:
I'll take that under advisement. We'll deal with that when we come to it on the agenda.
Let's start with our presentations. This is meeting 35 as we continue our study of Bill .
I want to welcome to the table today, from the Pembina Institute, Matthew Bramley, director of climate change. From the Greenhouse Emissions Management Consortium, we have Aldyen Donnelly, president. From the International Institute for Sustainable Development, we have John Drexhage, director of climate change and energy. From the Canadian Wind Energy Association, we have Robert Hornung, president.
Mr. Hornung was supposed to be here on Tuesday, but unfortunately he wasn't able to attend due to a family matter. I'm going to allow him to go first on behalf of the Canadian Wind Energy Association.
If your opening comments could be less than 10 minutes, we'd appreciate that.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I apologize to all committee members for not being able to join you here at the meeting on Tuesday, but as the chair noted, a family matter intervened. I do very much appreciate the opportunity to speak with you here today.
The Canadian Wind Energy Association is the national association for companies with an interest in the wind energy industry in Canada. Our 450 members include Canadian, American, and European leaders in wind energy product development, wind turbine manufacture and component supply, as well as key service providers to the industry. The Canadian members of our association are a diverse group, active in wind energy, but many are also conventional energy companies whose primary interests are electricity generation, oil and gas production, or pipelining. We also have a number of companies that are focused exclusively in the renewable energy sector.
We believe that climate change is a serious issue and that the federal government must adopt legally binding targets and put in place supportive actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, the establishment of such targets and supportive actions is critical to providing the policy certainty required to allow the wind energy industry to make well-informed and effective investment decisions that are consistent with the government's policy objectives. It's important that such targets and actions are transparent and that progress against them is measured on a regular basis. We note that many of these elements or themes are part of . Policy uncertainty reduces the incentive to invest.
We believe that wind energy will have an important role to play in meeting Canada's greenhouse gas emission reduction objectives, as well as the federal government's objective to have 90% of electricity produced from non-emitting sources by 2020. It's broadly accepted that significant progress on emissions reduction is required by 2020. In the electricity sector, the actions that have the most potential to reduce emissions in that timeframe are energy efficiency and conservation, increased deployment of renewable energy sources like wind, and fuel switching from coal to natural gas.
This is already being recognized in many parts of the world. In Europe wind energy has been the single biggest new source of electricity capacity for the last two years. It's been the second largest source of new generation in the United States over the last four years. In addition to providing these benefits, of course, wind energy also represents an important economic opportunity for rural communities across Canada and a manufacturing sector looking for ways to diversify production into products and technologies that are poised for significant growth in the 21st century.
For wind energy to fulfill its potential in meeting Canada's policy objectives and for any climate change strategy to be a success, it will be imperative to put a price on carbon. In this regard, CanWEA is supportive of the efforts currently under way at the federal level to put in place an emissions trading system that provides flexibility to emitters through the use of greenhouse gas offsets from non-emitting activities like wind energy production. It's critical for wind energy projects to have an opportunity to capture economic value for their environmental benefits.
It's also true, however, that it's likely to be some time yet until a carbon price is in place, and even longer until that price is not influenced by public policy safety valves that are designed to mitigate the economic impact of greenhouse gas emissions reduction but, at the same time, prevent the market from fully representing the real price of carbon. In this transitional period, it will be important for the federal government to continue to provide policy support and incentives that recognize and allow project developers to capture the full value of the environmental and carbon reduction benefits of clean renewable energy sources beyond that which will be initially provided by greenhouse gas offsets.
As the federal government's ecoENERGY for renewable power program will have fully allocated all of its funding this fall, such incentives will no longer be in place. A failure to expand or extend this mechanism or replace it with an alternative will result in delays and possible cancellations of several wind energy projects, and it will result in investors shifting funds for such projects from Canada to the United States. This is inconsistent with efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Canada. We remain committed to working with the government and all parliamentarians to obtain a renewed commitment to support the deployment of renewable energy projects during this transitional period.
While a carbon price is necessary, it will not on its own be sufficient to meet greenhouse gas emission reduction objectives. Numerous barriers exist that prevent actors from responding to price signals in the marketplace. For that reason, many jurisdictions are putting in place both carbon pricing and long-term renewable energy strategies and policies in an effort to meet their climate change objectives.
