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At this time, I'd like to call the meeting to order.
I want to welcome everyone here. Bienvenue à tous. On behalf of the committee, I especially want to extend a welcome to the witnesses.
Today, pursuant to the Standing Orders, we're dealing with chapter 5, “Keeping the Border Open and Secure - Canada Border Services Agency” of the October 2007 report of the Auditor General of Canada. The committee is very pleased to have with us today, representing the Office of the Auditor General, Hugh McRoberts, assistant auditor general, accompanied by Gordon Stock, principal; and representing the Canada Border Services Agency, we have Alain Jolicoeur, president. Bienvenue Monsieur Jolicoeur. We have Stephen Rigby, executive vice-president, and also accompanying him is Cathy Munroe, director general of programs and operational services directorate. Again, welcome everyone.
I understand, Mr. McRoberts, you're going to give an opening statement on behalf of the Office of the Auditor General, and I invite you to give your opening statement now.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for inviting me to discuss chapter 5 of our October 2007 report, “Keeping the Border Open and Secure”, an audit of the Canada Border Services Agency.
With me today is Gordon Stock, principal of the public safety team responsible for this audit.
The Canada Border Services Agency has a wide-ranging mandate. Every year it allows 96 million people to enter Canada and it approves the entry of $404.5 billion worth of imported goods. Its 12,800 staff provide a full-time presence at 148 border points and a limited presence at a further 1,121 locations across Canada.
[Translation]
This was our first performance audit looking specifically at the agency since it was created in December 2003. As such, we examined those areas of the agency that focus on its expanded mandate. The areas included the border functions of three legacy organizations—customs from the former Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, immigration from Citizenship and Immigration, and animal and plant inspection from the Food Inspection Agency. Added to this was the agency's expanded mandate in national security.
[English]
This expanded mandate requires the agency to facilitate the flow of legitimate goods and people while also supporting national security and public safety priorities. We found that the agency and its predecessor organizations had been refining their risk management approach to border management for more than a decade, but they did not have an integrated risk management framework in place.
Border management can be characterized as a number of sequential layers of protective measures. However, without an integrated framework, a weakness that is encountered in one area is not recognized and mitigated through additional evidence in the next layer of protection. For example, we found that containers that were not scanned before they arrived at the port of entry were not subject to additional procedures or examination to bring down the risk to an acceptable level. The committee may wish to ask the agency about the progress it has made in its risk management approach to managing the Canadian border.
[Translation]
We found that the agency does not have a risk-based model to determine the resources required for all ports of entry and modes of travel. For example, the decision to choose people and goods for further examination upon arrival at a port of entry is based on an assessment of risk indicators by border services officers. However, the overall rate of examinations is based mainly on the capacity of personnel and availability of equipment.
We also found that the reason to refer individuals and shipments for further examination is not fully communicated to those officers doing the secondary examination, and results of the examination are not always documented. Without this information, the agency does not have the information it needs to determine whether it is appropriately matching the level of examination activity to the level of risk.
[English]
The agency now receives considerably more information on travellers and shipments in advance of their arrival than it did five years ago. It is one of the few border service agencies to use automatic risk scoring systems to analyze advance information and to target higher-risk people and goods for additional examination.
However, the agency has not systematically examined whether these tools have improved its ability to identify national security risks or prevent the entry of prohibited goods or people. We found that the border service officers perceived weaknesses with these systems and relied on more traditional examination methods. The agency recognizes these weaknesses in the new systems and is working to improve them.
In recent years, the agency has developed a number of pre-approval programs to speed the entry of lower-risk people and goods. The agency cannot currently prevent someone from enrolling in these programs when intelligence information suggests that a person poses a higher risk, but it may carry out additional monitoring. We found, however, that even with this monitoring, the agency did not have processes in place to ensure that net risk levels were reduced to low.
[Translation]
We found that the agency has successfully used specialized inspection equipment to make high-value seizures at ports of entry. However, we noted that the agency had not linked the use of this equipment to its assessment of risk. Further, not all individuals and shipments that were identified as high risk—and referred for further examination—were actually examined at ports of entry, and explanations for not performing additional examinations were not documented.
