HUMA Committee Report
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It is clear from our meetings that EI program contributors, at least in terms of those who appeared before the Subcommittee, would like to see major changes to the Employment Insurance Act. In terms of future EI reforms, the Subcommittee witnessed the usual dichotomy of views held by employer and employee representatives. Witnesses representing workers indicated that the EI program has been significantly diminished in terms of both accessibility to benefits and the level of support provided. Some Committee members, and many witnesses, consider the retrenchment of EI as a major contributor to the cumulative balance in the EI Account. Proponents of this view maintain that it is time to make amends and have called for significant increases in EI accessibility and, in the level and duration of benefits provided under this program.
… for years now, the government has helped make it so that all Canadians who are unemployed would no longer have access to the employment insurance fund. You ask us today what should be done with the money that you’ve accumulated at the workers’ expense. The answer is very simple: you should give it back to the workers and make sure that the system is able to meet the needs and expectations of people who lose their jobs. (Pierre Séguin, Centrale des syndicats du Québec)35
Witnesses representing employers, on the other hand, lamented some of the changes that have been made to EI since 1996, particularly in terms of the elimination of the intensity rule and the rapid growth in social benefits. Most of these groups called for a return to the program’s original purpose, backed by stronger insurance principles.
The Chamber believes that the government must implement policies that discourage the frequent use of EI. Reinstating the intensity rule, increasing the hours to qualify for EI, and reducing the benefit period in high unemployment regions would enhance labour flexibility, productivity and accelerate industrial and regional adjustments. (Michael Murphy, Canadian Chamber of Commerce)36
I. Minimum Qualification Requirements
In moving to an hours-based qualification requirement and extending coverage to the first hour of work, the 1996 EI reform eliminated the concept of a week of insurable employment. Under the old weeks-based qualification requirement, a week was considered insurable if it involved at least 15 hours of insurable employment or weekly earnings equal to at least 20% of maximum weekly insurable earnings. There is no doubt about the significance of this change, since today’s hours-based qualification requirement is based on a 35-hour week, not a 15-hour week. Many witnesses who appeared before the Subcommittee forcefully noted that this reform has made it more difficult for short-hour and part-time workers to qualify for benefits, particularly in terms of those who reside in high unemployment areas of the country where job opportunities are limited.
Most importantly, members of the Subcommittee were told that the hours-based qualification requirement has been especially problematic for workers — especially those working part-time — who are defined as new entrants or re-entrants. In this case, the hours-based qualification requirement is 910 hours of insurable employment, irrespective of labour market conditions in the EI economic region in which they reside. Furthermore, this hourly threshold is more than 200% higher than the hourly equivalent of the former weeks-based qualification requirement under the minimum insurability rule.
The new rule stated that claimants who are not new entrants into the labour force would need between 420 and 700 hours to qualify for employment insurance. But a new entrant would need 910 hours of insurable employment to qualify. According to our studies, this requirement of 910 hours has a negative impact, particularly on women and young people. Furthermore, it is a major disincentive for people who are thinking about working in agriculture, forestry and a number of other sectors where the work is seasonal. It is just about impossible for these people to accumulate 910 hours of insurable employment in these types of jobs.
(Normand Carrier, Comité d'étude sur le travail saisonnier)37
The 360 is essentially 12 weeks times 30 hours. One of the things that happened when they went from UI to EI is that they essentially took a minimum of 15 weeks. Under the old weeks formula, you needed a minimum of 15 hours a week to qualify, so the maximum anybody needed prior to 1996 was 300 hours — and it was, of course, much lower because of the variable formula.
The important thing to keep in mind here is that in the more than doubling from 15 to 35 hours, you caught women who typically work much less than 35 hours a week on average … (Kevin Hayes, Canadian Labour Congress)38
For a number of years now, people have been going out and demanding that employment insurance should go back to being a plan that compensates people who are out of work. Eligibility for us starts at 350 hours. (Sébastien Duclos, Mouvement autonome et solidaire des sans-emploi, réseau québécois)39
Although the policy objective underlying the significant increase in the qualification requirement for new entrants/re-entrants was purportedly to reduce dependency on EI, the integrity of this policy objective was somewhat undermined in 2001 when the government reduced the qualification requirement for special benefits (including new entrants/re-entrants) from 700 to 600 hours of insurable employment. This was done largely in recognition of the fact that the incidence of part-time employment was much higher among women than men and that, compared to men, women tend to enter and exit the labour market more frequently. It is unclear why this reasoning is unique in terms of its application to the qualification requirement for special benefits, since the same rationale, in our view, applies equally to regular benefits.
