper, to his own committee chair; at the time, it was John Williams, the MP from Edmonton—St. Albert. It was a tactic used to bring publicity and public interest to the matter by using the chair of the public accounts committee and also using the committee itself. It served as a valuable tool to review government spending and the concerns that the Auditor General raised on a certain matter.
I think the position of the Auditor General is one of utmost importance to our Parliament. Auditors General serve independently of government. They are appointed for a 10-year term and are not typically subject to reappointment, so they do have a great deal of independence when they're undertaking their duties. Over the course of many parliaments, we can see the great influence that, one, the Auditor General has had in undertaking studies, but also, two, we can see the influence that the public accounts committee can have, and I might say positively. The work of the committee can often lead to significant changes in the way we operate—for the better.
When raising an issue, the Auditor General often makes recommendations, and the government has the opportunity to accept them, to decline them, or to make some modifications. When the Auditor General presents presents reports and the committee has an opportunity to review them, we can see changes for the better in the way government operates. That's one important point that I think we need to acknowledge when we're looking at the role of the committee.
In a way, probably all parties, I think, depending on who is in power, dread the Auditor General's report. No one wants to be called on the carpet for potential mismanagement. Regardless of party affiliation, I think we all acknowledge the essential need for the Auditor General in terms of a parliamentary function.
I want to get in a few more points. I see that we're approaching the midnight hour, but I want to talk about one last point from this paper, which Mr. Reid talks about. It has to do with a bit of the discussion that Ms. Duncan and Ms. May had near the beginning about the role of political parties in this whole process.
Mr. Reid writes in his paper:
Of course, one of the most important areas where a backbencher can exercise a legislative function results from his participation as a member of a political party in the development of party policy. In some ways, this can be the most important [work] of a backbencher's legislative outlook. I have not dealt with that aspect of his activities. I have not dealt with the impediments [of] reforming the legislative function which is implicit not so much in the nature of the [party] system itself, but rather from the fact that the floor of the House of Commons, and to a lesser extent in all of its emanations is a [battlefield] between parties and, occasionally, ideas.
We often hear what a panacea we would have if we didn't have political parties, but I think that neglects the role the political parties play in policy development and the policy process. Ms. Duncan talked about the grassroots process that her party has. I know that our political party has our own policy process. We have national conventions every couple of years, where we have the opportunity to meet with party members from every riding across the country and have that discussion on where ought to go on any given matter, which informs our duties as parliamentarians. When we debate things in the House of Commons, we'll often refer to our policy documents, to where our party encouraged us to go in a past policy convention. It gives us the opportunity to see where our grassroots are. Too often, political parties get a bad rap, I think; they get a bad name in terms of a negative perspective.
I'm pleased to be speaking to the committee today because my party doesn't often have the opportunity to do so. I know my colleague had a great deal to say, and I want to thank him for letting me take part in the discussion.
The members of my party don't often have the chance to speak. We have little or no speaking time in committee meetings. The only exception was when the Special Committee on Electoral Reform allowed the Bloc Québécois to sit on it. Since the last Parliament, we haven't been able to sit on any other committee. This is a major problem for us. Each time a bill is submitted and we have issues to raise, we can't do so. We also can't suggest amendments. We sometimes manage to do so, but often, we can't do so the way we would like to.
This causes specific problems. We're members like all the other members in the House of Commons, meaning we were elected by the citizens of our constituencies. There are 11 members in this situation in the House of Commons. No, there are now 12 members because a former Liberal member is now sitting as an independent.
The mandate from our constituents is the same as the mandate given to the other members by their constituents, which is to represent them in the House of Commons. It's unfair because we can't represent our citizens the same way the other members represent their citizens.
The committee should look at this issue to ensure that it's taken into account in the possible changes to the Standing Orders. The members must be able to express their views in all the House committees, and not only in the committees dealing with the Standing Orders of the House and the changes to the democratic rules for committees.
The democratic rules were discussed in a committee that studied the change to the voting system. I appreciated the openness to us and the fact that we were allowed to share our views. I think it was essential. When the rules of our democracy are changed and certain people aren't invited to the table, democracy is denied, because these people are part of the democratic process.
In this case, the situation is similar since we're talking about changes to the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. Obviously, the Standing Orders play an essential role in the parliamentary process. When it comes time to change the lives of parliamentarians, it's important to hear what all parliamentarians have to say on the matter. On that note, I appreciate that the committee is giving us the chance to speak. However, I don't think it's sufficient to give us the chance only on this occasion. We should also have the opportunity to speak on other occasions, in all the committees.
I don't think we should implement a practice of automatically assigning a member to a committee. We're 10 independent members, since you don't want to recognize us as Bloc Québécois members. Since there are more than 10 committees, we can't sit on all the committees, given the number of members in our party. Nevertheless, whether one or 11 independent members are elected to the House of Commons, we need to look at the possibility of those members sitting on the committees—no matter which committee—and participating in a meaningful way. It's a key way to allow everyone to participate in the democratic parliamentary life.
I'm sure the parties considered independent could agree on who would take the place of independent members on a given day. For example, I'm sure the member from would regularly sit on the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development. I'm sure she would often leave us her place on other committees. When we would have issues to raise in the committees that interest her personally, there wouldn't be any problem either. I think it would be something positive.
It would be all the more desirable because, in a democracy, we talk about the proliferation of views. Having views from all the parties is even better for the House and for all the members.
We each received in our offices a document that was released to the public. The document is a policy paper from the government describing the changes it wishes to make.
One of the changes is to sit four days a week instead of five. It's an interesting option to explore, but it involves many risks.
First, all members must be able to spend time in their constituencies, but they must also spend enough time on the Hill. If we decide to sit four days a week, for example, would members seen as independent have their number of questions reduced? Currently, each independent member has the right to ask one question a week. The Bloc Québécois has 10 members and can therefore ask 10 questions a week. The Green Party has one member, so it can ask only one question a week. These members mustn't lose the opportunity to ask their questions. They already can't ask many questions, and they may ask even fewer. I think the current system is already completely dysfunctional. Regarding the questions, it's not right that parties with fewer than 12 members aren't recognized. Parties should be recognized whether they have ten, five, four, two or one member.
The policy paper we received talks a great deal about London. The example of the British Parliament is provided. The British Parliament doesn't always sit five days a week and the Prime Minister sits only once a week to answer questions, as proposed in the policy paper. However, in London, the parties with two or more members are recognized, whereas here the parties need 12 members to be recognized. Great Britain has a population of 60 million and Canada has a population of 35 million. If we establish an equivalency based on the number of inhabitants, a party should be recognized starting at a single member. If the equivalency is purely based on how the British Parliament works, that's what must be done.
It isn't right that the members don't have the same resources. Recognition means the ability to ask more questions. In a question period where over a hundred questions may be asked, the party that's unable to ask questions can't even be included on the agenda and comment on what's happening on a given day. All political parties must be able to speak every day about key issues. Things are happening in society, and when the members of these parties can't be heard, their views aren't heard at all.
If we were to sit four days a week, we would sit for more weeks to compensate and to ensure the government sits for the same number of hours. We can look at this, but we're wondering what would happen to the recess weeks. Would the parliamentary recess weeks be eliminated? Would we sit more often? All members must have time to spend in their constituencies, especially the constituencies that cover a large area.
Important dates must also be considered. Sometimes, the House sits on June 24, which we find completely unbelievable as members from Quebec. June 24 is Quebec's national holiday, and it's an extremely important day for people in the province. All Quebec residents expect to see their members in their constituencies, to meet with their them, to celebrate with them and to share this important time. June 24 must be free so that Quebec members can go to their constituencies. I'm sure the Quebec members from the other parties would agree. The national holiday is very important for everyone in Quebec.
The policy paper also refers to the possibility of independent members sitting on committees. We're pleased about this, but I want to point out that members need preparation time to sit on committees. When members seen as independent are invited to committees, the time required is demanding. It's often said that time is money. These members need additional financial resources, because they currently don't have enough to prepare to sit on committees. Sitting on committees results in additional responsibilities, and financial resources must be allocated accordingly.
If ever there is a reform that allows independent members to sit on committees, or parties to be recognized in various ways—for instance, we could recognize a parliamentary group without acknowledging it as a party, or recognize parties on the basis of a lower minimum threshold—then budgets would also have to be made available at a lower threshold. Members will not be able to take on bigger workloads without having the financial resources to do that work. I think this is the most important point we have made today: additional financial resources are essential.
Currently, our Bloc Québécois members have to cut their riding office resources in order to be able to do parliamentary work. That means that they are not on an equal footing with the other members from recognized parties. All of the members should be able to serve the citizens of their ridings without having to amputate their constituency budget to do parliamentary work. What is happening currently is very difficult for our members. I think it is important that everyone be able to provide reasonable service in their ridings and on the Hill, both with regard to constituency files and parliamentary work.
Electronic voting is also discussed in the document. We view this with a certain amount of interest. However, there seems to be a certain ambiguity as to how this electronic voting would proceed. The document says that the members could continue to work in their ridings and vote electronically, or while continuing to work at the House. We are wondering how security measures could be put in place to ensure that the member who is in his riding has the proper context to allow him to vote for or against a bill. How can we ensure that the vote has really been cast by the member? For instance, it is not normal to have someone who is travelling vote without anyone verifying his identity. I think that the security systems have to be very reliable. We really need proof that this would be concrete and effective.
Whether we like it or not, there is a history that explains the way we vote now. The history behind the way in which the vote is carried out currently is an important symbol for a lot of people. If a change is made to the way in which we vote, I think it would be important that on certain important occasions, such as the vote on the Speech from the Throne, the budget or other such occasions, we be allowed to vote in the traditional way. That is part of our tradition and history, just like the way the pages, the Speaker of the House or some of the table officers dress. We should be able to continue to vote in the traditional way on certain special occasions.
We have not yet made up our minds about the idea of sitting four days a week, but we are open to the concept, as well as to the electronic vote. I think it is important to talk about it, and that it is a good idea to submit this to our committee so that we can discuss it today.
However, there is something that concerns us in the document that was presented. It concerns time allocation. It seems to open the door for the government to resort more easily to time allocation, that is to say that the House will be forced to take a position on certain issues and debate will be cut short, both in the House and in committees. We are concerned about that because according to the way things are done currently, we cannot even take a position on many bills, or debate them in the House. That too is a problem.
In other parliaments of the world, such as the National Assembly in Quebec for instance, when any member wants to speak, he or she has the right to do so. He can express his opinion on all of the bills that are introduced, and on every topic that is discussed.
We think it is abnormal not to be able to express ourselves. If a bill is tabled, it is important that all of the members be able to speak on it. With 10 members, it is not true that our group is so small that it should not be allowed to speak. There are parliamentary groups made up of 12 members. With only two additional members, they are allowed to speak on all topics, whereas we are not, although we have 10 members. There is quite simply something wrong with that picture. It is important that changes be made to that way of doing things. If it becomes easier to resort to time allocation, we fear that this will adversely affect members who, like us, already have trouble making their views heard in debates.
Traditionally we have always voted against time allocation because we think it is a way for the government to cut the debate short.
We think that cutting debate short is dangerous. It is important that the members be able to put forward their points of view. There are 338 members in the House of Commons and I think that if 338 people speak on a bill, it is not the end of the world. It is in fact interesting to hear about the vision of each of the members of Parliament on every bill.
You know, some members belonging to the same party may not have the same position; after all, people vote for a member, first and foremost. That is how our system works and it is important that this still be recognized today.
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We are very concerned by time allocation. Indeed, this is not something to be taken lightly. When you muzzle parliamentarians, it is because you want to prevent them from expressing themselves. However, we have been elected to Parliament precisely in order to be able to express our viewpoints. And so we have some serious doubts about the use of the guillotine, and we are anxious to see what form this will take. It is a dangerous instrument that has to be used with caution. Democracy consists in giving everyone a voice. Preventing people from expressing their opinions on issues alters democracy directly.
We also note that the document expresses the government's concern regarding the fact that the way motions are dealt with sometimes results in changes to the orders of the day it establishes itself, or which other parties establish occasionally. In my opinion, it is important that we maintain the possibility of introducing such motions. If urgent situations arise in current events, it is important that Parliament be able to deal with them. This can be a terrorist attempt or a major food crisis, for instance. There are all kinds of emergency situations Parliament has to be able to discuss.
These situations are not always to the government's liking, but Parliament must nevertheless be able to engage with these issues. The opposition has to be able to put the government on the spot occasionally. This is part of the roles of Parliament and of the opposition parties. It does not mean that the opposition is not doing good work. I think, on the contrary, that the fact that the government is sometimes put on the spot indicates that the opposition is playing its role properly. Indeed, the government must be transparent at all times and the opposition has to help it respect that obligation.
