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STANDING COMMITTEE ON HEALTH

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA SANTÉ

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, October 18, 2001

• 1108

[English]

The Chair (Ms. Bonnie Brown (Oakville, Lib.)): Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'd like to call this meeting to order and on your behalf, to welcome the witnesses who have come to us from the University of Alberta Health Law Institute, Advanced Cell Technology in Boston, Massachusetts, and the University of Toronto-Mount Sinai Hospital Samuel Lunenfeld Research Institute.

For our witnesses, we usually hear all the presentations and move from there to questioning by the members of the committee. I think today we'll go in reverse order and begin with Janet Rossant from the University of Toronto, because I understand her presentation could be fairly hard science, and we need our fresh minds to absorb it. Please start.

Ms. Janet Rossant (Principal Researcher, University of Toronto-Mount Sinai Hospital, Samuel Lunenfeld Research Institute): I hope the science is not too hard. I've tried to make it as understandable as possible, and if I really get to something you don't understand, stop me immediately, before we get to the end.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): When our eyes start to cross, you'll know.

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Ms. Janet Rossant: Short and to the point. And I think you'll hear this reiterated in some of Jose's presentation, so you'll get the chance for a repeat, which always helps in the learning process.

I wanted to talk about the scientific perspectives on cloning this morning. The term cloning is one that's used extensively in our culture. We're all very familiar with it. It applies to any process in which one generates an identical copy of the original. We're all familiar with computer clones—companies have been trying to do that for a long time. But the way we're dealing with cloning in its more controversial aspects today is using cloning to make identical copies of living organisms. That is a process that also is routine in many contexts. Plants we grow in pots in our house are often cloned. We take a cutting and make more identical plants—that's cloning. But it was the production of the sheep Dolly by a different kind of cloning mechanism that really opened up the controversy about this procedure. Dolly was the first cloned mammal, that is, an animal that is a genetic copy of another animal. That opened up a whole series of scientific possibilities, but also a lot of ethical concerns.

And so what I want to do is address the technical aspects of cloning in mammals, including humans, and some of the scientific and safety issues that arise. I'm also going to deal with the crossover between stem cell research and cloning research, which are often conflated in the public mind. I'll try to point out why they get put together and where they can be separated.

The term reproductive cloning is used to describe the process of making two or more genetically identical individuals. We're all familiar with natural reproductive clones. Identical twins are natural clones. They occur because during early development the embryo divides in two, each half has the same genetic material, and two people arise. We also know, of course, that though they may be genetically identical, they are not necessarily identical in their individual behaviour. Artificial cloning, producing reproductive clones by artificial means, occurs with two different methods in mammals, that is, all animals like ourselves that are warm-blooded.

Embryo splitting occurs. You can take an early embryo from a mouse, a rabbit, any other mammal, split it at the stage when there are only a few cells, and grow multiple embryos. So that produces clones. Because cells become progressively specialized as development proceeds, you can't generate a lot of clones that way. You can take an embryo and split it in half, maybe into four.

The technique that produces the more controversial ways of cloning is what we call somatic cell nuclear transfer. This is the way Dolly was made. In this procedure an egg is taken, and the DNA, the genetic material of the egg, is removed and replaced with the nucleus. The nucleus is the part of a cell that contains all the genetic material. That nucleus is taken from any other cell, including a cell from an adult. In the case of Dolly, the cell was taken from an adult cell in the mammary gland and put into the egg. The egg then goes through development, divides, generates an early embryo called a blastocyst, and then if you put it back into the womb, you can complete development, and a new animal will be born that now has the genes from the cell of the adult organism. So it is now a genetic copy of the person or the animal that gave the cell.

There is always at this point the remark, well, that kind of clone is not completely genetically identical to the person. And that's true, but it's a bit of a scientific specialty, in that there are parts of the cell called the mitochondria that make the energy in your cell, and they contain DNA as well. The mitochondria are not in the nucleus, and so a clone would actually have DNA in the mitochondria that's different from that in the nucleus. So they're not absolutely genetically identical, but it's the genes in the nucleus that make us what we are, that really determine our genetic traits. In my presentation, there is actually a diagram that illustrates that process for you.

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Reproductive cloning, then, began with Dolly, and since Dolly was made, people have generated live clones by nuclear transfer in a number of species: sheep, cows, goats, pigs, and mice. So it's possible to generate live-born clones that are copies of adult cells this way.

But the success rate is very low. It varies from study to study, but probably around 1% to 5% of embryos transferred actually go through and generate live offspring. That is a very low rate of success. By comparison, in vitro fertilization approaches in humans generate about a 30% to 40% success rate today. So it's very inefficient. That means lots of embryos are lost along the way. So cloning doesn't work well.

The clones that make it to term all have placental problems—that's the structure that maintains the embryo in the uterus—and many of them have other problems and defects as well. Patterns of gene expression are abnormal. There's a lot of work going on right now in the analysis of these clones.

There's a strong scientific consensus that cloning technology that's applied to animals is not safe for application to humans. That's a safety issue independent of any ethical concerns. There are no scientists in this area who would feel that this is something that is applicable to humans right now. That's a very strong statement on my part to say that reproductive cloning to produce live humans is unsafe and should not occur.

Embryonic stem cell research and cloning is the area where we hear people saying, you have to clone to make stem cells. So what's going on here? What's the connection?

There is a connection, but it's important to point out that embryonic stem cell research in humans does not depend upon cloning technology. Cloning technology, because you can use it to generate early embryos that are genetic copies, could be used. Instead of making live-born clones, you could stop those embryos at the blastocyst stage and generate stem cells. That's what we here refer to as therapeutic cloning, not a term I think is very appropriate, but it is the term that is used.

So what are embryonic stem cells? Embryonic stem cells are derived from the blastocyst stage, the very early stage of development, and they're cells that you can grow in the Petri dish indefinitely. They'll multiply and make copies of themselves, but they can also generate many different specialized cell types. It's embryonic stem cells that may have the potential as cell-based therapies for a variety of degenerative diseases, such as Parkinson's, diabetes, and other diseases.

Human embryonic stem cells can be derived not from nuclear transfer cloning, but as they are generally today, from in vitro fertilization programs, in which embryos are generated and not used for reproduction. If, however, cells were derived that way and they were to be used for transplantation purposes, you would have problems of genetic rejection or immune rejection of those cells. If they're derived from unknown eggs, they would not match the person you want to give the cells to, they could be rejected. It has been proposed that cloning technology could be used to generate stem cells that would match the person you want to give the graft to. That is where people talk about cloning and stem cells in the same context.

There is another potential application of stem cell technology, which is a research application that I think has not yet been considered very extensively. You could use nuclear transfer technology to generate embryonic stem cells that were derived from people who had certain diseases, particularly diseases like diabetes, hypertension, some mental diseases, in which we don't know the cause of the disease. If we had stem cells we could grow in culture and make develop into different cell types, they could be a very useful research tool to understand the causes of that disease. So that has been a proposal as a research use of cloning and stem cells.

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So to reiterate, stem cell research does not depend on cloning technology right now. Embryonic stem cells for basic research are derived from blastocysts in IVF programs. They're not created embryos, they're not cloned embryos.

