SRID Committee Meeting

SUB-COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

SOUS-COMITÉ DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL DU COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, May 16, 2001

• 1544

[English]

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.)): I will call the meeting to order, the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

• 1545

All the committee members will receive the blues, the transcripts of these hearings, and they will all be read. I don't want you to feel that just because there are only the three of us here right now, our judgment's going to be any less important.

This is our third hearing on the situation in Colombia. We are lucky to have with us three very knowledgeable witnesses today. We have Professor Christina Rojas, a Colombian academic who is presently teaching at Carleton. Welcome. Professor Hal Klepak teaches at the Royal Military College in Kingston. We have Luis with us again, and we're always very interested in what he has to say. He's with Peace Brigades International and he works in the field in Colombia.

I don't know if it was explained to you, but we try to go with ten-minute presentations, and then we do questions.

Shall we begin with you, Ms. Rojas?

Ms. Christina Rojas (Assistant Professor, Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University): First I want to thank the committee for inviting me to discuss the situation in Colombia and to offer alternatives for Canada.

I want to start by recognizing the important work the Canadian embassy is doing in Colombia, but I am also convinced that more can be done. I want to ask three questions. First, what is happening in Colombia? Second, how important is it to Canada to support the peace process? Third, what can Canada do?

I suggest three main directions. The first is that Canada should extend the ongoing support of civil society peace initiatives. Second, Canada can strengthen the linkages between Canada and Colombia. Third, internationally, Canada can attempt to influence the U.S. position on military aid and eradication towards alternative development programs.

First, what is happening today in Colombia? I am going to briefly present the situation on human rights in Colombia on a daily basis. It is important to say that in Colombia each day almost 70 people are killed, 20 of them for socio-political reasons, and of these 20 five are killed in combat, while 15 are political activists, trade unionists, human rights workers killed in the streets, in their homes, or at work. Every day twelve children die violently, nine persons are kidnapped, and there are 822 displaced people. Most of the displaced people are women, and 53% are children.

The situation on human rights is complicated by the growth of paramilitary groups. In 1987 there were more or less 650 participants in paramilitary groups, today there are between 6,000 and 8,000. Paramilitaries are responsible for 76% of the politically motivated killings, 5% are the responsibility of state agents, the guerrilla is responsible for 20%.

Social and economic rights are also relevant to the internal war in Colombia. In 1999 per capita income is at the level of 1995. There are 22.7 million poor in Colombia, a country that has 33 million people. Employment is at 20%, and GDP decreased 4.5% in 1999. Structural adjustment programs have contributed to increasing poverty and income distribution.

• 1550

It is important also to mention that cultural rights are also subject to abuse in Colombia. Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities are targets of paramilitary and guerrilla groups. It's important also to note that 70% of the killings are not politically motivated. That means there is a lack of tolerance for homosexuals, the homeless, and street children. There is the illegal campaign of social cleansing. To this situation is added a high proportion of violence against children and women.

Internationally and nationally, the politics are changing the situation of human rights in Colombia. On the one hand, as the United Nations report on human rights recognized, there is an increasing polarization of Colombia. One of the consequences of this polarization of Colombia is a tendency to support authoritarian solutions in the conflict.

The problem now is that as we are in a pre-election time with a presidential election next year, this polarization is reflected in what is happening politically. For example, in the Senate there is a bill on war legislation. Some of the articles in this bill are against the international norms of human rights, such as using army force to hold individuals without a warrant, etc. It is like the national security statute of the 1970s.

If we look at the polls on the elections, there is also a polarization. Alvaro Uribe, a hard-line politician, is high in the Gallup poll. He's very critical of President Pastrana's peace process and supports private self-defence groups.

In this context of polarization, we look at the $1.3 billion U.S. aid to Colombia. This plan, as you know, has been criticized for several reasons. I am going to mention some of them.

One issue is spending 75% of the $1.3 billion on military equipment.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare (Ottawa—Orléans, Lib.): Excuse me, is that in Canadian or U.S. dollars?

Ms. Christina Rojas: It is in U.S. dollars. It is $1.3 billion U.S. of aid to Colombia. Almost 75% is spent on military equipment in a country with high social needs.

Secondly, there is also a “narcotization” of the social and political problems. Narcotics traffic is considered the main factor for violence, and concentrates the strategy mainly in the southern part of Colombia, where the FARC operates.

The plan does not mention that, for example, coca crops in the hands of paramilitaries have also increased. The fumigation has also been criticized because of harm to the environment. There is also the ineffectiveness of this strategy to eradicate coca.

There is a report by the United Nations and Colombia, both governments, on the program against drugs. According to this report, since 1999 Colombia increased 60,000 hectares of cultivated areas for coca. It is almost the same amount that was eradicated. It shows if you eradicate here, then the production moves to another region. Also, there is concern for the neighbouring countries, where the production can move to Venezuela, Brazil, or Ecuador.

There is, at this moment, an increasing dissatisfaction with eradication. Governors of the southern part of Colombia have manifested their disagreement. At this moment, there is also a march of 20,000 Indians and peasants from southern Colombia to Cali to protest violence.

Even within the U.S. Congress, there is some dissatisfaction with the plan. Benjamin Gilman, who has been a strong supporter of the plan, withdrew his support.

Michael Shifter, from the Inter-American Dialogue, also summarized some of the main criticisms of this military strategy. One of the criticisms is the military has problems with human rights, and some of these human rights violations have been documented. The difficulty, from the United States point of view, is that it will be engaged in a problem it will be difficult to get out of.

• 1555

Mr. Shifter recommended that President Bush move to a more comprehensive long-term and multilateral approach than the one they have. I believe the nomination of John P. Walters, a law and order conservative, indicates maybe he is moving in the direction of increasing military intervention.

Not everything is negative. I think there are also some positive things happening. One of the positive things is the international support for the peace process. FARC and ELN agreed to include international friends, countries, within the process of negotiation. Canada is involved on the committees, and that's important. The European Union also approved $304 million for the establishment of peace laboratories. The United Nations drug enforcement officer in Colombia also acknowledged the paramilitaries are involved in narcotics traffic.

It is also important to note the pressure of the United Nations Commission for Human Rights. They announced they will continue the office in Bogota until the year 2002. They will support the peace process in Colombia, recognize advances in the negotiations with FARC and ELN, and welcome the participation of the international community in the peace process.

Canada, its government, and Parliament should continue to watch what is happening to this important Andean country and partner.

How important is Colombia to Canada? Colombia is important now, but more so in the future, as a potential trading partner. Investment in Canada is important. Canada, as a member of the OAS, has demonstrated a commitment to the protection of human rights. I think it is important that Canada has built a reputation in the region and in Colombia for participation in peace-building missions.

