



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

## **NATIONAL SECURITY IN CANADA**

### **Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts**

**John Williams, M.P.  
Chair**

**June 2005**



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# **NATIONAL SECURITY IN CANADA**

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# **THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS**

has the honour to present its

## **EIGHTEENTH REPORT**

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(g), the Standing Committee on Public Accounts has considered Chapter 2 of the April 2005 Report of the Auditor General of Canada (National Security in Canada) and has agreed to report the following:





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# LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

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## RECOMMENDATION 1

That Transport Canada, the Canadian Air Transport Security Agency, and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness indicate clearly whether they agree to each recommendation contained in Chapter 2 of the April 2005 Report of the Auditor General of Canada that pertains to them and produce an action plan outlining the implementation measures that they will take and when they will take them. These responses must be provided to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts no later than 30 September 2005.

## RECOMMENDATION 2

That Transport Canada, the Canadian Air Transport Security Agency, and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness incorporate Treasury Board's Integrated Risk Management Framework into all aspects of security enhancement programs and activities prior to 31 December 2005.

## RECOMMENDATION 3

That Transport Canada allocate the funds required to improve the accuracy of the data that was accumulated prior to April 2004 and is stored in its main inspection database.

## RECOMMENDATION 4

That once Transport Canada has put in place system-wide performance measures to assess the work done by the Canadian Air Transport Safety Authority, the Department conduct an overall analysis of the effectiveness of its security systems within one year and take all appropriate corrective actions as needed. Transport Canada must submit a progress report to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts by 31 December 2005.

## RECOMMENDATION 5

That Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada draft amendments to the *Emergency Preparedness Act* as soon as

**possible and table them in the House of Commons within one year in order to clearly define and ensure adequate powers and responsibilities for the Minister.**

#### **RECOMMENDATION 6**

**That the government, in cooperation with the responsible authorities, approve Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada's new National Emergency Response System plan as soon as possible and that PSEPC obtain formal support for its new plan from other relevant federal departments and agencies.**

#### **RECOMMENDATION 7**

**That Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada work with the relevant departments, agencies and other levels of government to coordinate emergency response plans and report their progress in the annual departmental performance report.**

#### **RECOMMENDATION 8**

**That Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada draft standards now to ensure the interoperability of emergency response equipment and training.**

#### **RECOMMENDATION 9**

**That Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada provide the Standing Committee on Public Accounts with an action plan detailing what it will do to increase the number of first responders trained to respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear emergencies and that it report on its progress in its annual departmental performance reports.**

#### **RECOMMENDATION 10**

**That the Department of National Defence immediately resolve the serious command and control issues in the Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense Company and report on its progress in its annual departmental performance report.**

#### **RECOMMENDATION 11**

**That Health Canada should immediately resolve the legal issues that are blocking the creation of emergency response medical and smallpox teams and report on its progress in its annual departmental performance report.**

#### **RECOMMENDATION 12**

**That the Public Health Agency of Canada purchase items for the national emergency stockpile based on risk assessments and casualty scenarios and report on its progress in its annual departmental performance report. It should also improve its ability to transport and distribute supplies during emergencies and report on its progress in its annual departmental performance report.**

#### **RECOMMENDATION 13**

**That Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada report on its progress in developing a long-term plan and budget for the conduct of national exercises in its report on plans and priorities and in its departmental performance reports. PSEPC must also indicate how people are trained and how many training exercises it has conducted in its departmental performance report and reference key lessons drawn from these exercises.**

#### **RECOMMENDATION 14**

**That a joint committee of the Senate and House of Commons on security and intelligence be established as soon as possible.**



# **NATIONAL SECURITY IN CANADA**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States of America, the Government of Canada announced an anti-terrorism initiative in its 2001 Budget. The government initially allocated \$7.7 billion to fund this initiative and then increased funding by an additional \$690 million.

Due to the significant cost of this initiative, and its importance in defending Canada and Canadians, as well as the United States, against further terrorist attacks, the Committee decided to review the results of an audit of the National Security Initiative by the Auditor General of Canada. This audit focused on air travel security, elements of marine security, and emergency preparedness.

To assist the Committee with this review, the Committee met with Ms. Sheila Fraser, Auditor General of Canada, and Mr. Peter Kasurak (Principal) and Mr. Ted Wood (Director) from her Office on 12 May 2005. Mr. Jacques Duchesneau (President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority), Ms. Margaret Bloodworth (Deputy Minister, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) and Mr. Marc Grégoire (Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security Group, Department of Transport) also attended to assist the Committee with its work.

