Before I introduce the witnesses and get on to the business of today's meeting, I would like to ask the committee about a couple of things.
Next Tuesday we're going to do the clause-by-clause study of this bill. Next Thursday we will deal with the summary on rare earths. It was suggested by Ms. that we be prepared, in case we get through clause-by-clause examination early, to start discussing the report on rare earths.
Is that agreeable to everybody here?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: Then the other thing that we need to decide is....
First of all, in case the clause-by-clause study goes longer than the two hours, is it agreed that we go as long as it takes to complete the clause by clause of Bill ?
Is that agreed?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
Now we'll get to the business we have before us today.
I want to start by thanking all of the witnesses for being here.
Mr. Labonté, this is two meetings in a row, and we're looking forward to your presentation and your answers to questions by members today.
We are here today to continue our study of Bill , an Act respecting Canada’s offshore oil and gas operations, enacting the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act, repealing the Nuclear Liability Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts.
For the first three-quarters of an hour this morning, we have from the Department of Natural Resources Mr. Jeff Labonté, director general of the energy safety and security branch, energy sector. Again, thank you.
We have Dave McCauley, director of the uranium and radioactive waste division in the electricity resources branch, energy sector. Welcome to you, sir.
And we have Joanne Kellerman, general counsel and executive director, legal services. Thank you for being here today as well.
Go ahead, please, with your presentation. Then we'll get to the questions and comments after that. I look forward to a meeting as productive as the last one.
Go ahead, please.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. It's a pleasure to be here this morning to speak to you about the second part of Bill . This will focus on nuclear compensation and liability.
[Translation]
This morning, it is my pleasure to provide you with some background about the second portion of this bill.
[English]
A presentation has been circulated. I hope everyone has a copy. As with previous representations, we will try to move through the presentation fairly quickly and open the floor for your questions and comments and will do our very best to respond to those.
The purpose today is to brief on the nuclear components of the energy safety and security act. In essence, the act proposes to amend the nuclear regime to establish greater legal certainty, and enhance liability and compensation procedures, protocols, and aspects related to the unlikely event of a nuclear incident in Canada.
For background, the act will replace our current nuclear liability regime, which is based on a 1976 nuclear liability act. My legal counsel has reminded me that the act was tabled in parliament in 1970 and wasn't in to force until 1976.
To point out a couple things, the act provided for liability limited to $75 million in the event of a nuclear incident. There are aspects of the act that I think it would be fair to say are outdated and that we would hope to modernize. Certainly it doesn't reflect international standards, nor international conventions that have emerged to manage transboundary and transnational issues related to nuclear incidents in the event that they ever occur. Those are the focal points, to us, in terms of the policy logic for the bill.
I think most committee members may know this, but I'll say it for the record. The bill has been introduced four times before parliament and has not managed to make its way to a vote and to royal assent. That said, I think it's an important piece of legislation that we hope we can help advance, and certainly respond to your questions in a fashion that allows so.
With regard to highlights of the bill, it is really about three things. One is to strengthen compensation and bring it in line with international peers and with other international context. Two is to clarify the compensation definitions and the procedures in which compensation would be provided and how it would be determined. Three is to allow Canada to sign and ratify the International Atomic Energy Agency convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage. That is in effect a convention that allows countries to work together to deal with transboundary incidents and to share resources in the event that there's an incident in a member country to the convention.
As well, the bill—similar to the offshore portion of the bill—has elements that are quite consistent with what was proposed in the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development's fall 2012 report. It looked at liability limits for all of Canada's energy production regimes and natural resource sector areas.
[Translation]
I will now discuss what is found on slide 4 of our presentation.
The nuclear sector is important for Canada's economy. It provides 30,000 direct jobs, of which 5,000 are in the uranium and aluminum sectors, and 25,000 in services and energy production from uranium. In total, over $6 billion in revenues are produced annually in Canada. This is a major aspect of our economic context as well as development.
[English]
On the fifth page, I'll cover a couple of key elements of the act in terms of highlights. I'm certain you'll have a more deeper look at things, but there are elements of the bill that focus on improving accountability and looking at the liability aspect.
