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DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING CAPACITY FOR A COVID-19 VACCINE – PREVENTION IS BETTER THAN CURE

Introduction

On 1 December 2020, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology (the Committee) adopted the following motion:

  • That, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology commence a study on the emergency situation involving the domestic manufacturing capacity for a COVID‑19 vaccine;
  • That this study examine the May 12, 2020 announcement by the Government of Canada regarding $44-million to refit a National Research Council facility in Montreal for the purposes of the production of a vaccine in collaboration with CanSino Biologics, and review and examine all related issues, including:
  • the investment of $44-million into the facility and the necessary upgrades to space, technology, equipment and personnel that would need to be made as a result,
    • (a)    the potential impact of this initial announcement on the government’s plans to procure other vaccines;
    • (b)   the facility’s prior capacity to manufacture vaccines, including past delivery orders and schedules;
    • (c)    the dissolution of the announced partnership between the National Research Council and CanSino Biologics on August 26, 2020, and its impact on the planned upgrades to the facility; and
    • (d)   the evolution of Canada’s domestic vaccine manufacturing capacity and the steps Canada can and should take to address it.
  • That, in order to fully study this emergency situation, the Committee invite the Minister of Health, the Minister of Public Services and Procurement, the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, and the President of the Public Health Agency of Canada, each to appear before the committee for one and a half hours, provided that:
    • (a)    in respect of each of the ministers who does not agree, within one week of the adoption of this motion, to accept this invitation for the length of time prescribed, the Chair shall be instructed to report to the House forthwith a recommendation that this committee be empowered to order his or her appearance from time to time, and
    • (b)   in respect of the President of the Public Health Agency of Canada, if he does not agree, within one week of the adoption of this motion, to accept this invitation for the length of time prescribed, a summons do issue for his appearance before the Committee at a date and time determined by the Chair but no later than three weeks following the adoption of this motion.

The Committee held five meetings and heard from 26 witnesses in February 2021 for this study. In addition, on 8 April 2022, the Committee heard from several witnesses, including government stakeholders and pharmaceutical companies, to get an update on the vaccine situation in Canada. This report only reflects testimonies heard during this period.

Initial Context

Witnesses explained why Canada’s biomanufacturing capacity—particularly for vaccine production—was limited at the start of the pandemic. Alain Lamarre, Full Professor, said that Canada was a world leader in the development and production of vaccines in the 1980s, but that its production capacity gradually eroded as the industry globalized. He added that “Canada's small share of the international market certainly also contributed to the exodus of vaccine manufacturers as early as the 1980s.”[1] For example, Joel Lexchin, Associate Professor, claimed that the sale of Connaught Laboratories to Mérieux (now part of Sanofi) in the 1980s and the sale of Quebec company Biochem Pharma to GlaxoSmithKline in 2006, weakened Canada’s biomanufacturing capacity.[2]

Witnesses pointed out that there were warning signs in recent years that a health crisis could occur at any time and that Canada needed to expand its biomanufacturing capacity. Dr. Lexchin pointed out that Canadian governments ignored the following signs:

  • the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis in 2003;
  • the 2003 report of the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, Learning from SARS: Renewal of Public Health in Canada,[3] in which the committee recommended that Canada develop a vaccine strategy and secure a vaccine supply;
  • the H1N1 flu crisis of 2009, during which vaccine production at a Quebec plant was delayed; and
  • the Ebola crisis of 2014, even though Canada was not directly affected.[4]

According to Ken Hughes, Chair of the Board of Providence Therapeutics, in recent years Canada has not invested enough or used its strategic capacity to assess its future vaccine and therapeutics needs.[5]

Other stakeholders also weighed in on the situation. The Honourable François-Philippe Champagne, Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, said that when the COVID‑19 pandemic began, “Canada had no flexible large scale biomanufacturing capacity that was suitable for a COVID-19 vaccine.”[6] Minister Champagne noted that, in 1973, about 19% of domestic demand for vaccines and therapeutic drugs was satisfied by imports, while that figure sits at 85% in 2021.[7] Mona Nemer, Chief Science Advisor, Office of the Chief Science Advisor, also cited the decline in Canada’s capacity to produce vaccines over the past 40 years.[8]

The Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of Public Services and Procurement, pointed out that when the COVID‑19 pandemic started, the federal government tried to reach agreements with the major manufacturers to ensure they used production capacity in Canada. However:

The manufacturers reviewed the identified assets here in Canada and concluded that biomanufacturing capacity in this country at the time of contracting, which was last August and September, was too limited to justify the investment of capital and expertise to start manufacturing in Canada. To be clear, PSPC [Public Services and Procurement Canada] frequently, forcefully, and aggressively brought this issue to the table and raised it with the manufacturers at every turn.
The reality is that standing up new manufacturing of a vaccine requires expertise, and it requires resources from the supplier. Given the scarcity of resources, suppliers emphasized locations that had existing capacity and that would be able to manufacture quickly on a global scale.[9]

The federal government opted for a procurement strategy rather than a production strategy in order to vaccinate Canadians against COVID‑19. Mark Lievonen, Co-Chair of the COVID‑19 Vaccine Task Force (the Task Force), stated that “[l]icensing in, tech transfer and Canadian production all make sense to pursue, particularly in the medium term, but they would not be part of the solution for 2021.”[10]

Current Situation

Overview of the Vaccine Procurement Strategy

Since the pandemic began, a number of government stakeholders have been involved in managing the production and procurement of vaccines. Health Canada was responsible for approving vaccine candidates, but not for purchasing or producing the vaccines themselves. Public Services and Procurement Canada played a key role in acquiring vaccines, while Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED) was tasked with making investments to expand the country’s biomanufacturing sector. Dr. Nemer advised the federal government on various aspects of the COVID‑19 pandemic. Dr. Nemer’s work was supported by a multidisciplinary scientific advisory group.[11] Following discussions with her international counterparts, she concluded that Canada would be better off creating a group of independent experts to advise the federal government on vaccine procurement and development. She therefore suggested establishing the Task Force.[12]

The Task Force described its work to the Committee. It met for the first time on 16 June 2020, which was more than one month after the National Research Council (NRC) announced their collaboration with CanSino to develop a vaccine candidate for COVID‑19. The Task Force met 39 times between June 2020 and February 2021. The Task Force consisted of 11 experts, including 10 Canadians, all volunteers. At its meetings, the Task Force examined domestic and international vaccine candidates and biomanufacturing opportunities. Joanne Langley, Co-Chair of the Task Force, said that the Task Force based its recommendations to the federal government on the most recent available information.[13] According to Roger Scott‑Douglas, Secretary of the Task Force, at every possible opportunity, the Task Force considered pairing up international candidates with Canadian biomanufacturing capacity. He noted, however, that Canada did not have the capacity for mass biomanufacturing (production of billions of doses) to form such partnerships early in the pandemic.[14] Following its assessment, the Task Force concluded that it would be quicker to import COVID‑19 vaccines rather than manufacture them.[15]

