:
Good afternoon, everyone. This is meeting number seven of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, Wednesday, April 28, 2010.
We will have bells at 5:15 and then a vote in the House at 5:30, so I'm asking the committee if we can go to committee business today somewhere between 4:45 and 5 o'clock. We do have a substantial amount of business that we must discuss.
Today we have panelled our two witnesses together, and we do appreciate their attendance here as well.
We're continuing our study on the transfer of Afghan detainees, and as our witnesses we have, from the Department of National Defence, Mr. Gavin Buchan, who is the former political director for the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team; and appearing as an individual, Major-General Timothy Grant, retired, former commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan.
My understanding is that both of you will have an opening presentation and then would entertain a round, or a couple of rounds perhaps, of questions.
We welcome you both. Thanks for being here. We look forward to your comments.
Mr. Buchan.
Mr. Chairman, honourable members, I will begin by explaining briefly who I am and the nature of my involvement with the Afghanistan file.
I've been in government for some 18 years, 15 with the Department of Foreign Affairs and three with National Defence. I have worked on Afghanistan detainee issues in three separate capacities. The first time was in early 2005 as deputy director of the defence and security relations division of DFAIT. Between April 2006 and July 2007, I was political director of Canada's provincial reconstruction team in Kandahar, with the exception of the months of May and June of 2006, which were covered by Richard Colvin. After my return from Afghanistan, I was transferred to the Department of National Defence, where I was director of the unit responsible for Afghanistan policy from October 2007 to February 2009.
I would like to address these three assignments in chronological order.
In 2005 I participated in interdepartmental meetings that considered options for how to handle future detainees in Afghanistan. The decision to base our regime on transfer to Afghan authorities was made in large part because most detainees would be Afghan citizens on Afghan soil. Transferring detainees to the host government was a question of respect for Afghan sovereignty.
I would like to underscore that in 2005 departments were aware that the Afghan detention system had serious failings. There was a risk that prisoners might be mistreated, so steps were taken to mitigate that risk. Canada sought and received assurances from the Government of Afghanistan that it would respect international standards of treatment and provide access to both the International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC, and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, AIHRC. However, looking back now with the benefit of practical experience in Kandahar, it is clear this was not sufficient.
[Translation]
With the arrangement put in place, we obtained little information on the detainees transferred between February 2006 and April 2007. It has been alleged that during this period, Canadian authorities knew that the detainees we transferred to Afghan prisons were being tortured. This is borne out neither by my memory of my time in Kandahar, nor by the written records that I have reviewed in preparation for this presentation.
[English]
Prior to April 2007, my engagement on detainee issues focused on capacity-building. I had no mandate to engage in monitoring. Nonetheless, in the course of my duties in Kandahar, I met with the ICRC and the AIHRC. I met with Afghan judges, prosecutors, prison officials, and police. I met with political figures, with village elders, and with farmers. I met with the UN, with NGOs, and with NATO allies. I even met with the Kandahar Council of Religious Scholars. None of these contacts produced information to the effect that Canadian-transferred detainees were being abused or that our detainee arrangement was not being respected by Afghan authorities. Had I obtained such information, I would have reported this to Ottawa and recommended a course of action.
The committee is, I gather, aware that messages were sent from the embassy in Kabul on detainee issues between February 2006 and March 2007. Having gone back and reviewed the documentation from this period--and I specify “this period”--I find that the documents add nothing of significance to what we already knew in 2005. They simply confirm that abuse of detainees was a risk in Afghanistan. None of them contain specific information about treatment of detainees transferred by Canada, none of them contain specific information about facilities to which Canada was transferring detainees, and, most importantly, in none of these messages did the embassy recommend substantive changes to detainee policy.
It is possible that there is additional material of which I am not aware. It is possible that there were events that to me, stationed at the PRT, were not visible.
[Translation]
However, to the best of my knowledge, the first information alleging abuse of Canadian-transferred detainees came to light in the context of press reports published in April 2007. These reports contained multiple allegations of torture at the facility of the National Directorate of Security or NDS
[English]
or in English, the NDS,
[Translation]
in Kandahar City.
[English]
The allegations were taken very seriously both at headquarters and in the field, and there was a vigorous exchange of views on what needed to be done. There was also a rapid response. Within 48 hours I had been sent with a colleague from the Correctional Service of Canada to conduct a preliminary inspection of the NDS facility.