First, the act maintains that liability for operators is exclusive and absolute. Similar to the offshore portion of the bill, that would mean that in the event there were an incident—and we believe that such an incident would be highly unlikely—the operator of the facility would be absolutely liable. There would be no need to provide fault or negligence to demonstrate that liability.
The bill proposes to increase absolute liability to $1 billion over a period of three years in several steps. It requires that operators have a commensurate amount of insurance or fiscal security that demonstrates they are able to handle the $1 billion worth of absolute liability. It also provides that the government will provide coverage where there is no insurance, and there are several instances where we might find that in this part of our economic sector. One example is small reactors or reactors that relate to research areas. The second example is in areas where the insurance community is not prepared to look at 30-year horizons, for example, for coverage of certain damages.
The act also provides a mandated review of liability amounts every five years so that at least Parliament will have the opportunity every five years to increase the amounts of liability and compensation that are fundamental in the act.
The second part or theme of the bill is really to look at increasing the response capability, so the bill goes quite a ways in expanding the definition of categories of what are the compensable damages. It provides for a limitation period and expansion for bodily injury for claims from 10 years to 30. It provides the compensation of remedial measures to repair and to deal with environmental damages and it establishes authorities to simplify the claims-handling process through a tribunal, should it ever be necessary.
It also allows Canada to enhance its transparency and to join the international community, so the bill provides for Canada to ratify membership in the convention on supplemental compensation for nuclear damage. Once in force, this convention will provide certainty for liability in jurisdictions for trans-boundary and trans-national issues. It specifies how these issues will be dealt with. It provides supplemental coverage should Canada ever need it and it provides that Canada would also contribute to supplemental coverage from another member country, should it ever be needed as well.
In terms of next steps for the bill, it was introduced on the 30th of January. Following royal assent and entry into force, part 2 requires a number of regulations to be established, and we expect to do those in the coming months and, over the next 12 to 18 months, one regulation is to provide for an insurance policy and another is to establish the definition of a nuclear installation.
Once it has come into force, Canada will then formally complete its process to ratify the convention. So we've signed the convention, but it isn't formally ratified until the policy is in place domestically in law and several regulations are in place, and then we're able to actually ratify the convention and become formal members of it. So there are several steps along the path that gets us to being a member. The annex includes the acts that will be amended either directly or consequentially through this process.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
:
From a policy perspective, the department would certainly feel that it was a stronger bill. The previous version of the bill limited the liability to $650 million, whereas this bill puts it at $1 billion, so there's a fairly sizeable change. This bill has that liability phased in over time, which is responsive to what some of the stakeholders felt was the need over time to be able to get into the insurance market, to get the insurance required, and to put the fiscal elements in place they would want. That's moving from $75 million to $1 billion over a three-year horizon, starting at $650 million, moving to $750 million, $850 million, and then to $1 billion.
Bill also more clearly defines psychological trauma, one of the damages that is compensable under the bill, and how that would work over time and how it's associated with bodily injury. It was less clear in the previous versions of the bill. So the longer we officials have had to look at a bill, the longer we have had to try to optimize and refine it to provide as much clarity as possible. As you're parliamentarians, I'm sure you're trying to do the same thing, but time always limits the ability for you to look at everything as much as you can.
Bill makes explicit that the costs incurred by authorities in responding to an incident are not compensable by the operator. For example, if emergency services of fire, police, or whatnot responded to a potential incident, those costs are not reimbursable to the municipality or the province responsible. They're covered via the emergency services of that particular part of the country.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Labonté, as you know, disasters like those we saw in Fukushima, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl happen from time to time, despite the fact that these are very unexpected and unfortunate events. That is an undeniable fact. Such situations place the environment and public health at risk. In short, the repercussions are huge. Taxpayers may be liable for these repercussions for decades to come. Here in Canada, we have been very lucky so far.
I would like to hear about the worst case scenario you have imagined that could take place in Canada. What are the potential costs of such an accident in the worst case scenario? Do you know how much the three greatest global catastrophes cost, those being Fukushima, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl? Could you also provide us with information as to whether we have had accidents or near misses here in Canada?
:
Thank you for your question.