[English]
From our work, there are three overriding factors that we would like to bring to the committee's attention. Together, these factors would allow the agency to respond quickly to a changing risk environment.
I have already mentioned the first factor, the need for a robust integrated risk management approach to border management.
The second factor is the need for random examinations, which are an excellent control, as they are the one type of examination that cannot be beaten by those who wish to go undetected. In our audit, we found that random examinations were often the first thing to be cast aside when workload increased.
The third factor is the need to document the results of all examinations, not only to have a record of decisions made but to serve as a foundation to measure performance and determine where there is room for improvement.
Without combining these three factors, the agency is reacting to a changing environment instead of managing it.
Mr. Chair, thank you. This concludes my opening statement. We'll be happy to respond to the committee's questions.
Chair, members, and representatives of the Auditor General, thank you for the opportunity to provide the CBSA's perspective on the Auditor General's report.
I'd like to introduce my colleagues: Stephen Rigby, executive vice-president; and Ms. Cathy Munroe, the director general of the operations branch.
First, it's important to understand the critical role of the border in ensuring both security and prosperity. The border plays a dual role of facilitation and security. Smart and secure borders keep criminals and other dangerous elements out and allow for efficient border support of immigration, trade, and tourism.
[Translation]
WIth thousands of trucks, boats, aircraft and travellers going across Canada's borders every day, it goes without saying that our agency plays a vital role in ensuring access to the Canadian economy. Here is an overview of what goes across the border every day: 17,000 trucks and 260,000 travellers. Further, over $70 million in taxes are collected every day and cross-border trade totals over $1.9 billion every day.
[English]
While we must be vigilant against dangerous people and goods, we must also ensure that the border is a gateway to prosperity, not a cumbersome checkpoint that hurts our economy.
The genesis of the CBSA was a very rare occurrence, where a new organization was created overnight by putting together pieces of three different organizations with a new mandate. The formation of a 13,000-person and $1.5-billion organization is a huge and complex undertaking. We've built this organization while operating on a 7/24 basis in a post-9/11 environment, with ongoing demands for new border services and significant resource pressures. In spite of these pressures, we are confident that our people and processes make Canada's border among the most secure and efficient in the world.
We have made significant progress in establishing the agency. CBSA is now a more mature and stable organization and has achieved some significant results in 2006-07, including over 10,000 weapons seized, 500 of which were firearms; 9,000 drug seizures, valued at over $400 million; and the removal of over 12,000 inadmissible persons in 2006, including 2,000 for reasons of criminality.
[Translation]
Clearly all nations, including Canada, cannot guarantee absolute safety against border threats. CBSA processes an average of 97 million travellers every year and approves the entry of over $400 billion in imported goods annually. It is impossible to stop and check every individual and every piece of merchandise.
Therefore, our focus must be on risk management. Over the past four years, the CBSA has developed a robust and sophisticated border management regime with a scientific approach to risk assessment and detection.
[English]
CBSA risk management is multi-layered. Our operations are based on three fundamental strategies: pre-approval programs to facilitate low-risk people and goods; advance information on what and who is coming to the border to identify high or unknown risk people and goods; and then turning this information into intelligence using sophisticated science and technology-based risk assessment systems.
[Translation]
CBSA is now engaged in huge and complex initiatives that will further transform and modernize border management, including deploying new science and technology such as biometrics for identifying trusted travellers, and sophisticated detection technologies for radiation; arming border officers and eliminating situations where they are working alone; working with U.S. counterparts in ensuring that the western hemisphere travel initiative is implemented as smoothly as possible and does not impede travel and cross-border trade.
But our work is far from being done. Integration is not fully completed yet. There are still many finishing touches to apply.
[English]
The Auditor General's report highlights areas where we need to, and will, make progress. The CBSA concurs with all the recommendations in the AG's report, which are indeed consistent with our ongoing actions and future plans.
A comprehensive action plan has been developed to address all of the recommendations, and actions have already been taken and completed, in some cases. As I said, we agree with the Auditor General that we can and must do better. Implementing her recommendations will enhance our ability to manage risk and improve border operations.
Thank you, and I look forward to our discussion.
