NDDN Committee Report

CONCLUSION

Our examination of the various elements of the acquisition of submarines for the Canadian Forces has highlighted, among other things, the risks involved in acquiring and operating such vessels. Decision-makers in government and the Department of National Defence no doubt recognized that there were risks involved in obtaining from a foreign source existing submarines and in attempting a smooth conversion from the old submarines to the new ones, given all the training and the efforts required to achieve full operational status. However, with hindsight, it is clear that the risks were to a large extent underestimated. The very complex schedule drawn up for the training of the Canadian submariners who went to the United Kingdom to sail the submarines to their new home and for the Canadianization of the vessels fell behind schedule almost from the start. Some persons involved in the planning of the training and Canadianization process may have been concerned by the overly ambitious schedule, but once the acquisition was set in motion, it was not possible to rethink the plans or reassess the reasons behind the acquisition.

The result of this overly optimistic view of how quickly the Upholder submarines would be transferred to Canada and brought to full operational status with the Canadian fleet is the series of delays which have frustrated Canadians. Of course, the submarine acquisition is not the only military equipment project to encounter problems and delays. However, most of the acquisition projects are for new equipment designed or modified to meet Canadian requirements where the manufacturers assist in the training of Canadian military personnel and correct deficiencies under warranty. The acquisition of the submarines had some elements of the usual equipment purchases, but buying used equipment involves some additional risks. When Canada buys a new aircraft for its military, the manufacturer has often sold similar aircraft to the armed forces of other countries and can provide support and issue alerts about deficiencies identified by other operators. With the acquisition of the British Upholder submarines, Canada now has the only examples of these vessels ever built and will be solely responsible for the safe and effective use of this equipment. No other country will be able to offer help and advice during the operational life of the submarines because no other country operates this particular type of vessel. Of course, this is not the first time Canada has operated warships that no other country utilizes. The Navy has considerable experience in operating frigates and destroyers of Canadian design not used by any other navy. However, given the complexity of vessels like submarines, the responsibility for ensuring their safe operation is considerable and the Navy faces a significant challenge in meeting this responsibility during the operational life of the Victoria class submarines.

While the Committee is concerned about the manner in which this acquisition was carried out, this does not put into question the commitment and determination of Canadian submariners. The decision-makers may have been over-optimistic about many aspects of this acquisition, but the personnel who operate these vessels have had to live with the consequences of the delays in the training process and in the Canadianization of the Upholders once they reached Canadian shores. The members of the Committee met Canadian submariners during the visit to one of the submarines, HMCS Windsor, in Halifax and on other occasions. The tour of the submarine and of the simulators gave us a small glimpse of what life aboard operational submarines entails. While surface vessels can face a number of challenges during operations, stormy seas often causing more dangerous situations than encounters with enemy forces, submarines must deal with another set of dangers while travelling submerged under the surface of the sea. The problems which have bedevilled the submarine acquisition project should in no way lead anyone to doubt the courage and determination of Canadian submariners.

Finally, with respect to the work of the Committee itself, the Committee is concerned about the attitude of the Department of National Defence. While cooperation was promised to assist the Committee in its examination of the acquisition project and while the requested documents were provided, the delivery left something to be desired. As mentioned in the Introduction, there were delays in providing the Committee with the requested documentation and more delays in ensuring the translation necessary to permit the distribution of the documents to each and every member of the Committee. There were no doubt costs involved in the translation of complex contracts and other documents, but such expenditures are part of the parliamentary business of reviewing government decisions and expressing the concerns of Canadians. Some of these documents, such as the contracts, should have been available in the first place in both official languages. The Committee issued a statement on February 3, 2005, indicating its concern over the delays and the use of translation costs as an issue for further delay and takes this opportunity to reaffirm its position on this issue. The Committee adopted a motion on April 12, 2005, which is reproduced herein as Recommendation 12:

RECOMMENDATION 12:

The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs is disappointed and angered by the inertia and systematic obstruction of the Department of National Defence in producing the bilingual documents required for the Committee to function smoothly. This has frustrated the Committee in doing its work. On a number of occasions they have proposed tabling English-only versions of documents requested by the Committee. The reasons given for the delay in providing bilingual documents centred on prohibitive costs and inadequate time for translating technically complex material. Whereas this has led to a marked slowdown in the Committee’s work, and whereas documents as important as the contract, the list of deficiencies in the submarines and the list of corrective measures took four months to be tabled and certain other requested documents have still not been tabled, it is recommended that the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs file a letter of complaint to the Minister of National Defence and report our concern about easy availability of translated documents to the Commissioner of Official Languages.