I think your comment contains a few sub-questions. I would like to answer by making several points.
There certainly is a risk of accidents happening in the nuclear sector. The risks are there and it's always a possibility. However, we think the probability is very low. At the same time, we need a compensation system and legislation to protect citizens as well as every aspect of our economic activity, the environment and public health.
In developing Bill , we have had many discussions with various stakeholders and with the population. We have imagined scenarios that could lead to an accident in Canada, taking into account our nuclear reactor's model, system and context.
With your permission, I will carry on in English.
[English]
We modelled the context—and certainly it was done a number of years ago—such that the design of the reactor and the situation provide for an incident contained within the design parameters and within the structures of the reactor. Procedures are built into the engineering to provide for things to shut down or to happen, and there are backup procedures and backups to backups that limit the potential for an incident to escalate into a more substantial incident.
The modelling looked at a scenario in which an incident would be contained within a nuclear facility. It also looked at a number of different contexts, one in
[Translation]
Gentilly, in Quebec, and another one here in Ontario, where there are reactors. In such cases, I believe the scenario would amount to $100 million, which includes costs and expenditures from an accident that would take place in the context of developing or installing a reactor.
[English]
In that context, it was believed to be in the order of about $100 million. The modelling did not model the scenario of a Fukushima or a Chernobyl, being that these are a very, very low probability and, if you will, very unique circumstances. In each of those, it hasn't been something that we've looked at in terms of trying to design a system to protect against those types of incidents.
In the case of Fukushima, I believe the cost of the Fukushima accident is in the order of $30 billion at this point and is expected to be much more as it goes on. It's a running total, if you will. In the Chernobyl case, I'm not sure of the figures for that one. It is not one in which the countries involved have been as transparent about the cost structures.
I think you had a third reference. Three Mile Island? For Three Mile Island in the United States, I'll have to get back to you on the exact numbers of that particular incident, although it's not considered a severe incident, if I could use language of that sort. There was one in the United Kingdom in the 1950s that was a bit more substantial in terms of an incident in which there was a release of radiation.
For the three examples that you have posed, certainly we can get back to you with the numbers, if you wish. On the design scenarios around the Canadian context, our colleagues at the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission would have done and have done some modelling work also, and some work in terms of incidents, and may be able to provide further evidence and further information to you in response to your question.
:
I think that's an important question, in the sense that the majority of the system begins with the design, implementation, build, and operation of the system, and the regulatory approach to ensuring the system is regularly developed, tested, and mitigated. On the work that goes in, there's a fairly substantial amount of work that goes in to protect taxpayers, to ensure that the system is designed well. There are prevention measures. There are exercises that are tested. There are a number of procedures in place that would prevent the worst case from ever even being possible. That's the most important point of all of the dollars invested in the investment of prevention and preparing for the possibility.
On the next step, you're right. The bill proposes $1 billion in absolute liability. That is a cap. It's a limit; there is a limit to $1 billion for the operators. The bill provides that should an incident ever appear to approach the $1 billion, or exceed the $1 billion, the Minister of Natural Resources would be obligated to bring to Parliament a report that outlines what said costs would be or what they're proposed to be, so that Parliament would be in a position to discuss and debate what response, if any, the government would choose to consider and invoke.
That said, I think it's important to point out that there are only three nuclear operators in Canada. Two of those operators are crown agencies. In other words, they're agencies for provincial governments. In fact, there are three, if we count Gentilly and Hydro-Québec in Quebec, although that particular facility is not operating right now. Also, there's one private operator, but in all instances, the reactors are owned by crown agencies.
There's an element of—how would I put it?—interaction between ownership of the reactors themselves, the operations of those reactors, and then the federal and provincial governments, in which you see an interaction between the law and the regulatory environment that's federal, and yet they're owned, operated, developed, and produced in provincial jurisdictions. There's an element of relationship between governments and between certainly how one would hold and deal with an incident should it ever exceed—which we don't expect it ever would, heaven forbid—the billion-dollar absolute liability amount.
:
Actually, I don't want to mislead the committee. It's probably worth pointing out that there are only three or four countries that have over $1 billion. In fact, the European Union is in the process of moving to $1 billion overall; so it's a staged period of time.