## **OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

In her opening remarks, the Auditor General told the Committee that improvements to marine security programs “are proceeding well” but that her audit had found “serious weaknesses” in emergency preparedness and in “some aspects” of air transportation security. Her overall assessment was that progress in implementing projects undertaken as part of the 2001 Budget’s national security enhancement initiative has been “uneven.”

Following its review of the audit findings, the Committee notes that the Auditor General has made a series of recommendations designed to close gaps in the National Security Initiative. The Committee fully supports each of these recommendations and regards their full and timely implementation as necessary for the enhancement of national security. As Mr. Duchesneau, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Air Transport Security Agency acknowledged, the Auditor General’s work in this area has been and continues to be “very useful.”

Yet despite this recognition, some of the responses to the Auditor General's recommendations do not state clearly that the entities involved fully agree with them and in many cases lack target implementation and completion dates. The Committee believes that greater clarity is required so that it can have some assurance that these recommendations will be carried out within an appropriate time frame. It therefore recommends:

#### **RECOMMENDATION 1**

**That Transport Canada, the Canadian Air Transport Security Agency, and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness indicate clearly whether they agree to each recommendation contained in Chapter 2 of the April 2005 Report of the Auditor General of Canada that pertains to them and produce an action plan outlining the implementation measures that they will take and when they will take them. These responses must be provided to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts no later than 30 September 2005.**

As a general observation, the Committee notes that risk assessment and management has been weak, at least in the initial stages of security enhancement initiatives, in the areas covered by the audit. It is telling that the one area in which the Auditor General found reasonable progress — marine security programs — benefited from a threat and risk analysis that established priorities (although funding did not cover all of them). Without use of adequate risk management procedures, it is extremely doubtful that scarce funding can be directed to areas in which security measures are weakest or that enhancement measures will be effective. Accordingly, the Committee recommends:

#### **RECOMMENDATION 2**

**That Transport Canada, the Canadian Air Transport Security Agency, and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness incorporate Treasury Board's Integrated Risk Management Framework into all aspects of security enhancement programs and activities prior to 31 December 2005.**

Although the Committee recognizes that significant challenges faced the government during the early stages of this initiative and welcomes the accomplishments that have been achieved, it is disturbed by an overall lack of progress, particularly as it relates to air transportation and emergency preparedness.



## **Air Travel Security**

Responsibility for aviation security is assigned to two principal government entities. Transport Canada establishes and monitors air travel security policy and regulations. A second entity, the Canadian Air Transport Security Agency (CATSA) carries out many of these policies including screening passengers and baggage, and establishes the qualifications, training, and performance standards for screeners.

The audit assessed whether Transport Canada's oversight of the air transportation security system was based on an adequate risk analysis and if the Department was taking necessary measures to ensure compliance with its security regulations. Although Transport Canada assesses security risks in air transport in a way that is consistent with Treasury Board Secretariat's Integrated Risk Management Framework, the audit found that the Department has not fully implemented formal risk management as part of its procedures. It appears that the Department will now do so and the Committee has recommended that it (along with the other entities included in the audit) make a formal commitment in this regard. (See Recommendation 2, above.)

Transport Canada relies on a security inspection system to determine whether the security system is meeting its regulated standards. This requires the Department to collect, store, and analyze information on how that system is working. Data on the Department's main inspection database, however, was found to be inaccurate in 40% of the files examined by the Auditor General. The central database's lack of accuracy was confirmed by transport security managers at airports who told the Auditor General that they were obliged to maintain their own databases and files to overcome this inaccuracy. The Department has now installed a new database system, but has not allocated the funds to clean up data accumulated prior to April 2004. This funding is needed so that the older data can be validated to determine the extent of their inaccuracy and that the accumulated data can be analyzed in their entirety. The Committee accordingly recommends:

### **RECOMMENDATION 3**

**That Transport Canada allocate the funds required to improve the accuracy of the data that was accumulated prior to April 2004 and is stored in its main inspection database.**

