HAFF Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, December 3, 2002

Á

1105

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.))

Á

1110

Professor Maureen Mancuso (Professor of Political Science, University of Guelph)

The Chair

Mr. Michael Atkinson (Vice-President (Academic), University of Saskatchewan)

The Chair

Mr. Daniel Weinstock (professor of philosophy, University of Montreal)

Á

1115

The Chair

Professor Ian Greene (Professor of Political Science, York University)

Á

1120

The Chair

Mr. C.E.S. Franks (Individual Presentation)

The Chair

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Á

1125

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp (Elk Island, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Prof. Ian Greene

Á

1130

The Chair

Mr. Michael Atkinson

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

Prof. Ian Greene

Á

1135

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds—Grenville, Lib.)

Prof. Maureen Mancuso

Mr. Joe Jordan

The Chair

Mr. Michael Atkinson

Mr. Joe Jordan

The Chair

Prof. Ian Greene

Á

1140

The Chair

Prof. Daniel Weinstock

The Chair

Prof. Maureen Mancuso

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie—Bathurst, NDP)

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Á

1145

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.)

Mr. Jacques Saada

Á

1150

The Chair

Prof. Maureen Mancuso

Mr. Jacques Saada

Prof. Maureen Mancuso

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada

Á

1155

Mr. Daniel Weinstock

The Chair

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport—Montmorency—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île-d'Orléans, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. Michael Atkinson

Â

1200

The Chair

Prof. Ian Greene

The Chair

Prof. Ian Greene

The Chair

Mrs. Carolyn Parrish (Mississauga Centre, Lib.)

Â

1205

The Chair

Mrs. Carolyn Parrish

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Mrs. Carolyn Parrish

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Some hon. members

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Mrs. Carolyn Parrish

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Mrs. Carolyn Parrish

The Chair

Prof. Daniel Weinstock

Â

1210

The Chair

Prof. Daniel Weinstock

The Chair

Prof. Maureen Mancuso

The Chair

Mr. Rick Borotsik (Brandon—Souris, PC)

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Â

1215

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Prof. Ian Greene

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Prof. Ian Greene

The Chair

Prof. Daniel Weinstock

The Chair

Mr. Rick Borotsik

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Prof. Maureen Mancuso

Â

1220

The Chair

Mr. Michael Atkinson

Prof. Daniel Weinstock

Prof. Ian Greene

The Chair

Mr. Michael Atkinson

Â

1225

The Chair

Prof. Daniel Weinstock

Â

1230

The Chair

Mr. Ken Epp

Prof. Ian Greene

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Â

1235

Mr. Ken Epp

Prof. Maureen Mancuso

The Chair

Mr. Tony Tirabassi (Niagara Centre, Lib.)

Prof. Ian Greene

Mr. Tony Tirabassi

Prof. Ian Greene

Mr. Tony Tirabassi

Prof. Ian Greene

Â

1240

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Prof. Ian Greene

Mr. Yvon Godin

Prof. Ian Greene

Mr. Yvon Godin

Prof. Ian Greene

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.)

Â

1245

Mr. Michael Atkinson

Mr. Geoff Regan

The Chair

Prof. Maureen Mancuso

Mr. Michael Atkinson

Â

1250

The Chair

Prof. Ian Greene

The Chair

Mr. Rick Borotsik

The Chair

Prof. Maureen Mancuso

The Chair

Prof. Ian Greene

The Chair

Prof. Daniel Weinstock

The Chair

Mr. Rick Borotsik

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

Â

1255

The Chair

Prof. Maureen Mancuso

Mr. Joe Jordan

Prof. Maureen Mancuso

Mr. Joe Jordan

Prof. Maureen Mancuso

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

The Chair

Prof. Daniel Weinstock

Mr. Michael Atkinson

·

1300

The Chair

Prof. Maureen Mancuso

Mr. C.E.S. Franks

Prof. Ian Greene

Prof. Daniel Weinstock

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

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NUMBER 011

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, December 3, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Á  (1105)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.)): Order, colleagues. Perhaps we could begin the meeting today. Pursuant to our mandate under Standing Order 108.(3)(a)(iii), we are considering matters related to the inclusion of a code of conduct in the Standing Orders of the House.

    Before I introduce our guests I thought I'd give you some idea of how we proceed from this point.

    Today, of course, we have our witnesses, and we'll get to that.

    On Thursday, we begin with the federal ethics counsellor, Howie Wilson. We have an hour or so with Mr. Wilson. Then that's followed by the walk-in lunch, you'll recall, with the Speaker and Senator Oliver, which in effect is a continuation of the same matter. In fact, as you know, it's going to be an informal working luncheon in the Speaker's quarters. I hope, by the way, you'll all remember that. It's not a social thing, it's a working thing, even though it won't be conducted here in the committee room.

    Next Tuesday, my thought is that we continue, and possibly conclude with the private members' business. The following Thursday, in response to our own interest and the motion from the Canadian Alliance, we will return to the matter of security.

    Just so you know, we had replies to all of our requests for information on security, except from the RCMP. So we have the documents and we'll be ready certainly a week Thursday to proceed with that matter.

    It's my great pleasure to introduce you today to our witnesses. Again, on behalf of my colleagues, we really are most grateful to you for coming here to help us with this very important matter.

    We have with us Maureen Mancuso, professor of political science from the University of Guelph. From the University of Saskatchewan we have Michael Atkinson, who is the vice-president, academic. Michael, thank you for coming all that way. From York University we have Ian Greene, professor of political science. From the University of Montreal we have Daniel Weinstock, professor of philosophy.

    Professor Weinstock, at least six weeks ago or so, I and I think at least one other person here heard your presentation at the breakfast on the Hill, and we were most grateful to you for doing that. Thank you for being here.

    We also have here C.E.S. Ned Franks, formerly a professor of political science from Queen's University. Ned, we greatly appreciate having you here.

    It's been suggested that you might have a short statement to make. We're in your hands. I can proceed in any order. Could I proceed in the order I read them out?

    Maureen, you would be the first if that is okay. Please proceed.

Á  (1110)  

    Professor Maureen Mancuso (Professor of Political Science, University of Guelph): I'll perhaps begin by talking a little about expectations, because I think they're very important here.

    When we talk about the history of political scandal, if it teaches us anything, it's that public officials habitually fail to understand the behavioural expectations to which the public subjects them. The scandals that erode confidence in government, that tarnish the reputation of politicians as a class, and that give rise to committees like this one are ultimately examples of political acts that confound or shadow public expectations.

    In some cases those expectations are rather unrealistic. The public are, after all, political outsiders and they really don't have familiarity with the day-to-day requirements of politics. They're really quite quick to discount the demands of the job and they're hypersensitive to the apparent benefits. Even unrealistic expectations must be understood and addressed, because it's those expectations on which any sense of public confidence in government is founded. I'm not going to go into too much detail here on the state of that confidence. I think you all know that it's low and dropping.

    I do have a table here, if any of you are interested, that shows there's quite a high decline in terms of the opinion of the members of the public about Parliament. Of course, correspondingly, politicians' perceptions are much higher. When it comes to the Senate, even there the upshot is even less flattering. Even the majority of politicians have little or no confidence in that institution.

    By way of introduction, I would remind the committee that I think public expectations are at play here, and I would suggest strongly that people pay attention to those expectations, whether they're right or whether they're wrong.

    The Chair: Thank you very much for that. We appreciate it.

    Michael Atkinson.

    Mr. Michael Atkinson (Vice-President (Academic), University of Saskatchewan): I want to thank the committee for the opportunity to appear again before another parliamentary committee to talk about the possibility of a code of conduct for members of Parliament.

    Believe it or not, I was involved in the drafting of a green paper on conflict of interest that was tabled back in 1973 by Minister MacEachen. I was only 12 years old at the time, but it was a wonderful opportunity. I have had a chance to participate with members of Parliament over the years as they seek to find a way to better improve the confidence of members of the public in the institution.

    Like Maureen, I want to emphasize that this effort now, which is in many, many respects a huge improvement over what we tried to do way back in the 1970s and what subsequent committees have tried to do, will nonetheless only take us marginally toward meeting some of the expectations the public has of members of Parliament. In some respects, as Maureen has pointed out, those expectations are unrealistic, but on the other hand, they certainly do require addressing.

    I want to say, by way of conclusion, that I think the package that has been put together now much better approximates what is reasonable for members of Parliament on the one hand, and what are reasonable expectations on the part of the public on the other.

    The Chair: Michael, thank you very much.

    Daniel Weinstock.

[Translation]

    Mr. Daniel Weinstock (professor of philosophy, University of Montreal): Thank you for inviting me to appear before your committee. I will be speaking French initially, but I will be happy to answer your questions in either English or French.

    As the Chair mentioned earlier, I had the opportunity to discuss at greater length the whole issue of ethics in politics at a breakfast on the Hill. I gave a rather lengthy speech which I would be happy to make available to members, if they so wish. Just talk to me after the meeting.

    I'd like to focus on two important, connected themes that my colleagues have touched on briefly.

    First of all, the public seems to have a very poor understanding of the political system and of the principles, structures and triggers that create conflict and tensions and complicate a politician's role, from an ethics perspective.

    When I say that the public has a poor understanding of the situation, I'm not blaming anyone. Quite the contrary, in fact. In my view, in attempting to take a systematic approach to the problem of ethics in politics, one essential step would be to initiate a campaign to bring the public up to speed on the workings of our democratic system. After all, the system is based on the notion of opposition, conflict and challenge, behaviour that we don't necessarily look for in our friends or dinner companions. I'd like to get into this subject a bit.

    More generally, a code of conduct that specifically targets the behaviour of individual Members, without taking into account the system in which parliamentarians operate and the conflicting roles associated with this system, will per force be incomplete. For these reasons, I believe it's important to focus on occasional, systemic dysfunctional behaviour. It is this type of behaviour that a code of conduct should attempt to address, even though the emphasis too often may be put on the individual role of parliamentarians. Thank you.

Á  (1115)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Daniel.

[English]

    The committee would be most interested in a copy of your text, at the end, before you leave.

    Ian Greene, I do apologize. As you already see, the chair is very disorganized here. You were poised to speak, and I jumped over your name. It was a mistake on my part.

    So it's Ian Green, of York University.