After its review, the Task Force shared its recommendations with the federal government in the summer of 2020. According to Dr. Langley, the Task Force considered various types of vaccines, including the adenovirus vector and messenger RNA (mRNA) vaccines.[16] She claimed that, for each technology, the Task Force examined its results at all the stages usually considered in clinical development and the manufacturing expertise of the organizations developing it.[17] The Task Force recommended a portfolio of experimental vaccines, given the risk that some vaccine candidates would not complete all approval stages. Canada could donate excess doses if necessary.[18] Members of the Task Force pointed out on several occasions that they were only providing recommendations to the federal government, not making decisions.[19]

The federal government opted for a diversified vaccine procurement strategy. Vaccine purchasing decisions were heavily informed by the Task Force’s recommendations.[20] By late summer 2020, the federal government had signed agreements with seven organizations, reserving over 400 million doses of vaccine candidates in total (some of these vaccines require two doses), with an option to increase those orders later.[21] Table 1 shows the figures for each of those agreements. In addition, Minister Anand said that, through the COVAX initiative, Canada expected to receive 1.9 million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine.[22] The COVAX program is a multilateral group-procurement mechanism that enables developed countries to obtain vaccine doses. In exchange, they fund the donation of doses to developing countries.[23] One witness noted that Health Canada is monitoring approved vaccines as virus variants emerge to ensure they remain effective.[24]

Table 1—COVID 19 Vaccines and Vaccine Candidates Reserved by the Federal Government

Organization Name<

Number of Doses Reserved (millions)

Development Stage as of March 2021

AstraZeneca

20

Approved by Health Canada

Janssen-Johnson & Johnson

38

Approved by Health Canada

Medicago

76

Phase 2 clinical trials

Moderna

40

Approved by Health Canada

Novavax

76

Awaiting approval from Health Canada

Pfizer-BioNTech

76

Approved by Health Canada

Sanofi-GlaxoSmithKline

72

Phase 2 clinical trials

Source: Table prepared by Library of Parliament analysts using data from INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1105 (Patty Hajdu, Health Canada); Government of Canada, Drug and vaccine authorizations for COVID-19: List of applications received; Medicago, COVID‑19: Medicago’s Development Programs; and GSK, Sanofi and GSK initiate new Phase 2 study of their adjuvanted recombinant protein-based COVID‑19 vaccine candidate.

Stakeholders explained the steps the federal government took to speed up vaccine distribution. Minister Hajdu said that Health Canada had taken measures to “safely” expedite its authorization process. To do so, it allowed manufacturers to submit clinical data as they become available rather than wait until all studies are completed.[25] In addition, the teams working on vaccine approvals worked rotating shifts around the clock.[26] Minister Hajdu explained that, while Health Canada works with international regulatory bodies, it must still approve vaccine data that are specific to where the vaccines are produced. Finally, Iain Stewart, President of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), reported that, in early 2021, to help the provinces and territories distribute vaccines, PHAC provided them with enough medical supplies to administer the vaccines they would receive in the first quarter of the year.[27]

Witness Comments and Proposals

Witnesses expressed various concerns about the federal government’s vaccine procurement strategy. For instance, some criticized the Task Force’s lack of transparency. They pointed out that its work plan and meeting minutes should have been public.[28] They also regretted the lack of transparency regarding the Task Force members’ conflicts of interest. Dr. Lexchin noted that half the members had conflicts of interest, including the co-Chairs.[29] Amir Attaran, Professor in the Faculty of Law and the School of Epidemiology and Public Health at the University of Ottawa, stated that compared with task forces in other countries, such as the United Kingdom (U.K.), “our vaccine task force is shockingly secretive.”[30] According to Gary Kobinger, Professor, one major problem is that there was no independent review of the conflicts of interest that were declared.[31] He added that there is a “lack of independence and political neutrality of advisory committees across the country.”[32] He proposed establishing an advisory board that is independent of government.[33]

In response to these criticisms, Task Force members explained the steps they took to promote transparency and manage the risk of conflicts of interest. Dr. Langley explained that the Task Force secretariat set up “a rigorous protocol to declare, manage and record potential conflicts of interest.”[34] Under this protocol, the Task Force members had to recuse themselves from providing advice on projects for which they had a conflict of interest. Dr. Langley reported that all the Task Force members’ conflicts of interest are public and disclosed on the website of the NRC.[35] Mr. Scott-Douglas added that the Task Force does not publish the agenda or minutes of its meetings, but it does provide every detail to the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry and the Minister of Health.[36] In addition, he said that Task Force members had met with the media or given interviews on 135 occasions.[37]

Some witnesses also criticized the government’s lack of transparency in making vaccine purchasing decisions. They pointed out that not only are the Task Force’s recommendations inaccessible, but the vaccine procurement contracts are confidential as well.[38] Professor Attaran noted that jurisdictions such as the United States (U.S.), Brazil and the European Union had disclosed their contracts.[39] He explained that government contracts and decisions should be transparent, because:

If you take high stakes decisions secretly, behind closed doors, without peer review, without peers in the field able to view what’s happening and offer constructive criticism, you end up in a dead end after bad decisions are made. Science turns on peer review. That is its lifeblood.[40]

Dr. Kobinger noted that the confidentiality of these contracts demonstrated that: “As long as we Canadians don’t produce more of those tools—drugs and vaccines—we are in the little seat in these negotiations.”[41]

The ministers responded to the witnesses’ critical remarks. Minister Anand explained that contract negotiations were different for every country. She pointed out that, under its agreements, Canada must comply with certain legal provisions and the confidentiality clauses in every contract. Minister Anand underlined that, if the federal government were to disclose the contents of its agreements with suppliers, “we would risk receiving those vaccines, because we would be in a potential breach of contract.”[42] Furthermore, Minister Hajdu stated that to provide more transparency, the federal government is sharing a great deal of information online, including on virus transmission, case numbers and vaccine distribution.[43]

The witnesses also discussed the federal government’s strategy to purchase vast amounts of COVID‑19 vaccines. Professor Attaran wondered what the government will do with so many excess doses if all the agreements it signed are fulfilled. He said that Canada had signed more contracts than any other country. In his view, the federal government seems to have panicked rather than acted strategically.[44] However, Andrew Casey, President and Chief Executive Officer of BIOTECanada, argued that the government “did some very strategically smart things in terms of looking at the technologies that were out there, investing in some of the Canadian technologies and trying to advance them a bit more quickly than they would have normally advanced.”[45]

Other witnesses highlighted the value of this large scale purchasing. Dr. Langley explained that the Task Force had recommended buying more doses than necessary because it knew that some vaccine candidates would not make it through the development process.[46] Minister Hajdu reported that the federal government agreed with that recommendation and preferred to ensure it would quickly have enough doses for all Canadians.[47] The federal government also invested in multiple technologies to minimize the risk of delays and to have different types of vaccines for different populations.[48] Minister Hajdu noted that, if Canada has too many doses, it can make a larger contribution to the COVAX program.[49]

The announced partnership with CanSino Biologics Inc. (CanSino), a Chinese vaccine manufacturer, without input from the Task Force, raised many questions from the witnesses. Mr. Stewart explained that the NRC had already partnered with CanSino for several years prior to this agreement, including on work to develop different kinds of vaccines.[50] On 12 May 2020, the NRC announced a collaboration with CanSino to develop a vaccine candidate for COVID‑19. Under the agreement, CanSino would use one of the NRC’s proprietary cell lines to develop a vaccine called “Ad5-nCoV.” In return, CanSino would enable the NRC to manufacture the Ad5-nCoV vaccine for clinical trials in Canada, in cooperation with the Canadian Center for Vaccinology.[51] Mr. Stewart said the NRC was ready to begin clinical trials in the summer of 2020, but the CanSino shipment never arrived.[52]

