:
I'd like at this time to call the meeting to order.
[Translation]
Welcome, everyone.
[English]
I want to welcome everyone here today.
This meeting is called pursuant to the Standing Orders to deal with chapter 2, on the Governor in Council appointment process, of the 2009 status report of the Auditor General of Canada.
The committee is very pleased to have with us today, from the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Richard Flageole, Assistant Auditor General. He is accompanied by principal Anne Marie Smith.
From the Office of the Privy Council, we have the Clerk of the Privy Council, Kevin Lynch. He is accompanied by Yvan Roy, deputy secretary to the cabinet and counsel to the Clerk of the Privy Council for legislation and House planning and machinery of government. I think he has the longest title in Ottawa. And we have Patricia Hassard, deputy secretary to the cabinet.
From the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, we also have the chair, Brian Goodman. He is accompanied by Sylvia Cox-Duquette, senior general counsel.
On behalf of all committee members, I want to extend to all of you a very warm welcome.
We are going to ask for opening statements now. We normally start with the Office of the Auditor General. Then we'll go to Mr. Lynch. Then we'll go to Mr. Goodman.
Mr. Flageole, the floor is yours.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for this opportunity to discuss our chapter on the Governor in Council appointment process.
As you mentioned, I am accompanied by Anne Marie Smith, who is the principal who was responsible for this audit.
Our audit examined the process used to make Governor in Council, or GIC, appointments to crown corporations, small federal entities, and the Immigration and Refugee Board.
[Translation]
Overall, there was unsatisfactory progress since our previous audits, with some issues having first been raised as long ago as 1997. Our audit found that there are still long delays in making GIC appointments in these organizations, and that there is a lack of communication about appointments and re-appointments and a need for sustained attention paid to the staggering of appointments.
We found some improvement in the areas of transparency in selection processes for chairs and chief executive officers of crown corporations and heads of small agencies through the creation of a website to publicize vacancies, and in training and orientation of appointees.
The audit found timeliness of appointments to be a problem, with large numbers of positions in crown corporations remaining vacant or occupied by appointees with expired terms for a lengthy period. For example, as of September 20, 2008, 16% of appointees' terms had expired an average of 373 days earlier, and 7% of positions were vacant. In small entities, there was an average gap of 91 days between the end of appointees' terms and their re-appointment, and average periods of vacancy of 296 days for 13 agency heads.
[English]
Another matter of concern was with communication with candidates, appointees, and the organizations to which they are appointed. Nearly half of the chairs and CEOs of crown corporations whom we interviewed commented on the lack of communication, with a third using the terms “black hole” or “black box” to describe the appointment process as they awaited information on outcomes. In small entities and the IRB, notification of appointment and reappointment decisions was also not done in a timely fashion.
We noted many instances in which individuals were not notified of reappointments until after their terms had expired. We also noted that the organizations themselves had difficulty in obtaining information on appointments. In three cases, directors learned at a board meeting that they had been replaced days earlier.
The Immigration and Refugee Board is a case study of the seriousness of issues that can develop as a result of insufficient attention being paid to appointments. High vacancy rates and high turnover of board members have significantly contributed to increased delays in rendering decisions and to a large backlog of unprocessed cases. The result is uncertainty for claimants and significant costs to social programs. As of September 20, 2008, there were about 10,000 unresolved appeals and more than 50,000 unprocessed refugee claims. At that time, the board had a 23% vacancy rate and a high rate of turnover.
We are aware that the refugee case inventory has grown since we completed our audit. The IRB 2009-10 report on plans and priorities indicates that the refugee protection division expects to begin the fiscal year with a pending inventory of approximately 65,000 cases and to receive an additional 50,000 new refugee claims this year. Depending on the number of decision-makers available and their level of experience, the board expects to have the capacity to finalize up to 25,000 refugee claims in 2009-10. Therefore, the pending inventory could be over 90,000 by the end of this fiscal year.
This is very serious. Action needs to be taken, and the committee may wish to ask the board about what steps they will take to address this situation.
[Translation]
The government's response to our recommendations in the report gives little assurance or definite undertakings as to how it intends to address the concerns that we raised. Your committee may wish to explore this further with representatives from the Privy Council Office, including whether the government has developed any action plans, timelines or other strategies to address the issues raised in the chapter.
Finally, you will note in our report that officials of the Privy Council Office express their view that aspects of our audit went beyond the Auditor General's mandate and encroached on the exercise of discretion by ministers and the governor in council. As we indicated in our letter to the chair, we are satisfied that the findings in the report fall entirely within our mandate.
Mr. Chair, this concludes my opening remarks. We would be pleased to answer any questions.
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.
The Auditor General's status report, chapter 2, looked at the federal government's process for making Governor in Council appointments to crown corporations, other small federal entities, and the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. I am pleased to have the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss the findings of the Auditor General on the Governor in Council appointments process, as well to as to update you on measures the government is taking to continue to improve the GIC appointments process.
