FOPO Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, October 9, 2003

Á

1105

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins (Delta—South Richmond, Canadian Alliance))

Mr. Martin Grégoire (President, Local 2182, CAW-Canada)

Á

1110

Á

1115

Á

1120

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Michael Wing (National President, Union of Canadian Transportation Employees)

Á

1125

Á

1130

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Andy Burton (Skeena, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Michael Wing

Á

1135

Mr. Andy Burton

Mr. Michael Wing

Á

1140

Mr. Andy Burton

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Andy Burton

Mr. Michael Wing

Mr. John Fox (President, Local 80809, Union of Canadian Transportation Employees)

Mr. Andy Burton

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy (Matapédia—Matane, BQ)

Á

1145

Mr. Martin Grégoire

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

Mr. Martin Grégoire

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. John Fox

Á

1150

Á

1155

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Carmen Provenzano (Sault Ste. Marie, Lib.)

Mr. Michael Wing

Mr. Carmen Provenzano

Â

1200

Mr. Carmen Provenzano

Mr. Michael Wing

Mr. Carmen Provenzano

Mr. Martin Grégoire

Mr. Carmen Provenzano

Mr. Martin Grégoire

Â

1205

Mr. Carmen Provenzano

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Andy Burton

Mr. Michael Wing

Mr. Andy Burton

Mr. Michael Wing

Mr. Andy Burton

Mr. John Fox

Â

1210

Mr. Andy Burton

Mr. John Cummins

Mr. Martin Grégoire

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. John Fox

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Loyola Hearn (St. John's West, PC)

Mr. Michael Wing

Â

1215

Mr. Loyola Hearn

Mr. Michael Wing

Â

1220

Mr. John Fox

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. John Fox

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Georges Farrah (Bonaventure—Gaspé—Îles-de-la-Madeleine—Pabok, Lib.)

Mr. Martin Grégoire

Â

1225

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Georges Farrah

Â

1230

Mr. Martin Grégoire

Mr. Georges Farrah

Mr. Martin Grégoire

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Michael Wing

Mr. Georges Farrah

Mr. Michael Wing

Mr. Georges Farrah

Mr. Michael Wing

Mr. Georges Farrah

Mr. Michael Wing

Mr. Georges Farrah

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore)

Â

1235

Mr. John Fox

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Martin Grégoire

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. John Fox

Â

1240

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. John Fox

Mr. Martin Grégoire

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. John Fox

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. John Fox

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. John Fox

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. John Fox

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. John Fox

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Michael Wing

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Loyola Hearn

Mr. John Fox

Mr. Loyola Hearn

Mr. John Fox

Â

1245

Mr. Loyola Hearn

Mr. John Fox

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. John Fox

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. John Fox

Â

1250

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. John Fox

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Martin Grégoire

Mr. John Fox

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Â

1255

Mr. Michael Wing

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. John Fox

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins)

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans

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NUMBER 053

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Thursday, October 9, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Á  (1105)  

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins (Delta—South Richmond, Canadian Alliance)): I'll call the meeting to order.

    There is just one item that I will bring to the committee's attention before I address the witnesses. You'll see that a motion was served, but unless there is a full quorum present, we won't be able to deal with that motion, so we'll have to deal with it after the break.

    That being said, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee is continuing its comprehensive study of the Canadian Coast Guard. Our witnesses today are Mr. Michael Wing and Mr. John Fox of the Union of Canadian Transportation Employees, and Mr. Martin Grégoire of CAW Local 2182.

    Welcome, gentlemen. Each of the organizations will have approximately ten minutes for an opening statement, and then we'll have questions from members of the committee according to our established procedure.

    Mr. Grégoire.

    Mr. Martin Grégoire (President, Local 2182, CAW-Canada): Bonjour, tout le monde. Hello, everybody, members of the standing committee.

    First, I'd like to thank you for inviting us to make this presentation. We feel it's a unique opportunity to share our experience, views, and concerns with your committee.

    I'm sure you're aware that we had a presentation back in October 2001, which brought the committee to visit many communications and traffic services centres in just about every region across this country, and brought about excellent recommendations for MCTS and the coast guard in general. However, I must say that the government's response to the committee's recommendations was not so good, and we are still hoping that this committee may make things better for coast guard employees. This is why we are back before you today.

    CAW Local 2182 represents 325 coast guard and marine communications officers working in 22 marine communications and traffic services centres across Canada, from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific coast, including the St. Lawrence River, the Seaway, the Great Lakes, and the Arctic.

    Our members provide marine safety communications for safety of life at sea; regulate marine traffic to prevent collisions and to expedite shipping; and authorize ships to enter our waters for state security and to protect our sensitive marine environment. Being a very small organization, with only 325 members, our elected executive and board members are all coast guard marine communications and traffic services officers who are currently working for the coast guard and are well aware of internal problems.

    In the following pages I will go over the government's response to your recommendations, then comment on the MCTS strategic review.

    Your recommendation number one was restoring appropriate staffing levels. The coast guard or MCTS keeps hiring a few new MCTS employees every year. We do have many MCTS centres that are still understaffed, which is forcing regular employees to work excessive hours of overtime and to go without the required training. There is still a need for hiring more employees and for more training.

    The second part of recommendation number one was providing required training. Training is still being neglected. Training is the first thing to be eliminated when managers have to decide what will be cut because of underfunding; so underfunding is still a major problem, and training is always the first thing to go. The training problem appears to be more severe in the Pacific, Quebec, central, and Arctic regions, where it is worst. Somehow, Newfoundland and the maritimes region managed to find funding to provide the required training to the marine communications and traffic services officers.

    Part three of your recommendation number one was replacing outdated, unreliable equipment. I must say that the replacement of outdated and unreliable equipment appears to be moving on schedule. There appear to be some delays with needed improvements to working positions that are more or less ergonomic, which I believe is being caused by a strategic review, which is expected to take place over the next four years. So management is more or less waiting for the results of that review, before moving forward with some of the improvements that need to be done.

    As for ensuring the scheduled preventive maintenance of equipment, again there is very little change from two years ago. There is still very little preventive maintenance being done, and the situation is getting worse, with technicians no longer being available after regular working hours.

Á  (1110)  

Your recommendation number two was that action be initiated without delay to bring staffing levels up to a minimum of seven officers per position. The government disagreed with this recommendation, and felt that the existing 5.5 officers per position was adequate, or should be maintained. I must say that my members are still working excessive overtime hours to replace sick employees and employees on leave. Again, required training is not being provided, because they don't have the qualified employees to replace employees, or the overtime money to replace them.

    This union feels, based on the following facts, that over the last 10 to 15 years, there has been an increase in leave, be it parental or annual leave, lieu days hours, personal and volunteer days, and so on.... As opposed to regular day workers, shift workers must be replaced when on leave. Moreover, our members work excessive amounts of overtime. As a result of all these problems, working too much overtime and job-related stress, our members find themselves sick more frequently than average public service employees do. This has to do with the fact they are shift workers. I must say that in some regions, especially the Pacific region, some of our members find themselves working up to 84 hours per week, or seven shifts of twelve hours. This is clearly excessive.

    So based on this, we strongly recommend that the staffing factor be increased to seven officers per position, as per SCOFO recommendation number two. This would go forward a long way toward eliminating the overtime problem, and to making training much easier.

    Recommendation number three and four were to place a high priority on upgrading and modernizing equipment without delay, and that where equipment was located at remote or poorly accessible sites, it be duplicated so as to provide backup to reduce the risk of service blackouts. Again, these go back to technicians being no longer available after regular working hours. I must say that in most locations we do have good reliable equipment and backup equipment, but with technicians being no longer available after regular working hours, it means that if for some reason we lose some equipment used to answer distress calls, regulate marine traffic, or screen vessels entering our waters, and it becomes unavailable on a Friday night on a long weekend, it could be until Monday morning before a technician is available to fix the problem. When you provide essential safety services, the equipment you use to provide those services must be available. So, again, funding is needed for those technicians to be available to fix that essential safety equipment.

    Recommendation number five was that the technical services staffing levels be increased. There has been no increase in technical staff. Again, because of the funding problem, the situation is getting worse.

    Recommendation number six was that the mandate of the coast guard has to be enhanced to include a formal role in national security. We feel that MCTS is a key organization for national security. Long-range AIS and other technology must be made available to MCTS in order for us to fully play our role in national security. We strongly recommend that shore-based radar be installed in strategic locations for MCTS to fully play its role in keeping watch on those ships entering our waters, especially on the west and east coasts.

Á  (1115)  

    I would like to add that MCTS officers are proud coast guard employees and are prepared, with the required training, to do the work to enhance national security.

