Introduction

At their Chicago Summit in May 2012, Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) discussed the implementation of the Alliance’s 2010 Strategic Concept Active Engagement, Modern Defence, which outlined its political and military goals for the future. To gain an understanding of NATO’s current and future priorities and to determine how Canada can best contribute to international defence cooperation, the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence (the Committee) held 10 hearings before and after the summit on the subject of the Strategic Concept. In addition to officials from the Department of National Defence and NATO, the Committee heard from defence and security experts and academics, including former military officers and ambassadors. The Committee also had the opportunity to hear from representatives from the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, a NATO ally, and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a NATO aspirant. Based on the testimony it received and on publicly available information, the Committee agrees to report the following findings to the House of Commons.

Background

Over the last six decades, NATO has had to adapt to an evolving global security environment. NATO was founded in 1949 to counter the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union as it extended its control from Eastern Europe to other parts of the continent. With the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, otherwise known as the Washington Treaty, 10 Western European states, Canada and the United States of America formed this political and military alliance based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and committed to the principle of collective defence. For the 40 years that followed, according to the majority of witnesses we heard, NATO’s deterrent of the Soviet threat was not only necessary; it was effective.

The end of the Cold War brought with it rapid developments in Europe. This included the fall of the Berlin Wall and German unification, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe, and shortly thereafter, the full independence of former Soviet satellite states, the transition to democratic governance and market economies, the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and finally the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and other arms control treaties — all of which required the Alliance to adapt to fundamental changes in its security environment. No longer was there a singular all-encompassing threat. However, the end of Soviet control brought with it instability in some parts of Europe due to ethnic tensions and territorial disputes. NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept was therefore a milestone in transitioning the Cold War alliance into one that could counter modern day threats and crises.

Although NATO’s raison d’être, which had been so closely tied to the Soviet threat, was being questioned, the very mechanisms that NATO continues to depend on today are those that had emerged over the first four decades of its existence. In ensuring the territorial integrity of Western Europe, an environment was created whereby the Euro-Atlantic allies could deepen their political trust in one another, strengthen their consultative and defence planning mechanisms, and further integrate their military command structures, thereby enhancing multinational military cooperation. With its Open Door Policy, the Alliance began integrating former adversaries into its fold which subsequently contributed to democratization and greater security in the region. There was, and still is, no other organization of this kind in existence. This cohesive relationship has allowed the Alliance to adapt to the changing security situation in Europe and beyond — long after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept: Active Engagement, Modern Defence

The development of a strategic concept is an opportunity for the Alliance to analyze the current and future security environments and their implications for NATO allies, to reflect on the strategic and operational lessons it has learned, and to set out its political and military objectives for the future. NATO’s most recent strategic concept was adopted by the Heads of State and Government of member states at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010. According to General Stéphane Abrial, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, the time was right for a new strategic concept since the previous one was from 1999, when the Alliance had a third fewer members and before the tragic events of 9/11.[1]

The Committee heard that Canada played an integral role in the development of the 2010 Strategic Concept by providing a member to the group of 11 experts which created the framework and worked on the initial draft of the document.[2] We were told that the NATO Secretary General made a deliberate choice in asking Canada to contribute to the team, noting that in addition to representation by the Americans and some Europeans, the Canadian voice was an important one to be heard.[3]

The 2010 Strategic Concept not only reaffirms fundamental commitments, it also goes further than previous strategic concepts in outlining the Alliance’s current and future priorities. With respect to NATO’s “Core Tasks and Principles,” the 2010 Strategic Concept notes that “the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:”[4]

• collective defence;
• crisis management; and
• cooperative security.

Witnesses before the Committee presented their analyses of these issues, including their continued relevance to Canada’s national interests and potential opportunities for Canada to shape the Alliance as it evolves to counter the threats of the 21^st Century.

Collective Defence

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is perhaps the most well-known of the Alliance’s commitments and is certainly the most robust in the way it binds member states in transatlantic solidarity. This article, which states that an attack on one ally is an attack on all, commits NATO allies to potentially sacrificing blood and treasure in defence of one another’s territory or interests. It also serves as a strong deterrent against potential aggressors. The fact that Article 5 has only been enacted once — in response to the 9/11 attacks — affirms the gravity of the decision and the responsibility that comes with making it. In addition to the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO’s May 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review commits the Alliance to maintaining an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities in order to meet the Alliance’s collective defence commitment. Challenges, however, do exist and NATO seeks to address them through Smart Defence, a continued cooperative approach to expanding the membership of the Alliance (NATO enlargement), and new policies addressing collective responses to emerging security challenges.

