:
Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by saying that we see this matter, this question of privilege and the motion before the House of Commons as important. We will therefore support this motion so that it can be adopted as quickly as possible and this whole matter, this question of privilege, can be referred to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs as quickly as possible.
It is a well-known fact that foreign interference matters to us. The member for , the member for and the entire NDP caucus moved a motion a year ago. The House of Commons voted on a motion of non-confidence in the special rapporteur who had been appointed by the to look into the issue of foreign interference. The NDP moved the motion, which was adopted by four out of five parties. While we had great confidence in Mr. Johnston as an individual, we did not have confidence in his role as special rapporteur. One week after the adoption of that NDP motion of non-confidence in the position of special rapporteur, Mr. Johnston resigned.
The parties then began the negotiations that led to the Hogue commission. Justice Hogue has done a lot of work. She has already produced her interim report, which was released last week. We know a few important things about it that I think are related to this question of privilege. One thing that she mentioned is that we know who some of the foreign government agencies are.
Even more importantly, the interim report indicates that there were two problems. The intelligence disclosed to the government was not communicated properly to the affected candidates or MPs in either the 2019 or 2021 elections. What does that mean? The NDP thinks that we need to quickly implement protocols setting out how to communicate this type of information. We also need to make decisions to prevent this sort of thing from happening again.
As Justice Hogue mentioned, there is no doubt that this did not change the outcome of the 2019 and 2021 elections. The reality, however, is that the possibility of foreign interference is becoming more and more critical. If we want to ensure that future elections are not affected and that our work in the House is not influenced by foreign interference, then we need to implement protocols. The secret intelligence that is shared with the government needs to be communicated to affected individuals. We must also make absolutely certain that measures are taken to prevent these attempts at foreign interference from succeeding.
For all these reasons, we support this motion. This motion speaks to the fact that there was an attempt to influence or affect 18 members through cyber-attacks. This information was never communicated to the affected members. That is worrisome. As we can see, the motion is coming from both sides of the House. There is the member for , of course, but there is also the member for and the member for , who intervened on this matter.
Members on both sides of the House have pointed out the problem, which is that we do not know what intelligence has been shared with the government but not communicated to members.
For all these reasons, we have to act quickly. If I am saying today that we need a protocol, and if the Hogue commission's preliminary report already shows that something needs to be done, then we have to take action. We have to ensure that incidents like these do not happen again. The matter has to be referred to the procedure and House affairs committee quickly.
I know that we will be discussing and debating the topic this evening. All of the parties already seem to support the motion. I do not think that we need to delay the adoption of this motion unnecessarily. I think we need to adopt it, unanimously if possible, and refer it right away to the procedure and House affairs committee, which is already equipped to deal with the matter.
Before the Hogue commission was created, the NDP moved motions at the procedure and House affairs committee. These motions were subsequently adopted by the House of Commons. That shows that the committee is already well equipped to take control of what happens next, make recommendations and inform the House of Commons of the actions that should be taken.
Yes, this work will be done in parallel. We already have the Hogue commission, which will also present recommendations and actions to be taken by the government, election officials and anyone else who cares about national security and the importance of maintaining or preserving our democracy. Of course, it is important that we take these actions. That is why I strongly suggest that tonight, between now and midnight, we adopt the motion unanimously and immediately refer it to the procedure and House affairs committee.
[English]
We have a situation where 18 parliamentarians suffered a cyber-attack. As was mentioned, they were not successful. Actions were taken by the House administration, which is important, but the Hogue commission's interim report has come out. Members will recall how the NDP presented the motion that led to the special rapporteur receiving from the House of Commons a polite refusal of the position of special rapporteur. New Democrats expressed non-confidence in the creation of the position of special rapporteur. We believed a public inquiry was absolutely needed and presented that motion on the floor of the House of Commons about a year ago. I think it was 50 weeks ago today that we moved that motion in the House. Four of the five parties, three of the four recognized parties and the non-recognized party, in the House of Commons voted for that motion.
David Johnston, to his credit, as we know he is respectful of democracy, saw that expression of non-confidence in the position of special rapporteur. It was not an expression of non-confidence in him. He is a man who has always served the country and worked hard to do everything he can for this country, but New Democrats expressed non-confidence in the position of special rapporteur. A week later, Mr. Johnston stepped down from that position, and the negotiations began to put in place the Hogue commission. Justice Hogue has been working very hard and very diligently to put forward the recommendations, which we should be getting at the end of the year.
However, what is clear from her report, and what is also clear from this question of privilege today, is that the government is privy to information that is not being effectively communicated. It was not effectively communicated in the 2019 or 2021 elections. It was not communicated to either members of Parliament or candidates who were involved. That is very clear.
It is clear from the Hogue commission that that occurred when we see this question of privilege where 18 members of Parliament were targeted by a cyber-attack, yet the government did not choose to inform them. In fact, it was a newspaper article that informed them. The FBI informed the government, and the government did not pass that information on.
We can say that we were lucky that the cyber-attack against those members of Parliament failed because of measures that were taken, but that still begs the question of why the government did not communicate that information. That has been a consistent theme from the 2019 election and the 2021 election, and now in the case of this question of privilege. We need to have protocols in place. We have called, as well, for the government to put in place a foreign agent registry. There seem to be some moves in that regard. That is important.
The government must put in place protocols about how to communicate information, including sensitive intelligence information, so that the process is clear prior to the next election. In that way, we can make sure we will not have the kind of foreign interference that may have failed in 2019 and 2021, but could be successful the next time if we do not take measures to prevent it. The government needs to do work on its side. The Hogue commission will be offering that full range of recommendations. That is very important as well, but PROC has been well equipped to handle this kind of work. The PROC report, which the NDP moved motions on and brought forward to the House, was endorsed by the House of Commons a little over a year ago. It was the first in-depth reaction to the potential for foreign interference in this country, as a result of which, this motion was rapidly moved.
This evening, as we have done a round of speeches, I do not think we need to spend a lot of time talking about this. We need action. That means referring this rapidly to PROC. We can do that this evening. We can choose, by unanimous consent, to adopt it on division, so that this matter will be referred promptly to procedure and House affairs. Certainly, my recommendation to the House is that we proceed rapidly on this, that we move quickly to actually have the procedure and House affairs committee respond to the seriousness of this question of privilege and then move to get the recommendations that will lead to action.