The fact that FARC and ELN nominated Canada as a member of the facilitation group will confirm that Colombia and the forces of conflict in Colombia trust Canada. It is also important to recognize the long tradition of Canada in the peace process and the role Canada has taken and can take in the process of negotiations, either through the use of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, or between communities and indigenous people.

The last part is what Canada should do. Canada has already agreed to a plan of action between Canada and Colombia. I think there should be support for this plan from NGOs and organizations. CIDA is committed to emphasize peace-building, has already committed $60 million over five years, and is collaborating with the United Nations and the Red Cross.

In addition, I propose the following recommendation. First, extend the ongoing support to civil society's peace initiatives through CIDA and IDRC. It is important to follow up and update the plan of action according to the recent development in Colombia.

I support what the Canadian ambassador in Colombia said. It is important to implement concrete projects that facilitate the process of confidence-building. I think it is equally important to support the articulation of a strategy where there are alternatives to development at the macro level, not only at the micro level, especially in the areas of social policies and equity.

• 1600

IDRC's work on peace-building should be expanded, and also the programs for women and children to receive special support.

In terms of the second strategy, strengthening institutional links between Canada and Colombia, I think it's important to establish linkages between universities and research institutions and to develop social and economic alternatives for the peace negotiations.

Second, I believe that Canada can support a Colombian initiative in a university to help development of policy options within Canada and for Colombia, and also to engage academics, NGOs, and policy-makers in a dialogue about Colombia. I think it's also important to facilitate the debate and the formation of public opinion about Colombia.

Canada can also facilitate visits of university professors, labour leaders, and human rights activists, especially those whose lives are threatened and need to leave the country. I consider it important that a delegation of Parliament visit Colombia and form a collective idea about the situation in Colombia and the type of support Colombia needs.

Finally, at the international level, I think Canada should attempt to influence the United States position of military aid and eradication toward a position more on alternative development programs. The ineffectiveness of the eradication strategy, the impact on internal and external displacement, the extension of Plan Colombia to neighbouring countries, the fear of further violation of human rights, and the increasing level of poverty all demand a revision of Plan Colombia.

Canada's tradition of peace forces and its reputation in the region and the credibility among the different forces in contention give Canada a privileged position to mediate with international actors and especially with the U.S. to revise the current strategy of eradication and military aid.

Thank you.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Thank you.

Professor Rojas, I have a copy of your presentation here. It will be translated and distributed to the members of the committee.

Thank you.

Professor Klepak.

Mr. Hal P. Klepak (Professor, History and Strategy, Royal Military College of Canada): Thank you, Madam Chair.

[Translation]

I would like first of all to compliment the embassy, and particularly the Canadian Ambassador to Columbia.

We are often spoiled by our overseas diplomats. The work that this gentleman and his team have accomplished in Latin America, and particularly in Columbia these last few years, is absolutely extraordinary.

My presentation will have three parts. I will not talk about my suggestions. I do not necessarily have very detailed suggestions to make, but perhaps we could discuss this during the question period. I'm going to begin by speaking of the war, and why it never ends. Then, I will speak of the military context, and finally, of the regional context, that is to say diplomatic context, of this zone, which is increasingly complicated and dangerous.

[English]

I would start by talking about why the war doesn't end, from my perspective. I believe that when Canada looks at this it will be important to keep these points in mind. In my view, there is nothing very powerful that presses either of the two sides, particularly the guerrillas, to the bargaining table, nor is there anything that presses any of the other sides—because as you have heard many times, there are more than two sides here—to any bargaining table with a real desire to negotiate a peace. I don't think we're at that stage yet.

Generally speaking, and particularly in the context of other insurgencies in Latin America, there are things that appear to be very favourable for a peace process succeeding in Colombia. People are frequently asking the question, “Then why doesn't the war end?” I would suggest that those reasons that suggest there is a favourable context include the point often made that neither side can win militarily. In general, both main sides agree with that. Indeed, the other fighting elements also agree that they don't have a chance to take power.

• 1605

The war has been a very long one, and therefore there is national exhaustion, if not exhaustion by the two main contenders. That usually pushes sides toward true negotiation. There is of course an increasingly obvious public will for peace expressed every day by hundreds of thousands of people in all manner of ways. In Central America that would have been and has been the beginning of a recipe for peace, but this is not Central America.

From the perspective of the government, or at least about the government and the elite, in my view, the elite in general, if one could use that term, does not feel it has to compromise on major issues of either the insurgent programs or for reform or more generally on reform.

The ley del bachellerato—even if that is a law, unfortunately, to put no finer a point on it, that protects young rich sons from going into the service—while it is going to be changed, no one except the most naive suggest that the war will be carried on the backs of the whole population any more than it has been in the past. That is, this is a war of the poor against the poor, in the army's ranks or in the paramilitary ranks or in the insurgent ranks.

The rich do not feel the war comes to them at home. Why is that? Not because they haven't been séquestré, not because they haven't been kidnapped or had problems. I'm not suggesting that the elite has not suffered. But they have found means over time—through private security, through the shipping of families and particularly children abroad, through the reduction and spread of assets—to make sure that the pinch that is particularly obvious in recent years as the economy has faltered has not been a shared one, as the rich have found ways to avoid most of its impact.

At the same time, the insurgents, it seems to me, have no very strong reason to compromise either. There are personal dangers very obvious to all of them from previous groups that have come to the negotiating table and accepted accords with the government, personal dangers of their elimination once a peace is agreed to. Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, they have never had it so good financially. There are no real prospects for reform coming from peace. They have never done so well militarily as they have done in the last three years. And recruiting is easy and all the other elements that we could easily talk about in question time.

Bringing both of these together is the fiefdom nature of this war—that is, the decentralization of the war in this extraordinary fashion, which one has seen since the beginning, certainly since the sixties but particularly in the nineties, which makes a general peace hard to imagine.

[Translation]

Having said that, I would like to talk a little bit about the military context. It was a long war that attracted incredibly little attention on the international front. The insurgents' extraordinary victories over the last four years changed this situation. This is what changed everything: Washington's perspective, the perspective of the international press, and everyone's perspective regarding the issues in Columbia. There were very significant attacks in extremely conventional contexts, within conventional contexts of war, which have little to do with traditional ideas of insurrection, such as the use of sophisticated weapons in attacks on sophisticated military targets.

Plan Columbia is a blow, but one which will not be decisive. This committee has probably already seen that both in Washington and in Bogota, there's a tendency to make a big hoopla as if things were moving forward very well, but even the greatest optimists are talking about wiping out 20% of the guerillas' financial sources, or at least of the most significant guerillas. At the end of the day, a 20% drop in the revenues of these organizations is really almost laughable.