1. Smart Defence

The Committee heard that, over the last two years, European defence budgets have been reduced by 45 billion Euros (close to U.S. $60 billion). As well, the U.S. Pentagon’s budget for 2013 was cut by roughly U.S. $37 billion[5] and it could still face full sequestration which would amount to cuts of U.S. $50 billion a year over the next 10 years.[6] By 2011, 20 out of 28 member states had already reduced their defence spending to pre-2008 levels.[7] The Government of Canada is also engaged in its own Deficit Reduction Action Plan which includes defence spending.[8] Although defence spending by NATO countries will likely continue to represent 50% of defence global expenditure, as of 2012, defence spending in Asia equalled that of Europe.[9]

As General Abrial explained, some member states cannot afford to spend more on defence; many, in fact, are forced to spend less. Yet, the security challenges the Alliance faces are not decreasing. Therefore, “there is no other choice than to increase the cost-effectiveness of the resources that nations dedicate to defence, notably by increasingly working together.”[10] In addition, as NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has stated, indiscriminate cuts to defence spending across the Alliance could leave it with serious gaps and an imbalance in capability. The Smart Defence concept was therefore developed to guide member states in developing multinational programs and coordinating defence spending cuts in order to ensure the Alliance can fulfil its requirements. Linked with Smart Defence is the Connected Forces Initiative, which promotes “interoperability, standardization, joint training and working with partners.”[11]

Smart Defence has three pillars: prioritization, specialization and multilateral capability cooperation. Prioritization will require member states to better align their defence capabilities with identified collective priorities. NATO is establishing the frameworks to manage this process. Since a number of member states cannot maintain the capabilities needed across the full spectrum of the Alliance’s requirements, they will be specializing in niche capabilities. Lastly, there are a number of areas where allies could cooperate in order to share the financial burden. These areas include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, logistics, procurement and training. A number of Smart Defence initiatives are already underway. For example, allies with air surveillance assets conduct air policing for the Baltic States. At the Chicago Summit, the Alliance extended this mission. Also at the Chicago Summit, allies committed to deploying the Alliance Ground Surveillance system and initiatives that will enhance joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. In terms of specialization at the national level, we were told that the Czech Republic, for example, has excellent chemical, biological and radiological defence capabilities and will therefore invest more in this area than in others.[12]

However, a number of obstacles remain which the Alliance will need to overcome to ensure that NATO will in fact be doing more with less and not less with less. Professor Jennifer Welsh, Co-Director of the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict at the University of Oxford, expressed caution with respect to specialization. She pointed to the problems with relying on allies to show up with capabilities that the Alliance needs. Canada experienced such problems in Afghanistan when it had to rely on American and British helicopters for air transport. Naturally, the movement of American and British troops and supplies were given a higher priority by those countries and as a result, Canada had to move troops and supplies more frequently by land convoys, increasing the exposure of our troops to improvised explosive devices and other deadly threats. Further, she noted that Smart Defence will require member states to rethink the caveats they place on their armed forces and their capabilities when deployed or else “it will leave countries very vulnerable in the field.”[13] In her opinion, the Alliance will have to develop procedures and built-in expectations for each mission as opposed to relying exclusively on political commitments.

David Perry, defence analyst with the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI), also addressed these challenges. He argued that Operation Unified Protector in Libya “demonstrated both the potential benefits of NATO Smart Defence and the likely challenges involved in implementing it.”[14] Mr. Perry explained that NATO’s operation exposed existing burden-sharing challenges, which could worsen as defence budgets decline, noting that only eight member states participated in the air campaign, with some of the European states deciding not to fly sorties. Also, some European members were forced to withdraw their assets due to funding shortfalls. In addition to national caveats and funding shortages, the mission highlighted the Alliance’s heavy dependence on American assets and the need for European allies to develop their own operational enablers such as air-to-air refuelling. Although Smart Defence initiatives could be the vehicle through which these enablers are developed, “both the specialization and cooperation components of Smart Defence will ultimately require that nations be willing to deploy the assets on operations.”[15] Mr. Perry cautioned that Canada should be realistic about the contributions other individual allies could make to future operations, and should therefore focus on developing stronger working relationships with allies it is more likely to deploy with in the future, including France, Great Britain and the U.S.

For states like Lithuania, it is clear why Smart Defence can be a win-win solution. Allies take turns conducting surveillance over Baltic airspace which allows the Baltic States to focus on other areas, such as contributing more personnel to the Afghanistan mission.[16] For Canada, the distance from Europe and the military requirements in our own geographical space make its contribution to and benefits from Smart Defence a little less obvious. Jill Sinclair, Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy at the Department of National Defence, stated that “we do expeditionary operations in Canada all the time in order to make the reach to the Arctic, to the coasts, to be able to do our missions out to our perimeter.”[17] Canada also has responsibilities to defend North America in cooperation with the U.S. through NORAD. She noted that Canada’s expeditionary capability is therefore “inherently in Canada’s interests.”[18] In addition to this capability, Canada has the ability to deploy rapidly, sustain its deployments, and has also tended to deploy without caveats. These are all important assets that Canada can bring to NATO missions. James Appathurai, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy at NATO, concurred with Ms. Sinclair’s statements, noting that the Alliance would not be looking to Canada to specialize in one particular area, and that Canada’s broad range of capabilities “are actually a strength of Canada that NATO would welcome.”[19] Although some Canadians may not wish to see their military specialize, others would agree with Professor Welsh, who argued that considering defence budget cuts and a number of expensive procurement projects currently in progress, the Government of Canada may be forced to make some difficult decisions as to which Canadian Forces capabilities it should continue to invest in.