Finally, we'll return to this particular subject, but I have other concerns. I've heard from officers that perhaps individuals flagged by INTERPOL could get on an airplane, be on a list—noted at Heathrow—arrive in Canada, and since many people have dual or triple passports these days, all they have to do is switch their passports and they can get through primary without being flagged. Could you answer that?
Also, something that I have found perplexing, and it's perhaps really low tech, but it's common sense. Virtually every country in the world has separate lines for the citizens of their countries, as they enter primary inspection, and separate lines for non-citizens. In this post-9/11 world, why wouldn't we have done something as simple as that?
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--and I'll try to capture them rapidly.
I have read the Auditor General's report many times. Indeed, I said that I agree with all of the recommendations and will repeat it as often as you want.
The question of the percentage of lookouts that would be missed by officers is a question of training. There is no doubt in my mind, zero doubt, that we don't miss one-fifth of the lookouts. The report and the procedure referred to a sub-area, and we can discuss that, but that would not be a proper projection in the whole universe of lookouts.
You made a point about the question of exchange of passports. This is a serious concern, and we have procedures in place to ensure that people come with the right passport. We have rovers and employees who are in the area where the exchange could be made. We also have something that's unique and that other countries, including the United States, would like to do: we have migration integrity officers in airports all over the world, in 39 countries. They basically work against that phenomenon. We have had success; we intercept more than 5,000 people every year who are trying to come in using these mechanisms. So we are doing that, and we are training our people so they can be better at doing that.
Your last point was on separate lines. I get that comment often, and when I travel and come back I make that comment myself. We discussed it, and we've tried it many times. Most of the time we've had to get out of it because the ratio of Canadians and non-Canadians in big airports is changing very rapidly; therefore, it is turning out to be less efficient to do it that way. But we will explore it again. We are actually doing it at Vancouver International Airport with the help of the airport authority, who are putting some resources into doing traffic management, because you need to adjust the flow of traffic very rapidly when you do that.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning and thank you for being here.
When I read the Auditor General's report on how the services of the Canadian Border Services Agency are generally organized, I got the impression that there is no integration with regard to the various areas in which you work. Perhaps I'm mistaken, but there seems to be one strategy for airports and another for ports, and yet another for land crossings. There are different strategies for small ports and for big ones, for small airports and for big ones. There is nothing to pull all these areas together. In saying this I am referring to paragraph 5.19 of the Auditor General's report, which says that the strategic plan you developed in 2007-2008 is incomplete.
The main risks were not integrated into this strategic plan. Of course, if the main risks are not integrated, you cannot evaluate or even identify what needs to be done to prevent those risks. The implementation plan is not in line with the overall strategic planning. I would like you to comment on this.
:
Mr. Chairman, that observation is important and fair. If you look at risk management, the strategic planning for an organization is targeted planning based largely on each area, rather than planning which is completely integrated. This is an important aspect of the Auditor General's report and we are working on it.
However, in each area, the planning is fairly solid now as regards specific problems, including contraband tobacco, or other issues such as illegal activities in airports. Our most recent risk analysis model is without a doubt state-of-the-art. We are world leaders in that regard.
However, something important is missing, and that is our ability to deploy resources from one area to another in a planned manner and based on a risk analysis approach which is completely integrated into the organization. This was one of the main points raised by the Auditor General. We expect our next strategic plan, not the one which will be presented in a few months, but the one after that, to be based on what the Auditor General recommended.
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Mr. Chairman, container examination has changed over the past few years. Four years ago, the approach we took was quite individual. The number or proportion of containers that we were able to examine had not changed very much for many years. What did change, however, was the capacity to select those containers that we wanted to examine more closely. This is now a two-level examination. For the first level, the examination is conducted with the assistance of VACIS equipment which scans 3 to 4% of all containers per year. For the second level, which is a more in-depth examination, we open and empty the container. This procedure is very costly, not only for our organization but also for the importers, who have to pay for a good portion of the expenses.
The system that we implemented, which enables us to decide in advance whether a container can be loaded onto a boat or not, gives rise to two concerns. First of all, there is a significant terrorist risk and there is a need to obtain information from the importers. We also have to involve the people who are responsible for transporting the merchandise. Occasionally, because of this system, containers are not loaded onto the boats when we have not been able to obtain all of the required information.
