FAAE Committee Report

Supplement to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development Report on Assessing Risk, Preventing Diversion and Increasing Transparency: Strengthening Canada’s Arms Export Controls in a Volatile World

All members of the Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and International Development support the completion of the final Report. The Conservative, Bloc and NDP members, representing the majority of the committee, recognize that many observations made during the study are not captured in the Report, as the Committee had limited time to complete it before summer adjournment, and wish to add the following evidence, observations and recommendations.

Wescam Sensors to Turkey

In the Government of Canada's April 2021 report on export permits to Turkey, officials noted that the December 2019 report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Libya, which had examined embargo violations in Libya, “does not provide sufficient evidence to determine whether UAVs supplied to the [Government of National Accord] during this period were equipped with Wescam sensors.”[1] However, the 2021 report states that, “Canadian sensors are listed as the exclusive sensor technology for Baykar’s UAVs as per its catalogue.”[2] In light of this information, it is conceivable that, with further analysis, Canada could have potentially prevented Azerbaijan's use of Turkish drones equipped with Canadian technology.  

It was also public knowledge that during border clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the months and weeks leading up to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey had voiced its full support for Azerbaijan. Global Affairs noted this in a 2 September 2020 memorandum for action to the Minister.[3]

Dr. Christopher Waters, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor, commented that,

one of the things I find extraordinary about this whole situation is that in the views of the Armenian diaspora in Canada, Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s actions have constituted continuing acts of genocide. Leaving aside the relative merits of that argument, this is nonetheless a situation we should have been approaching with extraordinary care and attention, and I don’t have the sense that those were there. I don’t have the sense from the heavily redacted documents. I don’t have the sense from the department’s report that this was something that should have been approached with greater attention than it was.[4]

However, the documents provided to the Committee suggest that Global Affairs Canada officials focused primarily on Canada’s relationship with Turkey, as a NATO ally and partner on the situation in Syria, when providing advice to the Minister on export permit applications for Turkey. 

A 14 September 2020 briefing note for Minister Champagne raises concerns about the priorities of the Government of Canada in Canada-Turkey relations, as well as concerns about Canada’s obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty and Canadian law. The briefing note lists a top objective in the meeting between the Minister and his Turkish counterpart as advancing the candidacy of the Hon. Bill Morneau for Secretary General of the OECD. The briefing note then advises the Minister to indicate to his Turkish counterpart that a decision concerning arms export permits is imminent or approved, suggesting a link between Turkey’s support for the Hon. Morneau’s candidacy and the approval of arms export permits to Turkey.[5] 

Ms. Peggy Mason, a former Ambassador and the President of the Rideau Institute on International Affairs, criticized the approach taken by Global Affairs Canada, stating that,

the Arms Trade Treaty legal obligations give no exemption for allies. Every country that you might export to is an ally of another country. The Arms Trade Treaty obligations have to be applied fully in respect of all prospective recipient countries. We don't have an international legal obligation to export arms, but we do have an international legal obligation to export those arms in accordance with the obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty.[6]

Mr. Cesar Jaramillo, Executive Director, Project Ploughshares, offered a similar view and said that that, “the law, both domestic and international, demands an objective, reliable system that is free from political interference and economic calculations.”[7] While Dr. James Fergusson, Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, instead suggested that, “as long as we as sovereign states, Canada included, are free to interpret these as we will, then the political realities will continue to be at play.”[8]

In addition to seeing Global Affairs Canada as, “pursuing two contradictory policy objectives,” Ms. Mason commented that, “when the Minister announces an investigation by Global Affairs, he or she is really asking officials to determine whether they gave him or her bad advice the first time round. How likely are they to do that?” [9] 

Role of Canadian Arms in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

The Committee heard from witnesses about the significant impact the Bayraktar drones had on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Dr. Kilford, writer on Turkish and Middle Eastern issues, stated, “use of the Bayraktar drones arguably contributed to Azerbaijan’s success more than any other capability in their inventory.”[10] Witnesses emphasised the significance of the Wescam sensors in the Bayraktar drones. Mr. Kelsey Gallagher, Researcher at Project Ploughshares, emphasised that,

they should not be mistaken for mere cameras. The variant of Canadian-made sensors exported to Turkey, the Wescam MX-15D, is also fitted with a laser designator. This component directs munitions toward their targets and is vital to launching modern air strikes.[11]

Dr. Kilford described the Wescam sensors as of, “a very, very high-quality”[12] making them preferred product for buyers. Dr. Christian Leuprecht, Professor at Canada’s Royal Military College and Queen’s University, emphasized  the impact the Wescam sensors had on the conflict and the wider geostrategic status quo,

ultimately, Canadian technology here fundamentally changed the geostrategic status quo, and it changed it in a way that was not in Canada’s interest and not aligned with NATO interests. Canada thus inadvertently aided and abetted a change in the geostrategic status quo.[13]

However, the documents provided to the Committee suggest that Global Affairs Canada officials—when providing advice to the Minister on export permit applications for Turkey—were largely focused on Canada’s relationship with Turkey, both bilaterally and in the NATO context, and on the situation in Syria. 

Strengthening Canada’s End-use Assurances

Recommendation 7 of the Report calls for the Canadian government to examine ways to include more stringent controls on end-use assurances that are set out in the documents provided for the export of equipment that is shipped from Canada. We consider it necessary that this include an examination of controls in countries such as Germany and Switzerland, which witnesses pointed to as having models to emulate.

Supplementary Recommendations

Therefore, following review of testimony delivered to the Committee, the majority members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development are pleased to submit the following supplementary recommendations to the Committee's Report:

Recommendation 1

That the Government of Canada support a requirement for Parliament to be notified of any significant arms export permit approvals not involving destinations or goods and technology determined to be low-risk. 

Recommendation 2

That the Government of Canada ensure that Global Affairs Canada has sufficient capacity and appropriate resources to adhere to the Export and Import Permits Act and the Arms Trade Treaty. 

Recommendation 3

That the Government of Canada harmonize the risk assessment process for all exports of Canadian military goods, at all stages, and across all relevant government bodies, including with respect to contracts brokered by the Canadian Commercial Corporation and transfers arranged by the Department of National Defence.

Recommendation 4

In order to enhance diplomatic presence in the region, the Government of Canada should  consider establishing an embassy in the South Caucasus.

Recommendation 5

That the Government of Canada should consider creating a new independent body for the review of applications for arms export permits.