We have limited time. The official date of the next election, as members will recall, is the fall of 2025. This is a minority Parliament. It could happen before then. It is incredibly important. All of the actions need to be taken. That is why we suggested that the deadline for the Hogue commission report should be by the end of this year, so that we would have the time to implement all of the recommendations, and have the time as well to implement recommendations that may come out of procedure and House affairs following this question of privilege and the motion that refers the question of privilege to procedure and House affairs. We cannot delay. We cannot dilly-dally. We cannot spend a lot of time talking about it. We need action.
I will close, even though there is more time to speak, because I believe it is important to get to a resolution on this. I will close by suggesting to all members of the House that tonight we refer this to the procedure and House affairs committee, either on division or by unanimous consent. We can refer it to PROC and, tomorrow morning, let the committee get to work on the important work of responding to this question of privilege and looking at why the government did not inform those members of Parliament and what the procedure and protocol should be next time, if there is a next time, which is likely, so those members of Parliament can be fully informed. We could then take the appropriate actions to stop any future attempts at foreign subversion or foreign interference in our electoral process.
:
Mr. Speaker, before I begin my remarks, I would like to state that I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for . I certainly look forward to his remarks as well.
Two weeks ago, I was sitting in my constituency office when I got a message from my colleague from . He informed me that there was going to be a special meeting of a small group of us, where he would inform us of a very grave and serious situation. I do not know if one has ever received news where one was told they are the target of a cyber-attack, but I will say that it is terrifying. It is a moment in someone's life when the blood drains from one's face.
When someone is told the date of those attacks, January 2021, one wonders what they were doing that month. What was going on in their life that month? How serious is this attack? It is something I do not want anyone to ever experience again, in this chamber or anywhere else in the world, but unfortunately, it happened.
One starts to wonder if this happened to me, and this also happened to other colleagues in the House of Commons, then clearly, this is also happening within our nation. Who is attempting to obtain what information? How successful are they? How many attacks like this are going on at this time? Worse than that, the Liberal government knew about this attack, yet it did not inform me, and it did not inform my colleagues. It is reprehensible. It is absolutely horrible.
I would like to thank again the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China for informing myself and my colleagues that we were the targets of such an attack. I would also like to thank the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States of America for once again doing the heavy lifting that the Liberal government should be doing. It is shameful that we were informed, through foreign governments, that we were under attack.
Unfortunately, it is not a surprise to me. It is not a surprise at all because we found out, just this past week, in the foreign interference report that the former member for Steveston—Richmond East was not successful in his election campaign as a result of foreign interference.
Last year, we saw the effects of a foreign government, the same PRC government, on the member for , who sits in this very aisle. He was also the victim of the interference of a foreign government in an attempt to try to gain information on his family to try to intimidate him.
Unfortunately, I had the honour of being the shadow minister for democratic institutions back in 2018-19. At that time, I begged the member for to do something about it at that time, and it fell upon deaf ears.
We set up things like the Leaders' Debates Commission, which housed a member of the WE Charity scandal. The commission was overseen by the former special rapporteur, who clearly failed in his mission to try to keep this chamber and to keep Canadians safe. We saw the implementation of the toothless digital charter, which achieved nothing to protect Canadians and to protect members of the House.
We spent hours going over Bill , where we talked about things like vouching. We talked about things like returning officers. We talked about things like the closing of polls across our nation, yet this did very little to solve the problem that is in front of us now, which is foreign interference.
Once again, it is the absence of responsibility of the Liberal government not only to do something about foreign interference, but also to even have the courtesy, the decency and the moral placement to let members of the House know that they were under attack and under threat. We did not get that courtesy, and it is an absolute shame.
Once again, we have seen that the government has done too little, too late. We see this time and time again. We saw this in 2019, when I would try and raise questions with the member for , with the , and the only response I would receive was that the Prime Minister had an indication that there had been some interference by Russia in the 2015 election, which is very cold comfort at this time, given what we know now.
The 2018-19 election was, my goodness, five years ago now. The Liberals have had five years to do something. Clearly, they have not spent their time doing anything. They are, once again, doing what they do best and that is creating the illusion of doing something when, in fact, they are happy to do nothing because, as we saw with the member for , as we saw with the member for , it benefits them to do nothing, so they have done nothing, and they will keep doing nothing.
Even if I blame the member for , I know that this direction was from the top. There is no doubt in my mind that this direction was from the top, and the same thing here. I am sure that the Liberals wanted to ignore the cyber-attack and that they wanted to ignore the potential harm it could have caused me, my family and 17 other members of the House. They wanted to turn a blind eye to that because that is what they do. They do not want to take responsibility for the types of atrocities that take place against myself, against other members of the House and against the Canadian people.
The good news about this is that this will not deter myself, and this will not deter the from continuing to stand up for democracy, human rights and the rule of law, not only in this nation, but also across the world as well. Members will continue to see us standing side by side with our allies in Taiwan, in Israel and in Ukraine. Once again, this is something that we do not see the Liberal government doing.
We see the government picking and choosing winners and losers, speaking out of both sides of its mouth, again, not only to the harm of people in the House, not only to the harm of Canadians, but also to the harm of people across the world. As I said, that is because this government will always turn a blind eye. Do members know what happens when we turn a blind eye? Evil prevails. Evil prevails in the House when the current government turns a blind eye. Evil prevails across this country when the government is not willing to take responsibility, as I begged the member for to do all those years ago; and evil prevails across the globe.
It is not a surprise that I was informed, after the fact, that this government had neglected its responsibility to keep our citizens safe and to keep members of this chamber safe, who were informed by a foreign entity, by someone else doing the work that the Liberals should be doing. Shame on them for trying to hide it from us and for keeping it from us. Once again, they would know, Canadians would know, that they had shirked their responsibility and that they had not done what they were supposed to do in overseeing the safety of the House and the safety of the members of the House.
As I said, I have, unfortunately, seen this time and time again, so it is not a surprise to me at all that we were left in this position and that we were left as targets of this foreign government and other foreign governments that are looking into us. I am not naive. I was in the Canadian foreign service, now elected to the House, and I understand that, I am sure, I will always be a target for those foreign governments. However, this government was informed by another government and was informed by another organization that is attempting to do the work that the Liberals should be doing, which is keeping Canadians safe and keeping members of the House safe.
We can refer this matter to PROC. I certainly hope that we do, but I hope it is with greater results than the previous times, when we saw Bill come out of PROC with no shield for the members of the House and no shield for Canadians. I hope, this time, that the Liberal government takes foreign interference seriously, does not pretend and actually does something about it.
