SRID Committee Meeting

SUB-COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

SOUS-COMITÉ DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL DU COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, October 31, 2001

• 0742

[English]

The Chair (Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.)): I'll call the meeting to order.

This is meeting thirteen of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are undertaking a study of human rights, development, and other matters in Colombia.

We have three guests today. Jan Egeland is special adviser to the Secretary General of the United Nations on International Assistance to Colombia.

Perhaps I can ask you to introduce the two people with you and what role they play in your life.

Mr. Jan Egeland (Special Adviser to the Secretary General on Colombia, United Nations): Thank you very much, Madam Chair and honourable deputies.

I'm very happy to be here together with James LeMoyne, my deputy special adviser. It's actually good for you and those who will take records that my title is now abbreviated. I'm special adviser to the Secretary General on Colombia—not international assistance any more—he's the deputy special adviser on Colombia, and Madam Angela Kane is director for the division for the Americas and Europe of the Department for Political Affairs of the UN Secretariat in New York.

The Chair: Would you repeat that, please?

Mr. Jan Egeland: Madam Angela Kane is director of the Americas and Europe division of the Department for Political Affairs of Kofi Annan in New York.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Jan Egeland: We're very happy to be here for several reasons. One is that Canada is playing, has played, and we hope will play an important role in the search for peace and reconciliation and human rights in Colombia.

• 0745

Canada has been one of our staunchest supporters in our United Nations work there. The United Nations has some 14 programs and agencies active in Colombia, on all the issues of concern, I would say, for the international community—children, civilians in general in the armed conflict, the drug issue, human rights in general, the displacement issue, development, etc.

I myself was appointed by the Secretary General in December of 1999. It was a big step for Colombia to ask for and approve such a post. Colombia had earlier not wanted a political involvement by the Secretary General in the conflict of Colombia, but given the new peace process initiated by President Pastrana in 1998 and 1999, it took this step, and the Secretary General asked me to be his special adviser on the country.

My work, assisted by my aides here, is to liaise between the Secretary General and the parties to the conflict. We are among the few—for a good while we were probably the only ones—in the international community shuttling between the president and the leaders of the armed forces and the civilian government; and on the other side, the leaders of the FARC and the ELN.

We have established some trust and confidence on all sides, but we are not mediating and we do not have a third-party formal role in seeking an end to the conflict. We are facilitators, which means we have initiated a number of meetings and seminars and have come with a lot of proposals to the parties, but our work is a discreet one for which we do not seek publicity.

Presently, the peace process is yet again in crisis. This is the most recent of several crises. At the moment there is a suspension of contact between the ELN, the second-largest guerrilla force, and the government. We, among others, work to see that relations are re-established.

There are also troubles between the FARC and the government, since they are not negotiating for the moment and the clock is ticking toward a deadline set by the government for the zone in the south of Colombia, which is a sort of free zone for negotiations—a fairly large zone where the FARC could be in relative tranquillity while they were supposed to negotiate agreements to end the war with the government.

A number of disputes have made progress very slow, but we feel an imperfect peace process is better than a perfect war, and it is important to do whatever we can to support a continuation of the peace process Pastrana courageously initiated in 1998 and 1999, because we believe there is no military solution for either side to this conflict, which has deep social and political roots in Colombian society.

I would urge Canada to increase, if possible, its involvement and its attention and its resources toward Colombia. There is great competition from many other troubled areas, but Colombia is the biggest conflict of the western hemisphere. It has the biggest human rights problem of the western hemisphere; it has the biggest displacement problem of the western hemisphere; and it has the biggest drug problem of the western hemisphere.

• 0750

The international community should do its utmost to help the forces for peace and reconciliation and human rights in Colombia, which are many, seek an end to their conflict.

I will not go into this in great length here, but I hope that among the elements for a joint international community policy on Colombia we could all strive to convince the various political groups and parties in Colombia to make a state peace policy, and not peace policies of various successive governments that change from one government to the other.

The FARC has been fighting continuously since 1964. The leader of the FARC has been fighting more or less continuously since 1948. It's a very long conflict, and it will take time to end it. The bitterness is great, and the distrust is great on either side.

It will require a state peace policy over a long time. We think it's very important to go into, perhaps, the heart of the topic for this committee—to do as much as possible to prevent human rights abuse by doing as much as possible to exert moral pressure on all parties and actors in the conflict.

All actors are responsible for grave human rights abuse. According to reports that both we and NGOs have made, paramilitary forces are responsible for the majority of human rights abuse against civilian populations. But the guerrillas also are responsible for grave and widespread and systematic human rights abuse, including the industry of kidnapping, which affects large segments of the population.