Human embryonic stem cell research is at a very exploratory phase worldwide. We don't know whether those cells are going to be useful for therapy, and so we're a long way from worrying about whether they're going to be rejected in such circumstances.

In addition, there's also considerable interest in the use of adult stem cells, and the use of adult stem cells, where you might be able to derive cells from the person who needs the graft, would obviously solve the issue of tissue rejection.

I think the strongest argument in favour of generating stem cell lines by nuclear transfer right now is the scientific one, to generate stem cell lines of specific disease models. However, this, in its current form, would require a donation of eggs, would require creation of an embryo, the cloned blastocyst, and it would certainly fall outside the draft legislation.

So in sum, human reproductive cloning by somatic cell nuclear transfer is unsafe, as well as ethically problematical. Stem cell research does not currently depend on nuclear transfer cloning. Nuclear transfer cloning to generate stem cells could have scientific value for studying human disease. Because science moves very rapidly, because societal responses to these issues also change rapidly, any legislation that is put in place in this area should be regularly reviewed to ensure that it responds to the changing circumstances.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Rossant. A very succinct and easily followed paper. Thank you very much.

We'll move on now to our guest from Boston, Massachusetts, Jose Cibelli.

Mr. Jose Cibelli (Vice-President, Research, Advanced Cell Technology (Boston, MA)): I'm pleased to testify today in regard to the new opportunities and challenges associated with embryonic stem cells and nuclear transfer technologies. During my testimony I may repeat some of the concepts already mentioned by Janet, but I think it's important that we really go through this very carefully.

ES cells, we heard, are cells derived from pre-implantation embryos. These cells can divide indefinitely, and can be induced to differentiate into different cell types. These cells were described for the first time in 1991 in the mouse. In l998 we had the first report on human ES cells by J.A. Thomson and Joseph Itskovitz, from Wisconsin and Israel. Now these cells are considered to be totipotent, or near totipotent, so there's a discussion as to whether they can make any cell type of the body or some of them.

If these cells were to be transplanted back into the inner cell mass of the blastocyst stage embryo, they would be expected to contribute to various cell types and tissues in the resulting human, leading to a chimera, a human comprised of cells from two distinct genetic backgrounds. Such individuals occur naturally when two independently fertilized pre-implantation embryos adhere to one another, thereby forming one embryo and a chimeric child. This was reported decades ago in the journal Nature.

What do we understand to be reproductive cloning? It's understood as a method by which a whole individual can be recreated. As of today, as Janet said, we have replicates of living individuals in cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, and mice. On the data gathered with animals, it is reasonable to speculate that attempts to clone human beings at this stage are likely to succeed. However, the price we would have to pay for this is going to be very high. So some of us in the scientific community are against reproductive cloning at this point.

Therapeutic cloning is the method by which 100% immune-compatible ES cells can be generated from a human being in need of therapy. Therapeutic cloning differs from reproductive cloning in the fact that pre-implantation embryos generated in the laboratory will never be transferred into the uterus—that's a key distinction. One thing is to have an embryo created and never put into a uterus, but placed in a Petri dish, and this is what we call therapeutic cloning.

As for the potential benefit of therapeutic cloning, we see a tremendous increase in the incidence of degenerative diseases, especially age-related diseases. These will likely lead to conflicts of economics, ethics, and aesthetics as we struggle to find a humane and practical means of treating the ailing.

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Concrete examples of tissues needed will likely include heart tissue for heart failure, arrhythmias, and ischemic damage; cartilage for arthritis; insulin-producing cells for diabetes; neurons for Parkinson's disease; kidney cells for kidney failure; liver cells for cirrhosis and hepatitis; skin for burns and ulcers; and bone marrow cells for cancer, just to name a few.

While current procedures are partially successful in alleviating human suffering, these therapies are limited by two major difficulties. One is the availability of the needed cell or tissue type, and the other is the histocompatibility of the transplanted tissues. As a result, thousands of patients die every year for the lack of transplantable cells and tissues, and projections from the Bureau of the Census suggest this shortage will worsen with the aging of our population.

Therapeutic cloning will combine all the benefits of ES cells, that is to say, the generation of any cell type in the body, with the capacity to match the immune system of the patient. And there is one more advantage. This actually was proved in our laboratory. Our data have indicated that cells generated by cloning will be completely rejuvenated, allowing us to envision not only treatment, but prevention of all age-related diseases. A recent study on the impact of this technology on human health estimates that more than 125 million U.S. Americans can benefit from ES cell-related treatments. This was published in the journal Science last year.

The procedure itself, as we heard, entails the superovulation of volunteer women and the harvesting of the mature eggs. Eggs are then transported to the laboratory, and their DNA is removed. The patient donates cells from his or her skin. Such cells are then fused with an enucleated human egg; we remove the chromosomes from the egg and put in the new DNA from the sick person. After about five or six days in vitro human embryos will reach a stage that is called the blastocyst stage. It is at this point that a subset of cells is removed and placed in a Petri dish, allowing the embryonic stem cells to grow indefinitely. The modification of the culture conditions will induce cells to grow into specific cell types, to be later reintroduced into the patient.

I have to say here that this is a key step. We have to remember that if we take cells from a person who is 70 years old and we do this procedure, when we bring back cells—let's imagine we are bringing bone marrow cells back—those cells will not only be 100% compatible with the patient, but will be completely rejuvenated. We can be thinking about humans when they reach a certain age who will have an immune system completely reset to zero.

Although no group has yet reported the generation of human ES cells from a somatic cell via cloning in a peer review journal, data on cattle and mice have already validated this concept. There are three or four papers, including one from our group, showing that you can transform a somatic cell into an embryonic stem cell through cloning. Those cells will be totipotent, will give rise to any tissue.

More importantly, critical cell types such as dopaminergic neurons, insulin-producing cells—

The Chair: Dopa—something or other.

Mr. Jose Cibelli: Dopaminergic, the cells that will make dopamine for the treatment of Parkinson's disease.

The Chair: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Jose Cibelli: Dopaminergic neurons, insulin-producing cells, cardiac muscle, have all been obtained by induced differentiation of mouse ES cells in vitro. There was a recent report in the Proceedings of National Academy of Science showing that you can make blood cells from human embryonic stem cells, so we're getting there.

Transplantation studies also conducted with these cells have clearly shown their clinical potential. Some people, with the mouse, put these cells that have been already differentiated into, for example, the heart. They show that there is a perfect graft.

One of the current objections for this work is that pre-implantation embryos should not be created for research or even to save an existing human life. Our primary response to this objection is that the pre-implantation embryo is, from a scientific perspective, simply cellular life, not an individualized human life. The trillions of cells in our body are all truly alive. Indeed, we once evolved from a such a single-celled individual.

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The human life, as opposed to simply cellular life, begins, at the earliest, at around day 14 of human development, around the time the pre-implantation embryo attaches to the uterine wall in the mother. Prior to that the pre-implantation embryo has no body cells of any kind, and in fact, it has no cells even committed to somatic lineages. Indeed, the embryo has not individualized. For example, it can still become identical twins if you split it.