The document also refers to the possibility of the Prime Minister only being present one day a week in the House, and we consider this problematic. There is a seat reserved for him in the House. We understand that due to circumstances he sometimes cannot be there, but question period only lasts about an hour. There are 24 hours in a day and 5 business days in a week. Therefore I think that it is not unreasonable to expect the Prime Minister to be present in the House five hours a week. It is very little, considering the number of hours in a week. I think the Prime Minister must be accountable and that it is a matter of transparency that he also be present in the House. In my opinion, the ministers should also be there as often as possible. Quite often the ministers are not present in the House. Questions are not always addressed to the Prime Minister, they are often addressed to the ministers as well.
I would now like to speak about private members' bills. The parties introduce motions, but they also introduce bills. Members who are considered independent may also present bills. All of the members follow the same processes. However, very little time is allocated to debate private members' bills. We think there should be more time for this and that this is important. Parties and the government have a lot of weight, but private members' bills must also be heard. They sometimes raise important issues and can make significant breakthroughs possible.
Bills are not always partisan in nature. Of course all of the members have their own ideas and these are generally in keeping with those of their party. It is normal that this tendency is reflected in private members' bills. That does not mean that these bills are not interesting and do not deserve to be debated. We need to increase the amount of time set aside to debate them. It is all the more important because members cannot introduce very many.
For my part, for instance, I will probably not be able to introduce a single one in the course of my entire mandate, since the number I drew in the lottery is higher than 200. I will not have that possibility, even though this is my first mandate. It may be the only one in fact, even though that is not my wish. But the fact remains that if this is my only mandate, I will have been a member for four years without having been able to have a single bill debated in the House of Commons. I think that is not normal, and that it should not be possible. That is nevertheless the system we must work with at this time.
The fact that votes often take place during the day is another thing that concerns us greatly. Members have a lot of work to do and they must often work in their offices in Ottawa during the day.
Moreover, the votes happen sporadically. After question period, we return to our offices only to find out, often enough, that a vote is being held and that we have to return to the House. Sometimes a whole day can go by when we are unable to work on our files.
Of course, for the parties that have a lot of members, that isn't as serious because they have a lot of people to call on, a real army. And many public servants also work for them.
However, in the case of the smaller parties, the members have more work to do. When there are five, six, eight or ten votes in the same day at various times, we spend the whole day going back and forth between our offices and the House. And so this prevents us from working on our riding files and our parliamentary dossiers. Since we have fewer resources, we are more penalized than all of the others. It would be important to think about those members when things are being organized. I don't know exactly how they could be organized, but I think it is important that we plan the day better for the members, because everyone has work to do.
Sometimes we meet with citizens, groups, or the representatives of Quebec organizations who come from our ridings. It can be an association of chicken producers, egg producers, or pork producers. All sorts of associations can come to meet with us. We make appointments with these association representatives, and they expect to see us. When there are votes at all times of the day, it is not easy to have productive meetings with them. We need to be able to plan our time more easily; that would be an improvement. It remains to be seen how that can become concrete reality, and we are anxious to see it.
It's the same thing for those who answer questions. I mentioned earlier that the Prime Minister should be present more often in the House in order to answer questions. We think that the obligation to answer questions should not apply only to the Prime Minister. I think that the ministers also have a duty to be present in the House to answer questions. Quite often the answer is given by a parliamentary secretary. A lot of parliamentary secretaries are certainly devoted and interested in the files they are given, but like it or not they are not the ones who make the final decisions. In the final analysis, the minister makes the decisions; he is responsible. The minister must be able to answer members' questions when they are addressed to him. I think that is fundamental.
I don't know if there is a mechanism that could force the person to whom the question is addressed to answer it. Often, people who are not familiar with the dossier at all answer the questions simply by reading a memo, which does not move the debate forward. Such answers do not help anyone to gain a better understanding of the issue. And so we are forced to ask the same question five, six, eight, ten or twenty times and every time it is difficult to obtain an answer. If it is difficult to obtain an answer from the minister or the Prime Minister, imagine what it is like when another member or a parliamentary secretary answers us. We always hope that he is providing a good answer, which sometimes happens, but I think it is important that the minister be present.
It would also be important that these regulations state that the ministers must also spend a minimum amount of time in the House. These rules should not apply only to the Prime Minister.
This week we also discussed omnibus bills. This topic came up again. As we know, these bills were a specialty of the previous government, but we are finding that the current government has also developed quite a fondness for this type of bill.
You will remember Bill . In it we found a measure that affected consumer protection legislation. This would have meant that the banks would no longer have been subject to that provision. We think that is unacceptable. There should be a restriction on omnibus bills so that when a different issue or department is involved, a different bill must be introduced. It is not normal that bills touch on 200, 300 or 500 different topics.
As I mentioned earlier, a smaller parliamentary group has fewer resources and it is more difficult for it to review an entire bill. Imagine the situation when a bill has 200, 300, 400 or 600 pages; in the case I am referring to, with fewer resources, it is much more difficult not only to have a complete and informed position, but also to find the points in the bill that are of interest to the people in our ridings. In light of that, I think it is essential that a limit be placed on the size of bills.
I don't know how that could be done because certain bills are complex. At least there should be a way of understanding the content of bills. Little poison pills should not be scattered throughout a bill either because that is the problem. Little poison pills scattered throughout the bill do not improve the government's image because, when these poison pills are discovered and discussed in public, the public is not happy and the government is in the hot seat. So the government should really never do that kind of thing.
As to the debates in the House, it is difficult at this time, as I noted, to speak to bills. In some cases, we cannot speak at all. There is a procedure to break up members' speaking time, that is, to break up the 20 minutes into two blocks of 10 minutes—which is interesting—but it should also be possible to break up those 10 minutes into blocks of 4 or 5 minutes, to give members from the smaller parties the opportunity to speak. Once again, it is important for various people to speak.
There is another issue regarding members rising to speak: it is also important to be able to ask questions to someone taking part in a debate. I submit this issue to you very humbly. I think we have to think about it. I am looking for ways to give all members as much speaking time as possible. A member might repeat themselves in 20 minutes, but perhaps the member would be more concise in 10 minutes. If more people are given the opportunity to speak, the discussion becomes more constructive. So that is something that could be considered.
Another aspect, which is an irritant right now, pertains to question period. During question period, right now our questions are systematically relegated to last place. We understand that the parties with more members are allowed to speak first. I think that is part of protocol and the way things work. At the same time, however, we believe that systematically having the last question of the day makes it difficult to capture the public's attention because, as question period wears on, people grow tired and are less attentive. If you and I become increasingly less attentive as question period progresses, the same is true of people watching the parliamentary network. This is even more so the case with journalists. In the interest of democracy and the diversity of points of view, members from the smallest parties should also be able to ask questions before the very end of question period.
Those parties' questions could be scheduled at another time, perhaps after the first blocks, because there is a block for the first opposition group and another block for the second opposition group. Blocks could also be set aside for the other opposition groups. That would provide a more balanced approach, especially as to the number of questions. The status quo seems completely unfair to me. The small opposition parties must also be entitled to ask more questions and to receive more resources. It is not normal for certain parties to receive millions of dollars for research, while we get no research budget at all.
I think there is a party in the House right now that has about thirty members. We have about ten, one third the number of that party. Yet we are very far from being able to ask a third the number of questions that party can ask in the House and very far from a third of its budget. So I think some major changes are in order in this regard. In my opinion, it is essential for us to be able to express our views as much as the other parties.
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Did I say Laurier? I should have said St. Laurent. Thank you very much for the correction.
There was no appetite for closure, but because it was on the books, St. Laurent was able to utilize it.
I point this out for a reason. I mentioned earlier in my intervention that what we do now will have repercussions, will have consequences. It may not be apparent to individuals at the time, but any action causes a reaction. Even though closure was not intended to be enacted after 1913, it was, because it was available to the government of the day.
Fast forward from 1956 to 1969, when time allocation was first introduced by the current father, Pierre Trudeau. It was hotly debated, but the reaction was not quite as visceral as it was in 1956, and certainly not as much as it was in 1913, because by that time Canadians had been somewhat acclimatized to the fact that parliaments had the ability to shut down debate. Prime Minister Trudeau the elder again whipped his caucus, and time allocation was something that came on the books as a standing order.
I note with great interest and point out to committee members that in the five years prior to the introduction, the approval, and the ultimate passage of time allocation as a parliamentary tool, a number of different parliamentary procedural committees discussed this very concept, and on five different occasions all-party committees decided not to approve time allocation. Why? Because they didn't have unanimous consent.
I'm underscoring this because it has been a long-standing tradition. Whether or not a special committee on parliamentary reform is constructed, whether or not an all-party committee is formed to examine potential changes to the Standing Orders, each and every time throughout history, all parliamentarians agreed that they must have unanimous consent—that is, until now.
Make no mistake that what this government is attempting to do is to shut down the ability of the opposition to prevent changes to a standing order by not agreeing to grant unanimous consent, merely allowing a parliamentary committee of which they have a majority to determine what standing orders should be changed.
Mr. Chair, that in my view is not a discussion, such as this government continually brays they want to have. It is not a conversation, because a conversation has to be two-way, and you have to be able to listen to and accept arguments from both sides and both points of view. This is merely a totalitarian attempt by this government to unilaterally impose their will on the opposition under the guise of a parliamentary committee.
I would suggest to my honourable colleagues on the government side that this has the potential to be extremely problematic for them from an electoral standpoint. This heavy-handed, ham-handed attempt by the government to curtail the opposition's ability to affect the rules of this place will be seen as dictatorial, as draconian, and they very well could end up paying the price for it.
I talked a little earlier in my intervention about how many of the Liberals were elected by a very small margin in the last election and how they have disappointed a lot of the progressive voters by their actions to date. They have greatly disappointed progressives who were looking forward to a government to follow through on their commitment to electoral reform. They were very disappointed with a government who said that they would respect the will of provincial and environmental jurisdictions by approving pipelines. They were disappointed, to say the least, that the government made a number of promises and have not fulfilled them—the two I have mentioned plus the fact that the modest $10-billion deficits have now mushroomed into a $30-billion deficit.
There is a host of progressive voters, I would suggest, throughout Canada from coast to coast to coast, and to the fourth coast, who will be looking to rethink their position and rethink their support for Liberals because of these disappointments. I would suggest that this course of action will only add to the frustration and disappointment of those progressive voters. I believe that will translate itself into votes, but they won't be votes for Liberals.
I would also suggest to members at this committee that one of the benefits of being elected is that backbenchers, in a truly enlightened government, have the respect of their party. I would humbly suggest that that respect has not been afforded anyone at this table. You know as well as I do that you have been instructed to follow a certain course of action to ensure that at the very least this filibuster continues. I suspect—although I will probably never be able to prove with any certainty—that many of you in your heart of hearts disagree with the approach your government is taking.
I can speak from experience that in the previous Parliament—I think most of my colleagues, if they were being completely honest, would agree—there were initiatives our government in the past engaged in that many of us did not agree with, but we only have ourselves to blame if we were silent. We can always fall back on the old tried-and-true adage that, well, we were just following party discipline. We wanted to be loyal. That's all well and good, and I agree with party discipline. I agree with having a united front, because if you didn't have it, it would prove to be politically disastrous for any political party. However, there comes a time when every single parliamentarian and every single citizen has to say stop.
I believe every Canadian knows the difference between right and wrong. We know that intuitively. It is simply wrong to try to impose the will of the government, the tyranny of the majority, upon the political process and the Standing Orders that guide us all. I believe that if members of the government—many of whom are sitting at this table—would speak honestly, they would agree with that statement.
That's not going to have any influence on the outcome, but I can tell you this. Having successfully run for election on five different occasions, I know what it's like to go back to my constituency and try to explain to constituents a course of action that my government took that was not appreciated. You can spin as long and as much as you want, but the reality is that constituents know when a course of action taken was wrong.
I heard it loud and clear in the last election and lead-up to the last campaign. Luckily for me, my voters did not blame me, but they blamed the prime minister and the government. Frankly, if I had been in any other region of Canada except the Prairies, there's a good chance I would not have been re-elected, simply because voters wanted to express their displeasure at the actions of our government.
The first individuals on the government side who will potentially experience some heartache from this action, combined with the actions their government did before, are backbenchers. They will be asked why they didn't stand up and say no.
To credit the current government, and to the members of the Liberal Party, on a few occasions I have been pleased to see government members stand up in opposition to their marching orders, usually with respect to private members' bills. I think that's extremely positive. I think that's healthy. But this is something that goes beyond just a private member's bill. If there is a point in time when government backbenchers should say, no, we don't agree with this course of action, then this is the time. Trust me, if some of these changes go through, and if you are successful in your re-election bids, at one point in time in your future you will be sitting in the opposition benches, and you will have to live with the changes you brought down yourselves. It will not be very pretty.