We believe the Colombian government can do more to prevent human rights abuse, perhaps especially by the paramilitary forces but also by the guerrillas, and we believe the guerrillas can and should do much, much more to control their fronts to not attack the civilian population.

One of the things we now see an emerging national consensus on is to push for the parties to the conflict to make a global humanitarian accord, which will really be a human rights agreement, to protect the civilian population, because by far the greatest number of victims of this conflict are women, children, and refugees. They are not soldiers on either side.

I'd like to end by saying there are, as I see it, three scenarios. There is a good one, a bad one, and an ugly one.

The good one is still possible, and this is one we should work for, that there is a breakthrough in the talks with the FARC before January 20, when the zone is expiring its current term. That agreement should be precisely on protecting the human rights of the civilian population. This would build confidence that could be translated into other areas as well.

We will work to see the good scenario happen, and would hope that the Group of Friends, which Canada is part of, will continue also pushing systematically to that end.

There is also a bad scenario, and that is that we continue stumbling on as we do now. Stumbling on with a peace process that gives hope but little concrete progress would mean we will have continued masochistic kidnappings and displacements and continued suffering on a very large scale. A continued conflict would also mean great and probably increasing drug production, and drug production is really the fuel of the conflict in Colombia at the moment.

• 0755

There is also a third scenario, which is that everything breaks down and we have a very ugly total war, if you like. I think you, belonging to the western hemisphere, should know that it could become worse—perhaps much worse—and could also affect regional stability if there is not any peace process with contacts among the parties.

We do not believe in this ugly scenario, but I think we all need to be aware of it so that we can work even harder for the good scenario.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to having your questions, with my colleagues.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

[Translation]

Mr. Dubé.

Mr. Antoine Dubé (Lévis-et-Chutes-de-la-Chaudière, BQ): We have heard a number of witnesses here, and, despite that, it is hard to discern responsibilities. However, it is a fact that civilians are often threatened and even killed. That is a problem.

Last week, what struck me in the last testimony was that simply talking about international organizations, from Canada or other countries, was enough for civilians to be threatened or, at times, even killed.

Among other things, they mentioned that, in early March, the NGOs wanted to hold a conference to try... I expressed a concern at that time. Organizing things such as that when the leaders of the various NGOs have no personal security means that some, if their lives are threatened, cannot speak freely or completely. When you question them to find out more, you feel there is a kind of mutism and that they are more talkative when not testifying, which is normal. If we were in the same situation... One senses there is always fear.

What can be done? I get the impression that, if union leaders or the leaders of the various NGOs who belong to the civilian population live in that kind of fear, we cannot put our finger on what they really think. Am I wrong? Can we manage to protect these civilians for one very simply reason: freedom of expression?

[English]

Mr. Jan Egeland: I thank you for your question. I think it's a key one. The fear spread by the terror that many of the armed groups is causing among human rights activists is tremendous. I would say human rights activists, trade union leaders, and indigenous leaders are among the most vulnerable and the most targeted.

Still, I would say it is not difficult to get the truth by speaking to NGOs—and still even in the conflict areas. There is a lot of fear, but there are many courageous people, and there is an enormous wealth of NGOs in the country. There are some 500 to 700 non-governmental organizations in Colombia, and there are 40,000 registered associations in Colombia if you count the peasant groups and others—and they all represent their groups, which is of great hope, also, for the future. You have a rich fabric of society that can be used for reconciliation if it's done in the right way.

I think Canada should keep on campaigning for human rights vis-à-vis the government, vis-à-vis the armed actors, vis-à-vis the guerrillas; campaign for the armed forces to do more to prevent paramilitary violence; campaign also for more resources devoted to the presence of international human rights and other organizations—and also the presence of international people in general.

• 0800

We believe presence and witnesses are important. There is an increasing international presence, even in very troubled areas like the Magdalena Medio region in the heart of the country, or in Putumayo in the south.

I have no quick fix here. Naturally it's a country where there have been, fairly stably, around 25,000 killings—most of those are criminal killings, but very many are political killings—nearly every year for many years.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Madam?

[English]

The Chair: Go ahead, Monsieur Dubé. You still have some more time.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: The question that arises is that the committee members are considering going on site, to Colombia. There were plans to go in late November or early December. This causes no problems for our security as parliamentarians. That is not what is in question. However, when you hear that witnesses suffer reprisals after meeting people, that troubles me somewhat.