If facts do not allow us to label the pre-implantation embryo as an individual, why do some propose that we label it as a person, with rights that are greater than those of a fetus, with all its organ systems in place, that a woman can choose to abort? The moral equation would seem to dictate that anyone who believes a sentient human being is deserving of a greater moral value than an undifferentiated mass of early embryonic cells should be convinced of the ethical validity of developing and using therapeutic cloning for the purpose of treating and curing human disease.

Finally, I want to repeat that therapeutic cloning has the potential to alleviate or remove human suffering with untold millions, but its progress will be hindered if lawmakers start enacting broad restrictions against human cloning and stem cell research.

In a recent report—and this is very recent—by the National Academies in the U.S. on the use of stem cells for regenerative medicine the final recommendation, the final paragraph, clearly articulates the current thought of the scientific and medical community:

    In conjunction with the research on stem cell biology and the development of potential stem cell therapies, research on approaches that prevent immune rejection of stem cells and stem cell-derived tissues should be actively pursued. These scientific efforts include the use of a number of techniques to manipulate the genetic makeup of stem cells, including somatic cell nuclear transfer.

We sincerely believe that this honourable Canadian House of Commons has the wisdom and courage necessary to allow this research to go forward. Millions of human beings currently suffering from disease and old age, including us in the not so distant future, will be forever thankful.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Cibelli.

We now go to Professor Timothy Caulfield from the University of Alberta.

Professor Timothy Caulfield (University of Alberta, Health Law Institute): Thank you very much.

First, I would like to thank the entire committee for the opportunity to speak on what I believe is an incredibly important legislative initiative. Despite the criticisms that are going to follow, I would also like to compliment the government both on pushing this initiative forward—it's clearly needed—and on what I believe to be a piece of legislation with a great many positive attributes.

However, in this brief statement I will, using cloning technology as the primary example, comment on what I believe to be the weakest aspects of the proposal. In particular, I'll talk about three things: why I do not think criminal law is the appropriate way to proceed; the importance of having scientifically accurate justifications for prohibitions; and finally, I would like to propose an alternative model to the committee.

There's no doubt that a clear and strong oversight scheme is needed in this area. There are currently technologies and scientific activities that should not move forward, but I believe that specific criminal prohibitions are neither necessary nor the best way to regulate this area. Criminal laws are blunt, they're inflexible, and they require a good deal of political energy and time to change, as everyone in this room knows better than I. I think the rapid advances we are seeing in this area are arguments against, and not for, criminal laws, and I really believe Canada needs a legal structure that can respond to the scientific and social changes.

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Let me touch on some specific arguments.

I think complicating matters in this area is that there really is still no agreement regarding the appropriateness of many of the suggested prohibitions. As is noted in several law commission reports, criminal law should be reserved for areas where there is a high degree of social consensus. In one of the information documents that accompanied the proposal in May it was suggested that “there is a broad consensus that the activities that would be banned under the proposed legislation are not acceptable in Canada.” This simply is not true. In fact, there is still a great deal of international and national debate about many of the prohibited activities, including the appropriateness of creating embryos for research purposes—yes, these are controversial areas—germ line therapy, and especially for the purposes today, therapeutic cloning. I'm not saying I agree with these technologies, that they should necessarily move forward, but rather that there just is not a consensus.

For example, recent survey work has found that over three-quarters of Canadians believe therapeutic cloning—and again it's not a great term—is acceptable. Research in other jurisdictions has also found no strong opposition to the use of this technique, and as you know, the U.K., some entities in the United States, and many in the scientific community are also against broad prohibition. So clearly there is no broad consensus on this issue.

I'm not suggesting that the federal government should craft laws in response to survey data. This is a methodology with inherent flaws. However, I think it's clear that the federal government can't justify many of the prohibitions, such as the one against therapeutic cloning, on the basis of a strong social consensus. More importantly, however, the government needs to recognize both the dynamic nature of the science in this area and the inevitably swift evolution of social norms that will continue to make it difficult for policy-makers to justify criminal prohibitions on social consensus alone.

Now I'd like to turn to what I think is another problem with the legislation, that many of the stated justifications are not particularly well presented. Worse, because they are associated with the government's most potent regulatory tool, criminal law, they have the potential to formally and powerfully legitimize inappropriate and scientifically inaccurate notions of human genetics.

For example, though there are a number of sound arguments against human cloning, such as the health and safety issues we've heard about, the possibility that it will facilitate genetic enhancement, some psychological issues, the federal government's explanations for the ban are inconsistent, scientifically inaccurate, in support of the current trend towards genetic determinism. At some level the government's argument against human cloning—this is human reproductive cloning I'm talking about—and the government's definition of a clone are based explicitly or implicitly on a belief that our future lies in our genes and that our sense of self is necessarily tied to our genetic heritage. This deterministic vision of genetics is socially dangerous and biologically wrong.

The goal of the government in this context should be to protect the public from genuine health and safety issues, which clearly exist, and to promote an ongoing discourse on the scientific, philosophic, and health care issues surrounding the technology. In fact, this latter goal seems critically important to the fight against the emergence of a deterministic ethos. In the end, the proposed ban may, ironically, help to promote and ingrain a social attitude that is more problematic than the use of the technology.

I would like to now use this opportunity to propose an alternative model, because I think one exists, a model that would allow the federal government to achieve the stated goals and produce a more flexible and effective regulatory environment.

The federal government could create a regulatory body empowered to both issue licences for a defined set of activities, as currently suggested in the proposal, and produce, modify, and monitor a moratorium list—perhaps a better term would be a prohibition list. This list would contain the activities that at this time should not be allowed.

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In addition, the law could set out a specific consultation process, thereby facilitating and promoting the ongoing interdisciplinary dialogue on these important issues. This mandated consultation process would minimize the criticism that the proposal I suggest is undemocratic, in other words, taking these key decisions away from Parliament and placing them with a regulatory body. I think it would ensure that the prohibitions continue to reflect current policy concerns, current public concerns, and the state of scientific knowledge. More importantly, I think it would allow a continual refining and sharpening of the regulatory scheme.

There's no doubt that federal-provincial jurisdiction is a big issue in this context. But recent Supreme Court case law gives the federal government a great deal of latitude to enact legislation on the criminal power. This is an issue that I've spend considerable time considering and had the opportunity to discuss with many of my constitutional law colleagues. The feds should retain jurisdiction so long as the regulatory scheme has criminal prohibitions and is aimed at a legitimate public health concern. In the scheme I suggest the criminal prohibitions would be triggered if an individual breached the terms of a licence or undertook an activity on a moratorium list.

In the Supreme Court case of Hydro-Québec, a case addressing the constitutionality of regulations—a case I'm sure many of you are familiar with—the Supreme Court was very sympathetic to the idea that a degree of regulatory flexibility may be required in order to achieve the legitimate goals of the legislation based on the federal criminal law power. It's nicely summarized in the head note to the case:

    Broad wording is unavoidable in environmental protection legislation because of the breadth and complexity of the subject. The effect of requiring greater precision would be to frustrate the legislature in its attempt to protect the public against the dangers flowing from pollution.

