:
Mr. Chairman, it's a matter of some concern regarding testimony last week by DFO officials.
My colleague Mr. Lunney addressed his first question to Mr. Wild. He said in his question that perhaps remarks had been made in the media concerning the motivation of groups that were concerned about gravel extraction, that they were “motivated by other issues than biology: by racial concerns”. That was a comment by Mr. Lunney.
Mr. Wild replied as follows:
That was reported in the Chilliwack paper by a reporter whom we've actually talked to for several years in the area. I might preface my comment by.... I think Marvin also noted that occasionally reporters twist the stories a bit. In my opinion, that was the case here. In that report there were quotes from Dale Paterson, who actually happened to be on holidays for two weeks at the time.
There's a theme in there, though, that is not totally unrelated.
And it goes on from there.
I further questioned Mr. Wild on that issue. I asked him directly whether he referred in his comments to the newspaper reporter about--and I quoted these words--“local animosity”. I suggested to Mr. Wild the following about the newspaper reporter's report:
He says that you suspect that “local animosity with the Cheam First Nation fueled the sport fishermen's outrage over the gravel removed”.
Mr. Wild said, “I understand, and I responded to that question earlier.”
When I asked him again, he replied, “That the local animosity between the two groups caused the problem on this site? No.”
I said, “That it fueled local sport fishermen's outrage.”
Mr. Wild said, “I don't believe I said that, Mr. Cummins.”
I said, “That's fine”, and that was the end of the exchange.
Mr. Chairman, I checked with the reporter involved in that story, because I think there was a serious allegation made here. There were comments and denials in committee, and--
:
Ladies and gentlemen, we would like to thank each of you for this opportunity to bring this matter to your attention and consideration.
We represent the Spawn on Kelp Operators Association, a non-profit organization formed in 1995 to represent 35 of the 46 licence-holders. The spawn-on-kelp fishery, once the most profitable on the coast, has suffered a total financial collapse because of Fisheries and Oceans Canada's interpretation of the Gladstone decision.
We are here today from British Columbia to make sure that you are aware of what happens when government enters into the established marketplace, and to ask you for your assistance in correcting the resulting financial devastation to our industry.
Prior to the Gladstone decision, there were 28 licences issued to various individuals on the B.C. coast. Their quotas were each 16,000 pounds per year, prices were rising, and demand for the product was high. Of these 28 licence-holders, 18 were first nation bands and individuals from various villages and towns spread through the entire length of the British Columbia coastline.
It was in 1996, when spawn-on-kelp was selling for $35 to $40 a pound, that the Supreme Court decided, in the Gladstone decision, that the Heiltsuk aboriginal band on the central coast of British Columbia had a right to harvest spawn-on-kelp for commercial purposes. The DFO wrongly determined that this decision provided the Heiltsuk almost unlimited access to the quota-regulated fishery. The resulting penalties and consequences of the Gladstone decision and DFO's interpretation are, and continue to be, the responsibility of the Canadian people as a whole. Presently the cost is being borne solely by the original 38 spawn-on-kelp licence-holders.
In 1978 five communal licences were issued to first nation bands, including one to Heiltsuk. In order to be eligible to participate, sac roe licences were required to be leased or retired by each communal licence-holder. These licences were created by lowering the 28 original quotas from 10 tonnes to 8 tonnes per licence. No increase in total coast-wide quota resulted.
In 1991 DFO issued 10 new J licences to first nation bands, but none to Heiltsuk or other first nations who held an existing J licence. Those who did receive a licence were required under the AFS agreement to retire six gillnet sac roe licences or one seine sac roe licence by 1999. And DFO contributed to the cost of doing so.
In 1993 DFO issued one J licence to Heiltsuk with sac roe requirements. Heiltsuk now held two out of a total of 39 J licences.
In 1997 DFO issued five J licences, and two additional J licences in 1998, to Heiltsuk.
In allocating these seven new licences, Heiltsuk did not have to retire any more roe herring licences, nor did they have to retire three of the six gillnet licences as required under the Heiltsuk 1993 AFS agreement.