[English]

Mr. Jan Egeland: All right.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: That is the first aspect we are really considering. A request has been made for us to go there.

They have that organization which you may have heard about, a federation of the various NGOs. Would it be better for us to wait or would it be preferable for us to go as soon as possible? You talk about an international presence. Ultimately, we would be an additional presence. What do you advise us to do?

[English]

Mr. Jan Egeland: My humble recommendation is that you consider going now, which is a crucial period for Colombia. It's up to this committee to see how much time it has and how you want to organize your work, but in general, when I get these recommendations, whether it be European and other parliamentarians or NGO groups or government officials, I always ask them to go to Colombia and talk to as many sides as possible, talk to the government, the army, the NGOs, the international organizations, go out of Bogotá to one or two areas or so and meet the witnesses of violence and human rights abuse, who can also give testimony and are witnesses of violence from both sides.

I would not say it is necessarily a great risk at all for them to meet with you, but I would warn you to be careful what you say publicly. You should have possibly discreet testimony and private talks with as many as possible, and then you may come with general recommendations and a general appeal to the parties as you leave the country. You should avoid saying we heard this priest who was telling us about such and such detailed massacres or action by such and such a group. That could be dangerous for that person who would be left alone after you leave. I'm sure you would know how to handle that.

If I may make one recommendation, I would say that the most underestimated and forgotten problem that Colombia has today is the problem of the displaced. The well-known parliamentarian, trade union leader, or journalist who is killed by one or the other group generally gets a lot of attention within Colombia, and even within the international community. But the tens of thousands of new displaced, many thousands every month, get very little attention.

There are now close to 1 million displaced. Some say 2 million; some say it's 500,000. It depends on how long you define a person to be displaced. If their village is burnt down and they're driven out from their village to another place and slowly start to find some work there, how long are they displaced? But if we say it's 1 million, it's one the most serious displacement problems in the world.

• 0805

These are the forgotten victims of the conflict. These are very humble people. These are peasants, and very little attention is given to them. If I were you, I would try to interview some of them. Some are driven out by paramilitary forces and some by guerrillas, some are driven out by criminals, and some are driven out by the drug cultures. They all have stories to tell, and Canada has played a leadership role in providing political asylum to human rights campaigners and threatened people. This is something we would really like to pay tribute to, and something we hope you can be doing also in the future. I think you could get a lot of firsthand information from a trip to Colombia, on the problems there.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): I want to join in welcoming Mr. Egeland before the committee and to thank him for his work, not only on this issue, but on so many other issues around the world—he has a very distinguished history—and for sharing his assessment of the situation in Colombia.

As my colleague, Mr. Dubé, said, our subcommittee does hope to be able to travel to that area at the end of next month. Certainly we're all struggling with this dilemma of the impact of witnessing by Colombians and the potential threat.

In December 1999, Kimy Pernia appeared before our foreign affairs committee. He was speaking then about the impact of the Urra Dam project, and at the time he spoke, he indicated that even for speaking out, his life could be at risk. Tragically, as we all know, on June 2 of this year he disappeared and has not been seen since.

But certainly my own view—and I don't speak on behalf of the committee, by any means—is that when we hear from NGOs, they are pleading with us to come and to witness and to meet with them. Even though there are risks, I hope we will be in a position to do that.

A number of us around this table, including the chair, have travelled to Colombia. I was there myself earlier this year. I travelled with our ambassador to the Barranca area. There had been nine people murdered in cold blood by the paramilitaries 24 hours before we got there. We met, as well, with displaced people and the situation, as you say, is devastating.

We also met with Anders Kompass when we were there, and I must say, he voiced deep concern and frustration at the lack of progress in persuading the Government of Colombia to act on recommendations from previous years. His most recent report is a very eloquent and damning critique, frankly, of the failure, the lack of cooperation, pointing out that his office has given the location of paramilitary camps just a short distance from the military, which the government completely ignores, and so on.

I have a couple of questions. As Canadian parliamentarians from all parties, we're proud of the leadership role our government, and particularly our ambassador, Guillermo Rishchynski, has played in Colombia, but what more should we be doing in very concrete terms? Are there additional resources that should be put in place? How does the level of support from our government—and we're not here on behalf of the government, we're a committee of parliamentarians—for humanitarian projects, for the work of the United Nations, both Kompass' office and United Nations agencies, compare with the level of support from Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and others? What more should or could we be doing at this very critical time?