The trend is that all of the global community is moving. Much of that, I think, is partly in response to better understanding and partly in response to growing and healthy insurance markets, which kind of move with economic cycles. It's also to be certain that their community is, if you will, changing the dynamic, and that's a factor of markets.
So there are a couple, for sure. There is an insurance community right now under the current act. That's the Canadian nuclear insurance association, the United States, the U.K., and another in Europe; so there are only four pools of insurance that we would accept as reasoned within the context of our act. There is a limited number, but those pools are made up of larger insurance companies that are globally based and have the assets and the segregation and the appropriate financial instruments to support the policies they have.
:
I'll have to defer to my legal expert, who might be able to provide that to you.
Generally, I think, his proposal was that there be a regulation-making authority that would follow passage of the bill, that would enunciate the value of a coastline, the value of a species, the value of a habitat, and enunciate how one would calculate a cost to return, or the impact to society. The very difficulty with environmental damages is that they're typically called “non-use” value. They're typically things you can't buy or sell. A fairly rigorous determination would need to be done up front and a number of factors would have to go into that.
My counsel can speak to where we would change, but I think the logic behind it was that in the event that it was necessary, given that once you put the regulations in place they need to be regularly updated, the courts are better served to look at the evidence base and to provide a role to determine what the value would be to the crown and to society more generally.
:
Proposed section 14 provides that “damage to property” is a compensable head of damage under this legislation. Non-use value is in fact a form of damage to property. It's damage to the property of the crown, whether it's the provincial crown or the federal crown.
Proposed section 18 deals with the reasonable costs of remedial measures to repair, reduce, or mitigate “environmental damage”.
Again, within Canada, in proposed section 18, and then in states outside Canada, they are both compensable heads of damage. The restriction is that the remedial measure has to be ordered by a competent authority.
While I did not hear Mr. Amos' intervention, I think I'm familiar with the general point he is making. My response would be that the bill you have before you does contemplate that a remedial measure for environmental harm is a compensable head of damage, both within Canada and outside Canada.
:
I'll address this broadly, and then turn to my colleagues.
Broadly, joining the international convention provides us more protection in the sense that there's a community of countries that have similar circumstances and basically have the same frameworks. So it provides legal certainty.
More specifically, the United States is a signatory to that convention, one of the charter signatories. Today it's fair to say that both Canada and the United States have nuclear facilities. Many of those are near the border. There is the potential—albeit, as we think or believe, pretty remote—that an incident could be transboundary.
Absent being a member of the convention, there is no treaty, no workable framework with the United States on how to deal with something that might originate in either country and impact the other. Joining the convention, and the convention coming into force, will allow us to have a treaty with the United States that deals with certainty of jurisdiction, certainty on how to deal with damages, and certainty on how to deal with what kinds of issues might arise.
I could certainly turn to Dave first, perhaps, and then Joanne next, to add to your question in terms of what other benefits would come.
Yes, this bill has undergone quite a bit of consultation since it was first introduced, of course, in an earlier form.
Most recently, however, and as Mr. Labonté indicated, because the bill has been before committee twice previously, we've been able to benefit from the comments that have been made by committee members and witnesses on the bill, and that's gone into, I think, building a stronger piece of legislation.
Also, in 2012, the department issued a consultation paper on how the bill might be updated, putting the issue specifically on the operator liability and what would appear reasonable and appropriate for increasing that liability. That was one of the key reasons moving us to the $1 billion consideration.
:
No. There's $1 billion that's required of operators. The regulation phase that follows passage of the bill will identify nuclear installations. There are different types.
A reactor that generates electricity will be one type and there would be an expectation of $1 billion. There are research reactors in universities across the country that are quite small, that are quite different than, say, electricity generation. In those instances, their ability to find $1 billion worth of insurance coverage doesn't exist.
The government will provide coverage for those research communities and then have a fund in which they contribute a premium to offset that particular aspect. So there are a couple of instances.
There's another instance where it's likely that the insurance community will not cover the 10 to 30-year change in bodily injury. So the government will have to contemplate that in an insurance process.