    In closing, I'll make a few comments on the MCTS strategic review. The strategic review was more or less the government response to the SCOFO recommendations. They are more or less saying it will solve all problems. We are very much concerned. Sure, their objectives are noble--which are to use available technology, to reduce cost, and to increase efficiency. We have nothing against those goals. But that review is taking place right now, and its implementation is planned over a four-year period, from 2004 to 2008. In clear terms, what it means is more than likely a reduction again in the number of centres, from 22 centres to 12.

    I must say that CAW is strongly opposed to further reducing the number of centres, which had already been reduced between 1995 and 1999 from 44 centres to 22, which resulted in $13.5 million in yearly savings. Somehow that doesn't appear to be enough, and somehow those moneys are gone--they disappeared--and we are still facing underfunding and understaffing.

    We believe there is a limit to the number of frequencies and noise that a human being can listen to. We believe there is a limit to the knowledge an employee may have of an extended geographical area. We believe there is a limit to the workload that a single employee can handle at any given time. We believe local presence and knowledge is important in order to provide adequate services, and we believe a reduced number of centres increases the risk of losing all communications over an extended geographical area, as opposed to a limited and smaller geographical area with many smaller centres, when facing major events like hurricanes, floods, ice storms, fires, or earthquakes.

    To summarize, the coast guard and MCTS need proper funding to have an adequate number of MCTS centres and the right number of employees to provide the required MCTS services for the safety of life at sea, protection of the environment, and state security.

    I must say, we are in the same situation as we were two years ago. Hopefully this committee's recommendations will somehow bring about changes to the coast guard in general and to MCTS.

    Thank you for listening.

Á  (1120)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Thank you very much, Mr. Grégoire.

    Mr. Wing, please.

    Mr. Michael Wing (National President, Union of Canadian Transportation Employees): Thank you.

    Good morning, Mr. Chairman and esteemed members of the committee. I want to begin by thanking you for the opportunity to make a presentation before the committee today.

    I'm Michael Wing, the national president of the Union of Canadian Transportation Employees. UCTE represents over 3,500 members within the Canadian Coast Guard.

    With me today is John Fox, the local president out of the Dartmouth-Halifax area. He's an employee of DFO and is currently on leave working with the Union of Canadian Transportation Employees.

    I'll make a brief presentation, and then both Mr. Fox and I will be available for any questions.

    The last time UCTE appeared in front of this committee, after the Auditor General had released his report, we hoped we would come back and say things have improved. Unfortunately, they clearly have not.

    In an effort to try to reduce costs, the department has embarked on a program to divest itself of properties, assets, and programs, such as marine aids, light stations, and bases. The various regions have jumped into alternative service delivery without following Treasury Board policy, such that there has been no focus on the achievement of results for Canadians. Moreover, there has been no evidence that it promotes discipline, due diligence, and value for money in the use of public funds. And finally, it does not ensure a citizen focus into program activities to test scrutiny in matters of prudence and probity.

    Further to this, the department has not followed its own policy, in that it has failed to gauge public interest and to review alternatives and options. The department has further refused to do a cost-benefit analysis, and it blatantly ignored the risk management of these essential services.

    Since the contracting out of services began in 2001, DFO has issued small buoy contracts, which has resulted in increased improper buoy maintenance and positioning. We estimate that this will lead to further chaos in the coming years as complaints and groundings increase and the department loses control of the service to the lowest bidder.

    Privatization is no longer based on service but rather on cost savings. DFO is ignoring its own risk management assessment and is simply steaming ahead blindly, hoping no one will notice how deep the cuts really are.

    Through the departmental assessment and alignment project, DFO is currently examining all its programming to ensure that its activities and resources are aligned with its mandated responsibilities. However, this means more cuts and reduction in service. DAAP was intended to help define coast guard deficiencies and assess needs, but it has turned into another budget-slashing exercise to meet requirements set out by the Manley cuts.

    Over the past 14 months, two high-profile incidents have highlighted the fact that these cuts not only affected programs that would be considered secondary, but those that go to the very core of what the coast guard stands for: search and rescue. The latest incident happened at Anticosti Island, where a distress call was sent out, and no one was there to respond. Two men drowned as a result of the lack of patrolling vessels in this area. The other tragic incident was the sinking of the Cap Rouge II in British Columbia. The cancellation of the dive team directly affected the ability of the coast guard to respond and react appropriately to the situation at hand.

    Right now we are setting ourselves up for another potential disaster, when the only remaining hovercraft in the Vancouver area will once again be taken out of commission for two weeks with inadequate backup provisions made. The fact that the region finds itself in this situation can only be put down to gross mismanagement, which is having a direct impact on the integrity of the SAR program and for which DFO management should be held directly responsible.

Á  (1125)  

    Today's coast guard is a result of the transfer of the coast guard to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans in 1995. The mistaken rationale for this merger from Transport Canada was that both departments dealt with maritime issues. It was expected that cost savings would incur if vessels from both departments were multi-tasked to various duties and by combining offices and ships on both the east coast and west coast. Unfortunately, the expected cost savings of $55 million per year never materialized. In fact, scant savings were achieved by combining the fleets, since most of the vessels in each fleet are specialized vessels.

    After 9/11 the coast guard received an additional $2 million for the fiscal year 2001-2002 and approximately $5 million for fiscal year 2002-2003 for additional patrolling days. This funding was not continued for fiscal year 2003-2004. The money received in 2002 was a pittance that allowed the coast guard to send out vessels that had been tied up as part of a cost-saving measure.

    During the same period, the United States coast guard saw their budgets increase from $5.7 billion in fiscal year 2002 to $7.3 billion in fiscal year 2003.

    Two years ago John Adams, the commissioner of the coast guard, appeared before this committee and stated that $350 million to $400 million was needed to renew and reinvigorate the fleet and a supplementary $100 million yearly for ongoing renewal. In the most current budget, the coast guard was allocated $94 million over the next two years for capital expenditures, a figure well short of what was needed. However, it was not allocated any new moneys for operations.

    The role of the coast guard is one of safety and general marine security of Canada's civilian fleet. DFO's mission has never dealt with safety or security.

    The rationale behind the 1995 merger was and continues to be fundamentally flawed and continues to have a serious effect on the morale and the capability within the coast guard.

    The coast guard has been identified through numerous audits and parliamentary reviews to be woefully lacking in its ability. In the 22nd report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, on October 23, 2001, on considering the report of the Auditor General of Canada, Mr. Desautel wrote that he was concerned about the number and the seriousness of the issues that had been found and stated that the need for action is urgent and well recognized.

    The services provided by the Canadian coast guard are of no small significance to Canada and the safety and security of its citizens and others travelling through its waters. Failure to resolve deficiencies is beyond contemplation.

    Even the latest presentation to this committee by the Auditor General's office indicated that the department has initiatives in the works but not enough funding to move past the planning stages. The term “coast guard” is a misnomer when used to describe our current services. Currently our ocean access is open to anyone with criminal intent. There are no patrols and no random inspections of the many vessels that sail our waters. One only has to look at the number of illegal aliens that have been caught on our shores, mostly by chance or when they are practically on our shores, and the admission by the RCMP that they intercept less than 5% of all illegal drug landings to recognize that we have little to no coastal security.

    The main focus of security has been on commercial activity in our ports, while thousands of miles of isolated coves and estuaries remain open for landings. Our own fishing fleet goes out daily into international waters and returns without any random security inspections. Commercial and recreational vessels sail our inner coastal waters daily without challenge.

Á  (1130)  

    A few weeks ago during a meeting held in St. John's, Newfoundland, John Butler, the regional director of the Newfoundland region for the coast guard, stated that despite the 30% reduction in budget, the coast guard was working better and more effectively than before. From the conference location, participants could clearly see two blocks away and across the harbour three coast guard vessels tied to the wharf, not out patrolling.

    UCTE believes the coast guard must be removed from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and that this should be done immediately. Jane's Defence Weekly recently gave a frightening account of the situation currently faced by the Canadian Armed Forces; however, many of the observations can be applied to the current situation of the Canadian Coast Guard. The Canadian Coast Guard is stretched, stressed, and insolvent. That's the good news. The bad news is that DFO is mortgaging the coast guard's future for its present.

    We would ask that this committee have the courage to stand up and confront senior managers of DFO who continue to claim all is well, when those on the front lines know this is not true. Chronic underfunding, overcommitment, and government neglect are causing irreversible damage to the Canadian Coast Guard. The service is poised on the brink of a downward slope toward irrelevancy if someone does not step in and say enough is enough.

    We've repeatedly stated that the coast guard is not a priority for DFO. This is no clearer than in the speech given by Minister Thibault to this committee, where out of the five initiatives, only one addressed the coast guard, and that, only briefly. We ask you to give serious consideration to removing the Canadian Coast Guard from the clutches of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and return it to its once proud state.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Thank you very much, Mr. Wing, for your very informative presentation, and thanks again to you, Mr. Grégoire.

    Will copies of your presentation be submitted for translation? I'm sure it would be helpful for the committee to have in its ongoing deliberations.