    Professor Ian Greene (Professor of Political Science, York University): Well, it's a great pleasure to be here. I very much appreciate the invitation.

    To begin with, I'd like to say that the code of conduct and the employment of an independent ethics commissioner are from my perspective a big step forward. Ten provinces and three territories now have a legislated code of conduct, and eight provinces have independent ethics commissioners.

    Whenever I speak in other countries about the Canadian contribution to political ethics, I talk about these situations, but it's a great embarrassment to talk about how far behind the federal regime is. Please make sure that this legislation actually passes this time. There has been stillborn legislation in the past, and it would be so wonderful to see this legislation passed.

    In the provinces that have regimes like this the number of ethics scandals has been cut dramatically. I think the ethics problems encountered by the Mulroney government and the current government, all or most of them, could have been avoided had we had this legislation in place. So please do what you can to make sure it's actually passed this time and is not yet again put on the back burner. I think that most parliamentarians are honest and are dedicated to the public interest. This legislation will help to enhance all your reputations and the reputations of all parliamentarians.

    The purpose of the code of conduct is clearly set out in the draft legislation, but it's also important to keep in mind that legislation like this would never occur in a country that didn't believe in equality. The purpose of this legislation is to ensure that everyone is treated equally and that public office holders don't get special favours because of their positions. This enhances the trust we have in the integrity of government.

    Much of the success will depend on who is appointed as the independent ethics commissioner. I would have preferred to see an all-party-consensus type of system to choose the ethics commissioner, but that's a minor flaw in this legislation. It should proceed, and I think that in the future we'll get that anyway. In terms of who might make a good ethics commissioner, if we look at the provincial situations, often retired judges make excellent ethics commissioners.

    The educative role of the commissioner is absolutely critical. One minor change I'd suggest in the legislation would be that instead of saying that the commissioner “may” meet with parliamentarians, it should say the commissioner “must” meet with parliamentarians for at least the first few years of this new regime.

    Another reservation I have relates to the criticisms Mr. Justice Parker had in the Sinclair Stevens report about blind trusts. Can there ever be a truly blind trust? I think a lot of attention needs to be paid to that in order to make sure that this regime works well and does result in an increase in the trust the public has in parliamentarians.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Á  (1120)  

    The Chair: Ian, thank you very much.

    Just to add to your statistics and to one of your comments, I've been handed a news story from the CBC, and it says “Former Winnipeg mayor Bill Norrie could become Manitoba's first Conflict of Interest Commissioner. His name has been put forward by all political parties. It's now up to the provincial cabinet to approve the appointment.” That's one more added to the list you mentioned.

    It's now a pleasure to introduce Ned Franks, from Queen's.

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks (Individual Presentation): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I wrote up some comments, which are far too long to read, but I've given a copy to the clerk so he can distribute them to anybody who wants them.

    Like the others, I must compliment you on getting to this stage.

    The Chair: If I can just comment on that, the reason I didn't leap in and get a copy is that I assumed they weren't translated. If they aren't, we'll take them and see that they're translated, and members of the committee will certainly receive copies.

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: Thank you.

    May I compliment you and Parliament in getting to the stage you are at. There were bills introduced on conflict of interest in 1978, 1983, 1988, 1989, 1991, and 1992. For various reasons none of them got through the parliamentary legislative process.

    I'm going to comment on three aspects. From one of them you will probably conclude that I am quite cynical, but I don't particularly like the general statement that parliamentarians are expected to fulfill their public duties with honesty and to uphold the highest ethical standards. The reason for that is that however well intentioned the wish for the highest ethical standards, I think that is a pious hope or an exhortation to goodness. I know very well that politicians have not in the past met the highest ethical standards, and I know they won't in the future.

    The real concern of the body of these documents on conflict of interest is setting minimal standards dealing with conflict of interest or abuse of office for personal gain. That is very good, and that should be made clear, but I'll just offer you one caution. If you put in a statement of general principle, such as adherence to higher ethical standards, it gives an opportunity for every media person in the country to say that parliamentarians are not meeting the highest ethical standards whenever one gets drunk, does something naughty, inflates an expense account, or does anything like that, even if their actions aren't punishable, aren't conflicts of interest, or don't really do anything else. I don't know if we need that in documents of the House. The concern is much more appropriate with respect to conflict of interest and the abuse of office for personal gain, and I would like the general statement to reflect that, rather than have this exhortation to goodness.

    The next question I raise is on the problem of interest. One always appreciates that there's a whole range of interest in politics a member can have, even pecuniary ones, from simply holding stock in a company to actually owning a company, in between being a director or having a wife who is a director or an employee, and so on. Somewhere in that grey area one has to draw the line between what is construed as a serious interest for the purposes of conflict of interest and what isn't.

    I would like to see in the Standing Orders of the House a practice much like what the British have. When there is a conflict of interest or an apparent one, the member has to state in the House that they have an interest in the issue--for example, if they are a director in a company, if their wife works for the company or is a director, or if they used to work for an oil company and they're dealing with the Kyoto accord and so on. I don't think there's anything the matter with that. All it does is clear up the groundwork. It doesn't have to go to not voting except if there really is a major conflict of interest.

    The third point I want to make here was mentioned by Professor Greene, and it is on the appointment of the ethics commissioner. I don't consider the process proposed in the draft legislation satisfactory. The ethics commissioner will potentially have an enormous influence over parliamentarians from both houses and all parties to do his or her job properly. The commissioner will need the trust, respect, and confidence of all parties in both houses. At the very least, the Prime Minister should be required, as is required for example by legislation for the appointment of members of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, to consult with leaders of the parties in the House of Commons before appointment of the ethics commissioner.

    The Senate must be consulted as well, and I really think that does need changing in the legislation. We have a problem here with these sorts of appointments generally in Canada, but for this one, which directly affects all members of all parties in both houses, we have to use a better process.

    Now I shall list some other issues in point form. First, there is a problem of putting things into law, which means that courts can intrude into the affairs of Parliament. Although there is a disclaimer that the legislation won't affect the rights and privileges of Parliament, I think there's a question that hasn't been answered.

    Second, with respect to having one ethics commissioner, one must recognize that there are different rules and standards in practice in the two houses of Parliament, and that is going to have to get sorted out one way or the other.

    Third, I'll just mention one little thing. Does the expression “institution of Parliament”, which appears in the draft bill, have any clear legal meaning? I've never run across it as a legal concept before.

    Fourth, not mentioned in the proposals are prohibitions against some kinds of activities when one is leaving office, and some of those already exist for ministers.

Á  (1125)  

    I think I should stop there. I could go on for an hour, as you can appreciate, but I am a professor and I should know when to stop.

    Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you all very much for being so brief.

    If I could repeat, we would be most pleased to receive, following the meeting or in the future, electronically or otherwise, written material from any of you, and I am grateful to you for making your point so succinctly.

    If I can explain to you, and then through you to my colleagues, how we're going to proceed, as you know, we go from either side of the House, beginning with the official opposition and then moving our way through the parties. We normally take about five minutes for each exchange.

    By the way, I would ask colleagues, if they could, to direct their question to one person, but if they can't, in this case, as there are a few of you, I'm going to go a little bit longer, maybe to six or seven minutes, because if we get through it, we can get to a second round.

    The witnesses should know that the answers are included in the member's time. If some members take a long time for their question, you'll have a short time for your answer; some give a short question, and then you have a longer time. It's not out of disrespect, but you'll see me trying to keep this pattern, okay?

    The list I have at the moment is Ken Epp, Joe Jordan, Michel Guimond, Jacques Saada, Yvon Godin, and then someone else.

    So, Ken Epp.

    Mr. Ken Epp (Elk Island, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much.

    I appreciate you all being here.

    I'd like to ask a question, first of all, to Dr. Greene. You indicated that the code of conduct should have a clear purpose. This is one thing that rather confuses me, because several of you mentioned that the public expectation is extremely high, and yet it's my observation that most of the conflicts that have been public have involved ministers. Yet ministers are treated differently in their role as ministers than they and the rest of us are treated as members of Parliament in this draft code. It seems to me that we should be addressing the problem where the problem exists, rather than trying to create a problem, which could possibly be a decoy from dealing with problems with ministers and the use of their powers.

    When you indicated that there should be a clear purpose for the code of conduct--that's what I wrote down here--what did you actually have in mind in terms of that definition?

    The Chair: Ian Greene.

    Prof. Ian Greene: I think the purposes as outlined in this draft legislation are clear and good. If you compare the purposes here with the Prime Minister's code or with the legislation in the provinces, which does cover cabinet ministers--and sometimes they have a higher standard for cabinet ministers--I think what's missing is the idea of objectivity and impartiality, because cabinet ministers have a duty to administer the law, so they have a duty to administer it fairly and impartially.

    So I think there are higher standards for ministers. Personally, I would like to see those standards included in the legislation rather than having separate guidelines for cabinet ministers. But I think the principles here contain 75% of what needs to be there for cabinet ministers as well, so this is a big step forward.

    I guess my fear is that through trying to make it perfect it might get delayed; it might not get passed. But in the future, I would like to see the guidelines that cover ministers included in this as well.

Á  (1130)  

    The Chair: If any of you would like to chip in very briefly when it's someone else's question...

    Michael Atkinson.

    Mr. Michael Atkinson: I understand that you may be concerned that members of Parliament, because they are not official office-holders, don't find themselves in the kinds of conflict of interest positions that are anticipated in the code. But actually the code does not confine itself to the narrow context of quid pro quo relationships or self-dealing that we sometimes associate directly with conflict of interest. It covers appropriately the furthering of private interest, the using of influence--in other words, abuse of office and undue influence, both of which, in my opinion, are well within the capacity of any member of Parliament to engage in to their disadvantage.

    So I believe these rules are appropriate for members of Parliament. The members of Parliament in fact do and should have rules, and the opportunity not just to have rules, but to engage in a conversation and discussion over the behaviour of their colleagues vis-à-vis these rules.

    The Chair: Ken.

    Mr. Ken Epp: My next question has to do with how complaints are proposed to be handled. I have a big problem with the fact that members of Parliament again are going to be dealt with in public and cabinet ministers are going to be dealt with in private, somewhat as they have been in the past. Members of the cabinet ask for advice from the commissioner. Presently the title is counsellor. If there's a problem, the Prime Minister can refer this to the ethics counsellor. He then reports back to the Prime Minister. It looks to me as if in the proposed legislation for misconduct or perceived misconduct by ministers, that process will continue. Does that not distress you?