So there are two stages to the regulatory phase: one, to set up the classes; and two, to put applicable insurance in place as an approved policy, if you will. That discussion is under way with the insurance community.
To answer an earlier question from one of the members, we were actually consulting with them a few weeks ago. There is an element that the government may have to provide a portion if you will.
:
Good morning everyone. We continue our study of Bill .
We have with us for the second part of our meeting three witnesses.
We have, first of all, from the Canadian Nuclear Association, Dr. John Barrett, president and chief executive officer. Welcome to you, sir. Thank you for being here on such short notice.
We have from Greenpeace Canada, Shawn-Patrick Stensil, nuclear analyst. Welcome to you, sir.
We have from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Dr. Michael Binder, president and chief executive officer. Welcome to you, sir.
We'll go ahead with presentations. We've asked you to limit them to five minutes, so that we have ample time for questions and comments from members.
We'll go in the order that you are listed on the agenda, starting with Dr. Barrett from the Canadian Nuclear Association.
Please, go ahead, sir.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to the members of the committee for inviting me to appear on behalf of the Canadian nuclear industry.
The Canadian Nuclear Association is a non-profit organization established in 1960 to represent the nuclear industry in Canada. The association promotes the development and growth of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. It represents the nuclear spectrum from uranium mining to waste management and all the points in between.
The Canadian nuclear industry provides isotopes that improve cancer diagnostics and therapies, imaging that improves manufacturing quality, electricity that avoids greenhouse gas emissions that in turn drive climate change. Through these activities, the Canadian nuclear industry directly employs 30,000 Canadians and another 30,000 Canadians indirectly through our suppliers.
According to the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters association, the industry generates nearly $7 billion of economic activity, exports $1.2 billion in goods and services, and pays $1.5 billion in federal and provincial taxes. In all of our activities, our business is safety. It is inextricably and permeates our corporate culture.
Nuclear power plant operators hold an enviable safety record highly regarded by employees, by host communities, and nuclear industry globally. We are proud of the fact that there has never been a claim under the Nuclear Liability Act. We are determined to see that none will ever occur under the proposed Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act. Our industry supports the passage of Bill . This legislation would improve the nuclear liability framework, bringing it in line with international standards. It would protect Canadians and improve the industry's ability to manage risk responsibly.
With the passage of the Nuclear Liability Act in 1976, our industry accepted the principles of absolute and exclusive operator liability, mandatory financial security, and liability limitations in time and amount. These principles are standard features of nuclear legislation in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere.
Bill C-22 adequately balances the needs of industry and the needs of Canadians. In updating the 1976 legislation, Parliament would bring Canada in line with modern international standards and our members appreciate the government's flexibility in proposing financial instruments as insurance alternatives.
Moreover, the nuclear industry strongly supports the ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation. This treaty already ratified by the United States will provide further protection in the case of an international incident. It will also improve the industry's ability to export Canada's significant nuclear expertise.
There are significant global opportunities presented by the current construction of 71 nuclear reactors in the world, including five in the United States and 20 in China. Canada enjoys an enviable international reputation as a nuclear pioneer and global leader in technological innovation and regulatory effectiveness.
Mr. Chair, we support the provisions of this proposed legislation and we urge Parliamentarians to pass it into law. With that said, there are two points that deserve the government's attention. The first is we would urge the Minister to use his authority to increase the number of eligible insurers. Our members face a substantial increase in premiums and would appreciate the benefits of open and fair competition in the insurance market. The government's recent actions have ended a long running monopoly, but greater competition will be needed when this bill is proclaimed.
Second, we seek clarification of the term “nuclear installation”. We detect a difference between the interpretation provided in the bill and that provided in the backgrounder that accompanies the bill. In the backgrounder, nuclear installations are defined as “Canadian nuclear facilities such as nuclear power plants, nuclear research reactors, fuel processing plants and facilities for managing used nuclear fuel”. In the bill however, the definition of nuclear installation is potentially much broader. If the backgrounder is correct in identifying only these four types of installations, then the legislation should be made equally clear.