:
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the ruling that we need to look into this, and it needs to go to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs for a fulsome investigation. The privileges of members of Parliament here are really sacrosanct, and we need to make sure that we are protecting them. I am concerned that privilege has been violated.
I am one of the 18 Canadian parliamentarians targeted by APT31, a hacking group from the People's Republic of China working under the Ministry of State Security. The role of APT31 includes transnational repression, economic espionage and foreign interference operations on behalf of the People's Republic of China. That Communist regime, of course, has been interfering in our operations and elections here in Canada. It has been trying to quash members of Parliament who are speaking out against the Communist regime, the way that it has been violating human rights and interfering in geopolitics around the world.
The reason we know that Canadian parliamentarians were targeted is because the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed an indictment from the FBI on seven individuals from APT31 on March 25. It charged seven PRC nationals with espionage and foreign interference. The U.S. Department of Justice put sanctions on these individuals. The U.S. State Department is also offering rewards for more information about them. When reading through the indictment and some of the activities of APT31, we realize that they had conducted over 10,000 different cyber-hacks around the world, predominantly targeting legislators.
It specifies that the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, IPAC, was targeted in 2021. I am a member of IPAC, and all 18 members in Canada who were targeted are also members of IPAC. IPAC was quite shocked to see that this had happened when it realized this in April; it quickly notified all its members in Europe, Canada, the United States and Australia. Of course, the Americans already knew about it. The FBI had alerted their congressmen and senators. They were very concerned.
Let us go through the timeline. APT31 targeted me and my colleagues, the 18 of us, in a phishing cyber-hack into our emails. The FBI discovered this in 2021-22. It let U.S. legislators know and then followed the proper Five Eyes protocol and let CSE in Canada know. CSE then contacted House of Commons services through its IT branch, but nothing happened. There were crickets. None of the Canadian parliamentarians were notified by CSE, by the government of Canada or by the House of Commons protective services. It was all mute.
IPAC found out in 2024 that its membership around the world, including 18 members in Canada, were targeted; this was two years after the hacking event happened, two years after CSE and the House of Commons were notified that it happened. Nobody thought it important enough to contact the parliamentarians to tell us that our emails and online services were potentially compromised. At that time, in 2019 and 2021, we were already witnessing foreign interference taking place in our federal elections. The PRC was using operatives to intimidate members of Parliament and their families, as we saw with the member for with his family back in Hong Kong. They were trying to intimidate him and all the people here in Canada.
We know that PRC police stations were set up across this country to interfere with and intimidate the Chinese nationals who call Canada home. We know the PRC was using foreign students to flood nomination meetings. Throughout all that time, the Liberal government turned a blind eye.
The Liberals have no problem with the PRC interfering in our election processes when it undermines people like the Conservative member for or Kenny Chiu, our former Conservative member of Parliament from Vancouver who lost his riding. As long as the Liberals think they are benefiting, they are prepared not to do anything about it.
We know, through Justice Hogue and her commission on foreign interference, that there is sound evidence to show that foreign interference is undermining our democratic institutions. I have been very active, of course, on standing up for Ukraine and holding Russian oligarchs and corrupt foreign officials around the world to account. I am trolled all the time on social media by Russian trolls. I was even asked to appear as a witness at the Hogue commission because of the ongoing attacks that happened on my social media platforms.
I am also a patron of Hong Kong Watch Canada, again standing up for democracy and civil liberties in Hong Kong because of the Communist regime's activities there, quashing any individual rights and liberties, especially free and fair elections in Hong Kong.
Also, I am the shadow minister for national defence for the official opposition. Therefore, if one thinks about my email potentially getting hacked by operatives for the People's Liberation Army in China, one would think somebody would have called to let me know that I was being targeted. In 2021-22, somebody should have made that call.
I am also the vice-chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence. We often deal with information on national security, our Canadian Armed Forces and our operations in Europe under NATO. I am always advocating for supplying more weapons to Ukraine. Members would think that would be enough of a red flag to see the Liberal Government of Canada contact us and say that we need to take precautionary measures to protect the information that I have and I am sharing with my colleagues, including other members on the Standing Committee on National Defence.
However, I was never notified by the CSE. I was never notified by the Parliamentary Protective Service. I was not notified by CSIS or the RCMP. Nobody from the Government of Canada has ever reached out to me to inform me that I was at risk or my colleagues were at risk and that we were potentially being undermined.
Surprisingly, I am going to get a briefing this week, tomorrow actually, from the FBI. The FBI is going to inform us, as parliamentarians, those of us who were targeted by APT31, to get the information out. One would think that the RCMP, CSIS or the CSE would be stepping up, or at the very least somebody from the Liberal government, but, no, it is mute.
That comes down to the fact that we have a Liberal government that has not taken foreign interference seriously. We have a who has never made national security a priority. National security should always be a priority for the , but it is something that is an afterthought for him. He has always downplayed the seriousness of the threats from Beijing, Moscow and Tehran. He has never stood up for us as parliamentarians to protect our democratic institutions. He has never stood up to say that we are going to protect the diaspora communities here, whether Chinese, Ukrainian or Persian, who have run away from oppression, dictatorships and totalitarian regimes.
I can tell members this. Our , the leader of Canada's Conservatives, will always defend our freedom, our democracy and our national security. We will always put Canada first. We will always stand up for the democratic rights and privileges of those of us who serve in this elected chamber, this hallowed chamber. I know that things will be better under a prime minister who represents the Conservative Party of Canada.
:
Mr. Speaker, I wish I were pleased to join the debate, but I am not. I am one of those 18 parliamentarians who had their email targeted by APT31. To be perfectly honest, I did not know what APT31 was. I think many of my colleagues know that I spend a lot of time in diaspora communities, so I do know quite a bit about random, obscure groups that many of us do not pay attention to, but this is a new one even to me. I had to have staff actually look up what exactly this particular group was involved in.
The attack was back in January 2021. By “attack”, I do not mean a physical attack. This was a digital hacking attempt, pixel reconnaissance. Again, that is another term I did not know, so I had to look it up. It was, I think, a sophisticated attempt. I would not have thought about it.
My colleagues and members of other political parties know that I am quite paranoid. I think a little bit of paranoia is healthy in this line of work. I used to work for the department of defence as an exempt staffer for the Minister of National Defence during the Afghan war. I worked at the Alberta finance department as a policy adviser, where the security of budget documents was important, so just as a regular practice, I would do things like stopping my emails from automatically opening images. Little did I know that, in this situation, that would have helped me out, because those images are the ones that contain one pixel that would upload code onto whatever device would open it. In the case of my email account, I did ask my staff on their computers to verify whether those emails were opened and were still there in my email account, and they were.