The same can certainly be said about legislation in the area of genetics and reproductive technologies. Indeed, one could argue that the only way to meaningfully achieve the objectives of the proposal and to achieve any degree of real precision is to create a scheme that is more flexible and responsive. I think this could be done with a relatively small adjustment to the existing proposal.

So in sum, in order to create a law with long-term relevance, to the benefit of all Canadians, I think we must do three things. We must move away from criminal bans or, at a minimum, save the true criminal law prohibitions for the one or two suggested areas where there is a degree of social consensus. We must get the rationales and science accurate. This is particularly important, because this law will stand as an important precedent for future work in a dynamic area. Finally, I think we must strive to be creative and establish a regulatory framework that is responsive and can meet the unique and ever-changing challenges of this exciting area.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Caulfield.

You've given us a lot to think about, and I'm sure the members will have questions for clarification of exactly what you meant and about your opinions on some of the other issues.

So we'll begin with Mr. Merrifield.

Mr. Rob Merrifield (Yellowhead, Canadian Alliance): Thank you. It is a fascinating study, and it's nice to have you here this morning and get some diverse views on all of this.

The first question goes to Mr. Caulfield. With regard to Quebec civil law, and the rest of the provinces, can you comment on criminal law versus family law in this realm?

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: I was worried you were going to ask me about civil law, an area I don't know very well.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Maybe this isn't a fair question for you, then, but what realm do you see this best handled under?

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: There's no doubt that there are jurisdiction issues here, and I suspect this is what the focus of your question really is. There are many aspects of the subject matter that could arguably fall within provincial jurisdiction, health, family law, etc., even civil law, if that's what you were referring to. Nevertheless, I think there is a body of jurisprudence. One case I referred to, Hydro-Québec, which was the environmental law case. There's RJR-Macdonald, which is the tobacco case. There are two Supreme Court cases that have, I think, given a great deal of latitude to the federal government in this context.

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If the model went forward as proposed, I don't think there's any doubt that the feds would keep jurisdiction. The model I and others have proposed, I think, does raise more constitutional issues. Nevertheless, I think that given the body of jurisprudence that exists, the feds would still retain jurisdiction.

I don't mean to make light of the jurisdiction issue. You can see various ways that a challenge could be brought, even by private companies, to the jurisdiction of the feds in this area. But I think it's important, despite those constitutional uncertainties, to create a law that is going to have long-term relevance.

Does that help?

Mr. Rob Merrifield: No. It's an interesting one. You've speculated on which way it will go. I want your opinion as to which way it should go.

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: Let's say the jurisdiction issue was placed before the Supreme Court of Canada right now. I think the feds would retain jurisdiction. As I said in my talk, this is at the heart of this issue. I've had the opportunity to do an informal survey with some of the constitutional professors across the country, and since Bill C-47 they've changed their minds, because many of these cases happened post-1997, and feel that the jurisdiction has now swayed more in the feds' favour. Any time you're relying on a court decision to retain jurisdiction, it creates a degree of uncertainty, but I believe, as I said in my talk and in the paper I presented, the jurisdiction is there.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Just to shift gears a little bit, I will ask Janet a question with regard to stem cells and their use.

First, I'm a little unclear, because you take an egg, you're saying, you pull the nucleus out of that, and you put in a nucleus from another adult cell. That's not necessarily an embryo. It's not a fertilized egg. Or is it a fertilized egg at that stage?

Ms. Janet Rossant: I would argue that it is an embryo, that as soon as you activate the nucleus and allow the embryo to start to divide, the nucleus is now reprogrammed and acts as though it were from an embryo.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Because it has the potential for life.

Ms. Janet Rossant: It has not been fertilized, but the nucleus came originally from the product of fertilization. The nucleus arose originally from an egg during the process of development. It has two parents, it has a mother and a father. So I think the distinction between a nuclear transfer embryo and an embryo produced by fertilization is not necessarily a valid one.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Okay, that's fair enough.

We seem to be pushing so hard at the embryonic side to gain stem cells, the elasticity of them, and on and on. We've had two witnesses say the same thing, and other witnesses who have come forward. When you see that stem cells can be achieved from adults, from the umbilical cord, from amniotic fluid, I understand, something we talked about a week or so ago, are these not just as elastic?

Ms. Janet Rossant: At this point, the answer is probably no. We do not have evidence that any adult stem cell has the degree of potency, elasticity, ability to make all the cell types that an embryonic stem cell has. However, that said, there is some very exciting research that does suggest that stem cells taken from the adult may have a lot more potential than we think.

I don't think we know, in the long run, where the therapeutic advantage is going to lie, whether we'll be able to take embryonic stem cells and really direct them down specific pathways carefully enough to use them, or whether we'll be able to take adult stem cells, redirect them, and use them. In the scientific realm at this point it is so much at the exploratory phase that there is a need to pursue research on both ends, because one feeds into the other. Knowledge of how embryonic stem cells develop and differentiate can be used to help us redesign and redirect adult stem cells. Clearly, in the long run, if we can use and reactivate our own stem cells in a therapeutic manner, that is perhaps the ideal way to think about using stem cells. But we are not there yet. We are not there with the use of embryonic stem cells in human therapy either. So I think both approaches need to go forward.

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I would just reiterate, however, that embryonic stem cell research at this stage does not require nuclear transfer and therapeutic cloning to pursue the basic research aspects. Using cloning technology to generate stem cells is an additional process that would generate stem cells genetically identical to the person who needs the graft. But since at this stage we are really looking at these cells in culture, looking at them in model systems, that is the next phase.

It is an important issue. If we are to use them, they have to be not rejected. Therapeutic cloning is one way to do that, there may be other ways. I think it is important to realize that you can undertake stem cell research now in both embryos and the adult without the use of therapeutic cloning.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: When it comes to the stem cell, with regard to the potential for creating bone marrow, are you saying that could come from the embryonic stem cell? Don't we already have statistics out there suggesting that it can and does already come from adults?

I get a little disturbed when we are rushing. We have all kinds of scientists come and say there's great potential in the embryonic side of stem cell research, and we seem to be rushing down that corridor very fast. I see some really solid science on the adult stem cell side, and yet I don't hear people yelling and screaming, researchers saying that's where the answers lie more. You're saying there's some potential in the embryonic, and we know there's potential in the adult. What I fear is the emphasis shifting onto the embryonic at the expense of the adult research.

Ms. Janet Rossant: I can you tell you for sure that in Canada that is not the case, that adult stem cell research is an incredible research strength in Canada. Many of the concepts and the first work were developed in Canada by Till and McCulloch in Toronto, C.P. Leblond in Montreal, who really established stem cell concepts using adult stem cells. If you were to look at the research grants funded in Canada on stem cells, you'd find most of them are on adult stem cells.

The embryonic stem cell is an additional exciting possibility. One of the main things embryonic stem cells have that adult stem cells don't is this ability to divide indefinitely. So it's true that you can generate stem cells from the bone marrow—that's how bone marrow transplantation works—but nobody has yet been able to isolate those stem cells and grow them indefinitely in very large numbers, so that instead of having to take one person to get a bone marrow transplant for another person, you could actually take one person and generate enough stem cells to be grafting onto the population of Quebec, if you like. That's what embryonic stem cells can do, they can divide indefinitely.

