:
I call this meeting to order. I will ask our friends in the media to please step outside. Thank you very much.
This is the 85th meeting of the Standing Committee on Finance. Our orders of the day, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), are a study on the report of the Bank of Canada on monetary policy.
Colleagues, we're very pleased to have, in our first hour today, the Governor of the Bank of Canada, Mr. Mark Carney. Mr. Carney, welcome back to the finance committee.
We're also joined by the senior deputy governor, Mr. Tiff Macklem, who is also a frequent contributor to this committee as well.
Gentlemen, welcome to you both. Thank you so much for being with us today.
Governor, please start with your opening statement, and then we'll have questions from members.
:
Thank you very much, Chair. Good afternoon, members.
Tiff and I are very pleased to be with you today to discuss our October monetary policy report, which we published last week.
[Translation]
The global economy has unfolded broadly as the Bank projected in its July MPR. Growth has slowed in ail major regions. The economic expansion in the United States is progressing at a gradual pace. Europe is in recession and recent indicators point to a continued contraction.
In China and other major emerging economies, growth has slowed somewhat more than expected. However, there are signs of stabilization around current growth rates.
Notwithstanding the slowdown in global economic activity, prices for oil and other commodities produced in Canada have, on average, increased in recent months. Global financial conditions have improved, supported by aggressive policy actions of major central banks. Sentiment, though, remains fragile.
[English]
In Canada, while global headwinds continue to restrain economic activity, domestic factors are supporting a moderate expansion. Following the recent period of below potential growth, the economy is expected to pick up and return to full capacity by the end of next year.
The bank continues to project that the expansion will be mainly driven by growth in consumption and business investment, reflecting, in part, very stimulative domestic financial conditions. Housing activity is expected to decline from historically high levels. The household debt burden is expected to rise further before stabilizing by the end of the projection horizon.
There are upside and downside risks around the evolution of household imbalances. Residential investment could regain momentum, thereby reinforcing existing imbalances. Conversely, continuing high household debt levels could lead to a sharper than expected deceleration in household spending. In this context, Canadian authorities are cooperating closely to monitor the financial situation of the household sector and are responding appropriately.
Canadian exports are projected to pick up gradually but remain below their pre-recession levels until the first half of 2014, reflecting weak foreign demand and ongoing competitiveness challenges. These challenges include the persistent strength of the Canadian dollar, which has been influenced by safe haven flows and spillovers from global monetary policy.
After taking into account revisions to the national accounts, revisions which had the effect of raising measured growth for this year, the bank now projects that the economy will grow by 2.2% in 2012. Going forward, we expect growth of 2.3% in 2013, and 2.4% in 2014.
With respect to inflation, core inflation has been lower than expected in recent months. This reflects somewhat softer prices across a wide range of goods and services. Core inflation is expected to increase gradually over coming quarters, reaching 2% by the middle of 2013, as the economy gradually absorbs the current small degree of slack, the growth of labour compensation remains moderate, and inflation expectations stay well anchored.
Total CPI inflation has fallen noticeably below the 2% target, as the bank had expected. It is projected to return to target by the end of 2013, somewhat later than previously anticipated, in fact, a quarter later than previously anticipated.
[Translation]
The inflation outlook in Canada is subject to significant risks. The Bank's projection assumes that authorities in Europe are able to contain the ongoing crisis, and that the U.S. fiscal cliff will be avoided.
The three main upside risks relate to the possibility of higher global inflationary pressures, stronger Canadian exports and renewed momentum in Canadian residential investment.
The three main downside risks relate to the European crisis, weaker demand for Canadian exports and the possibility that growth in Canadian household spending could be weaker.
[English]
Overall, the bank judges that the risks to Canada's inflation outlook are roughly balanced over the projection period.
Reflecting all of these factors, on October 23 the bank maintained the target for the overnight rate at 1%. Over time, some modest withdrawal of monetary policy stimulus will likely be required, consistent with achieving the 2% inflation target. The timing and degree of any such withdrawal will be weighed carefully against global and domestic developments, including the evolution of the imbalances in the household sector, which I described previously.