Mr. Jan Egeland: I do think Canada is doing a very good job there. You're supporting the right ideals and the right projects and programs. I would also like to voice my praise for the work of your ambassador, Guillermo Rishchynski, who is one of our key interlocutors in Colombia.

What more could be done? We can all do more in many different areas. More could be done for the displaced, for example. You could probably give more food to the World Food Programme. We don't even have enough food for some of the vulnerable and displaced groups.

• 0810

I think it would be good if you could continue to have discretional moneys available to your embassy for NGOs and others undertaking important reconciliation efforts, local efforts, in the country. Your aid budget is big, but it is not vast. I know the kinds of problems you would have. What I've learned from my own country and my own time in government is that it can be more effective to have $10,000 today than $100,000 next year. So having quick-impact moneys available to the embassy is one such idea. But I underline these are just ideas that you might consider as a committee.

Then I would urge you to try to engage actively and constructively with the armed forces of Colombia. The armed forces will be a key factor in reaching long-term peace in Colombia. There are several countries, including my own, Norway, that have military exchange programs that are influential in this respect. I mean, the guerrillas now have regular engagement with several in the Group of Friends, the UN, and other parts of the international community. It's also important the armed forces have such exchange focusing on humanitarian law, human rights, post-conflict roles of the modern military, etc. Again, that's another idea.

I think it is important to look at not only what one can be doing now in terms of political negotiations between the guerrillas and the government but also what can be done on the grassroots reconciliation level. The vast majority of killings in Colombia are not directly related to the political conflict between the two guerrilla forces and the army, not even to the paramilitary. They're connected to all sorts of local conflicts and local cycles of violence. There are many priests, NGOs, peasants associations, and Indian groups who try to do courageous work on a local level to create some degree of reconciliation there, and they also need support. And very often, we are talking about small sums of money.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I have a couple of other quick questions.

Mr. Jan Egeland: I think my colleague would like to add something.

Ms. Angela Kane (Political Director for Latin America and Europe, United Nations Secretariat): You also mentioned the report that the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights submits to the Human Rights Commission, and I think it's extremely important that Canada and like-minded countries support the findings of the report and request the government to do something about them. As you said, the facts are in the report and there's great frustration about doing something about them.

The other idea I had, which basically follows on what Mr. Egeland said, is that the internally displaced are a huge, overlooked problem. In the United Nations, the High Commissioner for Refugees is working very actively on the program. In fact, the UNHCR's offices have been expanded. We have sent more staff to Colombia and we've started to place some staff in the neighbouring countries—for example, in Ecuador, where an office has been opened. But again, there is a limitation because of the lack of funds, because it is an overlooked problem. It's not one that's very high on the radar screen.

If you were to go there, you could focus on it, speak about it, and make it better known. I think that would be extremely helpful.

Thank you.

The Chair: You have one minute.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Okay.

The search in Colombia is for an end to this incredible bloodshed, violence, murder, and disappearances, but it's also for justice. I wonder if you could comment on some of the economic concerns—for example, the issue of land reform. You talked about displaced people not being high on the agenda, but certainly when I was there speaking with NGOs, they pointed out that, yes, peace is important, but there are huge and growing gaps between the wealthy and the poor. Land reform, respect for the rights of working people, and labour are critically important as well in the search for justice.

I wonder if you could comment on that.

• 0815

Mr. Jan Egeland: In many ways it's perhaps one of the hopeful points in Colombia that everybody seems to agree; President Pastrana, the Liberal party, the Conservative party, the FARC, the ELN, and the paramilitary all now have political platforms that say Colombia should have deep political and economic reform, land reform, constitutional reform, etc.

One can ask, then why are they fighting? Well, because nobody knows how to start this kind of work. There is so much distrust, and there are also very different definitions of what “reform” means. But at least they agree there is a great deal of injustice and a great deal of exclusion, where very few people take decisions that affect the rest of the population.

Land reform should be easy in a country that has vast, unused, fertile lands. The fact that Canada, so close to the north pole, exports food to Colombia—which can have two or three harvests a year—is a big paradox, and it shows there is a great need for economic reform and so on. But how can you do reform when there is such a cruel and vicious conflict? There is so little security. People spend all their money to guard themselves. People are afraid to move, afraid to travel, afraid to invest. It's a vicious circle. Part of the circle is the social injustice, and part of it is the violence, the kidnapping, and the massacres.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Ms. Jennings.

[Translation]

Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for your presentation.

You emphasized the role of paramilitary groups. I would like to know the official government response, first, to the very existence of those paramilitary groups and, second, to their activities. What is the government's actual response? That is one of my questions.

