NDDN Committee Report

Dissenting Opinion of the Official Opposition to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence Report on Canadian Forces Readiness

A. Introduction

1)       While we agree with much of the committee’s majority report, there are a number matters on which we, the New Democrat committee members, disagree with the majority of the committee members. Therefore we are not signing on to this report. In addition, there are a number of issues that do not appear in the report, or are only briefly mentioned, which we believe should be given a higher priority or greater emphasis when discussing the “readiness” of the Canadian Forces.

2)       The committee’s report draws heavily on the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS). The CFDS is outdated; even the Department of National Defence has told the government that it is unaffordable. Indeed, it has sometimes drawn criticism as little more than a shopping list for military procurement without a coherent strategy. Dr. Philippe Lagasse told our committee, “However well intentioned, CFDS quickly proved unrealistic. The strategy was over-optimistic about the costs of replacing the CF’s major fleets and maintaining a general purpose force able to undertake operations on land, in the air across Canada, within North America, and throughout the world… Taken together, these problems have meant that CFDS left Canada with an unsustainable set of defence programs and policies.”[1]

3)       In addition to being outdated and too expensive, the CFDS also lacks clear priorities for our military. There is a significant need for a white paper on National Defence to reassess the vision for a modern defence policy for Canada, based on priorities and affordability. A defence white paper would provide a more concrete and realistic foundation for the task of “readiness.” Indeed, the most fundamental question is: ready for what?

4)       Our military has three broad roles: The primary role is the defence of Canada and the protection of the safety and security of Canadians; secondly sharing in the defence of North America through NORAD and other commitments; and thirdly contributing to international peace and security through collective security, assisting in multilateral peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, and providing foreign policy support when required. Readiness is about equipping and training the members of the Canadian Forces for fulfilling these roles.

B. Fighter Jets and Procrurement Generally

5)       One of the primary assets for the defence of the sovereignty of Canada and the security of its citizens is our fleet of CF-18 fighter jets. This is why the replacement program is so important to Canada’s defence needs and why it is surprising that the majority report ignores the state of affairs created by the government’s botched attempt to sole-source the F-35 fighter jets as a replacement for this current fleet. Much has been revealed since the Conservative Government’s announcement in July of 2012 to purchase the F-35 from Lockheed Martin, after telling the House weeks earlier there would be an open competition. Readiness requires a competent and credible replacement program for needed assets and a procurement process that is both transparent and inspires public confidence that it is clearly based on actual requirements, rather than the desire to choose a specific product. The lack of such a process diminishes public support for the procurement and, at a minimum, delays are inevitable. This is particularly true with the F-35 project, given its enormous and uncertain cost, and the lack of public disclosure by the government.

6)       New Democrats fully support the need for a replacement program for our existing fleet of C-18s. However, we believe that government has a responsibility to Canadians to accomplish this through an open and transparent tendering process, one that guarantees regional and industrial benefits for Canadians, and that results in an aircraft chosen based on the requirements for operational readiness to meet the actual needs of Canada’s defence priorities.

7)       An example of the temptations of sole sourcing is the tunnel vision implicit in the acceptance and promotion of the argument by this government that the F-35 were necessary for interoperability with our allies who were also buying them. However, General Stéphane Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander (Transformation) of NATO, put a different perspective on this when he told the Defence Committee that interoperability “does not imply that everybody is using the same equipment.” According to General Abrial, “With interoperability you are different, but you work together. It starts with the mindset, with the brain, of course, through education and training.” [2] He was referring to NATO members working together in common military actions. We were pleased to hear this perspective and clarification from such a senior and experienced NATO officer, himself a fighter pilot, who is charged with the responsibility for facilitating the coordination of the military assets of various countries in the NATO alliance.