In summary, Mr. Chair and committee members, the Canadian nuclear industry supports this bill just as we have supported the government's previous efforts to amend the Nuclear Liability Act. These amendments, long overdue, would bring Canada's nuclear liability regime in line with international standards.
We encourage you and your colleagues to pass this legislation with the improvements that we have recommended.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
:
Thank you for this opportunity to give Greenpeace's views and recommendations on the proposed nuclear liability and compensation act contained in Bill .
[Translation]
I will make my presentation in English, but I will be pleased to answer your questions in French.
[English]
While listening to the debate on Bill during second reading, I heard from the opposition parties that they viewed this bill as a step forward but with important flaws. They hoped that the bill could be improved upon and the flaws addressed at committee.
I didn't hear from the government that they were opposed to improving the bill.
In my presentation to you, I will provide four recommendations on how to improve Bill . These recommendations are reasonable and based on precedent.
First is international best practices, which I hope the Canadian government would be striving to meet. Second is modern principles of Canadian law and jurisprudence; specifically the inclusion of the polluter pays principle.
There are two key reasons that the bill should be amended. It increases the risk to the public and to the taxpayer.
The Fukushima disaster had yet to occur when Parliament last debated this bill, so the context has changed. In Greenpeace's view, this new version of the NLCA does not take into account lessons learned from Fukushima. We're now seeing major nuclear accidents, somewhere in the world, about once a decade. This regular occurrence of nuclear accidents was not what the nuclear industry predicted when Parliament passed the original Nuclear Liability Act in the 1970s. Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima all have a common cause and it has nothing to do with engineering. These accidents were caused by humans and companies, corporate entities, failing to put public safety first.
In a post-Fukushima world, where we know that nuclear accidents are caused by irresponsible companies, does it make sense for the Canadian government to increase the protection given to the nuclear industry at the expense of public safety? From a public interest perspective, I think the answer is clearly no. You don't encourage public safety by shielding companies from the consequences of their actions. This is a key weakness of Bill .
It also poses an unneeded risk and burden on the taxpayer. Natural Resources Canada has portrayed the $1-billion cap on operator liability as balancing public compensation while ensuring that reactor operators aren't burdened with high insurance costs. But as seen with the oil and gas section of Bill, you can require $1 billion in insurance and absolute liability with no coinciding cap on overall liability. You heard from representatives from CAPP, on Tuesday, that this wasn't a problem.
I will assert this: removing the $1-billion liability cap will not increase costs to operators. As written, the NLCA needlessly transfers all of the financial risks above $1 billion onto Canadians. This is contrary to the polluter pays principle, which brings me to my first recommendation.
The polluter pays principle has been omitted from the purposes section of this bill. It is 2014, not 1974, and this is a glaring omission. Greenpeace recommends the committee import the language regarding the polluter pays principle from the purposes section of the oil and gas section of Bill .
Greenpeace recommends clause 3 be amended to read as follows:
The purpose of this Act is to ensure accountability in accordance with the “polluter pays” principle in case of a nuclear incident.
To apply the polluter pays principle, Greenpeace recommends amending the clauses shielding operators and suppliers from liability; specifically, clause 24 (1) should be amended to state that reactor operators have unlimited liability above the $1 billion in absolute liability.
This is the same as for offshore oil and gas.
Unlimited liability is now an international best practice for operator liability and it is also the approach used by the government for the offshore oil and gas industry.
Similarly, clause 13, which completely shields reactor suppliers from liability even if negligent, should be amended. Greenpeace recommends clause 13 be amended to read:
In respect of damage that is caused by a nuclear incident, an operator may seek recourse against any person whose gross negligence causes an incident.
This would provide consistency between the oil and gas and nuclear sections of C-22 and meet another international best practice. India's nuclear liability legislation exposes suppliers to liability.
My final recommendation is forward-looking. There is ample documentation showing that the Department of Natural Resources Canada has intentionally avoided over the past decade, under both Conservative and Liberal governments, consulting Canadians while developing this bill. It is unsurprising, then, that NRCan believes it is acceptable to cap liability and transfer the majority of risk created by the nuclear industry onto Canadians.
Subclause 26(1) requires that the NLCA be reviewed every five years. Greenpeace recommends amending this clause to stipulate such reviews must be public and done in consultation with non-industry stakeholders. There's also international precedence for this.