This is one of the problems I have with what the government's position has been, along with the Communications Security Establishment and the House of Commons cybersecurity. As soon as I found out about this, just a few weeks ago, I contacted them immediately to find out whether they knew or whether there was something that I should do. At first, I got kind of mixed messages from them, saying they kind of knew about the investigation but they did not know. It was not really clear. There were two different emails saying almost identical things, using synonyms to avoid actually committing to anything, which I guess is typical. I do not fault them for it. However, when it came to the fact that my email had been targeted, I would like to have been told of that fact back in January 2021. I would like to have known, because I could have deleted those emails. I may have gone back to those emails several times and opened them all over again.
I will even read the headlines for colleagues, because I have them. The first one was on January 28, 2021, and it reads, “More than 50 passengers killed”. It looks like a random story about a traffic accident in western Cameroon. We get lots of different emails. There is not necessarily a reason for us to open those. It is signed by a David Aaro, and “nropnews” is a domain name. The next email is from Brooke Singman, on China's GDP. I might have opened that email out of sheer curiosity about what an analyst might be saying. The third email has the headline of “Canada parliament labels US far-right Proud Boys group 'a terrorist entity'”, by David Aaro again.
These emails were over several days. They were not all on the same day. They are just three emails that I still have in my email inbox that I could have reopened for whatever reason while searching for another email, because nobody told me anything. Nobody did.
I think it is both immoral and unethical, what happened through the House of Commons, CSE, and especially the Liberal government. For all the talk of wanting to protect Canadians, doing right by them and ensuring there is no foreign interference, it is only when the government is called out that it starts pretending it is going to do something.
I deal with political prisoners. I deal with people who have fled their country of origin, who were political activists. They were in jail. They were on death row, some of them. They were democracy activists. They were journalists, perhaps, in their country. I have one working for me who was a journalist in a country that has an authoritarian regime that shut down her newspaper. I have met journalists who used to work in Turkey who are on the Turkish “grey list”, which is their terrorist list. This particular individual has not done any crime of terrorism. I call her the Robert Fife of Turkey. She reported on the fact that the Turkish government, during the Syrian civil war, had given weapons and arms and other means to ISIS and ISIS-affiliated jihadi groups.
These are the people I meet with. They all saw the news that I had been targeted. They all worry. It directly affects the type of work that I can do, the type of work I am interested in doing, the type of work I have been asked to do by the leader of my political party as the shadow minister for immigration, refugees and citizenship. Refugees are quite core to that. Many of these people have applied for and obtained protected person status in Canada.
I read your ruling, Mr. Speaker, and this is, like you said, material to the type of work that I do. When the government claims it is doing enough, no, it is not doing enough. The fact is that nobody on the Liberal benches in the front cabinet, especially those responsible for administrating CSIS and CSE, thought they should warn the 18 parliamentarians, including me, my colleague from , the member for and the member for .
There are several of us, and there are members of the Liberal Party. The member for is one of the co-chairs of the IPAC group that was specifically targeted for that work. It is immoral. It is unethical.
When I then turn around to the diaspora groups, the chatter I am hearing is, “If the government will not protect you, if it will not protect a member of Parliament or a senator, what chance do we have?” No wonder they are self-censoring and so scared to speak out about things that are going on in their country of origin, but also about foreign agents in Canada who are interfering with their rights to free speech as free Canadian citizens in our own country.
Now they are afraid, because they look at us. Many of us are human rights advocates. We do pro-democracy work. We help groups organize and we give them ideas on how to lobby and advocate for things on important issues that they care about. However, they then ask, “Well, if I send you the email, is it actually protected? Will you protect my identity?”
I have had meetings where members of the public have asked me to turn off my phones and put them away. I mean shut them down and put them away. I know why they are doing this; it is because they are concerned that people can easily tap into these devices, which are generally unsecured, and then they can turn on the microphones on devices.
There is a reason why, in our caucus rooms, we do not bring our devices into the room. They are left in little metal cabinets, and we roll them in and roll them out all the time. I remember, as caucus chair, trying to convince my colleagues to leave their devices behind, which is very difficult. I see some members nodding and admitting how difficult it is for them to be kept away from the devices.
Especially in the case of APT31, I started to look, and the member for before me kind of started to go into who this group was, because I was interested in this. There is a $10-million reward for seven of them on the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security's rewards for justice program. It has seven persons listed.
It says that the hackers have helped China's Ministry of State Security conduct malicious cyber operations against U.S. critical infrastructure through their front company, Wuhan Xiaoruizhi Science & Technology Company. It is part of a group of China state-sponsored intelligence officers and contract hackers known in the cybersecurity community as APT31. Again, this was news to me. I would like to have known about APT31.
However, they are not just contract hackers; they are China state-sponsored intelligence officers. The rewards for justice website says that if anyone has information on these China hackers, Wuhan APT31, also known as Zirconium, Violet, Typhoon, Judgement Panda and Altaire, or associated individuals or entities, they should contact the rewards for justice program via the Tor-based tip line, and they may be eligible for a reward or relocation.
Again, this organization is not just a random group of hackers in mom's basement. Therefore CSE, House of Commons security, the cybersecurity people, CSIS, the government, the , the and everybody else seems to claim, “Well, we told somebody; that should be good enough”, but they have a moral and ethical responsibility to inform parliamentarians directly, beyond what the law says, both for our personal protection and for the protection of people that we deal with. What they are essentially saying is that we are on our own but that if someone finds out later, they will tell us. Then they will say, “Oh yeah, whoopsie doodle. True, there was an attempted hack.” It is not enough to say that the hack was not successful. We are being targeted; that is the problem.
I am sure that our digital infrastructure, the cybersecurity infrastructure for the House of Commons, is strong and that it is good enough. I remember trying to get Zoom right after the pandemic shutdowns had begun, and our caucus was the first one to go on Zoom. I remember the cybersecurity people telling us, “No, you must send your signals through a House of Commons server based in Canada.”
We waited patiently for the three days that they asked us to so we could actually host a meeting of the Conservative caucus right when the shutdowns began across the country. Therefore I trust them in that security infrastructure, but what I have a problem with is the fact that we were targeted and not told, in 2021. I had to be told by a foreign government, the Americans. Oftentimes, because they are our cousins, they are almost part of the North American security infrastructure.