I'm joined, as you noted, Mr. Chair, by Yvan Roy and Patricia Hassard.
[Translation]
Mr. Chairman, GIC appointments are those made by the Governor General on the advice of the Queen's Privy Council of Canada, as represented by cabinet. The responsibility for recommending appointments rests with ministers. The role of the public service is to implement processes, agreed to by the government, that bring to the political decision-makers a slate of candidates who meet the requirements and have the qualifications for the position, and reflect the diversity of Canadian society. In Accountable Government—A Guide for Ministers and Ministers of State, first released in 2006, the set out his expectations with respect to GIC appointments. The guide states that "it is essential for appointees to be well qualified, and that senior government appointees be chosen through a process that ensures broad and open consideration of the proposed candidates." Further, it specifies that an important aspect of the appointment process is the desire to ensure that GIC appointments reflect Canada's diversity, in terms of linguistic, regional and employment equity representation. The public service is supporting the government in meeting these commitments by developing new policies and guidelines.
These are drawn from best practices in other jurisdictions, that support an accessible and rigorous appointment process. Many such changes have been implemented since 2006.
[English]
The GIC appointments process is, by its nature, a complex one, with built-in checks and balances appropriate to the public sector. Private sector appointment processes and practices are not necessarily the benchmark for the GIC appointments process. The Prime Minister's Office, Mr. Chairman, plays a lead role in establishing the policies and is responsible for the overall coordination of GIC appointments as well as liaison with ministers' offices. Privy Council Office, PCO, provides operational support to and advice on the appointments process, including appointment policies, practices, and remuneration. PMO and PCO, as well as ministers' offices and their departments, consult and work closely with their respective organizations to understand their appointment needs.
The December 12, 2006, passage of the Federal Accountability Act provided legislative authority for the creation of a Public Appointments Commission, PAC. The legislative framework provides for a PAC that will have specific roles in the appointments process through the establishment of a code of practice for selection processes. The code will set out the steps necessary for a fair, open, and competency-based selection process for GIC positions in agencies, boards, commissions, and crown corporations.
Consistent with this legislative intent, the government has introduced a number of new processes and practices since 2006 to make the appointment system more rigorous. The management of vacancies has been improved, and both the transparency of the process and access to appointments have been increased.
I would like to highlight, Mr. Chair, for the committee, six such changes, which very much respond to both the spirit and the intent of prior advice we received from the Auditor General.
First--and this is a key one--to ensure that ministers and their departments are better equipped to manage appointments within their portfolios and understand the expectations of the government, PCO has developed and distributed a document entitled “A Guide to Managing the Governor in Council Appointments Process”. It focuses on the key elements required for a rigorous process. This document provides guidance on effective vacancy management, guidelines for making reappointment decisions, overall expectations, and appropriate steps for recruitment. It also provides specific guidance on effective communications with organizations and appointees on appointment issues.
[Translation]
Second, it is recognized that vacancy management must be improved. To that end, PCO now provides ministers and their departments with a monthly report outlining all appointments set to expire within the upcoming 12 months. This monthly report is meant to assist ministerial and departmental planning and to better ensure that appointment and re-appointment decisions are made in a timely manner.
A third change, in the same vein, addresses the management of upcoming expires. The government has issued new guidelines setting out expectations for ministers to provide notice to appointees as to whether or not they will be re-appointed.
For full-time appointees, ministers now should determine whether a re-appointment will be recommended at least six months before the end of the appointee's term. For part-time appointees, this now should be at least three months before a term expires.
The fourth change relates to increasing transparency and access to the GIC appointment process. In April 2006, the government launched the governor in council appointments website, where opportunities for GIC positions are advertised. Interested candidates have access to selection processes for leadership and quasi-judicial positions in more than 200 government organizations.
The fifth change increases the rigour of the appointments process. The government has broadened the scope of its recruitment efforts for leadership and quasi-judicial positions. Qualified candidates for these positions are recruited following rigorous selection processes, which include the development of the appropriate selection criteria, public advertisements and the assessment of candidates through interviews and reference checks.
The sixth change addresses the need for enhanced training and orientation, for both stakeholders and appointees. This now includes one-on-one orientation sessions for new chairs, heads of agencies and CEOs of crown corporations, and regular workshops on how to implement the appointments process for departmental officials and exempt staff in the ministers' offices.
[English]
As these changes indicate, Mr. Chairman, we are working to strengthen the process for GIC appointments. There are always opportunities for improvement, in particular with respect to vacancy management. To manage vacancies well, it's also important to identify the optimal number of GIC positions that are required in an organization to accomplish their legislative mandates and to determine whether existing GIC positions are apportioned where they can be most effective. In some cases, the optimal number of appointees may be less than the maximum allowed under the legislation. To examine this issue, a review led by the President of the Treasury Board will look at how the management of federal agencies, boards, commissions, and crown corporations is impacted by the number of GIC positions and whether the current size is required to optimize their effectiveness. This review is now under way, and it's anticipated that the President of the Treasury Board will submit his report and final recommendations by the end of 2009.