    Prof. Ian Greene: Perhaps I could tackle that first. Yes, it bothers me. As I said before, I think the majority of rules that would ensure, as Michael Atkinson said, that cabinet ministers aren't involved in undue influence or quid pro quo situations are included in this legislation. The guidelines for the ministers go a bit further, but I think if there were inquiries or complaints, the majority would be under this legislation.

    There will be problems if there are complaints that aren't handled under this legislation but are under the guidelines. There will be people like yourself who point out, I think rightly, that there's a different set of standards there. It's handled by the Prime Minister. The current Prime Minister wants to be accountable for those kinds of things.

    So let's see what happens in the future. I think in the future we'll have the guidelines moved into the legislation. I think we'll have those kinds of problems.

    I just wanted to say one other thing. The first province to have ethics conflict of legislation was Ontario, in 1988. To begin with, it was going to apply only to cabinet ministers and parliamentary secretaries. In the end, it was made to apply to all active members. At first I thought that perhaps that was unnecessarily broad, but in the end, perhaps a third or a half of the inquiries come from ordinary elected members who aren't part of cabinet but do have concerns about conflicts of interest. So I think it was the right decision to make it apply to everyone.

Á  (1135)  

    The Chair: If there are no other comments, we'll go to Joe Jordan.

    Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds—Grenville, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair. Through you I want to thank the witnesses for being here today.

    I'd just point out that there are sort of simultaneous things happening at the same time we're looking at this issue of ethics and maybe questioning why it would apply to backbenchers. We also have this democratic deficit argument going on, and we may very well be empowering the backbench more. We have to keep that in mind when we're looking at how relevant this legislation is going to be five, six, seven years down the road, if we're moving on the other issue.

    There are three issues that are emerging in this legislation, and I would just very quickly like to get your opinions on them.

    The first issue is that it deviates from Milliken-Oliver in the sense that this draft legislation does not require spousal disclosure. Can any of you think of a reason that should be kept out? None of you commented on that. Is that an issue? Maybe we could just go across.

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: I do think that leaving it out is an invitation to... [Editor's Note: Technical Difficulties]... For example, Revenue Canada does not allow taxpayers to pretend that their spouses' assets don't exist or have no bearing on their tax liability. The question the public is going to ask is why Parliament should turn a blind eye to potentially influential interests held in the family. I really do think you leave yourself open for the public to suspect the worst. It will be obvious that this is a blatant regression from the previous committee's work, the Milliken-Oliver work. I can say that Canada then will be the only Anglo-American democracy that does not require spousal declaration of one form or another.

    Mr. Joe Jordan: In the interests of time, maybe I could just ask whether anybody wants to speak in favour of leaving it out.

    The Chair: Does anyone want to comment further?

    Mr. Michael Atkinson: In the U.S. this is very clear. The argument in favour of keeping them out has to do with independence. I mean, it comes out of the feminist arguments of the 70s and 80s. These are independent people with independent interests, and that argument has been heard and discussed.

    But right now Maureen is right; the bulk of opinion acknowledges that, but especially in the context of the kind of legislation you're contemplating now, it has not carried the day.

    Mr. Joe Jordan: Maybe I'll mention the other two things and get some brief comment.

    The second thing is that the way this legislation is structured is you have an ethics counsellor or commissioner who really performs perhaps a dual role. When we had the provincial ethics people in, they talked about a 90% priest, 10% policeman. So there's a tremendous consultative, ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, component to their role, but they also have a hammer if required.

    The concern that's been raised is that a person may be put in a situation where they consult the ethics counsellor and disclose all kinds of information to get some advice, and in a totally unrelated matter a year or two later they find themselves at the other end of an investigation and the same person they consulted in an unrelated matter is in possession of details of information which, given that they're now being investigated, they may not have been so willing to give up.

    I may not have explained that properly. It's the two hats.... The suggestion is that maybe structurally within the office that's being created you need to separate those two functions physically.

    Dr. Greene, you talked about how the ethics counsellor must meet with 301 MPs and the sitting calendar is such that this person is going to be meeting people constantly, at the expense of whatever it is they're supposed to be doing. So I'd like to know whether you have any particular problem with that.

    The Chair: We're going to start with Ian Greene and then Daniel Weinstock.

    Prof. Ian Greene: I think it may be necessary, given the number of MPs and senators, for the commissioner to have one or more very high-profile assistants who could assist with those meetings, but I think those meetings are really critical.

    The two hats issue is something I have been concerned about in the past. In most cases, problems don't arise from that in just taking a look at how things have panned out in the provinces, but occasionally there is a conflict of interest between the advice that a commissioner has given privately and then the investigative role, as you've pointed out. It's been handled by asking one of the other provincial commissioners to come in and do the investigation where there is that conflict. So there does need to be some sort of provision where there is that type of conflict. I don't think it will arise very often.

Á  (1140)  

    The Chair: Daniel Weinstock and Maureen Mancuso.

    I should point out that we've been told also there are 3,000 Governor-in-Council appointments who come under this legislation.

    Daniel.

    Prof. Daniel Weinstock: There are two rival considerations that need to be balanced out, and I don't know that I know how to balance them out yet.

    One goes in the direction of what you were saying. In lawyer-client relations, if a client knows that his or her lawyer is going to be using information disclosed during private consultation for other purposes, that will have an inhibiting effect, and the last thing we want in this type of function is for that inhibiting effect to have an impact on what people do reveal to the commissioner.

    The other danger, which militates exactly in the opposite direction from the first one--and this is what I want to throw out--is that you don't want to end up in a situation where the consultative end of whatever body is going to be officiating all of this says one thing and then the adjudicating end ends up saying something else.

    I'm very alive to the concern you raise, but there is this other concern that there has to be some kind of link-up between the two functions or else you run the risk of...

    The Chair: Maureen.

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: I would agree, although I do think the legislation is creating a huge volume of work and a huge amount of paper.

    One thing that you might consider is looking at having someone who performs a registrar-type function in terms of taking care of the actual declarations and then the ethics counsellor who gives that advice, so that you are separating the function. You have someone they can go to about their declarations and how to fill out the forms, which by the way the legislation is really silent on. I think that unless you address this it leaves it open to all sorts of different standards being employed.

    I would suggest, too, that the British example is a very good one. It actually helps members of Parliament by asking a question under certain categories and forcing the parliamentarian to give a yes or no answer and then on the other side give the actual details of the holding or the interest being declared.

    I really think it is a gap that presently you need to address in this draft.

    The Chair: Yvon, Michel is not here, so I'm going to switch the two of you. It's Yvon Godin next. Then we'll go back to the Bloc Québécois.

    If I might comment, I think you should keep in your minds when you're replying the difference in scale and nature of the federal level as compared with the provincial level. This has been mentioned to us a number of times. It's not just order of magnitude. We think there's a huge difference between these two levels. So if you could mention that from time to time....

    Yvon Godin, followed by Jacques Saada.

[Translation]

    Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie—Bathurst, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Earlier, Mr. Franks, you stated that we should focus our attention on conflicts of interest rather than on... [Editor's note: Inaudible]... Do you have some idea of the practices adopted in the UK or in other countries? Could you elaborate further for our benefit?

[English]

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: I'm no expert on conflicts of interest in the different legislatures. What really struck me in the proposals in here, as I understood them, was that a member of Parliament could go and tell the clerk of the House when there is a conflict of interest. They would discuss it and that was the end of it.

    I was concerned that the member should make it public, because ultimately parliamentarians are accountable to the public. It should be stated, even if it's a minor one, that they can still vote on legislation.

    I should add, at that point, when I looked at this, Standing Order 21, which deals with conflict of interest on not voting, has not been changed since 1867 and has very rarely been invoked. I think we do have a problem there.

    I revert to saying that in some ways I prefer the British practice of forcing a member, either in committee or in the House, to express publicly that they have an interest in the thing involved. That's as far as I went without going into detail.

Á  (1145)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Yvon Godin: I think we're starting to split hairs, and they can't be mine. Speaking of conflicts, if we go so far as to...I thought ministers and the like were the ones being targeted by this code.

    Let's consider the following example. The majority of MPs are lawyers, and I say this with all due respect. If Members were called upon to vote on draft legislation likely to influence lawyers in Canada, would this mean that there was a potential conflict of interest and all MPs who are lawyers would abstain from voting?

    I'm a former shop steward. If we're asked to vote on strike-breaking legislation, I would abstain because I would be in a conflict of interest situation. I disagree that this is a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest occurs when someone receives something in exchange for a vote, that is when someone profits personally. Could you enlighten me on this, because Members would be affected by this provision. The public's attention will be focused on 301 MPs, not just on government members who have decision-making authority.

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: As I see it, there are three types of conflicts. First, there are minor, unimportant conflicts. For example, if a person is a lawyer, that person can vote on a question that concerns the work lawyers do. However, the CEO of a bank or some other similar institution must, in my opinion, abstain from voting on related issues. Where some matters are concerned, it's possible both to express an opinion and to vote.

    Mr. Yvon Godin: For example, if a CEO has tendered his resignation and is no longer the CEO of a company, and just an ordinary citizen, you're saying then that there would no longer be any conflict of interest, because he would no longer have any direct interest in the company?

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: However, if he is still totally involved with the company, then I think there would be a conflict.

    Mr. Yvon Godin: I'd like to congratulate you in so far as spouses are concerned. It was almost like closing the front door, and then opening up the back door, and leaving people hanging. Therefore, congratulations. The feeling was unanimous that

[English]

the spouse should be included.

[Translation]

    Thank you for that.

[English]

    The Chair: Next we have Jacques Saada, Michel Guimond, Carolyn Parrish, Rick Borotsik, and the chair.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you as well to the witnesses for being here this morning.

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Ms. Mancuso, you began your presentation by referring to the public's perception of politicians. I think I'm in a good position, as all my colleagues are, to agree with your statement. I have some comments and some questions for you. I'm wondering whether, in your view, a code of conduct merely reinforces the public's negative perception, rather than resolves this whole issue.