While the European Union has a functioning carbon market in place, it has also established aggressive and legally binding renewable energy targets for the year 2020. And the United States Congress is currently considering the implementation of a legally binding national renewable electricity standard as part of its climate change package. We believe Canada also should consider, within its climate change strategy, the implementation of complementary initiatives that will remove barriers and stimulate investment in renewable energy technologies in addition to the establishment of a price on carbon.
When examining what policy support should be provided to renewable energy or other greenhouse gas emission reduction options as part of a climate change strategy, it's also important to remember that Canada is competing for investment in new renewable energy projects and new renewable energy technology supply chains, and that competition is on a global basis. Our policy choices must consider what other countries are doing to encourage investment in these sectors and must strive to ensure that our investment opportunities are competitive.
An effective federal climate change strategy will also need to improve the efficiency, without diminishing the effectiveness, of federal permitting and approval processes for clean energy projects like wind energy and the transmission infrastructure required to support its development. And it will also have to focus on building public support about the urgency and importance of the actions needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Finally, provincial governments also have an extremely important role to play in putting forward policies to support both renewable energy deployment and greenhouse gas emissions reduction, and federal policies should seek to complement and support major provincial initiatives like Ontario's new Green Energy and Green Economy Act and other leading initiatives across the country.
Thank you very much.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Allow me to thank you and the other members of this committee for the opportunity to speak with you regarding Bill C-311, An Act to ensure Canada assumes its responsibilities in preventing dangerous climate change.
First of all, I would like to provide some specific comments on the bill itself and its implications for domestic implementation. I will then conclude with a brief foray into the current status of the international negotiations and the potential role a bill such as this could play in addressing Canada's current profile in the negotiations while also helping to provide a much-needed boost to the overall tone of the international talks.
Regarding the specifics of the bill itself, I would say that the long-term target of an 80% reduction from 1990 levels by 2050 is an entirely reasonable one. It is in line with the long-term target espoused by President Obama, and it's consistent with virtually all projections as to what might be required to avoid anything more than a two-degree temperature change globally, which I need not remind you that the Prime Minister agreed to at this year's G8 summit.
I would also note that this is the current status of the scientific information on climate change. In the past few years we have seen the peer-reviewed science conclude that the temperature changes are actually occurring at a more rapid pace and that the related impacts of that temperature change are more pronounced, particularly for the Arctic, than previously assumed. Hence, we would also strongly support the review provisions in this bill starting in 2015 to ensure that Canada continues to do its fair share in addressing climate change.
On the shorter-term target of 25% below 1990 levels by 2020, I would make the following observations. First of all, it is commonly assumed that this is the target recommended by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to avoid a two-degree rise in temperatures. In fact, what the IPCC does is review the literature on the issue, and in that respect, there was a relatively limited amount written on this topic by the time of the IPCC report—only some five reports.
There is in fact a range of options available by which we would see the global community reach the overall target of 80% by 2050. You can't, for example, start at a more moderate target for 2020 and then ramp up reduction goals for 2030 and thereafter. This is what the U.S. appears to be calling for, and given that in North America we are only beginning to break the link between economic and greenhouse gas emissions growth, many here in Canada argue that it would be reasonable to start with a more moderate target. Fair enough, but—and we have to keep this in mind—that would only have credibility if we were also to lay out what reductions would be achieved for 2025 and thereafter. And keep this in mind also that the longer we take in reducing our emissions, the more disruptive and sudden the transition that will be required for all involved at a later date. So not only are we asking our children to face the impacts of climate change, we're also asking them to face increasing impacts in terms of the transition required to address climate change if we don't take on aggressive targets now.
With respect to the regulations, I would also support those elements promoting performance standards and greenhouse gas trading. With respect to the latter, the terms of reference need to be broadened to cover participation in the international carbon market as well. It is an absolutely critical mechanism for Canada to meet its targets and in positively engaging developing countries in mitigation activities. In a word, it is simply unrealistic to expect Canada to be able to achieve even the current government's own targets through domestic measures alone. The Canadian private sector must become an active player in the global carbon market, and the Government of Canada needs to provide much clearer signals and incentives for Canadian industry to do so.
I would also strongly support any efforts to link up with the U.S. cap and trade system as it's being developed, which would mean an absolute cap and trade with a broad sector of the economy covered by 2016 and an increasing percentage of auctioned permits playing in the marketplace.
I have one other note, this relating to the penalties for non-compliance provisions in the bill: we would favour a system by which those who exceed their reduction targets would face a prohibitive charge that would provide the government with the opportunity to use at least some of those funds to purchase credits to offset any surplus emissions and remaining revenues in order to provide support for the transition to a clean energy future.