Committee members are concerned that EI’s qualification requirements have become fragmented and inconsistent. In addition to the lower qualification requirement for special benefits, the receipt of these benefits is an important determinant in establishing whether an insured individual is defined as a new entrant or re-entrant for the purposes of qualifying for regular benefits in a subsequent claim. The reason for this is that subsections 7(4) and 7(4.1) of the Employment Insurance Act40 allow these benefits to be counted in determining whether an insured person is or is not a new entrant or a re-entrant. Obviously, this is very significant, because individuals who are not defined as a new entrant or re-entrant must obtain between 420 to 700 hours of insurable employment (depending on the regional unemployment rate) to qualify for regular benefits; while individuals who are defined as such must obtain 910 hours of insurable work, a considerably tougher challenge in many parts of the country.
Many groups representing workers who appeared before the Subcommittee expressed the desire to replace the existing qualification requirement structure with a uniform requirement of 360 hours of insurable work, irrespective of the type of benefits received, labour market attachment or the unemployment rate. These
representatives, however, implicitly or explicitly supported the continuation of a benefit entitlement structure based on insurable hours of work and the unemployment rate.
Most Committee members agree that EI’s current qualification requirement is in need of reform. And in the opinion of most, reform should begin with a modification to the qualification requirement for new entrants and re-entrants. We do not believe that individuals who qualify for and receive a certain type of benefit should receive preferential treatment in terms of qualifying for other benefits. Hence, most members of the Committee support the view that the government should re-examine and eliminate any inequities in the existing qualification requirements for EI benefits.
Recommendation 10
The Committee recommends that the government implement a uniform 360 hours qualification requirement, irrespective of regional unemployment rates or the type of benefit. This would establish a qualification requirement based on a 30-hour week over a 12-week period.
The Employment Insurance Act reduced the maximum regular benefit entitlement from 50 to 45 weeks of benefits. This reform had its greatest impact on those residing in areas with the highest rates of unemployment in the country. Following the implementation of EI, the maximum entitlement for special benefits was raised from 30 weeks to 50 weeks of benefits, 5 weeks more than the maximum entitlement for regular benefits. Like that observed with respect to the qualification requirement, this reform resulted in preferential treatment for some claimants and moved the EI program further away from its primary purpose, which is to provide wage-loss protection to involuntarily unemployed workers. While supportive of a policy to allow parents an opportunity to provide an extended period of care to their newborn and adopted children, some believe that EI may not be the most appropriate vehicle for achieving this policy objective.
The surplus was paid by the workers and the employers, therefore, it should come back as a surplus to help get more people qualified, higher benefits, to alleviate the situation of black holes and maybe we wouldn’t have to bank hours if we had a properly funded employment insurance program that would address the needs of the unemployed. (John Gagnon, New Brunswick Federation of Labour)41
Groups representing workers expressed the view that the current benefit entitlement structure should be reformed and that maximum benefit entitlement should be restored to 50 weeks, similar to the maximum entitlement for special benefits. We were told that this would address the long-standing problem that is sometimes characterized as a “black hole,” a situation that predominantly affects seasonal workers who exhaust their benefits before the beginning of the next season. While the government has taken some initiative to resolve this issue, some of the testimony provided to the Subcommittee indicated that more needs to be done in this regard. Effective 6 June 2004, claimants who live in one of 24 participating economic regions (i.e., any economic region where the unemployment rate was at least 10% or more in at least one month during the six-month period ending 8 May 2004) will receive a five-week extension of their benefit entitlement (subject to the maximum benefit entitlement of 45 weeks of benefits).
… a portion of Quebec's economy, especially in areas further north, is composed of seasonal industries, and I would like to say that seasonal industries are not the same as seasonal workers, but it is the industries that are seasonal. We end up with these benefit rates and these benefit weeks, and there are people that find themselves in what is called a “black
hole” — a period when they have no access to any income or they have to turn to employment assistance, which is the last resort, if we can call it that, in Quebec. However, this is not really qualifying, either. So there are people here on the North Shore who just can’t make both ends meet anymore. They are saying it is the last straw, and we have come here to say that it has to change. (Sébastien Duclos, Mouvement autonome et solidaire des sans-emploi, réseau québécois)42
We recognize that despite this measure, some workers, specifically older workers, are susceptible to long periods of unemployment following a layoff.