I would also suggest that if the government simply agreed to this long-standing tradition of unanimous consent being required, the government might be pleasantly surprised at the reactions of some of the points that you put up for discussion. More than anything else, this impasse we are currently seized with would be completely eliminated. There could be a fruitful discussion on potential changes.
I can let members of the government know that in the previous Parliament, during the discussions of our all-party committee, many of the items it raised in its discussion paper were raised and discussed by our committee. It wasn't that all of them were opposed vehemently. In some cases there may have been one party that had some objections for some particular reason. In that case we took that standing order proposal off the table. However, there was some intelligent, reasoned, and rational discussion. Arguments were being made that did sway from time to time the opinions of others. That could be the case here, but it will not take place if the government continues to take the position that it does not require or request unanimous consent.
Simply put, if the government wants to continue down this road, and it appears it is doing just that, members of the opposition will have no choice but to continue our opposition, and not just continue our tactics such as filibusters, but to increase in intensity our opposition in other tactical and procedural ways.
Mr. Mel Arnold: We have no choice.
Mr. Tom Lukiwski: My colleague Mr. Arnold is quite right. We have no choice but to do that. We have to be able to show our displeasure as vociferously and as pointedly as we can to try to underscore the importance of what we are discussing. It is not enough to say simply that this is an issue that most Canadians aren't concerned with, that it's inside baseball. That may be true, but it affects Canadians nonetheless, because it affects how their elected members of Parliament have the ability to do their jobs.
In other words, it is undercutting the ability of any opposition party to be an effective opposition. There have been countless examples throughout history when, because of a competent opposition party, potentially damaging and destructive legislation was stopped, was prevented. Unfortunately, this government, when it talks about efficiency, wants the Standing Orders to be efficient only for themselves: to remove roadblocks from their way; to prevent opposition parties from having the ability to slow down and, in some cases, delay and prevent legislation from crossing the finish line. I'm all for efficiency, but I'm certainly not for a form of dictatorship, and that seems to be the considered approach of this government.
Let's look at a couple of examples from this discussion paper. One of the apparently more innocuous suggestions of the government is to change the length of time until a government is required to respond to written Order Paper questions from 45 to 65 days, or, as the government puts it in the discussion paper, put “an upper limit”, so that a government is required to respond between 45 and 65 days later. The rationale is that the 65-day upper limit would give the government more time to give a more considered and thorough response.
To that I say balderdash. I've been in this place for close to 14 years. I was in government for nine. I saw questions coming from the opposition that caused us to respond, in some cases, in 50 to 100 pages for one question. As I made reference to in my last intervention, to prove a point, I stood in the House and read one of the opposition Liberal Party's questions into the record. It took me 17 minutes to read it in the record. That was one question.
I made a suggestion that perhaps we ought to put some rules around the types of questions that can be asked so as to prevent opposition parties from abusing their right to ask written questions. It took countless public servants days upon days to develop answers, which then had to be translated into both official languages, photocopied, and presented. The cost to our government was enormous. I did a calculation and found out that literally tens of millions of dollars were being spent to respond to opposition questions, many of which were dilatory, frankly. They were simply done to try to put a monkey wrench into government operations by taking skilled professionals away from their jobs and into responding to a question. It was obstructionist at its very core.
I appealed to the prime minister at that time that perhaps we should take a look at doing at least a review of the Standing Orders, because I thought we could save taxpayers millions of dollars. The prime minister said it sounded like an interesting concept and to send him a memo, as he normally said to members who had ideas he felt were worth exploring.
I did. I sent it to them. We had a discussion. What ensued from that discussion was that the prime minister made it crystal clear to me that any standing order changes had to be done for the right reasons. He didn't talk about unanimous consent at that time. That was something I brought forward on my own initiative when we assembled the committee. His marching orders to me, however, were very clear. If the standing order changes proposed by the committee make sense, that's fine. However, we—and “we” meaning the government—were not to introduce proposals that would effectively impinge upon the rights of opposition parties.
That surprised me, frankly, because the prime minister was a very wise and some would say brilliant political tactician. Some changes to the Standing Orders, which haven't been included in this discussion paper but I certainly considered, would have hamstrung the opposition. The prime minister wanted none of it. He understood, I believe more than anyone else in our party, why the Standing Orders were put in place to begin with.
At the heart of everything else you can say about the prime minister, he understood what democracy meant.
An hon. member: Hear, hear!
Mr. Tom Lukiwski: He knew that since we had a majority, if we wished, we could change the Standing Orders in a number of different areas that would have benefited us greatly, that completely—completely—would have removed the ability of opposition members to hold us to account. He would have no part of it.
Therefore, when at the procedure and House affairs committee I raised the fact that we were legislatively obligated to study the Standing Orders between the sixtieth and ninetieth day of the new Parliament, as all Parliaments are, I suggested we go a step further; rather than have a day of debate in the House, we do something about it and see if we can agree upon changes that would make the Standing Orders better, clean up some of the more arcane items contained in the Standing Orders at that time, and hopefully make the House of Commons a better place in which to work and to act.
The opposition members agreed, and at our first meeting I brought forward a proposal. This was not something that came from the PMO. This was something that I felt would be appropriate based on my conversations with the Prime Minister. I was the one who suggested that we consider changes to the Standing Orders, but to do so in a manner that, if any proposed change were objected to for any reason by any member of the committee, that proposal was off the table for discussion. We didn't even debate it. We didn't try to convince other members of the worthiness of the proposed change. We just took it off. You know something? That was probably one of the best-functioning committees I've been on. It was actually a subcommittee.
All of the members of the committee went to back to their caucuses. They consulted with them extensively as to some of the proposed changes that our caucus members would like to see. Then we came back to the table, put our respective proposed changes on the table, and went from there. I can tell you, quite honestly, that in our caucus of the previous Parliament, some of the changes you have on your discussion paper were suggested. There weren't many, but there were a couple of people who recommended we go to a four-day week. You have that in yours. There were some who talked about electronic voting. There was a lot of other discussion about areas that would hamstring the opposition, and, as I said, I didn't entertain those.
I mentioned this in the last intervention, Mr. Chair, but I'll say it again because we have some new members at the table. I want to give a couple of examples of what I speak of. In the last Parliament there were only seven or eight members who were not part of recognized parties. By that I mean they didn't have 12 members of a caucus, so they weren't recognized. Ms. May was there representing the Green Party. I think there were two or three members of the Bloc Québécois, a couple of members of some other Quebec sovereigntist associations and political parties. However, in total, there were only, I believe, eight of them.
On two or three occasions during the last Parliament, the three major parties came to an agreement on some motions. Normally it would be something like the time we rise, or we ask for UC on, something that the Conservatives, the Liberals, and the NDP could agree upon. On two or three occasions, though, when we introduced the motion asking for unanimous consent, one or more of the seven or eight of what we should call independent members said “no”.
What happens? Well, you have to “stand five”, which they did. That forced a vote. We ultimately got approval of the motion we had introduced, but it took an hour out of our time. There were 30-minute bells, and you have to go through a vote. It delayed the government's own legislative agenda for an hour. Some may say it's not a big deal, but it is a big deal if it happens frequently.
This government is seeing what happens if you have unwanted or unnecessary votes. Your legislative agenda is getting thrown off the tracks. We're doing that by design.
But I digress. Going back to the issue of the day, as some have suggested, the stand five provision was put into place several decades ago, when there were far fewer members of Parliament than there are at this time. From an inflationary viewpoint, one could make the argument that if the stand five provision was in place when there were only 180 members, and now there are more than 300 members, wouldn't it make sense to change the Standing Orders to say that you have to “stand 10” to force a vote? What would stand 10 do? In that political environment, stand 10 would have prevented Ms. May, the Bloc members, and the other independent members from ever being able to force a vote.
We didn't introduce it. I would not allow it to be even discussed at the all-party committee, because based on my conversations with the prime minister, I knew what he would say: “no.” Quite frankly, I was a little fearful that if I allowed it to be discussed at the committee, I'd be hauled on the carpet. But I didn't do it because I knew that's what he didn't want to do. I also knew that it was not the right thing to do. How could we, the tyranny of the majority, be obstructing the ability of individual and independent members of Parliament from doing their jobs, doing what they felt was necessary to represent their constituents? It simply wasn't right. We thus didn't go beyond that point.
I also made mention in my last intervention of another scenario, if you want to talk about numbers. It was on Standing Order 56.1, which we used successfully on a number of occasions, both when the Liberals were the official opposition and when the NDP were the official opposition.
For the benefit of those of you at this table who are new and may not know what S.O. 56.1 is, it basically means that if a government introduces a motion asking for unanimous consent and the consent is denied, they can then reintroduce the same motion under the rubric of S.O. 56.1, and if 25 members do not stand, the motion is deemed approved.
What we would do on occasion is wait until a Friday morning, when attendance is traditionally lower than it is normally. We would even put some advance scouts into the opposition lounges to see how many members were sitting, and perhaps not in Parliament sitting in their seats. A lot of times on Friday mornings, as we all know, unless your whip has pretty good discipline, members don't tend to show up. So we'd wait until we thought we could win because there weren't 25 members to oppose. We'd bring in S.O. 56.1 on a motion, and what do you know? We'd get it passed, when we otherwise wouldn't have gotten it passed.
Some of our caucus suggested that the opposition was on to us now, and that their whips were never going to let fewer than 25 people be in attendance at any time; that we'd never get this done again. A member who shall remain nameless, who was actually defeated in the last election—perhaps it was a good thing—thus suggested, why not change the provision from 25 to 35 or 40? Then we'd probably get an S.O. 56.1 passed every time. If nothing else, it would inflame the opposition members, because they would have to have more of their people staying in Ottawa on a Friday.
I didn't let it happen. I simply would not entertain it, and it never came up for discussion in our all-party committee, because it wasn't right and because I knew the prime minister wouldn't accept it.
Those are just two examples of what one party could do with a majority to change Standing Orders to the absolute, absolute destruction of democracy. I choose my words very carefully here. I don't want to engage in hyperbole, but what members of the government are attempting to do is exactly that. The Westminster form of government was established by very learned individuals, and for a reason. They recognized the usefulness of Parliament as a decision-making body, but also they recognized the ability of opposition members to contribute to that process. Negating the ability of opposition members to hold the government to account is a very, very dangerous thing to do.
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Filomena, I believe you're one of the others. You do not need this as well. But that's not for me to coach you on how you plan to form your re-election strategy. All I'm suggesting to you from experience is that this would not be helpful. This will not be helpful. Think about that.
Also think about the fact that we don't have to be here. We can get out of this very simply, if you want to, by observing the tradition that has guided parliamentarians for centuries, and that is, let us all come together, sit down and discuss. What is the art of the possible? What would make Parliament a stronger, more modern, more efficient institution?
You've thrown out some examples, some of which I think I could be persuaded to accept. I would like to listen to some arguments. Some I disagree with, and I'd like to be able to debate those and present the arguments that I have as to why I believe this is a faulty way of thinking.
I started a few moments ago to talk about one of the proposed changes on providing answers to written questions, questions on the order paper, from 45 days firm to an upper limit of 65 days. All that does is it prevents the government from being accountable by 20 additional days. It is in itself an obstructionist tactic. For nine years while we were in government, I saw extensive questions, and we were always able to answer them within 45 days. In the extreme situation where a government is not able to respond in 45 days, there are provisions to ask for exemptions and extensions. You don't have to change the Standing Orders to gain 20 extra days, because all that would allow you to do is delay being accountable to the opposition and to Canadians by 20 additional days. We all know what happens if Parliament dissolves or adjourns and the response to a question has not been tabled in Parliament. It doesn't get tabled over the summertime or over the Christmas break. It can't be tabled until Parliament resumes.
There are many opportunities for the government by merely extending the ability to delay an answer for 20 days to delay it for several months. If there was a question that could have very severe and significant political problems for a government, say, on procurement or some other issue where the government would find itself to be politically vulnerable, having that extra 20 days is a big deal. That's why I feel that suggestion was made, not because the government would be better positioned to give a more fulsome and detailed answer, but simply because it gives the government more time to delay. I could not agree with that. I'd love to have that debate and provide evidence to suggest that your suggestion is wrong-headed, but I don't have that ability not just because of your reluctance, but because of your obstinance to agree to a tradition that has guided parliamentarians since Canada was formed as a nation, and that is, having unanimous consent when dealing with the rules of Parliament themselves.
I look at some of the items contained in your discussion paper. As Candice has pointed out, many of them do not require a change to the Standing Orders. We've talked extensively about the proposal to codify a prime minister's question period. Why do you need to codify it? He can do as he's done for the last couple of Wednesdays: just show up, stand up, and give such non-answers that frustrate the heck out of the opposition, but he at least is there.