With that, Tiff and I would be pleased to take members' questions.
:
Thank you for the question.
Absolutely you are correct in the sense that there have been some imbalances or disparities in economic growth. That's frequently the case. In an expansion or in a recession and subsequent recovery, some sectors are affected differentially. Particularly in Canada one of the most important impacts obviously has been the structure of global demand and particularly demand for Canadian exports.
As is referenced in the report, foreign activity, which is an aggregate measure of foreign demand—demand in the United States and across the emerging world, the demand that matters most for Canadian goods—has been particularly weak in the recession period, and its recovery has been relatively weak. I'll give you one example, which is that of the U.S. housing sector. At its peak that sector was producing two million starts a year. It went down to a trough of less than 500,000 new homes per year as recently as a year ago.
Over the projection horizon we see that coming back more rapidly than the actual measured GDP, so there will be some benefit. That will help with disparities.
On your particular question, though, related to government expenditures, I would note that the fiscal expansion in the early days of the recession made an important contribution to GDP and to the recovery. It accounted for up to a third of the growth that came out in 2009-10 on a fully measured basis, a multiplier basis.
The subsequent adjustment and move in the direction of fiscal balance obviously does create some measure of fiscal drag, but as a whole, the direct contribution of government, at least in the bank's projection, the actual government spending—and I refer you to page 27 in the English—in 2013-14 is about 0.3 percentage points of additional growth.
For reference—and I'll hand it back to you—on average historically that contribution would be something like 0.6, but that's the nature of the adjustment. So it's positive, but it's not as much as previously.
:
In our hierarchy of risks, we would say that the greatest risks are external. You referenced the European crisis quite rightly. Our expectation is that that crisis will remain contained. That is different from it being resolved, but it will remain contained.
The next in the near term is the potential resolution, or not, of the so-called fiscal cliff in the United States. This is something that, if not resolved—that's not our expectation, but we're no wiser than anyone else in terms of the eventual resolution of this--if the fiscal cliff were not to be resolved and all of the measures were to come into force that are on the books in the United States, the U.S. would almost certainly be in recession next year with a knock-on effect, obviously, for Canadian exporters, business, investment, etc. We're not predicting that, but it's a possibility.
I would note, as we do note in the report, that we do have a domestic risk that bears attention. That is the level of household indebtedness. This is the risk that we and others have been flagging for some time. It has built over time, since we've both been here in 2008. At present, given measures that have been taken by OSFI, by the government, given as well the stance and the leaning of monetary policy in Canada, there are mixed signals. I say that in a positive sense in that there are some signs that the pace of accumulation of household debt is certainly slowing. The pace is slowing, though it is still accumulating, and some adjustment appears to be under way in the housing market. This requires continued vigilance by all parties, and we certainly intend to play our part in that.
:
I have one minute? Okay.
Let me start from the bottom, which is first to acknowledge our sympathies for the families in the U.S. and in Canada who have been affected, and tragically so, by this storm, which as you know is ongoing.
Obviously it's very early days and the damage, unfortunately, is not yet complete. The estimates in the order of $20 billion are very early stage. What I would say in general is that with these types of disasters, there obviously is an impact on growth and activity. Initially there are activities that can never be redone: a visit to a restaurant or a movie or something similar that didn't happen over the course of the last few days represents lost GDP. There's obviously destruction, which isn't actually measured, but then there's the rebuilding, which is measured, and the extra activity and the shifting in time of activity.
I'm not trying to belittle the hardship that is being felt and continues to be felt, but in general it tends to be a relatively negligible impact over time. There will be noise in the data. There will be some stronger data and lesser data.
Those other two questions are very important, and hopefully, we'll come back to them.
:
Thank you. That is an important question.
Yes, the cash to book ratio has reached a record level. It is not just the amount that is important; it is also the ratio.