Recommendation 11
The Committee recommends that the maximum benefit entitlement for regular benefits be extended to 50 weeks, the same as that afforded special benefits.
Recommendation 12
The Committee recommends that following an assessment of the pilot project that extends benefit entitlement by five weeks in high-unemployment areas of the country, the government, following consultations with the proposed Employment Insurance Commission, modify benefit entitlement so as to provide an additional incentive to work for a longer period of time than the minimum hours of work required to qualify for benefits.
Recommendation 13
The Committee recommends that the proposed Employment Insurance Commission consult program contributors and report to the government on the feasibility of providing a supplementary benefit beyond the proposed 50-week maximum period so as to help unemployed workers 50 years of age and over cope with extended periods of unemployment. The amount of the supplementary benefit and its duration should depend on lifetime contributions to employment insurance.
III. Weekly Benefits and Average Weekly Insurable Earnings
The Employment Insurance Act reduced and fixed maximum annual insurable earnings at $39,000 until 2000. In 2001, the Act was amended and a method for indexing maximum annual insurable earnings was introduced. According to section 4 of the Act, maximum annual insurable earnings will remain at $39,000 until the value of annualized average weekly earnings in Canada, as determined by a formula set out in the Act, exceeds this threshold.43 For 2004, the value of annualized average weekly earnings as determined by the formula was $36,200 ($696 per week), an amount that is significantly less than the current maximum and indicative of the extent to which maximum weekly insurable earnings exceeded average weekly earnings prior to the EI reform. Although some witnesses suggested that maximum weekly insurable earnings should be raised, others, including employee representatives, did not share this view.
We think an increase in the maximum insurable earnings amount would be premature. On the one hand, it would further inflate the 2005 surplus, which we don’t want. On the other hand, it would improve the system, the merits of which we think should be assessed in the context of a comprehensive analysis of all system parameters. (Pierre Séguin, Centrale des syndicats du Québec)44
Some proposed increasing weekly EI benefits by raising the benefit rate from its current level of 55% of average weekly insurable earnings to 60%.
Another proposal to raise weekly benefits, and one that was unanimously endorsed by witnesses representing workers, is to eliminate the current “divisor” rule and replace it with a more equitable means of calculating average weekly insurable earnings while concurrently providing an incentive to work.
… if there is going to be an amendment or an improvement to the benefit rate, the best way to go at it is to take the best 12 weeks of earnings in the last 12 months and get rid of that silly divisor formula, which is capricious and nasty and does all of the wrong things to the wrong people at the wrong time. (Kevin Hayes, Canadian Labour Congress)45
In the case of the best 12 weeks, best 10 weeks and best 14 weeks, whatever you see, dump the divisor rule. It punishes people who actually take all available work. (Robert Blakely, Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO, Canadian Office)46
Actually what is happening is we have a knee-high system that is a disincentive to people to accept all available work. What is happening is we have people forced to refuse work in order to have a reasonable income in the winter months. We have several examples of real people; two employees working on the same operations, one next to the other, one only works the 14 peak weeks and the next one comes every day that she is called to work, the second employee will have a revenue of about $4,000 a year less — this is real, this is not fictional — of the person that only works the 14 weeks. So one person works 30 weeks, accepts all available work, is there all the time, very loyal to the company, very loyal to the job, people that are experts at what they do, and the other person does not accept all available work, he is rewarded by a higher income. The more you work under this regime in these types of situations and these types of industries, the less you make. We can prove this with very real situations. (Gilles LeBlanc, South-East N.B. Committee for Changes to Employment Insurance)47
… if the government agreed to take the 14 or the 10 best weeks, as Mr. Godin suggested, the divisor would then disappear, because total earnings spread over the 10 or 14 weeks would be divided by 10 or by 14 and that would give a salary average … the problem we have right now is that when a seasonal worker applies for employment insurance, if when he applies at a time when the unemployment rate in his region is low, the divisor increases. Someone may have worked for 15 or 16 weeks during the season, and this is almost the most that any seasonal worker, in the northwest at least, is going to be working in forestry, except if he has a really specific job. In the forestry sector, you work 14 or 15 weeks during the season … after working for 15 weeks, if you go to apply for employment insurance and the divisor is 18, for instance, they take the total of your 15 weeks and divide it by 18, which does not result in a weekly average at all. It gives an amount that is less than the average. And it is on the basis of this new figure that the EI benefits are calculated. If you have other questions about this, I can keep going. (Normand Carrier, Comité d'étude sur le travail saisonnier)48