The opportunity of retreating to the distension zones has changed the war. The insurgents can recover there after any defeats.

• 1610

The armed forces are improving under American training; the insurgents as well. And the war is much more complicated—Professor Rojas has already mentioned this—because of the Autodefensas, the paramilitaries and their growth.

Respect for human rights is improving, especially within the armed forces, but it is important to stress that up to a certain point, the armed forces are less tempted to get involved in the abuse of human rights because of the fact that the Autodefensas are much more effective, much more widespread and able to do this work for them.

[English]

The neighbourhood... I believe there is something of a conspiracy of silence, perhaps de bonne volonté, but nonetheless a conspiracy of silence among the five capitals that surround Colombia, the five bordering countries. One wishes to give the impression that one is supportive of the peace process and one wishes not to embarrass Bogota.

There is behind this conspiracy of silence a real annoyance at what was an extraordinary lack of consultation about Plan Colombia, not only on the part of the United States, which is, after all, a tradition of great powers, but also on the part of Colombia. That annoyance has been very clear at the defence ministerial of the Americas, where the briefing on what was supposed to be a Colombian plan in which the United States has a secondary role was given exclusively by the United States representatives at defence ministerial level, and also at other meetings, particularly in Bogota, where over and over again the five ambassadors in question have repeated their astonishment for the lack of consultation on the impact of Plan Colombia on refugee movements, on the environment, etc.

The fact is that the response of the five neighbours has been military, without exception. In Venezuela, which is the worst hit, there are tens of thousands of troops, national guard, and police, and all manner of activities to try to control a border of the size and length and complexity of the border with Colombia.

In Panama, whose army mercifully was abolished in 1989 with the American invasion, the very lack of an army has meant that the police are being armed as if they were an army, the same process that occurred under Noriega and others in the past. Why? To deter or defeat insurgent border crossings.

Brazil, which I don't need to remind this committee is a great power regionally, has major deployments into its extremely sensitive Amazon region. There is no question that a number one defence issue for Brazil at the moment is how to control the border with Colombia. Almost all exercises at all levels are conducted on this basis, and the deployment of aircraft, troops, naval shipping, and even satellites in this context has been exceptional.

Ecuador, as we saw with the kidnapping of some Canadians, has been dramatically affected in recent years, although there seemed to be something of a live and let live attitude before. Ecuador has been much affected by Plan Colombia, as has been Peru. And in both cases, again the military has been the national response to the problem, a very unfortunate development.

The result is we now have a militarized border on all five potential fronts.

The U.S., the last of these international factors, is of course very present. I do not have much worry about direct intervention; I think it's just too costly politically at home. But it is clear that the United States government feels the need to be seen to be doing something serious, and that until now has neither been coordinated with the region nor even with domestic U.S. policy. Plan Colombia has no U.S. dimension.

[Translation]

The conclusions for Canada. I am not going to discuss my suggestions. I hope that a few aspects will arise during the discussion, but I would simply like to say, as concerns the issues involved—and I agree with Professor Rojas—that they are major. It is extremely difficult to know how to get involved. There are no easy answers. The peace process is both serious and not serious, and always has to be on the alert. It is a very centralized peace process and this complicates our "Track II" traditions, when we are dealing with this kind of process. As I mentioned before, the problem is so ancient that it is hard to imagine how it could easily be grappled with. Therefore, I think that we will have to act with great care, recognizing that we are dealing with a weak democracy where the armed forces are still creating difficulties, as do the police, and where we are a long way from finding a solution for the moment.

Thank you.

• 1615

[English]

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Thank you. You've brought us a map.

Mr. Hal Klepak: Yes.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): In Spanish.

Mr. Hal Klepak: Yes, because I was told that it would be good not to have one or the other language.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): That was very wise of you. Thank you for bringing it.

Mr. van Isschot.

Mr. Luis van Isschot (North American Representative, Colombia Project, Peace Brigades International): Good afternoon. Thank you very much for this opportunity to share with you. Peace Brigades International has very deep concerns for the safety of Colombian human rights defenders, community activists, and internally displaced persons.

My name is Luis van Isschot. I'm the North American coordinator of the Peace Brigades Colombia Project. I personally spent a year in the field and have been back on at least on five occasions for two- to eight-week visits in the last year and a half. My last visit to Colombia was about a month ago, and much of what I'm going to be sharing with you today reflects some of the recent studies we did visiting our field teams in the month of April.

Established more than six years ago at the request of Colombian human rights workers, Peace Brigades International, or PBI, currently provides what is known as protective accompaniment to members of 20 Colombian non-governmental organizations, as well as three communities of internally displaced people. Through our work, we hear testimonies from individuals, communities, and organizations affected by political violence. We also have been witnesses to campaigns of terror designed to undermine legitimate non-partisan human rights work.

Speaking personally, I've passed through paramilitary checkpoints just minutes away from regular army bases. I've participated in the forensic study of the bullet-riddled bodies of students killed in a guerrilla raid. The examples are truly endless, and in the work we do, these kinds of events to which we bear witness are a daily occurrence.

We have 37 volunteers working out of four regional offices right now in Colombia, which means that PBI constitutes one of the largest international non-governmental presences in Colombia, second only to the International Committee of the Red Cross.

To explain a little bit, internal accompaniment is conceived of as a way of transforming conflict, by which third parties can help to maintain the political space necessary for human rights advocacy to take place. We ourselves are not an advocacy group. We are deeply committed to an impartial non-interventionist approach. We do not denounce the authorship of human rights violations, nor do we lobby on public policy.

Exactly three years ago today, in the small industrial city of Barrancabermeja, where I lived for a year, 25 people disappeared and another seven were killed in a nighttime paramilitary raid. I was in Barrancabermeja that evening and during the weeks that followed. Throughout this period of time, my colleagues and I accompanied the families of the victims. My colleagues in Barrancabermeja—we have a team of nine people there—continue to accompany the families of the victims, as well as many of the human rights and social organizations that called for a thorough and transparent investigation into the facts of the case.

I would like to invite you now to take a moment to remember with me the victims of the May 16 massacre. What I'm about to read is an excerpt from a letter I wrote soon after the massacre, in which I recall the events that took place during those first few days.

[Translation]

Sunday morning, we learned of a massacre that had occurred a few kilometres from a little working class seaside town called Barrancabermeja. Miguel, the Spanish volunteer with PBI, was accompanying Osiris Bayter, who was at that time the President of Credhos, the regional human rights organization. When he phoned us to tell us the news, the details were still not clear and no one knew exactly how many people had been killed. But towards the end of the day, José Javier Jaramillo's body along with those of six other young people had apparently turned up in a funeral home where family and friends were beginning to gather.