Although the decision to withdraw from the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) program seems to go against the spirit of Smart Defence, Paul Chapin, Vice-President of the CDAI, argued that European allies, notwithstanding their current economic problems, are rich enough to “look after themselves and their security.”[20] He further stated:

In the 60-odd years of NATO, I think the sum total of NATO common funded investment in Canada is a navy pier at Halifax, and only once have NATO assets made it over to North America: post-9/11 when the AWACS were brought over, and a very minor contribution after Hurricane Katrina. So there is a sense that we're not necessarily getting the return on investment, and part of that is driven by the fact that, yes, we do have needs like other alliance members and we should be beneficiaries of some of those programs that we fund on our own shores. We just don't see that occurring.[21]

These remarks highlight the need to remember that NATO countries do not necessarily share a common perspective on all issues, even in a prime forum for integration and cooperation like the Alliance. Refusing to participate in a conflict or get involved in a specific defence project does not necessarily indicate a lack of resources or commitment; it can be an indication of the policy differences that occur in a multinational alliance.

From his perspective, Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Charles Bouchard, who was Deputy Commander of Allied Joint Force Command in Naples and Commander of Operation Unified Protector, NATO’s Libya mission, acknowledged both sides of the argument, but emphasized that “it is easier to influence a system from the inside than from the outside.”[22] In terms of AWACS, Canada was able to influence decisions because it had both a quantitative and qualitative presence for many years. For this reason, he thought that Canada should have maintained this commitment within the Alliance. For the Alliance Ground Surveillance project, however, he agreed with the Government of Canada’s decision to acquire its own capabilities for domestic purposes while offering them to NATO when required.

Given Canada’s own domestic defence and security needs, and its distance from Europe, the Committee acknowledges that not all Smart Defence or Connected Forces Initiative projects will make sense outside of the European context, and that difficult decisions will need to be made as the government seeks to find the appropriate balance between Canada’s defence requirements and those of the Alliance. The Committee was told of one Connected Forces Initiative project that Canada is leading. General Abrial informed us that Canada has committed to facilitating the interoperability of weapons on NATO aircraft.[23] Interoperability is essential to the success of allied operations. General Abrial explained that while NATO “never want[s] to make sure that everybody has the same equipment,“ his goal is to ensure that “whatever nations decide to do and to procure, and however a nation decides to train and equip their own forces, these forces will be able to communicate and work together.”[24] Finally, given the technological underpinnings of modern intelligence collection and analysis, one could argue that it forms yet another facet of the interoperability question. Though the Committee did not hear a great deal about intelligence issues, we did hear that enhanced intelligence sharing among allies and partners, for purposes of intelligence fusion, remains a key focus.[25]

2. Enlargement

NATO maintains an open-door accession policy to European countries who meet the political and military standards of modern-day liberal democracies. The accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the Alliance since the end of the Cold War has served to stabilize the region and, according to Mr. Appathurai, this remains a “principal motivation for taking in new members.”[26] Professor Welsh, however, expressed caution with respect to further expansion of the Alliance, particularly to countries such as Georgia. She argued that “the larger NATO becomes, the more it stretches its credibility, possibly to the breaking point.”[27] This concern is largely due to Georgia’s tense relationship with Russia over its support for secessionist regions within Georgia which, in 2008, culminated in a crisis situation that brought both states to the brink of war. At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, NATO allies took the unprecedented decision that Georgia would become a NATO member — a clear statement of solidarity with Georgia and an ongoing motivator as it continues to make the necessary reforms.

Although current NATO allies continue to stand by this decision, as the Alliance expands, there is a possibility that other new members may feel differently on this issue and on other aspects of collective defence, particularly as it relates to NATO-Russia relations. The Committee heard from representatives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose country is formally in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process. Denis Becirovic, Vice-Chairman of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s House of Representatives, noted that Russia’s influence in the Balkans has increased. Close ties between Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Serbian Orthodox community and Moscow suggest a need for both states to cooperate. In that respect, he said: “do not make Bosnia, as a government, be against Russia.”[28]

Tensions already exist among current members of NATO regarding Russia. While North American and Western European member states desire increased cooperation with Russia, the Alliance’s Central and Eastern European and Baltic States still view Russia with concern. According to Rasa Jukneviciene, Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, her country continues to deal with the challenges posed by Russia through its military activities, cultural influence and use of its monopoly over energy resources to influence neighbouring countries.[29] Despite these challenges, Mr. Appathurai noted that NATO membership has placed former Soviet states in a position of confidence and as a result, their relations with Russia “have generally gotten better.”[30]

The Committee would like to highlight the role of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly with respect to NATO enlargement and in assisting aspirant countries as they institute the reforms needed to meet NATO membership standards. Since the end of the Cold War, the Assembly began integrating parliamentarians from non-member nations into its work, which helped it “build bridges with the new political forces in countries of the former Warsaw Pact, and assisted in the development of parliamentary democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. In parallel, aspirant countries used the Assembly as a channel to build support for their integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.”[31] Today, the Assembly is an inter-parliamentary organization of legislators from the national parliaments of the 28 member states of the Alliance, as well as 14 associate members which include, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia. As such, more than 300 parliamentarians participate in the Assembly’s sessions, which foster mutual understanding on key security and defence challenges facing the transatlantic partnership.