You don't need to codify that. The consequence of that, as I mentioned earlier, would be—I will guarantee you—that the prime ministers of future governments would look at that and say, “Well, the requirement is that he shows up once a day, and that's all I'm going to do.” Any action has a reaction, and that is what the reaction would be.
As I point out once again for emphasis, if we were the government of the day and our prime minister only showed up once a day or once a week, you would be furious. When Prime Minister Harper showed up three days a week, you were furious. However, that's what you're attempting to do, or if not, that's the consequence of what you are attempting to do.
Think about that. Think about prorogation. Why do you have to codify that? Your suggestion is that any government that wishes to prorogue must give some justification for doing so. Well, everyone does that now in some fashion. Prorogation is not a dirty word. In fact, it's quite common both at the provincial level and at the federal level, and in fact, it can be quite useful.
In this government's life cycle, you're just about halfway through your four-year term. I fully expect, if he doesn't do it prior to the adjournment of this House, that over the course of the summer your Prime Minister will prorogue and delay the resumption of Parliament until probably sometime later in October. At that time, he will come back with a throne speech. He will hit the reset button. He will outline to Parliament and to Canadians your plans for the last half of your term.
That's natural. That's normal. I would take no issue with that whatsoever. But why do you have to entrench that? Once you do, the manner in which you present it could be abused by future governments and future prime ministers. It is not necessary; in fact, it is dangerous. I keep stressing that word, and I mean what I say. Many of these changes are dangerous to parliaments not just now, but in the future.
I find it interesting that you have a section on time allocation. I told you the history of time allocation: how it was first introduced by Pierre Trudeau, the great furor it caused, and how he had to enact closure to get the time allocation provision codified. That's something which, frankly, not only is worrisome, but also speaks to the fact that Pierre Trudeau's government, in its attempt to ensure it had all the benefits before it that it already had as a majority government, decided to change the rules to make it even more difficult for opposition members to express the problems they had with individual pieces of legislation.
What I find even more worrisome in your discussion paper is how you want to put time limitations on interventions at committee. As some have said before me, this filibuster is about your attempting to deny us the right to filibuster. That's what it is. You're trying to handicap and kneecap members of the opposition. Why? Because you don't find it convenient. You find it decidedly inconvenient that you might have to put up with the opposition denying you the ability to pass legislation in the time frame that you wish.
Mr. David Christopherson: [Inaudible—Editor]
Mr. Tom Lukiwski: That's a very apt way of putting it, David.
That is simply not acceptable, and it shouldn't be acceptable to any parliamentarian, regardless of political affiliation or political stripe.
Once again, I offer that if any member on the government side of the table can explain to me why not asking for unanimous consent, based on the historical perspectives, conventions, and traditions that we have seen, is a good thing to do, I would be more than willing to cede my time and listen with rapt attention. The only difficulty is that you won't be able to explain it, because there is no good reason. The reason is not good. The reason is that this will benefit you and only you. It will benefit only the Liberal Party. Even more basic than that, it will benefit Liberals, not just the Liberal Party.
Mr. Chair, I know that regardless of what I say, what my colleagues say, and how passionate and articulate our arguments may be, we will get no acceptance from the members opposite, and I don't expect any. I'm certainly not trying to persuade them to change their minds at this table. If there is a change of heart, that can only come from people with a slightly higher pay bracket than those of my colleagues on the opposite side, but I sincerely hope that we can get to that point.
As Mr. Christopherson said, perhaps during this two-week constituency time when all members are back in their ridings celebrating their religions—some celebrating Easter—and their time with their families and friends, and talking to constituents, the time away from this place will allow cooler heads to prevail.
I know, as I mentioned earlier, that our House leader has reached out on several occasions to the government House leader, but the frustration we have is the fact that those overtures have been not just rebuffed, they've been ignored.
I can tell you that it's not just members of the opposition who are feeling frustrated during question period when legitimate questions are answered with the same lame and banal talking points we have heard for the last month and a half, Canadians are getting very frustrated as well.
If you have a valid point, if your rationale is sound, there should be no difficulty to express that rationale on behalf of the government. There should be no difficulty to explain to Canadians why you're taking the position that you're taking, but you have not presented that position whatsoever. You have talking points: “We want to have a conversation. We want to have a discussion.” Well, we're having one now and it's going to go on for a while, but it's not a discussion as most Canadians would interpret it.
To Canadians, to your typical Canadian, a discussion is where both sides are heard and both sides can make arguments that are reasonable and rational, and it is hoped that at the end of a discussion there can be an agreement. It doesn't happen all the time. Obviously, it doesn't happen in Parliament much of the time. At times the best we can say is that we agree to disagree, but at least discussions are intended to have an intelligent discourse of ideas being transferred from one side to the other. That is not the case here.
It simply doesn't matter what we say, what we suggest, what we recommend. It doesn't matter what overtures we make. It doesn't matter if we are willing to compromise. The inflexibility of this government is astounding.
I honestly believe that if the government agreed to unanimity requirements on changes to the Standing Orders, some of the suggestions the government would make would probably be accepted by members of the opposition.
To the point made by my colleague Mr. Christopherson, I would like to think that we, as individual members of opposition parties, could make some useful suggestions that might be accepted by the government. I won't suggest that the Standing Orders should be considered a living document, but there have been multiple changes, numerous changes, over the years that benefit parliamentarians, that improve the operation of Parliament, and that increase the efficiency of Parliament, which the current government seems so fixated on, but they have always been done with all parliamentarians coming together and agreeing on them. It just stands to reason. Common sense alone dictates that if all parliamentarians agree upon a proposed course of action, it's probably the right course of action.
There will be times in the life of any majority government when the government feels compelled to use all of the procedural tactics at its avail to push through legislation, procedures such as time allocation and closure. I understand that. I was a part of a government that used them. I take no issue with those because that is the way Parliaments have operated for the last 70 years, but I do take exception and great umbrage to the current attempt to change the rules so dramatically and so profoundly that it would tilt the playing field, if we're using a sporting analogy, one way and one way only.
I do not profess to be the leading expert on procedure and parliamentary practice, but I know some stuff. I've learned a little bit over my nine years in that position.
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Look, the government has been very clear on this issue, and I'll answer any questions the Ethics Commissioner has.
More seriously, Mr. Chair, thank you for giving me the floor. It's an honour to be back. I have to apologize to members of the committee for having to depart almost mid-sentence last time. There were many points that I had only started to make, and I know people were looking forward to my wrapping up those points the last time. I think I only talked for about 10 hours at that time, so now I have occasion to bring some of those points to a conclusion. The only reason I could not continue the next day was that I had an event I had committed to long in advance, an event at Queen's Park in Toronto. That's why I wasn't here. Since then, I've been trying to get back on the speakers list, but my colleagues have been hogging all the glory here, to quote Ajax from Troy. So now that I have the floor, they're not getting it back, whether they like it or not.
I think it's important to recognize that we have the opposition House leader here, and I really appreciate that. It shows the level of engagement that our caucus has with this issue in general. This is something that we are very much committed to in our party, namely, strengthening the role of individual members of Parliament. That's what this is about. It's not just about the balance that exists between parties. It's also about the role of individual members of Parliament.
I have to say, looking across the floor at some of the Liberals we have here at the committee, that we have some new members who are already very strong in their understanding of the importance of members of Parliament expressing some degree of individuality. I want to recognize Mr. 's excellent private member's bill. It was a private member's bill that he proposed, that all Conservatives voted for, and that passed as a result of the support of the opposition. I think New Democrats supported it as well. The cabinet did not support it, but he proposed it. Many members of the government supported it, and it went through to committee.
That's just an example of the importance of members of Parliament. We're engaged in this conversation around ensuring that there's unanimity of the parties in the study, which will proceed in order to ensure that we actually could protect the role of members of Parliament.
We need to understand that this is not just a fight for a particular party, not just a fight for the opposition. It's actually a fight that should matter to individual members of Parliament on the government side, members of Parliament who have good proposals that may not reflect what the government has in mind.
Our chair had an excellent private member's bill on FASD that I was very pleased to support. Actually, we had people on the front bench who opposed that bill, from both the government and the official opposition. Yet it almost passed because of the support of individual members of Parliament who were talking to each other, saying this was a good initiative, a good bill. Maybe there were some details that could be worked out at committee, but fundamentally it was a good bill.
One of the concerns I have with the government making unilateral changes to the Standing Orders...and by the way, if they don't like the direction that members of this committee want to take with respect to the study, they can pull you right off this committee and put somebody else on. That's something that permanent members of PROC know or should know. It's actually not up to you. The way our system works right now, who sits on this committee is entirely within the control of your whip. Even if individual members sitting here on the Liberal side think they could be reasonable and listen to what the opposition is saying, unless we pass this amendment, which deals with unanimity, unless we have this clarified in the language going forward, it's really only up to the government whip to decide the outcome. Any time the whip doesn't like the proposals or opinions from government members with respect to the Standing Orders, that's it. You can't actually express your individuality on the committee in the same way because of that constant threat. This is something that on the opposition side we're very aware of—the risks and problems.
I recognized Mr. May on his excellent private member's bill. I know Mr. Bittle voted in favour of , which was a great private member's bill that was brought to the House by Mr. Cooper. It was initially put forward in the Senate, but it was sponsored in the House by . There was a lot of advocacy that went on around that. The entire opposition supported that bill, and it was able to pass to the next stage because of a number of members of the government who realized it was a good bill and stood up to support it.
I can mention the genetic discrimination bill, on which I think almost the entire government backbench voted against certain government amendments that would have gutted the bill, and then in favour of the bill.
These are important moments in the life of this Parliament, when some individuals in particular, and especially on the genetic discrimination bill almost the entire government backbench, stood up. Sometimes it doesn't seem like the government backbench does, but in certain moments we do see this, an actual appreciation that, yes, good ideas do come from the opposition and also that as members of Parliament you have a critical role to represent your constituents, to advocate on behalf of your own considered judgment with respect to issues, and not to simply go along with the direction that you've been given from on high.
Changes to the Standing Orders that don't reflect the judgment of the entire House, that don't reflect the wisdom of all parties, put in jeopardy the position not just of the opposition, not just of the Conservative Party, but the position of individual members of the government. When we have these conversations as an opposition party, of course we're cognizant of the fact that, hopefully, we'll be in government one day soon. It's looking more and more like it will be after the next election, in light of some of the things that are happening. But whether that's after the next election or the one after that, the rights that we protect in this process will also protect those members of the government caucus, let's say, who are not, in the formal sense, part of the government.
These are important points that need to be made, and I hope that members of the government, even if they can't necessarily, for political reasons, come out and say in this committee, “All right, we agree with you; let's pass this amendment and move on”, hopefully they'll at least take this back to the , to their caucus, to their , and say, “We have an important role, too, in this place. This isn't just about being a backdrop for the Prime Minister. This is about representing our constituents in a constructive and meaningful way.”
This is a critical part of what we're engaged in. I invite government members to really reflect on that, to consider supporting this amendment as individuals, and to make the case back to their party. Not only would approving this amendment allow us to proceed in a constructive direction, but it would also be a way of actually preserving those rights that members of Parliament from all parties are supposed to have.
There's one thing I want to read into the record as we explore this question. This is from Discover Canada, which is the study guide for people who are looking to become citizens of Canada. It talks about the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. I think it's a great document. It talks about parliamentary democracy and what the principles that need to animate parliamentary democracy are.
I don't think this debate is about a possible end of democracy in Canada. I don't, but I do think that this debate is about the strength of our parliamentary institutions, and really, the ability of the government to move us away from our traditions of responsible parliamentary democracy towards a sort of reimagined quasi-presidential system in which we do have elections every four years, but effectively, in between elections all of the power is with one person, the prime minister. That's not what our system is supposed to have. Of course, presidential democracies around the world do have other kinds of checks and balances, but especially in a parliamentary democracy, where you don't have the same kinds of external checks and balances to that centre of power, it is important that you not allow that centre of power—the prime minister, the prime minister's office, and perhaps, by extension, the whip—to suck all the power in. You need to make sure that Parliament maintains its strength.
I'm not going to read the whole thing, but this is from page 28 of the citizenship guide where it talks about parliamentary democracy:
In Canada's parliamentary democracy, the people elect members to the House of Commons in Ottawa and to the provincial and territorial legislatures. These representatives are responsible for passing laws, approving and monitoring expenditures, and keeping the government accountable.
Right off the bat, we don't see discussion in this guide.... I think it's quite right in saying that members of the opposition are responsible for approving and monitoring expenditures, and keeping the government accountable. It actually says, “these representatives”, all members of Parliament, us as well as members on the other side of the table. We are responsible for doing all of these things, for passing laws, approving and monitoring expenditures, and keeping the government accountable.
Cabinet ministers are responsible to the elected representatives—
Hey, that's a thought.