8)       Other broader problems with the procurement process as it affects long term readiness have been identified. As the committee heard from Assistant Auditor General Jerome Berthelette, the Auditor General’s report on the F-35s “concluded that National Defence’s ability to meet its training and operational requirements over the long term is at risk because of a persistent maintenance and repair funding gap, ongoing weaknesses in the implementation and oversight of the new contracting approaches, and the lack of sufficient cost and performance information for decision-making.”[3]

9)       It was also troubling to learn that the procurement process is not a major focus of Canadian Forces transformation. For both training and performance of its duties, the Canadian Forces must have access to needed equipment in a timely fashion. The lack of efficiency of the procurement process is a perennial problem and clearly requires significant changes. There have been many voices calling for the reform of the procurement process including the Auditor General of Canada, parliamentary committees, outside experts, and internal and independent studies sponsored by the government itself.

10)     Unfortunately, the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence are still not able to objectively identify the problems, nor have they found solutions. The piece-meal approach of the government in establishing the National Fighter Procurement Secretariat – the renamed “F-35 Secretariat” – for example, cannot substitute for a permanent solution. Furthermore, even in the short-term, it is not a substitute for the open and transparent process needed for such an important acquisition. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a separate arms-length procurement process (e.g. a Defence Procurement Agency) with substantial parliamentary oversight. A similar recommendation was made by the Defence Committee in 2008.

C. Search and Rescue

11)     An important aspect of the protection of Canadians is the provision of search and rescue (SAR) services. In this context, the replacement of the fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft (FWSAR) should be dealt with as quickly as possible, but must ensure that a transparent and competitive bidding process is strictly adhered to, and cooperate fully with the Standing Committee on National Defence in facilitating parliamentary oversight. Also, in proceeding with the FWSAR replacement, the readiness capability should be based on a 30 minute response posture on a continuous, around the clock basis, as is the case in the United States and Australia for example. While this is currently the response posture for all CF search and rescue aircraft between the hours of 8:00am and 4:00pm, Monday to Friday, a two hour response time is in place outside of these hours.

12)     While the leadership of the Canadian Forces and the Government continues to defend the status quo it is clear that the two hour response time posture is an anomaly in the world and we believe is certainly below the standard that a country like Canada should be able to offer its citizens when they are faced with a life threatening emergency, especially at sea where time is of the essence. Even more disturbing is Department of Defence’s own study showing that 83% of the incidents requiring search and rescue aircraft to be dispatched occur outside of the 8:00am-4:00pm, Monday to Friday window and are therefore subject to up to a two hour period before an aircraft departs from a base. Since one of the primary roles of the Canadian Forces is protecting the safety and security of Canadians, New Democrats believe that a 30 minute response posture on a continuous, around the clock basis should be maintained for search and rescue aircraft.

D. Evacuating Canadians Abroad

13)     In the past 20 years, numerous missions executed by the Canadian forces involved evacuation of civilians caught in unstable environments. New Democrats strongly believes that the Canadian Forces should continue to play a strong role in helping Canadians facing emergencies at home and abroad. As the number of Canadians abroad continues to increase, the Canadian Forces needs to be ready at the request of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to act quickly and swiftly to help Canadians facing emergencies due to a deteriorating political situation or natural disaster. In 2010, some 10,400 Canadians received assistance in more than 37 separate crises or emergency situations, including earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, the explosion at a hotel resort in Mexico and mudslides in Peru.

14)     While not every evacuation requires the assistance of the Canadian Forces, certain circumstances require the CF to be tasked with a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). The unprecedented evacuation of more than 14,000 Canadians from Lebanon in 2006, the rescue of Canadians in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake and the evacuation of Canadians in Libya in 2011 are all clear indications that readiness of the Canadian Forces in this regard is crucial. The recent evacuation operations have also showed that important improvements can be made in the coordination and execution of these types of operations. Given the growing challenge of ensuring the safety and wellbeing of Canadian citizens at home and abroad we regret that this component of readiness was not studied in more detail during the course of the readiness study, nor addressed in the committee’s report.