The requirement for parliamentary ratification of new members gives an additional emphasis to Assembly debates on enlargement and on its engagement with aspirant countries. For example, Canadian parliamentarians participated in a NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegation visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 2011 in order to assess, first-hand, the country’s progress towards NATO membership.[32] As well, at the Assembly’s 58^th Annual Session in November 2012, parliamentary delegates had the opportunity to hear from Filip Vujanovic, President of the Republic of Montenegro, Bozo Ljubic, Speaker of the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nikola Gruevski, President of the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Mikheil Saakashvili, President of the Republic of Georgia. Each statesman gave an overview of the progress his country has made in meeting the Alliance’s requirements for accession and also addressed challenges that remain.[33]

3. Emerging Security Challenges

The Strategic Concept, in its analysis of the current and future security environment, identifies a number of emerging security challenges, including cyber attacks, disruptions to the energy supply of NATO members, and the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

With respect to cyber security, NATO has recently approved a new policy that is focussed on political solidarity as opposed to military responses to cyber attacks. Each member state still has the responsibility of strengthening its own cyber security defences. Even if a state were to come under cyber attack, NATO would only engage if the attack surpasses the state’s capacity to deal with it on its own and seeks NATO’s assistance. NATO itself is currently reinforcing its own systems, including the systems that link it to national networks. A centre of excellence has been established in Estonia to provide best practices and support to member states. Although non-NATO partners are also engaged in this dialogue, the parameters of how involved they can be are still being developed. NATO will also be able to deploy rapid reaction teams to provide advice and support to countries that come under cyber attack. Lastly, NATO is working closely with the EU with respect to standard setting, including issues such as supply chain protection.[34] In addition to these steps, Paul Meyer, former ambassador and Senior Fellow of The Simons Foundation, suggested that Canada could go further. On the diplomatic front, he argued that Canada could lead the development of international norms regarding responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. Such norms would “recognize that there’s a potential offensive military use that probably should be prohibited or strictly regulated, given the unique nature and dependency of humanity” on a secure cyber infrastructure.[35]

A larger question for the Alliance, however, is determining when a cyber attack would warrant invoking Article 5 and perhaps even a military response. Professor Welsh noted that the difficulty lies in determining what constitutes an attack, and in determining its origin. She argued that NATO will have to grapple with these issues while keeping in mind that the threat posed by a cyber attack would not be restricted to soldiers, but could potentially also have a devastating effect on civilians.

Another issue facing many governments is energy security, which refers to access to enough affordable energy, including oil and gas, to meet the needs of countries, their populations and economies. This challenge is compounded if access to energy is complicated by tense relations with another state or region. While member states are responsible for the security of their own energy supply, the potential impact of threats to energy security on the national security of member states is of some concern to NATO. At the same time, the extent to which this is the appropriate forum for addressing energy security issues has been questioned. For example, in his testimony, Paul Ingram, Executive Director at the British American Security Information Council, warned against “using an alliance that is based upon the military in order to deal with energy security.”[36] He noted that a military alliance may see military threats “far more quickly” than it seeks opportunities to cooperate.[37]

The Alliance as a whole also needs to consider how it secures the energy it needs to sustain its own operations. This includes the whole supply chain of moving energy resources from their origin to wherever NATO forces are operating. Numerous disruptions to the supply routes through Pakistan to Afghanistan, for example, forced NATO to negotiate northern transit routes through Russia, the Caucasus and the Central Asian states. This increased the costs to the Alliance, and caused delays in getting vital supplies, such as fuel, to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops.[38] The 2010 Strategic Concept states that NATO will develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, which includes protecting critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, and cooperating with partners. Consultations among allies with respect to energy security will focus on strategic assessments and contingency planning.

With respect to the proliferation of ballistic missiles, Mr. Appathurai told the Committee that “more than 30 countries have ballistic missiles, or are developing them or are enhancing them.”[39] According to the 2010 Strategic Concept, this poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area and to international stability as a whole. At the Chicago Summit, allies initiated the first of four phases of a NATO missile defence system for Europe. This is expected to be fully operational by 2020. The Committee heard divergent views on this issue, particularly with respect to its effects on NATO-Russia relations. Dr. Ernie Regehr, Research Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Waterloo, and Dr. Jack Granatstein argued that the technology of missile defence remains questionable, the threats are uncertain and the decision to deploy this system has politically destabilized the Euro-Atlantic region and soured NATO’s relations with Russia. While Mr. Meyer noted that Russia’s primary concern regarding the NATO system would be its ability to intercept a Russian missile, Mr. Appathurai explained that the NATO system, based on numbers, speed of intercept and location, would not be able to counter the thousands of nuclear warheads and missiles that Russia has — nor is the Alliance seeking the capability to do so.

George Petrolekas, Member of the Board of Directors at the CDAI, pointed out that the Russians have their own ballistic missile defence system — a fact that seems to be universally ignored. The Russian ballistic missile defence system, however, is only deployed around Moscow.[40] While he acknowledged that Russia does cooperate with NATO from a practical perspective when its interests are at stake — for example in Afghanistan and with respect to counterterrorism and counterpiracy — he expressed pessimism over the possibility of NATO and Russia cooperating on ballistic missile defence. Dr. Regehr argued that NATO should either pause the development of its system or move on with the project overtly and cooperatively with Russia. Mr. Appathurai stressed that there is “a big upside” to cooperation.[41] So far, NATO has offered guarantees, access to the technical parameters to witness the tests and joint centres for data exchange and joint interception. Although it may be a difficult road ahead, he was optimistic that NATO and Russia could find a meeting point on ballistic missile defence.