The Auditor General's status report that we're discussing today looked at the government's process for making GIC appointments and examined the extent of progress made in implementing her previous recommendations on appointments. Given the GIC's broad discretion conferred by statute to make appointments, the Auditor General has indicated that her office did not audit the decisions made by the GIC or the roles played by ministers, their offices, or the PMO. We share this view that the audit should not encroach on the exercise of discretion by ministers and the GIC, nor should it comment on the exercise of ministerial discretion, as that would be beyond the scope of the Auditor General's mandate.
The GIC appointment process is a complex one with distinct roles and responsibilities being exercised at the political and public service levels. The role of the public service in the appointment process is to provide advice and operational support. It is not to make decisions on individual appointments. The decision-making takes place at the political level through the exercise of ministerial responsibility and GIC discretion. While these two elements are linked through the common objective of an effective and efficient appointments process, the separation of responsibilities remains clear: PCO manages the process, while the decision-making authority on specific appointments rests with the political level.
In any given year, to conclude, Mr. Chairman, approximately 1,000 appointments are made by the GIC. This is an extremely important element of our Westminster system of government. We very much appreciate the advice of the Auditor General in this area over a number of years, and the Auditor General has contributed to ensuring that the key players in the appointment process are made aware of areas for improvement and are continually looking at ways to enhance policies, practices, and processes.
I'd be pleased to answer any questions you may have on the process.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.
Good afternoon, and thank you for inviting me here today. I'm pleased to have this opportunity to introduce myself to the committee and to provide you with information on the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada—or IRB—Governor in Council selection process, our actions to implement the one recommendation that the Auditor General directed to the IRB and the government, and the current state of our member complement and workload.
I'm joined today by our senior general counsel, Sylvia Cox-Duquette.
I've been a member of the IRB for almost eight years now, and I've served on two of the board's three divisions, first as a member of the refugee protection division, hearing refugee claims, until 2006, and then as deputy chairperson of the immigration appeal division, before being appointed interim chairperson in March 2007 and chairperson in June of that year.
[Translation]
The current selection process for GIC members represents a significant change from the previous process. In addition to setting a pass/fail mark for the written exam, the Selection Advisory Board (SAB) merged the former Advisory Panel and the Chairpersons Selection Board.
All members of the SAB are required to affirm their impartiality in all aspects of the selection process.
Under the revised selection process, the IRB Chairperson is accountable to the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism for the selection of qualified candidates according to nine behavioural competencies.
The IRB established these competencies for GIC members to ensure they have the necessary skills, abilities and personal suitability to fulfil their responsibilities.
Candidates who meet the written test and interview competencies undergo a detailed reference check and, on occasion, a behavioural event validation.
In my capacity as chair of the SAB, I recommend to the minister only those candidates who are qualified, based on these competencies, to be considered for appointment to the IRB. The selection process is transparent and merit-based.
The minister recommends the re-appointment of members to the governor in council after taking note of the IRB chairperson's recommendations based on rigorous end-of-mandate performance evaluations.
Since April 1, 2008, two-thirds of those members seeking re-appointment have in fact been re-appointed.
[English]
The Auditor General's report recognized that the IRB consistently followed established procedures to solicit and assess new candidates. It also found that new candidates were regularly recommended to the minister and that recommendations for re-appointments were consistently made six months in advance of the expiry date of the incumbents' terms.
Among the recommendations, the report called on the government and the IRB to work together to determine an appropriate complement of members or other strategy to deal with the inventory of unprocessed refugee claims and unresolved immigration appeals on a timely basis, taking into account the current size and the projected number of new cases. The IRB welcomes the recommendation of the Auditor General that the IRB be staffed in a timely manner with the required number of decision-makers who have the knowledge, skills, and experience to carry out the board's mandate. The IRB is pleased that the Auditor General recognized that the processes for soliciting, assessing, and recommending qualified candidates to the minister are sound and that my recommendations to the minister for appointment were based on the members' performance and made in a timely manner.
In response to the recommendation, I have recently shared with the government proposed options to address the IRB's workload challenges. I look forward to continuing to work with the minister and the government to arrive at a strategy that allows the IRB to address its pending inventory and increased intake.
One of the challenges the board continues to face in the pursuit of its mandate is the vacancies in the GIC member complement, along with the rate and timing of appointments and re-appointments at the board. The board is funded for a GIC member complement of 164. As of today, the IRB has a total of 137 members—107 in the RPD and 30 in the immigration appeal division. We currently have a shortfall of 27 members—20 in the RPD and 7 in the IAD. We also have 17 members whose terms are due to end in 2009-10. Of course, that doesn't take into account the possibility of members resigning prior to the end of their term for various reasons, including taking another job, which happens regularly.