And now for your question. In most instances, this information is available before the container arrives. Once the container has arrived, certain information may still be missing, information which should really be verified. But such information is not necessarily missing for all containers. Indeed, as I mentioned, we really have to manage our risks. So each decision made locally deals with containers that we want to take a closer look at. A good proportion of these containers should be examined, but not necessarily just those ones.
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That's correct. Nav Canada has the general aviation data the Auditor General had an issue with. So that's being dealt with.
Another thing that cross-references to the.... My concern, if some of the issues still exist that the Auditor General pointed out, is that CANPASS and NEXUS are two programs people pay a fee to join, but the benefits they receive seem to defy logic, as the Auditor General points out. Maybe you can explain it. On page 14, it says CANPASS members who are in a private boat program can call ahead and be let through if no customs officers are there.
Apparently those of higher risk who are not members can phone when they arrive, but the Auditor General said more than 93% of the boaters who reported to the agency by telephone did not see an agent either.
My concern is twofold. One is obviously for security. The second is it's only going to be a matter of time until CANPASS and NEXUS members begin to hear about that and ask why they would pay this fee and do this? Could you explain that circumstance to me, please.
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Yes, and at some point I'll ask for help from my colleague, Madam Munroe.
It is a difficult area. We've been discussing these programs with the United States CBP, our equivalent organization in the U.S., in the Department of Homeland Security. The drive for the marine NEXUS program, the main thing here, has really been coming from the U.S., which believes it's a proper way to risk manage these situations. We have to think of the border as being 8,500 kilometres long, if you add the Alaskan one too. And you can talk about the lakes, the rivers, and everything. We have to have a risk management approach to these. The U.S. believes, and we've had very many discussions on this, that by risk managing it this way we reduce breaches overall—but we don't reduce breaches to zero.
The only way to have a secure approach to these large areas, where we basically cannot be, would be to have armies of people, border patrols or police, all over the country. Without them, we have to risk manage the situation.
As to your other question on NEXUS vis-à-vis non-NEXUS, well, there are different places where NEXUS can go where others cannot, but I'll let my colleague comment on that.
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Just to clarify this, we have instituted a number of measures to help mitigate risk in these areas. These include working with our colleagues, such as the RCMP and U.S. border agencies, and so on, to undertake various projects and to exchange information and do what we need to do to target areas where we can focus our efforts. We also have targeted teams that go out and do unexpected verifications, if you will, in specific locations for a period of time, allowing us to collect data to do risk assessments on these various areas, as well as to provide a deterrent effect.
So it's not simply limited to the number of people who report in—but, obviously, as Monsieur Jolicoeur has indicated, we can't be everywhere.
In terms of the report-in for the NEXUS and CANPASS participants, we do have additional locations available above and beyond the regular reporting locations for these members. Certainly, because there are a lot of border communities and boaters, tourists, and so on, who use these programs, these locations are of benefit to them because they don't have to travel quite so far to report in.
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Thank you very much, Chair.
Thank you all for being here today.
I want to begin by referring back to your opening statement. You said on page 3, “Therefore, our focus must be on risk management”. So you're making it a priority, and yet the Auditor General has pointed out that in using these automatic risk-scoring systems—which apparently not that many countries are using yet—you didn't have any systemic method of determining whether or not they were actually working.
So from the beginning, I'm having some trouble understanding this. You are claiming that risk management is your focus, your priority, and yet something as obvious as having a system to review how effective an automated system it is—especially when it's not used across the system—doesn't seem to me to match up with what you are saying. It's almost as if you are saying this, but it wasn't there in reality.
Could you comment, please?
The introduction of new technology like that, a new system to manage risk, is something that needs to be planned very, very specifically. In this case, it is true that in the first couple of years we were not good at collecting information in two areas. One of them was the specific results obtained by the machine; the other was creating a sample or another parallel area where, say, containers would have been opened randomly or people referred randomly, and we measured the extent to which we were doing this better than a random result.
We have done this now. Following the visit of the Auditor General, we now have a system that collects that information. Version four of our risk-scoring machine actually integrates that information; we don't even have to input it. It compares the results and gets additional information. Not only that, but a portion of it uses artificial intelligence to do something that no human being could do, to combine the risk indicators in different ways based on what you've been saying, based on past information and past results.