Cabinet ministers are responsible to the elected representatives, which means they must retain the “confidence of the House” and have to resign if they are defeated in a non-confidence vote.
Maybe we need to have a footnote here that says this is how we want it to work. It goes on to say:
Parliament has three parts: the Sovereign (Queen or King), the Senate and the House of Commons. Provincial legislatures comprise the Lieutenant Governor and the elected Assembly. In the federal government, the Prime Minister selects the Cabinet ministers and is responsible for the operations and policy of the government.
The buck is supposed to stop there on decisions of the government. I'm ad libbing; that's not what it says. It doesn't use language that informal.
The House of Commons is the representative chamber, made up of members of Parliament elected by the people, traditionally every four years. Senators are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister and serve until age 75. Both the House of Commons and the Senate consider and review bills (proposals for new laws). No bill can become law in Canada until it has been passed by both chambers and has received royal assent, granted by the Governor General on behalf of the Sovereign.
Living in a democracy, Canadian citizens have the right and the responsibility to participate in making decisions that affect them. It is important for Canadians aged 18 or more to participate in their democracy by voting in federal, provincial or territorial and municipal elections.
This is a pretty simple and straightforward but positive description of what a parliamentary democracy is.
Sometimes we need to pinch ourselves and remind ourselves of the kind of basic civics grounding on which we are supposed to be standing. It is one in which members of Parliament are elected by their constituents directly. In fact, it was only relatively recently that party names appeared on ballots at all. Before, yes, people had affiliations with political parties. Those political parties were very important in terms of support, but you still had to rise or fall within your own constituency purely on the basis of your own name. If people wanted to vote for the candidate of a particular political party, they had to at least know the name of that candidate in advance. This is the structure of our system, one in which members of Parliament have the—yes, I say relatively recently; it was before I was born. Lots of things happened before that.
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I will respond directly to the points that Mr. Simms made, but first I want to set the stage on that point by making the underlying philosophical argument I wanted to make with respect to programming. This was an argument made explicitly by Ms. O'Malley in the podcast. She made a point that made me develop, I think, what may or may not be her thinking on the same point.
I have a broader concern about programming, even then about the potential strategic implications vis-à-vis government and opposition. That's a concern, but that's not the only concern.
Ms. O'Malley pointed out in this podcast I was listening to that programming doesn't just limit the opposition, but it limits the government, obviously. In advance you say there are a certain number of days that we're going to spend debating this, and then studying it, and then debating it again, and then we have a vote. That's limiting for everybody. That's limiting for the institution. It limits flexibility. It limits the ability to respond to new information and new events that come forward.
I think the idea of programming fundamentally misunderstands what we're supposed to be doing when we study and debate a bill. I think it's most evident in a situation that Mr. Simms described. He described a situation in which a person had prepared a certain set of arguments, and they brought those arguments in and were frustrated by the fact that the argument was cut off midway through. They hadn't been able to make all the arguments they were going to make. Okay, fair enough.
Actually, the point of a debate or a discussion isn't that we all come in with our arguments, deliver them, and then move on. The point of a discussion or a debate is where, yes, both sides perhaps begin with certain propositions that they want to put on the record, that they want to put forward for the discussion, and then each side responds to each other's propositions, and then there is counter-response back and forth.
Eventually there is a resolution of certain points, agreement, perhaps just a recognition that the differences actually relate to more fundamental philosophical differences that are not reconcilable. In that process, perhaps evidence is presented in support of one set of arguments, which is then countered by another side's arguments. This process unfolds as arguments, as evidence, perhaps personal experience are all related and compared against each other and used in support of different arguments.
Either way that process, if done properly, is necessarily unpredictable because unless I know exactly the arguments that people on the other side of the question are going to bring forward, and I know exactly how I'm going to respond, and I know exactly how they are going to respond, that's the only way you could possibly predict exactly how long it's going to take.
That is true of even a simple question that one might debate. It's that much more true in discussion about legislation. Very often it happens that legislation is brought forward. It may be that the government sees the legislation as a simple matter of housekeeping, but the opposition has some fundamental objections to it, and then the discussion proceeds in a different direction than was initially anticipated. Maybe the government frames the introduction of the bill in a way that the opposition didn't expect, with new original arguments that the opposition has to then respond to. This is only in the process of debate as it happens in the House of Commons, which is the unpredictable process ideally of refutation and counter-refutation.
Unfortunately, sometimes that doesn't happen. Unfortunately, debate in the House of Commons looks more like people reading speeches and ships passing in the night, but that's not what it's supposed to be. What it's supposed to be is constructive refutation back and forth about substantive questions.
If you're doing it right, you can't predict where that debate is going to go. You can estimate, but you have to have the flexibility to say that, if, for example, Mr. Berthold brought forward a point in debate on that issue, more government speakers are needed to respond to that point because that wasn't a point that we knew would come up, or a new study has been released that says something different and we have to now evaluate and discuss that. This is particularly true in the context of committees, where committees hear from expert witnesses who may say things that are a complete surprise to members of Parliament.
Sometimes, we may find ourselves here in a little bit of a bubble. We have conversations with a certain set of people, a certain set of stakeholders. The legislation has a path. It goes to committee. All of a sudden we hear from someone from industry who says, “Hey, this bill you thought was just a slam dunk matter of housekeeping actually creates some problems for our industry.”
When I was a political staffer, I was a parliamentary secretary's assistant when was the minister. I was working with Mike Lake, who was the parliamentary secretary at the time. We were working on anti-spam legislation. Nobody is pro-spam, except perhaps the meat, but nobody is pro-spam in terms of the kind that you get in your email inbox. It is something that I think we as members of Parliament know quite a bit about.
When we had this issue come up at committee though, there were people who came forward and said that the way in which we were defining spam for the purposes of this legislation raised some questions about people who are engaged in certain kinds of marketing, even people who may have been given a referral. It could be that someone may just be reaching out to an individual on the basis of a referral, but this legislation would catch them in the net of spam, when really, I think what the legislation most intended to target were those who are sending emails out to hundreds of thousands of people, perhaps with a malicious intent, such as spyware, phishing, and these kinds of things.
That's just an example of something where, if you had programming in that case, you might have had the government say, “Okay, this is really simple. We're going to have two committee meetings. We're going to have one day at report stage and one day at third reading. It's just going to sail through.” Perhaps opposition parties would have agreed. They would have said, “Well, of course, it's a simple matter.”
Then, all of a sudden, you end up at committee, and you have witnesses who say, “You know what? Agree or disagree, it's actually not that simple.” Then you think, “Well, okay, what do we do here? We've had one meeting, and two meetings have been allotted. We would like to be able to call more witnesses who can clarify whether the concern raised by this particular industry group is representative of the entire industry. Are they correct? Are there things we can clarify in this legislation? We need more meetings.”
It's not just a matter in that case of the government using this against the opposition, although that's a definite concern. It's a matter of the institution in that case having potentially imposed limitations upon itself which prevent the effective deliberation of that legislation.
What do you do in that case? Either you just push it through or you push it through on the basis of limited information. You try to make some kind of amendments or perhaps you defeat the bill and force the government to reintroduce it and program it differently. That's not very productive. That's not a good use of the House's time.
There has to be a recognition in the way we structure the House, that of course we want to have discussions about how much time is spent discussing particular matters and that there are certain issues that may be more time-sensitive than others.
The amount of time that is required for debate in the House, as well as for study, is going to vary and change throughout the process in response to the kinds of arguments that you're having. You don't necessarily know how long it's going to take you to resolve a conversation, especially about something as complex as a bill, before that process is actually complete.
This is, I think, a point that members need to think about with respect to programming. Again, it's not just about government versus opposition; it's about whether the institution has the breathing room to do the kind of work that Canadians expect us to do, which is to conduct detailed studies of legislation.
That was the underlying point I wanted to make at this juncture on the issue of programming, but to respond more specifically to Mr. Simms' points, I always think we need to be careful about comparisons between the British system and the Canadian system. We have countries, societies, and political institutions that, on their face, are very similar. However, there are very dramatic differences in political culture that inform the way those institutions behave in practice and the way people within those institutions behave in practice.
This hit home for me in a particular way when I was a master's student in the U.K. This was right after the coalition between David Cameron and Nick Clegg was created. It was interesting that here we had minority governments that did not automatically seek coalitions. It was presumed they would work with opposition parties on a case-by-case basis. The presumption on the other side of the pond, so to speak, was that immediately there would be a movement toward a coalition. You might say this is a way in which British political culture has been influenced by observing debates and political configurations in continental Europe, where there is a prevalence of PR systems and more use of coalitions, so coalitions were seen as more of the normal thing in light of the experience of proximate countries.
One of the biggest differences—and this reflects a lot of different aspects of their system—is the greater presumption of members of Parliament acting independently from their party or their leader. In our system, for a long time we have had political parties as mass membership movements that elect leaders. That leader then has to have a relationship with the parliamentary caucus. That leader may not have been the choice of the parliamentary caucus. I will resist the temptation to talk about some examples closer to home in that respect and what's happening.
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If she believed in answering questions, that's something she could implement herself unilaterally, and we wouldn't mind in that particular case. The issue is that, again, we see this discussion paper focusing on issues that are, in some cases, not even best adjudicated in the context of the Standing Orders. Certainly, however, these are questions that we would expect to be raised by somebody who is focused on the interests of the government in the context of that discussion, in the context of that interaction.
I think this is the reality coming out of our experience with two “Prime Minister's question times” that have unfolded before our eyes. Actually, the fact that this has happened clearly makes the opposition's point—namely, that the Prime Minister can do this without changes to the Standing Orders. According to our conventions, the Standing Orders don't police who does and does not answer questions in general. Clearly, the principal concern of opposition members is the quality of the responses.
If I were asking a question, a substantive policy question, and the Prime Minister was simply going to throw out the kinds of non-answers we got today, I would probably say I'd rather hear from the parliamentary secretary on that issue, assuming the parliamentary secretary knows the file and can answer the question. The Prime Minister should know these files and should be able to answer these questions.
There was a justice issue, and I believe it had to do with Wynn's law, although I could be wrong. There was a justice issue that the Prime Minister was asked about in a town hall. He basically said he didn't know the position himself, but he trusted the justice minister. Well, what's the point of having Prime Minister's question times if the Prime Minister is going to say that? He hasn't said it in the House, but he said it in a town hall. He said he didn't really know why he took that position, but he trusted his minister in the matter. It's all well and good for the Prime Minister to trust his ministers, but he should be able to give a reasonable public account of the positions that his government has taken on issues, especially if they're positions that have, presumably, gone through some kind of a cabinet discussion process. Yet this was a very important issue that was sloughed off on the basis of his trust in his minister
We have to be legitimately concerned about the quality of responses. My perception so far, not that I was overly enamoured by the quality of responses we were receiving initially, is that the quality of responses we received in these Prime Minister's question times were actually much lower. It's much more narrowed to a small set of talking points. We have the flagrant refusal to answer questions, for example, in the case of the ethics issues raised.
I'm not naive enough to think that these are problems we could solve through the Standing Orders. We cannot fully prescribe in the Standing Orders the degree of substantiveness we would like to see from ministers in responses to questions. Ultimately, it's up to the people of Canada to consider and evaluate the quality of the responses given by the government and to take that information into consideration when they decide whom to support in the next election.
If we're talking about changes to the Standing Orders, the kinds of changes, the direction of changes we're talking about, is striking. That brings me back to the point I was making before Mr. MacGregor jumped in, and that is this issue of modernization. What does “modernization” mean? If it means fewer answers, then I'm against it. If it means more power to the government and less power, or no power, for the opposition to hold them accountable, I'm against it. If modernization means the opposition doesn't have the ability to be involved in decisions about changes to the Standing Orders, then I'm against modernization.
I'm for modernization, however, if it means passing this amendment and having a constructive conversation, a conversation based on established ground rules, a conversation among members of Parliament to come to a conclusion we can all get behind, a conclusion that moves the Standing Orders in ways we all agree on. I guess I'm using some of that progressivist language with a view to moving this forward, but I'm doing so in the interest of making improvements to the Standing Orders.
That's the kind of modernization that I'm in favour of, modernization that empowers individual members of Parliament, modernization that gives us a greater ability to bring forward private members' bills and see them debated and voted on. Right now it's a relatively small number of members of Parliament, even in a four-year Parliament, who actually have a chance to bring a private member's bill to a vote. If we're talking about changes that make it possible for more members of Parliament to do that, then that is the kind of modernization that I'm in favour of. But I don't think anybody here on either side of these questions could say, just based on the word, if they are for or against modernization.
As we try to come to constructive conclusions here, we should rightly be suspicious of the kind of wording that's used if it doesn't actually mean anything. We should use words that are clearly defined that mean something in the context of our discourse. That is a pretty fundamental thing for us to ask for when we're hearing proposals from the government House leader.