• 1620

José was a rather reserved and contemplative young man, who loved playing the Tamboras, the traditional folk music of the Magdalena Media river valley. We knew José through the OFP, the women's working class organization. When Miguel gave us news of the massacre, I felt paralyzed, as if I had slammed into a wall of disbelief. But that wall quickly crumbled with the news of José's death, and I was left hurt and vulnerable.

Over the next few days, as we heard more rumours and more information, we were overwhelmed with painful and contradictory emotions. I remember at one point, I was told that the information concerning José's death was false and that he had not been killed. For a few glaring and appalling moments, I wanted to believe that it was another José who was dead.

Later on, when friends confirmed the initial information, I was overwhelmed by the horror once again. From that time on, we had gone one step further in this journey, one of the most intense we had experienced during the months we were there as a team. During that time, we discovered a new perspective in our work. Despite our seeming helplessness in the face of this violence, I believe we acquired a much stronger belief in the contribution, as humble as it may be, of the PBI in the fight for peace in Columbia.

The days and nights spent in touch with the members of Credhos and the OFP, and now the vigil beside the barricades, vindicated our efforts and allowed us to create bonds with the people we have accompanied here.

[English]

A paramilitary organization calling itself the Self-Defence Forces of Santander and Southern Cesar claimed responsibility for the massacre. However, very quickly a conflict developed between those who claimed that members of the Colombian security forces had been complicit in the massacre and those who maintained that the paramilitaries had acted independently.

I have no intention of debating this question. Nevertheless, I wouldn't want the very critical issue to go unmentioned.

One of the reasons I have chosen to commemorate the massacre of May 16, 1998 is because I believe it is, in a sense, paradigmatic. That is to say, it represents a macabre prelude to an even more terrifying drama that reached its climax this past December when paramilitary forces established bases of operation in the low-income neighbourhoods of the city of Barrancabermeja.

In the year 2000 alone, a dirty war waged through the civilian population claimed more than 500 lives in the city. According to eyewitness reports documented by local human rights groups, on December 22 of last year approximately 100 paramilitary troops entered the northeastern district of the city, seizing both abandoned and inhabited houses. One month later, on the night of January 20, a paramilitary squad attacked the southeastern district of the city, killing three people and seizing various homes.

Despite the increased presence of police and military in these districts, paramilitaries continued to carry out assignations, threats, house seizures, and so on, putting pressure on young people and families to inform on alleged guerrilla sympathizers.

On January 27, two men identifying themselves as members of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, or AUC, arrived at the women's centre operated by the OFP, demanding that the women working in the kitchen give them the keys to the building. When the women refused, they left a message for the coordinators of the OFP telling them to go and speak to a so-called Commander Fredy. At 1:05 p.m. that same day, in the presence of a member of PBI, one of the paramilitaries who had threatened the women earlier that same day arrived at the OFP and repeated that they would seize the women's centre, “breaking the door down and crushing anybody who got in the way”.

At that point, the national police arrived and arrested accused paramilitary Luis Eduardo Perez Bernal. However, two days later, on January 29, he was released.

According to the OFP women's organization, he has since been seen in the district patrolling with the same paramilitary group.

At 7:55 a.m. on February 8, just a few days later, a member of PBI was accompanying the OFP when two armed men, dressed in civilian clothing, demanded the PBI hand over his passport and cellular telephone. The PBI member initially questioned why he should have to comply with such a demand, but was then obliged to do so.

• 1625

As they were leaving the women's centre, one of the men pointed at the PBI member and said, “From now on you are now a military target of the self-defence forces”.

Now, the reaction of the international community, in particular that of the Canadian embassy in Colombia, was swift and emphatic. Many local, national, and international organizations were understandably concerned that a well-respected humanitarian organization would be targeted in this way. The passport of the PBI member was soon returned, and a local paramilitary commander was quoted in the press as denying he had anything against PBI.

We are satisfied that for the time being we can continue to work in Barrancabermeja, but it should be noted that the rise of right-wing paramilitary forces has put severe constraints on the work of local human rights defenders and social activists, as has the entire context of polarization in the city, generally speaking. And this is a trend, which I think has already been mentioned a little bit today, that is by no means unique to this city, although I do believe the case is instructive in many ways.

I'll give another example, which has more of a national profile, if I may, before concluding. The José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers' Collective is an internationally renowned Bogota-based non-governmental human rights group that has been active in Colombia for about 20 years. PBI has accompanied members of the collective for the past five. At present, due to renewed threats and a generalized state of fear in the Colombian capital, PBI has increased its level of accompaniment of the collective's members to 24 hours a day, if necessary. PBI has shared its concerns during meetings with senior government officials, members of the military, the diplomatic corps, etc.

To explain the case a little bit of this particular organization, during a search carried out as part of a criminal investigation into the attempted assassination of trade union leader Wilson Borja, Colombian authorities found a photograph of collective member and human rights lawyer Alirio Uribe Munoz, along with details concerning his home and office addresses.

What's important here is that responsibility for the attack against Mr. Borja, the union leader, was claimed by Carlos Castano, head of the AUC self-defence groups. The premises being searched at the time were home to one of the men suspected of actually carrying out the attack against Mr. Borja—the failed assassination attempt—a fact that has given rise to the fear that a direct order may have been issued to assassinate Mr. Uribe as well.

On May 5, Mr. Uribe was again the subject of a death threat when his name was published in a pamphlet warning of a paramilitary offensive in the city of Bogota and announcing the execution of a number of individuals identified on the list. According to the same source another trade union leader, who was assassinated on March 3 of this year, had only one week before his death made it public that his name, and that of three other people, including another member of this same lawyers' collective, appeared on the list of people to be executed, apparently by paramilitary groups.

Now, it must be emphasized that the members of the lawyers' collective named above are responsible for providing legal counsel in a number of very high-profile cases of human rights violations, cases that go beyond the scope of Colombia and have reached an international level. In the past, the lawyers' collective has received many threats, and a number of its members have been forced into exile. In Barrancabermeja, as well as in many parts of the country, a number of human rights defenders have been obliged to seek refuge abroad or in other regions of Colombia. This reflects a disturbing trend whereby the space available to humanitarian and human rights workers is being reduced—squeezed by a polarized conflict, and, in particular, by the exponential growth of right-wing paramilitarism.

My sole recommendation to this committee at this time is that we work together and remain vigilant in our accompaniment—and I use that term in a broad sense—of the non-violent alternatives being developed by Colombian civil society groups, alternatives which seek solutions to the conflict, as well as the very crucial work being done by Colombian human rights organizations.

When I spoke before the full standing committee in December 1999, I invited the members present to visit Colombia to experience firsthand the urgency of the crisis in that country. I know this is a suggestion that has been echoed in many quarters, so I would just like to conclude by reiterating how significant it would be for you, as Canadian parliamentarians, to meet the Colombian human rights advocates I've spoken about this afternoon.