The audit found that Transport Canada is using only one security performance measure — the rate at which CATSA's passenger screeners fail to detect threatening objects ("infiltration failure rate"). The Department has agreed to the Auditor General's recommendation that it implement additional system-wide performance measures that will establish what the Department considers to be satisfactory performance by CATSA. These additional performance measures will

be needed so that the Department can analyze the overall effectiveness of its various security systems (including intelligence gathering, use of protective officer on some flights, primary and secondary passenger screening, and questioning by ticket agents). This analysis is needed to support decision making and corrective action. The Committee accordingly recommends:

#### **RECOMMENDATION 4**

**That once Transport Canada has put in place system-wide performance measures to assess the work done by the Canadian Air Transport Safety Authority, the Department conduct an overall analysis of the effectiveness of its security systems within one year and take all appropriate corrective actions as needed. Transport Canada must submit a progress report to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts by 31 December 2005.**

#### **Federal Emergency Preparedness**

The last half of the Auditor General's National Security audit deals with emergency preparedness and is framed around two questions. First, what has the government done to improve the country's emergency preparedness, especially with respect to coordination within the federal government and between the federal government and other levels of government? Second, has the government's used "threat and risk assessments" to prioritize its emergency preparedness spending? On both counts, the audit identifies shortcomings.

In Budget 2001, the federal government committed to spending \$513 million over five years to increase its capacity to handle an emergency and to better coordinate federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal responses to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. The successful management of an emergency depends on the training, ability, and mobility of "first responders;" the police officers, firefighters, emergency medical providers and emergency management officials who are the front line of response to a terrorist attack. Because most first responders are provincial, territorial or municipal employees, the federal government's April 2004 National Security Policy says it "will often play only a supporting role in emergency management to provinces and territories, communities and the private sector." Amongst other things, the Auditor General believes the federal government must improve coordination by:

- setting up a clear chain of command;
- eliminating duplication in its response to crises;
- integrating its emergency preparedness plans;
- establishing Standards for First Responder Equipment;

Furthermore, the Department must better target its spending by:

- increasing First Responder Training;
- increasing its response capacity by spending in areas which pose the greatest risk;
- testing its emergency preparedness plans and systems;
- using risk analysis to direct its spending on measure to protect the country's critical infrastructure.

## **COORDINATION EFFORTS**

### **Setting up a Chain of Command**

According to the Auditor General, a coherent, coordinated and effective response to a CBRN threat depends on a clear chain of command based on clear roles and responsibilities. Currently, coordination efforts “suffer from the absence of an effective federal-provincial-territorial governance regime and from the absence of commonly agreed standards and priorities for the national emergency management system.”

In December 2003, the federal government passed the *Emergency Preparedness Act* which created a new department called Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) as a first step towards improving coordination both within the federal government and with other levels of government. The *Act* does not explicitly identify a leadership role for the Minister of PSEPC in the event of a national emergency.

PSEPC's Deputy Minister, Margaret Bloodworth, told the Committee however that her department would begin consultations with stakeholders in late spring or early summer 2005 and aim to bring forward legislative changes by next winter, although she added that she could “easily see it slipping till next spring, depending on the degree of controversy and on whether significant events occur between now and then.” The Committee believes these amendments must be made as soon as possible. It therefore recommends:

### **RECOMMENDATION 5**

**That Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada draft amendments to the *Emergency Preparedness Act* as soon as possible and table them in the House of Commons within one year in order to clearly define and ensure adequate powers and responsibilities for the Minister.**

## **Eliminating Duplication**

PSEPC is developing a new National Emergency Response System (NERS) that will standardize federal response plans and the links between these plans and those of the provinces, territories and municipalities. While the new NERS system is expected to receive Cabinet approval before summer 2005, the Auditor General believes it is also important for PSEPC to obtain support from all federal agencies involved in responding to national emergencies. The Committee endorses the Auditor General's position and recommends:

### **RECOMMENDATION 6**

**That the government, in cooperation with the responsible authorities, approve Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada's new National Emergency Response System plan as soon as possible and that PSEPC obtain formal support for its new plan from other relevant federal departments and agencies.**

## **Integrating Emergency Plans**

Prior to December 2003 and the creation of PSEPC, different departments were responsible for different national emergencies. Health Canada, for example, was responsible for managing biological, radiological or nuclear emergencies, while Transport Canada was responsible for cleaning up transportation accidents involving the same materials. PSEPC is designed to coordinate these responses and assure their consistency.