So that's significant progress, but it's true that at the first level, with the first package over the first two years, we didn't do enough of that. But you need that as well. You need a bit of a time period to justify what—
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The comment made by the Auditor General makes reference to how it is done by our sister organization, CBP in the United States, which goes to that additional step we have not put in place.
Our program was developed in pre-9/11 mode. We admit that we could have a tighter program. Actually what we've done is this. I went to Brussels with our colleague from the U.S. and we sold to the whole community of border organizations across the world a new approach to trade facilitation and a way to secure trade around the world, which included something called the authorized economic operator. So we have developed some sort of a standard for that very business.
I'm pleased to report that in June this year we will have achieved mutual recognition with the United States. We will be the first or second one to have achieved this. Therefore, our program will be exactly the same as the U.S. C-TPAT program. The extent to which verification will be made before an importer can be put on that list and be stamped as fit for C-TPAT will be the exact same thing on both sides. I agree, it has required a lot of action on our part to reach that point, but we're going to be able to celebrate that mutual recognition in June. They will accept our verification.
When we look at the concept of trying to manage risks, I would assume that when we recognize the trade problems, the economic arrangements that we have with the United States, and their concerns with terrorism and so forth, our major concern really has to be the North American continent and which dangerous people would come to Canada or what dangerous goods would be delivered here. We have to protect ourselves so we'll not be seen as a conduit to attacking our neighbour to the south. I would think the Americans would be watching that very closely.
With the various agencies you work with internationally—and you talk about the systems you have—I would think that you would have a highly automated system to hear from other countries, and if a ship or a plane were leaving a certain destination for Canada, your people would get advance warning of a possible problem. Are you satisfied that within your budget and with the equipment you have and the software available to you, you have an adequate program that gives you fast information to be able to deal with possible problems before they actually arrive, or when they do arrive, in Canada?
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Mr. Chair, the question of advance information has been at the centre of our organization since we created it. What we essentially put in place, with the help of partner organizations from within Canada and from other countries, is a multi-layered approach. We basically try to stop the threat before it comes to the continent. I must say our partners in the U.S. are very comfortable with that approach. They have a similar approach, and whenever possible we do it jointly.
In our case, it involves working regularly with other border organizations in very many countries in the world. It includes having CBSA officers deployed in very many airports all over the world to do interception. It includes the deployment to ports in other countries of our CSI program people to ensure that containers of real concern are scanned. It involves receiving all that information that we have discussed before.
Regarding airlines, we don't have it all. Your question was whether we are satisfied. We're not quite there, but we've moved a long way. We are getting information on containers from freight forwarders and carriers and importers, and we're getting the ability to reconcile it. Behind it we have the risk-scoring mechanism that digests all that, and behind that we have the normal thing that everybody has, which is officers, who, day in, day out, are looking at people and goods and ensuring that the country is protected.
We have created that multi-line, multi-border approach just to ensure that we are basically more secure.
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Your budget, you indicate, is $1.5 billion, and you indicate that $100 million is for firearms. You also indicate that it's going to cost probably $700 million or $800 million. With that, I would think, you must have a promise of money in the future for that same project.
Firearms are a major problem, and I see in your report that you say you only seized 500 firearms, but you seized 10,000 weapons. With respect to firearms on the streets of Toronto, they say you are doing a very poor job of keeping those firearms out of our country. That must be a concern to you, and hopefully you're making some progress with that.
I'm concerned about the 10,000, what you call, weapons. Are these personal weapons, like knives and swords, or could they be...? For example, there are various crude weapons that can bring down aircraft today. What types of weapons are you indicating you've seized? Are they a danger to our nuclear plants? Are they like self-projected missiles, which they use in the Middle East today? Are they weapons coming to our borders that are a danger to our aircraft? What types of weapons are we talking about when you say 10,000?
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Thank you. I think you've satisfied my concern that there is work being done in this area, because it seems to me it has a lot of potential and should be fully exploited or optimized.
I'm assuming that on initial inspection at the border, on primary inspection, a combination of three things would be occurring. One would be some sort of objective risk assessment that's taking place. There has to be some profiling of people who would fall into higher-risk categories than others would, and some knowledge on that.