Thank you.

• 1630

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Thank you.

Mr. Dubé.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé (Lévis-et-Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ): Given the fact that I missed a good part of the presentations in order to be present at other meetings, I will limit myself to a thank you for having brought us testimony such as the one that I just heard. I would also like to say that I did not miss the meeting through lack of interest for this very serious issue.

We will discuss this with members of this committee and with others in order to see how we can support what you have said, which is very sad.

[English]

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Actually, if you don't have any objections, Mr. Bellemare...

Luis, we've seen you before, and you and I have talked. You know there was a resolution drafted as a result of your telling us of this massacre in 1999 when you were here. I think one of the great frustrations—I'm sure for you, but for us as parliamentarians—is that we talk about human rights abuses all the time, and I feel as if we spin our wheels and spin our wheels and we talk and we talk and we talk.

Who are the good guys there? Who does the Canadian government work with? Are there any good guys? You're talking about civil society and the human rights groups there—who protects them? Who do we work with?

Professor Klepak.

Mr. Hal Klepak: I think, faute de mieux, we have to work with the government. We cannot change Colombia from top to bottom, nor would it be our right to suggest such a thing. We're a sovereign country and we want to be treated as sovereign, we can't expect others not to be. This government is a democracy that, by Latin American standards, is not so bad. It's in wartime circumstances of dramatic consequences over decades. Britain in 1940 would have been in a hell of a shape by today if it were trying to conduct a war, particularly of this savagery, and to maintain at least the trappings, and I think more than the trappings, of democracy. The government will have to be the main element with which we work, at least to provide the umbrella under which other work on track twos, in support of NGOs, or whatever occurs. I don't think there's a way to avoid that.

Good guys and bad guys is a really rough question in Colombia. Everyone believes they're the good guy—that's not particularly new—but the insurgents still roll out, however much criticism they get for being narcotraficantes and the rest of it, they still place the context of their message in the arguments of Marxist-Leninist progressive humanity, the dream of a better world. The army has a great many devoted officers and devoted soldiers who believe firmly that they're doing the best thing, and although it's a lot harder to buy it, the autodefensas are convinced they are upholding Christian civilization, despite their means in doing so.

It's what you might expect in human affairs. It's very sad. So I see the government as being the one we have to play with, but acknowledging, as I said in my last comment, that its a government of weak democracy. All of Colombia is narcotized, it's not just the guerrillas. The country is under the impact of this. As was mentioned, the autodefensas themselves are in no way clean on this, nor is congress, nor is the judiciary, nor is anybody—the left is guilty too. I think that tends to push us towards working with those elements of civil society that have a proven track record.

• 1635

I regret to say, and I hope my colleagues will agree, that there is something of an industry of NGOs at the moment, rather like we saw in Central America in the 1980s, an explosion of literally thousands of NGOs, which watch for the international community's buzzwords. So I think we very much need our own good NGOs on the ground, which can spot who does things well and who actually pushes forward agendas we can agree with. We have to spot those and concentrate our efforts on those, it seems to me.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Does the government offer protection to these human rights organizations?

Mr. Hal Klepak: In theory it does, but, as Luis was mentioning, I think we have real problems. One of the things one is so often thanked for—and CIDA knows this very well—is that we actually bring out the odd trade union leader to spend a few months in Canada so that he or she goes off the hit list. That might seem like an absurd way of dealing with it, but it's really appreciated, because it's something concrete. Somebody discombobulates a bit the structure of assassinations and may at least delay things a while. Officially, the state still functions. There is a security system in place, but it is known more for its lack of efficiency than its efficiency, I think it's fair to say.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): There's much evidence to indicate that the government supports the paramilitaries. They wouldn't be on a payroll, I wouldn't think, so is the looting and the booty of war their reward? I don't understand why a democratically elected government would need to use the paramilitary to fight in a civil war such as this.

Ms. Christina Rojas: I understand your questions, but for Colombia there are no easy answers. Colombia is a very complex country. But I will say that the government in Colombia by the standards of democracy has been long established.

Just to give you an example of what can be accomplished despite the war that is now in Colombia, the previous elections were successful elections, I would say. In four of the five main cities, where 70% to 80% of the Colombian population lives, the mayors were independent, not of the traditional party. So at the local level you can see in the municipalities a respect for democracy and independence.

Several mayors have been assassinated. People from the government and people working in the judicial system have been assassinated. Candidates from the left and from the Liberal and Conservative Parties have been assassinated. They fight for democracy and for what they believe.

Regarding the paramilitary, I would say that definitely they are the bad guys. Now they are seen by everybody as the main obstacle to peace negotiations. It is important to end the paramilitary. Paramilitaries are not supported by the government. The government has declared its opposition, and the paramilitaries are not considered as partners in the negotiations. They are regular killers and bandits. You cannot negotiate with them, and the government has been very clear about that.

• 1640

The problem is that in the army forces at the lower level there has been a relationship between paramilitaries and the army people. But it is not a policy of the government. I think it is an important decision even if it is difficult to sustain. There have been a lot of situations where the government could have intervened but didn't, especially with regard to the lower ranks. It has been documented that this happened.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Luis, did you have something to add?

Mr. Luis van Isschot: I have some brief comments to try to cover the various points. Like everyone around the table, those of us in Peace Brigades are very impressed with the role the Canadian embassy has played. I'd like to see us all continue to support the work they've done to advocate for human rights in Colombia. That means on the one hand allowing for the possibility, as has been described, of people who need a rest from the war in Colombia and who need to come to Canada for a while, but it also means advocating for people on the ground, people who plan on staying and doing that work.

I do believe that the Canadian embassy's voice and the voice of Ottawa do have an impact in Colombia. Nothing happens in a vacuum. Usually when there are significant human rights cases, Canada is not acting alone. It takes a leadership position, but it's certainly not acting alone. That kind of political will does go some way toward helping protect human rights workers, as well as follow up and visits to the regions on the part of the Canadian embassy. It's something they've done very effectively, and I think it needs to be applauded, underlined, and continued. I think the message also needs to be sent from Ottawa that there are people here in Canada who are concerned as well.

Regarding the Colombian government attempts to protect human rights workers, the Ministry of the Interior does have a program for human rights workers, which has existed for a number of years, but its implementation has been uneven, not for any one reason but for a myriad of reasons, including the fact that some NGOs in Colombia have decided they don't want to accept the terms of the agreements with the government. There are a variety of different dynamics going on there.

There are some mechanisms already in place, and those kinds of responsibilities are things that the Colombian government ought to be reminded of periodically. The Inter-American Court system as well has made very specific recommendations for protective measures for specific human rights and also—I don't know if there's any precedent for it—for the protection of entire communities in the case of internally displaced communities. Those kinds of conditions are things that Canada can support, and it can help the Colombian government implement,

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): You say internally displaced. Do you mean because of the war or because of development?