    But first, Mr. Greene, you stated that there has been a dramatic decline in the number of ethics scandals. However, I wish to remind you that since 1993, there hasn't been, to my knowledge, a single case of an ethics violation either in the House of Commons or the Senate, this in spite of the absence of a code. This punches some holes into Mr. Franks' argument, but no matter.

    Secondly, from the standpoint of ethical considerations, parliamentarians are governed by many provisions, notably the Criminal Code, the Parliament of Canada Act, the Standing Orders of the House of Commons and administrative rules of procedure. Therefore, to all intents and purposes, some elements of a code are already in place. It may not be called a code of ethics, but if we combine all of these components, what we have indeed approximates a code of ethics. There may be certain elements missing, and we could discuss that.

    If we adopt a code of ethics, are we not reinforcing the public's perception that problems do exist and that we need a code to resolve them?

    I'd now like to focus on a more substantive issue, namely the potential political use of the process proposed in the bill. If it's possible for colleagues to file an ethics complaint anonymously and if one can be judged by a panel of one's peers, how can we prevent people from using the complaints process for political purposes? The situation does not arise in the case of lawyers who have a bar association, or in the case of engineers or notaries. We operate in the political sphere. How can we prevent people from invoking these provisions for political purposes?

Á  (1150)  

[English]

    The Chair: Madam Mancuso.

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: On your first question, about whether it will make it worse rather than help, based on our research--and we talked to a lot of Canadians and a huge number of politicians and journalists in the middle to late 1990s about their views--we heard that a code actually helped make the rules public, so they wanted a kind of rule book or guide book from which they could evaluate or assess. Right now they don't have that. In my mind, it's better for you to provide the rules than for them to provide the rules.

    Mr. Jacques Saada: Can you tell me which rules you wanted to have?

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: In terms of possible reform, there are two that are the most timely for this committee. First is to create an independent ethics commission to investigate the public complaints. You will note that you left out the public in this go-around. It was in the original bill, but is now missing. Of the public, 61% said that would reduce corruption a lot. Of the politicians, 43% said that would reduce corruption a lot, and 52% of the journalists polled said that would reduce corruption a lot.

    The other very interesting one, which speaks to declaration, is to require all politicians to reveal publicly their tax returns. I'm not advocating this, but this was in the survey. Of the public, 48% said that would help a lot, 15% of the politicians said it would help a lot, and 32% of the journalists said it would help a lot.

    So we did poll them on a number of reform suggestions. They have some interesting suggestions. I have a copy of this that I will leave for the committee to look at in more detail.

    The Chair: We'd be grateful for that.

    Next is Daniel Weinstock, and then Mr. Franks, I think.

    Mr. Jacques Saada: That will reduce corruption from zero to less than zero, right?

    Voices: Oh, oh!

Á  (1155)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Daniel Weinstock: I think it's important to be very much aware of the reasons for wanting a code of ethics. It's not simply a matter of window dressing.

    There are a number of genuine problems that need to be addressed and the issue of how this will impact public opinion is somewhat secondary at this point.

    My colleague seated to my left may tell me that I'm way off base on this, but if public opinion of politicians is somewhat negative, I think the reasons largely extend beyond the problems addressed in this bill. The public views the debate in the House of Commons more as live theatre than as serious debate and believes that since politicians are restricted in what they can say, issues cannot truly be debated.

    There are many reasons why public opinion is what it is, and these extend far beyond the framework of this bill. We need to realize this fact. Given this wide range of reasons, conflicts of interest and corruption problems will be exacerbated in the public consciousness. If these issues were also addressed, perhaps then the media and the public would be less focused on all of the small...We also need to realize this fact. There may be quite a gap between what this bill, as it is currently worded, can accomplish, and the public's ideal image of politicians in a democracy.

[English]

    The Chair: Ned Franks.

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: I just want to make one very short comment. If we think unrealistic expectations are a problem, and I do, then you should not entrench unrealistic expectations in either the law or the rules of the House. That's where I get irritated or concerned about highest ethical standards being expressed there.

    We're really concerned here with an acceptable level of standards, not highest. I think it would be unreal to ask professors to meet the highest ethical standards, so I wouldn't ask of politicians anything I wouldn't ask of professors on that one.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport—Montmorency—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île-d'Orléans, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I have two questions, and I'll put them both to you, to give you time to respond.

    I have to admit that I have yet to form a clear, definitive opinion of the provision respecting disclosures by spouses of dependents. You all seem to be of the same opinion on the subject, but I'd like to know if you have given any thought to prohibiting the spouses of Members from running for elected office. Both male and female MPs—right now, there are more men than women in the House and we are still a long way off from achieving parity or of reaching the 52 per cent level of representation by women, which would reflect the makeup of the Canadian population—work closely with their spouses. If spouses are forced to comply with these disclosure provisions, would this not call into question their independence? That's my first question.

    I've already put my second question to the Minister, Mr. Manley and he agreed that it warranted further reflection. Eventually, he should get back to us with an amendment or some such thing.

    Moving on to the subject of gifts, I don't know if you've consulted the blues of previous committee meetings. Civil law, which applies in Quebec, provides for several categories of property, notably movable property, immovable property and property owned in perpetuity. However, we're talking here about consumable or non consumable goods. I fully realize that these are specific, finely nuanced considerations.

    As far as gifts are concerned, a television is deemed to be a non consumable food. Some 50-year-old units may still be in operation. Therefore, televisions cannot be considered as consumables.

    However, what about hockey or baseball tickets, or rounds of golf? If we're invited by a company or business person to a hockey game, once the game has been “consumed”, so to speak, that is once the three periods of regulation play are over and there is no overtime, then the ticket has been fully used. As you can appreciate, there is a difference between this kind of gift, and the gift of a television.

    You are academics and surely you have given these issues some thought. Do you believe disclosure is necessary for all types and categories of gifts?

[English]

    The Chair: Michael Atkinson is next, and then Ian Greene.

    Mr. Michael Atkinson: On the second question, what's left potentially is an encumbrance or a sense of obligation that may not exist, but then we get into the realm of the mind of the person. American law--and I think it's instructive here--has tried to keep us away from figuring out whether the hockey tickets create a feeling of obligation on your part. Who knows? Instead, what the Americans have done--and what we are contemplating doing here, and I think reasonably--is create a prophylactic, a way of stopping you from even getting into a position in which we have to determine what your state of mind is.

    To my mind, the distinction is unimportant relative to the question of whether there is an encumbrance left behind. These rules seek to prevent us from having to ask that question, by prohibiting it over $250.

  (1200)  

    The Chair: Ian Greene.

    Prof. Ian Greene: I would add that I think many of the inquiries the ethics commissioners in the provinces receive concern these kinds of questions, and you have someone independent who you can turn to for advice. I think it's very important for elected officials and parliamentarians who aren't elected not to be seen as getting special favours, because this reduces our respect for them.

    So I think many of these problems will be resolved through this legislation.

    Also, if you look at the annual reports of the Ontario integrity commissioner, you'll see many questions like this and very sensible responses. I think this is going to be very valuable.

    Having rules in place like this will encourage more good people to run for politics. I think very few people will say they don't want to get involved in politics because of these new rules. Currently I think some people don't want to get involved because they say they don't want to get involved with those rogues who are in Parliament right now. I don't think that's the case, but they think that. I think with these new rules it will be easier to recruit people to run.

    The Chair: Does anyone care to comment again on the question regarding spouses? No? Have we had enough on that?

    Prof. Ian Greene: In every Sinclair Stevens affair it's good to leave spouses out.

    The Chair: It's now Carolyn Parrish's turn.

    I believe you have been given a sheet that Carolyn uses when she's asking her questions.

    Mrs. Carolyn Parrish (Mississauga Centre, Lib.): I'd like to make some comments first.

    From all the polls that people talk about, my understanding is that 6% to 8% of the public really follows politics closely. One would assume that the media and university professors are the most influential on that 6% to 8%. Having had two kids go through university and they both have significant others who went through university, all four of these kids that I've had an intimate contact with, two at York University and two at the University of Toronto--

  (1205)  

    The Chair: Just a moment, Carolyn. Could you describe the information sheet more carefully?

    Mrs. Carolyn Parrish: It's a fact sheet that was handed out. It gives us all the bylaws and Criminal Code aspects and conflict of interest stuff that's been guiding us since the mid-1800s, as was pointed out to me.

    I think the reason I wanted to hand that out is I find myself always getting angry when I listen to people talk about us, saying that almost all parliamentarians are honest and public opinion is against parliamentarians.

    I'm going to go back to my point, which is 6% to 8% of people in the Canadian population follow politics, so you are influence-makers. All four of those kids I referred to would not tell any of their professors in political science classes that I was a member of Parliament. Nor would they offer to take me in to work as part of their presentation on a class, because they said all the professors said we're crap. They said that all politicians are difficult people, evil people, crooks, etc. So my four kids were ashamed of me, thanks to a couple of people in the University of Toronto and York University.

    I want you to know, first of all, that we are covered by certain rules and regulations, even if they're old. And sometimes old is good. Secondly, I think 100% of us come up here with very good intentions, and none of us wants to be unelected and none of us wants to be reduced to two members in the House because of incidents like poor Mr. Sinclair. We are governed by the polls and by getting re-elected.

    So that's my little rant. Now I want to ask a couple of questions.

    First of all, we have a system here, and you've been using the American system as an example. In the U.S.A., for example, 45 out of 50 states have big Lockheed Martin plants in them. So where these guys declare a conflict of interest because they don't work for Lockheed Martin, 45 out of 50 of those states have huge populations that work for Lockheed Martin. So how independent can that be, and how can they declare a conflict of interest?

    My second question is this. We have a party system here, so we vote on a platform and we have party solidarity. We don't vote as independents, as they do in the States. And our legislation isn't all private members' bills; it all comes out of a party system. Having one member of the Liberal Party stamp around the House of Commons and humiliate themself by saying “I have a conflict of interest” is not going to change the way that vote's going to go in the House, with a majority government. And that person can have a hell of a lot more influence in caucus and in committees than they can in a single vote in the House of Commons. So I'd like you to deal with that.

    I was on the Milliken-Oliver committee, and in the end that legislation didn't go through because the general consensus--and it wasn't ours, it was the people's who were giving witness--was that you were setting up a set of very tight guidelines for the crooks. If you have a system like we have now, which is, I must admit, a little looser, you have people who are caught out for doing something wrong quite easily. When you set up very tight rules, you take the geniuses who are crooks, and you show them how to avoid getting caught at any cost. That was one of the concerns of that committee. And I think you gave testimony there, because you look very familiar.