One of the goals of adult stem cell research is to try to understand how that is the case with embryonic stem cells and not with adult, to try to get situations where adult stem cells can be divided indefinitely. There are things happening, there are moves forward in that area, and there's a lot of research. I work on embryonic stem cells in the mouse, and to me, the adult stem cell research is extremely exciting. It's certainly a major area of emphasis, but we don't at this stage know which is going to be the best route forward.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: We're not at the abyss, but we can see it from where we're standing, when we look potentially at what is often termed the slippery slope on the ethical side of where we're going. We have a generation and a society, the baby boomers—and I class myself in that category—that is somewhat spoiled. We have had our way through society since we were born. Potentially, we'll stop at nothing to stay alive and to have our way near the end of our life. I guess it scares me a little how far we will go to have our way when it comes to the ethical side of science.

• 1155

Just in the last five years, we have developed some phenomenal science. I really question whether it's wise to proceed down some of these roads at the intensity and the speed we're going.

The Chair: Thank you Mr. Merrifield.

Ms. Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: What a fascinating presentation, and it was done in terms that kept my eyes from rolling too often.

You were talking about formation of cells, and you were talking about the moral issue. I sound like an idiot, I know, I don't know the terminology, but at what point did you say you could determine it was actually a human form?

Mr. Jose Cibelli: That actually goes back to the law. Some people think human beings should be considered to exist as of day 14—that's a way of putting in a limit. The problem is that there is no limit. It's very difficult for scientists to say when human life begins, when you have a human being. You go back and start thinking about differentiation of cell types, which is around day 14.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Prior to day 14, if you were to receive these masses, this nucleus that had no determination, could you determine rather scientifically whether it was going to be a human or a goat or whatever?

Mr. Jose Cibelli: There's no question that if you transfer that embryo into the uterus—

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: No, I'm not talking about prior to transfer. I mean if there were no transfer.

Mr. Jose Cibelli: If there were no transfer, you would never get a human being. You're always going to have a mass of cells. In vitro you cannot culture an embryo for too long. We don't understand it very well, we can't make an in vitro womb, the uterus cannot be recreated. The cells will be in vitro for some time, but then they will die unless you culture them in a proper way. That's what happened in 1998, when we got the first report. Someone found a way of maintaining these cells alive in humans.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: If you were to take a human nucleus that had been produced, would it survive in a lamb or another creature?

This whole thing is, I have to confess, a little spooky for many of us as we're learning it. I've read a lot of what Professor Caulfield has read and written, and we're talking about not putting it in the hands of Parliament. For many of us it's much easier to take the attitude that cloning is really very spooky and creepy, but if somebody else wants to do it, it's all right. But somewhere along the line somebody has to take responsibility for these decisions.

You're telling me that for the first 14 days there are, in dealing with a nucleus, no distinctive qualities or characteristics that render it human?

Mr. Jose Cibelli: No. I'm saying that this is just a group of cells that are trying to differentiate into a human being. What you can do is put them in a state of, I would say, suspension, and you just maintain them at that stage indefinitely. Then you direct them into specific tissues where you want them to go in the laboratory.

• 1200

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: So if you did not terminate them yourself, they would naturally die—is this true? If they were not implanted, they would just naturally die?

Mr. Jose Cibelli: Let's go back to the procedures. You retrieve a human embryo five days after fertilization, then you grow the cells in vitro. You have the ball of cells—the size is about one-tenth of a millimetre, so they're very small. If we maintain them as a ball of cells, we know we're never going to see a fetus; they're going to die, because we don't know how to do it in the laboratory. But if you take that ball of cells and remove some of the outside layers of that ball, there's a tiny group of 30 or 40 cells that are what we call the inner cell mass, because it's inside. We take those cells and culture them in a Petri dish, and they can grow indefinitely. If you take some of those cells and you put them back into a womb, would you get a human being? No, because they won't be able to make a normal placentation. They won't ever make a human being, but they can make different tissues.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: I'm afraid I'm going to have a lot of really dumb questions before this is over.

The Chair: Dr. Cibelli's explanation made it clearer to me.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Yes. I'm extremely impressed by the presentations of the three of you.

Somebody else go on and let me scramble here a little more—or unscramble.

The Chair: It's okay. Oh, you've actually used up your time.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Well, I'm babbling now.

The Chair: We could come back to you, because we don't have too many present, but do you mind if we go to Mr. Ménard now?

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Oh no, please do.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard (Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, BQ): Thank you, Madam Chair.

My question is to Mr. Caulfield, whose testimony surprised me a great deal. By that I mean that he caused us to think about these matters somewhat differently. Do you have the draft bill with you?

[English]

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: No, I'm sorry, I don't.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I would like us to proceed as follows. You said that the federal government could achieve the same objectives, that is maintain some prohibitions that are collective in nature to protect citizens by means of the Criminal Code. With respect to the eight prohibited activities clearly set out in clause 3 of the draft bill, I would like you to tell me whether you think there is a fairly good consensus regarding them.

Second, what similar provisions are contained in the Criminal Code?

In the case of human cloning, for example, I think you would agree that there is a broad consensus among the public to maintain this prohibition. Would you agree that there is nothing in the Criminal Code?

[English]

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: Yes.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: We agree on the first matter.

The second point is about choosing the genetic background you want.

[English]

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: I agree that there's a social consensus concerning reproductive cloning. Is that what your question was?

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Yes.

[English]

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: Even the depth of that consensus is suspect. That said, I agree, and I would actually have no problem with a criminal ban on human cloning, subject to that criminal prohibition's being supported by scientific and philosophically appropriate rationales.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: However, when the Minister of Justice appeared before the committee and she explained why, as a society, we want to prohibit human cloning, she said it was because of the uniqueness of each individual. We believe that all individuals in society are unique. No one would want that there be two Réal Ménards or two Bonnie Browns—please control yourself, gang—or two Yolande Thibeaults. So we want to prohibit human cloning because one of our Canadian values is the recognition of each individual's uniqueness. Would you agree with that?

• 1205

[English]

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: No. I think that's an excellent point and I'm glad you brought it up. In fact, a human clone, if we were able to clone you, would be a wholly unique individual. That individual would have been raised in a different womb, different in utero environment, would have been subject to different nutrition. If we've learned anything from the Human Genome Project, it is the fantastic complexity of gene-gene interaction and gene-environment interaction. Would you have the same genome? Yes, you would. Would there be certain traits that are similar to the clone source? Yes. But it's dangerous to assume that your individuality, your autonomy, is threatened by the fact that someone else shares your genome. There are certainly issues—

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Wait.

[English]

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: Let me finish, because I think—

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: But there's a lack of understanding.

[English]

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: —this is a very important point. There are issues associated. When I say that, I'm not saying I support human cloning. Human cloning certainly makes genetic enhancement easier, and it also has health and safety issues. For those reasons alone, it should be prohibited.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I have an identical twin. We have the same genetic baggage. Of course, we do not have the same personality. But what you are saying is that as legislators, we should not interpret cloning to mean that we will get someone with the same genetic baggage, that we will get the same individual. Since we are protecting our values in this legislation, you say that human cloning should not be seen as a threat to people's individuality. That is what you are saying.