Some first nation bands spent $150,000 to lease licences for the year, while others invested their earnings of up to $800,000 to purchase sac roe licences for conversion to spawn-on-kelp licences. This to them was a good investment in their future, as spawn-on-kelp was a closed-quota fishery with a product that was in high demand. With these new additions, without sac roe licence requirements, the Heiltsuk quota rose to 144,000 pounds.
In February 2001 the Heiltsuk, DFO, and the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada signed a letter of agreement for an interim measure for a one-year period. The interim measure increased the harvest from 144,000 pounds to 240,000 pounds for the 2001 season, which is equivalent to six more J licences.
In 2005 the Heiltsuk First Nation terrorized the sac roe fishing fleet with illegal acts of vandalism. No one was charged, even when personal property was damaged and livelihoods were threatened. Instead of charging the terrorists, DFO decided to appease the Heiltsuk by giving them 92,000 pounds more spawn-on-kelp in 2006 in exchange for the promise that they would not create the havoc that occurred in 2005 and previous years.
This year, 2006, the Heiltsuk produced approximately 350,000 pounds, which is equivalent to 50% of the coast's production, and the prices plummeted to $4 to $5 per pound. As Heiltsuk's production increased, the price went down by the same ratio. This was the icing on the cake for the spawn-on-kelp industry. Prices still remain below cost of production for the original 28 licence-holders and the ten bands who invested their earnings.
We feel that part of the DFO's mandate in this area should be to provide economic benefits to all aboriginal bands, including the Heiltsuk. This has not been the case, and to most bands the opposite effect has occurred.
In February 2006 secret negotiations were held with the Heiltsuk, which resulted in 92,345 pounds added to an already flooded market.
In a letter to the Minister of Fisheries dated February 20, the minister was asked why SOKOA was not asked to participate in any negotiations with Heiltsuk. A reply sent on April 7 stated that the Spawn on Kelp Operators Association elected not to participate in this process. He suggested that we contact Ms. Harpreet Gill to provide us with information regarding an invitation to be part of any negotiations with the Heiltsuk regarding roe-on-kelp.
We have done just that, and have been stonewalled with 39 pages of misinformation that mean nothing, but it strengthens our belief that it was intentional for SOKOA not to be present during these negotiations that decimated our industry and livelihood.
The Heiltsuk do not pay either the $10,000 licence fee or the $5,000 monitoring fee that the other 38 licence-holders are required to pay. Thus they start off with a dollar-a-pound advantage in cost over the rest of the spawn-on-kelp industry.
The people of Canada are not getting any taxes or royalties from the massive use and exploitation of this once clearly Canadian resource. The increasing concentration of quota allocation and earnings to Heiltsuk has devastated licence-holders, crews, and communities from the various towns and villages along the entire length of the B.C. coastline.
Many socio-economic problems from this abrupt cessation of employment and income have risen steadily since 1975. These problems were never considered by DFO as they stumbled over themselves to appease the illegal demonstrators and the Supreme Court's Gladstone decision by issuing the spawn-on-kelp quota to Heiltsuk.
In all other fisheries, DFO and government departments determined that to transfer quota out of the fisheries to first nations, the quota was first purchased out of the commercial fishing mainstream and then transferred to native interests. This principle was not adhered to in this fishery. The result has been a flooded market and prices lower than costs of production. The Japanese buyers lowered the price dramatically, not only because of the increased production but also because of their perception of open-ended quotas being handed to Heiltsuk.
Incidentally, much of the black market or illegal product comes from this area, with little or no effective enforcement. In a recent technical working group meeting with DFO, a central coast enforcement officer admitted that he had been instructed not to enforce illegal harvesting on the central coast. As a result of this type of inaction, the illegal harvest has risen to about 200,000 pounds.
The Supreme Court of Canada's Marshall decision of September 17, 1999, affirmed the treaty right to fish, hunt, and gather in pursuit of a moderate livelihood stemming from treaties signed in 1760 and 1761. Following the court's decision, DFO initiated the Marshall response initiative. Because of Marshall, increased aboriginal participation has been accommodated, in part through the voluntary retirement of fishing licences from existing commercial licence-holders. In this way, disruption of other fisheries has been minimized.