Mr. Luis van Isschot: The figure is not exact, but there are between 1.5 million and 2 million internally displaced people in Colombia. If I looked at my notes, I'm sure I could quote a specific figure. Those are mostly due to the war.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Eugène, do you mind if I ask one more question?

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: No. You're the chair.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): I'm being a bit piggish here. I'm glad there are not a lot of people here, because the chair doesn't usually get to ask questions.

A number of people have suggested that a military solution is the best way to combat the narcotraffickers in Colombia. Professor Rojas stated that this is not the appropriate way, and I was wondering if Professor Klepak has an opinion. I'm sure you do. Would you share it with me, please.

Mr. Hal Klepak: It's scandalous how often one hears what Professor Rojas has called the authoritarian and what other people call a military solution. Many observers even on the left and historically in Colombia have said that the problem in Colombia is not that the army is too strong, as in other parts of Latin America one might name, but that the army is so weak. It's a sedentary army. It doesn't go out and bash anybody. It sits and it waits. The Americans get incredibly frustrated with it because it has no active policy. So to some extent, the success and popularity of the paramilitary is related to the army's unwillingness or inability to prosecute the war with energy.

• 1645

There is what is called a Rangel solution, after Professor Alfredo Rangel of... well, of a number of universities in Bogota. He says that this is exactly the problem, that we have an army that doesn't conduct the war. If guerrillas are never to be under any military pressure to come to the table, then why would they come to the table? Since they're doing so jolly well out of the war anyway, it is counterintuitive that they would come to the table, and you should at least put sufficient military pressure on them so that there is a reason for them to come.

Well, in historical terms, certainly that sounds very logical, but the kind of mobilization needed in a national effort to conduct such things in terms of a real conscript army, and a truly professional pointy end, as the military call it, that would actually go out, in terms of destruction and freedom of action for the military and the nature of war, would have very severe casualties. In my view, it would not be a quickly done thing and would leave dreadful scars on the body politic.

While one acknowledges, as it were, the sequence of logic in the argument as to why anyone would come to the negotiating table if they're doing very well out of a war, the other side is that the defeat of the left would leave so many questions about reform still in the air. These revolutionary movements exist because there's been a need for reform. I agree that Colombia is a democracy, and again, by the standards of the region a remarkably successful one, but it does have real difficulties as well.

Perhaps I could also say a word in response to your previous question about paramilitaries. In a curious fashion, it's democratic governments that often need paramilitaries, or see themselves as needing them. The elites behind them do, at least, more than do the authoritarians. Why? Because the army's hands are to some extent tied. It would be easy to exaggerate that in Colombian history, but the army is going to be under international pressure. It is going to have observers. The press will have liaison people with army brigades, and even in Bucaramanga and Barrancabermeja will have people around.

If it acts, it will be sure to be criticized, whereas the reason the local elites founded in the sixties what we might call modern paramilitaries, and the reason these grew and prospered, is that they answered a local need. In fact, one of the horrifying things for me in this is how popular the autodefensas often are locally. You know, these people do something. The military sits on its duff and doesn't do anything, but these people actually go out and get things achieved.

Of course, anyone from our side is mortified in the face of this kind of comment, but it would be a mistake to think that because we would sit around and definitely agree that this is the single main obstacle—I agree completely with Professor Rojas—to successful progress of the peace process... The other side of the coin is that locally, particularly for the elites, these are frequently the people who get things done.

That's a grave issue, it seems to me, for democracy. Militaries can't do quite such dirty work, even though Colombia's had plenty of it, whereas paramilitaries feel their hands are completely untied. And that's a very worrying idea.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Professor Rojas.

Ms. Christina Rojas: Colombian guerrillas are the oldest guerrillas in Latin America, even older than Cuban guerrillas. It is not the first time that Colombians have had negotiations. In the last 20 to 25 years, there have been negotiations with the guerrillas. All of these negotiations have ended in attempts to have military solutions. They have not worked.

I think there is something that is now very clear in most of Colombia. As I say, this is not a good time. People are disappointed. But I think the only solution for Colombia is dialogue. It's the only solution. The military solution has not worked and it is not going to work. It didn't work in Central America and it is not going to work in Colombia.

• 1650

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): How do you bring narco-traffickers to the table? What can you possibly offer them that they can't have a lot more of without negotiating with you?

And you keep referring to the left. Surely the narco-traffickers aren't considered left, are they? I mean, they're just criminals, aren't they?

Mr. Hal Klepak: I think as both my colleagues have pointed out, now the autodefensas are probably as dependent on narcotraficante relationships as the traditional, if I can call them that, insurgent movements. But certainly the language is still of the left, and I think we get confused.

Yes, where is financing? People say, well, 93%, 90%, or 80% is from extortion and from narcotraficantes for the insurgent groupings, but the leadership, perhaps for internal cohesion reasons and perhaps even for romantic unifying cohesion as well, still speak words, if you look at the reform programs and at the demands, that are couched in the old language—with little nuances, yes, but nonetheless in the old language.

It's like so much in life, isn't it; yes, it's a cover, but there's still enough reality that you can't talk about negotiating. Perhaps under the table you can say, “We'll buy you off by offering you this, so you don't need to stay with the narco-trade”, but you can't say that publicly. You still have to say you are addressing the 10 points, or the 12 points, and are going to bring reform to the Organization of American States or to the alliance system, or you're going to guarantee the list of demands of the self-termed left.

I wonder, even though they get some indoctrination still, how much the recent recruit really understands of that leftist revolution, which is after all long behind Latin America in many ways. But certainly in their own perception, the leadership continues to use that language and to express itself as loyal to those ideals.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Did you have anything to add, Luis?

Mr. Luis van Isschot: Frankly, from our perspective it's difficult to comment on the issue of narco-trafficking as it plays out, although there is narco-trafficking in all of the regions in which we work. It does infuse the situation.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Mr. Bellemare, I'll let you have a little turn. I'll let you squeeze in here.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: I've always known you to be very generous.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Oh, I am a generous woman.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: I appreciate that.

I really don't know where to begin. This is savagery on a multicoloured scale that's going on.

The chair asked who are the good guys and who are the bad guys. I have perhaps two questions. The elite and the business people are the ones who could lose the most, the narcotraficantes. They've made the money, and they could go somewhere else and bring their loot. But the elite, and you made reference to them, and the business people—are they the ones that the Government of Canada should work with to try to convince, yes, you're now in a free trade zone, we're talking business, but we don't like what you're doing to the people, to the women, to the children, to the labour groups, to the workers?