Task Force members discussed the steps leading to the recommendation to establish a partnership with CanSino. Mr. Scott-Douglas stated that CanSino was one of the international candidates reviewed by the Task Force, independent of its prior relationship with the NRC. He said that CanSino was initially recommended, as it was one of the most promising vaccines early in the pandemic. In fact, it had started Phase 3 clinical trials well before the other candidates.[53] Moreover, Mr. Scott-Douglas said that while the Task Force members initially recommended this partnership, after receiving additional data, “their advice to ministers was that new science suggested not backing CanSino further.”[54] However, Dr. Kobinger, who was an early member of the Task Force, stated that:

The first written recommendation I saw from the task force was about CanSino. I remember it vividly, because my first reflex was to think that we had not discussed CanSino, as we had the other one, wherein we had an exchange with the company.
I didn’t know where this recommendation came from.[55]

For her part, Minister Hajdu said the federal government had established this partnership following the Task Force’s recommendation.[56] As for Minister Champagne, he said the government had considered the partnership for three months and then decided to end the discussions.[57]

Lastly, in February 2021, the federal government was harshly criticized for the delayed delivery of doses of the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines. Professor Attaran said that Canada had been too slow in purchasing vaccines, taking weeks or even months longer than its peers.[58] He also asserted that the government should have a mass vaccination strategy to speed up vaccination, including by mobilizing the Red Cross.[59] Professor Attaran claimed that part of the problem is that Health Canada is playing too small a role in the vaccination strategy. He said that, since this department has the scientific expertise, it should have been in charge of vaccine strategy, as is the case in countries that have managed vaccination effectively.[60] However, according to Mr. Casey, the government moved quickly to prepare itself to deal with the vaccination issue by creating the Task Force.[61]

Stakeholders explained the reasons for the vaccine delivery delays. Mr. Stewart told the Committee that deliveries were delayed in February 2021 because Pfizer was working on improvements to its production lines. The company nonetheless expected to keep its commitment to provide 4 million doses in the first quarter of 2021. Moderna was also behind on its deliveries, but it also expected to deliver the doses promised by the end of the first quarter.[62] Minister Anand stated that the government had negotiated the earliest possible delivery dates.[63] Mr. Scott-Douglas explained that Canada had a lower vaccination rate than most of its peers in February 2021 because the vaccines were approved later, as they were not produced there.[64] Table 2 shows the total confirmed distribution of COVID‑19 vaccines as of 19 April 2021.

Table 2—Total Confirmed Distribution of COVID 19 Vaccines, as of 19 April 2021

Vaccine

Doses Distributed

AstraZeneca

2,316,020

Pfizer-BioNTech

8,198,562

Moderna

2,856,880

Total

13,371,462

Source: Table prepared by the Library of Parliament using data from Government of Canada, Vaccines for COVID‑19: Shipments and deliveries.

Despite the vaccination delays, the federal ministers were confident that Canada will be able to meet its vaccination timelines. They were all confidant that all Canadians who wanted the vaccine could be vaccinated by the end of September 2021.[65] Furthermore, Mr. Stewart highlighted that these predictions reflected only the Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines, meaning that new vaccine approvals would surely lead to even faster vaccination in Canada.[66] Minister Hajdu stated that Canada would receive more doses between April and June and then mass vaccination campaigns would begin.[67] In her view, these delays and difficulties show that Canada needs to build a strong domestic biomanufacturing capacity.[68]

Future Direction

Development of a Domestic Biomanufacturing Capacity

During the Committee’s study, the witnesses agreed that building a strong domestic biomanufacturing capacity is important. Mr. Hughes pointed out that, with the emergence of variants, COVID‑19 will likely be present for a long time. In his view, the variants could be contained if Canada further develops its domestic expertise.[69] Minister Champagne said that the immunity conferred by the vaccines may be short-lived and Canadians may need to be vaccinated again.[70] The witnesses also highlighted that the current situation has shown the value of developing a domestic biomanufacturing capacity, particularly for vaccine production, so that Canada no longer needs to rely on other countries in future health crises.[71] Finally, Associate Professor Brian Lichty said that having a “robust domestic manufacturing capacity for vaccines is pivotal for Canada not only to ensure Canadians have timely access to lifesaving vaccines, but also from an intellectual property, innovation and national security point of view.”[72]

The Task Force also played a key role in developing the strategy to build Canada’s domestic biomanufacturing capacity. Mr. Lievonen explained that, within the Task Force, a joint biomanufacturing subcommittee was mandated to make recommendations to the government on various issues relating to the procurement and production of vaccines, including the development of a strategy to boost the country’s biomanufacturing capacity. The group met for the first time on 23 June 2020 and subsequently met 22 times between June 2020 and February 2021. In the course of its work, the subcommittee invited international experts from countries such as the U.S. and U.K. to learn about their strategies. The subcommittee made recommendations on immediate investments to respond to the COVID‑19 pandemic and on medium– and long-term investments. The subcommittee followed the same rules for disclosing conflicts of interest as the Task Force.[73]

Additionally, the joint biomanufacturing subcommittee assessed the projects proposed to the government through the Strategic Innovation Fund (SIF). Dr. Langley explained that it considered 24 domestic vaccine candidates under the SIF. The most promising candidates in the early going, including those of Medicago and Precision NanoSystems, were funded. The most promising businesses over the medium term, such as Providence Therapeutics, were funded through the NRC and the Industrial Research Assistance Program.[74]

As part of the Committee’s study, a number of Canadian organizations working on COVID‑19 vaccines made presentations on the status of their efforts. Table 3 summarizes the status of their work in 2021. In addition to developing a COVID‑19 vaccine, the Vaccine and Infectious Disease Organization (VIDO) is building a pilot-scale manufacturing facility that will be large enough to work with animals of various sizes. The facility will be ready in October 2021 and will be able to produce vaccines by 2022.[75] Precision NanoSystems is building facilities to produce genetic therapeutics.[76] Minister Champagne reported that the federal government has invested $792 million through the SIF to develop vaccines and therapeutics in Canada.[77]

Table 3—COVID 19 Vaccine Development at Various Canadian Organizations, 2021

Organization

Type of Vaccine

Development Stage as of March 2021

Expected Annual Production of COVID‑19 Vaccine Doses

McMaster University biomanufacturing facility

Adenovirus

Clinical trials to begin in 2021

Not available

Medicago

Virus-like particle

Phase 2 clinical trials

80 million (2021)

1 billion (2023)

Providence Therapeutics

mRNA

Phase 1 clinical trials

50 million (2021)

120 million (2022)

VIDO-Intervac

Protein subunit

Phase 1 clinical trials

Not available

Source: Table prepared by the Library of Parliament using data from INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1115 (François-Philippe Champagne, ISED); INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1110 (Volker Gerdts, VIDO-Intervac); INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1225 (Brad Sorenson, Providence Therapeutics); and Medicago, COVID‑19: Medicago’s Development Programs.