According to the Auditor General, however, PSEPC and the individual departments have yet to develop a coherent and cohesive set of plans that could assure a coordinated federal response to a CBRN emergency. Moreover, "(o)fficials at PSEPC could not show us an inventory of departmental emergency response plans that could be activated in the event of a CBRN terrorist event" nor could they show how departmental plans would work together or with provincial plans in the event of a CBRN emergency. The Committee believes this coordination problem should be resolved as soon as possible. It therefore recommends:

### **RECOMMENDATION 7**

**That Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada work with the relevant departments, agencies and other levels of government to coordinate emergency response plans and report their progress in the annual departmental performance report.**

## **Standards for CBRN Equipment and Training**

The Auditor General expected to find that PSEPC would have standards that guarantee the interoperability (i.e., compatibility) of CBRN equipment purchased by first responders at the provincial, territorial and municipal levels. These standards are needed to develop a national “surge capacity,” which is the capacity for one set of first responders in one part of the country to work with first responders from another part of the country. This “interoperability” requires compatible equipment *and* compatible skill sets. In other words, the equipment and the people from Alberta for example have to be able to work with the equipment and people from Québec.

The Auditor General found instead that, contrary to earlier promises, PSPEC had yet to develop national guidelines on equipment and training. As a result, Ms. Fraser “found a considerable variation in the capabilities of the CBRN equipment purchased and in the training required for its proper operation. These variations would translate into problems with interoperability and surge capacity.” The Auditor General added, however, that PSEPC had recently drafted a document that, amongst other things, aims to develop national equipment and training standards in conjunction with the Counter-Terrorism Technology Centre (CTTC) in Suffield, Alberta. The Auditor General also noted that PSEPC officials explained the delay in developing national standards by pointing to difficulties in setting international standards. The Committee believes interoperability is an important and urgent aspect of emergency preparedness and cannot wait for international standards. It therefore recommends:

### **RECOMMENDATION 8**

**That Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada draft standards now to ensure the interoperability of emergency response equipment and training.**

## **MORE FOCUSED SPENDING**

### **Spending on Training**

Budget 2001 allocated \$59 million over five years to train first responders. The goal was to provide intermediate-level training to 6,000 first responders, of which 2000 would obtain advanced-level training. The Auditor General noted that by fall 2004, 134 first responders had received intermediate-level training and 63 advanced-level training.

Ms. Bloodworth told the Committee however that there are now some 800 trained first responders and that that figure would increase to 1,200 within a year.

She added that her department spent a “huge amount of time and effort developing a course. Indeed, I understand they got a lot of credit from people for the quality of the course. A more general point I’ll make is that maybe they didn’t spend enough effort at that same time in delivering it.”

Later, Ms. Bloodworth told the Committee that the original target of 6,000 trained first responders appears “to have been an estimated guess. I’m not even sure how educated a guess it was.” However, she emphasized that wasn’t “being critical of people at the time. I don’t think they actually knew how big a universe it was that would need intermediate training.”

In response, Ms. Fraser told the Committee that she was “guardedly optimistic” about PSEPC’s training strategy, noting that “(i)t’s not just about preparing the course but also about how you get people to attend and the roll-out of that. We’ve certainly seen efforts to improve the outreach to bring provinces and others into the courses.”

While the Committee is encouraged by the steps taken by PSEPC to increase the number of CBRN trained first responders, it feels more must be done. It therefore recommends:

#### **RECOMMENDATION 9**

**That Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada provide the Standing Committee on Public Accounts with an action plan detailing what it will do to increase the number of first responders trained to respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear emergencies and that it report on its progress in its annual departmental performance reports.**

#### **Spending on Priority Areas**

The \$513 million devoted to emergency preparedness in Budget 2001 was aimed at improving the CBRN response capacity of the federal government and the provinces, territories and municipalities. At the federal level, money was allocated to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Department of National Defence, Health Canada and Transport Canada.<sup>1</sup>

The Auditor General found that for the most part, the RCMP was spending its funds according to a threat and risk assessment, having chosen to focus its resources on, among other things, equipping and training all 15,000 of its members

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<sup>1</sup> The Audit report makes no further mention of Transport Canada with respect to monies transferred for CBRN response capacity.

by April 2006 and on setting up specialized teams to support local first-responders. The Auditor General expressed concern however about the small size of these specialized teams and recommended that the RCMP improve its capacity to respond to CBRN threats.

At National Defence, Budget 2001 allocated \$30 million for the creation of a new military unit called the Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Company, which is designed primarily to support other federal departments and the provinces and territories in their response to a CBRN threat. While an evaluation by National Defence of the company found “serious command and control issues,” the Auditor General did not make any specific recommendation with respect to this department.