In other words, do we have any power to squeeze them, for lack of a better term? We can't go in there like a brutal army, invade, say “We're going to set you straight”, and then leave. We can't do that. It's impossible. But to go in and have discussions with the elite and the business people, who are world travellers most likely, who have contacts in Canada... If you were a businessman in Colombia and you were coming over to see me, or I was seeing you, you may want to develop a rapport with Canada. If, even socially, you feel un froid, would you not want to say maybe this can be done, or that cannot be done, and help work at it?

• 1655

Mr. Hal Klepak: A study that I think CIDA was wise in organizing recently tried to look at that very issue.

A wonderful man named Fernando Cepeda, who used to be ambassador to Canada—perhaps some people in the room know him—who is a real intellectual of the correct stripe, once said that the business community is el gran ausente, it's the absent big guy on the block in this. He had something called Ideas para la Paz, which is Ideas for Peace, which is an NGO.

He would be the first to say we are talking about a business community that, for historical reasons, cultural reasons, and perhaps political reasons as well, has not traditionally got involved. It is the grey pressure in government, but it is not the organized structure. It's a bit like a sponge. You press, and it just yields. You then say, well, I should just press somewhere else, and it yields again.

It's very hard. It is remarkable how little has been done on the NGO front in terms of organizing views. It's true that they have a lot to lose, but it is exceptional. I know our ambassador sees this as significant.

How do you address it, when they themselves are divided into the big farming elements, and even then between crops and ganaderos, and between cattle people, between big exporters and small local people? It just doesn't lend itself, it would appear, easily at least, to the creation of a pressure point.

But God knows, that's the pressure point we need within the elite, capable of touching government, close to where government can feel it. We're a long way from success. Perhaps it is an area where Canada can do more.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Okay.

Madame Rojas.

Ms. Cristina Rojas: I want to complement that and mention that business people have been involved in the negotiations and the negotiation committee. I don't remember at the moment, but at least a few months ago the head of that committee was one of the most important businessmen in Colombia.

In Colombia there are five groups that have a lot of power and wealth. They are named the cacaos, which means chocolate, because that was the way money was exchanged in Colombia. The five of them are the richest people in the country.

The five of them went to San Vincente del Caguan to have meetings with the guerrilla. They are involved in the negotiations, and as you say, they even have these foundations that in the past were private businesses.

So I think it's important to work with them, but it's also important that people understand that issues like income redistribution, land redistribution, taxes, and welfare are important, because I think one of the failures in Colombia has been precisely the lack of social reform. This is an issue that has to be brought and made one of the points in the negotiations.

In that sense, I would say that business people need to be more generous. Without the involvement of the private people, the agreement, the peace, will be very difficult. They have to be involved.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Should social reform come from within the country, amongst the groups, or should it come from organizations like CIDA?

Ms. Cristina Rojas: I think it should come from both of them.

As I said before, Colombia has not been very strong in terms of income distribution. Colombia, with Brazil and Chile, is one of the countries with the worst patterns of income distribution in Latin America.

Latin America is the continent with the highest inequity in income distribution in the world. Africa and Asia don't have that problem. There is high inequality in the region, and in Colombia in particular.

• 1700

Yes, I think there has to be involvement by CIDA, and here also Canada has an important role, not only through CIDA, but in the IDB, the World Bank, the OAS.

As I said before, the structural adjustment in the countryside has left a lot peasants poorer. So I think this kind of model, this kind of thing, needs to be looked at through another lens. Without that, peace will be very difficult.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: What other countries are participating in Colombia like we do through CIDA?

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Luis, I thought you indicated that you have that information. You must.

Mr. Luis van Isschot: No, I don't have the specific information.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Oh, you just look after Canadian-based NGOs.

Mr. Luis van Isschot: No, but I can tell you that our organization receives money from a variety of European sources. There are many countries in Europe in particular that have direct donations. I'm not an expert in this particular field.

Mr. Hal Klepak: It's the Dutch, the Swiss, the Swedes, the usual players, and CIDA is in very close contact with them on the ground.

They do have meetings to try to see what can be coordinated from at least local funds that are at ambassadorial discretion or if CIDA has equivalent discretion. But I think everyone agrees that, again, like Central America, it's not particularly well coordinated. These are sovereign governments with budget issues, and so on, at home, and of course everyone likes to have their own flag on projects that are of value. It's very natural.

I think there's some coordination. There are other players. There are lots of people who look around for ideas on how one could coordinate on ideas to get better bang for a limited buck—but not a terribly limited buck. There's a lot of money out there.

One of the accusations made is that Colombia is not very good at receiving. Rather again like Central America, it's not necessarily very good at bringing in what might be available. Obviously Plan Colombia would be the exception in some ways, and the rule in others. But there are lots of other players.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: To Mr. van Isschot, regarding your Peace Brigades International, you just go there and accompany people. I wonder what your parents think of that. You're about the age of my son, and if my son left like that to go to some village in a country where I need a program to follow what the hell's going on and none of it is good, I'd worry about you at night.

Mr. Luis van Isschot: Sure.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: What do you do exactly? You just accompany people in villages?

Mr. Luis van Isschot: I'll try to boil it down for you very concisely.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: What do you tell your parents?

Mr. Luis van Isschot: Let's tackle that question second.

The first issue is the accompaniment that we do, which is a model we've developed over the last 21 years. We've been doing it since the early 1980s in Central America. It is a model of accompaniment that relies on much more than the fact of being a foreigner, of looking different from the average Colombian or having a foreign passport. It's something much more profound than that, because we have made great efforts to not only dialogue with the Colombian government, but with the entire international community at the governmental, non-governmental, and multilateral levels, so that if something were to happen to a member of our organization, there are a great number of people concerned for our well-being, not just as individuals and as human beings, but also for the work we do. They value our presence in the field—Canada being one of those countries, but our contacts extend through the UN system, and so on.

It's a philosophy of trying to mitigate an armed conflict in a very specific way, in very specific situations, to create small breathing spaces where people can do human rights work or community organizing work that is non-violent, that looks for non-violent solutions to a conflict, whereby humanitarian aid can be delivered safely to communities that are in trouble, that are displaced, because we are the ones on the ground who can provide aid delivery organizations or agencies with information about the security situation of a displaced community so that they can be more responsive.

• 1705

That's a typical example. It's a classic example. Or we would be working in the same region with Médecins Sans Frontières, OXFAM, the Red Cross, etc., and we all communicate on a regular, if not daily, basis. So that's a picture of what we do.

We're not all young people. I'd say the average age of our volunteers is probably about 35 years old, which is relatively young, but it reflects a certain range.

What do our parents think about this, or what do our families think about this? It depends on each individual. My parents read the Colombian newspapers online when I'm there and follow the situation very closely.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): They must be very proud of you.