To conclude, I believe Bill C-311, or some amended form that does not compromise the 2050 target, would be very timely.
I've had the privilege of following the climate change negotiations for the past few years, and I can bring in at least two clear observations on that process as we head to Copenhagen.
First, the negotiations are in deep trouble, and we may not find our way to an effective comprehensive agreement by December. I could get into the details, but it comes down to a serious lack of trust that exists between developed and developing countries.
Secondly, Canada's profile in the negotiations continues to be compromised by its status as a party to the Kyoto Protocol that has made it clear it will not take actions to meet its target under that agreement.
Bill , particularly if it managed to receive universal assent of this Parliament, would send out a strong signal to the international community that Canada is ready to be a positive player in these negotiations. In addition, Canada needs to be ready to come up with a healthy and significant contribution towards helping developing countries adjust to the current and future threat of climate change.
I'd lastly note that doing so is particularly critical given Canada's role as host and leader of the next G8 and G20 summits to be held next year. If we are to have any credibility in those discussions, Canada must develop a strong domestic plan for reducing our emissions that also addresses all aspects of society, including targeting our incredibly wasteful consumption practices in North America. It also needs to reflect the strong messages we have heard from our Prime Minister in the last few years that we must develop strong, sustainable, and clean national energy systems. As a first step, I would recommend that we implement a clean, integrated national electricity grid as part of the government's stimulus and infrastructure packages.
I cannot stress the extent to which we suffer a credibility gap in the multilateral world as a result of 15 years, and counting, of inaction—and that includes both party persuasions.
In closing, I do not regard this as a right-left issue, and I believe that, with good intent, unanimous consent on a bill such as Bill should be possible. Effectively addressing climate change is simply too critical and complex an issue to hold hostage to political posturing. Ultimately, successfully addressing this real and present threat means an evolution in understanding what national interest truly signifies, acting responsibly for the sake of the global environment and our children.
I believe Canadians are ready and impatient to face this challenge. It is time for politicians of all stripes to demonstrate the same resolve.
:
Good afternoon. Thank you for your invitation.
[English]
I'd like to begin by referring members of the committee to my December 2007 testimony to this committee on the same bill, when it was known as Bill C-377. I've provided copies through the clerk.
As time is short, I won't repeat the reasoning I presented then in support of this bill. Suffice it to say that in light of the increasing urgency of curbing climate change and the continuing lack of action to cut Canada's greenhouse gas emissions, major Canadian environmental NGOs believe it is more important than ever that Parliament pass Bill C-311.
Bill C-311 makes no pretension to be a comprehensive plan to cut emissions. Instead, it would set a level of ambition for emission reductions and enforce accountability mechanisms to increase the likelihood that the government of the day would fulfill its responsibility to develop and implement a plan to achieve those reductions.
Having said that, I'd like to present the results of a study by the Pembina Institute and the David Suzuki Foundation in which we did design a plan, a package of government policies that meets the level of ambition set by Bill C-311 for the year 2020. We ran the plan through two leading economic models to determine its likely effects on Canada's economy.
I've distributed copies of the report entitled Climate Leadership, Economic Prosperity to members of the committee. The report was published this morning.
Our study found that Canada can meet the level of ambition set by Bill C-311 for 2020 and still have a strong growing economy, a quality of life higher than Canadians enjoy today, and continued steady job creation across the country. However, to achieve this the federal government would need to act immediately to put a significant price on most of Canada's greenhouse gas emissions either through a cap and trade system or a tax. The emissions price would need to be backed up with strong complementary regulations and, ideally, major public investments.
Our study also examined the federal government's own current emissions target for 2020 and found that in order to meet its target the government would have to implement far stronger policies than it has proposed to date—in particular, a price on emissions that would need to reach $100 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent by 2020.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to comprehensively examine how Canada can meet a greenhouse gas reduction target for 2020 that goes beyond the federal government's current target and the first published study of the government's target to show regional impacts on employment and GDP. We commissioned the leading economic modelling firm, M.K. Jaccard and Associates, to do the calculations. Their models have been widely used by the governments of Canada, Alberta, and other provinces.
In our study we call the level of ambition set by Bill C-311 for 2020 “the 2°C emissions target” in reference to the objective of limiting average global warming to 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels. The Prime Minister formally recognized the scientific community's support for this objective when he signed this year's G8 leaders summit communiqué.