One other thing that I don't think has been discussed thus far by anyone at this committee is the relationship between Standing Orders' changes in the House of Commons. and the way in which those are done, and the Senate, and the relative power and influence of the House of Commons and the Senate. It is interesting in the present time we're seeing proposals for very dramatic changes to the way the House of Commons works and to the way the Senate works, both in the name of modernization. What's striking to me, though, is how those changes actually move in opposite directions.
I don't know that anybody has dug into this or commented on this, but it was something that was obvious to me right away as a member of Parliament because I was very involved in the debates around Bill , the government's euthanasia legislation. Right from the start, that process involved both the House of Commons and the Senate; and given the government's desire to move this forward quite quickly, the work with the Senate was quite important. A joint committee of the House and the Senate did an initial study on the question of euthanasia and reported back to both Houses in a report. There was a dissenting report. Then following on that there was legislation brought forward.
The process was that legislation was brought forward in the House of Commons. It was debated. Eventually the government invoked time allocation. Then there was a vote on time allocation, a vote on the motion. It went to committee. There was a whole host of amendments proposed at committee. I proposed 13 amendments, three of which passed, the rest of which were rejected. The changes that were accepted were fairly minor and didn't save the bill, not by a long shot from my perspective.
I was able to propose four report stage amendments in the House and they were all defeated. In and of itself, that was relatively rare. The Standing Orders provide for report stage amendments only in very rare cases, but because of the exceptional importance of this issue, the sensitivity of it as well as the differences of opinion within different parties, I made a case to the Speaker. Other members made a case to the Speaker, and he ruled yes, you could have report stage amendments.
There were report stage amendments. There was a vote on those, and I was up all night sending emails to other members, trying to encourage them to vote in favour of my amendments. A few members of the government did vote in favour of my amendments, but at most there were five or six votes on the government side for any of the amendment proposals that I put forward. All of the opposition amendments on the floor of the House were defeated.
The amendments were passed. Bill was then passed at third reading, and this is the important point of contrast. Then Bill C-14 was sent to the Senate, and there were a substantial number of amendments to Bill C-14 that were passed in the Senate, one of which was very similar to an amendment that I had moved at report stage in the House that was defeated. The amendment dealt with people receiving information about palliative care options as part of the process leading up to their receiving euthanasia.
The bill went through the House of Commons. There were a number of amendments, one of which was very substantial and would have very dramatically liberalized the eligibility criteria. Although I felt the eligibility criteria were quite ambiguous in any event, and it wasn't clear that there was actually that much substantive difference from the liberalization advocated by the Senate and the original version, nonetheless the perception was, and certainly linguistically, there was a significant liberalization of that process. Then this went back to the House. There was a motion in the House to support some of the Senate amendments but not others.
What was striking right at that point was the government did not want to bring in some of those Senate amendments, in particular that dramatic, more liberalizing one, but they agreed to support some of the Senate amendments including, in particular, the one that I had moved. It wasn't the same but it was a similar one to the one I had moved and it had been voted against at report stage. The government understood that they wanted to get this legislation through the Senate and it wouldn't have been that strategic for them to just reject all the Senate amendments. They wanted to reject some, but not all.
This came back to the House. The government proposed this motion to support some of the Senate amendments, not others, and then send the bill back, in a somewhat amended form, to the Senate. That all happened on one day. I think it was a Thursday, right before the session was ending in June. That motion passed.
At the time, if I remember right, all of the government members, perhaps with the exception of a small handful, voted in favour of that government motion to support some of those Senate amendments, even though those same members had voted against one of those amendments when it came from me at report stage. Then the revised version of Bill went back to the Senate, and there was a proposal to re-amend it. That proposal was defeated, and then the bill was passed as it was, as it had been received from the House. Bill C-14 was passed and it went for royal assent, and it became law. That's what happened.
What is striking about that process is the fact that I, as an elected member of Parliament, had effectively much less leverage in that legislative process than a senator who moved that same amendment. I think it's very clear, given that the government would not accept the amendment when it came from a member in the House but did accept it, ultimately, when it came through the Senate, that government members, generally speaking, within the House vote together. There is an effort, further even from where we were at the time of the Bill debate—and it's represented in this discussion paper—to strengthen the centralization of the structure in the House of Commons to make it that much easier for the government to push through legislation without having the opportunity for extended interventions at committee. It will allow the government to do programming, and so on and so forth.
You have all these things that the government is doing, which have a centralizing effect in the context of the House of Commons. At the same time, the discussion in the context of the Senate is the opposite. The government doesn't even have a government leader in the Senate. They have a government representative who, to be fair, is for all intents and purposes likely the same thing. I'm not an expert on the Senate, but it's clear that the emphasis with the Senate is on empowering individual senators to act more independently, in a non-partisan manner, and to be able to deviate from what would be the direction of their party. You have all these different groups in the Senate. We still have a Conservative caucus in the Senate, but then you have these Senate Liberals, who are supposedly independent—depends on the day— and then you have the independent Independents group. Then you have people who are independent of the Senate, independent Senate Liberals and the independent Independent caucus.
It's confusing, obviously, but it is the kind of environment in which individual members, in a House of 100 members, can actually exert a lot of leverage. If a member can, on an individual basis, persuade their colleagues to support something, then it can pass in the Senate. Then it puts a lot of pressure on the government to adopt all or some of those changes, as we saw happen with Bill . But if an individual member of the House of Commons puts forward an idea, an amendment to legislation, very likely the way things operate is that members will vote along party lines and that proposal will be shut down.
We should be concerned about the roles of individual members of Parliament, but I think we should be particularly concerned if by these two forces of reform or modernization, which are actually opposite forces—the empowering of individuals within the Senate and the strengthening of efficiency of the centre in the House of Commons—we're actually increasing that disparity in power and influence over the legislative process between members of the Senate and members of the House of Commons.
I think the Senate is important. The Senate has an important job to do. It was striking to me as a new member of Parliament, right away being involved in that Bill debate and finding that appointed senators—people who were put there by a prime minister, who did not have to win an election and in many cases had never sought election—actually had more influence over what kind of legislation ultimately became law. That was clear in the instances of the amendments we dealt with on Bill C-14. There was a greater influence there from the Senate members than from the House of Commons.
When we look at Standing Orders changes, how we make those changes, and who's involved in making those changes, we have to be particularly sensitive to the kinds of changes that are happening in the Senate if we want to ensure that we have an environment in which the elected House of Commons is the most important House. In principle, we would all accept the idea that the House of Commons—the elected House, and not just the House as a whole over the Senate but individual members of the House—should have more of an influence than individual members of the Senate.
Of course, some members have advocated the abolition of the Senate; others might favour moving to an elected Senate. Those are larger debates that require changes to the Constitution. What we do in the Standing Orders has an impact on the relative influence of the House and the Senate, and we need to be cognizant of that in the discussion here.
The way in which Mr. Graham has described this proposal would be to render the House of Commons even more like a television studio than it already is. The idea would be that there are red dots and you look at this camera or that camera. Of course, that's not really the tradition or the convention. You would normally be looking at other members and engaging them in conversation, or looking at the person to whom you're speaking.
The introduction of cameras was about showing the public what was going on in the House. One of the things people didn't necessarily expect was how much the presence of cameras would change the way in which debates unfolded. It was this deliberative body which was open to the public. The written records were obviously published. Journalists would attend the sessions and write about them. Members of the general public would attend as well. With the introduction of cameras, it has become one in which members are sensitive to always being on camera, and there is a greater emphasis on look, presentation, and form as opposed to substance.
This is a good example of how, when you talk about modernization and change, the kinds of things you might think are just part of the modern world, they actually can have distorting effects on the way in which that institution works. To quote , “distortative effects” result from those changes.
Mr. Graham's proposal is interesting, but I worry about the impact of this additional initiative that would further change the way in which the House of Commons works in terms of the extent to which it's a television studio versus effectively a deliberative body. I don't think it's realistic or desirable to go back and remove the cameras, but I think we should be sensitive to changes that may have an effect and may not be the ones we are going for. It speaks to the need for that wider engagement of members of Parliament from all parties in the discussion. There may be things that are not even of a partisan or strategic nature, which members of the opposition, members who are more experienced, perhaps, or not, may be aware of which may not necessarily reflect the concerns of members of the government.
One of the problems with having decisions made unilaterally, especially by a new government of predominantly brand new MPs, is that you don't draw into that experience that comes from a larger number of veteran members in other parties. I think it's still the case that the longest serving current member of Parliament is a member of an unrecognized party, a member of the Bloc. It is generally going to be the case that there will be more veterans on the opposition benches than on the government benches. If you have a party that was recently in power and then has gone to the opposition, you are going to have some new members, but you're likely to have a lot of returning members. Whereas, when a party substantially grows its caucus, as has happened with this government—this government was in a third party position, and it went from being the third party to being government—a vast majority of members of Parliament on the government side, and I think the vast majority of ministers, certainly the government House leader, are new members of Parliament.
Part of the importance of engaging the opposition, and you see it in the example of cameras and what their effect would be, is actually tapping into the experience and institutional knowledge that exist in this place. If the House leader were effectively allowed to make these changes unilaterally, it would be the government but with the ability of the leadership team to add and remove members to and from the committee at will. That process, as we see with this discussion paper, would be highly directed by the House leader. Effectively, you have someone who has, to this point, been a member of Parliament for less than two years, who wants to fundamentally dictate the terms of the so-called modernization, the changes, perhaps the revolution, that they wish to see to the Standing Orders. That's quite a striking point that we would see that level, that type, and that magnitude of change undertaken without engaging the experience that exists in all parts of the House.
I don't mean to suggest that new members can't have valid points about the Standing Orders. I'm a new member myself, obviously. I've been a member for as long as the government House leader has been. New members may see things from a different perspective and be willing to put forward ideas for certain kinds of changes that maybe those who have been here for a very long time are less likely to see as necessary.
There is a balance that needs to be struck between hearing the voices of new members and hearing the voices of members who have been here for a longer period of time and who have a level of context and experience that informs the approach that they take. It's that balance that is achieved by this amendment. It is an amendment that speaks to the question of balance between government and opposition, but I would argue to a range of different kinds of balances that need to exist in the deliberative process that's unfolding. It's a balance between government and opposition, between major parties and minor parties, between recognized and unrecognized parties, between those on the front bench and those who are not part of the front bench, whether in government or in general throughout the House. This would be a balance between newer members and experienced members, members who have different kinds of experience.
Of course, some of the members here look at the Standing Orders from the experience of having been former political staff. I was a political staffer at one time, and you do see the Standing Orders in a bit of a different way when you are navigating them. In my case, I was involved in a number of different positions with different aspects of the Standing Orders. In one case it was question period preparation, and in another case it was working with parliamentary committees.
There are obviously things about the mechanisms of this House that staff experience which may be less part of the reality of members of Parliament. This is because we often rely on our staff to support us when we have specific questions to ask, or when there are specific kinds of motions that might need to be brought forward in that context.
It's about the multiplicity of voices that we can ensure are engaged if we have the widest number of voices included with different kinds of experience. We have members who have been former political staffers. We have members who look at this place with a relatively fresh set of eyes. You might have people who look at the Standing Orders from the perspective of operating procedures that they've seen in private sector work places, in terms of processes that we follow, hours, sitting processes, and balance of work, how this place squares with the way things operate in the private sector.
We have members, and Mr. Christopherson is one of them, who came to this place from other legislatures, and who have experience at the provincial level. In some cases we have people who have been involved at the municipal level. The kind of perspective they bring to a discussion of the Standing Orders is going to be different still. It's going to be informed by the experience they had as part of a different legislature. It's all these different perspectives, these variations and experience, that inform the way members think about the kinds of questions that are in front of us. It's important that we listen and engage those voices.
I don't know if we have any members of Parliament who were former senators. We have senators who were former members of Parliament. I know we've had people who have stepped back from the Senate to run to be members of Parliament, but I don't know if we've ever had someone who has gone that way. That's another set of experiences that you draw on when you have the full range of voices involved.
The kind of study we could do at this committee on the basis of the amendment would be one in which we are assured that not only are all of these different voices heard formally, that we have lots of people who are able to speak, but then the discussion that members of Parliament have after that is one that incorporates those voices in a substantive way. If you have members from different parties who are part of that discussion and are represented in it, you necessarily will achieve a better outcome given the diversity that would come to the fore.
One issue the discussion paper addresses and one which I mentioned before but in a different context, because this was before the government's introduction of the budget implementation bill, is the issue of omnibus bills. I have a hard time understanding what the government's position is on omnibus bills. The in question period yesterday was trying to carve out this distinction between good omnibus bills and bad omnibus bills. A good omnibus bill, it seems, in the eyes of the Prime Minister, is one proposed by a Liberal government; a bad one is one proposed by a Conservative government. We would understand that he would have that perspective, of course. We all tend to prefer legislation proposed by our own side, but the question of the degree of “omnibus-ness”—I don't know if that is a word—is not dependent on the party that brings it forward. To me, some of the discussion in the discussion paper suggests that there is a binary.... It's either an omnibus bill or it's not an omnibus bill.