However, since October 2008, I'm pleased to report that 33 new members have been appointed and 10 members have been reappointed. Understandably, our efforts have recently focused on training and mentoring the new members. It takes up to a year for a new member to become fully productive. Currently, 71% of our members are in the first term of their mandate, which is usually three years. That is an unusually large number. As the Auditor General pointed out in her report, we'd like to see a balance between the number of new members and the number of experienced members.
I would also like to stress that one external factor over which the IRB has no control, and which has a huge impact on our inventory, is the dramatic increase in the intake of refugee claims. Our intake is volatile and we have no control over the number of claims that are referred to us. In this past fiscal year, 2008-09, a total of 36,262 claims were referred to the IRB, compared with 30,564 in 2007-08 and 23,460 in 2006-07.
As a result of this increased intake, coupled with our member shortage, the current pending inventory has grown to 59,007—which is better than the 65,000 we had projected. The average processing time is now 17.6 months in the RPD and 11.9 months in the IAD. This is obviously very high: people are looking for a finality with respect to their applications and appeals, and their lives are on hold in the meantime, as are the lives of their families. From fiscal year 2006-07 to 2008-09, the intake has increased by 55% in the RPD, 9% in appeals to the IAD, and 21% in ID detention reviews and admissibility hearings.
I'd like to conclude by highlighting the fact that over the last year, in my view, the performance of the board has been extremely praiseworthy. Notwithstanding the external pressures of a mounting intake and a shortfall in member complement, we finalized 20,218 refugee claims in fiscal year 2008-09. Thanks to the dedication and hard work of our members and our support personnel, along with the positive impact of some of the case management efficiency measures we've adopted in a number of areas, finalizations per member have increased to the extent that we were able to achieve this notwithstanding a member vacancy rate that averaged over 27% over the fiscal year.
Finally, I'd like to mention that 2009 marks the 20th anniversary of the Immigration and Refugee Board. Thank you for your good wishes. Over the 20-year history, the board has finalized almost one million cases.
Thank you. I'd now be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Thank you all for your attendance today.
I must say it's rather disappointing to be back in this world again after things were so good on Tuesday. We had an excellent meeting with the passport agency, who had actually listened and acted on recommendations, who were able to show us what they'd done and acknowledged where they'd made mistakes. I mean it was really good, and now we're back to the bad old stuff again.
I'm really disappointed, Mr. Lynch, in your response in particular. I don't think we've ever had a response from a deputy so long and full of such bureaucratese, just filled with stuff that doesn't answer anything. It was very frustrating to read that letter. I have to tell you, I am not impressed at all, particularly—and people know this—when we have audits that go back where things have been found, and then they're not acted on, and then there's another audit and they're not acted on, and another audit. It just makes the blood boil.
There are aspects of this that go back 12 years. Twelve years! If you read your response today, you'd hardly know anything was wrong.
I want to start by dealing with this issue of the mandate. In your letter dated today, where you respond—although it's funny that you never did respond to the Auditor General—you say, and I'm quoting from Mr. Lynch's letter:
Further, commenting on the Immigration and Refugee Board's accumulated backlog and the number of vacancies on the Board, could be interpreted as moving from the mechanics of appointments to the decision to appoint, which is the prerogative of Ministers and the GIC.
Mr. Walsh is here. We have a letter from him. He's our law clerk, our law adviser, top lawyer in the whole organization, and he says, in part:
It seems to me fairly clear that GIC appointments, as a matter of process, fall within the AG's mandate to review from time to time and to report to Parliament, if necessary. The legal fact that the GIC appointment power is done at the exclusive discretion of the Governor in Council does not mean, in my view, that the exercise of this discretion cannot be reviewed, either by the House itself or by the AG on its behalf. It’s all part of the House’s constitutional function of holding the Government to account.
So we've heard your position and we've heard from the parliamentary law clerk. What do you say in response to the law clerk's position?
:
Yes. Thank you very much.
There were at least six, which I enumerated at the start. The PCO has developed and distributed a document entitled: “A Guide to Managing the Governor in Council Appointments Process”. That sets out the expected standards for rigour, for communication, for the guidance in terms of appointees and communication issues.
We've also, again responding to the very valid points made by the Auditor General, worked on vacancy management. PCO now provides ministers and their departments with a monthly report outlining all appointments that are set to expire within the next 12 months. So in a sense, there is full information coming up.
Thirdly, related again to observations by the Auditor General, we have tried to address the management of upcoming expiries in our guidance to ministers and to their departments. For full-time appointees, ministers should now determine whether a reappointment will be recommended at least six months before the end of the appointee's term. For part-time appointees, this should now be at least three months before a term expires. Again, we're responding to concerns of the Auditor General over a number of years.
The fourth change relates to increasing the transparency and access to the GIC appointments process, something the Auditor General has raised in previous audits going back over a decade. In April 2006, the government launched the Governor in Council appointments website, which actually makes it fully transparent. That is a substantial change. It allows interested candidates across the country to have access to selection processes for positions in over 200 government organizations.