    I'm going to restrain myself from questioning, in my usual inquisitive and fair manner, and I'm going to turn it over to Mr. Burton, for ten minutes.

    Mr. Andy Burton (Skeena, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm sure you'll get your questions in at some point in time. I hope you do, because I know they'll be very relevant.

    The crux of the matter seems to be that you obviously feel the coast guard is under the wrong ministry. I have a bunch of other questions, but I think in summing up that seems to be the crux of the matter in your mind. Do you see it being returned to the Department of Transport or going to DND? Where do you think the coast guard really fits in the overall scheme of things in terms of dealing with national security and a possibly increased mandate due to the change in security issues and so on over the last few years? Where do you actually see the coast guard fitting in?

    Keep in mind that we are in the process of studying coast guard issues and have actually travelled fairly extensively looking at how the coast guard operates in other venues. What I'd like to hear for the committee's good is where do you think the coast guard fits in, and how do you think the overall mandate and operation should be adjusted, if you had your way?

    Mr. Michael Wing: Thank you, Mr. Burton.

    I have to admit this is not my area of expertise. I do have some thoughts on where the coast guard could be put. Certainly there's a fit with the coast guard and Transport Canada, where it came from. There's legislation that currently governs the activities of the coast guard that the Minister of Transport is actually responsible for. Marine safety is the responsibility of the transport minister. I do think a logical place for the coast guard would be back with Transport Canada. There's also the idea that the coast guard could become a special operating agency by itself.

    The strongest point I'd like to make is that wherever the coast guard goes, it needs to have proper funding, sustained funding, so it can carry out its mandate. It needs to be a priority within whatever structure it fits. The programs of the coast guard need to be a priority. The idea that the coast guard is but one of 17 different departmental priorities and is treated as such is not acceptable. It certainly hasn't proven to be in the best interests of the coast guard or the Canadian public, the people who depend on the services of the coast guard, where it's at right now.

Á  (1135)  

    Mr. Andy Burton: Thank you.

    If substantial or significant change were to be made to the overall view from government of what the coast guard should be doing, what is your group's opinion or thought as to what the coast guard should actually be doing? Should it be an increased mandate, more toward national security? Just putting money in is one thing; having adequate funding is one issue. Should the actual job description, the mandate of the coast guard, be expanded to go beyond what it's expected to do today, or should it be revised in some other manner?

    Mr. Michael Wing: I'll start by saying, Mr. Burton, that a couple of weeks ago the Union of Canadian Transportation Employees made a presentation to the Senate's defence and national security committee. That presentation certainly supported the increased role relating to national security that the committee is currently looking at. We think it's a logical fit.

    The coast guard, when they're out patrolling, are eyes out on the water right now. They do not have the ability to approach vessels they have concern with. They have to call in other agencies, whether it be calling the RCMP or bringing in fisheries officers to climb aboard and do an investigation. I think that needs to be changed. It can be changed so that role is given to the coast guard, so that an expanded role is given to the coast guard.

    The one thing I did say in front of the committee, and the one thing I would caution the members of this committee about, is I think on the surface it may seem that a fit for the coast guard might be the Department of National Defence. I strongly caution people about making the same mistakes that we made a few years back. It's not as simple as just identifying programs that have ships and vessels, and marrying them, because it might seem, at least on the surface, that similar work is being done.

    I think you really have to understand, and maybe with the amount of work this committee has done--and I thank the committee for focusing on the issue of the coast guard--I think maybe it has an appreciation for the fact that the coast guard is a civilian fleet. It has been a civilian fleet since its inception, and to introduce this fleet into a military hierarchy or environment would be a very serious mistake.

    I'm sure if you talk to people--you're going to be interviewing people--coast guard people are very proud of the work they do. Part of that pride is based in the fact that they are a civilian fleet. They're there to assist and help people who are in need and deal with very significant security concerns.

    I don't know, Mr. Burton, if that answers your question with regard to where the coast guard might fit in.

    Should there be something to the effect of a homeland security? I've heard some talk around town among various circles that that's being discussed, modelled after what's happening in the United States. I really haven't completely worked that one through. I certainly think that the coast guard, if it were in a separate operating agency and part of a homeland security body, could function as a separate entity, maintaining many of the roles it currently is providing, especially in the area of public safety and navigational aids.

Á  (1140)  

    Mr. Andy Burton: Do I have any more time?

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Yes, a couple of minutes.

    Mr. Andy Burton: I have a question then to sum up.

    For the clarification of the committee, I think what I'm hearing is that you want to see the coast guard removed from DFO, but possibly with an expanded role in terms of dealing with maybe fisheries issues on the high seas, interdiction of vessels on the high seas. It seems to me that if the coast guard vessel is out there and there's a problem, by the time you get a naval vessel or an RCMP vessel, or whatever, things are going to change. Do you see a duplicate or triplicate role there in terms of what you can actually do when you're on the high seas?

    To expand on that a little bit, we just came back from visiting some other countries, and in some of those countries their vessels have overlapping roles and the crews actually do that. Do you see that as a coast guard expanded role?

    Mr. Michael Wing: Mr. Burton, I'm going to ask John to answer that.

    Mr. John Fox (President, Local 80809, Union of Canadian Transportation Employees): Yes, we do see that as an expanded role. Actually, we have had armed boarding parties for issues like controlling the foreign fishing fleets off Newfoundland, basically a combination of coast guard officers and fisheries officers. That point was not missed by the security committee. Exactly, we are out there; we should have the mandate to intercept, to do casual inspections, and to deal with any kind of criminal activity on the high seas. Just change the mandate.

    The issue came up of arming the vessels or building new vessels to meet that need. We don't envision building more ships for use by the Canadian Coast Guard. Light arms, as has been proven in the past, is all we need to do those types of interceptions. Yes, we see that as something we can do, and we have no opposition to bringing that element into the coast guard.

    Mr. Andy Burton: Presumably, with adequate training and funding.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Thank you, Mr. Burton.

    Mr. Roy.

[Translation]

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy (Matapédia—Matane, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    In summary, if I understand correctly, you are saying that the Coast Guard has been underfunded for years now. Basically, you have never benefited from the savings that have been made. You are also saying that the Coast Guard is an organization that is being ignored by Fisheries and Oceans, to all intents and purposes. You are saying that operationally speaking, the Coast Guard has almost reached the breaking point. You do not have enough staff and—I will come back to this later—Coast Guard officers are sick more often than public service employees because they do too much overtime. You probably have some statistics in this regard.

    The commissioner and some representatives from the Auditor General's office came to meet with us last week and told us that according to them the Coast Guard was a completely unmanageable organization because there are four organizations in Canada that do not at all function in the same way. They felt that the solution would be to create a single organization and to have the same standards everywhere, whether in the west or in the east, so that the Coast Guard Commissioner could have at his disposal all of the information that would allow him to manage the Canadian Coast Guard properly. The commissioner stated that he still did not have this information at this time and that he will only have it next spring.

    Do you think that this type of reorganization would really have an impact, in light of what I have said and of what you have said? As long as we do not make further investments in the Coast Guard and hire personnel, no matter what reorganizations take place, nothing will change. Operations may be improved, but the basic problems will not be resolved. Is that a fair summary of what you have said and of what you wanted us to understand?

Á  (1145)  

    Mr. Martin Grégoire: Mr. Roy, I think that you have summarized the gist of the matter. Indeed, as long as we do not obtain the necessary funds to operate the Coast Guard properly, administrative changes will not in and of themselves resolve the problems.

    I think that the Coast Guard must indeed have similar or identical standards in each of the country's regions. That is very important.

    Yes, I believe administrative changes could greatly contribute to improving the functioning of the Coast Guard, but there must also be additional funds so that we can hire the required number of employees and purchase adequate equipment, as well as ensure its renewal as the need arises.

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: In fact, you are saying that the Coast Guard has reached the breaking point with regard to the services it provides. You are certainly basing such statements on important elements of information. We have heard about officers who are sick more often than employees in the public service; you must certainly have statistics in that regard.

    When you say that you have reached the breaking point, are you referring to public security or to all of the services provided by the Coast Guard? At this time, in what area is the Coast Guard close to the breaking point? Would it be search and rescue? Security?

    Mr. Martin Grégoire: I think that all divisions of the Coast Guard have reached the breaking point. For years budgets have been cut in all divisions and all sections. About a month ago, there was talk of closing Marine Communications and Traffic Services centres in Iqaluit and Inuvik, in the Arctic. There was talk about closing them a month ago because of a lack of money for operations.

    Fortunately, the employees and the unions managed to get through to those who wanted to do that. That is one example of the state of MCTSs. Michael could also surely talk to you about the vessels of the Coast Guard that are staying in their berths rather than going out to sea and patrolling. You could say similar things about each division. We have reached the breaking point because for years now there have been multiple cuts in operations and we never have the necessary funds to do what needs to be done.

    Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: I would like to ask one last question, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): I think Mr. Fox might want to comment on that as well.

    Mr. John Fox: I'd like to speak briefly on the issue of the five coast guards. That's an historical problem. I joined the coast guard in 1984, and that problem has existed for some time.

    Actually, an attempt was made to straighten that issue out by John Thomas, the previous Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard, in the early 1990s. He started a project of internal review. I think we actually got down to the superintendent level nationally and what the organization was going to do, how it was going to be balanced, to iron out those regional differences. Naturally, there are regional differences in program delivery, for instance, in ice breaking, and the Maritimes has many more buoys than central and Arctic, so there are a number of issues.

    John Thomas also proposed to take us to a special operating agency. He said before we could do that we had to get our house together internally, and that's when that coast guard reorganization took place. In 1995 we were slammed in with the fish people and that project went out the window.

    I agree, we do have to get back to standardizing our programs and procedures. It was identified by the Auditor General. It is one of the problems within the coast guard.

    The things we're seeing now are basically that the five regions operate based on whatever they can get from Fisheries and Oceans, whatever the current budget allocations are. I could show you some of the documents, and I'll pass them around.

    This is the Maritimes vessel deployment plan. If you look at this plan--it's brightly coloured--I want you to particularly look at the lay-up periods that are identified here for coast guard vessels. Our fleet has already been cut by 50%. These existing vessels that are here also have mandatory lay-up periods, as you can see. So our capacity to do search and rescue, which is outlined here in the yellow, basically is two large vessels and another part-time large vessel. These are large ocean-going vessels, 1100-class vessels. The department is more and more dependent on the small inshore cutters, four-man crew cutters, which really don't even have the space to take on a full crew of an ocean-going tanker or cargo ship, as an example. They do have a 250-mile range, but that's where we feel that SAR has been compromised.

    This other document I'm going to give you is another copy of the Maritimes vessel deployment plan, but what you can see here is that these are science vessels; these are not coast guard vessels. I suppose you could say they're all coast guard, but these are science activity vessels that are fully operational throughout the year, with one brief lay-up period for two of them. Again, this document outlines search and rescue vessels in the cutter stage, coast guard vessels, and again you can see the lay-up period in purple. So when we talk about services depleting and our ability to deliver the coverage, it's not there.

    The other thing we were just given recently was the Maritimes 2003-2004 budget allocation documentation. This outlines another $4.8 million hit to the coast guard in the Maritimes region--part of the “Manley moneys”, as we call it. Of interest in this document is the unfunded priorities list, things like oil and gas, fisheries management, sustainable aquaculture, real property management. There is no money for these activities. For the coast guard it's the same thing; there's no money for ships, no money for things like computers. Employees are being told to turn in their cellphones. We're down now to really scraping the barrel on office supplies, with no new furniture; that's the shape of the coast guard at this point in time.

    As far as other cuts that have occurred are concerned, this document I'll give you is the planned fleet services delivery for 2002-2003. Basically what they've done is reduce the total number of cycles of the ships from 28 to 9. So our very presence on the water has been restricted by two-thirds. On the one hand, we're talking to you about increasing the coast guard presence and having us out there to do the job, but in fact what's happening under Fisheries is we're being cut more and more. Our presence is being lessened as we speak.

    Some of the other issues that we feel are compromising the services of the coast guard are the privatization of the navaids programs. Don't get us wrong, we're not against contracting out in all cases. We've always contracted out buoys, stakes, and bushes, usually in small inlet areas that were better serviced by the fishermen, but now we're talking about contracting out all aids.

    The technology they've chosen, plastic buoys--I'll pass around these photos here--will show you that this technology has not been proven. We're wasting a lot of money on it. We've had steel buoys in the system since 1915 and have had no problems with them.

Á  (1150)  

    We're moving to technology that's extremely questionable. The next effort by the coast guard is to remove all sound buoys--that means landfall buoys, bells, and whistles. The reason for that is if they can eliminate the need for sound, then they can just put out a small plastic buoy. It's all predicated on costs and not service to the user groups.

    Basically, that's how we feel about where the services are going and what's falling apart.

    There are a number of contradictions in the way they're delivering the service as well. I'll pass you a contract document that shows we paid $37,000 to paint eight buoys in Saint John--and we're supposed to be in a cost-saving mode. We have a base in Saint John with spray-painting and sandblasting facilities, but the department is hell-bent on contracting regardless of the cost. We just heard in Dartmouth base two weeks ago about them paying $15,000 to do two buoys, yet we have a facility there that's capable of delivering those services.

    Again, it needs closer insight. It needs an independent third-party review to see what's actually going on at the front-line level.

Á  (1155)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Thank you very much, Mr. Fox. Certainly the information you provided the committee this morning is the subject for a meeting in itself. I know I'm going to go over the documents with relish. Perhaps we'll have to contact you later to get answers to some questions.

    Mr. Provenzano.

    Mr. Carmen Provenzano (Sault Ste. Marie, Lib.): I have just a couple of questions. I think the gist of one of the presentations was that there would be some agreement to enhance or produce a formal role in national security. I think what I'm hearing is that you look forward to that role for the coast guard. At the same time we're saying, “Well, DND is really not a fit”.

    The mandate or function of DND is national security. If it's not a fit in terms of an organizational structure, you have to presume that if you have a role in national security there has to be some kind of integration. How do you see, being outside of DND...? I heard your comments about a homeland security arrangement, but do you have any thoughts on how that could...?

    Mr. Michael Wing: What we're talking about is maritime and coastal security. We have customs officers who man our borders. They are an integral part of national security, but they're not part of National Defence. The RCMP has broad powers in the area of security of the country, and it's not part of National Defence. The coast guard and its role in coastal security could certainly continue to exist, along with its current roles, outside of National Defence. Just because it's national security or there's a security component to it doesn't necessarily mean it needs to be under National Defence.

    Another part of security is CATSA, the airport security agency. There are many organizations in the country that are responsible for or have some component of national security that aren't necessarily under National Defence.

    Mr. Carmen Provenzano: I'd like to give you some comfort and assurance that the comments you're making here are not falling on deaf ears, at least in terms of what this committee might recommend on organizational structure.

    The three members opposite, three other members, and I--a total of seven members--toured four countries and looked into their coast guard operations. Those countries included Great Britain, Norway, and Iceland. We found variations in structure. One of the interesting things was that we were down there studying them and we found out that they were studying us.

    A voice: How not to do it.

  (1200)  

    Mr. Carmen Provenzano: Well, not necessarily. I think we have some respect in those countries.

    I just want to make the comment that your presentation really did not contain the comments you eventually made. You said you needed to get out of the clutches of DFO. I assume from your use of that terminology--and from the other things you said--that this is a desperate situation, and this committee should look as seriously as it can to make the recommendation to somehow get you away from DFO. Am I correct?

    Mr. Michael Wing: Sir, you're absolutely correct. This has been a desperate situation for some time. I don't know if anybody's had an opportunity to make an unofficial visit to some of our vessels. It's amazing how nice and tidy things can be when they're officially organized. I would encourage you to try to schedule an unofficial visit, and you will hear that firsthand from the people in the coast guard. I suggest you wouldn't have to go to many places to hear it. It is a desperate situation.

    Mr. Carmen Provenzano: You're talking to one member of Parliament who lost his coast guard presence. I'm from Sault Ste. Marie, and there was some rationalization that went on there.

    Just on the topic of overtime, how is that compensated? Is it in money or time off in lieu of money? Is there a standard for that?

    Mr. Martin Grégoire: It can be either one.

    Mr. Carmen Provenzano: You're supporting the recommendation that the staffing be increased to seven officers per position. You make a point that there's a tremendous amount of overtime. However you're compensated for it, whether it's in time off or in dollar amounts, are you able to make a financial case? Is it going to be a wash? If we have the seven officers per position, can you make a case that if we're not paying the overtime or giving the time off it's going to be a wash, that there won't necessarily be a huge increased cost to go to that higher staffing level?

[Translation]

    Mr. Martin Grégoire: I think it has been demonstrated that for an organization it is less costly to pay for overtime than to hire new employees. This has been the practice at the Coast Guard for years now. Rather than hiring additional employees, the Coast Guard pays for overtime. In this way, it does not have to pay for annual leave, pensions, and all of the other costs associated with new employees.

    This is all done to the detriment of the health of Coast Guard employees, of the Marine Communications and Traffic Services officers. They are asked to do overtime to an unreasonable extent and this has been going on for a very long time. The current result is that the employees are exhausted, their morale has hit bottom, and they are often ill because of all these overtime hours they have to put in.

    Because of all that, the situation must change. We must increase the number of employees per work station. The figure of 5.5 has been the standard used for a very long time, and no one has taken into account the important changes that have taken place, among others the number of holidays that have increased over the years.