Crisis Management

1. Conflict Prevention

The 2010 Strategic Concept is the first in which NATO has committed to pre-crisis and post-crisis involvement with a view to preventing conflicts. While noting that United Nations (UN) Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon declared 2012 as the Year of Prevention, Professor Welsh expressed cynicism about the role of the international community in conflict prevention, given that it is so often stated as a goal but rarely operationalized. She questioned how far NATO would go to prevent crises and conflicts. Mr. Appathurai, in his remarks, acknowledged that the Alliance has yet to clearly define its conflict prevention role.

At the same time, Mr. Meyer argued that “NATO should spend as much time on conflict prevention as it does on crisis management.”[42] He noted that Canada had championed the consultative role of the Alliance enshrined in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. He expressed concern over what he saw as a decline in regular consultations within the Alliance, which he argued hinders both Canada and the Alliance as a whole. He urged Canada to work with other non-European Union (EU) allies such as Norway and Turkey in re-energizing the Alliance’s consultative mechanisms as there has been a tendency for the U.S. and the EU to hold their own internal consultations when crises arise. As well, if NATO truly intends to engage in conflict prevention programs, these consultative mechanisms will be vital in ensuring that the Alliance is ahead of the curve with respect to emerging crises.

2. The Role of NATO in Crisis Management

Given the wide range of crisis management tasks set out by the Strategic Concept, Dr. Samir Battiss from the University of Quebec in Montreal noted that the document neither articulates precisely what the Alliance envisions may be the nature of future crisis management operations, nor sets out the conditions for potential engagement.[43] As a result of this lack of precision, some witnesses expressed concern as to what a more enhanced crisis management role for NATO would entail. Others argued that the Alliance’s commitment in this area has been long overdue. Issues including military-civilian cooperation and NATO’s relationship with the UN were discussed.

Although witnesses agreed that a key lesson for NATO over the past decade has been the need for the organization to develop the mechanisms for more effective coordination between military and civilian components when engaging in operations, there is disagreement as to whether the Alliance should develop its own civilian capacity, or whether it should focus on working better with civilian actors in regional and multilateral organizations. The Strategic Concept calls for the formation of “an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners” which “may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors.”[44] At the same time, Mr. Appathurai emphasized that NATO is focussed on deepening its structural engagement with non-governmental organizations, the UN and the EU — what the Alliance calls the “comprehensive approach”. He further noted that “NATO doesn’t have the money, or the mandate, or the ambition to do what the UN does,” stating that “we do security, and the UN does everything.”[45] It remains to be seen how this civilian capacity will be developed and employed in practice.

Since NATO has committed to engaging in operations covering the full spectrum of crisis management, witnesses argued that mechanisms need to be in place for more effective coordination between the Alliance and the UN. Mr. Appathurai told us that, although NATO does not require a UN mandate to operate, particularly in response to a threat to or an attack on allied territory or interests, “NATO will always look to the UN for a mandate for expeditionary operations.”[46] Whether NATO is operating directly under a UN Security Council Resolution as it did in Libya, or working within a broader UN-led political framework such as in Afghanistan, there are structural challenges that need to be addressed to ensure success in future missions.

Given that NATO may be an operational partner of the UN from time to time, Professor Welsh argued that the Alliance needs to be aware of the backlash that exists against certain aspects of the Libya mission, namely the perceived expansion of the mandate from the protection of civilians to regime change and the lack of accountability back to the UN Security Council. This discussion goes to the heart of the issue of legitimacy and the meaning a UN mandate has with respect to signalling that a particular operation has broad support from the international community.

With respect to NATO’s military mission in Libya, LGen Bouchard noted that, from the military command perspective, lines of accountability were clear. The political arm of NATO, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), provided the tasks, the rules of engagement and the target sets to him through the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). While he maintained that the military mission stayed well within the limits of its mandate to protect civilians, he argued that the political objectives shifted to regime change. Individual states within the Alliance made public comments about the need for regime change in Libya.[47] In addition, LGen Bouchard noted that, politically and diplomatically, Colonel Gadhafi was left with no viable option but to fight until the last moment.