… we have never said that it should be 10, 12 or 14 weeks. What is clear right now is that the method used to establish the average wage based on the qualifying period, especially with the denominator rule as currently applied, is actually designed to trip up workers. (Marc Bellemare, Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec)49
I think we can all agree the best weeks, whether it's 10 or 14, would work. The problem is nothing's being done yet. (Rodrigue Landry)50
Members of the Committee acknowledge that the intent of the divisor rule is to strengthen attachments to work. However, virtually every group representing employees that appeared before the Subcommittee viewed the divisor rule as unfair and a major irritant. It is perceived to be inequitable because it penalizes workers who meet the minimum qualification requirement, but who are unable to obtain two additional weeks of work with weekly earnings at least equal to those related to the minimum qualification requirement. Moreover, this rule ignores weeks in which high earnings were paid during the qualifying period, but prior to the beginning of the rate calculation period (i.e., the last 26 weeks of the qualifying period). In addition, and perhaps most importantly, it encourages some workers to restrict their hours of work during the rate calculation period, despite the current treatment of “small weeks.”51
Many members of the Committee concur with those who would like to see the divisor rule reformed. However, some of us have mixed views as to the period of time that should be considered in calculating average insurable earnings and the number of weeks that should be included. Although some witnesses strongly endorsed a best-14-week rule within the 52-week qualifying period, this uniform divisor is both arbitrary and potentially harmful to those who can obtain enough hours to qualify, but who are unable to obtain two additional weeks of work with weekly earnings at least equal to those related to the minimum qualification requirement. The selection of “best” weeks within the whole qualifying period seems to offer the fairest reference period for determining average weekly insurable earnings. As for the number of weeks to be averaged within this period, the least arbitrary approach seems to be the weekly equivalent of the lowest minimum hourly qualification requirement.
Recommendation 14
The Committee recommends that the government repeal the current method of calculating average weekly insurable earnings and in its place adopt a new rate calculation period equal to the qualifying period. Only those weeks with the highest earnings in the new rate calculation period would be included, and these earnings would be averaged over the best 12 weeks of insurable employment.
Recommendation 15
The Committee recommends that the government increase the benefit rate from 55% to 60% of average weekly insurable earnings.
Recommendation 16
The Committee recommends that the government, following consultations with the proposed Employment Insurance Commission, establish a nation-wide pilot project to assess the impact of a variable benefit rate that ranges from between 61% to 65% of average weekly insurable earnings, depending on the number of insurable hours worked in excess of the minimum hourly qualification requirement.
IV. Enhancing Workplace Skills
As our labour force ages and grows more slowly, the potential for serious skills shortages in the Canadian labour market is expected to grow. Many small- and medium-sized businesses across the country are already experiencing serious difficulties recruiting the workers they need to stay competitive and realize growth opportunities. According information collected by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business (see Labour Pains: Results of CFIB Surveys on Labour Availability — April 2003), close to 60% of small- and medium-sized businesses anticipate difficulties hiring workers in the next three years. This is not good news, because these businesses are responsible for much of this country’s job growth.
We also noted the fact that there is a shortage of workers in Canada. It is not the situation everywhere but it does nonetheless indicate that the economy has changed a great deal over the past 20 years. Should we not then examine this dynamic and determine how we can improve the program in order to respond more appropriately to the needs of the unemployed in Canada? (André Piché, Canadian Federation of Independent Business)52
While the federal government recognizes the importance of encouraging individuals and firms to invest in human capital, its focus has tended to be on higher learning. Relatively less attention has been paid to workplace training and assisting unemployed workers obtain the right skills in order to become re-employed. In terms of the latter, support for labour market adjustment is primarily provided through employment benefits and support measures, under Part II of the Employment Insurance Act. This assistance is delivered under federal-provincial-territorial labour market development agreements. Only unemployed individuals receiving EI benefits or those who have received regular or maternity/parental benefits in the past three or five years respectively are eligible for this support, a clientele that excludes many unemployed individuals. According to section 78 of the Employment Insurance Act, the maximum amount that can be spent on employment benefits and support measures in any given year cannot exceed 0.8% of total insurable earnings as estimated by the CEIC. In 2004-2005, planned spending on these measures is $2.2 billion, or 0.6% of total estimated insurable earnings. Despite the many years of year-end surpluses in the EI Account, expenditures on these measures have been relatively constant and always well below the legislated limit.