I studied in America. I know that few of my colleagues look up my bio because, why would one do that? I have a concentration in counterterrorism and the Department of Homeland Security. It is just a personal interest area, but it is not focused on digital cybersecurity, to be honest. This is why I did not know.
These particular individuals, again, are not just a random group of hackers doing it for fun or doing it for money. These are intelligence officers. That is what the U.S. Department of State says.
I had to find out from a foreign government, the FBI telling a parliamentary group that I belong to. I had to sign off on letters, listen to what the analysts had to say, get information from them and share information with them. I had to find out from a foreign government that I was being targeted, openly targeted.
I have been criticized by foreign governments before. Famously, about two years ago, I was criticized in Pakistan's national assembly for raising very simple questions in the House here about a $50,000 taxpayer-paid trip by a certain chief of defence staff in the Pakistani military.
I was highly unpopular. I was very popular in my riding, though, because I have a lot of constituents who are Mohajirs and Sindhis, who are highly persecuted. I did it on their behalf and they deserve to know. However, they are going to come to me and ask me if what they tell me is protected. Am I protected? Can I guarantee to them that what they pass on to me, my email, digital files and the personal security in my offices, is protected? I worry because I worry for them.
There is a great Yiddish proverb. I never miss an opportunity to share them. I know members wait for them. If we take the 's words and the 's words and CSE's and CSIS's words, and if their words were a stick, I could not even lean on it. It is a great Yiddish proverb. It is so true in this situation.
The claim has been in the newspapers that, because it was not successful, we did not need to know. I have it in the complete reverse. Because we were targeted, we did not just deserve to know; they were morally obliged to tell us and ethically obliged to tell us.
Whoever found out should have told us because, for three years, we could have adjusted our behaviour. We could have changed the way we did things. We could have turned around and told the diaspora community leaders, the groups we were working with on petitions, on letters and on starting campaigns to rescue political prisoners in other countries, that maybe we should do it a different way.
Some of us travel to regions of the world that are dangerous, like Ukraine. Some of us travelled to Iraq just a few years ago, which is not exactly the safest region to travel to generally. I found, on the ground, that it was very safe. I would have liked to know if I was targeted by, say, an Iranian-based hacker group that works for the Islamic regime, if I had been in the region.
I now have to work under the assumption that, even if I were targeted, if the target was not successful in hacking into my emails or hacking into my personal digital files or any of my social media accounts, because it was not successful, I could be the target of one of these espionage or hacker attempts.
There are many of us who work with these types of individuals. Because we know that it was APT31, thanks to the FBI, thanks to IPAC, thanks to the U.S. Department of State, not thanks to our government, we have to now wonder if we are individually, because of the work that we do, targeted by another foreign regime.
The member for talked about the work he does on behalf of the Canadian Ukrainian community. He has spoken out repeatedly against the Kremlin. If there was a Russian hacker group, of which they have many, and they are renowned in the Kremlin for both operating state-sponsored groups and also paying contract hackers, and if he were to be targeted, nobody would tell him unless it was successful. If it was successful, then he would likely know about it. One can see where this is going now. This does not make any sense. The government's position makes no sense.
In the Speaker's ruling, he said that this matter was in fact a prima facie violation of our privilege. I knew that from the moment it happened that this would be the case. I am very glad that he ruled that way. I am glad that the member for brought it to the Speaker's attention and made a very cogent case on why we should be protected.
I want to bring up another fact, which is that this actually happened in Belgium as well. This is not APT31's first attempt. APT31 is renowned. APT40 is another group that has also done it repeatedly against others. It is not just IPAC members.
I am going to draw one's attention to one particular group that was targeted in Belgium. It was a series of politicians, including the former prime minister of that country, who were targeted. One foreign affairs minister and several parliamentarians were also targeted by APT31, around the same timeline that we were.
In that particular country, those targeted were also not told. In Belgium, they all had to go public and shame their government in that situation. As far as I know, in this particular attack, I think only Finland and one other, I believe, Baltic state informed their legislators that they were victims of such an attack. Then again, they are also much more used to it. They are right next door to the Kremlin and the Russian Federation, which makes it their business to be in all of our business. They want to know what emails we are exchanging. They want to know the people we are meeting with. They want to know what devices we are using as well.
This is the problem I have with how this has been handled by the government, with its claim that it is doing enough and that it has introduced this new process. Those five members, like I said, were a former prime minister, the chair of the foreign affairs committee, the vice-chair of the foreign affairs committee, the Belgium-Taiwan Friendship Group and a member of the EU foreign affairs committee.
I have the declaration in French and am going to read it into the record.
[Translation]
Statement of Belgian elected officials targeted by APT31
It has now been confirmed that all five of us were the target of a Chinese state-sponsored cyber-attack in early 2021.
This was not an attack on any single political party or any particular country. It was an attack on any elected official who dares to challenge Beijing. We stand united in condemning these actions, which strike at the heart of the democratic values that unite us and that transcend party lines.
Over the past decade, China has shown a growing desire to interfere in the political systems of other countries, including our own. All too often, its malicious actions have gone unanswered.
We cannot allow this campaign of cyber-attacks against elected representatives of the Belgian people to remain without a robust and proportionate response.
We are calling on the government to do the following:
Then they list five items. The statements ends with these two sentences:
Chinese intelligence services tried to intimidate us, but they will never silence us. We will continue to actively defend democratic values and human rights in Belgium and around the world.
[English]
This goes on. There was a case in New Zealand where APT40 as well hacked into legislators' and Parliament's devices. There was a cybersecurity attack committed in Australia, again by another state-sponsored affiliated group also out of Beijing. It is not like this is unique. This is another problem with the line the government has taken, which is to behave as if this is brand new and as if this has never happened before. That is the claim. That is the top-line talking point being printed out of the 's Office and sent to all of us. That is simply not true.
Since 2012, since Xi Jinping took over the Communist Party in Beijing, there has been a steady increase of attacks, both in rhetoric and in actual actions, by various hacking groups and by various military organizations. Like I said, intelligence officers of Beijing are now targeting 18 Canadian parliamentarians. For three years, we were told absolutely nothing. I only found out a few weeks ago. The moment I found out, on a Tuesday, I immediately began contacting the House of Commons' cybersecurity. I want to get to the bottom of this.