Finally, Minister Champagne told the Committee about the federal government’s investments to enhance Canada’s biomanufacturing capacity and improve the country’s resilience to future health crises. One example is the federal government’s $126‑million investment in building NRC vaccine production facilities in Montréal. Minister Champagne explained that the centre would be completed by the end of summer 2021, certified a few months later and then be ready for production.[78] These facilities will have a production capacity of up to 2 million vaccine doses per month.[79] They will be able to produce the Novavax vaccine, as the federal government signed a memorandum of understanding with that company in February 2021.[80]

Minister Champagne explained that, in addition to building the NRC production centre, the federal government is supporting other organizations in order to improve Canada’s resilience, including Medicago and VIDO-Intervac.[81] For instance, it provided $12 million to VIDO-Intervac to bring its facility up to the standards required to produce human vaccines. According to Minister Champagne, the federal government wants Canada to have production capacity for every step in the vaccine supply chain so that it can be self‑sufficient.[82]

Witness Comments and Proposals

During the Committee’s study, witnesses were critical of several aspects of the government’s strategy to develop domestic biomanufacturing capacity. They also made various recommendations to improve Canada’s research and innovation capabilities.

Some witnesses argued that the federal government has not invested enough in domestic biomanufacturing capacity since the pandemic began. Mr. Hughes stated that the federal government has not marshalled the scientific, medical, and business expertise in the public and private sectors since the pandemic started. In his view, the federal government focused solely on purchasing vaccines and has invested little in preparing for the future.[83] Dr. Kobinger asserted that the federal government did not move quickly enough in either January or February 2020 to implement strategies to develop and produce vaccines in Canada.[84] He claimed that with adequate support, Canada could have produced at least two vaccines by February 2021.[85] However, according to Mr. Casey, the federal government adopted an appropriate strategy, reviewing the most promising vaccine technologies in order to deliver an immediate solution while investing in certain Canadian technologies to help them advance.[86]

A number of organizations making vaccines in Canada reported that they need more funding to continue their work.[87] Karen Mossman, Vice-President of Research at McMaster University, and Brad Sorenson, Chief Executive Officer of Providence Therapeutics, said that more federal government support would have helped them develop their COVID‑19 vaccines much more quickly.[88] Mr. Sorenson explained that Providence Therapeutics waited all spring and summer in 2020 for a response to its funding application under the SIF as timelines were repeatedly extended.[89] Volker Gerdts, Director and Chief Executive Officer of VIDO-Intervac, said that his organization needs more funding to continue clinical trials of its COVID‑19 vaccine.[90]

Moreover, according to Dr. Kobinger, the federal government should follow up on the support it gave to the various organizations. He explained that his group received $1 million in funding, but that the federal government failed to provide further support as its vaccine development progressed. He noted that:

Nobody on this planet can bring a vaccine through any clinical study in humans with $1 million, so we can ask whether this $1 million was well spent considering the lack of follow-up support. How many more like this in Canada also used funding and then were left behind? How far could my group and others be today if we had had early support like in the U.K., the U.S. or other countries?[91]

Dr. Kobinger advocated for the federal government to follow up with every project that receives funding so that it can boost support to those that are making progress and pause funding for those falling behind.[92]

Various stakeholders addressed these comments. Mr. Lievonen stated that he did not think that “we could have done it faster with any type of licensing in or tech transfer agreements.”[93] Andrew Booth, President of Precision NanoSystems, concurred.[94] Mr. Lievonen explained that science has been paramount in decision-making and that Canada would clearly receive vaccines more quickly by buying them than by producing them. Furthermore, he said that the domestic investment strategy was implemented at the same time as the purchasing strategy, not afterward.[95] Both Dr. Nemer and Mr. Booth emphasized that Canada needs to start investing in building its biomanufacturing capacity right away, as it takes years or even decades to develop strong and resilient capabilities.[96]

Minister Champagne stated that the federal government has provided significant funding to develop domestic biomanufacturing capacity since the start of the COVID‑19 pandemic. For example, he said that “within 12 days of the World Health Organization’s declaring a pandemic, we were investing $192 million in biomanufacturing here in Canada. Within a month, we had invested close to $792 million.”[97]

One witness compared Canada’s vaccine manufacturing capacity with that of the U.K. Professor Attaran said that the U.K. made a major effort to improve its production capacity from the outset of the pandemic. As of February 2021, it was one of the leading vaccine manufacturing countries, while Canada ranked 40th.[98] He added that, when the pandemic began, the U.K. had the capacity to produce 200 litres of cell culture in order to make the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine, while Canada could make 500 litres. Professor Attaran argued that Canada could have made the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine under licence. He also noted that, as of 2019, the NRC laboratory was the only one in the world to have made and commercialized an adenovirus vaccine, the same technology used in the AstraZeneca and Johnson & Johnson vaccines.[99]

ISED officials responded to the comparisons with the U.K.’s production capacity. According to Minister Champagne, when the COVID‑19 pandemic started, Canada had a much smaller manufacturing base than the U.K.[100] Simon Kennedy, Deputy Minister of ISED, explained that, at the time, the U.K. already had large contract manufacturing operators that could quickly shift to mass production of COVID‑19 vaccines. He added that, in 2017, the U.K. had launched a rebuilding strategy and had started work in 2019 on one of their large vaccine production facilities, which will be ready by the end of 2021.[101] Lastly, Mitch Davies, President of the NRC, said that while NRC researchers have expertise in the technology used for the AstraZeneca vaccine, what matters is the company with which one reaches an agreement. In Canada’s case, that agreement is with Novavax.[102]

The witnesses offered strategies for building Canada’s domestic biomanufacturing capacity. Dr. Mossman stated that “[i]nvesting in domestic biomanufacturing capacity is certainly part of the solution.”[103] Witnesses also pointed out that government investments need to support a variety of technologies in the vaccine manufacturing industry.[104] Dr. Lexchin suggested that the government implement a national strategy to publicly fund vaccine research in the public sector. In his opinion, the federal government should invest in a publicly owned vaccine manufacturing facility to ensure Canadian facilities are never sold to foreign interests.[105]

To prepare for future health crises, Dr. Gerdts proposed that the federal government fund organizations and centres that focus on emerging diseases that affect both humans and animals. He also suggested establishing emergency organizations that can respond immediately to emerging diseases.[106] Multiple witnesses emphasized the many opportunities for public-private partnerships in the biomanufacturing sector.[107]

Some witnesses said that scientists are not adequately supported in Canada. Dr. Gerdts stated that Canada should have more research capacity.[108] Professor Attaran argued that the Canadian scientific establishment is inferior to that of peer countries. He said that, during the pandemic, the Chief Science Advisor has produced just three reports, while Switzerland—a much smaller country—has produced 70.[109] In his view, the government lacks scientific expertise.[110] Dr. Lexchin noted that the federal government spends $1 billion per year on medical research, about four times less per capita than the U.S.[111] Dr. Lamarre explained that the number of researchers in Canada has increased, as researchers from around the world are attracted by the good working conditions and access to research infrastructure in Canada. Yet, he said that, despite these greater numbers, funding for basic research has stagnated for decades, with the result that researchers’ funding application “success rates have dropped dramatically in recent years.”[112]