    Another result we are having to deal with on daily basis is that we do not have the employees or the necessary budgets to provide the employees we do have with the training they need. If the number of employees per work station is increased from 5.5 to 7, this will allow us to provide the necessary training without having to force the employees who are not on training to do even more overtime to replace staff that has gone for training.

    I think that this concept has not yet been understood. The employee who works in an office from 9 to 5, from Monday to Friday, is not replaced when he goes on leave, is sick or is absent for training. One thing is certain, when he returns, he has to face surplus work. In our continuous operations, for instance in search and rescue, or in a Marine Communications and Traffic Services centre, when an employee is absent on annual leave, on sick leave or on training, we have to replace him. Thus, we need additional human resources to replace him, or employees who do overtime.

    Resorting to overtime has been done for a long time and leads to a vicious cycle. I think that we have to get out of it by hiring new employees precisely to allow Coast Guard employees to have a normal life and to be able to take the training they need.

  (1205)  

[English]

    Mr. Carmen Provenzano: Merci.

    Those are my questions, Mr. Chair.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Thank you, Mr. Provenzano.

    Mr. Burton.

    Mr. Andy Burton: Thank you.

    One of the things it always comes down to at the end of the day is money. You mentioned--and we heard this when Mr. Adams was here--that $300 million or $400 million was needed to bring things up to snuff, plus an extra $100 million a year to get the coast guard on some sort of decent footing.

    In your opinion, are those dollar figures in the range of what's required, or do you see something different? I guess the two options are staying with DFO or moving somewhere else, but either way the money is always going to be an issue.

    Mr. Michael Wing: I think the $350 million to $400 million you referred to is what is needed to bring the fleet up to the operation standards we feel are required. The coast guard has recognized that's the type of investment needed just to bring the current fleet up to standard. Then ongoing capital investment of approximately $100 million a year is required to maintain that fleet, so we don't get to the point we're at right now.

    Also required is additional funding for operations. You can have vessels that are functional but tied to the dock because there's not enough money for them to operate, or not enough money for fuel. It's an incredibly sad statement of how bad things are within the coast guard when a vessel doesn't even have enough money for fuel.

    Mr. Andy Burton: We've certainly heard that in the past, and it is obviously a big concern.

    In terms of operating funding, then, what sort of percentage increase would be required?

    Mr. Michael Wing: I'm depending to a certain degree upon the figures the department has provided. If I remember correctly, ongoing operations would require about another $60 million a year annually for operations.

    You have to take a look at what's happening gradually and, I would say, ever more rapidly as the deterioration goes on. The more deteriorated the service is, the more it takes to bring it up to standard. Currently we're not able to fulfill the mandate the coast guard is there to do right now. The decision that needs to be made is, are we going to ask the coast guard to do the mandate it is currently required to do? To continue to underfund it to the extent it has been underfunded is a recipe for disaster, as we're seeing.

    Mr. Andy Burton: Thank you.

    I have to ask this question because we've heard a bit about it in the last little while. Has there been any direction to any of your members that you're aware of where, if they're approached by or have discussions with a member of Parliament, they're to fill out some sort of form and forward it? Can you elaborate on that a little bit?

    Mr. John Fox: Yes, it recently happened in our region. It's been an ongoing problem, where our members are told, you're not to speak to your MPs.

    We have some long-term term employees who are facing layoff and who indicated they wanted to talk to their MPs about the situation in the coast guard. They were told they couldn't do this; they would have to fill out a form. There has been some intimidation around the form. When the department was challenged with it locally, it backed down and said no, anybody who talks to an MP has to fill this out as a matter of course; we want accurate information.

    We've been adamant that we'll talk to any elected member, whether it's the member of Parliament or the MLA. We say, that's your right and we'll stand on that and back you on that. Yes, that is part of the democratic process.

    So we have seen it, and we've seen intimidation of union officials as well, myself being one of them, for political activities around the coast guard, namely starting an SOS campaign, talking to MPs, and speaking in front of committees. That's the nature of the style of management we see.

  (1210)  

    Mr. Andy Burton: Thank you. I just wanted to clarify that for the record.

    Mr. John Cummins: Mr. Grégoire.

    Mr. Martin Grégoire: I just want to add that our members were also asked to fill out a form whenever they talked to their MP, and that happened in the central and arctic regions. We told them this is a free country, and whenever you want to speak to your MP, go right ahead and do it; your employer cannot direct you on what to do or ask you when and where you talked to your MP or what you talked about.

    That's it.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Mr. Fox, do you want to comment as well?

    Mr. John Fox: I should clarify that. In some areas, such as the Navigable Waters Protection Act, where there are ministerial inquiries or things of a nature that require employees to respond, MPs may call or whatever and we don't see that as a problem; it's accepted in that part of the organization. But we do not accept it with our ships' crews or any of our other workers. There are cases where the department does need to prepare a proper response, and that's where that form comes in, but it's not for casual conversations with our MPs.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Mr. Hearn.

    Mr. Loyola Hearn (St. John's West, PC): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    I just have a couple of questions. One is in relation to lighthouses. We hear a lot about lighthouses and the commission changing over to a mechanical system. What is your own view on that? Do you agree with mechanization, and are there specific lighthouses in specific locations that perhaps should continue to be manned for safety's sake?

    Mr. Michael Wing: Mr. Hearn, I'm not able to speak to specifics on particular stations. What I will say is that I and our organization strongly believe we need to maintain the staffing levels for the remaining lighthouses. While I recognize that it would be seen to be very self-serving of our organization to take that position, I invite you to ask the people who use the services of these lighthouses, who have taken very strong positions and who have insisted that the remaining lighthouses remain staffed. They feel very strongly that this is a safety issue, and I would encourage the members to speak to some of those groups. There have been a number who are on record with that position, and I'd be happy to provide a list of who those individuals are.

    I know the Auditor General particularly singled out lighthouses in her last report. Previous ministers can certainly speak to how important and emotional an issue this is for the people in the communities that depend upon these services. I don't know if the Auditor General had an opportunity to talk to those people. While it's no secret that this program has been on the chopping block for a long period of time, there have been decisions made because the communities have insisted that those services remain.

    But with regard to specific light stations, I can't give you any details at this meeting, but there are very few light stations that are manned relative to what the case was before. I know the process that's been followed in order to destaff was that where there was a higher requirement or a higher need, those ones remained staffed.

  (1215)  

    Mr. Loyola Hearn: Thank you very much for that.

    You mentioned earlier that you didn't think the Department of Fisheries and Oceans was the best home for the coast guard. Having looked at other areas ourselves, I think we agree with that, but wherever your home is, unless you're properly funded, it's not going to make a difference. But some departments seem more natural. Again, during our visit to Norway in particular, we saw that the coast guard there is under the defence department. Not only is there very close coordination, but the coast guard seems to have a much higher profile than it has here in Canada.

    I don't know whether you heard Elsie Wayne's comments in the House yesterday, when she said the Toronto Maple Leafs have spent more on defence this year than the Canadian government. I'm not sure whether that's the home for you either.

    If Fisheries and Oceans isn't the proper fit, where do you see it? Would it be Defence? It was in Transport, but I don't think that really worked well. Would it perhaps be tied in with our defence, perhaps with more emphasis on security, etc., as we see particularly in Norway but I'm sure in other countries, Scotland in particular?

    The coast guard plays a very important role in protecting our coasts, which is really what it's supposed to do in relation to pollution, particularly with respect to oil traffic off the coast. Nowhere is there greater concern right now than in the Placentia Bay area in Newfoundland, which I represent, where we have large tankers from all over coming into the bay to Come By Chance and going out again. All it takes is one little slip-up and we'll have a major ecological disaster.

    Where do you see yourselves and why? Do you see more specific attention being given to you with more recognition and more strength by being part of another department?

    Mr. Michael Wing: I'll deal with the one issue concerning where we belong, and then I'm going to ask John to touch base on the environmental issue you've raised.

    Mr. Hearn, being a die-hard Senators fan, the idea of us being part of the Maple Leafs just wouldn't work.

    As I mentioned earlier, the Canadian Coast Guard is a civilian fleet. I think we made the mistake a few years ago of just assuming that we could plug an organization into another organization and it would be a natural fit—“Ship, ships, hey, we've got something here, and this has to work”. I would really caution against making the mistakes we've made in the past by putting it into National Defence. The coast guard is a civilian fleet; the culture of the civilian fleet is very different from that of a military fleet. I have heard there are people within National Defence who really don't want the coast guard, in part because they think that two grossly underfunded projects wouldn't work either.

    Certainly, if the coast guard's role were expanded to include security, as is being looked at, I firmly believe those security functions could be done outside of National Defence. There are other bodies performing security functions within Canada that aren't attached to National Defence.