Our modelling analysis projects that Canada's GDP would grow between 2010 and 2020 at an average rate of 2.1% annually while meeting the 2°C emissions target, which compares to 2.2% while meeting the government's target, and 2.4% under business as usual conditions. These are modest differences.
The study does show that the need to address very high emissions in Alberta and Saskatchewan would significantly reduce the projected growth rates in those provinces. However, Alberta would still have the highest rate of GDP growth and the highest per capita GDP of any province in Canada, while Saskatchewan's per capita GDP would stay close to the Canadian average.
The analysis also projects Canada's total number of jobs to grow by essentially the same amount under the 2°C target, the government's target, and business as usual. In the three cases, Canada adds 1.8 million to 1.9 million net new jobs between 2010 and 2020.
An important aspect of the study is that it shows how revenue from emissions pricing—for example, revenue from auctioning allowances in a cap and trade system—can be used to address several concerns that are commonly expressed about ambitious action to tackle climate change. Our policy package uses this revenue to make payments to individuals to compensate for regional variations in household energy cost increases, to provide rebates to protect the international competitiveness of the most vulnerable manufacturing sectors, to invest in public transit and electricity grids, to reduce personal income tax, to stimulate job growth, and to purchase international emission reductions to reduce the cost of meeting the targets.
In our study, we close one-fifth of the gap between business as usual and the targets using international emission reductions. We would, therefore, be supportive of an amendment to Bill C-311 to allow Canada to purchase high-quality international reductions to meet the targets in the bill.
In my remaining time, I'd like to revisit the origin of the 2°C target for 2020, a 25% reduction in Canada's emissions below the 1990 level.
This is truly a science-based target, because it starts from scientific analysis of the reductions in global emissions that would be needed to have a chance of preventing global warming from crossing the danger threshold of 2°C. When the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change looked at reasonable ways to share out those global emission reductions, it arrived at 25% to 40% reduction below the 1990 level by 2020 for industrialized countries.
Although industrialized countries, as a whole, could in principle meet a target in this range, even if Canada met only a weaker target, there are several reasons why Canada's target should be at least at the weakest end of this range, that is to say, 25%. Notably, the 25% target is supported by published analyses of what Canada's fair share would be among industrialized countries. The 25% to 40% range for industrialized countries corresponds only to about a 50% chance of keeping warming below 2°C, and the international climate science community is now telling us that the problem is worse than they thought when the IPCC's most recent report was compiled, and that the emission reductions needed may therefore have been underestimated.
Environmentalists are not claiming that confronting climate change is easy. There's no doubt that it requires tough decisions. But the study we've published today shows that there are solutions to allow us to meet science-based climate targets and opportunities that would be created in doing so.
As we head into the difficult negotiations in Copenhagen, the world desperately needs leaders on climate change. Passage of this bill in time for Copenhagen would send an important signal of Canadian leadership to the world.
Thank you.
:
First, thank you for having me here.
Like the rest of the panel members, I strongly believe that Canada has an important role to play and that we must move quickly to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions. I do not, however, recommend the passage of Bill . Bill C-311 is yet another target-setting exercise with no plan. I think that the editorial in The Globe and Mail got it correct this morning.
I'd like to remind you about Canada's traditional process for ratifying international treaties, to which the Kyoto Protocol stands as an exception. Typically, we develop our own domestic sense of priorities to address an environmental or economic issue. When we've identified our objectives and decided to pursue them in an international partnership, for competitiveness reasons, we tend to present our case in treaty language. We find some other parties. We negotiate a treaty that we sign. Then we come home and implement domestic legislation and regulations. Typically, we find that living with our first pass at the regulations isn't so comfortable and we amend them. Maybe we do it a third time. After we've lived with our legislation and regulations long enough to think we have it right, and our treaty partners have been through the same experience, we go back to the table, amend the original treaty language, and ratify it. That's what we did for the Law of the Sea, and that's why the elapsed time between signing the treaty and ratifying it was 11 years. That's normal history; that's not unusual history.
We in Canada signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol in a very short time without developing any implementation plan. Bill is enunciating yet another target. We're spending a lot of resources talking about targets, and we haven't even started to contemplate what an implementation plan would look like. If we were to stick with our historical successful experience, we would be asking a number of conventional questions: What regulations? Who is being affected? Who is changing behaviour and why? What are the implications of all this?