Another part of the criteria would be a random selection process. If somebody beat the profiling system, you could maybe pick them up in the random selection.
The third one—I don't want to underestimate it, because I know experienced police officers and people in the field and so on—would be called human judgment, based on experience, gut feelings, and so on.
Would it be a fair comment to suggest that the people at the border are using all three of these criteria in assessing people who come to the border?
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Absolutely. If somebody wants to know why they have been referred to secondary, for example, the answer is exactly the one that you have given.
The system may force somebody to go to secondary because of one zillion combinations of reasons, but all having to do with what we have in our system. It could be random. The report from the AG made the point that in airports, on occasion, we have turned the valve of random too low, occasionally to zero. We have corrected that, because it is a concern.
The third one you flag is quite important. There are today more, slightly more, referrals made in that third category, where an experienced officer judges, from the kind of reaction they are getting from a passenger, “Hmm, there's something....”
Another area I want to pursue is relevant to my constituency. I have a lot of people who are in businesses that rely upon American citizens who travel to Canada to fish and hunt, who are tourists in the area and so on. I've encountered a problem in my riding with border issues pertaining to Americans.
The profile that typically shows up is some American 63 years of age who, back when he was 19 years of age, was charged with impaired driving. There doesn't seem to be any consistent pattern for treatment of these individuals at the border. Some are turned back. Some believe they are pardoned under the state system, but our border people don't seem to accept that concept. In some cases, they allow them in on paying a cash payment at the border. It's not a bond. I mean, they don't get the money back, they just make a cash payment. And this has caused a lot of difficulty. I've had lots of complaints in my riding from people who are affected one way or another on this issue.
Is this an issue that is relevant to your department? Are you trying to deal with it? Because on a risk assessment system, I really don't see where this should be a priority at the border, this sort of concern.
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Yes, I recently looked at this question again, because I was getting a few more complaints than in the past.
Let's look at the numbers first. The first point that's made—not here, but it's one I get all the time—is that we are turning more people away for that reason, for driving under the influence. But no, we are not. In terms of the people who are turned away, the numbers on that kind of thing are reducing as opposed to increasing.
Now, we're working with the law, with IRPA, and the law is fairly specific about admissibility into the country. Anything that is criminal makes one inadmissible to the country, if you are not Canadian. There are a few things an officer can do to deal with that...of course, the difference being is that it's illegal in Canada and not in the United States.
:
Thank you, Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Before moving to the second round, I have a question for you, Mr. Jolicoeur. It's a general question on reporting to Parliament and the whole concept of accountability.
First of all, I preface my remarks by saying that I appreciate that you deal with an extremely complex and challenging agency with 97 million visitors and $404 billion in goods coming across the border every year. No one expects you to search every person or examine all goods. It has to be based upon a risk management model, and you have to balance the competing objectives of security on the one hand and continued prosperity on the other hand.
The Auditor General has identified what I think most members on this committee consider to be significant shortcomings in your whole risk management model. However, I read your performance report for the 2006-07 year. It's 94 pages in length. It's very long and elaborate. But the bottom line is that everything in that department is simply tremendous. It's great.
I'll just quote if I may, talking about commercial risk assessments:
The ACI program is based on the concept that the transmission of electronic commercial data allows the CBSA to better assess the risk of conveyances and goods before their arrival in Canada. To enhance its risk-management capability, the CBSA developed and implemented an automated Commercial Risk Assessment System to screen ACI in order to identify high-risk shipments before they arrive at our border.
Building on the success of Phase I of the ACI program, which was implemented in the marine mode in 2004, the CBSA expanded the ACI model to the transborder marine and air modes as part of Phase II. Phase II was fully implemented in June 2006.
Since the implementation of Phase II, there have been ongoing enhancements and refinements to the Commercial Risk Assessment System to support the Agency's ability to respond to emerging threats to health, safety and security of Canadians.
Then we go about the awards that you've won. There's no mention at all, Mr. Jolicoeur, of the challenges the agency faces, the risks you have every day, the resources that you don't have to complete your mandate, and the shortcomings that were identified on the part of the Auditor General, which, of course, you've agreed to.