Fifthly, we've broadened the scope of recruitment efforts for these positions. We have a rigorous selection process. We have the selection and publication of appropriate selection criteria, public advertisements, and assessment of candidates through interviews and reference checks. That's a substantial change from previous practice, and it's applied uniformly, again something the Auditor General had asked us to do.
The sixth change--and again, the Auditor General in this report I think notes the improvement here as well--is that we have responded to her previous concerns about the need for enhanced training and orientation for both stakeholders and appointees. We now have one-on-one orientation sessions for new chairs, for heads of agencies, for CEOs of crown corporations, and regular workshops on how to implement the appointments process.
As I said, there are over 1,000 GIC appointments per year. It's over 200 organizations and agencies across the government. That's a very diverse and distributed system. I think these sorts of changes actually make a substantial difference and again respond very much to the valid and helpful observations of the Office of the Auditor General over a number of years.
:
I just have a couple of questions to you, Mr. Lynch.
It seems to me, and I have considered this issue carefully, that both your office and the Office of the Auditor General start at the same premise, that the actual appointment is beyond the scope or mandate of the Office of the Auditor General. But when you talk about the specific recommendations, it seems to me when I read the recommendations, they're dealing with the process. One is “clarify its expectation regarding the level of Crown corporation board involvement”. That involves mainly the immigration board. There is a little bit of an issue there.
The second one is the insurance of “timely appointments".
Again, Mr. Lynch, if we have a situation like the immigration board, which has what I consider to be a high vacancy rate, there is a 17-month delay, it brings the whole process...and some could argue that the system is almost broke. But again, we're not going to get into the actual appointments.
The third one is the whole communication issue, and the Auditor General interviewed all these appointments and none of them were given sufficient notice. We had situations where people were showing up to meetings that had been discontinued. That is a process issue, and it is an issue that is of concern to this House. It's not an issue about which you can say there is no mandate for the Auditor General or that it is of no concern to Parliament. I think it is. These are very much process issues. They're not getting involved.... They're not dealing with the actual appointment of the individual; they're dealing with a process issue. The Auditor General has made certain recommendations, which quite frankly I agree with. I would have thought that the Office of the Privy Council could have given us some response or given the Office of the Auditor General some response to that, especially the communications issue.
Let's be frank here. If you were not reappointed and you get all dressed up, you fly to Toronto, you go to a board meeting and the chair comes over and taps you on the shoulder and says, your appointment wasn't renewed a month ago, don't you think that as the Clerk of the Privy Council that brings the whole system into disrepute? It shouldn't be tolerated by either your office, your political masters, or by Parliament. Am I wrong on that?
:
Mr. Chairman, you're raising the chapeau of subsection 7(2) of the Auditor General Act. The way we are looking at this is that the analysis has to start with section 5 of that same act, which provides the mandate of the Auditor General. I will quote from that section: “The Auditor General is the auditor of the accounts of Canada”. When you go to section 7, it is presented in the context of the general mandate that is given to the Auditor General to audit the accounts of Canada.
From our perspective, we thought that an audit would have led the auditors to look at the process through which you get to bring forward candidates to these positions. If the auditors, as part of that process, say the government is missing a lot of things, that it doesn't have a process that provides for enough candidates, and that people don't know what's going on.... The chair was talking about people who are already incumbents in these positions and who do not know it has expired; it's stuff of that nature. We should welcome, and we do welcome, these comments, because we think they have to do with the process. But the process is leading to an appointment.
The appointment itself, whether or not it takes place, is not in the hands of the Privy Council Office or anyone in the bureaucracy, but is part of what the Governor in Council has as its prerogative. And when you get to that, it seems to us that you are crossing beyond the mandate of the Auditor General, which is to audit the mechanisms.
A case in point, if I may, is the IRB. You've heard Mr. Goodman describe, I think, in a very fair way, what the audit is providing, that the process is better and is bringing candidates to the table. What the audit does is it then goes beyond that and starts talking about the fact that there are vacancies and the things that follow from that.
We are saying—and maybe the point is technical, maybe the point is narrow, but I don't think it's insignificant—is that when you do that, you're going beyond what an audit is supposed to be. In that sense, we think the point should be made. Other people, perhaps, may disagree, but from our perspective, this is where the line should be drawn. That's the only reason we raise the issue at this point in time.
:
Thank you, Chair. Welcome to our guests.
My apologies if I don't spend a lot of time with you today. I'm going to in one way, but on a different topic.
I very seldom rant, but since Mr. Christopherson has had his little rant, I'd like to have mine today, too. It's with regard to the appointments commissioner and the whole discussion on when he should have been there, when he shouldn't have, how, and why.