    Where it belongs is Transport Canada. If things weren't great there, they sure look great now. There is some legislative sense in tying it to Transport Canada, if the Minister of Transport is responsible for marine safety, and I think that in part is why the coast guard was part of Transport Canada once upon a time. Or a possibility as well is the idea of it being its own separate operating agency. It has been mentioned here that whatever happens, an investment needs to be made in the coast guard; it's not just a matter of leaving the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, but a significant investment would need to be made into this program.

    From that point of view, I hope I addressed your questions.

    John can certainly speak to the environmental issues.

  (1220)  

    Mr. John Fox: I'll refer to this document here, which is the national marine program's performance report for 2001-2002, where the department does a number of its own internal assessments. It's very questionable, as I think a number of these program activities should be done objectively by a third party to validate the information.

    It says here that the coast guard maintains a considerable preparedness capacity. We would argue that we've seen the rescue, safety, and environmental response groups whittled down to practically nothing. I think we now have two full-time staff in the Strait of Canso, and we're bringing large single-hulled tankers into that facility practically on a daily basis.

    It says here that we acted as a federal monitoring officer, monitoring polluters 409 times, and we were the on-scene commanders 288 times. What the coast guard has come to depend on is the private sector mopping up its own spills—if in fact you catch the private sector doing that.

    How well does this work? I guess you'd have to analyse the raising of the Irving Whale and who actually paid for that. How much funding did we actually get out of that fund, and what would happen if you had a large spill by a foreign-flagged vessel from Liberia, or wherever, which had run aground off the tip of Cape Breton?

    Again, it's risk management, which we don't think the department has effectively looked at. We don't train people any more to the extent that we did. Everybody in the coast guard used to know how to clean up a pollution spill at one time, even the people who worked in the shops back in the eighties. Not today. We're very limited in our capability to respond.

    Also this booklet says that “Between 74% and 88% of observed oil spill incidents cannot be attributed to a specific source and are considered mystery spills.” In other words, we have pollutants going into the environment all the time. We're not there to watch it; sometimes it's reported or recorded, and we don't know who the polluter was and we don't know where it goes. That's going on continuously in Canadian waters.

    Again, the coast guard doesn't have the resources to go out to adequately investigate and pursue or take care of these issues. That's one branch of the organization that needs a hard look, either by the Auditor General's group or somebody, to exactly evaluate what its capacity is.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Thank you.

    Did you say that 80% of the spills can't be traced?

    Mr. John Fox: It says “Between 74% and 88% of observed oil spill incidents cannot be attributed to a specific source and are considered mystery spills.”

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Thank you.

    Thank you, Mr. Hearn.

    Mr. Farrah.

[Translation]

    Mr. Georges Farrah (Bonaventure—Gaspé—Îles-de-la-Madeleine—Pabok, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to welcome you to the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, Mr. Grégoire. You mentioned that several Marine Communications and Traffic Services centres were closed for a certain length of time. Are you under the impression that the Coast Guard wants to close other centres or that it is in the process of identifying other centres that could eventually be closed? If that is the case, were you involved in that process or at least consulted?

    Mr. Martin Grégoire: The answer is yes. The fundamental principle of the strategic review is to use available technology to become more effective at a lesser cost. The union was consulted from the inception of the strategic review project and each region prepared different scenarios that would allow us to provide more effective service at a lower cost. These scenarios ranged from the status quo to reducing the number of Marine Communications and Traffic Services centres down to one per region.

    Let consider the regions one by one. In the Newfoundland region, I think that the most plausible option would be to have two centres, one on the east coast and one on the west coast. I could review all of the regions in this way with you. It seems that they are seriously considering reducing everything so as to only have two centres per region. That would mean that two or three centres would close in each region. Our union and its members are deeply concerned by that. This would mean that we would lose the presence of Coast Guard Marine Communications and Traffic Services in several areas. In some regions, they make an important economic contribution. I'm thinking for instance of Rivière-au-Renard in Gaspé, Goose Bay, or St. Anthony in Newfoundland. I could add Prince Rupert on the west coast, Thunder Bay in the central region, the Arctic, and so on and so forth. It is important that we be present in certain regions. It allows employees to be more aware of the local needs of Canadians, and these centres also make a significant economic contribution in these remote regions.

    Following the reduction we experienced between 1995 and 1999, when the number of centres went from 44 to 22, several of our members had to move to remain employed. All of our members had to undergo training that lasted approximately three months at the Canadian Coast Guard College in Sydney, in addition to local training which varied according to the centre or the place they were working in. This training lasted three, four, eight, nine or twelve months. This means that we lost input at the local level. Although no decision has yet been made, we have heard talk of reducing the number of Marine Communications and Traffic Services centres from 22 to approximately 12. This would mean asking employees who are already overburdened to put in an additional effort, while they are already being required to provide more and more communications and marine traffic services. Often, we must respond to several important calls simultaneously, be they requests for assistance or requests for information. Often, there is noise during the summer months, from June to September. There are a lot of recreational vessels, among others in the Prescott, Comox or Montreal regions. Our Marine Communications and Traffic Services officers must exhibit a great deal of professionalism to ensure that they don't miss any calls for help. I think that further reducing the number of centres and asking these employees to listen to more frequencies coming from more remote sites represents a very big risk. Someone is going to have to shoulder some of the responsibility for the possible loss of human lives or ship collisions that could occur among ships going to Port Hawkesbury or elsewhere in the country; you should also anticipate enormous costs for the cleanups that will be needed following such collisions.

  (1225)  

    I think that we really have to look at the pros and cons of a new reduction in the number of Marine Communications and Traffic Services centres. I think that there are great risks involved.

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): You have another minute.

[Translation]

    Mr. Georges Farrah: What we also hear is what the marine industry raised when it testified before the committee a little earlier. It said it might be a good thing for the Coast Guard to undergo a technological modernization. It might acquire all kinds of new equipment.

    Let me give you an example. On the St. Lawrence River, the Coast Guard is trying to implement an electronic navigation system and to reduce the number of buoys in order to better fulfil its own mandate. This does, after all, involve ship safety and nautical safety. This could have an impact on personnel. What do you think about this potential technological modernization?

    Secondly, since I don't have much time, I would like to go back to a point Mr. Wing mentioned earlier. I want to be very clear. You referred to the tragic incident at Anticosti Island. You may not have gone so far as to say this, but I want to make sure: if there were casualties or drownings, was it because of a lack of Coast Guard personnel?

    I think it is important that we send a message to the population so that it knows that it is not true that when there is a disaster, the Coast Guard and the Department of National Defence cannot react quickly enough to guarantee the safety of the individuals involved. Here, I have the chronology of events at Anticosti Island. At 10:18 a.m. on September 29 a call came in from the vessel in distress and five ships were sent out on site, as well as two helicopters and a Hercules plane. From 10:18 a.m. to 11 o'clock, everything was done that could be done. Unfortunately, only the captain was saved, and two other sailors died. But there were seven-meter waves there, and 50-knot winds.

    Thirty or thirty-five minutes after the call came in, people were already there and the only living person left was rescued. Five ships, two helicopters and an airplane were sent out. I don't want to say that the situation is easy for the Coast Guard, but I think that we should not alarm people by saying that the government is not shouldering its responsibilities. If we can improve things, all the better, but I think that we have to be clear and not use data that are inaccurate, in my opinion, to frighten people. I'm not saying that you did that, but I felt a need to clarify things, because this is an important message we are sending out, especially to the people who work in the marine field.

  (1230)  

    Mr. Martin Grégoire: First, I'd like to answer your question on technology. Our union is strongly in favour of new technology that will help ensure better marine safety and better protect human life at sea. Even if in the long term this may have an impact on the number of employees, we think that we have to use available technology and new technology if it allows us to do better, more effective work.

    Mr. Georges Farrah: And also to provide relief to your employees, probably.

    Mr. Martin Grégoire: Exactly, yes.

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Mr. Wing, please.

    Mr. Michael Wing: I just want to briefly speak to the point.

    I understand the point you're making. What is unclear from the information you've provided is how many of those were coast guard vessels.

[Translation]

    Mr. Georges Farrah: Wilfred Templeman, Louisbourg and E.P. Le Québécois.

[English]

    Mr. Michael Wing: Did the department provide that information to you?

    Mr. Georges Farrah: Yes.

    Mr. Michael Wing: I have not seen that. I would be very happy to take a look at it, and I promise I will get back to you in response.

    Mr. Georges Farrah: Just for clarification.

    Mr. Michael Wing: I think there will be clarification provided, but I've not seen that particular document.

    Mr. Georges Farrah: I'd appreciate it.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): I think it would be interesting as well, Mr. Farrah, if you could provide that to the committee, if that's possible, please.

    We could come back to you, Mr. Farrah, if you have something to add, as there should be some time.

    Mr. Stoffer, please.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    As my colleague Loyola said, we question whether certain areas should be within a certain department. I sometimes question whether fisheries management should be in DFO, because in my opinion, they're not doing a very good job of that either.