When SOKOA put this rationalization plan forward to the herring industry advisory board and the new integrated herring harvest planning committee, this plan was accepted unanimously as the best solution.
The Spawn on Kelp Operators Association respectfully requests that the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans consider funding a spawn-on-kelp licence rationalization plan proposal based on Marshall. We would ask you to direct the government to treat all fishermen equally, regardless of which coast they come from.
Thank you.
:
They never did want to study the impact. The mandate of DFO should be to study the viability of every fishery in British Columbia that they seem to be giving quotas away on. We seem to be settling land claims with fish quotas in British Columbia.
When you come to the east coast, to Atlantic Canada, they have interim measures where they give the permits, licences, give them a quota, and then they start buying it back from the industry. In British Columbia we don't do that. What they do is buy the odd licence back, find out it's too much money, and then turn around and decide they're just going to issue licences. And nobody stops it.
If you look at spawn-on-kelp--you can see how small our membership is--we get railroaded by industry. The interim agreement for this year was signed by the roe herring industry. We're not even on the board that signed it, and DFO pushed it through; they've given the 92,000 pounds. Then they write a letter, which I have right here, to industry saying, oh, we've just made a deal with Heiltsuk, and we're going to have peace in the central coast roe herring fishery; we're giving them 92,000 pounds of roe-on-kelp.
You cannot trade apples for oranges, which is what they've been doing. They keep saying they're going to retire licences and they don't. If you look at the Heiltsuk deals, they were supposed to retire licences and then they turned around and reversed it. The only licences they've retired for Heiltsuk are three gillnet licences, when they were supposed to retire six. The rest of it is just being made up.
When I say “apples and oranges”, what I'm getting at is that you can keep putting roe-on-kelp up for sale and you have roe herring for sale. They're two different markets. One does not balance the other. They're totally different. That's what our problem is.
If you retire licences, it does not help people who are in the roe-on-kelp industry. The only thing that's going to help us is to retire roe-on-kelp and bring the licences back to the original 28 in the quota. Then we have a hope in the market to go ahead. But if we just keep saying, “We're going to retire roe herring,” it helps the roe herring industry; it does not help the roe-on-kelp industry whatsoever.
Thank you for coming. You've'e made a compelling case, and we appreciate your taking the time to be here.
You're here, I suppose, for a number of reasons, but part of it, I'm sure, is that you're interested in making a living. It's difficult to do so now, with the current price. I just want to be clear, in my mind, about the basic economics here.
My understanding is that the landing in tonnes of spawn-on-kelp hasn't changed much in the last several years. You can correct me if I'm wrong, but was it not 400 tonnes of spawn-on-kelp....in, say, 1996...? I don't see, according to the figures I've seen, that that's changed in recent years. It would seem that the supply coming out of the industry hasn't changed very much from the Canadian side.
Now, basic economics says that the price has collapsed, but that's due to supply and demand. Has the supply changed? Has it increased from Alaska or Russia, say, to push down the price, or do you know if the demand has changed internationally? Are the Japanese not so fond of spawn-on-kelp any more, as they used to be in, say, 1996?
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
After listening to Mr. Kamp, I gather that the quota didn't go up. The quota was there, if I understand it correctly, gentlemen, but you're not taking the quota. The perception, like many things, turns out to be reality when you're dealing with the markets in Japan.
What I would like to know is, what needs to be done? Before I heard Mr. Kamp ask the question, I thought that you would want a reduction in the quota, you would want some buyout of licences, or you would need something taken out of the system. In the end--Mr. Kamp is absolutely correct--you want to make a living. You can't make a living today when you go from $40 to $4 a tonne.
If it is 400 tonnes, how much could you ship? Could you ship 800 tonnes? Is that what the Japanese feel could come? Or what's really destroying the market?
Again, I think there has to be a control on how much can be taken. Obviously, if the price is at $4 or $5 and you're not taking as much as you could--if I understand it correctly--then you are very close to destruction, or very close to the end. You need something to happen.