Perhaps we might ask the other two witnesses whether they agree with this view, Madam Chair. Perhaps this is not a proper value for legislators to protect, and we should be permitting cloning. Do you share that view? No? My question is to—

[English]

Ms. Janet Rossant: I agree that cloning per se does not generate identical individuals, so it does not affect or challenge individuality. That is not a good justification for not cloning. They are genetically identical, but as you said yourself, identical twins are genetically identical, but separate individuals. I'm often asked whether clones would share a soul. I find this is obviously not the case. The soul, the identity that we as human beings understand, is not something that's totally written in the genes. What Tim is saying, I think, is not that we should not ban cloning, but that the justification for that is not really simply this challenge to identity.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Why? Why should we ban human cloning in that case, if not to protect individuality?

[English]

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: I really appreciate this question, because this is an ongoing dilemma that has surrounded the cloning debate. The National Bioethics Advisory Council in the United States also struggled with this. In their cloning report that came out shortly after Dolly was first cloned they explicitly noted this genetic determinism paradox, and they said, no, this is not a justification for banning cloning. However, they went on to say that in a world where genetic determinism exists, an individual created by cloning technology may believe their autonomy and individuality is compromised. Again, I don't buy that argument, because if that's the case, then the goal of the government should be to dispel the deterministic myth.

What are rationales for banning cloning? First, the health and safety concerns are profound. It will be difficult to get around those concerns, because it is difficult to imagine an ethical research protocol that would allow us to overcome them. The second reason I think cloning's problematic is that though an individual is cloned to be a wholly unique individual, they do share the genome. As a result, it would facilitate genetic enhancement. In other words, traits that are highly genetic, such as height, would be easier to select for—there's no doubt about that—through the use of cloning technology. I think in Canadian society we've decided that genetic technology should not be used for those types of superficial traits.

I could go on, as there are other arguments against it, but I think those are strong arguments. The important thing is having, I think, a law that's based on scientifically accurate and philosophically consistent rationales. Is that helpful?

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Yes. In any case, your testimony caused us to see things in a very different way from what we have heard so far. In that regard, your testimony is very precious to committee members.

• 1210

The effort to maintain a ban on choosing certain inherited traits, for example... Among other things, it has been said that parents should not be able to decide that they want to change the germ line in order to get a tall girl with blue eyes and blond hair. The draft bill provides that the germ line cannot be changed because parents decide they want to have a boy or a girl. This is in keeping with a value enshrined in the Charter, namely that all individuals are equal.

Do you think, for example, the prohibition mentioned in paragraph 3(1)(b) is based on false representations, or do you think the reasons we have been given are correct? Do you think parent should be able to choose the sex of their child?

Mr. Timothy Caulfield: No.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Why?

Mr. Timothy Caulfield: Why?

[English]

I don't necessarily think there should be a criminal ban on it. Keep in mind, when I say we shouldn't have a criminal ban, I'm not suggesting that we should have softer laws. On the contrary, I think the regulatory scheme I propose would allow sharper regulations. It will make it easier to catch the activities that form the intent of the legislation.

One of the problems with criminal laws, as you have heard not only me say, but I'm sure other scholars or lawyers, is that they are very blunt instruments. Something like a ban against sex selection may be better as a regulatory scheme, in the regulatory prohibition. So it's not allowed, it is still a prohibition, but that prohibition can be interpreted and modified by the regulatory body. A number of my family law colleagues have pointed out inconsistencies in this definition of sex selection. I apologize, and would be happy to get back to you on the inconsistencies there. Again, it highlights the importance of having a sharp prohibition.

The Chair: You have more than used up your time. We might get back to you, but I would appreciate being able to move on.

Ms. Sgro, please.

Ms. Judy Sgro (York West, Lib.): Professor Caulfield, to follow up on my colleague's comment about the issue of utilizing criminal law, you need a message. You want to send a strong message that certain things are not going to be allowed. Frankly, I was under the assumption—or at least it made me feel better—that if we're putting this into the Criminal Code, it's going to have some teeth to it, and so on. Putting it into the Criminal Code is also part of the message we would want to send out, that there are certain things that are not going to be allowed and encouraged in this country.

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: That's an excellent point.

There may be others, but there are three strong arguments against what I propose. First, you are exactly right, criminal law has a strong symbolic impact. When you're talking about a regulatory scheme, it has the taste of bureaucracy, it has the taste of Health Canada monitoring. The second one is the constitutional issue that we've touched on. The third one is the democracy issue, the idea that we're putting this into the hands of Parliament. I think I have answers to all of them.

For the symbolic one, I think that's important, but if you create a law—keep in mind, I'm not saying that these are going to be pushed into a regulatory scheme—I think what we need to do is create a unique regulatory body that has a strong mandate placed in the piece of legislation. We need a strong preamble, and there already is, I think, a strong preamble. There are criminal prohibitions. If you breach something on the prohibition list, the criminal consequences flow, so the strong message is retained.

In addition to that, you have a regulatory body, as in Great Britain, that is charged with taking on a public education role, can make sure the message continues to be heard, and engages the public on an ongoing basis. I think if you structure it correctly, it is actually more symbolic, because criminal law has a tendency, as we've seen in other areas, to polarize debates. Once it becomes a criminal law, the tone of the debate changes. I would like to see it be an ongoing constructive debate, because these issues aren't going away. Science is going to bring us new technologies, new challenges. Let's create a body that can meet those in a quick and constructive fashion.

• 1215

Ms. Judy Sgro: In our legislation we're talking about prohibiting therapeutic cloning. Are we hurting ourselves when it comes to the scientific community in restricting future medical uses?

Ms. Janet Rossant: That's probably the area that is the hardest to deal with right now. You've heard from both of us that nuclear transfer cloning to generate stem cells has potential therapeutically and as an experimental tool. I think, generally speaking, again, scientists would be reluctant to see something banned under criminal law that could have potential therapeutic value in the future. I think this comes back to Tim's point that there are areas—and this would be one of them—where there is neither a public nor a scientific consensus about where this field is going. If you prohibit it, it then becomes very hard to move out of that prohibition, if it's on the criminal side. But a regulatory body with strong teeth has the ability to respond to changing circumstances in a much more flexible manner than the strict criminal prohibition would allow.

Ms. Judy Sgro: You probably have more confidence in a regulatory system than I do.

Ms. Janet Rossant: I know this is a major issue for this legislation, and for those of us outside it's a major issue too. Obviously, there are models. The U.K. model, the HFEA, is actually, I think, a good model on which to work. And it does work. Research is regulated, the public has confidence, and the scientists have confidence as well.

Ms. Judy Sgro: But we would still have an opportunity to be reviewing our legislation in three or five years time. Instead of five, we could always suggest doing a review in a three-year period of time, if we thought science was moving along so quickly that we needed to stay current and able to reflect public opinion and what we thought would be best for the Canadian public.

Mr. Jose Cibelli: May I comment on that?