I can tell you that I have served in this House for the better good of Canadian citizens. I've been honoured to have had some of the highest of highs and the lowest of lows, as we all have. I was privileged to sit on the vetting committee for Justice Marshall Rothstein. There was representation from all parties, and it was absolutely a wonderful education for all of us, quite frankly. I think it was a great method of demonstrating to the public quite clearly his compassion and capability. It was just a win-win all the way through. I don't think there was a member from any party who served on that who was not pleased with that process.
It was in total contrast to the vetting of the appointments commissioner. At that time, I was the only member here now who was sitting on the government operations committee when the most butchered case of character assassination, the most shameful exhibition I have ever witnessed in this House since I have been here, took place. It was vicious. It was disgusting. It was completely untruthful. We had a gentleman of unbelievably high character—and I could elaborate at great length—who came in here. And the most blatant partisan attack I've ever seen in this House took place. This gentleman was accused of being deliberately racist and un-Canadian. Words were taken right out of context completely and other people's words were put in his mouth. He was deemed to have completely insufficient qualifications and competence, and he was deemed a political supporter, because he had admittedly donated funds in his career to both the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party.
This gentleman obviously we all know. This is a person who was the president and CEO of EnCana. He chose the name EnCana to show his pride in his country. He has 40 years of classic business experience. He was recognized by 250 CEOs in this country as the most respected chief executive officer in this country. He was willing to do the job for a buck. Obviously, his concern was for the country and the people. I quote from him in his one statement, and I was so privileged to hear what he said: “...I'm willing to put whatever I can and whatever abilities and effort and enthusiasm I have into this role.”
I sat there and listened. I might not be the most perfect judge of character, but quite frankly, I was really impressed that there was the possibility of someone like this coming forward and serving our country. When I saw that process unfold, I asked myself who in their right mind would ever put their name forward to serve for the public good after having to put up with that kind of abuse. It was a shameful act, and I say that to all members here today opposite. I'm thankful that you were not involved. I'm thankful that we've never had that kind of display on this committee, and I hope we never see it again.
The question I can put, then, is to either Mr. Lynch or Ms. Hassard. There was the impression that all of sudden, if they appointed this person, he would automatically just go and make a lot of appointments, not even understanding that it was not his responsibility.
Mr. Lynch or Ms. Hassard, could you actually tell me what the responsibility of Mr. Morgan would have been had he been nominated to appoint? Would he have been able to make appointments all over? What exactly would his role have been?
To begin, I'll come back to Mr. Lynch. One of the reasons for my attitude today is contained not only in the findings of the report but also in the statement from the Assistant Auditor General. I'm quoting from today's statement:
The government's response to our recommendations in the report gives little assurance or definite undertakings as to how it intends to address the concerns that we raised.
Overall, there was unsatisfactory progress since our previous audits, with some issues having first been raised as long ago as 1997.
At some point in this hearing we're going to talk about the fact that this whole area of appointments has been problematic for a long time. The 1997 report spoke specifically, and it's on page 34 of the report—this is from 1997. Listen to it. It almost sounds like it could be word for word in this report, I say to colleagues:
The government should improve its practices for appointing Board members, in order to ensure that the Immigration and Refugee Board has a sufficient number of experienced decision makers available when they are needed.
That was 1997. It was repeated in audits of 2000 and 2005, and here we are again and it's still a problem. In fact it's such a problem that we have the Assistant Auditor General saying, talking about the IRB, “This is very serious.” Those are the words, straight up, and auditors don't normally talk that bluntly, I'll tell you.
To the report itself, on page 31, 2.102:
The high number of Board member vacancies at the IRB had a significant impact on the Board’s capacity to process cases on a timely basis. The inventory of unresolved cases has reached an exceptionally high level.
I'm sure that every member here can share experiences of people coming in front of us—most of whom are going to be Canadian citizens at some point—in tears. They're in tears because they don't know what to do. It's been years, they've laid down roots, started businesses, started families, and they know that every day the mail could bring a notice that they have to go. This backlog thing is not just an exercise in numbers. This is about people, people who are going to be Canadians.
When I look at the chart, exhibit 2.5 on page 31, Mr. Lynch, I can see—and I say this to my government because I don't very often—that right at the time the current government took power, because that's what the chart says, we began to have increasing unprocessed claims, to the point now where the number is practically off the chart.
How could you not have seen it? How could they not? They knew what the intake was. We've heard from Mr. Goodman that it's lack of decision-makers and it's increased cases. Your office would have the capacity to know that. Why did they not act on it?
I would like to say something that perhaps our guests here today don't feel comfortable saying and that everybody knows. I suspect one of the key reasons for vacancies is that as soon as someone accepts an appointment or proposed appointment from a political party or government, the media Googles their name and does everything they can to find some connection: Did they ever join a political party? Did they ever donate to a political party? Did they ever have any business with the government? Did they work for a political party? Did they work for the government?
Then they drum up any connection, however loose, to the politicians or to a political party, as if there's any shame in belonging to a party, which there isn't. In fact, to me, it's a key part of citizenship. People are reluctant to put their names forward, and that has to be a key reason for vacancies.