Every single member who was targeted should have a chance to speak in the House and to explain exactly how this impacts their work, so it can become a permanent, official part of Hansard, and the next time this happens, the Liberals cannot claim that they did not see anything, that they did not hear anything or cannot say that it did not work, so we should not be bothered by it. We were targeted by a foreign government because of our parliamentary work. That should be enough. It was immoral not to tell us. It was unethical not to tell us.
:
Mr. Speaker, I rise to participate in the debate arising from your ruling earlier this evening of a prima facie breach of privilege involving 18 members in the House who were targeted by the Beijing-based Communist regime as part of a hacking operation, a progressive reconnaissance attack, due to their affiliation with the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, or IPAC.
This attack occurred in early 2021, and for three years, these members were kept in the dark, which is completely unacceptable, so I welcome your ruling, Mr. Speaker, because here we go again one year later.
One year ago, we were having a very similar debate in the House based upon the ruling of your predecessor, Mr. Speaker, of a prima facie breach of privilege concerning the member for . That was referred to the procedure and House affairs committee through which a report was recently tabled in the House finding that indeed the privileges of the member for were violated, and for the very same reason that those of the 18 members of Parliament who were subject to the matter of your ruling were, which is that the member for was kept in the dark that he was being targeted by Beijing and that his family in Hong Kong was being targeted by the Beijing-based regime.
This hacking attack did occur in 2021. It was reported by the U.S., by the FBI, to the Communications Security Establishment, to this government, in 2022. However, like the member for , many of the 18 members first learned that they were being targeted by Beijing not through a briefing but through a report in The Globe and Mail. It raises serious questions as to why it is that this came to light because of The Globe and Mail reporting on it, and not based upon information from this government but from the U.S. government.
Indeed it was an unsealed indictment of the justice department earlier this year that resulted in the IPAC secretariat becoming aware that members of IPAC were targeted, and not only Canadian members of Parliament but parliamentarians from around the world who were part of IPAC. That, in turn, led IPAC to ask questions of the Department of Justice in the U.S. as well as the FBI as to why members were not informed.
The FBI, in effect, said that due to jurisdictional issues, it could not communicate directly to them and could not directly brief them, but it did, as soon as possible, provide that information to the Government of Canada, more specifically to the Communications Security Establishment. From there, that information went into a black hole, just as it did with respect to the targeting of the member for .
What is also disturbing is that, once again, the excuse being offered by the government is that it is not its fault; it is someone else's fault.
When The Globe and Mail reported that the member for was being targeted by the Beijing-based regime, the first claimed that he learned about it in The Globe and Mail. Then, he said that it was the fault of CSIS. He said to the media at the time, “CSIS made the determination that it wasn't...needed [to] be raised to a higher level because it wasn't a significant enough concern”.
Then, it was revealed that what the said was not true, that the information had in fact been passed on to the Prime Minister's department, the PCO, to the Prime Minister's national security and intelligence adviser and that the information was not acted upon and was not shared with the member for . Nothing was done.
Again, the was very quick to blame someone else, to blame CSIS. The same is true of the . It was learned at the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, during the study we undertook on the question of privilege, that in fact CSIS had sent an IMU to the Minister of Public Safety, to the deputy minister of public safety and to the Minister of Public Safety's chief of staff, alerting them about the fact that the member for and his family were being targeted by Beijing.
When the came to committee, he, just like the , said that it was not his fault, that it was the fault of CSIS and that somehow CSIS had made an operational decision not to inform him. He said that repeatedly and unequivocally. It was not a misstatement. Those were carefully selected words by the Minister of Public Safety that were patently not true. How could CSIS have made an operational decision not to inform the Minister of Public Safety when it sent to him an IMU, addressed to him, his deputy minister and his chief of staff? It is patently absurd.
When the director of CSIS came before the procedure and House affairs committee, I asked him what the significance of an IMU was. He said that it was a matter of high importance. It was not just any memo that was sent, it was sent specifically to get the 's attention. Not only did the minister not act upon the intelligence concerning the member for , not only does he bear responsibility, along with the and the government, for keeping that member in the dark, which led to a breach of that member's privilege, but also the minister may not have been entirely forthcoming with all the facts, in a desperate and pathetic effort to blame someone else.
The Liberals and the are not responsible, and that is true. They are not a responsible government. However, when it comes to taking responsibility, it is always someone else's fault. Here we go again with another instance. This time, 18 members of Parliament were kept in the dark for two years. It was three years from the time of the attack, but two years from the time that the government was informed by the FBI. What is the excuse offered by the Liberals? It was a decision of House of Commons administration. Somehow it was the House of Commons administration's fault, not the government's fault.
I say that is completely unacceptable in terms of an excuse for keeping members of Parliament in the dark about something as serious as a progressive attack against them. It was an attack that, yes, began at a low level, but it was an attack aimed at gathering information about them, information that could have impeded their ability to do their work as members of Parliament and that could have threatened their safety and security and that of those with whom they meet, including members of the diaspora communities that are targeted by the Beijing-based Communist regime.
For the Liberals to simply pass the buck to the House of Commons administration on something like this is a complete abdication of responsibility. At the end of the day, the ultimate responsibility lies with the government and, in that regard, the government completely failed. I would submit that it was more than just a failure; for the Liberals, the information that had been passed on to them by the FBI was inconvenient.
The Liberals did not want to pass the information on to members because it could have resulted in members' putting pressure on the Liberals to actually do something, to take action in response to the Beijing-based regime, which, I will remind members, the said was a dictatorship he admired. He admired its basic dictatorship. The Prime Minister extended his hand, time and again, to the Beijing-based regime and who turned a blind eye to Beijing's interference in our democracy because, as he saw it, it was benefiting the Liberal Party.
Therefore we need to get to the bottom of what happened, who learned what, where the information went and why members were left in the dark. Why was it information from the U.S. Department of Justice, in an unsealed indictment, that led to IPAC's raising questions that in turn resulted in members of Parliament being informed in some cases by IPAC and in other instances through the report in The Globe and Mail?
Let me observe it more broadly. When it comes to foreign interference, and specifically interference by the Beijing-based regime, which is the largest threat when it comes to interfering in Canada, targeting diaspora communities and interfering in our democracy and our sovereignty and impacting the safety of Canadians, the current government's record is an abysmal one. It simply cannot be trusted to stand up to the Beijing-based regime.