You may want to be able to constantly review the legislation. I think three years is too much time, things are moving so rapidly. And you have so many good scientists in Canada that you're definitely going to hurt them if you ban therapeutic cloning. You can ban the use of those cells transplanted back into a patient because perhaps it's still preliminary, but the data are out there on the animals showing that this is going to work. I don't have the numbers in Canada, but I know that in the U.S. we're talking about 120 or 130 million people who can benefit from this therapy. You can't turn away from that.

Ms. Janet Rossant: I have, as a scientist, to point out again that the therapeutic side of this is not going to only be from therapeutic cloning. So I am not so enthusiastic that we must have therapeutic cloning in order for the benefits of regenerative medicine to come into play. I am taking the broader general scientist's view of things, I guess, that says we need to keep all avenues open at this stage.

Ms. Judy Sgro: Okay. Thank you.

The Chair: Okay.

Would my colleagues allow me to ask a question? I'm afraid the bells are going to start ringing.

I should share with you that the things that have upset me so far in this set of hearings have been more concerned with what's happening in the field of in vitro fertilization for reproductive purposes and all the adults that are involved in that, as the commissioning parents, the donors, perhaps the surrogate, etc. So what you're telling me this morning is that through therapeutic cloning we could get embryos with only one donor, the egg donor. Is that right? And then that same egg donor could have a cell removed from some other part of the body to be injected into the egg, so now we only have one adult who is the source of this embryo. Is that right?

Ms. Janet Rossant: Yes.

• 1220

The Chair: In which case, we would eliminate all these other people who seem to have some involvement in the creation of the embryo, afterwards carrying it to the creation of a child.

So now I'm just sitting here wondering why we are banning therapeutic cloning. It seems a lot easier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: No, that's wrong.

The Chair: No?

Ms. Janet Rossant: That's reproductive cloning.

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: You're talking about reproductive cloning there. What you've identified is reproductive cloning.

The Chair: Oh, okay.

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: You're right up to the point of the creation of the embryo for research purposes, but that technology you described is, in fact, reproductive cloning.

The Chair: Okay. And that's what everybody agrees is too dangerous. Even if you're using the embryo for research purposes only?

Ms. Janet Rossant: That's what we're proposing, so that there's the distinction.

The Chair: Exactly.

Ms. Janet Rossant: Reproductive cloning would take that embryo and put it back, so you could have a baby born.

The Chair: I don't want to do that.

You see, there are so many abuses we've heard of based on the use of the extra embryos that were essentially developed for reproductive purposes, while they only want to implant, say, three of them into the prospective mother. So then they end up with, say, six over here. There's this possibility that certain people might try to produce 15 or 20 embryos, overstimulate the ovaries to produce so many eggs, and in fact, the two or three that are going to be fertilized and implanted are the minority of the large group of eggs that are being produced as a way of getting more embryos for research. That, to me, is to the detriment of the woman whose eggs are being used.

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: May I comment on that?

The Chair: Yes.

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: I think this is an excellent point. It's one that has been lost a little in the noise, at least at the first cut. In many respects you're talking about commodifying the reproductive process.

The Chair: Exactly. We want to avoid that.

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: I think that is a genuine risk. But what you want to do is get at that issue, not necessarily at the technology, in other words, create a scheme that doesn't allow that to happen, not ban the technology that may benefit from the commodification process. If you are going to regulate it on those grounds, I think you need to be very explicit in your justifications for the ban, which doesn't appear to be the case to date—I can appreciate why that may be. I would suggest that you get at the commodification issue, not necessarily the technology.

The Chair: We're trying to, but from what we've read and from what we've heard from witnesses, the commodification is already taking place out there in the field in a variety of ways, including the arrangements for assisted human reproduction falling into contract law, which we want to avoid.

But you think, even with the therapeutic cloning model of creating embryonic stem cells, we could get into this whole commodification problem?

Ms. Janet Rossant: Most definitely, because you have to remember that in order to generate those embryos, you have to have ovum donors, and so they actually would then not be generating ova specifically for generating stem cells. That would be another form of creating embryos for research. It is another form of commodification.

I'm chair of the CIHR working group on stem cell research, and we had a conference call last week where some of these issues came up. I actually raised exactly that issue you raised, how we ensure that by saying we can't create embryos specifically for research, we don't let it through the back door, with research scientists or physicians just making a few extra ones on the side.

We have actually put in very specific guidelines to state that the primary goal of a reproductive fertility treatment must be the best treatment for the woman to generate reproduction, and that you cannot alter that treatment in order just to generate extra embryos.

The Chair: That's such a broad, vague goal. Are you going to then go further and say, therefore, we suggest that one should not harvest more than seven eggs, or something like that? Are you going to put numbers on it?

Ms. Janet Rossant: No. One can't do that, because it has to be the physicians' best guess. They're the ones who are involved in the treatment. You separate the researchers from the physicians, so they're not the same person, and you separate the goals of the reproductive treatment from the research goals.

• 1225

The Chair: It's a lot of trust we're putting in there.

Ms. Janet Rossant: I think for you this is a real issue.

The Chair: This is why, when we run into these things, we think of the criminal law as a way of making people understand that they have to take a guideline such as that proposed by Dr. Rossant and make sure that everything they're doing is documented and fits into that general guideline. I can see people doing exactly what I described, making extra eggs and all that sort of thing.

Dr. Caulfield.

Prof Timothy Caulfield: You have to remember that this commodification issue—we can call it almost the commercialization of medicine—happens everywhere, not just in the context of reproductive medicine. It happens in the context of clinical research trials, where the best interest of the patient is perhaps compromised by conflicts of interest involving everyone from the GP to an internist. This issue is present everywhere. So do we isolate reproductive medicine in the context of this piece of legislation? I don't know.

The regulatory model I propose I think has the opportunity to be more specific than just having the criminal ban, because you may be able to flesh out some of the exact things Janet suggests. You're not going to put those types of things in a criminal law, but you could flesh them out in more detail in a regulatory body. In fact, you may be able to reflect with the regulatory body exactly what needs to be done. Also, the regulatory body can play a monitoring role.

As I said, there are a lot of good things in the proposal, and one of them is the record keeping and the greater oversight you guys are proposing.

The Chair: I have one other point of clarification. As I recall, Dr. Cibelli does not want therapeutic cloning banned. Is that correct?

Dr. Jose Cibelli: That's correct.

The Chair: Dr. Rossant isn't quite as enthusiastic about therapeutic cloning right now, but she wants the right for scientists in Canada to be able to work simultaneously with embryonic stem cells and adult stem cells, probably in the hope that we can train, or whatever the term is, the adult stem cells to behave in the pluripotent way the embryonic stem cells operate.

Dr. Jose Cibelli: May I interrupt? My position is the same. I believe we still have to do research in embryonic stem cells and adult stem cells. The potential for therapeutic cloning is tremendous, and we should go forward.

The Chair: Dr. Caulfield, I think you also want to have fewer restrictions on the activity of scientists, but I don't think you were clear about not wanting therapeutic cloning banned.

