TRAN Committee Report

Due to the frequency of rail accidents in Canada in the last few years, notably in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec, there is a concern that the rate of accidents is on the rise.  The repercussion from these accidents has been severe in terms of human fatalities and environmental damage.

In this context, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities passed a motion in October 2006 to conduct an in-depth inquiry into rail safety in Canada.  The motion reflects the Committee’s concerns regarding both the increase in main track derailments and the need for better rail safety generally across the country. 

At the end of December 2006, in an attempt to modernize the Railway Safety Act(RSA), the Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, announced the third review of the RSA, which came into force on 1 January 1989.  The Advisory Panel for the Railway Safety Act Review, which was appointed on 20 February 2007, released a Consultation Guidance Document on 30 March 2007 to help stakeholders participate in the public consultation process.  Beginning in April 2007, the Advisory Panel traveled to selected cities across Canada to consult with stakeholders, including the public, railway companies and their industry associations, railway company employees and their unions, railway customers (e.g., travelers and shippers) and their associations, the provinces and territories, municipalities, aboriginal and environmental groups, and federal government departments and agencies.  Consultations concluded in August 2007.  The Advisory Panel reported to the Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities with findings and over 50 recommendations.  The report was tabled on 7 March 2008 (a brief summary of the Advisory Panel’s findings are presented in Appendix B of this report). 

During the Committee’s deliberations, we heard witnesses from Transport Canada, the unions, the railroads as well as from the Advisory Panel on rail safety.  While we endorse the findings and recommendations contained in the Advisory Panel’s report, we believe that more needs to be done and there is considerable room for progress to ensure that rail safety meets the highest practicable standards.  We believe, after hearing from the witnesses and reviewing the Advisory Panel’s report, that in some areas, the Advisory Panel’s recommendations can be strengthened.  This was particularly evident in the area of Safety Management Systems (SMS) and their implementation.

What was evident from our study was that three major themes were continually raised during our hearings.  These were: the governance and regulatory framework; safety management systems; and human factors.

In some instances, there is an overlap between themes as is the case with governance, human factors and the Safety Management Systems.  We stress however, that common through all of the themes, is the paramount issue of the lack of communication.  We were continually struck by the fact, that while safety and the implementation of SMS were stressed by all stakeholders as being the overriding objective of the railroads and the government, there was a lack of attention to the most vital component of achieving that goal – communication.

These themes are discussed in the following sections of the report along with our recommendations for improving rail safety in Canada.

Throughout the Committee’s hearings we heard evidence that there was a lack of accountability on the part of both Transport Canada and the railroads with regard to rail safety.  Witnesses stated that the regulator was not accountable enough in enforcing safety regulations, harmonizing regulations across the regions and conducting safety audits in a timely manner and making audit results public.  The railways, for their part, were criticised for the lack of meaningful management-employee consultations, poor crew training and poor prioritizing, implementing and carrying out of safety procedures.

We are particularly concerned with what appears to be a lack of consistency on how the rules and regulations are applied across the regions.  While we recognize that there are regional differences, in terms of climate and geography, that might require variations in how rules are interpreted, we believe that that there must be overall consistency in how rail safety is treated across the country.  The railroads and the employees must have a clear understanding of how the rules are interpreted and applied.  To achieve this, the Rail Safety Directorate in Transport Canada must work more collaboratively with the regional offices in developing a national safety framework while, at the same time, allowing for flexibility to meet local needs.

We agree with the Advisory Panel’s first recommendation calling for the Rail Safety Directorate to assert its existing responsibility to provide guidance to the regions on the enforcement of rail safety rules and regulations.  However, we would like to know how Transport Canada will achieve this goal and how long it will take.  Therefore the Committee recommends that:

Recommendation 1

Transport Canada report, within one year from the presentation of this report in the House of Commons, to the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, on its progress in providing guidance to the regional offices, on the application of safety rules and regulations.

Railroad employees told the Committee that with regard to the adoption of new rules and implementing safety procedures they participated in only cursory consultations with the companies and were not an integral part of the process.  They stated that, especially in the case of CN Rail, there was a perceived “disconnect” between management and frontline workers in understanding management’s commitment to safety.  It was pointed out, that until recently, CN Rail did not have a senior management official dedicated to rail safety.  This issue will be more fully addressed in the following section dealing with Safety Management Systems.

We were also told that the present governance structure lacks sufficient regulatory tools to ensure the enforcement of rail safety.  In fact, Transport Canada told the Committee that it had become apparent that the current regulatory framework may not provide the full set of tools to effectively deal with safety enforcement.  The department also stated that there is a view that the current framework needs to be modernized and better aligned with safety legislation in other modes of transport in Canada.  This view was also held by the Advisory Panel, which called for the adoption of Administrative Monetary Penalties (AMP) for companies that violate safety rules. We agree with this recommendation.  Currently, there is no provision for fines under the RSA.

We believe that at the core of these concerns is the lack of an effective governance regime, both within the railroads and the regulator.  We are encouraged that Transport Canada has established an Advisory Council on Railway Safety (ACRS) to provide a forum for the development and assessment of changes to the Railway Safety Act (RSA) regulatory framework through collaborative activities and for dialogue on railway safety issues.  However, we are concerned that we do not know what kind of power the Council will have and how it will “feed” into Transport Canada’s decision making process. 