That concludes my comments. I look forward to your questions.
:
Good morning, Mr. Chair and committee members.
My name is Michael Binder and I am the President of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. It is a pleasure to accept your invitation to be here today.
[English]
The CNSC is Canada’s nuclear regulator. Under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, the CNSC carries out its threefold mandate: regulating the use of nuclear energy and materials to protect the health, safety and security of Canadians and the environment; implementing Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and disseminating objective scientific, technical, and regulatory information to the public.
The CNSC is an independent, quasi-judicial administrative tribunal. It regulates all things nuclear in Canada including uranium mining, nuclear fuel fabrication, nuclear reactors and power plants, the production and use of medical isotopes, and the decommissioning and remediation of nuclear sites. The CNSC is therefore directly involved in regulating the nuclear facilities to which the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act will apply.
As you know the government is responsible for setting policy such as this act, the NLCA, and the CNSC's role is to carry out its responsibilities under the act. We welcome the NLCA as it will modernize and clarify the various roles and responsibilities of those involved in case of a nuclear accident.
The CNSC's job is to make sure no claim is ever filed under the NLCA. We will not license a facility unless we are convinced it is safe. The CNSC is a hands-on regulator, and we have a robust regulatory framework in place to ensure that our licensees are operating safely and meeting their licence conditions.
One of the ways in which we do this is to conduct all kinds of studies. We undertake probabilistic safety analysis, we simulate large accident consequences, we look at physical protection measures to ensure security, and we do research to determine the life of pressure tubes. All these studies aim to ensure there are no weaknesses in the safety case and to bring in new measures to address any gaps identified.
For example, yesterday we released for public comment the “Study of Consequences of a Hypothetical Severe Nuclear Accident and Effectiveness of Mitigation Measures”, a study that investigates the health consequences of a release due to a hypothetical severe accident involving four reactors, and the mitigation measures needed to safeguard public health. This is only the latest example of the CNSC's ongoing work as a safety regulator.
You have heard references to the Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan in 2011. I can assure you that this unfortunate accident spurred a global effort to raise standards to guard against events that were previously considered to be improbable. For our part, the CNSC ordered a review of the safety case of all nuclear operators. The result has been increased safety measures in the design and operation of our nuclear facilities.
There is now added capacity to ensure the redundancy of emergency mitigation equipment to maintain safe shutdown of one or multiple reactors simultaneously. This added capacity includes 21 portable and mobile diesel operators to provide emergency power; 20 cooling water pumps on site with municipal fire trucks acting as off-site support; enough fuel to operate for days without off-site refuelling; and additional hydrogen mitigation equipment, such as passive recombiners, have been installed to ensure protection of containment, and, hence, reduce the likelihood of release. Furthermore, the NPP licensees have established a memorandum of understanding to construct a centralized emergency response centre to provide off-site support in case of an accident.
These enhancements in the on-site emergency mitigation capabilities, as well as off-site emergency response readiness, have been procured, installed, and designed so that potential for this kind of accident ever happening in Canada is practically eliminated.
Canada enjoys an enviable safety record with no claim ever having been made under the Nuclear Liability Act. Our role is to ensure this does not change under the new act.
[Translation]
Our role under the proposed act is to provide advice to the minister on the designation of facilities containing nuclear material as nuclear installations that will be covered by the act.
We will also verify on an ongoing basis that licensees who are required to carry liability coverage under the proposed act are in full compliance with this obligation.
[English]
In closing, the CNSC is actively involved in overseeing all of Canada's nuclear licensees. As such, we are fully familiar with the facilities existing in Canada and the nature of nuclear materials contained on those sites. We stand ready to provide any assistance the minister requires in implementing this new legislation.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have. Thank you.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to our guests today.
Mr. Binder, you indicated early on in your statement to the committee that you'll not license a facility unless you're convinced it's safe. Then you went on to talk a bit about your regulatory framework and some of the testing you've done. Can you comment on the current sites that exist in Canada in terms of their location, and contrast that with the Fukushima site? I mean, we can construct but we can't control acts of nature. I think what I've heard from the testimony is that there is low probability, but I think we all recognize that there's high consequences, of any sort of disaster. So the probability of an incident based on what you put in place seems low, but, of course, we know that the consequences are high.
