As a result of their deliberations committees may make recommendations which they include in their reports for the consideration of the House of Commons or the Government. Recommendations related to this study are listed below.

Recommendation 1

That the foremost consideration informing the Government of Canada’s arms export policy, including the assessment of risk, should be Canada’s domestic and international legal obligations, and that those obligations should be applied universally and consistently in all decisions about permit applications.

Recommendation 2

That the Government of Canada ensure that it has access to all necessary expertise, knowledge and information, including diplomatic, in relation to all countries, regions, and military goods, technologies, systems and subsystems implicated by export permit applications that are under review. In any cases where such information, knowledge or expertise does not exist, export permits should not proceed.

Recommendation 3

That the Government of Canada pursue regular and meaningful consultations with industry, civil society and independent experts regarding Canada’s arms export policy.

Recommendation 4

That, in any cases where civil society and independent experts have raised credible concerns about the misuse of Canadian technology with respect to the arms export permits regime, the Government of Canada take immediate action to understand and investigate those concerns. Should an investigation reveal that there is substantial risk that such an export permit is not compliant with domestic and international legal obligations, that – as in the case at hand – the permit be suspended and/or cancelled.

Recommendation 5

That the Government of Canada implement a system that would allow companies seeking permits for the export of military goods and technology to know the status of their application.

Recommendation 6

That the Government of Canada explore the most effective means of clarifying the destinations and military goods and technology that are typically considered to be low-risk, and those that are typically considered to be higher risk and therefore likely to involve a lengthy review process within government and/or a high likelihood of permit denial.

Recommendation 7

That the Government of Canada examine how stricter controls could be included in the end-use assurance documents attached to components and subsystems that are exported from Canada and later incorporated in finished military products and systems, with the goal of preventing transfers to any high-risk destinations without prior approval from Canada.

Recommendation 8

That the Government of Canada explore options for an effective and feasible post-shipment verification system that could be applied to military goods and technology being exported to destinations not determined to be low-risk. Prioritization could reflect the volume and type of military goods and technology being exported to such destinations, and any diversion concerns that have been identified.