What can be done? We can use monetary policy. This is one of the reasons why that policy is so accommodating at present. The overnight rate is 1% and return on Government of Canada bonds is a little under 2%. Obviously, that money is not earning a company's capital costs. So after a certain time, they feel the need to invest.
What more can be done? The incentives for companies to invest can be changed, with measures like the accelerated depreciation deduction that the government put in place in the last budget. That is one approach.
What is essential is to offer certainty as soon as possible. There has to be certainty in the conduct of monetary policy, in budget policy, and in the regulations. As well, if it could be done, we would like to offer certainty globally, in Europe and elsewhere, but that is impossible.
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. Mark Carney: Even the Bank of Canada can't do that.
:
There is a series of reforms that are, as you say, technical and relate really to the plumbing of derivatives markets. I think we do well to remember that these are $300 trillion-plus markets in notional size. These are immense markets globally. They bring real, true systemic risk to global financial institutions and back into institutions in Canada. The so-called infrastructure of these derivatives markets was found wanting in the crisis and needs to be fixed.
I'll briefly walk through some of the key elements.
First, we actually want to know what's going on in these markets. In other words, we want to make sure that every trade in every derivatives contract is actually reported to what's called the trade depository, so that regulators and authorities can see the actual level of activity, spot trends, see emerging vulnerabilities, and address them as necessary. That's the first thing. Unlike the equity market, one does not have a central repository of the trades that actually happen in derivatives, and it's not acceptable. It's being fixed. It's the first element. Canada is moving forward on that.
The second thing is that the actual mechanisms of so-called settlement in these markets used to be done effectively on a bilateral basis between you and me. I'm going to pick on you, Mr. Adler. If you were going bankrupt, the concern of all other members of the committee would be who else is exposed to you. Then we would think maybe we should cut off the Chair, for example, with all due respect, or maybe that wasn't the best choice; maybe we should cut off Mr. Brison. If the consequence of that was to freeze the system, if there's a central counterparty in the middle so all our trades are through a central pool and all our collateral is held there, if you have the misfortune to fail, then the rest of us can continue to function because we know the collateral is safe and the system continues.
That is fundamental to ending too big to fail, which is a shared objective certainly of members of this committee and of the G-20. Also, it's fundamental to actually make the system more efficient because by pooling the collateral, there can both be more of it available in the event that you fail to the system as a whole but less of it required as a whole because it is in fact pooled.
What Canada has done—and maybe I'll say, as FSB chair, all G-20 countries have just done—is to decide the direction in which they're going to proceed with central clearing. Those legislative amendments were important for the ability of Canada to make those decisions.
:
As you are aware, the important aspect here is that the first responsibility of monetary policy is the achievement of the inflation target, it's inflation.
With respect to issues around household debt, there are several lines of defence. They start with the individual and the institutions lending to those individuals. They then extend to so-called micro-prudential regulations, which are a type of regulation that OSFI would put in place. The amount of capital a bank has to hold against a given loan, OSFI has actually been raising those amounts, so that has helped.
Related to that, the second line of defence is supervision and underwriting standards. OSFI has been tightening those underwriting standards, so that has helped.
The third line of defence is macro-prudential regulations, the types of measures raised by Mr. Van Kesteren on CMHC and mortgage insurance. They have been tightened four times. That has helped.
The last line of defence is monetary policy. One doesn't want to lean with monetary policy, but one doesn't want monetary policy working at cross-purposes, easing when everything else is tightening, for example, when there is economy-wide vulnerability. Monetary policy can play a complementary role. It's the last line of defence. That's why we work closely with other authorities to ensure that all potential mechanisms and tools can be used to the greatest effect.
:
You have about 30 seconds, if you wish.
Thank you, Mr. Marston.
I'm going to take the next round as chair.
I wanted to follow up, Governor, on a few issues.