Other witnesses rebutted these criticisms. Dr. Nemer said that Canadian researchers have been very active in helping deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. She said that “science has guided decision-making in real time like I have never seen before.” The COVID‑19 expert panel, made up of researchers and practitioners from across the country, met over 40 times to discuss various issues.[113] In response to a question on this topic, Dr. Mossman asserted that Canada has scientific experts in all of its universities and that, “in many ways and in many aspects, Canadian scientists lead.”[114] James Taylor, Chief Executive Officer of Precision NanoSystems, agreed.[115]

Finally, one witness proposed ways of supporting the growth of a stronger Canadian science ecosystem in the years ahead. Mr. Lamarre argued that the federal government should keep investing significant amounts “in the coming years to rebuild a rich and diverse ecosystem at all levels of the vaccine development chain.”[116] He encouraged the federal government to boost investment in the following two areas:

  • basic research, because it is a vital part of the development of new immunization technologies. Innovation does not always require targeted investments, as it often emerges from broader investments that deliver unexpected benefits; and
  • leading-edge research infrastructure through the Canada Foundation for Innovation (CFI). Canada needs cutting-edge infrastructure to support the development of vaccines, but this infrastructure entails significant operating costs for researchers and universities.[117]

Dr. Lamarre further proposed establishing a government funding structure for vaccine development that bridges academic research and the pharmaceutical industry. He pointed out that Canada has world leaders in vaccine development in its universities, but it is extremely costly to develop vaccines. Universities often lack the funding to complete their projects. Such a structure would help these projects advance to a stage where they would attract the interest of the large pharmaceutical companies. According to Dr. Lamarre, this could even encourage these companies to build facilities in Canada.[118]

April 2022 Update on the Vaccine Situation

In April 2022, Government officials explained to the Committee what initiatives the Canadian government had put in place to increase Canada’s biomanufacturing capacity since March 2020. Eric Costen, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, said: “From the very outset of the pandemic, the government immediately set to the task of addressing these biomanufacturing gaps through a series of strategic investments.”[119] Mr. Costen said that, since the spring of 2020, the federal government had invested approximately $1.6 billion in new vaccine, therapeutic and biomanufacturing projects across Canada. Organizations that received federal government funding include the following:

  • the University of Saskatchewan’s VIDO, to support the clinical trials of its two COVID-19 vaccine candidates, as well as an expansion of its facilities;
  • BioVectra, in Prince Edward Island, to build up mRNA capabilities and supply chains;
  • AbCellera and Precision NanoSystems, both based in Vancouver, to support their research and production activities; and
  • Sanofi Pasteur and Resilience Biotechnologies, to support end-to-end vaccine manufacturing capabilities across a range of technology platforms.[120]

The NRC collaborated with many of the companies that received federal funding over the course of the pandemic to support them in their work.[121]

As mentioned above, the Government of Canada also invested in the Quebec company Medicago. In March 2022, the World Health Organization (WHO) rejected Medicago’s vaccine because of its ties to cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris, a minority shareholder in the company. In response to questions, Mr. Costen explained that the Government of Canada funded Medicago in 2020 in an emergency context; after assessment, it was one of the most promising options in Canada. He added that other countries, such as the United States, also saw Medicago as a reliable vaccine manufacturer, one of the most scientifically proven in Canada. He also noted that cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris held only a minority share in the company, and therefore the Canadian government had not considered it to be a contravention of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.[122]

Federal investment is needed to build a strong biomanufacturing sector in Canada for the long term. Mr. Costen explained that it is important to invest in a range of platforms to build a resilient sector, because no one knows what form the next public health crisis will take.[123] He added that government investment has taken Canada from a position where it had very little capacity to fill and finish vaccines to one where it can fill and finish approximately 300 million to 400 million doses per year across platforms, which would serve both domestic and global vaccine needs.[124] He said that Canada will have this capacity in a few years, once work on the vaccine production facilities has been completed. Finally, Mr. Costen added that

we're very aware that the company is looking with some urgency at the question of its ownership structure, and we continue to be in close contact with the company, understanding that they recognize the seriousness of the WHO decision and are moving to make decisions to address the challenges they face.[125]

Canada must also attract foreign investment to ensure the sustainability and growth of its biomanufacturing sector.[126] For instance, Mr. Costen pointed out that, in August 2021, the Government of Canada signed a memorandum of understanding with Moderna to build a state-of-the-art vaccine production facility in Canada. He said that the Government of Canada hoped that its investments and discussions with Moderna would ensure Canada has a diversified production capacity in the months and years ahead.[127]

Mr. Costen said that the federal government had introduced its Biomanufacturing and Life Sciences Strategy in the summer of 2021 to establish a long-term plan to “ensure an innovative, responsive and resilient sector.”[128] Mr. Costen explained that the strategy has two broad objectives: (i) to grow a strong and competitive domestic life sciences sector with cutting‑edge biomanufacturing capabilities, and (ii) to fundamentally enhance Canada’s preparedness in order to respond to future health emergencies. The strategy to achieve these objectives has five pillars: ensuring strong, coordinated governance; strengthening research systems and the talent pipeline; growing world-leading companies in the sector; building public assets and public capacity; and enabling innovation through world-class clinical trial systems and the regulatory environment.[129] Darryl C. Patterson, Director General of the Life Sciences and Biomanufacturing Branch at ISED, explained that building a resilient ecosystem entails providing support from start to finish, from basic research to commercial production. He added that Canada wants to develop flexible manufacturing capacity that can be put to other uses in non-pandemic times.[130]

As part of its strategy, the Government of Canada invested in building the NRC’s Biologics Manufacturing Centre in Montreal. This centre is an end-to-end production facility capable of producing a wide range of vaccines and other biologics.[131] Construction was completed in June 2021. The centre’s production capacity is approximately 4,000 litres, which could translate into approximately 2 million doses of a vaccine per month, depending on the type of vaccine produced.[132] In the winter of 2022, the NRC was completing the commissioning, qualification and validation process for the centre to demonstrate its compliance with good manufacturing practices.[133]

Maria Aubrey, Vice-President of Strategic Initiatives at the NRC, provided additional details about the centre. She said that, in February 2021, the Government of Canada had signed a memorandum of understanding with Novavax to pursue the option of producing its own COVID-19 vaccine at the NRC’s Biologics Manufacturing Centre. Health Canada approved the vaccine in February 2022 for adults 18 years of age and older.[134] In April 2022, the NRC was working with Novavax on the technology transfer. Ms. Aubrey explained that, once Novavax received approval for production at the NRC’s centre, production could continue on a commercial scale.[135] She added that the centre has a public-good mandate. Accordingly, in health emergency situations, the centre will be made available to produce vaccines. Outside of those times, it will focus on projects of public interest, such as the production of drugs for rare diseases.[136]

Mr. Costen also spoke about a number of initiatives the federal government put in place to develop a strong end-to-end biomanufacturing ecosystem in Canada to develop vaccines and other therapeutic and biologic products. These initiatives include the following:

  • the Canada Foundation for Innovation will deliver a bio-innovation research infrastructure fund to support infrastructure needs at post-secondary institutions and research hospitals;
  • the new Canada Biomedical Research Fund will support high-risk applied research, as well as training and talent development;
  • Health Canada is working to enhance and modernize the relevant regulatory systems; and
  • the Canadian Institutes of Health Research is preparing to launch a new clinical trials fund that will support clinical studies for new drug candidates.[137]

Ms. Aubrey said that the NRC had also developed programs to establish a sustainable and thriving biomanufacturing and life sciences ecosystem in Canada. For example, it established the Challenge programs and the Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP). Through the IRAP, the Government of Canada invested $81 million to support 14 small and medium-sized enterprises developing made-in-Canada vaccines and therapeutics. Ms. Aubrey added that, through IRAP, the NRC had also supported over 2,200 innovative businesses, helping them weather the pandemic and preserving over 26,000 jobs in Canada.[138]

The witnesses who appeared provided several perspectives on federal investments since 2021. Some noted that the federal government had made significant investments in recent years.[139] M. Casey said that Canada has a strong foundation upon which to build. He added that Canada is in a good position because it has established partnerships with a number of companies, such as Sanofi Pasteur and Moderna.[140] Dr. Lamarre agreed, but added that these investments are only the first step and that Canada must make an even greater effort in the next few years to restore its domestic production capacity and support the biomanufacturing ecosystem at all stages of the vaccine development chain.[141]

Witnesses agreed on the importance of building a resilient biomanufacturing ecosystem over the long term, one that can respond to future health crises, and they proposed ideas for achieving this goal.[142] Oliver Technow, President and Chief Executive Officer of BioVectra Inc., said that the key to being competitive with other nations and attracting investments from pharmaceutical companies is to make ambitious investments.[143] According to Mr. Casey, Canada must also diversify its skills and establish a plan of action during and between pandemics. He added that Canada must have a collective vision to move forward.[144]

To build an ecosystem that is resilient over the long term, Dr. Lamarre noted the importance of bolstering investments in basic research. He said that Canada ranks last among G7 countries in research and development spending.[145] He was disappointed that there were no significant budget increases for the granting councils, even though costs are rising. In his view, the Government of Canada must boost its investments in basic research by 10% per year over 10 years to return to its role as a global leader.[146] He also proposed increasing investments in advanced research infrastructure through the Canadian Foundation for Innovation.[147] Dr. Lamarre further proposed implementing a vaccine development funding structure that would bridge the gap between academic research and the pharmaceutical industry to support academic innovations until they are mature enough to attract the interest of pharmaceutical companies.[148]

Some witnesses also highlighted the importance of retaining and attracting talent to build a resilient ecosystem in Canada. Several said that talent is crucial to be ready for another health crisis, because it is a catalyst for a robust and globally competitive biomanufacturing sector.[149] Some witnesses said that Canada does not have the talent it needs to deliver on its biomanufacturing strategy.[150] To develop and retain top talent in Canada, Mr. Technow mentioned the importance of collaboration and partnerships between the public and private sectors to create employment opportunities for students at all levels. Furthermore, he said that, to attract talent to Canada, the federal government should adopt policies that streamline and speed up the immigration process, or follow the example of other countries and create other incentives, such as personal income tax incentives. Mr. Technow added that, in his experience, to attract international talent, Canada needs to offer an attractive place to live.[151]

Witnesses also commented on Canada’s vaccine response. Mr. Casey noted that, in March 2020, the predicted time frame for developing a COVID-19 vaccine was three to five years. In his view, the fact that COVID-19 vaccines were already being administered in the spring of 2021 was “a remarkable scientific feat.”[152] He added that the Canadian biotechnology industry played an important role in delivering on some of these vaccines.[153] However, John R. Fulton, Spokesperson and Representative for Biolyse Pharma Corporation, said that the work of the Vaccine Task Force was not transparent enough. In his opinion, the federal government should maintain that type of group in the future, but should ensure that its work and its discussions are public.[154]

Lastly, pharmaceutical companies explained what they had done since 2020 to develop their biomanufacturing capacity:

  • Dr. Gerdts explained that his organization was building an in-house manufacturing facility for making both human and animal vaccines. VIDO anticipated that it could start production in the fourth quarter of 2022. Once it is up and running, the facility could make as many as 40 million doses a year, depending on the type of vaccine;[155]
  • Mr. Fulton explained that, in May 2020, Deloitte had contacted Biolyse Pharma on behalf of the Vaccine Task Force, which led the company to repurpose one of its facilities to produce vaccines. He said that Biolyse Pharma’s main advantage was that it already had all the equipment and expertise necessary to make biologics, and the Health Canada licences to produce vaccines were available on site. According to Mr. Fulton, given its existing capacities, if the federal government had invested $4 million, Biolyse Pharma could have hired the necessary staff to accelerate the repurposing of its facilities for vaccine production and, within four to six months, been in a position to attract one of the manufacturers of the vaccine candidates and establish a partnership;[156] and
  • Mr. Technow explained that BioVectra received federal and provincial investments in November 2021 to expand its facilities to produce mRNA vaccines and therapeutics. In the spring of 2022, he expected that the work would be completed in 2023 and that BioVectra would be able to produce up to 160 million doses of mRNA vaccines per year, with the capability to commercially package, or fill and finish, 70 million doses.[157]

Observations and Recommendations

The Committee recognizes that the COVID‑19 pandemic has been unprecedented in scope. It applauds the hard work of Canadian governments—federal, provincial, and territorial—to protect Canadians during this challenging time.

Based on the large amount of evidence it heard, the Committee believes that warning signs that a health crisis could happen at any moment were ignored in recent years. Canada should have assessed the erosion of its biomanufacturing capacity sooner and taken action to rebuild it. If Canada had had enough biomanufacturing capacity to quickly produce COVID‑19 vaccines, it would have been able to avoid some of the problems it encountered during the pandemic, in areas such as vaccine procurement and distribution. The Committee understands the concerns witnesses expressed in February 2021 regarding the delayed deliveries of Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccine doses. However, it is relieved that the delivery of millions of doses in March 2021 has made up for these delays.

In the summer of 2020, the federal government signed numerous agreements to reserve various types of vaccines from multiple companies. The Committee understands why the federal government took this approach but wonders about the associated costs. For example, while Canada can donate excess doses if necessary, if it ends up with tens of millions of surplus doses, the cost of these unused doses will likely be substantial. Accordingly, the Committee is of the view that, for transparency, once all Canadians are vaccinated, the federal government should publish the final data on the number of doses received relative to the agreements that were signed and the costs incurred.

The Committee salutes the members of the Task Force, who volunteered to advise the federal government on its vaccine procurement and production strategy. However, it also acknowledges the concerns of multiple witnesses regarding the importance of ensuring the advisory group’s activities are transparent from the start. To maintain Canadians’ trust in the work of such groups, the Committee believes the federal government should publicly disclose most of the details about them, such as their composition, the conflicts of interest of their members and the progress of their work, from the moment they are created. As some witnesses noted, a lack of transparency hurts accountability and peer review to properly understand and assess the chosen strategy. The Committee therefore recommends:

Recommendation 1

That the Government of Canada review the COVID-19 Task Force’s work and publish its recommendations for improving advisory groups’ transparency within one year.