    I guess the frustration I have begs the question, does Canada really want to have a coast guard?

    My concern, of course, is when you present receipts like this: $37,000 of our taxpayers' money to do eight bell buoys. In your opinion, Mr. Fox, how much would this have cost us if it had been done in-house?

  (1235)  

    Mr. John Fox: I would estimate several hundred dollars per buoy would probably be the total cost.

    The problem with this concept is that, again getting back to the five coast guards, in the Maritimes we have a rationale that was used by the regional director of the coast guard that says the savings on the contracting out of buoys wouldn't necessarily be there. However, if you look at the fact that they don't have to build a new paint facility or when they relocate to BIO to service these buoys, then that makes all the sense in the world.

    In other words, we don't have the money to do it. We can't build a new facility, so we're going to contract them all out.

    I'll pass around that e-mail from the regional director of the coast guard.

    The thing we challenged in there was that there are no off-ramps in any of these programs. If the contracting doesn't work and the costs escalate, you now have no backup. You have no facilities.

    In Newfoundland and the Pacific region, they built new facilities. They built brand-new buoy-servicing facilities. They're carrying out the work, and their contracting out isn't as escalated as in the Maritimes. Why? That's what we're asking ourselves.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Monsieur Grégoire, on your concern regarding our MCTS people, we thank you for your clarification on our recommendations.

    One of the things I'm convinced of is that in order for the coast guard to meet maybe its obligation to some of our recommendations, if you eliminate a lot of the centres....

    Right now, the staffing standard is at 5.5, but we'd like to see it at 7. If you eliminate half of the centres, then you could take those people and put them into the other centres to alleviate the pressure.

    I think that's eventually what they're going to be doing. We saw it in Environment Canada, where they shut down weather stations and consolidated them.

    Are you firmly convinced that this is indeed what is going to happen?

    Mr. Martin Grégoire: Unless the government agrees to increase the staffing standard to 7, it's not going to happen. As long as they are convinced that 5.5 is right, they're not going to do this.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: There have been a couple of incidents where large ships have run aground very close to Halifax Harbour.

    Mr. Fox, I ask that because when Mr. Adams was here I asked him what I thought was a very simple question. Colour me ignorant for asking it, but I said, “Is it the mandate of the coast guard to guard the coast?” He said it is not their mandate.

    So we had these two large vessels run aground, I think one near Herring Cove and one near Chebucto Head, and nobody really knew about it. They just showed up.

    I'm just thinking, how in the world can this be? After September 11, and with all the concerns of pollution, overfishing, illegal aliens, drug interdiction, and so on, how did it ever get to this state?

    If you say to move it to a stand-alone agency, or transfer it, or wherever you would like the coast guard to be, do the workers and the unions have faith in the current management to be able to carry that out in the future? I say that because you mentioned a gentleman in Newfoundland who said the coast guard was fine--correct me if I'm wrong on that.

    When we were in Vancouver, Mike Henderson of the coast guard said, “Money is not a problem.” Yet when we went out to the field, the people were very pissed off at what he said.

    So do you have faith in the current management to fulfill an upgrading, or a reinvestment, or a movement toward a more positive future for the coast guard?

    Mr. John Fox: One of the things you have to understand is that even with the new directors we have in the department, they've known nothing but cut, cut, cut since 1995. Actually, they get performance bonuses based on their cuts. That's the philosophy. That's DFO's management style.

    Performance bonuses are based on how well they do. Naturally, cutting or maintaining the budget line is what you have to do.

    We have other coast guard managers who talk with us. These are managers who bleed red and white. They're coast guard people. They're proud, professional people who in confidence tell us that they agree with us. They're promoting us to carry forward our work and our message.

    Basically it's the same thing in DFO management. You either tow the line or you're gone. You're parked out; you're put aside. That's how it works in the department.

    I think if the coast guard were to be on its own and not have to worry that every time something happens in fisheries management we're going to have money sucked out and put over there.... Sure, we would still have cuts. We still have to follow the government agenda, but at least it's our agenda. It's autonomy for us to deal with our own programs and manage that without being one of 17 other programs.

    But I believe we still have capable people within the department. I do believe that.

  (1240)  

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: This is my final question, Mr. Chairman.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Very quickly, Mr. Stoffer.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: This is for both of you. Have the unions responded to the Auditor General in regard to the Auditor General's report, in terms of a letter?

    And in regard to some of the cost overruns and some of the fiscally stupid things some of the coast guards are doing within their own department, has the union sent any kind of documentation to the Auditor General either making the Auditor General aware of these types of fiscal overruns or just asking if it is possible to investigate these types of overruns in costs?

    Mr. John Fox: In Atlantic Canada we met with the Auditor General's group after the report was released and we asked them basically why they didn't talk to us and would they talk to us in the future, put us on their list, because we would like them to have a front-line perspective on what happens.

    Typically, these audits are conducted with senior management and they don't really get to see a lot of where the rubber hits the road and what the problems are. But we did make a presentation to them--Wayne Fagan and me--and outlined a number of our concerns as well. I think that was just prior to the audit being released for marine programs--they did one on marine programs as well. We think they missed a number of salient points in that audit as well.

    We're hoping in the future they will involve the unions of the coast guard in their audit processes.

    Mr. Martin Grégoire: We did talk to the auditors at the Auditor General's office about two years ago when they were preparing their report, and we did provide them with information, hoping to make their job easier.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

    I believe, Mr. Wing, you may have the document from Mr. Farrah. This maritime search and rescue situation report may just have been handed to you.

    Regarding the three coast guard vessels that are identified there, could you identify the class of vessel, what they are, how large they are, please? Are you able to do that?

    Mr. John Fox: The Louisbourgis a small cutter. The Wilfred Templeman...I don't know if it's a 1000 class or an 1100 class.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Which means?

    Mr. John Fox: It's a larger vessel.

    I'm not familiar with the Québecois, and I'm assuming the Jakov Sverdlov and the Fairchemwere vessels of opportunity that were traversing the area. It looks like the Québecois was a cutter as well.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Are these 45-foot cutters?

    Mr. John Fox: They'd be four-man cutters, yes.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): And the Louisbourg would be the same?

    Mr. John Fox: The Louisbourg is a small, ARUN-class cutter, I believe.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): And the Wilfred Templeman?

    Mr. John Fox: The Wilfred Templeman is out of Newfoundland, I believe.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): I think the information that was first available to us when this incident happened was that there were no large vessels available in the Gulf.

    I think that is probably the issue you were referring to, Mr. Wing.

    Mr. Michael Wing: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to take this document--as I say, I've not seen this document before--and talk to some of our officers down in the Laurentian region to review it. I will make sure it gets forwarded to the committee.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Were there any other questions from the committee?

    I have a couple myself, but, Mr. Hearn, let's go to you first, please.

    Mr. Loyola Hearn: I have one I didn't get to ask last time, Mr. Chair.

    When we had Mr. Adams here we talked about leasing possibilities, because of the state of the coast guard in particular. Many of the bigger boats are aging, and the government undoubtedly is looking at replacing some of them.

    In Norway a lot of the boats that are used--small and big ones--are leased for five to ten years. He mentioned that they are looking at proposals; they are looking at the issue.

    What is your perspective on leasing rather than replacing boats with government-owned boats?

    Mr. John Fox: To be built in Canada?

    Mr. Loyola Hearn: I don't know, because we didn't get into that, but it's a very good question, of course.

    Mr. John Fox: Yes.

    From our perspective, if you're talking about leasing a vessel like leasing a truck or a car, there's nothing wrong with it. If you're talking about leasing a vessel complete with a crew, for example from Irving Oil or somewhere else, we'd certainly have a problem with that. The training, the professionalism, the multi-tasking of our crews, the work we do, you know....

  (1245)  

    Mr. Loyola Hearn: I think what they have, basically, in Norway, and what he talked about briefly, was having the boat fully leased and mainly equipped by the coast guard, with a coast guard crew, with perhaps one or two people representing the owner to keep an eye on the boat, which I suppose is reasonable.

    Mr. John Fox: Well, ship repair is very costly. Maintaining a fleet of vessels is very costly. I guess you'd have to look at what the lease entails and what it brings with it, as far as maintenance, warranties on equipment, and that type of thing are concerned. Overall, I don't see a potential problem with it, really. One would just hope they're built in Canada.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Just on that same note about vessels, what about the quality of vessels we have? There was an incident off Vancouver Island a couple of years ago. I talked with the skipper of one of the fishing vessels that became involved in the search for fishermen, of whom two drowned and two were rescued. His comment was that he was happier being on his 130-foot fishing vessel than he was on the 200-foot-plus coast guard vessel in those seas—and they were horrendous seas, there's no question. He said the coast guard vessel looks good tied to the dock, but under certain weather conditions it's anything but desirable.