I ask my question as a parliamentarian, and I address my question to you as an accounting officer. With all due respect, and I say this with the greatest respect, because your department has an extremely difficult task ahead.... You merged the three components, the three departments, and you're in transition. People expect that trade is increasing and that the volume of people is increasing, and we're dealing with the “gotcha” mentality if there is a problem and you hear about it. But if there are one million or three million people crossing a day, you don't hear about it.
But going back to the performance report, my question is, do you think it's based in reality? Why is it prepared--and I'm not signalling at you. The 78 agencies, the 22 departments in Ottawa do this, and they've done it for years. Does it serve any purpose at all for me as a parliamentarian? Would you be happy sitting down yourself as the accounting officer doing a 15- to 20-page report and giving us the straight goods as to the agency you are charged with?
:
Mr. Chair, I'll give you my personal opinion on that. I stand by everything that was written in that report. Everything you've read and said is true.
Now your question is fundamentally, as a parliamentarian, what should you get and what would you like to get? I sit on a few boards. Everything is a-okay. The report I get on the other side now tends to have a significant portion about risks in Sarbanes-Oxley and everything.
I've been at Treasury Board for many years feeding Parliament, and I can say honestly that I really believe there has been a significant improvement in reporting to Parliament, reporting on results, etc. It's a tough thing to do, but there has been some progress. I understand the frustration.
I think the piece that I normally see and otherwise that you should be expecting to see—again, my personal view—is a more elaborate section about risk. I do not mean risk as we've discussed it here--not programs--but overall corporation risk. I believe we could do better. I can certainly do what I can here to try to improve what we submit to Parliament. But I would say that's a piece that tends to be missing. I'm not talking about CBSA in particular. I'm talking about the job you have to do.
Thank you to the witnesses.
I share many of the concerns that have been brought up. One of the concerns I have is that there's a lot of money and attention being put into the area of border security; in fact, there will be $1 billion spent on arming border officers in the next 10 years. But we know there are a lot of competing priorities for those dollars.
The Auditor General's report raised a number of concerns. Mr. McRoberts, I haven't heard you to this point, but the Canada Border Services Agency agreed with the recommendations that were found in the audit. You've heard what they've had to say today, and I'm wondering whether your office has been satisfied with the implementation of the recommendations to this point and the action taken by CBSA.
:
When the program was originally developed, we looked at the whole question of what information we would look at in terms of establishing the risk assessment. We did take legal advice that intelligence information would be difficult for us to use in denying applications that were put forward.
That said, however, we have, in the last little while, tried to enhance our monitoring processes so that if we do see something from an intelligence point of view, and I think our colleagues from the Auditor General's office have pointed this out in the chapter, we try to ensure that when these people are looked at in a subsequent year—so-called re-risking, as we do it—they continue to be a low risk in all other categories.
The other point I might make is that we're in the process of looking at the NEXUS program with our colleagues in the United States, and we're going to revisit the whole question from a legal point of view as to whether we can or cannot use intelligence information in the future.
:
No. The way the process works is that they essentially have to apply to both countries. Both countries pursue their own individual risk assessments. Ours is based on individual information that we seek from their applications; we establish their risk based on that.
The point has been made, I think, that the Americans will on occasion use intelligence information that is available, and they may or may not use it as part of the establishment of their risk.
In our case, the position we take, on the basis of legal advice, is that to deny something on the basis of intelligence information would not be legally defensible. That said, we have recognized that it's probably time to take another look at this, and we are going to do that.
We do, however, as a matter of course now—it's something we've implemented recently—make a note that there may have been something brought to our attention as a result of intelligence information, and when we do subsequent risk assessments, we will continue to check whether or not anything untoward has happened with regard to that member, whether or not they represent low risk in all other aspects of their membership.
:
Thank you. Do I have four or five, Mr. Chair?
The Chair: Four.
Mr. David Christopherson: Thank you. That will give me time for one line of questioning.
There was a letter recently published in the New Brunswick Telegraph-Journal from the executive director of the Atlantic Provinces Trucking Association. He was speaking to the surcharges that are charged if a vehicle has been pulled over for any kind of inspection.