Several witnesses who appeared before the Subcommittee indicated that more support should be available under EI to help both employers and workers acquire the skills needed in today’s workplace. One major suggestion in this regard was that EI should provide 40 hours of training to each worker per year. This training would be modelled after the support that is provided through EI to apprentices while they are enrolled in classroom training.
We’re also recommending that regular insurance entitlement currently available to apprenticeship training should be expanded to everyone in the workforce, both employed and underemployed, for workplace training. (Hassan Yussef, Canadian Labour Congress)53
Another suggestion was that EI should offset the costs of training workers who replace workers receiving maternity and parental benefits. It was also suggested that EI’s role in facilitating active labour market adjustment should be broadened to include the provision of mobility assistance.
I’ll talk about parental leave. We had one member with five employees; they lost four employees in one year to parental leave. They had to retrain all the other employees. We’re not against parental leave, but no one even thought about those implications on that firm. We think there should be an offset there. There are ways to deal with this. (Garth Whyte, Canadian Federation of Independent Business)54
What we feel could be done in this area is to offer incentives to employees to accept employment in other areas, such as the temporary mobility program that was part of the EI program in previous years, and similarly, to assist employers with the additional costs that are associated with moving people from one part of the country to another. That’s not only the cost of travel, and so on, but sometimes there is licensing and different tests that are required to give that person the status to be able to work in another region of the country. (Dennis Ryan, Canadian Construction Association)55
There are a significant number of trained people in whom Canada has invested. Spend some money in EI and move them to where there is work. That’s in our industry — construction. (Robert Blakely, Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO, Canadian Office)56
Finally, the Subcommittee was also told that in some instances the effectiveness of adjustment assistance provided under EI is questionable and more needs to be done to ensure that this spending provides genuine training and the skills required to find and keep employment.
There is a famous black hole in the duration in my area. Your benefit runs out and then there’s a period of time that you have to go on welfare. For many workers in the fish plants in the Acadian Peninsula, that’s a reality. They send them back to school to sit them on school benches doing little things that are not very constructive as training. We have to start looking at that type of money in order to get them trained properly and get some constructive training, not this type of work where people sit down on benches because the system doesn’t allow them to have benefits for that duration of time. (John Gagnon, New Brunswick Federation of Labour)57
Now, we can and we should do better. For example, we are evaluating, as we speak, each of our active-measure programs province by province. We do that in partnership with provinces because, as you’re well aware, they typically deliver the active measures. (Andrew Treusch, Department of Human Resources and Skills Development Canada)58
Recommendation 17
The Committee recommends that following the completion of the evaluation that is currently underway to assess the effectiveness of employment benefits and support measures, the federal government use this information, to the greatest extent possible, to ensure that spending under the next generation of labour market development agreements focuses exclusively on those measures that have achieved their intended results.59 In addition, the federal government must negotiate with provincial and territorial governments to establish an appeal process for individuals who are denied access to employment benefits and support measures.
Recommendation 18
The Committee recommends that the Employment Insurance Act be amended to include mobility assistance in employment benefits and support measures. Mobility assistance would only be paid once a job is verified and confirmed. As with other employment benefits and support measures, this assistance would be based on voluntary participation.
Recommendation 19
The Committee recommends that the government amend section 78 of the Employment Insurance Act to require that at least 0.8% of estimated total insurable earnings be allocated to employment benefits and support measures and that the additional funding that results from this be used to provide meaningful training to those who qualify under a more inclusive definition of “insured participant” pursuant to section 58 of the Employment Insurance Act.
Recommendation 20
The Committee recommends that the government initiate a pilot project to assess the effectiveness of providing a premium refund to employers who: (1) provide training to alleviate skill shortages; (2) incur training costs while replacing workers receiving maternity/parental benefits; (3) provide training to seasonal and older workers; and (4) provide workplace literacy training to their employees. If the pilot project finds this training incentive to be effective then it should become a regular feature of the Employment Insurance program and its cost should not be included as part of the expenditure limit contained in section 78 of the Employment Insurance Act.
Recommendation 21
The Committee recommends that the government amend the Employment Insurance Act to exempt foreign agricultural workers and their employers from making contributions to employment insurance.
Recommendation 22
In view of the growing incidence of self-employment in the Canadian labour market, the Committee recommends that the government consider developing a framework for extending EI coverage, both in terms of regular and special benefits, to self-employed workers.