    Do you have any comments on the quality of vessels that are available to the Canadian Coast Guard, perhaps compared to what may be available on the west coast, in Seattle, for the American coast guard? How are we equipped?

    Mr. John Fox: The 1100s were a good purchase when we made them. Those vessels now are certainly mid-life. Take a look at those vessels today. We just visited one that came back off patrolling the Hague Line here a couple of weeks ago, when Mike was in Halifax. The state of them is just deplorable: they're not being properly maintained; we've had two significant fires aboard our vessels; mechanical problems are continuous. If you lose a prop in ice or whatever, it sends a financial shudder through the organization. It's a hard way to run a fleet.

    We've heard the same comments. As a matter of fact, when we were talking to the captain of the vessel that was tied up next to us—a trawler, in Yarmouth, I believe it was—he said, “My trawler looks better than that thing you're in.” And it did—and trawlers are run hard and put away wet, so to speak. It's a sin.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): On that same notion, the American Coast Guard, as I understand it, have one crew dedicated to a vessel. If the vessel is out on patrol for six weeks, it comes back in and is basically in harbour for six weeks and undergoes whatever repairs and upgrades are necessary, whereas we double-team: the vessel goes out; it's out for six weeks; it comes back in; a new crew goes on; and away it goes again. Is that the way the system operates? Just how desirable to do you see that?

    Mr. John Fox: They're in various cycles. The small boats are on a 46-hour average cycle, with two crews, on and off; then we have the larger vessels, which could be on 10, 2, and 1. But the larger vessels go through a mandatory lay-up period, as I showed you.

    If you read the Auditor General's report, to have them tied up is a very inefficient way to run any fleet of vessels. Vessels have to work. They only have perhaps a 30-year life cycle—some of them less than that—so they have to be working to pay for themselves.

    In our case, our argument is that we need that presence out there. The ship we were on had just come back from patrolling the Hague Line for two or three days—you're all familiar with the Hague Line—but it never stopped a vessel; it never did anything the entire time it was out there. It was on a fishery patrol. Our argument is that whatever vessels are in that area—recreational vessels or whatever—there's an opportunity to stop them to do a courtesy inspection or whatever, to see what's going on.

    The joke by the security committee was, “Oh, yeah, if you see a red and white vessel, don't worry, it's just the coast guard; keep on going.” It's pathetic.

    We had the incident with the Chiloli, which is a small freighter but a very large vessel, which we found washed up on the eastern shore with the crew and cargo gone. Hell knows what those people brought ashore. That's continuous. The RCMP catch illegal aliens hitchhiking down the highway with a suitcase. There was the bunch of them from some East Bloc country last year, I think it was, or the year before. They only catch them by a fluke. A large drug shipment they made on the eastern shore was found by two RCMP officers who just happened to be going down a deserted road and found some guy in a truck. It led to a big seizure of hashish, or whatever it was. That's the kind of activity that's going on.

    We talk about sleeper cells, dirty bombs, or whatever. We're the back door to the United States, and it's wide open.

  (1250)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Well said.

    Mr. Stoffer.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman.

    Going back again to the role of the coast guard and its mandate, I've only been here six and a half years, and I'm confused about its mandate.

    Mr. Adams said that over 400 people worked for the coast guard at 200 Kent Street, and I'll be damned if I know what those folks do.

    Mr. John Fox: We don't either.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: One of the concerns I have.... In your opinion, the MCTS and the air side, what do you see? Just explain it to the average Canadian citizen who pays the taxes. What, in your opinion, should the role of the coast guard be for Canada?

    Mr. Martin Grégoire: I believe safety of life at sea is the coast guard's first role and mandate, to make sure that the people working out there in bad weather and rough conditions can get help when they need it, either by communicating or by having a search and rescue vessel available not too far away. Making sure those waters are safe is, in my mind, a coast guard objective and should be a coast guard mandate.

    Of course, while doing that, if we can enhance state security, I think we should. It makes our tax dollar more valuable by asking those people out there on the waters, making sure that those ships entering our waters are safe to enter, and they are not drug smugglers or whatever else. I think we should make the most of the coast guard to play that double role to make sure that we get the most out of those tax dollars.

    Mr. John Fox: If you go back to de Cotret's report that was done in 1990, I believe, on Canada's fleets and what the coast guard's role should be, I firmly believe that there are sovereignty issues, the extension of Canada's territorial rights under the ocean. Certainly we can fulfil all of these things: customs inspections on the sea, security of fisheries--we did that before we merged with fisheries. We had to take an individual with us responsible for that. It simply changed that mandate. We're out there doing pollution work. We're out there doing navigational aids work. Our presence, although it is diminishing.... We are the lead agency; that is what our role should be--the extension of the government's needs.

    The thing that really bugs me is that we're being told by the commissioner and the deputy minister that we're no longer a can-do organization, the coast guard is not a can-do organization--in other words, we're not there to help out in times of emergency or give assistance to other agencies or whatever. This is what we are. We don't see ourselves as that. Coast guard crews are highly motivated to help the public, no matter what it is, whether it was the flooding out in the prairies.... Unfortunately, we weren't called out to do anything with the hurricane in Halifax, but that's how we see ourselves. We see ourselves providing safety and security to all marine users.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Thank you.

    We have just a couple of minutes here and there's one question I want to ask.

    I just want to comment first to Mr. Grégoire that I do appreciate, and I know the committee does, your presentation here and your documentation and comments on the recommendations of the committee's MCTS report. I can assure you the committee will keep these recommendations and the response to them in mind when it does its report.

    There is one other request I'd like to make. I think this issue of the mandate of the coast guard is important. It would be helpful, I think, to the committee if you took the time, not to do a massive document on the mandate of the coast guard, but to do a few pages on what you and your members see as the coast guard's mandate, because I think it needs to be redefined, and that kind of information would be helpful to the committee in its deliberations.

    There's one last question I have--and slap me silly for asking it. You may not want to answer, and if you don't, I understand, but I'm going to ask it anyway. That is a question relating to the high-priced help at the coast guard.

    It's my contention that the coast guard is and should be primarily viewed as a rescue organization: an organization involved in search and rescue, an organization involved in marine communications, and all of those other tasks. I find it disturbing, both as a private citizen and as someone who tries to understand the workings of government, when senior bureaucrats in that particular organization appear to be lacking in marine experience. It seems to me, as just an ordinary person--but also, I guess you might say I can't divorce myself from my position as a member of Parliament--that the most appropriate leadership for the coast guard would be a uniformed officer who had come up through the ranks, who started at the bottom, perhaps decking on a smaller vessel and working his way through. You'd know the individual in charge making the recommendations and establishing the priorities had a full understanding of the operations of the coast guard, its duties, and its responsibilities.

    I wonder if you would care to comment on that.

  (1255)  

    Mr. Michael Wing: I can't disagree with anything you've said, Mr. Chairman. I think the people who have been in the system, who understand the system and have worked their way up through the system, are probably the best to be leading the program. That's a personal opinion.

    I know that individuals who are over there right now are faced with a very difficult job, and I think given the current situation they would be faced with a difficult job even if they came from the coast guard or the navy.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): Mr. Stoffer, you have about a minute, if you have a quickie.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Yes, it's a last one.

    One of the things I'd like to talk about--and I know you do, Mr. Chairman, as well--is dealing with coast guard employees who have ignored the commissioner's request to advise them of any contact with the MPs.

    One of the things I find around the hiring practices--the term to full-term and everything else within the coast guard--is that they're advising me, in confidence, of course, that they fear intimidation, they fear reprisals, and they fear that nepotism is going on within local hiring practices. I was just wondering, have people come to you and expressed, as a union, these types of representations of what's going on with either low-level or mid-level management when it comes to hiring, job protection, terms, etc.?

    Mr. John Fox: Yes. I'm also an appeals officer with our union, so I handle challenges.

    We do have a major problem with favouritism, with staffing, particularly with the coast guard on the floor in Dartmouth. There are a lot of concerns about not only staffing, but classification. We don't see norms across the country. Again, getting back to the five navies, why is one position in Newfoundland at this level and the one in Dartmouth at that level? We see problems with that.

    We see problems with things as well in HR management, things like health and safety. These are the last accident statistics we have from the Maritimes region, and they clearly show that 20% of ships' crews are injured each year on our ships. That's totally unacceptable. It was brought up in the Auditor General's report. We haven't got any more of these reports since the Auditor General's report; they don't put them out, not as detailed as this. I'll leave it with you.

    We see health and safety as a major problem, as well as staffing, nepotism in some cases, and it goes unheeded. We bring it up at union-management meetings where we can with a number of appeals, but again, it begs a review.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. John Cummins): I want to thank you gentlemen again for appearing this morning. It's been a tough two hours for you, I'm sure, but your information has been well received by the committee, and we appreciate your taking the time to come here this morning. So thank you again.

    The meeting is adjourned to the call of the chair.