TRAN Committee Report

Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities
Official Opposition – New Democratic Party of Canada

Review of the Canadian Transportation Safety Regime:
Transportation of Dangerous Goods and Safety Management Systems

Supplementary Opinion

On July 6^th, 2013 a 74-car runaway freight train carrying a deadly mixture of misclassified crude oil and volatile gases derailed, caught fire and exploded in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec – 47 lives were lost forever, 30 buildings were annihilated, a river and lake contaminated, and a town burned beyond recognition. The tragedy that struck Lac-Mégantic unfolded in a matter of hours. Unfortunately, the conditions that led to this devastation were much longer in the making, and entirely preventable.

Protecting the public is a core responsibility of government. The Official Opposition believes that as legislators we must do everything in our power to ensure that tragedies like Lac-Mégantic never happen again. In the wake of the disaster, Official Opposition MP’s in the Transport Committee called for an emergency study to review all recommendations from expert authorities and stakeholders that had not yet been implemented by Transport Canada. Unfortunately the Conservative and Liberal members of the committee did not agree to an emergency rail safety study and our proposal was rejected.

Thankfully, the committee five months later agreed to this study on the transportation of dangerous goods and safety-management systems. We are appreciative of all of the witnesses who took the time to share their perspectives and expertise to improve the safety of our transportation sector. The majority interim report of the Committee provides a reasonable summary of their testimony. We note that only the final report will provide recommendations.

The Official Opposition would like to underscore several key areas where Transport Canada must act to immediately to improve the safety of Canada’s railway sector.

Inspections & Audits

Since 2009, crude oil shipments by rail have ballooned from just 500 carloads a year to 160,000 last year alone—an increase of more than 300 fold. The majority interim report recognizes that rail shipments are expected to rise to 510,000 carloads per year by 2016. This new traffic is great business for rail companies, but the industry and Transport Canada have been dangerously slow to react to the new risks that this increased activity brings.

The first job of any government is to ensure the safety of its citizens. Under successive Liberal and Conservative Governments, the necessary audits, spot-checks and rigorous enforcements needed to uphold basic safety standards have taken a back seat. The Transportation Safety Board (TSB) has recommended that key rail routes need to be inspected twice a year and side lines at least once a year. The Minister must confirm when they will implement this recommendation. The 2013 Fall Report of the Auditor General heavily criticized the government for mishandling rail safety by providing a lack of oversight, inadequate inspections and missing quality assurance measures. Completing only one out of four planned rail safety audits is a serious safety risk to the public.

“Transport Canada should identify and develop a strategy to ensure that it has the needed number of inspectors with the necessary skills and competencies required to plan and conduct the oversight of federal railways, including oversight of safety management systems.” 2013 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada

Violations and Exemptions

After years of delay, and demands from experts and the NDP, the government has finally implemented regulations to allow railway companies to face penalties when violations of safety occur. Such measures have been in place in the United States for years. Transport Canada has documented safety violations by Montreal, Maine and Atlantic, Inc. (MMA), the rail company involved in the Lac-Mégantic tragedy, in 2004, 2009, 2001 and 2012. It is completely unacceptable that penalties were not available as an enforcement tool until now. A lack of penalties contributed to a lack of rail safety culture in Canada. The Minister must reassure Canadians that this new tool will now be used regularly when violations occur.

Similarly, we need the Minister to exercise restraint when granting exemptions to railways who wish to avoid existing regulatory practices. Regulations are in place for a reason – to protect the public –, and when exemptions are granted, the public is put at greater risk. Mr. Richard Boudreault of United Steelworkers stated that safety “is being put at risk by a Minister of Transport who grants exemptions to railways companies like handing out Halloween candy to kids.” Currently, there is not sufficient disclosure of who is granted exemptions, for which reasons, and when they plan on conforming to existing regulations. This must end.

Transport Canada granted MMA an exemption to allow only one conductor on board their trains; several witnesses testified that this was completely unacceptable. The government’s latest Budget Implementation Bill, C-31, also grants the Minister the right to create regulations with less advance public consultation. The NDP is concerned that this will make the system less transparent.

Better Planning and Emergency Preparation

As confirmed by the Emergency Response Assistance Plan (ERAP) Working Group and the Auditor General, Transport Canada suffers from a general lack of information. Transport Canada does not know the destinations of the 400,000 railway cars that carry dangerous goods, what they contain or what routes they take. Therefore, it is impossible for the government to know which communities are at risk. We need better public data at Transport Canada to help municipalities and emergency first responders do their job protecting their residents, and we need adequate funding to ensure that the ERAP program can efficiently and effectively review, approve, inspect and monitor all plans.

Transport Canada needs to ensure that vital training exercises with municipal and government agencies, railway personnel, private contractors and other parties take place to prepare for potential incidents involving the transport of dangerous goods. Municipalities need funding assistance where necessary to implement ERAP’s. Grade crossings regulations and environmental management plans need to be finalized, while a system to collect and analyse rail safety performance data needs to be implemented.

Safety- Management Systems (SMS)

Twelve years after deregulating rail safety through the Safety Management regime, the federal government cannot ensure the safety of Canada’s railways. This has been confirmed by the Auditor General in 2013 and by numerous witnesses during this study.

“We've made it very clear today that the safety management system doesn't exist. There is no safety culture. It is not safe.”  Mr. Phil Benson, Lobbyist, Teamsters Canada

“Concerns have also been expressed that SMS allows companies to regulate themselves, in the process removing the government’s ability to protect Canadians and their environment and making it possible for the industry to hide critical safety information from the government and the public.” Mr. Emile Therien, Past President, Canada Safety Council, As an Individual

The Minister must publish amendments to strengthen SMS regulations, develop an action plan for the full implementation of SMS, and develop a tool for continuous oversight of SMS implementation. More work needs to be done to protect whistleblowers and ensure fatigue-management standards are upheld by railway companies. 

“I understand there is currently a lack of protection for railway workers who report safety violations to Transport Canada. They are not allowed to bypass their company’s SMS. If that company has already accepted the complaint as a tolerable level of risk, nothing can be done, and Transport Canada will never know about it. Whistleblower protection must be incorporated into the Railway Safety Act, and soon.” Mr. Emile Therien, Past President, Canada Safety Council, As an Individual.

As far back as 1994, the TSB had found that the DOT-111 railcar design was flawed, leading to a “high incidence of failure during accidents.” After years of incidents, expert recommendations, and pressure from the NDP, the government has finally agreed to phase out the use of DOT-111’s for transporting dangerous goods. While encouraged by this announcement, we want to see a detailed plan for how the sector will reach the target of three years, and Transport Canada should ensure that companies are immediately phasing out the use of these dangerous railcars for transporting the most volatile products, like the explosive crude that devastated Lac-Mégantic. It is extremely disappointing that it took a tragedy of this magnitude to finally pressure the government to act.

The TSB also recommended that a risk analysis of routing take place, to determine the safest routing and speed. It appears the government is leaving it to the railroads to do that analysis. We ask why Transport Canada is not involved in that process.

The Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities must make strong recommendations in the final report that reflect the testimony delivered by witnesses in committee. The NDP expects the government to give regular updates to the public on their progress implementing the recommendations from the Auditor General. The Transportation Safety Board is expected to release their final report investigating the tragedy at Lac-Mégantic soon. The Government of Canada must ensure that all of their recommendations are implemented without delay.

Never again must we allow the devastation that occurred in Lac-Mégantic to happen in another community. Canadians have the right to the highest level of protection and assurances that our railroads are safe. When it comes to the safety of our communities and our families, we should expect nothing less.