Another reason is that there have been inappropriate appointments that were not monitored closely.
I arrived here last October. I wasn't here in 2004, but we saw a number of key appointments from the previous government of people who had to step down or were fired for outrageous office expenses. There was David Dingwall; there was Alfonso Gagliano, who was recalled in relation to the sponsorship scandal; there was Michel Vennat, fired from the Business Development Bank of Canada; Jean Pelletier, fired as chairman of VIA Rail. All of this had to do with matters of perhaps entitlement or matters related to the sponsorship scandal.
In 2006, we had a new government. We had a new process based on transparency and merit, which you have administered.
Back in the 1980s, I read a book by Jeffrey Simpson, from the Globe and Mail. At the time I thought it was the definitive work, and I think it probably still is, on public appointments. He said that parties can make appointments and that there's nothing wrong with them as long as they're merit-based. Merit is what the system is based on: are they qualified to do the job? A prime minister and a government need people on the agencies, boards, and commissions who want them to succeed. They have to answer to the voters for successful implementation of a platform and an agenda, and you need qualified people who want them to succeed.
So you have those things working for you; you have a guide for ministers now, a process in advance to let the ministers know when people need to be reappointed; you have consulted with other jurisdictions on best practices; you have a new public accounts commission; you have a code of practice. I know now that if a constituent calls me who is interested in a public appointment, I can send them to the website. I say, “Go to the website and read it. If you think it's a match for your jobs and skills, please apply for it.” I think that's a great, open process. You've also been able to say that vacancies have been reduced and appointments have been increased. I think you deserve to be congratulated on administering a new system.
I have a question for Mr. Goodman, though. Is it possible that you have set the standards too high? I'll tell you why. I have a constituent who used to be on the board, for I think almost 10 years. He did a thousand cases and hearings. He had good written reviews. He said that he'd happily come back and help get rid of the backlog, but they asked him to write this test again.
My question to you is, why would you ask someone who has a good record on the board and who had been there for 10 years to rewrite a test?
:
Let me give a little bit of context. There has been an issue raised about whether progress is being made versus whether we have an optimal situation. I would argue that progress is being made.
There are six areas that the Auditor General has raised over a period of time. Let me flag first the management of vacancies. I'll come back quickly to this. Second is communication about the process. Third is communication about decisions. Fourth is dealing with expiry of term. Fifth is the transparency of the appointment process, and the sixth is orientation and training.
As you'll see in the Auditor General's report, we have introduced fairly substantial changes to the orientation and training, which are acknowledged. For example, the Canadian School of Public Service has developed a new training program for all GIC appointees. Privy Council Office has implemented a one-on-one orientation session for chairs, CEOs, and heads of agencies, and almost all appointees of crown corporations and small entities surveyed by the OAG confirm that they received orientation and training upon appointment, including orientation concerning expected standards of conduct. That is a significant response to legitimate concerns raised by the Auditor General going back a decade concerning what best practice should be.
But Mr. Chair, I'd like to come to the vacancy issue, because it's been raised by a number of members here. It is important to look at both the numbers that are reported in the Auditor General's report and the interpretation of the numbers. The numbers come from a survey that was done over 33 months from January 2006 to September 2008, 33 months during which there were two elections and a change of government, which pose challenges. The measurements that are provided really look at the average tenure opening, but the report also provides, Mr. Chairman, a very interesting snapshot as of September 20, 2008, of where this changing process has come to.
Let me just flag five—
Let me just begin by thanking you, Mr. Lynch. It's well known that you're heading toward a new chapter in your life, at least, and I do want to thank you for your service to Canada over many years. I wish you well. In fact, thank you all for your service to Canada in your various capacities.
My observation, based on the reports that I see here, is that notwithstanding the comments of my colleague across the way, there have been many positive changes. I think you're responsible for many of them.
With respect to the IRB, Mr. Goodman, the point has been made that these are peoples' lives at stake and so on. I agree with that. But that's also a good reason why we need a very good process for choosing and training those people who are making these decisions. I thank you for your part in making sure we have good people who are making good decisions. We know poor decisions lead into the courts and so on, and all of the extra costs that are involved there.
Your report, Mr. Goodman, says that you're in your 20th year and nearing the 20th anniversary, with almost a million cases. I guess that works out to about 50,000 cases a year. Has that been a normal caseload? How many people would you need, in your estimation, to meet that caseload, if 50,000 is an average?
:
First of all, it's important to understand—I think I mentioned the figures for the last three years—that intake is very volatile. It's dependent on world events, migration patterns, all kinds of things. For example, it's dependent on policies from our neighbour to the south, where people have come through the United States. The clampdowns on people without status in the U.S. have an impact on our intake.
What's going on currently? The largest source of claims is in Mexico, and Haiti is second. They account for, I think, 27% in all of our claims, or perhaps even more. It's very difficult to make projections. Who would have known two years ago what is now going on in Sri Lanka and Pakistan?