What kind of assessment is done in the Canadian context for location? What sort of contribution, in terms of location, did the Fukushima disaster have on that incident?
:
The most noticeable thing that changed in Fukushima is something that our technical expert called “beyond design“ accidents.
Those facilities were designed with some very conservative accidents in mind. They assumed events based on historical records of seismic events, tornadoes, all kinds of ice storms and so on, and then they designed those facilities way, way back, about 30 years ago.
What Fukushima taught us here was that we can get too preoccupied with the technical analysis. What we decided to do is to assume a doomsday scenario, as I call it, that there will be a big, big accident. So what can you do to actually prevent it? By preventing it, we mean we don't try to preserve the asset; what we want to make sure of is that there will be no releases. What happened in Fukushima is that they were not able to bring water to the plant fast enough.
All the things we've done in Canada is create a post-Fukushima action plan with many, many mitigations to deal with how to make sure that we cool the plant. That means water, being able to draw water from the lakes, making sure that we can bring in back-up power fast enough to cool things.
I can go on for a long time on some of the technical details, but that's the lesson we've learned.
:
At this time, in terms of liability, a reactor supplier has no obligation if an accident occurs. That is how the law is worded and that is also true of the new version. In our opinion, this is not a good thing.
In the case of Fukushima, it was demonstrated that the designer, General Electric, was aware of the reactor's problems not only in design but also in manufacturing. That was not what caused the accident, but it did contribute to the radiation leaks into the environment. In any other industry, the Japanese could have sued the company.
We therefore recommend that there be a right of recourse in that respect.
The operator is always the entity that can be sued. However, a negligent supplier could be sued by the operator as he is in the best position to do so and thus obtain the largest amount of compensation for the affected population. That is what we are requesting.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start with Mr. Binder.
Thank you all, by the way, for being here this morning.
Mr. Binder, numerous Canadians, as you can imagine, have written to the committee, our members' offices, in relation to Bill . One of them was Mr. Chris Rouse of New Clear Free Solutions in New Brunswick. He wrote to my office some time ago and made a submission to the committee earlier in the week to say that he has asked the commission for the definition of nuclear safety and risk used in deciding liability limits—the legal definitions you apply. He claims he's not able to get an answer, so I wonder if we could ask you to provide one. I don't expect you to have it just at your fingertips, but I wonder if it would be unreasonable to ask you to provide it before Tuesday's clause-by-clause meeting.
:
I'll be as brief as I can. I didn't think I was going to get an opportunity to ask questions.
Thanks to my colleague, Mr. Regan, for being so brief.
I do have a question in regard to the definitions, Mr. Barrett, that you talked about, insofar as nuclear installation and so on.
I know the department officials who were here before talked about the next steps coming forward. I didn't get a chance to ask them a question, but they talked about bringing forward these similar types of definitions in the regulations versus putting them in the act. My question to them was, why would they put it in the regulations and not in the legislation in the first place?
I'm wondering if you could clarify for us whether having those definitions more clear, does it matter to you whether they're in the act or in the regulations?
:
I appreciate that. You already mentioned that earlier.
I don't know how much more time I have, but I have one last question for Mr. Barrett.
You talked about the ratification of the International Convention on Supplementary Compensation. I believe once we get this legislation passed, and Canada ratifies it, and, I think, one or two other countries—maybe Japan or Korea—ratify it—the international convention is close to coming into force—as you said in your comments here, it will provide further protection in the case of an international incident.
Could you expand on that or give us an example of how the legislation would actually further improve safety if there were an international incident?
Thank you, Mr. Calkins.
We're down to a little over 15 minutes. All of you have in front of you a copy of the budget. You can look at that and we could vote on it at the next meeting. The total budget for this study is $3,900.
Do you want to just approve the budget?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: The budget is approved.
Okay.
Thank you very much to the three witnesses for being with us today. Sorry for the disruption. We would have appreciated more time, but that's the way it works around here.
The meeting is adjourned.