E. Emergency and Humanitarian Relief

15)     The Canadian Forces possesses unique capabilities that make it essential to disaster response plans here in Canada. These capabilities can and have been deployed to assist civilians throughout the world facing emergencies like natural catastrophes or other threatening circumstances. As Major-General Jonathan Vance told our committee: “The DART is a very good example of a high-readiness unit that can go off and support individuals in crisis around the world and sustain itself for a period of time.”[4]

16)     Our committee heard very positive testimony about the ability of the Canadian Forces to assist in humanitarian assistance outside of Canada. For example, a representative from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade offered this observation: “I would simply say that since we've had the C-17s there's no question that our ability to get strategic airlift, to move stuff out quickly, to be places on the other side of the world, has vastly, vastly improved.”[5]

17)     The Chief of Land Staff for the Canadian Forces, Lieutenant-General Peter J. Devlin, provided the committee with a comprehensive picture of the dexterity of the Canadian army, saying that it “must be nimble, highly trained, and immediately responsive to a menu of new and unanticipated challenges. It must be trained, equipped, and funded to operate in numerous theatres, often simultaneously: from snow in the Arctic to jungles in Africa, from a potential train derailment and evacuation in Port Hope to flooding on the Red River. It must be flexible enough that it can get fresh water using the disaster assistance response team, DART, to a tsunami-affected area in the South Pacific while at the same time delivering relief efforts to Haiti.”[6]

F. Peacekeeping

18)     While the Canadian Forces has demonstrated real readiness in the recent past when providing humanitarian assistance or preforming a NEO, an area in which Canada needs to be more ready is peacekeeping. Canada has a great interest in a strong, stable and peaceful multilateral system and has a strong history and reputation as an effective and leading participant. United Nations peacekeeping is one of the best tools to maintain a stable international order. Until 1995, Canada had participated in almost every UN peacekeeping mission. Now the demand for United Nations peacekeeping has never been higher, but Canada’s participation has never been lower. “We’re currently participating in 8 of 16 active UN-led missions… As of January 2012 we had 198 uniformed personnel, 38 military and 160 police, deployed to UN operations.”[7] Canada has fallen from being the single largest contributor of UN peacekeepers, a position it often held before 1992, to 55th position today.

19)     The UN, though far from perfect, has made considerable improvements in the way peace operations are carried out after some of the seriously flawed missions the 1990s. UN peacekeeping effectiveness has earned the confidence of the international community. The UN now supports more troops in the field than any actor in the world other than the United States, and more than the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia put together. Despite re-engagement by some of its NATO allies, as well as rising powers like Brazil, India and China, Canada’s contribution to UN peace operations remains minimal. We believe that it’s essential for the Canada Forces to be trained and equipped to take part in whole range of multilateral operations including United Nations Peacekeeping. Again we find it unfortunate that this was not examined in more detail during this study.

G. Education and Training

20)     We recognize that an important part of our military’s readiness is the formal education provided through Canada’s two military colleges, the Royal Military College (RMC) at Kingston and the Collège militaire royal (CMR) at Saint-Jean. We believe that highly educated leadership in the military is essential to the successful carrying out of the Canadian Forces mandate and the proper conduct of military missions. Also a well-educated leadership is more capable of bringing originality, critical thinking and flexible problem solving to the tasks of military leadership, planning and organization, which are essential to readiness.

21)     Recently, the Royal Military College was reportedly told “to cut $1 million from its budget in the coming year, nothing the following year, then $3.5 million for 2014-2015.” According to Jean-Marc Noël, the President of the Canadian Military College Faculty Association, 32 out of 182 faculty positions – nearly 1/5 of the faculty will be eliminated, which could mean up to 160 fewer courses for cadets to choose from. In 1998, the Withers’ Study Group was charged with overhauling the education at RMC. The group recommended that a well-rounded education was essential for the students.