At Health Canada, the Auditor General found that the Department had not acted on two tasks assigned by Budget 2001 because of certain unspecified legal reasons. However, the Department has yet to set up the emergency response team of physicians, nurses and medical technicians for which it received \$501,000. It has also failed to train Smallpox Emergency Response Teams for which it received \$626,000. The Auditor General also found that the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), which was formerly part of Health Canada and is now responsible for maintaining emergency supplies of medical equipment and pharmaceuticals in warehouses across the country, had not purchased its emergency supplies based on a risk assessment. Moreover, PHAC stockpiles contained no CBRN equipment such as protective gear, detectors and decontamination showers. The Auditor General also found that PHAC could improve its ability to move emergency stockpiles to where they would be needed.

The Committee is concerned about the problems identified by the Auditor General, particularly those at Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada. It therefore recommends:

#### **RECOMMENDATION 10**

**That the Department of National Defence immediately resolve the serious command and control issues in the Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense Company and report on its progress in its annual departmental performance report.**

#### **RECOMMENDATION 11**

**That Health Canada should immediately resolve the legal issues that are blocking the creation of emergency response medical**

**and smallpox teams and report on its progress in its annual departmental performance report.**

## **RECOMMENDATION 12**

**That the Public Health Agency of Canada purchase items for the national emergency stockpile based on risk assessments and casualty scenarios and report on its progress in its annual departmental performance report. It should also improve its ability to transport and distribute supplies during emergencies and report on its progress in its annual departmental performance report.**

### **Testing Emergency Preparedness Plans and Systems**

When she began her audit, Ms. Fraser said she expected to find that PSEPC had engaged in tests of the nation's emergency preparedness plans and systems. The National Security Policy, for example, calls for "regular national and international exercises involving civilians and military resources in order to assess the adequacy of the national system in various emergency scenarios." The Auditor General found evidence of some national exercises conducted since 11 September 2001 and that departments had engaged in some testing of their emergency response plans. She also said that federal departments had participated in some exercises that integrated federal responses to a CBRN attack with responses by the provinces, territories and municipalities. She also found, however, that there was "... no federal strategy or criteria to guide the federal government's participation" and that there were "... delays and gaps in the post-event analysis and implementing of recommendations." Moreover, Budget 2001 did not allocate resources to exercises or to training of emergency managers.

In its response to the audit, PSEPC pointed out that it has created an "Exercise Division" and that work was "already underway to develop a long-term plan and funding strategy for a National Exercise Program" as recommended by the Auditor General. The Committee believes that training exercises are an essential part of emergency preparedness and is encouraged by the Department's response to the Auditor General's recommendation. It would, however, like to monitor the Department's progress in this respect. It therefore recommends that:

## **RECOMMENDATION 13**

**That Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada report on its progress in developing a long-term plan and budget for the conduct of national exercises in its report on plans and priorities and in its departmental performance reports. PSEPC**



**must also indicate how people are trained and how many training exercises it has conducted in its departmental performance report and reference key lessons drawn from these exercises.**

### **Spending on Critical Infrastructure**

Budget 2001 promised to spend \$190 million for a new program called Emergency Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure protection — also known by its acronym as the EP/CIP program — which was to be coordinated by the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OC�PEP), the precursor to PSEPC, across 12 departments. The EP/CIP program was designed to expand the capacity of federal agencies to protect key elements of the country's infrastructure (roads, bridges, buildings, factories) from attack.

The Auditor General expected to find that the funds, about half of which were actually transferred to OC�PEP, would be spent according to a risk analysis. The Auditor General found no evidence of spending based on risk analysis nor could PSEPC officials explain how the money was spent or how much of the Budget 2001 funding had lapsed. The audit found that officials are aware of these problems and are taking measures to address them. Consequently, the Auditor General recommended that all PSEPC's future critical infrastructure strategy planning be based on risk assessment. The Committee endorses this recommendation and has called for all entities engaged in the Security Enhancement Initiative to incorporate risk assessment and management into their planning and decision-making processes. (See Recommendation 2, above.)

### **CONCLUSION**

In presenting the findings of her audit, the Auditor General raised an important issue. In order for Parliament and parliamentarians to scrutinize spending on national security measures and make informed judgments about their effectiveness, access to performance information is required. Yet, as in the case of data on infiltration failure rates collected by Transport Canada, much of this information is classified and is thus not available. This creates a dilemma for parliamentarians who expect to hold government to account yet have every desire that sensitive information not find its way into the wrong hands.