Second, you spoke of persons who travelled within the country, who are in a way internal refugees. What is the role of neighbouring countries in this problem of displaced persons? What is the role of neighbouring countries in this peace process which appears to have been stopped and which may completely fail?

[English]

Mr. Jan Egeland: Thank you for your questions. They're both very important ones.

President Pastrana and his government have been very clear in the condemnation of paramilitary violence. They've also admitted these are among the most grave and systematic violations of human rights, what the so-called paramilitary groups, or the AUC, the self-defence groups as they call themselves, are committing. Also, the head of armed forces, General Tapias, said to me he feels the greatest threat to internal security in Colombia in the future is not the guerrillas but the paramilitary.

A number of declarations and a number of measures have been undertaken by the government, but I think it's pertinent that you ask what is the real effect of what the government is doing, what is the real response. The reality is that too little is done in the field to prevent paramilitary violence and seek justice for the victims of paramilitary violence.

• 0820

There are various reasons for that, but one of them seems to be that certain of the brigades are not pursuing the paramilitary as they should be, and are not protecting the civilian population as they should do vis-à-vis the paramilitary.

In other parts of the country, actually, there has been more action against the paramilitary in the last six months than in the preceding six years. So, again, the picture is varied, but in general, as reported by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, we are not satisfied with the real response of the government in the field, although President Pastrana is very clear in his public statements.

With regard to the displaced, so far very few of the displaced have become refugees and crossed the borders. A few thousand have crossed the border to Ecuador. Most of them have actually returned back to Colombia through a different route, and are back in Colombia. Colombians want to stay in Colombia. They love their country. In Venezuela as well, a few thousand have come in, and also some have returned. So the vast majority of these hundreds of thousands of persons have been displaced from one part to the other, from rural countryside to the cities.

In some respects, as you will note, the displaced have less protection and less assistance than refugees. Very many of them are really in a pitiful situation.

The neighbouring countries in general are nervous of the situation in Colombia. Some of them are also in a very precarious internal situation. Equador has a big economic crisis, and has urged for both international assistance and greater preparedness in their border areas.

The neighbouring countries all support the peace process in Colombia and all voice support for a negotiated solution. Venezuela is in the Group of Friends for the peace process, with the FARC, and so is Cuba, actually, for both peace processes.

There might in the future be more of a need for some joint involvement with the Latin countries to support the peace process. Maybe this is something that can be discussed within the foras of this hemisphere.

[Translation]

Ms. Marlene Jennings: I have other questions, Madam Chair.

You mentioned the problem of the uneven response, for example, by Colombian military personnel. In some regions, the response to the activities of paramilitary groups appears to have been much more positive, whereas, in other regions, there has been a lack of response, which means there is a fairly positive response for paramilitary activities.

At the start of your presentation, you mentioned that it was necessary for the international response in general, and for the response that Canada might make in particular, to support bilateral activities with Colombian military forces, particularly on the human rights issue, etc.

I know that Canada is still very active, but it has recently been very active in Brazil, with its military forces and police departments, particularly with the RCMP and certain municipal police departments which have some working experience with international development in countries where there are human rights abuses either by the army or by police.

In Sao Paulo, for example, there are programs subsidized or funded by the federal government, with military and police officers who must work with the armed forces and police department of Sao Paulo in an attempt to resolve the violence problem there.

• 0825

You mentioned a response that will target the military forces. Is this the type of activity you were talking about, that is to say joint conferences, actual training programs and so on?

[English]

Mr. Jan Egeland: Yes, these are certainly among the kinds of things you should consider. I now have experience with ten different peace processes—Middle East, Africa, Balkans, Caucasus, Central America, and Colombia—and it's very important to engage with all parties. I am a fundamental believer in this. At times we make the mistake of talking and talking with the people who agree with us. We all agree that the situation is very bad. We have to speak with everybody and we have to try to influence everybody.

Certainly I have now many friends in the armed forces, because we had an interchange program between my country and Colombia for some years. I have learned to know them, to know their situation, and I also have some influence on them.

Local projects, training, exchanges...and the Lester Pearson centre for peacekeeping had a conference there. I think that's very good. There will not be peacekeepers in Colombia but there will be training and there will be a lot of exchanges of ideas. If possible, that could also be extended in the future to include the guerrilla forces in the same kind of activities.

[Translation]

Ms. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.

Mr. Jan Egeland: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Ms. Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): Thank you.

Welcome. I came in during your presentation, and I apologize.

You may have spoken to this earlier, but I'm very concerned about the vulnerable and displaced individuals and families at present. You did address this in response to Ms. Jennings' question.