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: It's unsafe to say that I don't, because I'm often characterized as someone who wants fewer restrictions for scientists. That's not the case necessarily. I want a regulatory body that is more responsive. It may, in fact, result in more restrictions for scientists, if that's the way the Canadian public and the consultation process take us. What I would like is a flexible framework that, at a minimum, opens the possibility of going in either direction.

The Chair: Thank you.

Thank you to my colleagues for giving me that little bit of time, because there were a lot of concepts this morning. It's difficult.

On my list I have Mr. Merrifield and Ms. Beaumier again, so while we have time, we'll move forward.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: I have just a quick question.

I guess, Mr. Caulfield, my question is more to you, because we've talked a lot about the embryo and where it's at. Perhaps I know your answer already, but I'm really intrigued as to whether you see any rights under criminal law, applying that to life at 14 days? Are there rights under criminal law prior to that, or after that? Where and why?

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: As everyone on this committee probably knows and has heard over and over again, the definition of life in law, not just criminal law, but Canadian law in general, is uncertain. Many of the cases that have explored the legal status of the fetus are abortion cases, and in those cases the matter was coloured, understandably, by the fact that there was another individual's rights in play, those of the mother.

• 1230

What has emerged in the international community—some have said this is arbitrary—is the 14-day rule. It flows a lot from the Warnock report in Great Britain, as I'm sure you've heard, but it really has emerged as a somewhat arbitrary international norm for when research on an embryo should stop.

The criminal law does not specify when life begins. It does say that criminal sanctions happen after a live birth, and there have been some very graphic cases in Canada to illustrate that. It's not that instructive for your purposes.

Have I answered your question? Probably not. I don't seem to be very good at answering your questions.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: You're suggesting that 14 days is international.

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: There's nothing in Canadian law anywhere, to put it succinctly, that says 14 days is when life happens.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Okay.

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: There are things like the tri-council policy statement, which refers to the 14 days. There are other international documents that refer to the 14 days. But there's no hard criminal law, or even any law, that refers to the 14-day limit.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Or rationale.

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: Oh, I see where you're going with this. Yes, or a specific rationale.

The Chair: You gave your one rationale. Maybe Dr. Rossant would tell us what the rationale is.

Ms. Janet Rossant: Jose vaguely put it forward. The rationale is that by 14 days of development several things happen. First, the embryo starts to develop a nervous system, and that is one sign we think of as human. Second, it is the point at which, if you were to split an embryo, you could still get two individuals, and so there is the idea that this marks the time of individuality. But it is also true to say that to a degree, it is arbitrary, because life is a continuum. It is very hard to define when life begins.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: So I guess where I'm going is to establish that the 14 days is a very big line. There's nothing magic about 13 and 15, that's what I was getting at. Under criminal law this is a vague area. You told me about international law, I understand that. I guess I'm more after your opinion on that.

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: On the 14 days?

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Yes, or on where life should be protected under criminal law.

Prof. Timothy Caulfield: Again, I'm going to try to dodge that bullet. This is a tremendously controversial area, and I know it has come up. I've actually had the opportunity to speak with Preston Manning on this issue in another context.

I think it would be dangerous for this committee, in addition to all the other challenging tasks it has before it, to take on the definition of when life begins. It has profound ramifications beyond just reproductive technologies. It affects maternal-fetal conflict issues, coercive treatment of women issues. It has broad implications, and I don't think it's necessary to engage that issue at this point, because I don't think many researchers are proposing taking embryos beyond 14 days. That said, I think it would be useful for Canada and other countries to explore this issue in a more comprehensive fashion and in another forum.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Okay.

The Chair: Thank you.

That was a half-hour bell, the clerk has told me, so we have time for Ms. Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Currently, as I understand it, if someone goes for in vitro fertilization, they produce several embryos, and once one works, often the others are allowed to die—I guess die is the word.

What I want to know is, if today someone is working on an embryo, where do these come from? Do they come from clinics that have done this? Do we have special clinics where people go in and donate for the cause of science? Where are the embryos that are being worked on today coming from?

• 1235

Mr. Jose Cibelli: One of the things you said is not quite correct. When you transfer embryos, the physician usually decides which is the one he wants to transfer, because of certain characteristics. The rest are frozen. They can be stored for many years.

Clinics have now accumulated so many of these embryos that they have to empty their tanks, if you will. They call the parents and say they are going to have to keep billing them or they are going to have to take care of things. They go to the clinic, take their embryos, and trash them, just put them in the trash. That's when they die. It could be three or four years after the procedure is done. Many of them ask if there's something they can do with them. Can they be used for research? Can we learn from these things in the laboratory? Right now some of the clients don't have that possibility, so they just keep trashing them. But it's at that moment that many of the parents come forward with a willingness to help research.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: So that's where the embryos are coming from.

Mr. Jose Cibelli: There is one difference. There was one article recently published in the U.S., North Carolina or somewhere around there, where they created embryos for research. That will go into a whole different ethical issue.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Yes, that does present a different ethical issue. From my perspective right now, we are looking at the choice between active and passive termination of these embryos. However, if in fact parents have to dispose of these embryos on their own, they're both active.

Mr. Jose Cibelli: The question goes back to why we have so many embryos in the first place, but that's different.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: No, I don't have a problem with that. As I say, if most of our embryos are coming from fertility clinics now, we can look at it as active or passive expiry of this tissue.

The Chair: Mrs. Beaumier, that's the big question we face ethically.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Yes, ethically. I won't comment. I'll leave my comments to the end. Right here and now I don't see a big problem with that. However, you never know what tomorrow may bring.

Ms. Janet Rossant: Although the issues about generating excess embryos in order to have excess embryos have been raised, I've been told that in most of the clinics that are associated with the tertiary care centres in this country, there aren't huge numbers of excess embryos. But they do exist. People are given various options. They are maintained in the freezer for several years, but at some point they do have to be discarded, because there are rules that say, if you keep them for too long, we can't guarantee that they are safe. There is the option of using them as embryos for other people to receive, or they can be used for research, and people are given those options. Otherwise, those embryos would be discarded.

The Chair: On behalf of the committee, I thank you very much for coming and making us think on another level of this whole discussion. I would also ask for your cooperation, should our researchers want to phone and ask you some questions about your opinions on certain things. They will be charged with writing our report, and if you would welcome their calls, I would be very appreciative of that.

Thank you for your time today, and thank you for your clarity.

For the members of the committee, the clerk informs me he has found a room for Monday evening at 7 p.m. It will be this room, 269, scheduled from 7 to 9. The minister and the Health officials will be here.

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On another matter, you'll all be aware that the private member's bill on genetically modified organisms failed to carry last night, and that pulls into play the letter that was distributed to you on Tuesday of this week. We don't have enough people to vote on whether we're going to adopt that project, so I would prefer to wait until Monday evening or Tuesday morning, depending on the turnout, to try to develop a consensus as to what response you want made to that letter. You all know the letter, it's been distributed. The clerk is going to bring extra copies for the next few meetings, so don't worry about digging it out, and we'll look at it at one of those meetings, when we have a quorum.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Madam Chair, are we going to examine other items as well?

The Chair: Not really. I just want to get a yes or a no on this.

I now declare this meeting adjourned.

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