LGen Bouchard testified that, throughout the mission, he provided weekly assessments up the chain of command and a monthly report to the NAC. Mr. Appathurai maintained that, at all levels, from the NATO and UN secretaries general on down, communication was fully transparent and cooperation was close between both organizations operationally and politically. Questions remain, however, as to how information was reported by the NAC to the UN Security Council. Professor Welsh argued that procedures need to be established to ensure a more effective reporting relationship between the two bodies. Former ambassador Peggy Mason noted that NATO has learned over the decades the importance of having UN authorization and legitimacy when it has engaged in military operations. In fact, the NATO Secretary General insisted that the Alliance would only intervene militarily in Libya if and when such authority was given.[48] Ms. Mason argued that Arab states were more likely to participate in the Libya mission because it was broadly supported by the international community. Such support, in her opinion, is “so fundamental to the success of an operation.”[49]

This legitimacy and therefore UN Security Council authority, however, needs to remain throughout the mission. Mr. Meyer argued that the blockage within the UN Security Council on the question of intervention in Syria is related to the fact that Moscow and Beijing did not have political control or influence over NATO actions in Libya. Professor Welsh pointed out that these concerns were not raised solely by Russia and China, but also by key non-permanent members of the Security Council: India, South Africa and Brazil. The Government of Brazil has since put forward a proposal to the UN Secretary General called “Responsibility while Protecting”. It asserts that “enhanced Security Council procedures are needed to monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and implemented” and that “the Security Council must ensure the accountability of those to whom authority is granted to resort to force.”[50]

Another structural issue that NATO and the UN have faced in past operations has been the challenge of aligning the NATO-led military operations within the broader political framework of the UN mission. In Afghanistan, while the UN was conducting its political mission and reporting back to the Security Council, the NATO-led military mission was answering to the Alliance’s own political body, the North Atlantic Council — resulting in a divided command structure and a lack of coordination between the two bodies. Ms. Mason noted that the historical reason for this division in Afghanistan was the refusal by the U.S. to place its armed forces under UN command; if U.S. forces were to be available for the stabilization mission, it had to be in another form. As a result, though Canada was initially involved in both, it eventually needed to choose, and it chose the NATO-led mission. Given this reality, as well as the fact that NATO member states provide some of the best forces in terms of professional capacity, and have an “unrivalled capacity to project and sustain forces and to manage effectively a multinational mission”,[51] there is a high likelihood that the Alliance will remain the “go-to organization for conducting combat operations on behalf of the United Nations and other groupings of states.”[52] In addition, as Dr. Battiss noted, unlike NATO’s relationship with the EU, NATO does not have a permanent arrangement with the UN for crisis management operations for either the civilian or military dimensions.

3. The NATO Response Force

The NATO Response Force concept was approved by Ministers of Defence in 2003. It provides NATO with a flexible expeditionary capability to rapidly intervene in crisis situations. Mr. Chapin and Mr. Petrolekas argued that NATO needs to “broaden its horizons to beyond the limitation of the European geographic land mass” [53] to all areas of interest. In their view, the NATO Response Force should be ready to deploy anywhere for any type of mission and, so far, it has been underemployed. General Abrial stated that this is due to a number of reasons. Given that forces for a NATO Response Force rotation are prepared 18 months in advance, the force composition may not be adequate for every crisis that arises. In addition, member states that provide forces to the NATO Response Force may opt out of a given operation. As a result, an ad hoc force is built for every operation.

Still, General Abrial argued that there remains a good rationale for maintaining ready forces for the future and that the NATO Response Force continues to be “an excellent transformation and training tool.”[54] Mr. Appathurai noted that the NATO Response Force will be a major component of the Connected Forces Initiative. National forces designated to the NATO Response Force will train together, in the field, on a more regular basis. In addition to ensuring a high readiness capacity for the Alliance, the NATO Response Force remains a key tool through which the Alliance can ensure allied forces are fully interoperable before they engage together in a crisis or conflict situation.

Cooperative Security

NATO’s third core task as defined in the 2010 Strategic Concept is cooperative security: “The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.”[55] Since issues pertaining to NATO-UN cooperation and NATO’s open door policy were addressed earlier, the following discusses the opportunities and challenges presented by NATO’s commitment towards nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation, and solidifying partnerships.

1. Nuclear Deterrence, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

NATO’s policy on nuclear weapons, which was reinforced by the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, states that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. The Alliance’s nuclear deterrent has been a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic defence and security posture since its creation. The Strategic Concept also states that “Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts.”[56] Witnesses expressed their concerns with respect to NATO’s compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the effect its nuclear posture has on its relationship with Russia, and the Alliance’s commitment to creating the conditions for a world free from nuclear weapons.

Dr. Regehr noted that the 2010 Strategic Concept does not explicitly state that the Alliance’s nuclear capabilities need to be based in Europe, whereas in the 1999 Strategic Concept, this was deemed vital to the security of Europe. This is a significant change and puts into question the future of the American tactical nuclear weapons, or B61 bombs, that are currently on European soil. He argued that the answer to this should be straightforward given that the U.S. and NATO are not in compliance with the NPT which prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear weapon states. Currently, five European allies host the B61 bombs: Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Turkey. The justification for this arrangement is that it precedes the NPT’s 1970 entry into force. However, there have been repeated calls by the NPT review process that nuclear weapons be “returned and held within their own territories, that the capability for their rapid deployment to other states be eliminated and that all nuclear training with non-nuclear weapons states be ended.”[57] Dr. Regehr does not believe these countries will continue to host B61 bombs as there would be a significant additional financial cost to future investment decisions to ensure any new platform or delivery mechanism, such as fighter aircraft, are nuclear capable. He argued that there would also be considerable political costs to non-nuclear states agreeing to take on a nuclear role for the next three to four decades. Germany, for example, has already called for an end to nuclear deployments on its territory. Further, Mr. Ingram noted that if Turkey continues to host the weapons, this will hinder any current and future negotiations on a weapons of mass destruction-free Middle East, which was a primary focus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

2. Partnerships

Over the past decade, the Alliance has learned that “the promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe.”[58] Partners from around the globe have participated in operations alongside NATO allies in Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere. The challenge remains how to maintain and build on these partnerships once operations have drawn to a close. The Alliance will also need to address challenges where the relationship between particular allies and certain partners are strained, as such obstacles to cooperation hinder the Alliance as a whole.