In terms of regional security, noting that September 11 occurred and the U.S. has its focus at this point in time on maybe other regions, how would you assess the situation in Colombia? That leads into the discussion around drugs, because I think it's a very crucial factor in the conflict.

So I would like you to reflect on this for us. If you are proposing, or if you would like to see, some joint international policy, as you say, on Colombia, how can all of those elements be incorporated into a joint international set of initiatives or actions?

Mr. Jan Egeland: You pointed to one of the reasons the conflict is as intense as it is in Colombia, and that is the many armed groups. Some would call them terrorist groups and others would call them insurgency groups. Whatever name you give them, they are armed, they are very violent, and they are big. The reason they are big is that to a large extent there is a lot of fuel for conflict—namely, drugs.

But drugs are not the reason for the conflict in Colombia. Some believe that now, but the leaders of the conflict of FARC and ELN were fighting for many years before drug production became a big thing in Colombia. Today it's a very open fact that all groups derive money from the drug industry. In addition, the kidnapping industry gives a lot of money, as does the extortion industry.

But it's drugs more than anything else. The leaders of the paramilitary forces have admitted publicly that three-fourths of their income comes from drugs.

What can be done post-September 11? I think those in the north should put their heads together and look at how an effective counter-drug policy could be designed that has both carrot and stick. At the moment the stick is bigger than the carrot. That is a problem for many peasants, whose fields may be fumigated but who still don't have the package to go into the production of bananas or maize or whatever else.

• 0830

There are very good policies of alternative development undertaken by the government. The United Nations also has programs to that effect, but they are very underfunded, and they are also very slow to happen.

We all know that fumigation alone cannot solve the problem. Perhaps Canada, which is very much affected by drugs, could work with the Europeans, the United States, the other American countries, and the United Nations so that we could design a coherent, long-term strategy that looks at all sides of this—the very complex problem of demand and supply; money laundering; chemical precursors coming from the north; small arms coming from the north; how production can be stopped in the south; how to use the stick against the industrial plantations the big drug cartels and some of the armed activists have; and how to give a new package to the poor peasants so that they can go voluntarily from drugs to cultivating something for which where they have some future in getting a market.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Since we've had one round, I'm just going to put in three very short questions before we move on.

Could you tell us the effect of the presidential campaign on the peace process? And do you see any strong role that developments such as mining and oil have had in the country as a whole...and the impact of Plan Colombia?

Mr. Jan Egeland: Your second question was with regard to foreign investment in mining and oil and so on?

The Chair: If there's anything like that going on that's affecting the country in any negative or positive way.

Mr. Jan Egeland: Some of that falls outside my portfolio and some certainly falls within it. All are very key questions for Colombia and the future of Colombia.

The presidential campaign will be the dominating political consideration in the next months until a new president takes office on August 7 of the coming year. It's never easy to be in your last year in any democratic country, but it's even worse to be in your last seven months if there is conflict and there is economic crisis, as there is now in Colombia.

The presidential candidates are people you should try to meet, if you go there, or at least meet their campaigns if you can't see the candidates. You should ask them to take stands, in my view, in favour of a negotiated solution, in favour of systematic human rights prevention and protection, in favour of the UN and other recommendations, and so on and so forth.

We've been meeting with the candidates ourselves, and we've urged them to take these stands. We've had fairly encouraging responses, or at least on most of our questions. However, certainly any campaign—as you would know, being politicians—may easily lead to taking positions that would be populistic rather than in the long-term interests of peace and human rights of the country.

On investment in mining and petrol and so on, this falls a little bit outside of my area. I would say foreign investment is very important for Colombia, and it is very important that the foreign investment is undertaken in a socially responsible manner and in a manner that would add to reconciliation rather than to increased local and regional tension.

• 0835

In this way, Colombia is like any other country. It is not good for Colombia that foreign investment is now hurt by what is seen as lack of security. At the same time, it's not good for some of the foreign investors that they are seen as not taking adequately into account local needs for protection of Indian rights or social rights and so on. But I would not generalize here. In many of these cases, it is difficult to distinguish the facts among the many different versions presented.

Plan Colombia has become a very much debated and controversial issue in Colombia. In general, we do not comment on bilateral policies of individual countries. As such, I'd rather not go into the U.S. package. It is a big package with both military elements and traditional socio-economic support elements.

I'd like to say that in Plan Colombia are also many good intentions and good programs that affect UN-sponsored activities as well. Many of those are not very well funded and also slow to take effect, although there are also programs that are now taking place and giving hope locally and in other areas.