I have a number of questions. There seems to be an element of unfairness, to the extent that if you randomly choose that vehicle and it goes into the inspection territory, or whatever happens, there are added fees for that, and those fees are passed on to the people who have packages inside that truck. They have no way of knowing ahead of time whether those additional fees will be charged. They have no way of knowing that there may be an additional delay. It's just the luck of the draw, and there seems to be an inherent unfairness to that. Can you speak to that for me, please?
:
Most of the complaints we are receiving about fees at the moment come from the new system that was put in place by the U.S. I just wanted to put that in context.
For people and containers coming to Canada, there are, on occasion, fees, such as the one you describe, for instance. If we open a container in Halifax or in the Atlantic, there'll be a cost of about $1,000, I believe, to the carrier. It is linked with bringing the container to where we want to have it and emptying it. I may be wrong on the number, but there is a cost.
Of course, in moving to doing more measurement and doing more random sampling so that our system is stronger, as was suggested, properly, by the Auditor General, we'll have to deal with that question. But there is indeed a cost, a cost to the organization and a cost to the carrier. If we were to change the system to charge nothing to carriers for these operations, then there'd be a need for an additional appropriation.
:
Here's my difficulty. I appreciate what you're saying, and those are the theories that apply when there's a user fee. The user fee is usually predicated on an individual's wanting a certain service or program, whatever, so the individual chooses to have that and pays the money.
In this case, there are 10 trucks lined up, and I'm one of the unlucky ones who gets chosen. Now I'm out a minimum of $1,000. If I have a small vehicle, that could be my whole day's profit—if I've done absolutely nothing wrong, there's nothing amiss, yet fate grabbed me. What if I get grabbed again next week? I'm out another $1,000.
I don't understand this business. You're being checked for security—you haven't done anything yet, we're just doing our job—and you're going to start ponying up for being unlucky enough to be pulled out of the line.
Do you appreciate that there seems to be a prima facie case of unfairness here?
:
I'll say that with the more than 100 million interactions with Canadians that our officers have every year, we don't speak to the minister before each of them. It would be impossible and unnecessary.
I think you are referring to two incidents that were in the paper everywhere during that period, I believe last year—two incidents in which our organization was blamed for going to schools.
You describe it as our officers going into classrooms, but that's not the case; it's not factual. We didn't go into classrooms.
In one of the incidents, where we were trying to locate an individual, indeed one of our officers went to the principal's office to check the record, to be able to identify the location of a person whose child was at that school.
In the other incident, the mother of the child involved asked us to take her there to get the child out of school so that he would be with her at the end of the day, as she had been arrested. Those are the two occasions.
Following that, we changed our procedure to ensure that our officers would not go to schools unless it was a matter of national security and with the approval of a senior manager at headquarters.
I think the right thing was done on those occasions after this.
:
We have to go into what lookouts are. There are different categories of lookouts. My colleague Mr. McRoberts, from the Auditor General's office, is referring to the FOSS system. The FOSS system is a database managed by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration that has information about people who at one point or another tried to become a permanent resident in Canada or came to Canada and obtained a visa from overseas. I shouldn't use a number, but it's probably 160,000 names, a huge database of people, with all kinds of information.
The lookout system that we have in place and that we want our officers to focus on is not an old database. It's something that is regularly updated. We regularly put in our system a list of people, a much smaller list of people who we as an organization want to stop. It's a lookout. Beware. This person is coming in, or we believe there is a reason for that to occur, so beware. And every morning, people on the front line have discussions and are made aware of that critical thing.
So that focus is important. When we say the system is telling us that we should stop someone, then we go to the broader universe. Yes, we have information in the database on very many people, but they may not be at the level of concern that we would have in our own lookout system.
:
If there's nothing further, then, on behalf of all the committee members, I want to thank you very much for your appearance here today. It has been an excellent meeting.
Mr. Jolicoeur, I want to thank you and all the people who work for your agency for the very important job you do on behalf of all Canadians.
Colleagues, we are meeting again on Thursday. That meeting is in camera. We're dealing with reports. We're going to start off with the Barbara George report, then the EMS report, then the report on the correctional services ombudsman, and then the report arising from the work done by Jack Stilborn. We're also going to discuss and approve the minutes of the steering committee.
That's Thursday at 11 o'clock. I look forward to seeing you all then.
This meeting is adjourned.