I'm going to tell you something quite different from what you will read in the Pembina report. I work largely for the private sector but also for NGO clients and three provincial governments. My job as a consultant is to develop policy and regulatory recommendations. I think I do my job well. I have been working on climate change for 15 years, and it's the biggest issue of the day for me. What's the reality? The reality is that 80% of the reported large industrial emitter emissions, 67% of all industry emissions including those that are not reported at a facility level, and 30% of all national emissions originate in plants that are located in 30 communities.
I have a presentation for you, nicely locked up in a hotel, and I'm going to e-mail it to the clerk right after this report.
We're talking 30 communities. That's your ghost town list. How do you stop that from being your ghost town list? It's not a whole country. It's not nicely spread all over the place. You can't go to Sydney—Victoria, to 's riding and say that it's okay, his constituents can keep their jobs if they spend $40 a tonne building wind farms in China. In Blake's community, do you know what $40 a tonne is to keep their jobs? It's over $4,000 per man, woman, and child in the riding. There are 30 communities for which $40 a tonne to restructure the plants or buy offsets from China comes to over $400 a tonne per man, woman, and child in the community. I am not saying you shouldn't do this; I'm saying it's only in 30 communities.
The first recommendation is that this committee should have a subcommittee on which sit representatives of the 30 communities. Let's start talking about what their long-term sustainable core competencies are, sources of competitive advantage. What does that mean in terms of technology strategies? A lot of the technology strategies recommended in this report have no match whatsoever to the real sustainable sources of competitive advantage in those communities in a carbon-free future. There is no link. It doesn't work. And what do you get when it doesn't work? You get what Germany has.
From 1996 through 2007--so I'm not adding in the recessionary time--goods-producing jobs were down 18%; greenhouse gas emissions were down only 16%. You don't even have a one for one in terms of your job loss match. Jobs lost over that period were 6.4 million, so I don't really care about 250,000 jobs that might have been generated by the wind industry. Electricity prices for households in Germany--41¢ Canadian per kilowatt hour--that's not a special rate for wind, that's the rate that everyone in a household in Germany pays for electricity. Fifty per cent of the electricity in that country still comes from coal plants. Eight new coal plants have been constructed in the last eight months in Germany, and twenty more have been approved. The eight new coal plants themselves wipe out all of the zero emission reduction gains Germany achieved by being the largest developer of wind power nationally in the world.
If we don't sit down and look at the community list and the company list--it's only 30 communities--and build a strategic plan for each community, we will have 40¢ electricity, we will still be burning coal to make power, we will have significant industrial job loss, and we won't have greenhouse gas emissions even tracking with the job loss, because that's Germany, that's Denmark, that's Sweden, and that's not where we want to go.
I'll stop there.
And thank you very much for joining us.
I'd like to begin by congratulating Mr. Bramley and the Pembina Institute and the David Suzuki Foundation for delivering this report. I'd like to remind Canadians that this is one of the reasons it was so important to have an extension on this bill, to have this kind of testimony presented so we can set it in context. And I really want to congratulate you, because as they say in contract law, he who writes the first draft often has the upper hand. And in this case you have at least reduced to writing some analysis that the government has heretofore failed to present.
On that note, I want to ask all four of you, very quickly--because you all made either direct or oblique references to the need for a coherent plan--do either of you have in your possession, after 46 months, a plan from this government on a domestic climate change response?
Mr. Hornung, can you start very quickly--yes, no, if you have one?
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
First of all, I would like to welcome the witnesses, all of whom we recognize for their expertise.
Mr. Bramley, I thank you for your study which you presented this morning, because it enlightened parliamentarians on the economic impact of respecting the scientific evidence.
Until now, the government was expected to ensure a 25% reduction compared to 1990 between now and 2020. That would have spelled economic chaos in Canada: substantial job losses, a decline in the economy. It's as if we found the Canadian economy horribly weakened overnight.
Today we see—you'll tell me if I'm wrong—that between the government's scenario and the scientists', there's not as big an impact as we would have thought.
How is it that having ambitious goals doesn't considerably weaken our economy and the opposite happens? Why is it that substantial reductions don't lead to economic chaos as some people try to have us believe?
:
There are several parts to the answer.
First, there are technologies available to significantly reduce emissions. We are familiar with renewable energy. For example, according to our scenarios, wind energy is projected to account 18% of the electricity produced in Canada in 2020. We have many possibilities in energy efficiency, and also in carbon capture. We therefore don't need to come up with new technologies; we already have solutions.
Second, yes, our scenarios call for carbon pricing. That would create a high price for emissions. It would also generate revenue that could be recycled into the economy to be reinvested in solutions and deal with problems that might arise, such as competitiveness problems in some specific sectors.