First of all, though, I think it's important to say that I thought your statement as governor on the passing of former Bank of Canada governor James Coyne was an outstanding statement. I did want to commend you for that. That was very much appreciated in terms of him as a person, but also in terms of his role in the development of the Bank of Canada.
I did want to follow up on the point about quantitative easing three. I don't know how much you want to say about that, but certainly from our perspective I'd like to hear your thoughts on its impact, positive, negative, or otherwise.
Then, I did want to follow up on the issue of the statement you made with respect to the cash that companies are holding. It was presented as being a sort of critical statement, although in your report itself, on pages 29 and 30, I don't really see it as a criticism, frankly. It's more of an analytical statement at the bottom of page 29 and the beginning of page 30. I did want to get your full response on that, because there has been a lot of dialogue here, certainly dialogue back and forth as to what the government should or should not do with respect to companies and whether they are in fact sitting on too much cash, as it's said colloquially.
If I could get your comment on those two issues, I'd appreciate it.
First, with respect to quantitative easing, we have in the report, as I'm sure you saw in box 1 on page 6 in the English text—I think it's page 7 en français—a technical box that goes through the implications of, in effect, QE3. It's called “U.S. Monetary Policy Developments”. I'll make a couple of observations just to summarize.
The first is on the measures taken by the Federal Reserve, the so-called QE3, which is not just a commitment or an expectation of asset purchases—$40 billion per month until it's no longer necessary—but also a communications strategy associated with that, which included the central tendency expectation that U.S. interest rates would remain at their lowest possible level through the middle of 2015, but also tying that to “substantial improvements in the labour market”. The combination of those, in our opinion, was quite a significant move by the Federal Reserve to provide significant additional stimulus to the U.S. economy.
The question is, what's the net impact of that on Canada? We took the overall level of those measures, and we feel that it will lift the level of U.S. GDP by 1.3%; that's not growth, but the cumulative impact of 1.3% on U.S. GDP by the end of 2014. That's a significant move.
Now, we expected them to do something over the second half of this year, so some of that was already in our projections. Our U.S. projection does not move up by the same amount as that. I won't draw any more on that, but we had something in there because we expected additional U.S. stimulus.
For net for Canada, it's obviously a good thing if the U.S. economy is growing more, but some of that is taken away by upward pressure on the Canadian dollar, which is one of the channels through which quantitative easing works. In fact, any monetary policy easing works. It doesn't have to be unconventional; it can be conventional. That upward pressure on the Canadian dollar takes some of that benefit to Canada back. Our point estimate on the net impact of the U.S. measures is about 0.4% on the level of Canadian GDP measured to the same point in time.
It's something, and it is positive. We do believe that it's positive. One shouldn't put too much faith in the specific estimates. I mean, they're directionally correct and we think order of magnitude correct, but what will matter ultimately is through which channels quantitative easing operates, and how much of that is through the improvement in the value of domestic assets in the United States, which spurs spending and investment in the U.S., and how much is through the exchange rate channel. We can go into more detail if you want.
In terms of the question about cash balances, first off, the original observation was an observation. Yes, it's an observation that if there's cash on the balance sheet and it's not earning the cost of capital, firms ultimately will put that money to work, or they will give it back to shareholders, who will redeploy.
The Chair: Yes.
Mr. Mark Carney: Operating in an environment of uncertainty, the best thing we can do is provide the maximum amount of certainty about as many aspects as possible. It starts with macro policy, goes to regulation, and goes to the structure of structural policy. There is some advantage for consideration. It's for the committee and ultimately the government and the House to decide—for Parliament to decide—the merits of tax measures that have been deployed—
Thank you for being with us today, Mr. Carney.
I would like to come back to the point Ms. Nash started to address: budget austerity. If we look at some countries, Great Britain for example, that have moved fairly aggressively toward budget austerity, we see that they seem to be having a lot of problems with economic growth at present. In a recent report, the International Monetary Fund questioned the multiplier it currently uses to study budgetary effects, and in particular effects associated with budget austerity.