Twenty-two non-NATO partners from around the globe have worked alongside NATO allies in Afghanistan. As the ISAF mission transfers the responsibility for security in the country over to Afghan National Security Forces, the Alliance needs to solidify the partnerships that it has developed over the last decade with these non-NATO partners. Mr. Appathurai told the Committee that close to 40 partners have formal agreements for political consultation and practical cooperation with NATO. These agreements are renewed on an annual basis and cover some 1,000 activities in which NATO allies and partner countries can participate — from language training to complex defence reforms. As well, part of the Connected Forces Initiative will include maintaining interoperability with partners and therefore including them in training and exercises will be a priority. This will allow for partners to “plug and play” with NATO allies in future operations.

Given the sacrifices partner nations have made in supporting NATO operations, Mr. Chapin argued that the Alliance should not consider these countries as second-class citizens. They should be included in the decision-making process from the start of a mission and should have a voice as to how strategic policies are devised and how operations are shaped. This includes being invited to participate in NATO summits. The Chicago Summit did, in fact, include the leaders of partner countries, making it the broadest NATO Summit in history.[59] Libya was an example of where partner countries were immediately welcomed at the negotiating table once they decided to participate in the operation. Qatar, for instance, helped shape the plan and the subsequent decisions allies took regarding the mission. Further, having these partnerships in place could help with the legitimacy aspect of NATO deploying beyond its borders. Mr. Meyer argued that the call for military engagement in Libya by the Arab League and the eventual endorsement of the mission by the African Union were “invaluable in terms of the credibility, and ultimately the acceptability, of that intervention.”[60]

The Libya mission also illustrates the importance of regular, structured dialogue and consultations with regional partners. The Alliance has consultative mechanisms with countries from the Middle East and North Africa through the Mediterranean Dialogue and with Gulf states through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. As seen in Libya, consultation with partner states through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative led to real operational cooperation. From the perspective of conflict prevention, these fora enable the Alliance to consult with partners on emerging crises and threats. For example, allies and partners have consulted on counter-piracy and cyber-security. They also foster dialogue between states that would not otherwise talk to each other or do not recognize the existence of another state, as in the case of Israel which is a NATO partner through the Mediterranean Dialogue.[61]

At the same time, poor bilateral relations between individual members and partner countries can create considerable obstacles to effective partnerships and impact the Alliance as a whole. This is the case with Turkey and Cyprus, which impedes deeper cooperation between NATO and the EU. This unfortunately leads to unnecessary duplication and hinders coordination particularly since the two organizations are partners in peace operations and are looking for opportunities to pool and share defence capabilities at a time of fiscal constraint. Mr. Appathurai stated that although NATO and EU staff work well together, “there isn’t enough coordination, because at the political level we cannot meet, talk, and plan.” “This blockage,” he noted, “is a problem.”[62]

Russia remains an important partner for the Alliance and the Strategic Concept emphasizes the Alliance’s “commitment and desire to have a deeper strategic partnership with Russia.”[63] Through the NATO-Russia Council, NATO allies and Russia are able to discuss issues of mutual concern as equals where decisions are made by consensus. There also exists a “whole range of actual cooperation,”[64] particularly on Afghanistan. However, as discussed earlier, the issue of Georgia becoming a NATO member and the Ballistic Missile Defence project continue to be major irritants. Mr. Appathurai recognized that there is a lack of trust between NATO allies and Russia and that, given President Putin’s rhetoric regarding NATO, the Alliance may have a few “interesting” years ahead. Mr. Ingram stressed the need for the Alliance to strive towards improving its relationship with Russia. He noted that over the next two to three decades there will be a number of diverse regional and global challenges that NATO and Russia will need to collaborate on including emerging threats, climate change and organized crime — much of which emanates from Russia. Russia also has important relationships with other countries that the Alliance may seek to collaborate with; and Russia has significant energy resources that many European states, including allies, rely on. Mr. Ingram warned that given Russia’s immense nuclear arsenal, a series of missteps or misunderstandings could easily backslide into a strategic competition that would have a significant impact on global security. He urged the Alliance to seek opportunities to overcome negative perceptions and build greater trust — even if this means “forego[ing] capabilities that the Alliance may otherwise see as beneficial.”[65] He argued that this is not about “giving in” to Russia but rather “seeing the larger security picture and the mutual benefit there would be to everyone’s security by acting with everyone’s interests in mind.”[66]