That is the answer I gave earlier; after all, the Canadian economy is primarily a service-based economy, and large parts of the manufacturing sector are not particularly big sources of greenhouse gases.
:
When I read your report, I noted that by auctioning credits, the government could—unless I'm mistaken—bring in almost $72 billion a year, which you say could be reinvested in the economy. That would probably mean, according to your analysis, that the Canadian economy would be more competitive. When we talk about innovation, development and competitiveness, in the end, we're talking about job creation. Is that what I am to understand?
I was looking at the figures from the Canadian Wind Energy Association. You're talking 18% by 2020; the industry says 20%. In terms of electricity sales, the word is $78 billion dollars—of new money into the Canadian economy. That's probably an important factor.
I'd like to come back to the impact on each province. When I look at your table, I see that Alberta still has the highest year-over-year growth in GDP: 3.3%. Quebec, meanwhile, has the lowest annual growth in GDP in Canada; we're talking growth of 1.3%.
What guarantee does Alberta have that the commitments will be met, which is recommended by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change? What assurance is there that the Alberta economy will still remain strong? According to your scenario, you take into account carbon sequestration and capture. How will Alberta be able to maintain its economic growth?
:
Thank you for the question. I'm not a doctor, just so you know.
To respond to that, as I indicated in the presentation, in the absence of any price on carbon and any realistic market price on carbon, in essence we are faced with a situation where we make choices in the electricity sector without full information with respect to pricing. In that regard, many governments around the world, including Canada, have taken steps to put in place programs that help provide a signal to the marketplace that helps to improve the relative competitiveness of clean energy technologies.
In Canada that program has been the ecoENERGY for renewable power program, established in January 2008 with an objective of supporting the deployment of 4,000 megawatts of renewable energy by March 2011. It's an extremely successful program that will meet its target this fall, a year and a half ahead of schedule. Again, in the absence of having any carbon price framework in place at the current time, we as an industry are looking to government to step forward and indicate that, in essence, support for the deployment of clean energy technologies is not simply ending this fall but will indeed be renewed or continued going forward.
That's very important because, as I noted in my presentation, we are competing with other countries for this investment. The United States has made it very clear that it wants to be a leader in clean energy technologies like wind energy and has put in place programs to encourage and stimulate manufacturing and deployment of these technologies. A failure to do so in Canada will see, in fact, investment dollars leave Canada for the United States, creating jobs and opportunities there that we could have here.
:
You've said that our lifestyle is not sustainable. My question is going to focus on what lifestyles would look like if Canada were to adopt Bill . What would the cost be?
Mr. Bramley, I'm not going to be asking you questions, because I feel that if I asked the cook to critique his own creation, the cook would have a bias. So with respect, I'm going to direct my questions to Ms. Donnelly and Mr. Drexhage.
The government is responsible for sustainable development. Each of us is. We passed, in the House, Bill S-216. Actually, it was in the last Parliament. It was sustainable development legislation to make sure we have good jobs in Canada but also a clean environment, and that's the government's responsibility, each of us. So how would lifestyles change if we adopted targets?
On the targets being proposed in Bill , Pembina's position has been consistent that China and India, the big emitters in the developing world, would not have to have hard targets. They would not have to accept these targets in a new international agreement. You have the developing world buying international offsets. Bill C-311 also requires billions of dollars in mitigation and adaptation funds internationally, and the government's position is that there has to be substantial assistance in that. What would the world look like if we were accepting these very extreme targets?
I just came back from Copenhagen, where I saw gasoline at $2.50 a litre.
:
In Denmark, government spending is 55% of GDP, and if you net $51,000 Canadian a year, you pay 63% of your gross income in taxes. That's income taxes and payroll taxes, not including sales taxes. I'm not saying that's bad, but that's a different kind of society from the one we live in. Maybe that's the society we need to go to. I'd like to be part of that debate.
But again, I'm arguing that there's a dialogue that needs to be had, and when we talk about communities on that list of 30 vulnerable communities, three are in Newfoundland, two are in Nova Scotia, two are in New Brunswick, and four are in Quebec. We've got it in our heads that this is an Alberta story. This is not an Alberta story.
I also want to touch a little bit on the whole complication of international trading. You know what I'm saying. I'm saying we can do what we want to do, but the devil's in the details. This report says there's an unlimited supply of capital, so all we have to do is hike the price of energy and all of the capital we need will flow into the country to reduce our energy demand.