The Committee is pleased with the federal government’s current efforts to develop domestic biomanufacturing capacity and build a more resilient Canada. With an adequate biomanufacturing capacity, Canada would be better equipped to deal with future health crises. Like a number of witnesses, the Committee believes that other health crises may occur, and Canada needs to be ready for them. As multiple witnesses pointed out during the study, it takes a lot of time to build a strong domestic biomanufacturing capability. Consequently, the federal government must continue investing in this sector after the pandemic. However, to ensure these investments are effective, the federal government needs to follow up on them periodically to assess the development of Canada’s biomanufacturing capacity and ensure it does not erode once again. The Committee therefore recommends:

Recommendation 2

That the Government of Canada assess the current state of development of the country’s biomanufacturing capacity to determine whether it meets its needs for a future health crisis and publicly disclose the status of this work within one year.

Recommendation 3

That the Government of Canada create a five-year domestic biomanufacturing capacity review process. This process could include consideration of pharmaceutical companies operating in Canada, the scope of their work and the vaccine manufacturing capacity of production facilities.

The Committee commends the various Canadian universities and pharmaceutical organizations on their work to develop COVID‑19 vaccines. As a number of witnesses explained, vaccine development costs can be very high, which can hinder their development. As a result, the Committee is of the opinion that the federal government must continue supporting these organizations’ efforts if it wants to build a strong domestic biomanufacturing capability. However, to properly support the wide variety of research work, the Committee believes the federal government needs to follow up on the funding it awards to assess the status of the work and identify needs. The Committee therefore recommends:

Recommendation 4

That the Government of Canada establish a follow-up mechanism for funding awarded through the various research support programs, including, but not limited to, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC), in order to consider other funding options for research organizations awarded funding through the networks of centres of excellence program so they do not suffer a funding shortfall after 31 March, 2023, and are able to continue their activities through another source such as the strategic science fund, as of 1 April, 2023.

The Committee recognizes that partnerships between the private and public sectors may help foster the development of vaccines and therapeutics. As a number of academic researchers told the Committee, multiple universities have a great deal of expertise in vaccine development but lack the funds to bring their projects to fruition. To address this problem, Dr. Lamarre recommended establishing a funding mechanism at the interface between academic research and the pharmaceutical industry. Like Dr. Lamarre, the Committee is of the view that such a mechanism could accelerate vaccine development and encourage private sector investment. The Committee therefore recommends:

Recommendation 5

That the Government of Canada consider ways to improve its funding structure at the interface between academic research and the pharmaceutical industry to both support research at universities and stimulate investment by pharmaceutical companies.

Because the COVID‑19 pandemic has been an unprecedented health crisis for Canada, the Committee believes the federal government should take stock of its actions and decisions. For example, the federal government has awarded a great deal of funding and undertaken a large number of vaccine manufacturing projects since the pandemic began. Accordingly, the Committee believes the federal government should review the actions it has taken during the pandemic to determine what has worked and what has not. The Committee notes that, in her testimony, Minister Hajdu said the federal government was conducting a review of lessons learned during the pandemic.[158] The Committee is of the opinion that it is critical for the government to complete this review in order to learn from the COVID‑19 pandemic and prepare for future health crises. The Committee therefore recommends:

Recommendation 6

That the Government of Canada carry out a review of lessons learned during the pandemic as regards vaccine procurement and development and publish its findings within one year. The review could include, but is not limited to:

  • The work done by scientific experts to advise the government during this period;
  • The investments in research infrastructure and vaccine production and the status of that work;
  • The investments in organizations that developed a COVID‑19 vaccine and the status of their work;
  • The costs of the large-scale vaccine procurement strategy and the timelines for vaccinating all Canadians;
  • Government of Canada contracts with pharmaceutical companies for COVID-19 vaccines procurement.

Recommendation 7

That the Government of Canada increase investment in university research and fundamental sciences, bringing it in line with other advanced OECD nations in the world.

Recommendation 8

That the Government of Canada support the creation of high-value, well-paying positions in biomanufacturing and life sciences to attract and retain top talent and consider:

  • increasing the value of graduate scholarships and the number of scholarships awarded at the master’s, doctoral and postdoctoral levels;
  • ensuring that scholarships are internationally competitive and increase with the cost of living;
  • addressing the underinvestment in a generation of Canada’s most promising young researchers;
  • ensuring that graduates and workers have the skills Canada needs by increasing opportunities for lifelong learning and work-integrated learning; and
  • encouraging the immigration of international talent to the country by strengthening Canada’s position as a destination for global talent by reducing processing times for study and work permits for students and faculty.

Recommendation 9

That the Government of Canada help strengthen Canada’s biomanufacturing ecosystem by funding diverse national expertise capable of withstanding future health crises, by taking a broad approach that includes research related not only to vaccine development but also to neuroscience, mental health and immunotherapy, and protecting the patents and intellectual properties.

Recommendation 10

That, as part of the implementation and evolution of the Biomanufacturing and Life Sciences Strategy, the government develop a holistic approach to supporting Canada’s biomanufacturing industry and develop a framework for funding translational research organizations by supporting pre-clinical to clinical translation.


[1]              House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology [INDU], Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1125 (Alain Lamarre, As an individual).

[2]              INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1125 (Joel Lexchin, As an individual).

[4]              INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1125 (Joel Lexchin).

[5]              INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1135 (Ken Hughes, Providence Therapeutics [PT]).

[6]              INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1115 (François-Philippe Champagne, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada [ISED]).

[7]              INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1115 (François-Philippe Champagne).

[8]              INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1110 (Mona Nemer, Office of the Chief Science Advisor).

[9]              INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1140 (Anita Anand, Public Services and Procurement Canada [PSPC]).

[10]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1120 (Mark Lievonen, COVID-19 Vaccine Task Force).

[11]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1105 (Mona Nemer).

[12]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1110 (Mona Nemer).

[13]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1105 (Joanne Langley, COVID-19 Vaccine Task Force).

[14]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1150 (Roger Scott-Douglas, COVID‑19 Vaccine Task Force).

[15]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1120 (Mark Lievonen).

[16]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1205 (Joanne Langley, COVID‑19 Vaccine Task Force). For more information on the various types of vaccines, see Government of Canada, Vaccines for COVID‑19: Authorized vaccines.

[17]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1205 (Joanne Langley).

[18]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1105 (Joanne Langley).

[19]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1225 (Roger Scott-Douglas); and INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1115 (Joanne Langley).

[20]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1110 (Patty Hajdu, Health Canada); and INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1110 (Anita Anand).

[21]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1110 (Patty Hajdu); and INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1110 (Anita Anand).

[22]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1110 (Anita Anand).

[23]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1205 (Anita Anand).

[24]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1225 (Stephen Lucas, Health Canada).

[25]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1105 (Patty Hajdu).

[26]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1125 (Patty Hajdu).

[27]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1110 (Iain Stewart, Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC)).

[28]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1115 (Amir Attaran, As an individual); and INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1145 (Joel Lexchin).

[29]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1215 (Joel Lexchin).

[30]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1120 (Amir Attaran).

[31]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1205 (Gary Kobinger, As an individual).

[32]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1150 (Gary Kobinger).

[33]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1240 (Gary Kobinger).