That visit generated two allegations of abuse, conveyed to me personally. Démarches were then made at the highest levels. The ICRC and the AIHRC were notified, and within 10 days a new arrangement had been agreed to with the government of Afghanistan. This supplementary arrangement empowered Canadian monitors to visit without prior notice and to hold private interviews with detainees. It also included Afghan commitments to investigate and prosecute allegations, and several other significant improvements.
The May 3, 2007, supplementary arrangement, while a much more robust regime, is not a panacea. Full implementation of the arrangement is not an easy task. Every monitoring visit goes through the streets of Kandahar to a predictable location that is closely watched by insurgents and occasionally attacked. Every trip risks the lives of not only the monitoring team but of all the personnel in the security detail, and it uses scarce PRT resources that are then not available for patrols to advance Canadian development projects or engage villagers out in the districts. For every call to do more monitoring, there are trade-offs to be made, but overall the supplementary arrangement is among the strongest models in NATO for dealing with detainees.
[Translation]
There have, however, been some challenges in ensuring full implementation. This became clear in November 2007, after my return to Ottawa. At that time, as the Committee is aware, there was a compelling allegation of torture that caused a suspension of transfers. It took some months, a significant escalation in monitoring and extensive engagement with the NDS, to restore confidence that detainees we transferred would not be at significant risk of abuse.
[English]
In the Afghan context, it will never be possible to completely eliminate all risk of torture. But when used to the full, the supplementary arrangement does offer a robust deterrent and a means to detect violations should any occur. As such, it has been instrumental in changing the workings of the NDS in Kandahar, a step that has benefited not just Canadian-transferred detainees, but all detainees held by the NDS.
I would like to close on a personal note. Since the committee hearings last November, I have struggled with a fair amount of self-doubt. It has been alleged that in the period leading up to March 2007, Canadian authorities knew that we were transferring detainees to torture. I was the DFAIT representative on the ground. I was the person meeting with the local representatives of the AIHRC and the ICRC, but it was only in April 2007 that it became clear to me that our detainee arrangement was not working. I was left wondering if I had overlooked information I should have seen. If everybody supposedly knew, then what had I missed? My review of documentation in preparation for this meeting has gone some way to reassure me. I saw nothing in the record through March 2007 that indicated Canadian-transferred detainees were being abused, nothing that changed the baseline understanding from 2005, when the original arrangement was put in place; and the record very clearly shows that when serious allegations were brought forward, in April 2007, firm and rapid action was taken.
In my experience working on this file, there have been hard lessons, and these deserve to be examined to ensure that they are learned for the future. But overall, what I have seen has been the work of a team of dedicated individuals—civilian and military—doing their best to ensure detainees are treated humanely and in accordance with Canada's international obligations. They have done this in harsh, difficult, and often dangerous conditions; and in the best Canadian tradition, when they have seen problems, they have done their best to address them. It has been my privilege to work alongside them.
Thank you.
:
Mr. Chair, members of the committee, good afternoon.
My name is Tim Grant, and from November 1, 2006, until August 1, 2007, I was the commander of the Canadian military contribution to the Afghanistan mission. This included national responsibilities as well as those of being the NATO commander responsible for ground combat operations in Kandahar province.
You've heard from others that casualties, be they military or civilian, as well as the handling of detainees were considered possible points of strategic failure for the Canadian mission. This focused my attention on these two subjects on arrival and throughout my tour.
One of the first documents I read on arrival in Kandahar was the task force standing order on the handling of detainees. This was essentially the bible for how to deal with detainees from the point of capture to the point of transfer or release. I made sure all my subordinates had read the TFSO and understood its contents.
As the mission progressed and we learned more about the environment we were operating in, we adjusted that TFSO based on lessons learned. I was very comfortable that the right people were doing the right things at the right time and in the right places.
In November 2006—to set the scene—the battle group had been through Operation Medusa, and while successful, they had taken serious casualties. The companies were essentially deployed in the Panjwai area, between Zhari and Panjwai district centres. To say that the conditions in which the soldiers lived were austere is an understatement. Many of these young men and women had gone over a month with no showers, no running water for toilets, no laundry, and a constant diet of hard rations. To make matters worse, these outposts were subject to regular attack by insurgents.
It was our challenge to prevent those insurgents, who did not wear uniforms, from re-infiltrating the area where local farmers were trying to tend to their fields. These farmers were the very people we were trying to protect. This task actually became more difficult as we repopulated the area in early 2007. Tactical questioning by soldiers on the ground was a vital tool in allowing this determination to be made, thereby protecting the population from insurgents' influence and threat.
Some have questioned why we even took detainees. Let me provide some context, which I believe has been lacking to date.