We believe strengthening of the justice sector is important as part of that umbrella plan. Plan Colombia has been wrongly identified as a U.S. bilateral package, for various understandable and other reasons. Plan Colombia is, however, a vast umbrella for lots of different domestic and international support programs that go far beyond that bilateral package. As I say, strengthening of the justice sector, support for the displaced, support in building roads and infrastructure in conflict areas and so on are also very much within what the government has coined “Plan Colombia”.

The Chair: Okay. Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Dubé.

Mr. Antoine Dubé: Since your last reply partly answered my question, I'll try to change that question.

You say that you cannot comment too much on the Colombia Plan even though you nevertheless did so somewhat. Once again last week, witnesses openly criticized that plan, saying that, in their view, it was not a solution for peace, that another approach should be taken. It was really perceived by them as an American plan, a plan mainly emphasizing the security aspect.

I am somewhat embarrassed because you want to keep your distance from that, but questions arise in my mind. In my view, it would be better to know the elements of the Colombia Plan you are working on so it is no longer perceived as an American action, but rather as a U.N. intervention. And that brings me to my question.

Is U.N. aid perceived favourably by Colombians? If not, as I believe it is not, is it somewhat mixed up with the American action? Could you comment on Canadian bilateral aid since that is a concern for us? How do you perceive it?

My questions are a bit vague because I understand your situation is delicate.

[English]

The Chair: We'll see what he can do with it.

Mr. Jan Egeland: My answer will be equally unclear, I suppose.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

• 0840

Mr. Jan Egeland: I'd like to clarify that Plan Colombia was conceived and presented by President Pastrana and the Colombian government. It is their initiative. The United Nations was not part of developing Plan Colombia as such.

I do say, however, that it affects our work. Some of our programs have been included by the government in this umbrella of $7.5 billion U.S., of which $1.6 billion U.S. is the U.S. bilateral package. The rest is—should be—to a large extent funded by governmental sources, by private sources, and by other international sources. To a large extent it is still unfunded. In that plan some NGO projects are included that are undertaken by NGOs who criticize other elements of Plan Colombia.

So it's a big umbrella, really. In many ways it could be called the “national development plan”. UN assistance, which is mostly outside of that thing that has been coined by the government as Plan Colombia, is, I would say, uniformly well received in Colombia, whether it is by the government, even by the armed actors, by local communities, by the church, and so on. They say it's good, although they do have one criticism: There is too little of it.

I mean, it's our strength and our weakness—you will see this, if you go—that we have a very diverse program. All of our 15 offices and active programs are relatively small.

Canadian assistance is the same. It's very well seen, and very well regarded, but it's not very big. So if there is any criticism, it's that it could be bigger.

The Chair: Mr. Robinson, briefly.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Sure. I have just two questions.

Actually, Ms. Phinney had asked my questions, particularly with respect to Plan Colombia. Frankly, the fiction of Plan Colombia, the idea that somehow there's this great $7 billion program out there, and so on.... I mean, it's really driven by the United States bilateral program.

But you don't have to comment on that.

[Translation]

Mr. Antoine Dubé: You can say that again.

[English]

Mr. Svend Robinson: I can it say it, though, yes.

Two questions. One is with respect to the UN Human Rights Commission.

I must say, I have attended sessions of this commission for many years. Some of my colleagues have attended as well. I find this probably the single most frustrating forum within the United Nations. It's a forum that is often steeped in hypocrisy. The kind of power politics that take place there are extraordinary.

We have a country, as you yourself said, that has the worst human rights record in the hemisphere, and the best the UN Human Rights Commission can come up with is a chairperson's statement voicing concern—despite the fact that your representative has said the situation has deteriorated over the years.

You know, they can come up with a special rapporteur on Cuba. The last time I looked, there weren't trade unionists being assassinated in Cuba. There weren't whole villages being wiped out by murderers in Cuba. However, there are human rights concerns in Cuba, no question about that.

I appreciate the delicacy of your situation, because you work within this framework of the United Nations, but what more should the international community be doing? What should the international community be doing within the framework of this body, the United Nations Human Rights Commission, to indicate its deep concern about the deterioration in the human rights situation there? Would it be helpful to call for the appointment of a special rapporteur, for example, or would that be counterproductive? The United Nations does at least have a foothold there now and has a presence, which is hard to come by. Perhaps you can comment on that.