[34]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1105 (Joanne Langley).

[35]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1105 (Joanne Langley).

[36]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1155 (Roger Scott-Douglas).

[37]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1155 (Roger Scott-Douglas).

[38]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1220 (Amir Attaran); INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1125 (Joel Lexchin); and INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1245 (Gary Kobinger).

[39]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1220 (Amir Attaran).

[40]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1220 (Amir Attaran).

[41]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1245 (Gary Kobinger).

[42]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1235 (Anita Anand).

[43]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1205 (Patty Hajdu).

[44]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1115 (Amir Attaran).

[45]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1115 (Andrew Casey, BIOTECanada).

[46]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1105 (Joanne Langley).

[47]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1135 (Patty Hajdu).

[48]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1110 (Iain Stewart).

[49]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1135 (Patty Hajdu).

[50]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1125 (Iain Stewart).

[52]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1145 (Iain Stewart).

[53]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1200 (Roger Scott-Douglas).

[54]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1130 (Roger Scott-Douglas).

[55]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1240 (Gary Kobinger).

[56]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1135 (Patty Hajdu).

[57]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1125 (François-Philippe Champagne).

[58]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1115 (Amir Attaran).

[59]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1250 (Amir Attaran).

[60]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1115 (Amir Attaran).

[61]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1140 (Andrew Casey).

[62]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1110 (Iain Stewart).

[63]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1110 (Anita Anand).

[64]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1210 (Roger Scott-Douglas).

[65]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1105 (Patty Hajdu); and INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1110 (Anita Anand).

[66]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1110 (Iain Stewart).

[67]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1105 (Patty Hajdu, Health Canada).

[68]            INDU, Evidence, 2 February 2021, 1130 (Patty Hajdu, Health Canada).

[69]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1105 (Ken Hughes); and INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1210 (Mona Nemer).

[70]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1135 (François-Philippe Champagne).

[71]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1135 (François-Philippe Champagne, ISED); INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1205 (Volker Gerdts, VIDO-Intervac); INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1115 (Andrew Casey); and INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1120 (Andrew Booth, Precision NanoSystems).

[72]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1115 (Brian Lichty, As an individual).

[73]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1110 (Mark Lievonen).

[74]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1105 (Joanne Langley).

[75]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1110 (Volker Gerdts).

[76]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1120 (James Taylor, Precision NanoSystems).

[77]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1115 (François-Philippe Champagne).

[78]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1125 (François-Philippe Champagne).

[79]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1115 (François-Philippe Champagne).

[80]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1115 (François-Philippe Champagne).

[81]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1125 (François-Philippe Champagne).

[82]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1135 (François-Philippe Champagne).

[83]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1105 (Ken Hughes).

[84]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1130 (Gary Kobinger).

[85]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1240 (Gary Kobinger).

[86]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1115 (Andrew Casey).

[87]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1110 (Karen Mossman, As an individual); INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1120 (Andrew Booth); and INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1130 (Takashi Nagao, Medicago).

[88]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1235 (Brad Sorenson, PT); and INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1110 (Karen Mossman).

[89]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1235 (Brad Sorenson).

[90]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1205 (Volker Gerdts).

[91]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1135 (Gary Kobinger).

[92]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1215 (Gary Kobinger).

[93]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1120 (Mark Lievonen).

[94]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1215 (Andrew Booth).

[95]            INDU, Evidence, 18 February 2021, 1200 (Mark Lievonen).

[96]            INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1225 (Mona Nemer); and INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1215 (Andrew Booth).

[97]            INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1120 (François-Philippe Champagne).

[98]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1115 (Amir Attaran).

[99]            INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1155 (Amir Attaran).

[100]          INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1200, 1220 (François-Philippe Champagne).

[101]          INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1215 (Simon Kennedy, ISED).

[102]          INDU, Evidence, 4 February 2021, 1300 (Mitch Davies, National Research Council of Canada (NRC)).

[103]          INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1110 (Karen Mossman).

[104]          INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1150 (Alain Lamarre); INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1250 (Volker Gerdts); and INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1120 (James Taylor).

[105]          INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1125 (Joel Lexchin); and INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1150 (Alain Lamarre).

[106]          INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1205 (Volker Gerdts).

[107]          INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1225 (Andrew Casey); INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1120 (James Taylor); and INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1130 (Takashi Nagao).

[108]          INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1250 (Volker Gerdts).

[109]          INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1115 (Amir Attaran).

[110]          INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1140 (Amir Attaran).

[111]          INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1155 (Joel Lexchin).

[112]          INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1210 (Alain Lamarre).

[113]          INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1110 (Mona Nemer).

[114]          INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1255 (Karen Mossman).

[115]          INDU, Evidence, 25 February 2021, 1255 (James Taylor).

[116]          INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1125 (Alain Lamarre).

[117]          INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1125 (Alain Lamarre).

[118]          INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1125 (Alain Lamarre).

[119]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1305 (Eric Costen, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada).

[120]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1305, 1310 (Eric Costen).

[121]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1335 (Lakshmi Krishnan, National Research Council of Canada).

[122]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1320 (Eric Costen). See also World Health Organization, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.

[123]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1325 (Eric Costen).

[124]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1325 (Eric Costen).

[125]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1355 (Eric Costen).

[126]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1310 (Eric Costen).

[127]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1310 (Eric Costen).

[128]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1305 (Eric Costen).

[129]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1305 (Eric Costen).

[130]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1330 (Darryl C. Patterson, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada).

[131]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1305 (Eric Costen); INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1310 (Maria Aubrey, National Research Council of Canada); and INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1335 (Lakshmi Krishnan).

[132]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1310 (Maria Aubrey).

[133]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1310 (Maria Aubrey).

[134]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1310 (Maria Aubrey).

[135]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1315 (Maria Aubrey).

[136]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1310 (Maria Aubrey).

[137]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1310 (Eric Costen).

[138]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1310 (Maria Aubrey).

[139]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1430 (Andrew Casey); and INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1425 (Alain Lamarre).

[140]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1430 (Andrew Casey).

[141]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1425 (Alain Lamarre).

[142]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1415, 1500 (Oliver Technow, BioVectra Inc.); and INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1430 (Andrew Casey).

[143]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1415, 1500 (Oliver Technow).

[144]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1430 (Andrew Casey).

[145]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1425 (Alain Lamarre).

[146]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1450 (Alain Lamarre).

[147]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1425 (Alain Lamarre).

[148]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1425 (Alain Lamarre).

[149]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1420 (Volker Gerdts); INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1415 (Oliver Technow); and INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1430 (Andrew Casey).

[150]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1500 (Oliver Technow), INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1455 (Alain Lamarre).

[151]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1415, 1420 (Oliver Technow).

[152]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1430 (Andrew Casey).

[153]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1430 (Andrew Casey).

[154]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1405 (John R. Fulton, BioNiagara).

[155]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1420 (Volker Gerdts).

[156]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1500 (John R. Fulton).

[157]          INDU, Evidence, 8 April 2022, 1415 (Oliver Technow).

[158]          INDU, Evidence, 16 February 2021, 1240 (Patty Hajdu).