I'll provide three short scenarios: first, soldiers in contact with the enemy, both sides exchanging gunfire and fighting for their lives, which leads to insurgents being captured; second, an IED attack on a convoy where Canadians are killed or wounded, and a local Afghan who has been wounded by the blast, in the course of receiving first aid, is found to be in possession of a weapon; and finally, a surgical strike is made on a bomb-making factory where individuals are found to be in possession of explosives. Each of these are real cases, and in each case Canadian soldiers would look at the conditions and indicators before deciding to take control of detainees.
Once identified as a threat and detained, detainees were processed administratively and attended to medically, and then moved to the detainee handling facility at Kandahar airfield. Here the detainees underwent further medical and administrative screening to verify the information provided from the field.
Finally, two decisions were made: first, were there grounds for transfer; and second, was it appropriate to transfer? The decision was exercised, on average, on a weekly basis.
I hope you can see how critical it was to be able to support those soldiers in the field with a system that would quickly and safely remove insurgents and suspect individuals from the battlefield. In my mind, this was primarily about protecting our men and women, the detainees themselves, and of course the Afghan people.
As you know, the decision to transfer a detainee rests with the commander. That was me, and I know how important a decision it was to determine if there were substantial grounds for believing that there existed a real risk the detainee would be in danger of being subjected to torture or other forms of mistreatment at the hands of Afghan authorities. I knew it was my responsibility to ensure that I was knowledgeable regarding the conditions into which detainees would be transferred. I watched communications traffic, read e-mails, and spoke to those I believed could help inform my decision-making process.
This was not a one-time affair. I paid attention to this issue constantly. Without question, information from the ambassador and the embassy was important, but I also spoke to our allies, the Red Cross, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, and the United Nations. I made use of every possible source of information to inform my decisions, including dedicated legal advice.
At no time before April 2007 did anyone express to me that they had concerns involving transfers, and that includes Mr. Colvin, who had ample opportunity to do so. I met with the local representative of the Red Cross within three weeks of taking command and regularly thereafter. No reports of concern from the Red Cross came to my attention, but I believe they would have, given my positive relationships, my open, frank, and frequent dialogue with them.
When allegations were raised in April, prompt actions were taken to investigate their veracity and determine what actions, if any, were needed to address them. In the end, the decision to transfer was never taken lightly and never in a vacuum.
While I was acutely aware of the strategic points of failure and the actions of Canadian soldiers on a daily basis, I also knew my responsibilities as a commander went beyond those in uniform. I forged strong relationships with other members of the whole-of-government team. These included the RCMP training the police, Corrections Canada officers working in the prisons, and the Canadian International Development Agency staff helping in some of the most destitute areas of the province. In addition, I reached out to international agencies, including the United Nations assistance mission and the United States Agency for International Development, to name but a couple. The issues and challenges were clear to everyone, and we were joined at the hip. We helped each other and received regular guidance and advice from our leaders in Ottawa.
I also established a good working relationship with Ambassadors Sproule and Lalani. Without question, they led the Canadian effort in Afghanistan. They represented the Government of Canada in Afghanistan, and I supported them in their efforts. They helped me to develop a better understanding of the complex and ever-changing political and security environments in Afghanistan and the workings of the major players represented in Kabul.
But the person I relied on for his insights into the political dynamic in Kandahar is the man sitting beside me. Gavin is the political director of the provincial reconstruction team. I don't say this because he's here today, but I believe he had a unique and informed perspective on all things political in the province.
The signing of the supplemental arrangement was a key venture in my tenure in command. Throughout the development of the arrangement, my staff and I worked closely with the whole-of-government team and the military chain of command. We revised our task force standing order and confirmed the roles that all members of the team would play before, during, and after transfer.
You've heard about the special relationship the Canadian Forces had with the leaders of the Afghan security forces, including the police, the army, the border police, and the National Directorate of Security, the NDS, as well as the governor. I would agree that we had a good relationship, and I don't apologize for that. I fostered strong bonds with those organizations that we were working with in battling the insurgency; my soldiers' lives depended on it. I established weekly security meetings with the Afghan generals and the governor to discuss common challenges. I found these exceptionally useful, but they were not meetings held behind closed doors under some veil of military secrecy. I insisted that my political adviser and the senior leadership from the provincial reconstruction team, including Gavin, be in attendance. I used this event in part to show the Afghans how military and civilian can and must work together.
In summary, I was fortunate to be part of a team of dedicated professionals who focused on doing the right thing. Everyone knew their roles and responsibilities and performed at an exceptional level. I was proud of each and every one of them.