The current government is a government that turned a blind eye to Beijing's interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections, notwithstanding the fact that the had been repeatedly briefed about that interference. He covered it up when Global News and The Globe and Mail first reported on it in the fall of 2022 and early 2023. He tried to downplay it. He is not able to downplay it now that the first report of Madam Justice Hogue was issued last week, which is a damning indictment on the Prime Minister in many respects.
Under the government's watch, police stations have been operating in communities across Canada, targeting Chinese Canadians. At least two of those stations remain open. The government was actually funding some of the organizations that were operating the police stations.
There was a major national security breach at the Winnipeg lab, Canada's highest-security lab, in which agents of the Beijing regime transferred sensitive materials to PRC institutions, including the transfer of two of the most deadly pathogens, Ebola and Henipah, at the direction of one of those scientists. That happened even after PHAC's fact-finding report indicated that the scientist had breached multiple security and intellectual property policies of PHAC and that the individual had collaborated with Beijing on an unauthorized basis. Nonetheless, under the government's watch, Henipah and Ebola were sent to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
At the Winnipeg lab, a military scientist had access to the lab, someone who was working with Beijing's foremost expert in bioterrorism and biodefence. The list goes on and on.
It is pretty incredible. It is what happens after nine years under a who is not serious, does not take foreign interference seriously and does not take these threats seriously. The Prime Minister's chief of staff said at committee that the Prime Minister reads everything put on his desk and that he is frequently briefed. Then we learn, when the Prime Minister appears at the foreign interference inquiry, that he actually does not really read anything at all. We have a Prime Minister who, at best, is asleep at the switch and, at worst, has turned a blind eye, at times, and even been willing to go along with Beijing's interference if it benefits the electoral interests of the Liberal Party.
In closing, the facts underlying this prima facie question of privilege that the Speaker has ruled on are a matter that should never have happened. The government can point blame at everyone else all it wants, but a directive was finally issued in 2023 to inform members of Parliament. It should not have taken until 2023, but it was issued then. Still no action was taken and the members were kept in the dark. Why were they not informed, at the very least, after that directive was issued? These are among the questions that need to be answered.
There needs to be accountability for this very serious breach. I believe that it was not just a prima facie breach but that the privileges of those 18 members were violated.
:
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise and add my voice to what is an incredibly important discussion. There are, of course, a host of issues that this place is seized with on a regular basis. However, for those who might be watching, “privilege” is a word that has quite a few definitions, especially in the world in which we live. It speaks to something very specific when it comes to the parliamentary context. It is the ability for a member of Parliament to do their job well.
Mr. Speaker, in your ruling earlier today, you outlined how the actions of a foreign state actor impeded the ability of 18 parliamentarians to be able to do the job that they were elected to do, or in the event that included senators, to do the job they were sent to the respective Houses to do. I think it is key to outline that because it is not simply a matter that can be taken lightly; it is something that needs to be treated with the utmost seriousness. I will try to outline a few reasons as to why that is such an important aspect to the debate we are having on the ruling made earlier this evening.
As parliamentarians, there are a host of things that happen beyond simply the debates in this place. The Speaker's ruling noted how the actions of the cyber-attack were directly related to the larger duties that members of Parliament have, although this did not necessarily have the direct implications for debate. For many people, this is what they see on television. It is the clips from this place. It is the press conference outside the doors not far from us. However, it speaks to the bigger issue about what our democratic infrastructure is, and I think that is absolutely key.
I will use myself as an example. I know that many others in this place, in our support for our ally Ukraine, were sanctioned by the Putin regime in Russia. It was for our strong stance in support of our democratic ally, and that is a consequence of the actions we undertake in this place. Although it is not a universally held opinion, I am proud to be a strong supporter of the state of Israel and its right to exist. I know, especially since the happenings of October 7, 2023, there have been a host of developments around that. I am talking not just about the conflict itself but also about the international conversations and some of the geopolitical dynamics associated with that.
We have heard about the issue that we are speaking about today, more specifically how the organization known as APT31, affiliated with the Communist dictatorship in Beijing, targeted certain members of Parliament. However, it is part of the larger conversation around the geopolitical influence of the Communist dictatorship in Beijing. Many of us in this place have made strong statements. I know that my colleague who just finished speaking has brought a number of bills forward throughout his career in Parliament about support for Taiwan and how Taiwan can be treated on the international stage.
It is important context because it is some of the work we do as parliamentarians. We have to be free to be able to do that work well. We have seen over the last number of years how there have been significant attempts by hostile foreign regimes, and not simply to engage in the political discourse. Even when it comes to Russia's sanctioning me and many of my colleagues in this place, it has gone beyond that to trying to use fear and intimidation tactics, or some of the tactics that would be more familiar from spy movies, like espionage or spyware on computers.
I am a member of the ethics committee, and I know, Mr. Speaker, that you spent a long time on that committee, where there have been a host of conversations around on-device surveillance tools, whether during the pandemic or the use of tracking information from cellphones.
There is a host of information available in the digital age. Not to get into a conversation about AI, although some of those developments are essential parts of what needs to be included in this conversation, but we have a hostile foreign regime that has a very specific political agenda attempting to use tools nefariously to possibly influence and manipulate what Canadian parliamentarians are doing within the scope of their duties in this place. I appreciate this finding of a prima facie breach of privilege. I am hopeful, and from what I have heard throughout the debate tonight, I am optimistic that, when this important debate comes to a vote, we will be able to send this to PROC. The committee will be able to propose solutions, some of which, I would suggest, will complement this.
You noted in your ruling how this is different than one of the previous instances where the member for had brought forward a question of privilege. There was another member, the former member for Durham, Erin O'Toole, the leader of the Conservative Party in the 2021 election, who had brought forward a similar motion. However, because of the timing, in part, and some of the developments at that point, his case was not found to be, but I believe the Speaker had encouraged PROC, which was seized with the issue, to include that in its study.
Certainly, there have been a host of developments that have taken place since that point in time revealing truly the extent to which specifically Beijing, but other foreign state actors as well, has attempted, and has been seen to have the ability, to influence what we do here in this place. Specifically, with Justice Hogue's report, we have seen how there was a potentiality of impact in the last election. This is one thing where we have to be seasoned.
I was quite frustrated with how the government responded initially to some of the accusations about foreign influence in the elections. Part of my frustration was around the fact that it simply declared that it was not an issue and therefore would not have changed the result of that election. There was certainly much debate in the media and among parliamentarians, even in this place, as to what that exactly meant. Justice Hogue made what I think is an important contribution to highlight how Canadian elections are not simply one election, like with the U.S. presidential election, but rather, in the case of the current Parliament, 338 individual elections, and there is evidence that suggests that there could have been a substantial impact.