Mr. Luis van Isschot: Maybe they are.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): They have to say “We've done all right”.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Okay. We tried, but,

[Translation]

practically speaking,

[English]

there you are going from village to village accompanying groups even if it's international groups, but helping the community. Then I can picture paramilitary groups roaming around—on a mule, on a jeep, on I don't know what exactly. In their eyes, aren't you a nuisance? If you are, you have to rely on their sense of humour. If they're in a bad humour one morning, you need—

Ms. Luis van Isschot: Right.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: What protection do you have? Because these are lawless people.

Ms. Luis van Isschot: Well, I think the base assumption is that paramilitaries, guerrilla organizations, even the army in a given situation, are political actors. The violence that they carry out has political objectives and we have to understand those objectives. We have to understand the motivations of an armed actor whose goals are political or politicized and judge how sensitive they are to international pressure, because amazing as it may sound, even somebody who openly admits to massacring peasants in Colombia, as is the case of the leader of the paramilitary in Colombia, is sensitive to international pressure. He has put himself out there in the political world and he is sensitive to that.

So what do they feel about us? I suppose, yes, we are a nuisance. That is in fact the idea. But when push comes to shove, hopefully in most situations we can judge where our presence can be useful. There are obvious times when a military political objective overrides international pressure. There could be even a situation where, for example, eliminating a particular human rights worker is more important to that military, paramilitary, guerrilla organization than any repercussions that Canada, the U.S., or anyone else could bring to bear on that organization. There have been cases in Colombia like that.

So we have to judge and constantly be wary of those dynamics.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Do I still have time?

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Well, no, we're past the time. But if you want to continue on, I'm sure our witnesses don't mind, and I have a couple more as well.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Okay, two things. I'm going to point out activities that CIDA has in Colombia and I would like your impressions. Secondly, I'm going to ask you what your opinion is of parliamentarians going to—I'm going to be generous—a risky place to take photos of what is happening or to agitate those who don't like to be agitated.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): You mean to be visible and irritating.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: So let's say you start with the parliamentarians visiting there exactly. Would we be safe, yes or no? And if no or maybe, explain why. Would we be accomplishing anything except coming back with photos and saying to our relatives and friends, I have been there; I am a pseudo-Hemingway; I've been there in the middle of the mess. Would we be contributing anything positive? Let's look at that question. Then I'll ask for the points on the activities that CIDA has there.

• 1710

Ms. Christina Rojas: As I said in my presentation, I think that one of the assets that Canada has is credibility and confidence. That is something that's not very common in Colombia.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: By whom?

Ms. Christina Rojas: Everybody.

Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Oh.

Ms. Christina Rojas: I would say that really the guerrillas, the ELN and FARC, nominated Canada to be in both commissions.

Now, I think that the international press is very important. It has not been easy. Ten months ago the guerrillas didn't accept international forces, especially the FARC. They were against overseeing by international forces. It has been something very difficult for the government and even the negotiators to bring international people. It has been a struggle, let us say. Now there is an opening for international forces. This is a very important situation.

In terms of the legitimacy of the process, this is even more important, because when you go to Colombia, you are sending a message with your presence alone that you believe in the peace process and that you are able to support the peace process. As I said before, at this moment they believe that something can be done and the solution has to be peaceful. It's very important.

In terms of security, there have been commissions from Europe. Do you know who went to Colombia to the militarized zone? The president... well, I don't know if the name is president, but the director of Wall Street. He went to del Caguan and sat with Manuel Marulanda, who is the leader of the guerrilla group. Look at that in the newspaper. Maybe there's a picture.

Looking at that from the point of view of the common people, that Manuel Marulanda is able to sit with the Wall Street guy—one of the most powerful persons, the representative of capital. He is taken to the guerrillas who have been in the mountains of Colombia for 50 years. This is very important.

As far as I know—maybe you can say something different—nothing has happened; that is, there have been all kinds of commissions, and they respect... I don't know how to say it in English, but those are like hechos de paz. That is peace—

Mr. Hal Klepak: Reality is fact.

Ms. Christina Rojas: Peace reality. That's what is needed to build.

I liked the ambassador of Canada in Colombia. I was very impressed with him. He said Canada should create hechos de paz. Canada can have concrete things that will give credibility to the process, and the process needs to have credibility. Canada is not the United States. So since Canada is part of the Americas and has this kind of image in the region, I consider it is worth going.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): I believe Professor Klepak has to leave. He has a—

Mr. Hal Klepak: Buenos dias, Madame Chair.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): And they're not going to hold it for you.

Mr. Hal Klepak: They won't hold it, unfortunately.

But I would like to echo all that Professor Rojas has said. I think there are perhaps two other things.

One, very quickly, is that Canada matters in the Americas. We're not very accustomed to that in NATO and in other places, but people listen. It's actually rather embarrassing for us at times, because we have the second-largest GNP in the Americas and we're the new people on the block. People actually look at and watch what we do and say—particularly what we do, which can be embarrassing.

I think that everything she said... Also, you're the way we're going to get into the Canadian debate, since we do matter—knowledge. Because it's pretty slim pickings in terms of people who are comfortable with these issues, and if in Parliament there isn't anyone, it seems to me that's very sad indeed.

Colombia's a big country. It matters in Latin America, and we're a surprisingly big country. We matter in the Americas. It's just that next to our neighbour, we sometimes don't seem to.

• 1715

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Could I purport a request? I'm wondering whether the lack of understanding about the situation is the big problem or whether it's just that we don't know what to do about it. Or is it a combination? What I would like to ask you to do is to give us suggestions for more sources of information on Colombia. If you could send that on to us, we could do a little more research as well.

I thank all of you.

Luis.

Mr. Luis van Isschot: Can I just add a thought about the parliamentary visit? Just a thought. There are many precedents of delegations going to visit the area where the guerrillas have met with the president of Wall Street, etc., and I think that's crucial. Obviously, as government representatives that might be an item on your agenda. Thousands of miles away from that media focus and thousands of miles away from where much of the money of Plan Colombia is being currently spent, there are other parts of the country that are worth visiting as well.

Just in the beginning of this year we received a visit of six congressional offices to a very small isolated community in the region of Urabá. Six congressional offices, including two members of the House of Representatives of the United States and about eight staff people, all went up without bodyguards, without escorts, without fear to visit a small community to discuss their experience of internal displacement and their fears of guerrilla and paramilitary reprisals. Those kinds of visits I think could be added to the agenda in the event of a visit. Anyway, it's just a thought.

The Acting Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): I'd like to thank all of you for being here today. I would like to thank you for your humanitarian work. As Canadians, we're very proud of you. Thank you.

The meeting is adjourned.