As I said, in Europe when they hiked the price of capital, two things happened: manufacturing employment in Canada increased 26% and manufacturing capacity in Germany, Denmark, and Sweden fell 11% to 17%. If you look at the foreign direct investment flows, those European nations invested more capital in Canada between 1996 and 2007 than they invested in all of Asia, including China.
:
When they implemented their policies, their investment capital came to Canada. Their goods producing employment fell 15% roughly. Our goods producing employment increased 26%.
Now let's go back to what this means international treaty-wise. It also means that we've got in the developed world the most efficient manufacturing sector in the world, because we just built it in the last 15 years. And I'll just do the one comparison. Europe is saying to us, cut emissions by 20%. I'll give you a specific. The U.S. is saying to us, cut emissions by 20%. I'm not saying don't cut emissions, but the U.S. is saying have comparable percentage reduction targets by sector. The average U.S. and European aluminum plant discharges 12 tonnes of CO2 per tonne of aluminum it produces. The average Canadian aluminum plant discharges six tonnes of CO2 per tonne of aluminum it produces.
The Copenhagen Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol, and the U.S. Congress's proposal is that we agree to the same per cent reduction. What the U.S. and Europe is proposing is that when they cut their greenhouse gases per tonne of aluminum from 12 to 10, we have to cut ours from 6 to 5. They are proposing those as equivalent measures. But it costs three times as much for us to cut from 6 to 5 as it will cost them to cut from 12 to 10.
Canada has to be a leader. We have to step up and say, that's not equivalent. That's not about greenhouse gases; that's about trade protectionism.
What should the developed world's greenhouse gas standard for aluminum be by 2015? Should it be 10--
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Ouellet.
[English]
Yes, I do think it can be a contribution, but I would also like very strongly to agree with Ms. Donnelly that this has to be followed up with a real plan.
I think one of the failures we've had over the last 15 years is that we've never come up with a real, credible plan. It has a lot to do with the fact we're very, very sensitive about touching the whole consumption side. Politically it's charged, and we have a very difficult time with that in North America.
To the previous question—and I apologize for speaking out of turn—about whether we have to become another Denmark or Sweden, I think that to a large degree, yes, we do. And keep in mind that it is the conservative government that's in power in Denmark; it's not some left-wing socialist party. It's an arch-conservative government, aligned with the liberal party—albeit liberal in the neoclassical sense of Adam Smith. So they've managed to progress this debate beyond a left-right issue. They've managed to progress it towards an issue of sustainability, and that's what we need to do in Canada. I don't want to make this a left or right issue. We can't afford it.
Merci.
:
I might be remembering this a little wrong, but I'd say that of the 30 communities, less than 15, but close to half, would be Alberta and Saskatchewan; no communities in Manitoba. In the list I'm going to send you, it shows no communities in B.C., but if I step back from the numbers and look at it technically, I would put Kitimat near the top of the list, even though it doesn't technically show right now. It's based on 2007 numbers, so I would add Kitimat.
In proportion to population, the provinces with the greatest risk profiles are New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, because while they have greenhouse gas per capita exposures that are lower than others, the opportunities to generate new revenues are substantially lower than in other regions as well. So when you're looking at the community list, the situation is different for each context.
If you look at the community list again going to this study, this study does two things at the same time. It generates a whole bunch of new government revenues from operations that it presumes are going to continue to discharge greenhouse gases and buy permits to do so, but you can't have the money if they actually cut the emissions. The communities tend to be single-industry towns, sole-employer towns, so when you take out the sole employer, what I'm saying is that you'd better know what you're putting in its place. In British Columbia, where I live, every time we've taken out a sole employer, the primary source of income becomes government.
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I appreciate that. Thanks, Mr. Malhi.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I'd like to go back, if I could, looking for positive go-forward opportunities, Mr. Drexhage.
What are we saying? We just don't have any idea; Canadians don't know. We've been asking and asking the government just to level with the Canadian people and tell them what Canada is saying internationally. The message keeps changing, and I don't understand it. I can't divine the inspiration for it or try to explain it away, but I think Canadians have a right to know. They won't tell us what our position is.
The dialogue keeps changing. They say, first of all, a bilateral dialogue; then they assert that we have a North American target, which is news to my Washington and Mexico City counterparts. Nobody has ever heard of a North American target. We don't really know what is being said anymore.
But you are tracking the international developments. What in fact is Canada saying internationally right now, in advance of Copenhagen?