The reality is we see many different kinds of bills that come before the House that deal with different kinds of provisions that do not necessarily have to be included in the same bill but have some common thread to them. Those are bills that maybe move a step in the direction of being an omnibus bill but don't go all the way.
One bill we dealt with was on the response to the opioid crisis in Canada. This wasn't an issue on which we agreed with the NDP, but in the Conservative caucus we felt that this bill combined certain kinds of provisions that shouldn't have been combined. There were many provisions in that bill that we were very supportive of, that dealt with things like more effective enforcement, addressing pill presses. These kinds of things we thought were not only good measures but needed to be expedited. However, the legislation also included provisions that dealt with the community consultation process around putting in place what we call supervised injection sites, and what the government increasingly likes to call safe consumption sites, which is a little misleading as far as the terminology goes.
In any event, the legislation, in addition to those positive things we all agreed on, dealt with the government's proposal to remove most of the requirements around engaging with communities before constructing a supervised injection site. We looked at the bill and said there were some things in it that were not only worth supporting but were important and required the fastest possible movement through the House, but there was another part of the bill that we were totally opposed to.
The government House leader in her discussion paper talks about an omnibus bill being one where members might want to vote for a part of it but not for another part of it. That's the reality of almost all legislation that comes before the House. Someone somewhere is going to agree with part of it but not another part of it. Unless you only have legislation that has one provision in it, that makes one specific change in one clause, which would be pretty unrealistic in terms of the efficiency of the House, any time you have legislation that makes multiple policy changes, you're going to have members who will like some parts of it and not other parts of it.
Yesterday I talked about the debate around Bill , the government's euthanasia legislation. Aside from the fact that there were a whole host of different provisions in this legislation, there were two very distinct issues that needed to be adjudicated. Unfortunately, they were often mixed up in the public conversation. There was a question of the eligibility criteria, who was eligible to seek euthanasia, and there was a question on the safeguards, the administrative requirements that had to be met before someone could seek euthanasia. The point is these were two different questions. Someone could conceivably believe in more open eligibility criteria and fewer safeguards, but someone could also believe, let's say, in a more open, more liberal eligibility criteria while also having more safeguards in place. You have these different kinds of philosophical questions and different kinds of provisions that are wrapped up in the same piece of legislation.
Of course, in a formal sense, no one would say that Bill was an omnibus bill. It was a bill that set the terms for the legalization of euthanasia and assisted suicide. In that sense, we could accept, relatively speaking, that it was on one thing, but it was a step in the omnibus direction, at least according to the way in which omnibus bills are defined by the government's discussion paper. The government's discussion paper suggests that an omnibus bill is one in which some members might like some provisions and not others.
What happened with the legislation around the opioid crisis—I can't remember the number of the bill offhand—was that a point of order was raised seeking unanimous consent to split the bill. This was proposed by the Conservative caucus, I think by , our health critic. It would have created two separate bills. One of those bills would have dealt with the provisions we all agreed on, and that bill would have moved along immediately. It may well have moved along to the end of third reading right at that point. Certainly, it would have gone all the way to committee. It would have separated off the controversial provisions.
The benefit of that approach, actually, is that it would not have slowed anything down, but would have sped up the process. It would have allowed for the immediate passage of the provisions on which we all agreed. Those provisions could have started doing their work and having a positive impact, whereas the controversial provisions could have continued to be debated.
This is particularly sensible when you consider the way in which the House and the Senate interact. If you have two separate bills that both go to the Senate, and the Senate amends one of them and not the other, then only the bill that was amended has to come back to the House, while the other, if it passes in the Senate in the same form it did in the House, goes on from there to receive royal assent. If all of those provisions are wrapped up in the same bill, then all of those provisions have to come back to the House again.
In cases where the opposition is prepared to expedite certain provisions...and as we saw with this particular bill there was a substantial public interest in the government supporting the splitting of that bill, yet they didn't. Unanimous consent was denied for that proposal.
This is telling of the government's actual views on bills that, although they may not be omnibus bills in the full sense, have a component of “omnibus-ness” to them. The government, in a reasonable case like that, was not willing to allow the splitting of a bill in a way that would have very much reflected the public interest with the timeline the public wanted to see. That did not happen because of a refusal of the request for unanimous consent. That refusal, of course, came from the government side. This is telling about the approach being taken for omnibus bills already.
I think we now have examples from this government of actual full-blown omnibus legislation. You would be very hard-pressed to identify a single, credible, philosophical distinction in terms of the degree of “omnibus-ness”, let's say, between the kinds of omnibus bills that the previous government brought in and the kinds of omnibus bills that this government is bringing in.
We have a budget implementation bill—I have my notes here on it—that changes over 20 statutes and runs to over 300 pages. The defence of that is identical to what was said, I think quite correctly, about the budget implementation bills that were brought forward by the previous government. When you have a whole bunch of measures that are related to the budget, the implementation of the government's fiscal plan, then there is a common thread. These are not entirely unrelated elements. They deal with the economic plan of the government.
That's fair enough, but of course almost anything in terms of government policy has some relationship to the economy. It likely relates to questions of social values as well, but almost anything has some relationship to the economy. Immigration has an impact on the economy. Social policy, drug policy, criminal justice, all of these things have some impact on the economy, or at the very least they involve questions of government expenditure.
That is true of every policy area. The government said in the election that they were opposed to omnibus bills, and now they are redefining their opposition to say that the omnibus bills they are opposed to are only those that have provisions that have absolutely no plausible relationship to each other. That is a pretty substantial stretch in terms of what we were actually talking about with omnibus bills.
We should, in good faith, look for ways to divide bills when we can, especially if there is a willingness of the opposition to expedite certain aspects of the bill that they agree with, but it's never going to be—and I think the government realizes this by now, if they didn't already—an exact science in terms of what does or does not constitute an omnibus bill. This is what raises some questions in terms of the proposal in the discussion paper for the Speaker to split the bill, because if you ask the Speaker to do something, the Speaker being a non-partisan person within the House in the context of that function, you have to give them some criteria. On what basis would they decide to split a bill or not to split a bill? If we can't even arrive, through discussion here, at clarity about what is a bad kind or an acceptable kind of omnibus bill, then we are effectively putting the Speaker in an almost impossible position.
What is clear with respect to omnibus legislation is that the government is breaking a promise here. The government said that they would get rid of omnibus legislation, but they are moving forward with something that is clearly quite similar, not in substance, of course, but in form, to what we saw from successive governments over our recent history.
It's an important question how we should handle the issue of budgets and budget implementation bills, because they are always going to deal with a variety of measures. They're going to have to. If we want the government to bring forward a budget every year, and it should, then there will be lots of different policy areas covered in that budget. You couldn't have a budget that talked only about some things and not others. It would have to cover all the things that are within the ambit of the activities of the federal government.
When it comes to omnibus legislation and questions of reform, we can look at other kinds of potential reforms that would provide the kind of scrutiny of those documents that the public and many members want to see, without being unrealistic about what a budget has to be. It's interesting that the only substantive kind of legislation on which a number of days is prescribed for debate in the Standing Orders is the budget itself. It's either four or five days for the budget to be debated, and after that it's the end of the budget debate. That is automatically put in place.
If you think about the breadth of measures that are covered in a budget, and the number of statutes the government is going to change over the course of a year, it's likely, it seems, with the projector that we have in place here.... Sorry, I lost my train of thought.
With the number of days we have, and with the record of this government with respect to the Standing Orders and how they've unfolded, we are likely to see more changes to statutes made through the omnibus budget implementation bill than changes to statutes in all the rest of the bills that the government brings forward. It's interesting to think just how important that process is, and yet we limit it to a relatively small number of days—I can't remember exactly whether it's four or five days—and we are discussing changes to statutes that outweigh all the changes to statutes that may well happen for the rest of the year.
Maybe one change to the Standing Orders we need to look at is allocating more days to the discussion of the budget. Maybe that would address some of the concerns that members have around ensuring that there is proper scrutiny relative to the relatively long budget documents that we're seeing. That would be one possible change.
Another change we might want to consider, and one which I think would be worthwhile for all members from all parties to deliberate and pronounce on, would be a process by which all committees, or at least a larger number of committees, studied the budget. Right now, the process is that the finance committee does pre-budget consultations. The finance committee looks at the budget implementation bill. We don't have a provision for the same bill being referred to multiple committees. What if we had all of the committees of the House, or at least most of the committees, do some degree of study—
I think that's a good clarification in terms of what the rules say and what the changes are that are proposed in the context of the proposals that are coming from the government House leader. The government House leader is looking for potential changes in terms of the degree to which the Speaker would be engaged. As you pointed out, Mr. Chair, it would be a pretty substantial change to the way we conceive of the role of the Speaker.
Up until now in our tradition, the Speaker has not been someone to police aspects of content. That includes answers to questions and questions of accuracy. It's not a point of order if someone said something that isn't true; that's seen as a point of debate. The same is true with regard to omnibus bills. It is not the way we generally conceive of the role of the Speaker: to be evaluating and saying, “Substantively I think this is part of one theme and this is part of another theme.” That would involve the Speaker taking a few additional steps down a road which, thus far, the Speaker has not gone down at all: into adjudicating the kind of content that is in front of him or her. That said, I'd like to touch on a number of other different themes.
Part of the question that we need to consider in the context of this amendment is the way the time of this committee is managed and the kinds of other questions that have to come before this committee. This is an extremely important committee, obviously. It's the committee that studies all those kinds of procedural and mechanical aspects of what's happening in the House. The challenge for this committee can be, of course, that sometimes there are a lot of those different issues that are coming forward at the same time. It creates a circumstance in which there is a need for some conversation on multiple different issues. The committee has to grapple with what terms of study, what schedule of study, etc., allow for the committee to grapple with those different issues in the most effective way. These are the kinds of considerations that we have to think about in the context of this study and this amendment.
I don't need to tell anybody this, but we're having a fairly lengthy discussion of committee business in the lead-up to a prospective study. It's important that we have this lengthy discussion because, in the context of that, we in the opposition, all opposition parties, including unrecognized parties, feel that we are fighting for the basic integrity of our democratic system. We are fighting for the fact that changes to the basic rules of how Parliament works should not be made unilaterally. That's what we're fighting for, and it's important that we do. We are going to continue to do so until there is a change in disposition from the government on these issues.
In the meantime, there is a range of other questions of pressing importance that need to be studied by this committee. There is a debate, I presume, going on as we speak—okay, not quite; it's about to start in the House again—with respect to a question of privilege. It's a major question of privilege. As members have pointed out, it has happened a number of times that members of Parliament have been prevented from coming in to vote. It's so important that we get that right, because members are supposed to have unfettered access to the parliamentary precinct. Members didn't have, in certain cases, unfettered access to the parliamentary precinct and were denied their right to vote as a result of it. That was an important question of privilege that was brought forward, and it's being debated in the House right now.
Actually, right now in the House, we're debating a secondary question of privilege and an amendment to that, which deals with both the original privilege issue and also the legitimacy of the government having adjourned the debate on a question of privilege without a vote.
These are critical issues because they deal with the basic rights of members of Parliament to be present, to vote, and to represent their constituents. These are rights that they need to have, and because of an error that took place in whatever form, they have not always had them. That's a potential problem, and this committee needs to study that question.
The motion put forward in the House with respect to that study was to ask that this be made a priority in terms of the committee study. Why is that important?
As members of Parliament, we do lots of different things. We give speeches. We participate in studies. We consult with our constituents. We write letters. But the core of the job of a member of Parliament, the most important thing we can do, which people who are not members of Parliament cannot do, is vote in the House of Commons. That is the core of the job.
When you have an question of privilege where members are prevented from voting in the House of Commons, that is the kind of issue that should be a fundamental point of priority in terms of the discussion that happens at this committee, because it's up to this committee, PROC, to evaluate those questions and to adjudicate upon them.
Yet this whole resistance by the government to move forward on the amendment has created the conditions under which we have less effective work in the House because of a lack of co-operation from the government side with the opposition, and therefore a lack of co-operation all around. That's part of the issue. There is also the issue of the vital work this committee needs to be getting on with, especially those privilege issues.
We have a motion from a member of this committee to do a study of the question of privilege here at this committee. It's fair for members to bring forward motions at this committee, but the process that needs to be followed is for that question of privilege to be voted on in the House. It is of course up to members to vote for or against amendments in a way that one hopes reflects their individual conscience but which is, in any event, how they see fit to vote.
