Whereas,
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the House recognizes the important contribution and
sacrifice of Canadian Forces and Canadian civilian personnel as part of the
UN mandated, NATO-led mission deployed in Afghanistan at the request of the
democratically elected government of Afghanistan;
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the House believes that Canada must remain committed to
the people of Afghanistan beyond February 2009;
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the House takes note that in February 2002, the government
took a decision to deploy 850 troops to Kandahar to join the international
coalition that went to Afghanistan to drive out the Taliban in the wake of
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and that this deployment lasted
for six months at which time the troops rotated out of Afghanistan and
returned home;
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the House takes note that in February 2003, the government
took a decision that Canada would commit 2000 troops and lead for one year,
starting in the summer of 2003, the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Kabul and at the end of the one-year commitment, Canada’s 2000
troop commitment was reduced to a 750-person reconnaissance unit as Canada’s
NATO ally, Turkey, rotated into Kabul to replace Canada as the lead nation of
the ISAF mission;
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the House takes note that in August 2005, Canada assumed responsibility of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar province which
included roughly 300 Canadian Forces personnel;
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the House takes note that the government took a decision
to commit a combat Battle Group of roughly 1200 troops to Kandahar for a
period of one year, from February 2006 to February 2007;
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the House takes note that in January 2006, the government
participated in the London Conference on Afghanistan which resulted in the
signing of the Afghanistan Compact which set out benchmarks and timelines
until the end of 2010 for improving the security, the governance and the
economic and social development of Afghanistan;
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the House takes note that in May 2006, Parliament
supported the government’s two year extension of Canada’s deployment of
diplomatic, development, civilian police and military personnel in
Afghanistan and the provision of funding and equipment for this extension;
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the House welcomes the Report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, chaired by the Honourable John Manley, and recognizes the
important contribution its members have made;
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the House takes note that it has long been a guiding
principle of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan that all three components of
a comprehensive government strategy – defence, diplomacy and development –
must reinforce each other and that the government must strike a balance
between these components to be most effective;
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the House takes note that the ultimate aim of Canadian
policy is to leave Afghanistan to Afghans, in a country that is better
governed, more peaceful and more secure and to create the necessary space and
conditions to allow the Afghans themselves to achieve a political solution to
the conflict; and
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the House takes note that in order to achieve that aim, it
is essential to assist the people of Afghanistan to have properly trained,
equipped and paid members of the four pillars of their security apparatus:
the army, the police, the judicial system and the correctional system;
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therefore,
it is the opinion of the House, |
that Canada should continue a military presence in Kandahar beyond February 2009, to July 2011, in a manner fully consistent with the UN
mandate on Afghanistan, and that the military mission should consist of:
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(a) training the Afghan National Security Forces so
that they can expeditiously take increasing responsibility for security in Kandahar and Afghanistan as a whole;
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(b) providing security for reconstruction and
development efforts in Kandahar;
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(c) the continuation of Canada’s responsibility for
the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team;
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that, consistent with this mandate, this extension of Canada’s military presence in Afghanistan is approved by this House expressly on the condition that:
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(a) NATO secure a battle group of approximately
1000 to rotate into Kandahar (operational no later than February 2009);
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(b) to better ensure the safety and effectiveness
of the Canadian contingent, the government secure medium helicopter lift
capacity and high performance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance before February 2009; and
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(c) the government of Canada notify NATO that
Canada will end its presence in Kandahar as of July 2011, and, as of that
date, the redeployment of Canadian Forces troops out of Kandahar and their
replacement by Afghan forces start as soon as possible, so that it will have
been completed by December 2011;
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that the government of Canada, together with our allies
and the government of Afghanistan, must set firm targets and timelines for
the training, equipping and paying of the Afghan National Army, the Afghan
National Police, the members of the judicial system and the members of the
correctional system;
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that Canada’s contribution to the reconstruction and
development of Afghanistan should:
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(a) be revamped and increased to strike a better
balance between our military efforts and our development efforts in Afghanistan;
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(b) focus on our traditional strengths as a nation,
particularly through the development of sound judicial and correctional
systems and strong political institutions on the ground in Afghanistan and the pursuit of a greater role for Canada in addressing the chronic fresh water
shortages in the country;
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(c) address the crippling issue of the
narco-economy that consistently undermines progress in Afghanistan, through the pursuit of solutions that do not further alienate the goodwill of the local
population;
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(d) be held to a greater level of accountability
and scrutiny so that the Canadian people can be sure that our development
contributions are being spent effectively in Afghanistan;
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that Canada should assert a stronger and more disciplined
diplomatic position regarding Afghanistan and the regional players, including
support for the naming of a special envoy to the region who could both ensure
greater coherence in all diplomatic initiatives in the region and also press
for greater coordination amongst our partners in the UN in the pursuit of
common diplomatic goals in the region;
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that the government should provide the public with franker
and more frequent reporting on events in Afghanistan, offering more
assessments of Canada’s role and giving greater emphasis to the diplomatic
and reconstruction efforts as well as those of the military and, for greater
clarity, the government should table in Parliament detailed reports on the
progress of the mission in Afghanistan on a quarterly basis;
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that the House of Commons should strike a special
parliamentary committee on Afghanistan which would meet regularly with the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and National Defence
and senior officials, and that the House should authorize travel by the
special committee to Afghanistan and the surrounding region so that the
special committee can make frequent recommendations on the conduct and
progress of our efforts in Afghanistan;
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that, the special parliamentary committee on Afghanistan
should review the laws and procedures governing the use of operational and
national security exceptions for the withholding of information from
Parliament, the Courts and the Canadian people with those responsible for
administering those laws and procedures, to ensure that Canadians are being
provided with ample information on the conduct and progress of the mission;
and
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that with respect to the transfer of Afghan detainees to
Afghan authorities, the government must:
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(a) commit to meeting the highest NATO and
international standards with respect to protecting the rights of detainees,
transferring only when it believes it can do so in keeping with Canada’s international obligations;
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(b) pursue a NATO-wide solution to the question of
detainees through diplomatic efforts that are rooted in the core Canadian
values of respect for human rights and the dignity of all people;
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(c) commit to a policy of greater transparency with
respect to its policy on the taking of and transferring of detainees
including a commitment to report on the results of reviews or inspections of
Afghan prisons undertaken by Canadian officials; and
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that the government must commit to improved
interdepartmental coordination to achieve greater cross-government coherence
and coordination of the government’s domestic management of our commitment to
Afghanistan, including the creation of a full-time task force which is
responsible directly to the Prime Minister to lead these efforts; (Government
Business No. 5)
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