    I get really upset that people who influence the public, especially the young public, walk in here with an attitude that I was getting from all of you, which is “The public doesn't trust you crooks, and we're here to help you.”

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: I was going to begin, Ms. Parrish, by saying it's a pity you didn't send your children to Queen's, because they would have had me as a professor. I remember some years ago you talking to one of my classes up here, and they had great admiration for you.

    Mrs. Carolyn Parrish: You didn't tell them I was a crook, did you?

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: No, but I don't know you.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: What I do say to them is that politicians have to fill a very difficult job, and one can't expect to like them. That's where, for example, this concern of mine with highest ethical standards comes in, because ethical standards are what philosophers would call--forgive me, Daniel--essentially contestable concepts. They mean different things to different people, and my ethical standards might not be yours, and I worry about that.

    The other thing I want to mention here is the conflict of interest. There's a big difference between having an interest and a conflict of interest. I think what I've been concerned about is people stating when they have an interest in these very minor things, like owning stock in a company or being a director of a very small company in a big area affected by a public bill. I think the public is sensible enough to say that's not a conflict; he or she is just being honest in expressing something.

    You're a member of a profession, if I remember correctly, and I'm sure there was a bill--

    Mrs. Carolyn Parrish: I formed opinions.

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: Well, you might express an interest if it was a bill.

    Underneath it all, I don't think we should ever assume that interest is a bad thing. As I've said in my longer comments, interest in the legal sense is a key part of politics. Perhaps one should have more trust in politicians when they're acting on an interest than when they're acting on ideals. At least one knows then what's motivating them and that they're taking the consequences of their actions into account. There's nothing the matter with interest; it's an important, essential ingredient in politics.

    The real question is to distinguish between having an interest, having a hidden interest, having expressed an interest, and having a place where your interests of a personal sort conflict with your duty as a politician. I think we have to make those. I think the legislation actually does a pretty good job, by and large.

    Mrs. Carolyn Parrish: How does that affect the party system vote that we have here? Could someone address that?

    The Chair: We have a problem, because we're going to get replies from the others, Carolyn, and we're running out of your time.

    Daniel--and we'll come back if need be--and then Maureen.

    Prof. Daniel Weinstock: I don't know that I'll be able to address everything you mentioned. Generally, I'm very sympathetic to what you say, and I think one of the principal problems with public perceptions, if I may defend our class somewhat, is not so much us, as really a misunderstanding on the part of the public with the way the democratic system operates.

    I go back to something that was mentioned here just a second ago. The system is based on contestation, on conflict, on very forcefully and sometimes in a warlike manner putting forward views and having them countered by other views. Frankly, that doesn't necessarily select the most likeable and lovable manners of behaviour. I'm convinced that part of the reason there is a public disaffection with politicians is that they just don't understand that connection.

    It's the same thing with lawyers. Why are lawyers and politicians always at the bottom of the heap when people ask about whether they trust this category or that category? I don't know how we do, by the way, university professors, but why are lawyers and politicians often at the bottom of the heap? I think it's more than a coincidence that they happen to be the two central institutions in our society that are built on institutionalized conflict, institutionalized war.

    What I said in my brief remarks was that there has to be more in the way of public education about that, because, frankly, there's just a deep misunderstanding.

    I want to reiterate one of the things that you--

  (1210)  

    The Chair: It has to be very brief, Daniel.

    Prof. Daniel Weinstock: Yes.

    There is a very great concern with all codes of deontology for politicians, for whatever profession, that what you're doing is essentially giving a clear blueprint for cheaters. What you're doing is saying here are the rules and here is what you have to do in order to get away with it.

    So let's be very clear about what the limits of a code of rules can do. It can't get to those people who are bent on influence-peddling or doing wrong, come what may. It just can't. It won't do it.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    If anybody could comment on this, on Carolyn's party system and caucus comment, I'd be grateful.

    Maureen.

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: I was just going to pick up on the last point that Daniel made and your question.

    First of all, I teach a course on Parliament and the legislature, and I never tell my students that parliamentarians are crooks. I think all our work and even the results from the public have in certain areas reinforced the notion that people do have a threshold of respect and support for their parliamentarians.

    Again, the media plays a role, because we don't often hear about the good things that our parliamentarians do; we only hear about the bad. So I think part of it is to get the message out that there are good things that happen as well.

    With respect to your exact comment about people distrusting politicians because they don't understand what politics is all about, in our study, a full 25% strongly agreed with that statement, and an additional 43% said they somewhat agreed. So I do think there is something at play with respect to how people understand the process works. For many, it's a very mysterious process.

    The Chair: Next is Rick Borotsik, followed by the chair, Ken Epp, Tony Tirabassi, and Yvon Godin.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik (Brandon—Souris, PC): Mr. Chairman, I take a bit of a different tack from Carolyn Parrish. I like rules. I like a rules-based conflict code. It's like anything else. It may well be seen as a blueprint for the dishonest people, but it's like a lock on your front door: it keeps the honest people out, and the bad guys are going to get in anyway. At least in this way, shape, and form, with a definitive code of ethics, it does give us the opportunity to at least be perceived as following a code of conduct. So I do like it.

    One of the other areas, which I believe Mr. Franks talked about and which hadn't been articulated by the other panel, is the appointment of the commissioner. The rules being set, they have to be administered, and the commissioner is to be appointed. We've had other commissioners here, by the way, from other provinces who said that it's an all-party decision, as it is just being identified in Manitoba.

    You said, Mr. Franks, that he had to have the trust and confidence of all members of Parliament. Could you expand on that a bit? Perhaps others would also like to comment on that. One of the cornerstones, I believe, of trying to make this whole process work is confidence in the commissioner.

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: I can see that a different case could be made, say, between appointing heads of crown corporations that are doing government business and an ethics commissioner for Parliament as a whole, who has to be concerned with members of all parties, and all parties and all members have to have trust in him.

    That happened, as I said in my remarks, with the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which acts as a proxy for Parliament in dealing with secret information. Most parliamentarians would rather not have their hands on that, because it can be quite bothersome. What happens there is that the Prime Minister or the government, in making appointments, which are order-in-council appointments, consults with the leaders of all the parties in Parliament. The end result is that the committee has a varied membership.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Are you suggesting that this should be in consultation with the leaders or the members of Parliament? Some jurisdictions actually have the members of the legislature vote on a 66% or two-thirds of members basis to approve that individual.

  (1215)  

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: I'm not going to give you an answer on that because I haven't thought it through.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Please give me an answer.

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: It has to be a way that is satisfactory to the members of Parliament.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Does anybody else have a comment on that?

    The Chair: Through the chair.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Through the chair, absolutely, to the panel.

    Prof. Ian Greene: Another way of doing it would be for the Prime Minister to consult with the leaders of all the opposition parties. But I think there does need to be consensus and respect for the appointment. That is going to be so critical.

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: Perhaps each party should set its own rules for satisfaction on this.

    I must add that the Senate also needs consulting here. We can't just look at this as a House of Commons issue.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Carolyn took on the academics. I'm going to take on the other half of the equation, and that's the media.

    The media certainly has a part to play in how politicians are seen by the public, and it's not in a very positive light, unfortunately. I'm going to ask a question that is kind of off in left field. In some jurisdictions members of the press gallery also provide a declaration of their interests. That to me is tit-for-tat, because they might well have a conflict of interest when they're going after a member, a true pecuniary interest. Do you have any views on whether the media should be involved in this kind of regulation? Mr. Greene.

    Prof. Ian Greene: I don't think you can have ethical politics without an ethical media. I think the media does need to think about ethics and standards of ethics. I think they're part of the problem. But I think they need to address it.

    I think all political parties ought to have their own codes of conduct. I think this would prevent some of the problems you alluded to.

    I've been criticized for being too optimistic and positive about politicians, and I delight in that criticism.

    The Chair: Daniel Weinstock.

    Prof. Daniel Weinstock: I think there has to be much stricter self-regulation by the media than there is now.

    There is a feedback effect between the perception the public has about what politicians do, the image that politicians send out, and what the media can sell a newspaper with. It goes back to a discussion we were having over here. It's like hockey. Pardon the analogy. If you don't really appreciate the finer points of hockey.... I lived in the United States, where all that people wanted to see were fights, and a game without a fight that was won two to one was not a good game. I think it's similar, if you're following the analogy, to what goes on in politics. If you don't really understand the intricacies of what goes on and why things are done in certain ways, what you are going to want to see in the newspaper or on a morning TV show when you wake up is the scandals.

    So I think we have to address this whole constellation of things: the way in which politicians present what they do to the public and the way it's presented by the media that will alter the expectations the public has.

    The Chair: Rick Borotsik.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Do I have more time?

    The Chair: Yes, sure.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Again, Mr. Franks, you took some exception to the fact that we, as politicians, should have the highest of ethical standards. You said it's really hard to achieve the highest of standards. I take exception to that to a degree.

    When you get into this business, there are 301 of us and there are a lot of professors. You said you don't demand the same standards for professors. I believe when you come into this job that you should, in fact, be above reproach.

    Are you suggesting we take the preamble out and simply say we should be mediocre members of Parliament and mediocre members of our society?

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: I have a personal objection to pious hopes like that. Over the years, I've watched politics far too long. I know politicians suffer from original sin like the rest of us and often fail to achieve the highest ethical standards. I don't think it needs stating. I find that very few people go into politics without a strong commitment. I have the highest respect for them. Often these things are better not said than said, partly because, as I say, ethical standards are so contestable.

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: Yes. I think to have a code you need an aspirational element. It's what it's all about, a preamble that's aspirational in nature. If the highest aspiration isn't the highest ethical standard, I don't know what is.

    I do think, when you went back to the media question, Westminster is a good example of where Parliament did ask for members of the press gallery to register their interests, as well as parliamentary researchers. This was all done, maintained, filed, and operated by the same clerk who takes care of the members' interests and declaration forms. It's a good example of a system that does in fact make journalists register.

  (1220)  

    The Chair: This is going to be very brief because everyone wants to speak.

    It's Michael Atkinson, Daniel Weinstock, and then Ian Greene.