We were told by witnesses and the Advisory Panel that there needs to be a better understanding of rail safety rules and how they are developed.  That there needs to be a more structured and inclusive procedure established for rule making to ensure that all interested parties, especially labour, are included in the process.  We believe that the ACRS could provide the appropriate model to achieve this if its mandate is clarified to include a formal process for rule making.  Therefore, the Committee recommends that:

Recommendation 2

The government mandate the Advisory Council on Railway Safety (ACRS) to be an integral component of the rule making process with participants from all interested parties and ensure that its decisions are formally integrated into Transport Canada’s rule approval procedures.

We also note that the Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities has tasked a joint Transport Canada – Industry steering committee to develop an action plan to address the Advisory Panel’s recommendations.  This steering committee is composed of officials from Transport Canada and the Railway Association of Canada (RAC) but does not have representatives from railway labour.  As we have stated earlier, communication is one of the keys to improving railway safety and all participants in the industry must be part of the decision making process.  Without labour representatives on the steering committee, full communication is not possible. 

Therefore, the Committee recommends that:

Recommendation 3

The government ensure adequate representation from railway labour organizations be part of the joint Transport Canada – Industry steering committee that is developing an action plan to address the Advisory Panel’s recommendations.

The most important area of concern raised throughout our deliberations was the implementation of SMS.  Safety Management Systems are not a new concept.  They began in the 1990s as a new way to manage safety.  SMS regulations were added to the Railway Safety Act in 1999 and came into effect in 2001.  The Act, as amended, requires the railroads to implement and maintain an SMS, which is defined as a formal framework for integrating safety into day to day railway operations.  It includes a safety policy with annual safety targets and initiatives to meet those targets.  There must be clear responsibility for safety at all levels of the company and a means to involve employees in safety management.

In addition, as was stated by the Advisory Panel, within the SMS there must be:

• systems for identifying and showing compliance with applicable rules and regulations;
• a process for identifying hazards and assessing and mitigating risk;
• processes and procedures for accident reporting and investigation;
• methods to ensure that employees are properly trained;
• procedures for data collection and analysis and periodic internal safety audits; and
• requirements for monitoring corrective actions and consolidating documentation. 

While we strongly agree with the concept of the SMS, we would not recommend that it replace the current regulatory system.  As the Advisory Panel stated, the SMS is not intended to replace existing rail safety regulations, rules or standards, but to develop a more comprehensive way of managing safety by complementing the existing regulatory framework.  We agree.

We have serious concerns regarding both the delays and the manner in which the SMS has been implemented by the railways and the government.  We have heard that: it is difficult to create a “safety culture”; that this requires time and patience; that communications, especially with employees, has been difficult or non-existent; and that the system is “fragile.”  It has been almost seven years since the railroads have been required to implement SMS and in our opinion, as well as that of the Advisory Panel, the railroads and Transport Canada have not made sufficient progress in attaining this goal.  In fact, as the Chair of the Advisory Panel told the Committee, on a scale of one to five, with five being the optimum level, CN was at level 1 or 2, CP at 3 and Via Rail at about 4.  With only one railway at the upper level of the scale, this is not, in our view, acceptable progress.  This, coupled with the fact that employees who were at the front line of implementing SMS had, in many cases, very limited knowledge of SMS and what their role in this system was, makes it is inconceivable how SMS can successfully be implemented.  Here again, we believe that the lack of communication is at the root of the problem.

We also note that Transport Canada has a key role to play in the successful implementation of SMS.  We heard from witnesses as well as the Advisory Panel that the regulator requires a change in its approach to developing a safety culture.  The Advisory Panel stated that Transport Canada would have to reorganize its activities to better integrate SMS as the key focus of its oversight role.

We are of the opinion that, if more stringent oversight by Transport Canada had taken place, there might have been better results in implementing SMS and the railroads would have been further along in developing a safety culture than they are today.  Transport Canada will have to take a much more “hands on approach” in this process if we are to see a favourable implementation of SMS in a timely manner.  To be at the stage we are today, after seven years, is clearly not acceptable.

In order to achieve the successful implementation of SMS, we recommend that three initiatives must take place.  First, Transport Canada and the railroads must develop an action plan for implementing SMS.  This should include the steps taken to date and the future steps required to fully implement SMS and the timeline for full implementation.  Second, Transport Canada and the railroads must develop a concrete assessment tool to continuously monitor the progress of SMS implementation.  Finally, Transport Canada and the railroads should report their progress to the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities within six months of the presentation of this report in the House of Commons.

Furthermore, we agree with the view of the Advisory Panel when it stated that the weakest component in SMS plans appears to be in the management of human resources and organizational factors, rather than the technical or equipment aspects.

Needless to say, we believe that labour has to be meaningfully involved in every step of this process and recommend that the regulator ensures that this takes place.  We further suggest that this can be most effectively done through the participation of the railway health and safety committees.  Without this, there can be little effective communication among railway employees, railway management and Transport Canada.

Finally, we want to stress, that given the slow and uneven pace of implementing SMS, we do not envisage it replacing a rigorous inspection program, with the appropriate level of resources, by Transport Canada.  Therefore, the Committee recommends that:

Recommendation 4

Transport Canada and the railroad companies develop, within one year of the presentation of this report in the House of Commons, an action plan for the implementation of SMS, including timelines for full implementation of the system.

Recommendation 5

Transport Canada and the railroad companies develop a concrete assessment tool to continually monitor the implementation of SMS.

Recommendation 6

Transport Canada ensure that union and non union railway employees are meaningfully involved and consulted at every stage of implementing the SMS.

Recommendation 7

Transport Canada and the railway companies report their progress in adopting measures to facilitate the implementation of SMS to the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities within six months of the presentation of this report in the House of Commons.

Recommendation 8

Transport Canada ensure that a rigorous rail safety inspection process is in place, with adequate resources to properly administer this program.