If it is approved in the House, as amended or not, the motion will either be sent here to PROC or not. If and when it comes here, it will then be discussed, considered, and so forth.
In the absence of the amendment, it may be that, regardless of what happens in the House, we continue to delay in terms of our ability to have a discussion on that vital privilege issue. We're really missing the necessary opportunity to do the job that this committee is supposed to be doing in that respect, if we don't come to a consensus that allows us to move forward. The way of having that consensus in place, I think, is to have the passage of the amendment which says that all parties will be engaged. It achieves the objective that some members of the government have said they actually wanted all along. They want to have unanimity on a report, but for whatever reason, they are just not interested in passing the amendment. Well, if you want to have collaboration, if you want to have all voices represented in the process of that discussion, then just pass the amendment. In part it's the right way of dealing with the Standing Orders, but it also allows the committee to undertake and respond to these vital questions of privilege.
The other thing that needs to be acknowledged about changes to the Standing Orders is—and someone here is advocating a public referendum on the Standing Orders—that there is not the same breakneck timeline with respect to these changes. We could well agree to a framework by which a study would take place, one that includes unanimity, and also agree that the study could take place in the fall. In the meantime, we could take this opportunity to move forward on these questions of privilege which the House is obviously very much seized with.
I haven't heard anybody say that these questions of privilege aren't important. Members of the government have criticized the opposition, sort of strangely, for making this political, as if they've forgotten where we are, but there's been no denial of the fact that, yes, these are critically important questions that are dealt with in the context of a discussion of privilege. Since there's that recognition, I think we should move forward on this particular motion by supporting the amendment in a way that reflects that recognition, but then we should also move forward with those other studies that are critically needed.
The other issue this committee could be studying is the prospective issues around the Canada Elections Act. There are others who know the details on this better than I do. My understanding is that this committee was asked and agreed to undertake a study this spring on the Elections Act to contribute in a substantive way to what's happening to the Elections Act.
The failure to do that involves multiple problems of unilateral action. There's the question of the unilateral action of the government with respect to the Standing Orders. Then, in the absence of a committee study, which is now prevented by the insistence on a unilateral approach on the Standing Orders, there's a concern of what happens in terms of the process with respect to the Elections Act. It is important for members of Parliament to be engaged in that discussion. There just doesn't seem to be an interest or willingness to establish an agreement that would allow us to move forward.
We hear a lot of talk about conversations from the government House leader. It's often hard to understand in that context what's meant by “have a conversation”. The point of having a conversation should be to come to some form of consensus that allows for action. Generally speaking, a conversation is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself. A conversation is a way in which particular goods ought to be realized, which are, generally speaking, goods external to, as opposed to internal to, the process of conversing. In this case, the goods to be achieved through the conversation would be changes to the Standing Orders that reflect the wisdom of the entire House, not just of one or a few people or of one party, but also to allow this committee to operate in a constructive way that then moves on to some of these critical issues that have not been considered yet and very much need to be considered as we go forward with respect to what's happening on the Standing Orders.
Having talked about other aspects of committee business, I want to return to the government House leader's discussion paper. I had an intervention on this a week and a half ago or so, and unfortunately, because of the limitations of time, I didn't have a chance to speak to all aspects of the discussion paper. I want to do that now. Then I want to talk about the Green Party's response, the Green Party's discussion paper on changes to the Standing Orders. I don't agree with all of it. I don't know if I even agree with most of it. I agree with some of it, but I think it's quite provocative.
I think it was Mr. Chan who praised Ms. May for bringing forward that discussion paper. I don't know, though, if the government would be praising it if they'd read it in detail, because it's very critical of the approach taken in the government discussion paper. In many ways it's much farther away from the government, even, than we are as an official opposition party. I don't know if Ms. May has had a chance yet at this committee to actually talk through that paper, but I think it's something that is going to contribute to the discussion around this.
If you look at the government's discussion paper and the Green Party's discussion paper, just as two examples of prospective proposals for changes to the Standing Orders, you see how “modernization” can mean dramatically different things. It can mean the kind of enhancement of the power of the executive to expedite legislation, that kind of so-called reform. It can also mean, on the other side of the spectrum, a change that reduces the power of the centre and strengthens the ability of members of Parliament to be involved in the process.
I should say that it's not as if these approaches are mutually exclusive. There would be proposals that could both strengthen members of Parliament and strengthen the efficiency of the legislative process. In the context of a study that would include the framework established by the amendment where there is a requirement that there be unanimity and involvement of all parties, we could look for those solutions that would actually achieve all of those objectives, that would increase efficiency without derogating from the important role of members of Parliament. It is, perhaps, hard to know exactly what those would be.
You would need to hear from experts about what the implications of different changes are. The government discussion paper may well point to some things that ultimately do achieve that objective of strengthening the role for members of Parliament and addressing the efficiency of the legislative process. However, in the absence of an agreement up front for how that would work, we can't be confident that the government would draw the right conclusions from the witnesses we hear.
If we go into a study without the amendment and the government hears witnesses who say that if we do x, y, and z, the government is going to increase its power, government members may think that's great and want to do x, y, and z, rather than drawing the right conclusion from that testimony. The right conclusion would be to hear all those concerns and say that we have to be cautious about doing something that increases the power of the government unless there is some compensatory change on the other side.
It might be that through unanimity you actually have some horse-trading with respect to the Standing Orders. You might have agreement to support some provisions that do concretely enhance the power of the government, while other measures concretely enhance the power of the opposition. Members might agree that those proposals kind of balance each other out and in the end are, in totality, beneficial for the entire institution.
That's the kind of discussion, the kind of framework, that is rendered possible in the event that we have a clear requirement up front to engage all voices on all parts of that conversation. That's something we'll be missing if we don't have the amendment. That's a bit of context for the next steps that I want to take in the context of this discussion.
For those following along at home, where I left off before was under theme three of the discussion paper where it speaks about the management of committees. It's interesting in terms of how it talks about the kinds of changes that could happen with respect to the structure of committees, and the relative balance between committees and the government and other actors within this institution. There are some important and interesting proposals for changes here, although I have some pretty substantive concerns about, especially in the discussion of committees, what I see as some sleight of hand, some arguments being made that suddenly go off in a different direction from the one expected.
Before I get into the management of committees, I should review the section on omnibus bills, so-called, because it's right before it. It's relatively short, and it speaks to what I was talking about before, especially in the context now of what is a very substantial omnibus bill that the government has put forward.
It says, “The Government committed to end the improper use of omnibus legislation.” I don't actually think that was what was in the Liberal platform. I think they said that they would get rid of omnibus legislation. Maybe there are members who can correct me on that, but we see these subtle shifts in language that are sort of the road to a broken promise. First, they're going to get rid of omnibus legislation. Then they're not getting rid of omnibus legislation; they're just getting rid of the “improper use of omnibus legislation”. It seems that, in their minds, when they say “improper use of omnibus legislation”, what they mean is the Conservative use of omnibus legislation. I would say that omnibus legislation should be used conservatively, in both senses of the word.
In any event, the section continues, “Omnibus bills can be defined as a bill that contains separate and unrelated themes packaged into one bill.” In reading that definition, “separate and unrelated themes packaged into one bill”, an omnibus bill could be any bill, because any bill contains distinct themes. Then, of course, if you consider the meaning of “unrelated”, there is no such thing as an omnibus bill if a bill contains unrelated themes, because all bills, all themes that we deal with in this place, can be seen as having some relationship to each other. Is there a relationship between immigration and health? Yes, of course there is. Is there a relationship between criminal justice and finance? Yes, of course there is. Even disparate policy areas have relationships between the two of them. This is a definition without a definition.
It essentially goes on, “Members are then forced to vote for or against a bill that could have elements that Members would support or oppose.” That happens all the time. Basically, the process that is normally followed is you would look at the principle of a bill at second reading, and you would maybe vote for a bill at second reading, even if you have substantial objections to certain parts of it, because you think that those sections could be removed at committee.
Mr. had a private member's bill that introduced higher mandatory minimums for drunk drivers and also introduced mandatory screening so that basically police could ask anybody for a Breathalyzer test as there's no requirement to establish probable cause. Those are two very different kinds of provisions contained within not just the same bill but actually contained within one private member's bill. I was very supportive of that bill and I encouraged members to vote for it. Even if you are against mandatory minimums but like mandatory screening, you should vote for the bill so that you can support mandatory screening. Even if you're for mandatory minimums but against mandatory screening, you should support the bill as a way of showing support for mandatory minimums. That makes sense at second reading, because then you're advancing that bill on to a committee study, and then it's up to the committee to wordsmith and decide which parts of the bill should move forward or not. Maybe that's a bill that could have been split, but of course given the limits with private members' business, it makes sense for individual members, who already have a very limited opportunity to bring forward legislation, to try to deal with different elements of legislation in a similar format.
My own private member's bill, Bill , which I just had a chance to table this week in its entirety, is a bill that was put forward for first reading by Irwin Cotler, a Liberal MP in the last Parliament. It was seconded in this Parliament by Mr. , the member for Etobicoke Centre. It's good non-partisan legislation.
I wouldn't call that bill an omnibus bill, but it does include different elements within it, but all to deal with organ harvesting without consent. It deals with Canadians who might go abroad to try to get an organ and how they establish consent for that organ when they come back, but it also deals with the inadmissibility of people to Canada who are involved in this kind of organ-harvesting activity. It deals with immigration in terms of admissibility to Canada. It deals with health because it deals with the kinds of reporting structures that would be in place with respect to someone who is getting an organ. It deals with a question of criminal justice. It is fundamentally a justice bill because it deals with the criminal penalties that would be put in place for those who are involved in this terrible human rights violation involved in organ harvesting.
That's my bill, Bill , and we already have, related to a similar theme, key elements of criminal justice, health, and immigration issues. It might well be that members say that they, for whatever reason, don't like the inadmissibility provisions of it, but they are supportive of the requirement that Canadians get consent when they get an organ. I think members should support my bill in its entirety because it's really a great bill, but it might be that members like some parts of it and not others. That doesn't make it an omnibus bill just because it deals with a number of different aspects of the same issue. Even the way in which omnibus bills are explained and described in this discussion paper is totally at odds with how they're usually described in the public debate.
By this definition, you could say that almost every bill is an omnibus bill. I mean, there are some bills like Wynn's law that really only changed one word in the Criminal Code. That bill is uncomplicated enough that you can very clearly say, “ Yes, that's one word”, and you're either for it or against it. There's not the complexity of, say, being for parts of it but against other parts of it. That bill was about whether certain evidence would be brought forward about someone's past convictions in the context of a bail hearing. The law now says that evidence may be brought forward. The new provision would say that evidence shall be brought forward. That's the kind of bill that, yes, on the surface, if you were to come up with a scale of “omnibus-ness”, a relative degree of “omnibus-ness” in a particular bill, it would be at the low end of the scale. Almost any other bill, including private members' bills, will touch on different elements.
Some members choose to vote against bills, even if they're fairly small or simple, on the basis of the whereas clauses. My approach is to vote on the basis of the substantive provisions, not the whereas clauses, but we've had members say, “I cannot support that bill, not because of what's in the bill itself, but because of the affirmations that are contained in the whereas clauses”, the perception being that, when you vote in favour of a bill that has certain whereas clauses, you're endorsing the ideas behind the whereas clauses. There are some members who take that approach. I don't, but even for very small, very simple legislation, if you are going to vote for or against it on the basis of the whereas clauses, then definitely you find yourself in a situation where members are forced to vote for or against a bill that could have elements the member would support or oppose.
The discussion paper goes on with respect to omnibus bills, “The only recourse for Members has been to seek to divide omnibus bills in committee, but these motions rarely come to a vote or are agreed to by way of unanimous consent.” That's true. It is quite rare that there is division of bills. There are potential issues with division of bills, obviously, in terms of efficiency and also in terms of private members' business. There are some bills that, even if they deal with different kinds of provisions, don't need to be divided. I don't think my bill needs to be divided into five or six bills just because it addresses a number of different aspects of the question of organ harvesting. I think it makes sense together thematically. It's still relatively short. It's a couple of pages, not 300 pages like the budget implementation bill, but it does deal with different areas of policy and the interaction and relationship among those areas of policy.
The proposal here is that, “Since the Clerk of the House has the power in Standing Order 39(2) to divide written questions, a similar approach could be used by the Speaker to divide omnibus bills.” I don't think this point has been made before, but it's quite a stretch to say that because you can divide written questions you can divide bills. Bills are not written questions. There are very substantial differences. Of course, yes, members have a limit on the number of questions they can have on the Order Paper, so having a division of written questions has some substantive effect. The substantive policy implications, the importance and potential controversy around a decision of a Speaker to divide a bill, far outweighs the kind of concern that might be associated with dividing an Order Paper question. The size and scale of that are very, very different. It's striking that there isn't an acknowledgement of that—