    Michael.

    Mr. Michael Atkinson: In 1996, when we did our survey, we asked members of the public, and then politicians, the same question. This was the statement: “We should not expect MPs to have higher ethical standards than the average person.” Interestingly, politicians disagreed with that more vehemently than the public at large. It was politicians, to give some credit where credit is due, who said we actually should have higher standards; 75% of politicians took that perspective. About 55% of members of the public offered the same opinion, whether out of a sense that this will never happen or out of a sense of fairness. Why should they have to be ethical?

    The important point here, I think, is that elected members of Parliament have clearly stated that they expect higher standards of themselves.

    The Chair: Daniel. Then it's Ian's turn.

    Prof. Daniel Weinstock: I only want to insist on one distinction. What do we mean by ethical standards?

    I think it is perfectly right to have something in the preamble that says there are ethical standards that are inherent to the functions of a parliamentarian. There are things a parliamentarian goes into the business of Parliament for that should be insisted upon at all times. Then there are ethical standards in what the public means by ethical standards, which most of the time means sex, money, and booze.

    I think we have every reason to expect parliamentarians to live up to the standards that are inherent in the role of the parliamentarian. I think there's too much focus on the latter. There perhaps is a point. I don't see why we should insist on better behaviour from the human parliamentarians than from the human lawyers or whoever.

    The Chair: Ian.

    Prof. Ian Greene: The phrase “highest ethical standards” appears in most, if not all, of the provincial codes of conduct and legislation.

    I had the same fears to begin with that Professor Franks has. In the end, I think it's been a good thing. It has allowed the commissioners to interpret the legislation in such a way as to plug loopholes and maintain the integrity of the regime.

    The Chair: Just so my colleagues know, it's the chair, then Ken Epp, Tony Tirabassi, Yvon Godin, and Geoff Regan.

    What I'd like to do is to go back to this business of scale and the nature of the federal level as distinct from the other. We've met with provincial commissioners.

    I was at Queen's Park when the Liberal government brought in the conflict matters they have, and I was a parliamentary assistant, as they call it there, just as I was a parliamentary secretary here. And in both cases, my wife and I both found the debriefing side of it, and the explanation when I became a parliamentary assistant there and when I became a parliamentary secretary here, very useful, and it's been useful to me since as a member of Parliament. So that part of it, the preventative part that the commissioner has mentioned, I found extremely useful.

    I was also very conscious, having been at both levels... The Government of Ontario is a very large government, but it is much larger here and it is much more diverse. It's been pointed out to us that it's virtually impossible for us to avoid conflict of interest. For example, we are in conflict of interest now. If we move this forward into legislation, we're moving something forward that is for ourselves.

    Can I give you another example of the differences? The provincial houses meet much less than we do, by the way, normally at the call of the premier, whereas here we have a two-year rotating calendar. We meet in ten months of the year, and most weeks of the year. We meet up to nine or ten hours every day when we're here. We're on the record. We're on the record now, so we're hanging out there every single thing to do.

    I know Ned is going to recite his three levels again, but how do we avoid conflict of interest in this business? Or how do we explain to the people that when we're voting on something we don't have a conflict of interest? Carolyn gave the example of the districts in the United States, and if I have a General Electric plant in my riding and I've never worked for General Electric in my life yet I'm in conflict in a certain sense.

    Would you care to comment on those things?

    Michael Atkinson first.

    Mr. Michael Atkinson: There is a fundamental difference between being a minister of the crown or a parliamentary secretary and being a member of Parliament. The former brings with it a host of responsibilities, administrative responsibilities, responsibilities to the law, which members of Parliament simply don't have, and with that, certain requirements and restrictions that members of Parliament don't have.

    So there's no question that members of Parliament have the responsibility by virtue of the legislative role, the representational role, to represent all of those interests you were talking about. As Ned was saying before when he talked about interest, we all have interests. You have interests in doing your job properly. Your job properly is defined broadly by the public in terms of its expectation, or to represent those interests out there. Whether it's the plants you were identifying before or the other interests in your constituency, those are properly your job.

    Ministers of the crown are somewhat, in my opinion, circumscribed in that regard, notwithstanding what some people say about the responsibilities of ministers of the crown to be members of Parliament and represent those interests, because they have this other burden, if you like, to carry. It's very important that we distinguish.

    Part of what is going on here is we're pulling all of this together, and that's good, but we should not lose sight of the fact that the guidelines here should not, and I don't believe they do, restrict the responsibilities of members of Parliament to represent those interests that are in their constituencies. If they did, they would be cutting into your legitimate role.

    On the other hand, it does create problems. To come back to the matter of the appointment of the ethics commissioner, I think one of the reasons we're getting a suggestion in this legislation has to do with the fact that this person has to be responsible for these ministers of the crown and responsible to the Prime Minister in that regard. And the Prime Minister, or whoever is responsible for making these suggestions, has erred on the side of making sure that is covered off. And that's not an unreasonable thing.

    I actually think, as with my colleagues, that on balance it is not the right way to go, but one can understand that there are competing kinds of requirements here. That is what will happen when you pull everything together. The good news is that pulling everything together like this will allow us to make the kinds of distinctions we've been making.

    I can't comment on the scale question so much. But I suppose you'd have to persuade me, Mr. Adams, that somehow the scale of involvement mitigates in some fashion your responsibilities to your constituents and your responsibilities to the public differently from what would happen at the level of the provincial Parliament. I'm not clear on this, and maybe I just need to understand and to think about that a little bit more.

  (1225)  

    The Chair: Daniel, would you care to comment on this? In your talk, you also differentiated between work you have done in professions—for example, medical ethics or legal ethics—and the approach here on Parliament Hill. Here we all have different professional backgrounds, so we come with one set of ideas and have to deal with this and articulate it in the different environment we have here?

    Prof. Daniel Weinstock: Yes, I think I'll just go back to something said over here to my right. I think the parliamentary system works when it creates an organized and civilized channel for putting in common a variety of different interests. The system wouldn't work if 301 of you were all philosophers, debating at the level of pure principle. I think parliamentary democracy works because it allows us to arrive at the appropriate compromises. It works when it allows us to arrive at appropriate balances of competing interests—regional interests, professional interests, class interests, and what have you. So a fundamental element of this workinig is that the interests be out there. Right?

    At the end of the day, there's a point at which we just have to draw a slightly arbitrary line between representing the interests of where I come from and representing my own interests. Where does it stop? Well, at my spouse, my kids, or my first cousin. At a certain point, we have to draw a line and recognize it is going to be somewhat arbitrary in deciding where the legitimate expression of interests, combined with the legitimate expression of interests from 300 other representatives, is going to shade into something more on the level of personal interests.

    I want to insist on one thing. This is something I try to make clear in the paper. It is a question of shading into. It is a grey zone. I have a concern with trying to put everything into black and white, although I understand why we want to do that and what the temptation is. We have to be aware of the dangers in treating something that is inherently grey as if it were black and white. There are dangers there, which whoever ends up administering this code has to be alive to.

  (1230)  

    The Chair: I have to move on, but if I could comment on one other thing, I would be most grateful for any thoughts you have on the scale and the diversity.

    Another thing I was trying to think of, and which you brought up, is that it is easier to deal with things at the provincial level because many, but not all, things are much more specific there. But a great deal of what we do is very, very general, you understand? It deals with underpinnings of the law and things like that. In this sense, it's more difficult to avoid “potential conflict” here, to use the most commonly expressed term.

    Anyway, the next speakers are Ken Epp, Tony Tirabassi, and Yvon Godin.

    Mr. Ken Epp: Before I go on to my question, I want to just comment on this topic.

    I remember when we were doing the Milliken-Oliver report five years ago, or however long ago it was. One of the examples I brought forward was of a farmer, or of a person living in a farming community, who was elected because the other farmers said “Here's a guy who understands us, so we're going to send him over there to represent us”. Now along comes legislation on the Canadian Wheat Board, or something, putting him in direct conflict because of the fact that as a farmer he's directly affected by the outcome of the legislation. Yet his obligation is to represent the wishes of the farmers in the constituency in which he was elected. Therefore, he either does his job and is in conflict, or he doesn't do his job, in which case he avoids the conflict. It was a real dilemma we were discussing at the time.

    Before any of you maybe comment on this, I also want to ask about this whole issue of having a set of rules in the code and a commissioner and a committee to deal with the proposed legislation, which will be dealt with in the House, and so on. I have a question with respect to the actual use of a committee. We live in a very intense political and partisan environment here. The temptation to draw the attention of the public to the shortcomings of a person in the other party is overwhelming. How can this possibly be avoided? If we have a committee of parliamentarians, how can we possibly get this committee or even the commissioner himself to work in a non-partisan way?

    Prof. Ian Greene: I got a call from a journalist in Saskatchewan a few years ago about the sort of situation you describe. The legislature was about to vote on changes to the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, and he was very upset that so many members seemed to be in conflict. I said, “No, it's a matter of general interest. They're not in conflict.” He was very disappointed.

    I think the draft legislation covers this. There are many matters that are of general interest. I think what members have to do and what the ethics commissioner will have to do is ask whether this is a matter of general interest. Could someone potentially be seen as enriching themselves or doing special favours for friends or associates or family members? In most cases it's quite clear. But in cases where it's not, at least you have an independent ethics commissioner to turn to.

    Another question is materiality. Yes, there are many potential conflicts. How many of them are really important in terms of people being able to do their jobs? No one is perfectly impartial, but that doesn't mean we can't have an impartial judiciary.

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: This affects both here, but if you look at the legislation, which I think is pretty good--these are good proposals--what you see is the beginning of a dialogue. It's going to take years to identify when an interest becomes a conflict of interest or when a conflict of interest is big enough that it needs to be expressed publicly or a member has to abstain.

    Again, this will take a while, because these things are very general as they are and they have to be made specific. But I again remind you that we have two houses here, and the historic practices of the Senate have been quite different from those of the House of Commons. That's one of the things that's going to have to be resolved as this legislation is worked out in practice. I can't suggest what the solution will be to that, whether it's harmonizing or remaining different.

    Thank you.

  (1235)  

    Mr. Ken Epp: With respect to the resolution of conflicts, when there's a report made.... The way it seems to be bending is that complaints can only be brought forward by a parliamentarian and not the public. I've noticed that at least one review is concerned about that. On the other hand, if the public are permitted, you have many more frivolous complaints and could endlessly tie up the work of the commissioner.

