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PACP Committee Report

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NATIONAL SECURITY IN CANADA

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States of America, the Government of Canada announced an anti-terrorism initiative in its 2001 Budget. The government initially allocated $7.7 billion to fund this initiative and then increased funding by an additional $690 million.

Due to the significant cost of this initiative, and its importance in defending Canada and Canadians, as well as the United States, against further terrorist attacks, the Committee decided to review the results of an audit of the National Security Initiative by the Auditor General of Canada. This audit focused on air travel security, elements of marine security, and emergency preparedness.

To assist the Committee with this review, the Committee met with Ms. Sheila Fraser, Auditor General of Canada, and Mr. Peter Kasurak (Principal) and Mr. Ted Wood (Director) from her Office on 12 May 2005. Mr. Jacques Duchesneau (President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority), Ms. Margaret Bloodworth (Deputy Minister, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) and Mr. Marc Grégoire (Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security Group, Department of Transport) also attended to assist the Committee with its work.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In her opening remarks, the Auditor General told the Committee that improvements to marine security programs “are proceeding well” but that her audit had found “serious weaknesses” in emergency preparedness and in “some aspects” of air transportation security. Her overall assessment was that progress in implementing projects undertaken as part of the 2001 Budget’s national security enhancement initiative has been “uneven.”

Following its review of the audit findings, the Committee notes that the Auditor General has made a series of recommendations designed to close gaps in the National Security Initiative. The Committee fully supports each of these recommendations and regards their full and timely implementation as necessary for the enhancement of national security. As Mr. Duchesneau, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Air Transport Security Agency acknowledged, the Auditor General’s work in this area has been and continues to be “very useful.”

Yet despite this recognition, some of the responses to the Auditor General’s recommendations do not state clearly that the entities involved fully agree with them and in many cases lack target implementation and completion dates. The Committee believes that greater clarity is required so that it can have some assurance that these recommendations will be carried out within an appropriate time frame. It therefore recommends:

RECOMMENDATION 1

That Transport Canada, the Canadian Air Transport Security Agency, and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness indicate clearly whether they agree to each recommendation contained in Chapter 2 of the April 2005 Report of the Auditor General of Canada that pertains to them and produce an action plan outlining the implementation measures that they will take and when they will take them. These responses must be provided to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts no later than 30 September 2005.

As a general observation, the Committee notes that risk assessment and management has been weak, at least in the initial stages of security enhancement initiatives, in the areas covered by the audit. It is telling that the one area in which the Auditor General found reasonable progress — marine security programs —benefited from a threat and risk analysis that established priorities (although funding did not cover all of them). Without use of adequate risk management procedures, it is extremely doubtful that scarce funding can be directed to areas in which security measures are weakest or that enhancement measures will be effective. Accordingly, the Committee recommends:

RECOMMENDATION 2

That Transport Canada, the Canadian Air Transport Security Agency, and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness incorporate Treasury Board’s Integrated Risk Management Framework into all aspects of security enhancement programs and activities prior to 31 December 2005.

Although the Committee recognizes that significant challenges faced the government during the early stages of this initiative and welcomes the accomplishments that have been achieved, it is disturbed by an overall lack of progress, particularly as it relates to air transportation and emergency preparedness.

  1. Air Travel Security
  2. Responsibility for aviation security is assigned to two principal government entities. Transport Canada establishes and monitors air travel security policy and regulations. A second entity, the Canadian Air Transport Security Agency (CATSA) carries out many of these policies including screening passengers and baggage, and establishes the qualifications, training, and performance standards for screeners.

    The audit assessed whether Transport Canada’s oversight of the air transportation security system was based on an adequate risk analysis and if the Department was taking necessary measures to ensure compliance with its security regulations. Although Transport Canada assesses security risks in air transport in a way that is consistent with Treasury Board Secretariat’s Integrated Risk Management Framework, the audit found that the Department has not fully implemented formal risk management as part of its procedures. It appears that the Department will now do so and the Committee has recommended that it (along with the other entities included in the audit) make a formal commitment in this regard. (See Recommendation 2, above.)

    Transport Canada relies on a security inspection system to determine whether the security system is meeting its regulated standards. This requires the Department to collect, store, and analyze information on how that system is working. Data on the Department’s main inspection database, however, was found to be inaccurate in 40% of the files examined by the Auditor General. The central database’s lack of accuracy was confirmed by transport security managers at airports who told the Auditor General that they were obliged to maintain their own databases and files to overcome this inaccuracy. The Department has now installed a new database system, but has not allocated the funds to clean up data accumulated prior to April 2004. This funding is needed so that the older data can be validated to determine the extent of their inaccuracy and that the accumulated data can be analyzed in their entirety. The Committee accordingly recommends:

    RECOMMENDATION 3

    That Transport Canada allocate the funds required to improve the accuracy of the data that was accumulated prior to April 2004 and is stored in its main inspection database.

    The audit found that Transport Canada is using only one security performance measure — the rate at which CATSA’s passenger screeners fail to detect threatening objects (“infiltration failure rate”). The Department has agreed to the Auditor General’s recommendation that it implement additional system-wide performance measures that will establish what the Department considers to be satisfactory performance by CATSA. These additional performance measures will be needed so that the Department can analyze the overall effectiveness of its various security systems (including intelligence gathering, use of protective officer on some flights, primary and secondary passenger screening, and questioning by ticket agents). This analysis is needed to support decision making and corrective action. The Committee accordingly recommends:

    RECOMMENDATION 4

    That once Transport Canada has put in place system-wide performance measures to assess the work done by the Canadian Air Transport Safety Authority, the Department conduct an overall analysis of the effectiveness of its security systems within one year and take all appropriate corrective actions as needed. Transport Canada must submit a progress report to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts by 31 December 2005.

  3. Federal Emergency Preparedness
  4. The last half of the Auditor General’s National Security audit deals with emergency preparedness and is framed around two questions. First, what has the government done to improve the country’s emergency preparedness, especially with respect to coordination within the federal government and between the federal government and other levels of government? Second, has the government’s used “threat and risk assessments” to prioritize its emergency preparedness spending? On both counts, the audit identifies shortcomings.

    In Budget 2001, the federal government committed to spending $513 million over five years to increase its capacity to handle an emergency and to better coordinate federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal responses to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. The successful management of an emergency depends on the training, ability, and mobility of “first responders;” the police officers, firefighters, emergency medical providers and emergency management officials who are the front line of response to a terrorist attack. Because most first responders are provincial, territorial or municipal employees, the federal government’s April 2004 National Security Policy says it “will often play only a supporting role in emergency management to provinces and territories, communities and the private sector.” Amongst other things, the Auditor General believes the federal government must improve coordination by:

    • setting up a clear chain of command;
    • eliminating duplication in its response to crises;
    • integrating its emergency preparedness plans;
    • establishing Standards for First Responder Equipment;

    Furthermore, the Department must better target its spending by:

    • increasing First Responder Training;
    • increasing its response capacity by spending in areas which pose the greatest risk;
    • testing its emergency preparedness plans and systems;
    • using risk analysis to direct its spending on measure to protect the country’s critical infrastructure.