We believe that we will get 40,000 to 45,000 claims this year. We make projections for the following years, and we believe it will be fairly stable. When you ask how many people we need, it's simply a question of how fast you want to eliminate the backlog. We've presented options to the government, and they're considering them very seriously within the context of different tracks. There's strategic review, legislative reform, other tracks. I'm satisfied that they're considering our proposals very seriously.
But we're talking about quite a dramatic increase unless there are targeted policy changes by the government that would limit intake. Right now there are no such changes, given our two largest source countries. Of course, we have no input--nor should we--on policy decisions of the government. It's for the government and Parliament to determine what the policies should be in relation to immigration and refugee matters. We simply are a specialized tribunal that adjudicates claims and appeals. We deal as best we can with what we have.
I want to say that I'm struck, honestly, when I go out to the regions, by how many times I hear from legal counsel how impressed they are with the quality of the recent appointments. I hear it all the time. Yes, it's a very demanding process. But it has produced excellent members. The quality of members from the time that I began at the board in 2001, I can tell you, has improved very dramatically.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We appreciate the chance to have the discussion today. As a background to my comments, we have given again the response to recommendations 1 through 4. In terms of the six areas of recommendations by the Auditor General, I spoke to the vacancy issue, we spoke to the orientation and training issue, where we both agree substantial progress has been made. In the Auditor General's report, she, in effect, notes that progress has been made on the transparency and increased rigour in the processes, and we appreciate that.
The Auditor General has raised the issue of communication, both about process and about results. We agree with the need to act on that. And the guidance to ministers' offices is, as they set out, six months before expiry of a full-time appointment, three months before expiry of a part-time appointment, and also a process for communication in the event of appointments.
On those issues, I very much agree, and I hope we've put in place the kind of process that will lead to a remedy of the issues raised by the Auditor General.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.
I guess the first thing I would say is that we were very pleased with both the process that was undertaken by the Auditor General and her officials and the outcome. It required a lot of work on our part. We're not a department, and there was an incredible amount of information requested. But I believe you'll agree with me on the findings in terms of the board having a sound process that's resulting in recommendations to the minister and in recommendations for reappointment in a timely manner, and that we have excellent training and so on. We were very pleased with that, as we were with the Auditor General's recommendation. It certainly helps to have an Auditor General's recommendation to deal with the backlog.
I must say that I do agree, from the perspective of the chair of the IRB, that there have been improvements since the audit began, improvements in the process for processing recommendations from me to the minister, and many of them have been implemented by PCO. So we're seeing much better communication between PCO and us and much better communication with the candidates who are being considered for appointment between PCO and the candidate. We're hearing that from the candidate. I find out as soon as the appointment is made that an appointment has been made, so I can call the candidate, the appointee, and welcome them.
I would say there has been quite a dramatic improvement from the time that I served as deputy chairperson and then as interim chairperson. So I'm very pleased to see that, and I'm very pleased that the government is seriously considering our problem, because it is not just about numbers, and all of you have recognized that; it's about people. Whether it's a sponsorship application, a removal appeal, or a refugee application, there are real people who are waiting for answers.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Goodman.
I want to thank, on behalf of the members of the committee, all of the witnesses for appearing today. The committee will be writing a report in due course.
Before we adjourn, I just want to make a brief statement. Mr. Kamp alluded to this in his question. As Mr. Kamp indicated, the Clerk of the Privy Council, after a very distinguished and successful career, is retiring at the end of June. I suspect, and I assume Mr. Lynch hopes, this is probably his last appearance—
Voices: Oh, oh!
The Chair: —or the last of his many appearances, before a parliamentary committee. I'd be remiss, colleagues, if I didn't take this opportunity to acknowledge and pay tribute and thank Mr. Lynch for his tremendous service to the public, the public service, and public policy.
Perhaps some of you aren't aware that he joined the public service in 1976. He's had successive roles. He spent five years as the Deputy Minister of Industry. He spent four years as the Deputy Minister of Finance. And when the present Prime Minister was elected, he chose Mr. Lynch to be the Clerk of the Privy Council. That's the position he has held over the last three years.
I've watched his career, and I've actually known Mr. Lynch from before I was even elected. He's been involved in transformative issues, such as the research and science agenda of the government, straightening out the country's finances, and the Canada Pension Plan. As Clerk of the Privy Council he's been involved with the Afghan conflict. As he's indicated, he's led the whole renewal of the public service over the past three and a half years. Again, it's a tremendous credit. He really exemplifies the role of a non-partisan, competent public servant, which, in my opinion, gives the country of Canada a comparative advantage. We're fortunate to have that.
So I suspect, Mr. Lynch, that your career is not over. You will resurface somewhere else, and we'll certainly be watching with interest.
But again, in closing, on behalf of every member of Parliament, I want to thank you for your tremendous contribution, and we wish you all the best in the future.
Voices: Hear, hear!