Recommendation 23
The Committee recommends that the government amend the Employment Insurance Regulations so as to not consider pension, severance and vacation income in the determination of earnings for benefit purposes.
Recommendation 24
The Committee recommends that the government amend subsection 5(3) (and if necessary, section 5(2)(i)) of the Employment Insurance Act with a view to remove the presumption of guilt if an employer and an employee are related.
Recommendation 25
The Committee recommends that the government ensure that every district office in the Department of Human Resources and Skills Development employ a claimant’s advocate.
Recommendation 26
The Committee recommends that the two-week waiting period be eliminated for those engaged in approved training.
Recommendation 27
The Committee recommends that the government study the possibility of extending sickness benefits by 35 weeks for those who suffer from a prolonged and serious illness.
Recommendation 28
The Committee recommends that the government study the possibility of extending compassionate care benefits for families whose children must receive medical attention outside of the locality in which they reside.
| 35 | SEIF, Meeting No. 2 (19:45), Monday, 15 November 2004. |
| 36 | SEIF, Meeting No. 3 (15:40), Wednesday, 17 November 2004. |
| 37 | SEIF, Meeting No. 4 (15:50), Wednesday, 24 November 2004. |
| 38 | SEIF, Meeting No. 2 (20:45), Monday, 15 November 2004. |
| 39 | SEIF, Meeting No. 4 (15:40), Wednesday, 24 November 2004. |
| 40 | Section 7(4) defines a new entrant or re-entrant as an insured person who during the qualifying period has had fewer than 490 hours of insurable employment, hours for which benefits have been paid (calculated as 35 hours for each week of benefits paid), prescribed hours that relate to employment in the labour force, or hours comprised of any combination of those hours. Moreover, subsection 7(4.1) states that an insured person is not a new entrant or re-entrant if the person has received at least one week of maternity or parental benefits in the 208-week period preceding the 52-week period before the qualifying period. |
| 41 | SEIF, Meeting No. 4 (16:15), Wednesday, 24 November 2004. |
| 42 | SEIF, Meeting No. 4 (15:40), Wednesday, 24 November 2004. |
| 43 | The formula is 52 x A x B where: A = the 12-month average (ending on 30 June of the preceding year) of monthly average weekly earnings; and B = the ratio of A to the 12-month average (ending 12 months prior to 30 June of the preceding year) of monthly average weekly earnings. If the amount produced by this calculation exceeds $39,000, then maximum yearly insurable earnings (MYIE) for that year would be that amount rounded down to the nearest multiple of $100. MYIE for years subsequent to this would be equal to MYIE in the preceding year, before rounding down to the nearest multiple of $100, multiplied by B. If this amount is not a multiple of $100, it too must be rounded down to the nearest multiple of $100. The average weekly earnings referred to in this calculation are the industrial aggregate for the nation as a whole as estimated and published monthly by Statistics Canada. |
| 44 | SEIF, Meeting No. 2 (19:25), Monday, 15 November 2004. |
| 45 | Ibid. (20:10). |
| 46 | SEIF, Meeting No. 4 (16:55), Wednesday, 24 November 2004 |
| 47 | Ibid. (15:50). |
| 48 | Ibid. (16:45). |
| 49 | SEIF, Meeting No. 2, (20:00), Monday, 15 November 2004. |
| 50 | SEIF, Meeting No. 4 (16:25), Wednesday, 24 November 2004. |
| 51 | As of September 2003, weeks in which a worker earns less than $225 do not have to be included in calculating average weekly insurable earnings provided that the worker has enough regular weeks to satisfy the regional divisor as set out in section 14(2)(b) of the Employment Insurance Act. If not, small weeks are included in the calculation. |
| 52 | SEIF, Meeting No. 3 (16:45), Wednesday, 17 November 2004. |
| 53 | SEIF, Meeting No. 2 (19:35), Monday, 15 November 2004. |
| 54 | SEIF, Meeting No. 3 (16:00), Wednesday, 17 November 2004. |
| 55 | Ibid. (15:25). |
| 56 | SEIF, Meeting No. 4 (16:55), Wednesday, 24 November 2004. |
| 57 | Ibid. (15:30). |
| 58 | SEIF, Meeting No. 1 (11:45), Thursday, 4 November 2004. |
| 59 | The Bloc Québécois maintains that the federal government must respect the Quebec-Ottawa accords on labour market development. |