As well, some players in Colombia are saying that the AUC should be at the table, that the paramilitaries should be at the table, as part of the peace process. Certainly they want to be there. I don't think they should be there, but I wonder if you could comment on that issue.

Ms. Angela Kane: Since I brought up the Human Rights Commission I think I'm the one who's condemned to answer your question.

• 0845

Basically, as you said, all the facts are before the commission. The commission is composed of representatives of member states. They are the ones who set the policy. So if there is any hypocrisy, as you called it, if policies being set in the Human Rights Commission are not, in turn, by the secretariat, what we can do, and what the representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights does, is present a report. Basically, based on the facts in the report, the matter is discussed or is not discussed—whatever agreement is reached among the member states.

I understand there was a proposal at one point to have a special rapporteur on Colombia. I also understand that proposal did not find majority opinion, and therefore an office was established in Colombia. I think that is already something that is a concession, if you could call it that, from the government, because it is not very comfortable to have someone in a whole office that, as I understand it, the government partially pays for in the country, and that basically points the finger at very strong human rights abuses.

Again, I must stress that whatever accommodation is reached in the commission, it's done by the member states. The member states are the UN.

So I have to throw the ball back in your court and say that you have to talk to your other government colleagues to see what can be done about the situation and how to handle it.

Mr. Jan Egeland: Just let me add that, in many ways, it's a big step forward, after all, that there is a human rights office there. It's active, it has a presence, and it's going to step up its work with regional offices. There is an annual report that is very clear and very explicit. As well, there is, after all, a chairman's statement that comes with very concrete recommendations that should be followed up.

Should the AUC be at the table? It's a key question, really. The government is against them being at the table. The government is against us, as internationals, having contact with them. Officially, they see the AUC as organized crime rather than a political organization. We do not, therefore, have direct contact with them.

I do not discard anything for the future. Maybe at some point there should be contact with them, as they're a big force, a de facto force. But there should be such contact when there is a clear strategy for achieving something—for example, an end to violations and an end to hostilities, and potentially a reintegration of these young men in the society of Colombia.

Again, this is something that will have to be discussed during a new precedent. I don't see any changes at the present stage.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you.

The Chair: Jean.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Mr. Egeland, if we are to work towards a joint international policy in Colombia, if we are to work towards a global humanitarian accord, what is the possibility of the acceptance of a formal international facility for the peace process? That has been tried in Africa, as you know. Would that be out of line in the present thinking?

Mr. Jan Egeland: It wouldn't be out of line at all. It would be very pertinent to put it there, and we are putting it there.

Actually, in ten days I will participate in a conference on transitional justice in Bogota. People from South Africa, Central America, Europe, and many other places will speak of transitional justice, which is an issue that will have to be increasingly debated in Colombia.

So it's not out of line, but it certainly is a new concept to the parties there, and it takes time for new concepts to be accepted.

• 0850

Colombia has been for too long a conflict forgotten by the international community and for too long a conflict in which the parties agreed on one thing—not to bring the international community into the internal conflict of Colombia.

That is changing. The world understands the need to help the process for peace and conciliation in human rights in Colombia, and Colombians understand that there needs to be international assistance and presence there. One day there will be verification, observation, facilitation, and maybe even mediation by the international community in the peace process and in protection of human rights in that country.

The Chair: Did you want to add something, Mr. LeMoyne? Go ahead.

Mr. James LeMoyne (Deputy Special Adviser to the Secretary General on Colombia, United Nations): Just so it's very clear, Mr. Egeland really works under the good offices of the Secretary General. We have no mandate beyond that at this point in Colombia.

If you want to be formal about it, we've been invited to advise and assist the Colombians in what they still define, diplomatically and politically, as an internal conflict. So when one enters into human rights, the humanitarian crisis of the displaced, or the political issues of the peace process itself, we have no real instruments or standing to enter and engage those issues in an international forum other than discussing it. We have no mandate beyond that. One could see that as a limitation to the process. Maybe Mr. Egeland is right; given that the Colombians have never permitted the UN to be active, his appointment is one step, but in a way, it's a process of education.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Egeland will be leaving his position at the end of this year and will become Secretary General of the Norwegian Red Cross.

The committee would like to thank you for the good work you've done over the two years you've been there. We'd also like to thank you for coming this morning. We don't usually have our meetings this early.

We excuse those who had to leave. We have caucus meetings on Wednesday morning, and some people have to get to those meetings.

Again, thank you for coming. We wish you good luck in your new job.

Mr. Jan Egeland: Thank you very much. And thank you for having us.

The Chair: We are adjourned until 3:30 this afternoon.