TRAN Committee Report

During our study, the Committee heard from witnesses that there were critical challenges that need to be addressed which relate to what we term “human factors”.  These include non-punitive reporting of safety violations, fatigue management, personnel shortages, and insufficient crew training.

A. Non-Punitive Reporting

With regard to non-punitive reporting of safety violations, the Committee heard evidence that employees were reluctant to report safety violations, for fear of reprisals from the companies.  This was especially true in the case of CN rail, where employees stated they were working within a “culture of fear.”  While CP Rail was viewed as having a somewhat better approach to safety management, there was still concern that its safety record could be improved.  The fear of discipline for reporting safety violations was viewed by railway employees as a major deterrent to reporting such violations. 

This experience contrasts with the non-punitive reporting approach adopted in the airline industry in recent amendments to the Aeronautics Act under Bill C-7.  Indeed, in testimony before the Committee we heard from union representatives that a system of non-punitive reporting was one of the key elements in ensuring that SMS achieves the desired result of reducing accidents and improving employee safety.  We agree.  Therefore, the Committee recommends that:

Recommendation 9

The government amend the Railway Safety Act to require federally regulated railway companies to include in their Safety Management Systems, an effective process for the non-punitive reporting by employees of safety issues and incidents, violations and non-compliance with safety rules and regulations.

B. Fatigue Management

We heard from witnesses that fatigue management was a significant problem in the railroad industry.  Indeed, the Advisory Panel stated that it was convinced that the operational issue that affects an effective safety culture the most is fatigue management.  Witnesses told the Committee that the current Work/Rest Rules do not provide a satisfactory baseline framework for managing the risks associated with fatigue and they should better reflect the current science in this field.  We believe that there are lessons to be learned from the trucking and aviation industries and how these sectors handle fatigue.  As the Advisory Panel stated, this issue cries out for an effective solution and fast.

We realize that there are many issues surrounding fatigue management, such as crew scheduling, suitable away from home rest facilities for crews, and collective bargaining agreements.  However, the overriding issue should be to ensure that employees have the proper rest periods to ensure their safety and to provide for the safe operation of the railroad.  We believe that there needs to be a collaborative effort between the employees and the railroads to develop effective Work/Rest Rules based on current science and the operating experience of the railway employees.  Railway companies should have precise fatigue management plans and these should be carefully monitored by Transport Canada.  Therefore, the Committee recommends that:

Recommendation 10

The government mandate the railway companies to work with their employees to develop Work/Rest Rules and fatigue management plans based upon the current science and operating experience of their employees.

Recommendation 11

The railway companies file their fatigue management plans with Transport Canada and the department monitor the effective implementation of such plans.

C. Training

We were told by some witnesses that limited training was provided by CN Rail for newly hired employees.  This was occurring because of a shortage of employees to operate and service trains due to the difficulty recruiting and retaining employees resulting in these shortages.  While we understand that there may be a tendency to rush new employees through training to deal with staff shortages we believe that training cannot be compromised.  Transport Canada must stringently monitor the railways’ training programs to ensure they meet the proper training guidelines.  Therefore, the committee recommends that:

Recommendation 12

Transport Canada monitor the railway companies’ training programs for new employees to ensure they meet the highest practicable standards.

D. Resources

We were told throughout our hearings that more resources were required by Transport Canada to advance railroad safety – especially when it came to monitoring and auditing the implementation of SMS We have stressed this point in recommendation number 8 in an earlier section of our report. In the Advisory Panel’s view, the department has inadequate financial and human resources to carry out its many responsibilities in the area of railway safety.  We agree with the Advisory Panel and strongly urge the government to adopt its recommendation number 54 to give Transport Canada more resources to fulfill its mandate as inspector, auditor and monitor of the railway safety system.

We heard from witnesses that there are constantly evolving technologies that can be utilized to improve railway safety. These include systems for detecting rail flaws, hot box detectors, digital imaging and advanced train signal control systems. We also note, as did the Advisory Panel, that while the railways are investing in these technologies there is room for more innovation. This is especially true in the area of railway crossing safety. There is a need to increase the focus on scientific and technological advancements to improve safety in this area. As the Advisory Panel pointed out, crossing safety can be significantly improved with the use of moderately priced scientific innovation and technology to mitigate accidents. We believe that Transport Canada can play a leadership role in this area and provide the necessary guidance for implementing new technologies especially as they apply to railway crossing safety and track and wheel maintenance. Therefore, the Committee recommends that:

Recommendation 13

Transport Canada provide the leadership to implement new technologies for improving safety, with particular emphasis on railway crossings and track and wheel maintenance, and report its progress, within one year of the presentation of this report in the House of Commons, to the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities.

As we stated in the introduction of this report, we concur with the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Panel.  However, we want to stress that there needs to be a more proactive approach in addressing the issues raised by the Advisory Panel and the ones we have highlighted in our study. As stated earlier, we believe that much more progress should have been made during the past seven years in implementing the Safety Management Systems.

Some witnesses have said that the rail systems are fragile and safety improvements take time.  We do not entirely agree with this view.  The system was not too fragile to introduce new technologies, operate longer trains and establish new services to the heartland of North America.  Surely it is not too fragile to introduce new safety measures and regimes in a more timely manner.  We believe that the lack of action has come about for two reasons  – that it was not a high enough priority for the railroads and the government and that there has been a critical failure to communicate among the stakeholders on how safety issues must be addressed and how the SMS can be properly implemented.  These failures are hampering the development of a “safety culture” in the Canadian railroad industry.

The government must recognize the importance of rail safety and that its advancement and the proper implementation of SMS will require more resources and more commitment by the regulator.  The railroad companies will have to place a much higher priority on these issues than has previously been the case and all stakeholders must make a significant commitment to better communicate with each other.  We cannot overly stress how important we believe that better communication is the key to improvements in railway safety.  Until we have a clear indication of how the SMS is being implemented and working it may be necessary to increase the regulator’s oversight role.

In summary, to achieve increased safety and the efficient implementation of SMS there will have to be better communication among the stakeholders, more resources for the regulator and a higher priority given to railway safety by the government and the railroads.  This must be done as quickly as possible.  Therefore, the Committee recommends that:

Recommendation 14

Transport Canada report to the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, within two years of the presentation of this report in the House of Commons, on its progress and that of the railway companies in improving railway safety and the implementation of the Safety Management Systems and report annually thereafter.