One solution proposed by the Auditor General involves the creation of a parliamentary committee, bound to secrecy that could receive reports containing classified information from security and intelligence agencies.

In October 2004, an advisory committee of Members of the House of Commons and the Senate (Interim Committee of Parliamentarians on National Security) issued a report in which it called for the creation of a joint House of Commons/Senate committee — called the Parliamentary Intelligence Committee — to be established by statute. On 4 April 2005, the Hon. Anne McLellan (Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) tabled details of a proposed national security committee of parliamentarians. This proposed committee, to be composed of Members of Parliament and Senators, would be mandated (among other things) to review the ability of departments and agencies engaged in security and intelligence activities to fulfill their responsibilities. Ms. McLellan indicated that appropriate safeguards would be in place to ensure the protection of classified information.

The Committee has not reviewed either proposal and has not indicated a preference regarding the form such a committee ought to take. However, it regards the issue as a serious one requiring urgent action. The Committee therefore urges the government and parliamentarians to work together to bring about the timely establishment of a parliamentary committee capable of receiving and reviewing sensitive information on the performance of departments and agencies engaged in security efforts. This action is required in order that Parliament be able to exercise appropriate scrutiny over these activities and hold government to account for the outcomes that result. Accordingly, the Committee strongly recommends:

#### **RECOMMENDATION 14**

**That a joint committee of the Senate and House of Commons on security and intelligence be established as soon as possible.**

In closing, the Committee wishes to thank the Auditor General and her staff for bringing these issues to the attention of Parliament in a way that respects the need to keep some information classified while at the same time conveying a clear picture of how security enhancements are working and where they need improvement. Clearly, Canadians and the entities tasked with protecting their security have benefited enormously from these audits.



# APPENDIX A LIST OF WITNESSES

<b>Associations and Individuals</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Meeting</b>
<b>Canadian Air Transport Security Authority</b> Jacques Duchesneau, President and Chief Executive Officer	12/05/2005	37
<b>Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness</b> Margaret Bloodworth, Deputy Minister		
<b>Department of Transport</b> Marc Grégoire, Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security Group		
<b>Office of the Auditor General of Canada</b> Sheila Fraser, Auditor General of Canada Peter Kasurak, Principal Edward Wood, Director		



## REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In accordance with Standing Order 109, the Committee requests that the government table a comprehensive response to this report.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings ([Meetings Nos. 37 and 44 including this report](#)) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

John Williams, M.P.  
*Chair*



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Monday, June 20, 2005  
(Meeting No. 44)

The Standing Committee on Public Accounts met *in camera* at 3:31 p.m. this day, in Room 209 West Block, the Chair, John Williams, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Dean Allison, Gary Carr, David Christopherson, Brian Fitzpatrick, Sébastien Gagnon, Mark Holland, Daryl Kramp, Hon. Walt Lastewka, Benoît Sauvageau, John Williams and Borys Wrzesnewskij.

*In attendance: Library of Parliament:* Brian O'Neal, Analyst; Marc-André Pigeon, Analyst.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(g), the Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 2, National Security in Canada — The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative: Air Transportation Security, Marine Security, and Emergency Preparedness of the April 2005 Report of the Auditor General of Canada referred to the Committee on April 5, 2005.

The Committee commenced consideration of a draft report.

It was agreed, — That the Committee adopt the draft report as the Report to the House.

It was agreed, — That, pursuant to Standing Order 109, the Committee request that the Government table a comprehensive response to the report.

It was agreed, — That the Chair, Clerk and analysts be authorized to make such grammatical and editorial changes as may be necessary without changing the substance of the report.

It was agreed, — That the Chair present the Report to the House at the earliest opportunity following the expiry of the forty-eight (48) hour revision period.

It was agreed, — That the Clerk and the analysts, in consultation with the Chair, issue a news release.

At 4:18 p.m., the sitting was suspended.

At 4:57 p.m., the sitting resumed.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(g), the Committee resumed consideration of Chapter 5, Management of Public Opinion Research of the November 2003 Report of the Auditor General of Canada referred to the Committee on February 10, 2004.



The Committee commenced consideration of a draft report.

At 5:32 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Elizabeth B. Kingston  
*Clerk of the Committee*