    When you have a hearing, should that hearing be public so as to appease the necessity for the public to be assured that everything is done properly, or do you have the hearings in private in order to protect the potential innocent person who's been falsely charged? If you do have a private hearing, then of course the speculation about what went on there is often worse than if it were public. What's your view on public versus private?

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: I do think the public should be allowed to file complaints. I think you're conflating two problems. If the problem is that you're worried about getting frivolous or vexatious kinds of allegations, then I think you put in place the right kinds of procedures to deal with that so that there would be penalties attached to the filing of those kinds of complaints. But if you leave the public out, once again it leaves you open to the charge that you're bringing in the green or the red wall around your members, and it's really reinforcing that insider view that the public has of how Parliament works.

    The Chair: Tony Tirabassi.

    Mr. Tony Tirabassi (Niagara Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'd like to thank the panel for their input here today.

    I believe it was Mr. Greene who referred to the independent ethics commissioners that have been put in place in other jurisdictions. I believe in one instance it cut the number of misconduct infractions in half.

    Prof. Ian Greene: Oh, much more than that.

    Mr. Tony Tirabassi: If this is also about so much to do with perception and improving perception in the public, is there any evidence that would show that the public's perception improves after an independent commissioner has been put in place, whether that's through increased voter participation in elections, maybe findings through survey polls, increased participation by the public?

    Prof. Ian Greene: After the independent ethics regimes and legislation were put into place in many Canadian provinces, the public trust in politicians doubled. The number of ethics scandals went way down. So I think there is evidence that it does make a difference to public perception. If there's more trust in the political regime, more people will participate.

    Mr. Tony Tirabassi: That's something.

    Prof. Ian Greene: It's hard to prove it absolutely. I've been keeping track of the surveys about public perception of politicians and comparing that against ethics scandals reported in the media. The fewer the scandals, the greater the trust in politicians. I'm convinced that the regimes put in place in the provinces have had a major role in reducing the number of ethics scandals.

    Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Tying in with that, under the present system that we have, if there's misbehaviour or allegations of inappropriate behaviour by a member of the cabinet, the Prime Minister has to stand in his place and the minister has to stand in his place day in and day out to answer to it.

    Does it reduce the front-line attack in most jurisdictions when you have an ethics commissioner? In other words, does the leader or the effective minister stand up saying there has been a ruling by an independent commissioner, and he or she is totally independent, so why do you keep attacking?

    Prof. Ian Greene: Right. Once again, in the annual report of the ethics commissioner in Ontario, several times it was pointed out that members need to not only obey the conflict of interest rules, as they were doing, but they need to watch their behaviour in the legislature. People watch them on television and develop negative images from that, as well.

    Whether members in Ontario have heeded the advice, I don't know. The problems relate to each other. This particular legislation is not going to resolve all ethics problems. It's one step in the right direction.

  (1240)  

    The Chair: Yvon Godin, Geoff Regan, and then Rick Borotsik.

[Translation]

    Mr. Yvon Godin: We haven't discussed donations to candidates. The code of ethics mentions donations in the amount of $250. It's possible for candidates to receive a donation of $1,000 or $2,000 from a constituent. When that happens, everyone thinks that the candidate has been bought.

    How will the future code of ethics address this matter that involves Members? If receiving a ticket to a hockey game is cause for scandal, considering that candidates are authorized to receive $2,000 or $3,000 to prepare an election, I have to wonder where we draw the line.

[English]

    The Chair: It depends on which teams are playing.

    Mr. Yvon Godin: If it's in town, it's all right. You go to the grand opening and it's free.

    In the legislature that they do have, do they deal with that, or is it another thing?

    I don't know if I explained myself.

    The Chair: Ian Greene.

    Prof. Ian Greene: I know in Ontario and British Columbia members are allowed to accept benefits if it's part of their constituency duties. If they're unsure whether this might be a benefit that gives them a special favour or is something they need to do as part of their constituency duties, they check with the ethics commissioner. The answers are not always easy.

    Mr. Yvon Godin: No. I'll use an example. A member of Parliament works almost seven days a week, in my view. I think all of us would agree to say the same thing. You work in the Parliament. It's something the public sometimes doesn't see.

    Clearly, what they see, if they go to an event and you sit at the front table, is what a lucky person you are for having a free lunch. They forget that maybe tonight you would like to be with your family. You have no choice but to be there at seven at night having the free lunch, in one way, because you are there to represent the public.

    Prof. Ian Greene: That's not a conflict. It is not a conflict of interest, it is material.

    Mr. Yvon Godin: Okay. It's the same thing as when a colleague was talking about going to a golf tournament. We have groups that do golf tournaments, and they appreciate it if the member, MLA, or MPP is there with them. They like to see that.

    This weekend I was with a group of people who were recognizing firefighters, police, and forest rangers. People like that. You represent the whole public. They want you there.

    Prof. Ian Greene: On the other hand, if a company paid for your golf club membership and there was a chance that they were trying to influence your behaviour, then you couldn't exclude it.

    Mr. Yvon Godin: You're right.

    The Chair: Next is Geoff Regan, then Rick Borotsik, and then Joe Jordan.

    Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I first want to talk about this issue of complaints by the public. We heard today from Professor Atkinson the suggestion that we're one of the few professions in which there is institutional conflict--or was it Professor Greene?

  (1245)  

    Mr. Michael Atkinson: It could have been either of us.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: One of you talked about institutional conflict, and said only lawyers and politicians probably live in a situation where there is so much institutional conflict. It strikes me that if a member of the public wanted to bring forward a complaint, it should not be very difficult to find a member of the House of Commons from a different party who would be more than happy to bring it forward, if it had any chance at all of being legitimate. It strikes me this is a filter that would work. It might not be much of a filter, as a matter of fact, but it would be somewhat of a filter.

    Secondly, on the idea that we should have a registrar for receiving the forms, and so forth, it seems to me that's an additional position that isn't necessary, because the ethics commissioner has staff. There's not just one person in that office. It's an office with different staff, who can fulfil the role of receiving the documentation and ensuring it's complete, without the additional high salary of a person with a title.

    There was mention that we should change--and maybe this was facetious--the media's desire for conflict, or ideally try to deal with the situation where the media are always looking for scandal and conflict. That would require global behaviour modification of the highest scale, because the media respond to public interest in conflict. They know people want two things. They want to know what the weather is, and they want to see conflict. They'll watch your television show or read your paper if you have those things, otherwise they won't. So I don't know how you'd overcome that fact.

    On the idea of my colleague, Rick Borotsik, that we should be above reproach in this job, I agree with him; however, I would add to that. I asked myself, in what job would you not want a person to be above reproach in their behaviour. Particularly in any job where someone has power over other people, you'd want a person to act with the highest ethics. I'm sure you'd agree with that.

    The Chair: Ms. Mancuso.

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: On the first question, about the public going through members, members of the public already feel disconnected from MPs and senators, so that would just further degrade their ability to have access to seek a resolution.

    I also think it leaves it open to politicizing the process, as we talked about a little bit this morning. If you need to find yourself a friendly opposition member to bring the complaint forward, it runs the risk of actually politicizing the whole process, and I heard a number of you say the goal was to avoid that.

    On the second point, about the registrar, in Britain a clerk of the House is appointed to take care of the forms. One thing again that is very sketchy is what you do about non-compliance. You'll remember in Britain, Enoch Powell very famously refused, from the time of the introduction of the register and the declaration requirements, to file a declaration, and the House did not act. Part of it was because Enoch Powell was an MP who was beyond reproach, but he flaunted the rules.

    I don't see in here necessarily what would happen in that instance. I don't think the code does a very good job of spelling out what the range of penalties might be. So if you want the appearance that this is a code with teeth, a little more work could be done on actually spelling out what the range of penalties might be.

    Mr. Michael Atkinson: In fact, on that score, just to pick up on that, the code's anticipation that the ethics commissioner would either dismiss the complaint, determine that the complaint is founded, or determine that the complaint is founded but no remedial action was available, is giving the ethics commissioner quite considerable latitude to determine what a remedial action might consist of.

    I'm assuming that the ethics commissioner--although perhaps assumptions here are precisely what needs to be tested--would need to explain his or her recommendations to the satisfaction of the committee. It's very thin on the question of any kind of remedial action or corrective action that needs to be taken. I can appreciate why, because the strength of this is that it is not too prescriptive, and I think it tries not to invite this pattern of inducing investigations, which then multiply and create the very impressions that we want to avoid.

    But I would urge you to ask yourselves whether you're satisfied that the single clause in here that gives the ethics commissioner the opportunity to propose some remedial action that is accepted by the parliamentarian doesn't contemplate the parliamentarian, as in Enoch Powell's case, not accepting it. What happens then?

    I just point that out as a potential area you might want to think about how you're going to handle, not necessarily as something you want to correct in here.

  (1250)  

    The Chair: Ian.

    Prof. Ian Greene: I want to comment on filters for unnecessary complaints. I think the party whips would play a very important role in terms of ensuring that complaints that do come forward or inquiries are bona fide. Also, the annual reports of the ethics commissioners can serve a very useful function in terms of suggesting improvements to the ethics regime.

    I remember a few years ago, in Ontario, the integrity commissioner said they were getting too many frivolous complaints, and the whips should do a better job. The next year he complimented the whips on doing a better job.

    In British Columbia, where the public can send in complaints, the ethics commissioner commented that the system was working quite well and that they weren't receiving very many frivolous complaints.

    The Chair: Next is Rick Borotsik, then Joe Jordan, and then I'm going to wind up.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    We talked about--and I just want to bring it back and hear your comments--a spousal declaration. As you are aware, in this particular proposal and draft, there is no spousal declaration.

    You've all said you would support spousal declaration. All of you said that. I didn't hear anybody speak to the contrary.

    If this goes forward without spousal declaration, would you say this is worsening this situation, as opposed to making it better with a conflict that in fact still leaves the public out there with the perception that we're trying to hide something?

    Secondly, is one of the reasons for spousal declaration being left out not only the independence that we talked about, but also the factor that some people had said--in fact I think it may well have been the minister who said it--that if you put it in there, it would dissuade people from running for the position of elected office as a parliamentarian? I don't agree with that statement. Can you very quickly say whether you agree or disagree with that statement?