22)     Fewer courses mean fewer opportunities for students to pursue studies outside of their immediate area, ultimately depriving them of a well-rounded education. In addition, the program that brings experienced non-commissioned officers to RMC to earn degrees will also be eliminated.  The long term impact of these changes will be detrimental and not easily reversed. The New Democrats believe that the funding to RMC should be immediately restored.

23)     A second concern relates to francophone education at Collège militaire royal at Saint-Jean. In 1995, under the then Liberal Government, this degree granting military college was closed. Though re-opened as a two-year college in 2008, it no longer offers a full program to francophone students from Quebec and elsewhere in Canada. This is having an ongoing negative impact on the number of francophone compared to anglophone officers in the Canadian Forces. We believe that the Canadian Forces leadership from the bottom to the top of the chain of command should properly reflect the national linguistic and cultural duality of Canada as represented by our two official languages. This is not limited to bilingualism; francophone representation throughout the chain of command is imperative. We do not believe this can be fully achieved without a degree granting, French language campus and that therefore, Collège militaire royal at Saint-Jean should be restored as a full degree-granting institution.

24)     Throughout the study, the committee heard about the constant challenge of recruiting specialised employees who are essential within the Canadian Forces. Several witnesses spoke of existing shortages of qualified employees in certain trades. For example, Major General Steve Bowes testified regarding the shortage of armour officers and vehicle technicians.[8] Moreover, Vice Admiral Paul Maddison noted his concern with the number of marine engineers and naval electronics technicians. Of the naval electronic technicians he said, “This is a key tactical trade that requires top-drawer skill sets. These are the folks who maintain and groom our radars, our fire-control systems, our guns and missiles—and they are in short supply at the moment.”[9]

25)     Further to what we heard at committee, the Fall 2012 Auditor General’s Report to the House of Commons also highlights shortages in trades that are engaged in military construction. According to the report, this has meant that “military and civilian real property staffs are stretched thin, with risks of undue stress and burnout, and … junior staff have been taking on responsibilities beyond their capacities.” We therefore recommend that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces evaluate and identify the shortfall of employees in the different trades and put forward an action plan to overcome these deficiencies within the Canadian Forces.

H. Infrastructure Readiness

26)     Much like the procurement process, it is evident that there is a problem with the process for maintaining the infrastructure at the Canadian Forces bases throughout the country. And as is the case with procurement, these unaddressed problems cost time and money. The Fall 2012 Report of the Auditor General contains a chapter assessing DND’s real property assets. The report found that while money was allocated for maintenance, repair and recapitalization, the bases were not receiving the financial resources in time to plan for the work needing to be accomplished in the construction cycle. The report went on to state that “fundamental change is required in the way National Defence manages its resources to support real property.” The real property inventory is degrading on a daily basis and lacks a clear and coordinated management plan. Some buildings do not even meet basic safety and health requirements, such as the National Fire Code of Canada. In terms of readiness, the Auditor General found that the poor management of the real property of the Department of National Defence is having a critical impact on the operational capabilities of the Canadian forces.

I. Security and Oversight

27)     In the most recent Auditor General’s report, the chapter on cyber security outlines serious gaps in the ability of the Government of Canada to protect itself against cyber threats and to coordinate responses to attacks. The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) falls under the auspice of the Department of National Defence, and has been given new responsibilities regarding the protection of Canadian cyber security. It is therefore appropriate that we recommend a review of the lines of responsibility of various authorities within government, complete with a new layer of parliamentary oversight. In order for this to be effective consideration must be given to providing security clearance to parliamentarians who exercise this oversight.

28)     According to Dr. Philippe Lagasse: “There should be a parliamentary committee with security clearance that’s able to look at operational secrets and operational details so that Members of Parliament have a much better sense of exactly what is happening on the ground and whether the mission is operating as successfully as what they’re being told.”[10] Such authority would enable parliamentarians to be aware of the true state of readiness of the Canadian Forces generally, including in areas such as cyber security and intelligence, without compromising national security interests, a reason that has been used in the past to withhold information.