I know we're down to the wire for talking to our witnesses, so I'll get to the point, and hopefully I'll have a little time to share with my colleague Mr. Watson to make sure we both have an opportunity to get on the record.
I'm going to preface my comments. In testimony before the Senate banking committee, Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney said that “Overall, there will be a subdued recovery, but there will be a recovery”, and this is good news for Canadians.
I'm going to ask Ms. Donnelly in particular, do you think that Canadians are particularly ready to buy into targets and a plan that basically is, from what I can see, just a recreation of the green shift that was offered to Canadians in the last general election, which the chief economist of the Toronto Dominion Bank, Mr. Don Drummond, called the “biggest fiscal shock” in Canadian history in the Globe and Mail today?
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My opposition to is due to the shock it would promote. Every time we jump out and set a target that feels out of reach—I'm setting aside the question of whether or not it is in reach—we back whole communities into fear-based tactics. My position is that we know which those communities are; that's not uncertain. The prudent next move is to develop a strategy for working with the communities and finding out what's possible.
I don't mind the whole strategy being about trying to get to types of objectives or another set of objectives. But I think that if you pass one more bill and haven't gone through that process, there's difficulty.
I also want to add a little comment about the whole international trading thing. Last year, in 2008, the United States discharged just over one billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent from coal-fired power plants that are over 55 years old. We don't have a coal-fired power plant in Canada that is yet 45 years old, so when we're having this dialogue and talking about money flows, it's expensive to cut emissions here. I'm not saying don't do it, but when we have a new economy, writing off a 20-year-old plant is a lot more expensive than walking away from a 65-year-old plant.
Those are our special circumstances. Our 26% increase in goods-producing jobs since 1996 was from capital investment that came here and that did not go to the United States, and it was capital investment that came here from Europe. We have a special challenge and we have to go at this differently from anyone else.
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, of course, to our witnesses for appearing.
As a matter of a comment for the record, Mr. Chair, since this report comes to us very recently and with the TD Bank's sponsoring the report, Don Drummond, the economist, would be a good witness to have before the committee to explore some of the economic questions in the report. I leave that for the chair's consideration or the committee's consideration at a future point. I think it would be beneficial to have Mr. Drummond appear to explain the TD Bank's report.
Mr. Bramley, you said every model has different results. You've obviously chosen a very specific model for the report. I notice that on the inside cover the position of the David Suzuki Foundation talks about the policy choices being constrained by the model and says they represent some of the potential scenarios for achieving a GHG emission reduction target in 2020. I note further that they actually have a disclaimer that they don't specifically endorse the technologies and policies in the report. Apart from that, you've chosen a very specific path here.
I'm going to ask you some questions on that in short order by comparison too.
Back in the spring, I wrote the Parliamentary Budget Officer asking for him to do a full cost accounting of Bill C-311, and we had some exchange with Mr. Page. He presented a bit of an outline of what he thought could be a framework for considering this. Under the idea of new policy scenarios, he makes the point:
A number of policy scenarios would need to be developed since there are likely multiple approaches and combinations of approaches to achieve required reductions in emissions. The use of different approaches or combinations of approaches would likely result in differential economic impacts.
So my point, first of all, is that this is one opinion with respect to the economics, based on certain key assumptions. There are things that are not included in this report, in terms of alternate pathways to compare. Is that a fair assessment?
And thanks to the members for eating up a lot of time here today.
In a full cost accounting, the Parliamentary Budget Officer goes on to say that there could be key assumptions that have to be made about responses of monetary policy as well. In other words, in a nutshell he's proposing something that would take about 12 months to produce that would be far more comprehensive, and I think it would be far more valuable to this committee if he could undertake that study.
But my point here is that this only represents a particular and, I would say, narrow opinion, first of all. And secondly, I would go on to suggest that the assumptions that are made in here.... I think The Globe and Mail noted that Canada would have to turn itself into an environmental paradise overnight. It's a perfect case scenario and it really represents some things that are unrealistic--the California emission standards, for example. Buzz Hargrove of the Canadian Auto Workers union, a couple of years ago called that suicidal for the auto industry. It's not a realistic thing.
Don Drummond himself says that it's not reasonable to expect that technical advances will provide a solution by 2020, yet you're assuming certain things in the account itself.
Have you proposed this unrealistic policy scenario to cover what the actual costs are? They could be higher than what they're calling an economic upheaval, the biggest fiscal shock in Canadian history, deeply disruptive to the economy? Have you in fact underestimated what could be significantly higher costs to the economy?