    The Chair: Maureen Mancuso, and then Ian Greene.

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: I don't agree with that statement.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Neither do I.

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: I think one thing you might contemplate is a compromise, which the British Parliament did do, which was to have spousal declaration, but only in three restricted categories. They asked for a spousal declaration in shareholding, a spousal declaration for gifts, and a spousal declaration for foreign travel. So they didn't go with the same categories that are asked of the spouse of the politician. They asked for a subset of those categories, which you might contemplate as a compromise.

    The Chair: Ian Greene, and then Daniel Weinstock.

    I'm chair of the committee, Rick.

    Just ignore him, folks.

    Prof. Ian Greene: I'm married to a chartered accountant, and when my wife was an auditor, I had to declare my investments so that she wouldn't be in a conflict situation. I don't see any problem with members of Parliament having to explain to their spouses why it's important. When you're in a position of responsibility and privilege, there are greater responsibilities that go along with that. I think it's absolutely important.

    I think the Prime Minister's code of conduct does require spouses to declare their assets, so that will still be there. It does need to be expanded for members of Parliament and senators. We'll get there eventually. I think it's dangerous to leave it out.

    The Chair: Daniel.

    Prof. Daniel Weinstock: I'll return to the caveat that I've been entering into a little bit in response to other questions. I think, from the point of view of public perception, it is disastrous. Going back to what we're discussing here, it sort of indicates with a big red line that here is where you go if you want to cheat, and cheat legally.

    That being said, even if you put it in, it doesn't mean that a person is... You know, we have spouses, but we also have cousins and friends. Our lives are complicated and they're made up of all kinds of different webs. I think this is really a question of public perception, and it's important that the public not think that parliamentarians have basically built in an obvious escape hatch. But you have to be very, very lucid about the fact that just because you put “spouse” in doesn't mean that, again, somebody who's intent on violating the principle of conflict of interest isn't going to be able to find a way of doing it.

    The Chair: Okay, Rick.

    Mr. Rick Borotsik: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Joe Jordan.

    Mr. Joe Jordan: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I want to come to this issue of complaints against MPs. I think I'm hearing some conflicting views. Mr. Regan spoke a little bit about why we felt it should be restricted to MPs complaining against MPs. One is that you do have the opportunity for the whip to control.

    The second issue, though, is that you also have an opportunity to have some control over the disclosure of the complaint. MPs may very well be bound by rules that say they cannot disclose the fact that they've made the complaint. I would suggest that if you ever get the chance, look at the mail MPs get. If you think for one second that interest groups in this country could not have 8,000 complaints about an MP tomorrow, you're kidding yourself. Absolutely, it could happen and would happen.

    In terms of the process, and I in a former life was a college professor too, students can complain against professors, that's fine, but you also have safeguards in there and you have processes in there.

    In our world, we have to be very sensitive to the fact that the public's perception at a certain time in the election cycle can be fatal for us, in terms of our careers. An accusation, once made, leaves a residue. To think that it wouldn't be partisan, or there wouldn't be potential for partisanship, I think is a little bit naive.

    I'm wondering what your view is. How do we come up with a process that serves the need but minimizes the chances of this being used? To clear someone's name after they've lost an election, thanks for nothing. Really, you haven't accomplished anything there.

    What I'm asking, I guess, is where's the balance line?

  (1255)  

    The Chair: Maureen.

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: In both the British and American jurisdictions, citizens and lobby groups, common cause, bring the largest number of charges in the United States against members of Congress, larger than anyone else, so the public fully has the right to do that.

    I think you have to empower the ethics commissioner or the official to sift through the complaints and determine--

    Mr. Joe Jordan: Can I stop you right there? That's fine, but the fact that 7,000 people go public and say they have complained, that there are ethics complaints against Joe Jordan, a month before the writ is dropped, give your head a shake. Are you saying that's a better situation?

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: I'm saying that you counter the charge, and this happens. These other jurisdictions--

    Mr. Joe Jordan: Oh, come on.

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: —seem to manage when there are elections. It's the same electoral cycle. In the United States, they're running for election, some of them every two years. So it is very well handled in those jurisdictions where the same kind of thing happens, where members of the public are empowered to make these complaints. They don't run off and make them public to sort of do people in. That has not been the case.

    The Chair: Is there anyone else? Joe, are you okay?

    Mr. Joe Jordan: Sure.

    The Chair: Daniel, please.

    Prof. Daniel Weinstock: In a way, we're throwing the hostage to fortune here. A lot depends on the political culture in which these mechanisms, these tools, are deposited, as it were. You can't predict in advance how things are going to function in Canada on the basis of how they function in England, because there are traditions, ways of doing things, political cultures that are very different.

    I'd like to see something in the way of sort of deploying a mechanism gradually over time, so that people get used to thinking in terms of an ethics code, so it becomes part of their.... Do you see what I mean? To put this in the hands of the public, sort of immediately, within the context of a political culture that for various reasons might be poisoned along certain specific kinds of party lines might be a problem. Whereas deploying it gradually over a period of time, empowering the public to use a mechanism that it has beforehand been given a chance to become familiar with, see its limits and strengths, might be a better way of going about it.

    Mr. Michael Atkinson: Daniel, I think to some degree your comment regarding the spousal part and the big red circle around that could easily apply to this provision. Only members of Parliament are permitted to raise questions about other members of Parliament. The expectation, which I think is not just cynical but reasonable, is that will be heavily influenced by partisan considerations right at the beginning. It could very well compromise the role of the ethics commissioner, who then has to try to judge partisan reasons behind some of these allegations that all of us really don't want to see there in the first place.

    Why not consider a threshold, a requirement? If you want to get yourself involved in making an allegation, then make that something distinctly non-routine. Make it a requirement, swear an affidavit, do something, put something in the path of members of the public, lobbyists and others, that gives them a sense that what we're talking about here is something serious.

    I'm very sympathetic to your concerns. I'm also sympathetic to the question of who knows how it's going to play out here. Going with what's happened in the U.K. and in the United States may not be a perfect guide, although I think it probably should give you some reassurance. I would suggest that you consider putting an obstacle, a threshold, there, making it difficult to put that complaint forward, but not making it impossible. That's what you have right here; it's impossible.

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    The Chair: I will just try to fill in some holes, because as you know, we're doing this for the record. This has to do with the committee.

    No other jurisdiction in Canada has a committee in the legislature that plays the kind of direct role, including that of an investigative body, that is envisaged in the federal proposals. On the other hand, there is a committee for this purpose in the United Kingdom.

    What are your views with regard to our proposal for a committee, if you have any? We don't have that much time. Secondly, do you have any suggestions as to how potential partisanship on the committee might be minimized?

    Prof. Maureen Mancuso: I think by the creation of a committee. The committee idea is a good one. What we found in our survey, what was interesting when I talked to the politicians, is that there certainly was--we talked about this earlier--the notion of bigger parliamentary reform questions, empowering backbenchers, allowing them to have more say in the proceedings. I think this is one vehicle to allow members to feel that sort of responsibility. I actually think it's a good idea.

    Mr. C.E.S. Franks: Your question is about one or two committees, it seems to me. That one, again, I hesitate to answer, but it's going to have to be sorted out. You'll find that there are quite different rules at present, or let's say standards of behaviour, in the two Houses.

    The other question is what the functions of the committee are. I don't think the committee should ever actually do investigations or adjudicate formally on individual instances. I think the committee should be a sounding board for the ethics commissioner to toss things off and ask about, that it should advise caution and be asked questions of. I don't think it should go beyond that because you get into real dangers of vicious partisanship.

    Prof. Ian Greene: The committee approach is a novel idea, whether it's two committees or a joint committee. I think it can really be a benefit to the ethics commissioner. The way it works will depend on the integrity of the people who are on the committee. I think it would be up to all parties to ensure that they get people on the committee who will make it work.

    Prof. Daniel Weinstock: There are two functions that a committee could serve. One of the things we haven't talked about very much, and something I tried to bring out in my presentation, was the fact that what we're talking about isn't so much easily adjudicated black and white rules, but rather shades of grey. A conscientious parliamentarian is one who is going to be genuinely uncertain about whether or not a particular action is going to fall foul of a rule. I think there's no clear answer.

    One of the things a committee does is to supplement the role of the ethics commissioner. You get away from a sort of traffic cop mentality about these things. Either you've gone 35 kilometres per hour in a 30 zone or you haven't. The rule ends there. I think the single ethics commissioner encourages the view of the sort of traffic cop mentality of these things, whereas a committee made up of different people with different points of view might be more suitable to something where we are talking, after all, about judgments and shades of grey.

    The second, very different, function that a committee might serve addresses the concern that's been coming around a lot about the politicization of an ethics code. How can we put safeguards in place that will prevent or make it as improbable as possible? This will just become more ammunition for partisan politics.

    Part of it is, quite frankly, having a committee made up of members from all parties in a way that does not represent their weight in the House of Commons so that you get into a sort of mutual destruction pact. If someone starts misbehaving within the committee, the invitation is open for others to. There could be kind of a prudential element to having a committee in place that would offset the risks of excessive politicization.

    The Chair: I do appreciate those comments. As you know, normally our committees are set up with some sort of proportional representation of the parties. We actually do have a subcommittee that functions in the way I think you were thinking about, but I appreciate that.

    Colleagues, on your behalf, I'd like to thank Maureen Mancuso of the University of Guelph, Michael Atkinson of the University of Saskatchewan, Ian Greene of York University, Daniel Weinstock of the University of Montreal, and Ned Franks of Queen's University. We do thank you; this has been extremely useful for us.

    With regard, Daniel, to that committee, you realize that all the whips are on this committee. That's one of the reasons you've seen people disappearing: they're getting ready for question period. The people who normally staff those committees actually sit around this table.

    Thank you very much, and as a former academic, I thank you in particular for keeping to time. This is really wonderful on your part.

    Colleagues, we're going to adjourn in a moment, but can I remind you that on Thursday we meet with the federal ethics commissioner, Howie Wilson, and then we proceed to the working lunch with the Speaker and Senator Oliver. I would urge all parties, by the way, to advise their members that this working lunch is an important part of our work.

    The meeting's adjourned until 11 o'clock Thursday.