For the former member for Steveston—Richmond East, it had a significant impact, and hearing before the ethics committee some of the ways in which, even though he is a Canadian of Chinese descent, his integrity was impugned by an absolutely horrific thing that was said about his personal character and his Chinese background. That was spread often in a language that is not one of Canada's official languages, which led to it having a significant impact.
We heard specifically how the candidate who ran for the Liberal Party and ultimately defeated Kenny Chiu in the 2021 election did not separate himself or fight back against what was clearly disinformation. There was a clear attempt to take what Mr. Chiu had brought forward, specifically a foreign agent registry in the form of a private member's bill, which would have really taken this whole conversation a giant leap forward, and see that stalled or stopped. The impact was what very well could have been the change of an election result.
That has had the impact of causing Canadians, ultimately, to see an erosion of trust in their institutions. When we see some of those issues surrounding it, that is one example that has brought a whole host of opportunities for us to debate within this place, and of course, different committees are doing good work on that. I know the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs has also had that chance.
I would suggest there is an important dynamic here that cannot be lost in the midst of it. While there is the impact that it has upon the privileges we have in this place, and the Speaker highlighted that within his ruling, but beyond that, it has a specific and very significant impact on diaspora communities who might be impacted.
Take the three examples I listed earlier, when it comes to my personal connection. Whether it is supporting Ukraine, being a supporter of the state of Israel or taking a strong stance in support of Taiwan, those are things I can do as a parliamentarian, and I willingly take those positions and present that to the Canadian people. Certainly, it is justified to make sure that I can do that freely and fairly within this place.
However, I would encourage the Speaker and all those participating in this debate to consider the impact that has on regular Canadians, those who are not protected by the same rights and privileges we have in this place, those of Chinese origin, those of Ukrainian origin, and those who are connected with Israel and who might be Jewish. I would suggest that part of the reason we need to take this so seriously and to make sure all Canadians, whether they take a seat in this place, which I am proud to be doing, or whether it be a new Canadian who deserves to be protected and to have their government take it seriously, is that there is the potentiality and a real significant threat that they would try to be influenced, manipulated or coerced by a hostile foreign state actor.
My colleague who spoke earlier talked about this, and we have heard this a number of times this evening. There has been a host of examples of that, and one example would be those police stations, some of which may still be operating. At first, when I started receiving correspondence based on some initial media reports, I thought that this cannot be real. I thought that this cannot be happening in our country, yet we have learned not only that it is happening, but also that there was an unserious response to it.
When it comes to some of the foreign election interference, again, one thinks that we guard our democracies. That is key to who we are as Canadians. We are proud of that democratic legacy, and I talk often about this, that dates back to the foundation of the Westminster system. We see that over the last two elections, there was a concerted effort by hostile foreign states to impact the results of the election. Again, we see a government that did not take that seriously.
There is the potentiality of threat to Canadians' personal information, and that impacts every segment of our society, our economy and the ability for Canadians to go about their daily lives. In fact, I would encourage members in this place to consider some very developing news from Premier Eby of British Columbia. He made an announcement earlier this evening that there was a sophisticated cyber-attack levelled against the B.C. government. While there are not extensive details yet, I am sure we will learn those in the coming days. The fact is that we have one of 10 Canadian provinces facing a cyber-attack and that it was called “sophisticated” by the Premier of British Columbia. It sounds like, and I hope, certainly, that British Columbians' data was protected.
We see that these are very real and present threats to how Canadians live their daily lives. In light of the privilege debate, which is very important because it is key to our ability to operate as a democracy, I would encourage us to take seriously how this impacts regular Canadians who are not given the same rights and protections that we are as MPs, who do not have the infrastructure or the ability to appeal to a Speaker, to see the issue studied in a report and brought back. It is a regular Canadian who may now be questioning the email they sent criticizing the regime where a family member may still live and what that impact might have on them or whether somebody could be listening. There are so many unanswered questions.
What I have been frustrated with since being elected to Parliament is how the current government does not seem to take that seriously. In the few minutes that I have remaining, I would suggest that the trend of the government only responding to serious issues when pushed to the point where it has become public is simply not good enough.
We see this time and time again. We see this with the example of my former Conservative colleague, Kenny Chiu. He brought forward a private member's bill on a foreign agent registry. It was criticized significantly by other parties. They said it was unnecessary. It was a significant and maybe the contributing factor to his electoral defeat, yet now we have a bill brought forward by the government, after there has been so much scrutiny, that is functionally very similar to what Mr. Chiu proposed more than two years ago.
I think that this is a clear example of how not treating seriously the demands of government is leading Canadians to not only lose trust in their institutions but to lose trust in the government's ability to keep them safe.
As was highlighted in some of the conversations surrounding the fact of how we learned about this, there is no question that the American intelligence infrastructure is probably the most sophisticated and well funded in the history of the planet, but that does not excuse our need, whether it is as a Five Eyes partner, a member of NATO or a G7 country, to be at the front of ensuring that not only are we protecting Canadians but that we also are doing everything we can with the tools available to us to make sure that MPs, senators, in the case of the prima facie breach of privilege, and, further, all Canadians can trust that they will be protected by their government.
What I would suggest is that we need a very serious response to this. What Conservatives have advocated for all along, and this goes back long before I was elected, is to make sure that we take these threats and concerns very seriously and to treat them with the gravity that they deserve, so that parliamentarians are freely able to do their work.
I know I heard my colleague from talking about the questions she was asking as soon as she learned about when this attack might have taken place. There was a host of questions: What was she talking about back in January 2021 and all of these things?
To find out almost two years later about these things speaks to a trend that is very concerning and one that shows, certainly, a lack of trust in the current government, the and the security process. It was highlighted earlier how there is conflicting testimony from the Prime Minister himself, who says that he does not read reports and just gets high-level briefings, and his chief of staff, who says that he reads everything.
These are the sorts of things that Canadians may not be seized with on a daily basis, but it speaks to a trend of how concerning the lack of response is.
As I close my speech, I would simply say this: I would encourage all members of this place to vote in favour to ensure that this goes to the procedure and House affairs committee and gets the attention that it deserves, not simply for MPs and senators and parliamentarians, but to show all Canadians that the pinnacle of Canada's democratic institutions takes our security and their security seriously, because we have not seen that thus far under the Liberal government.