Canada’s Role in International Defence Cooperation

In examining the Alliance’s commitment to the three core tasks, collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, it is clear that the 2010 Strategic Concept attempts to balance the defence priorities and ambitions of all 28 member states. Since the last Strategic Concept in 1999, the tragic events of 9/11 took place and signalled a change in the global security landscape. As well, the Alliance has gained a third more members, all from Central and Eastern Europe. It should come as no surprise then that NATO is very much shaped by its more diverse membership and growing reach. That is to say, those allies that have mixed relations with Russia remain concerned about that country; those allies who border the Mediterranean are concerned about stability in the region; and that Canada and its like-minded allies are focussed on ensuring the Alliance’s expeditionary capability remains strong.[67]

At the same time, although allies may look at collective defence through different lenses, this principle is still very much the bedrock of the Alliance. It continues to serve as an effective deterrent and the Alliance has made it clear that in the face of emerging threats, allies continue to stand in solidarity. Though observers may question NATO’s commitment to collective defence and Article 5 in particular, at least with respect to military responses to threats; it must be noted that coming to the defence of an ally does not necessarily or automatically imply military action as is often perceived. NATO is both a political and a military alliance and invoking Article 5 remains a political decision that requires consensus among NATO member states. That is to say, allies would need to agree that an attack has occurred, they then would need to agree that collective action is warranted, and finally, they would need to agree on what collective action they would take, which could include the use of force.[68] One could argue that perhaps one of NATO’s more important features is its commitment to political consultation on threats to Alliance security, enshrined in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The effectiveness of such political consultation was displayed in December 2012, when at the request of Turkey, NATO allies agreed to bolster that country’s air defence capabilities in reaction to repeated violations of Turkish territory. The provision of PATRIOT missile batteries, a surface-to-air missile defence system, by Germany, the Netherlands and the U.S. not only serve to defend Turkey’s territory and population, but also contribute to de-escalating the crisis at the Turkish-Syrian border. While not contributing to this deployment, Canada, as part of the North Atlantic Council, would have participated in the discussions and the decision-making process that led to it. It should also be noted that Canada’s 350 military personnel who are integrated within NATO’s military command structure are implementing decisions Canada has made in concert with its allies on a daily basis.

It is important to take a global approach to recognizing potential threats to Canada and the Alliance’s security, and that means confronting these threats as far away from our national boundaries as possible. In this context, we were encouraged to hear that Canada continues to raise the importance of “forward defence” within the Alliance.[69] Whether NATO conducts an Article 5 mission or is called upon by the UN Security Council to intervene in a crisis situation, robust and sustainable expeditionary capabilities will likely be required. NATO’s missions in Afghanistan and Libya are both evidence of this.

Given that some allies have more of a global view of security than others, some observers argue that the Alliance is developing into a “two-tiered NATO.”[70] However, it can be argued that this inequality does not necessarily undermine the value of operating under NATO command.[71] The degree to which the Alliance is integrated both politically and militarily and the extent to which its members’ forces are standardized and interoperable is unmatched in the world. It is unlikely that Canada would have the capacity or the political will to “go it alone” in crisis or conflict situations abroad. NATO is, therefore, a trusted vehicle through which Canada can conduct, and even lead, such deployments — even if ad hoc coalitions within the Alliance need to be built every time. Moreover, the Alliance’s commitment to solidifying partnerships around the globe will allow for more non-NATO nations to contribute to future NATO expeditionary operations.

Although it may be a preferred option, NATO is only one aspect of Canada’s international defence and security commitments and obligations. The Committee would like to see Canada continue to contribute to UN peace operations and, of course, maintain its obligations to NORAD — which in turn, helps bolster the North American side of the NATO alliance. Security threats in the Americas and the Asia-Pacific will also need to be addressed and Canada should continue participating in operations and exercises in these regions. Given that the Government also needs to balance these international activities with Canada’s own domestic defence and security requirements, in a world of finite resources, NATO continues to offer Canada flexibility in how it chooses to contribute to international peace and security.

To conclude, while questions will continue to be raised about the relevance of NATO and whether or not Canada still benefits from the Alliance, the Committee believes that NATO is clearly important to Canada’s security interests today and that it remains in Canada’s national interest to be an active member of the Alliance. However, serious challenges must be addressed in order for this to remain so. The current decline in defence spending across the Alliance is of great concern, and the Committee hopes that the multinational projects under Smart Defence will help mitigate some of the impact of uncoordinated cuts. Allies have a responsibility to each other to ensure that the Alliance remains modern, flexible and fully capable of fulfilling its commitments as outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept. This will require the organization itself to become more streamlined and cost-effective. In this regard, the Committee encourages the Government of Canada to continue pushing for reform and transformation within NATO. In addition, Canada will need to continue emphasizing interoperable, deployable capabilities across the Alliance and strengthened partnerships with non-NATO nations and regional and multilateral organizations, including the UN. NATO’s relationship with Russia is also of paramount importance to transatlantic security and to global security cooperation. Canada could contribute to strengthening this relationship by working with like-minded states to move the Alliance forward on meeting its NPT obligations. Finally, Canada itself will need to ensure that its own capabilities are of benefit to the Alliance and therefore continued investment in the Canadian Forces is welcomed by this Committee.

The Committee has an ongoing interest in NATO and Canada’s role in international defence cooperation. We will remain apprised of any developments that pertain to Canada’s role in NATO, particularly as it continues to shape the organization into a 21^st century alliance.