Here in Canada, you probably know that the Parliamentary Budget Officer, using the Department of Finance multipliers, concluded that Canada is not currently realizing its full economic potential. Among other things, he concluded that growth is 1% lower than what it could be if we did not take the austerity approach, and that we have a loss of about 125,000 new jobs.
As things now stand, and in the global climate of economic uncertainty we are experiencing, do you think austerity is the direction we should be going in? Should we not instead examine other alternatives, such as stimulating the economy with infrastructure work, which would provide an injection of sufficient funds to help growth?
:
Thank you for coming today.
I'd like to ask some questions but, first of all, I'd like to congratulate you and your staff on your website and the interactive nature of it and also on having the speech today published so I could read it, even though I wasn't in the room listening. Congratulations. That is very helpful.
I'd like to ask some questions in relation to globalization and the skills shortage generally found in Canada.
In the context of the speech you made to the CAW on August 22, 2012, specifically in regard to building foundations to create prosperity, you mentioned the competitive advantage that we have here in Canada. We are, I would say, more advanced than many countries in resource development. Many countries in Africa, South America, and Central America use our corporations. We lead the world as we have more investments overseas than they have in Canada as far as ownership and management control goes.
Keeping in the thought process the policy tools of mobility of workers, removing barriers—provincial barriers, primarily—and immigration reform, and training and education, do you see, first of all, that the status quo, as we've been operating over the past years, is not good enough and that we have to make changes?
:
I think that's a good operating principle. We always have to examine the status quo and see how we can continually improve. In fact, in a competitive world, we find that you almost level-peg as a result of doing that, and you're running to stand still. The question is how we can further advance.
With respect to skills and skills shortages in this country, as you reference, first and foremost, we want to make sure we have as flexible interprovincial labour markets as possible so we can maximize opportunities for all Canadians to work where they wish and to realize the advantages in this country. Obviously, targeted immigration and the immigration reforms that have been put in place, in our view, will enhance the productivity of the country and the experience of new Canadians. It's a challenge that goes to equality of opportunity, which we discussed earlier. It's a challenge that goes to productivity, goes to the ability to continue to build the skills of Canadian workers and enhance those skills over their working lifetimes. That's workplace training.
It also goes to the post-secondary education experience in Canada. As you know, a very high proportion of our population pursues post-secondary degrees. The matching of those degrees and those skills and the requirements of a modern, globalized, technologically intensive economy has been less than ideal. We're seeing that in work outcomes for graduates. Therefore, it's an ability to better target, better encourage the skills that Canadians are acquiring in post-secondary education and mapping them to a globalized economy.
I'll hand it back to you. We talked a bit about inequality and equality of opportunity. One of the challenges is that the level of technical and technological expertise that is required for the middle class job continually goes up as globalization extends, and the range of activities, including very importantly, service activities that become tradeable, that technological advantage has to increase. We need to better prepare our children for that.
Good afternoon Mr. Chair, vice-chairs, and members of the committee.
[Translation]
Good afternoon Mr. Chair, vice-chairs, and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me and my colleagues to speak to you today about Canada's economic and fiscal outlook.
Yesterday, as you know, PBO released two reports. The first examined the short- and medium-term outlook, and the second analyzed the performance of the Canadian labour market. In addition, just over a month ago, the PBO released its 2012 Fiscal Sustainability Report, which examines Canada's fiscal structure from a longer-term perspective.
[English]
My remarks will focus on three topics that go to the core of the PBO's mandate: the nation's economic and fiscal outlook over the medium term, the government's fiscal sustainability in the long term, and Canada's labour market performance.
The global economic outlook has deteriorated since the PBO's April 2012 economic and fiscal outlook. The recent International Monetary Fund's world economic outlook indicates that uncertainty surrounding policy-makers' ability to control the euro crisis and to avoid the fiscal cliff, i.e., automatic tax increases and spending reductions, in the U.S. are weighing on growth in advanced as well as in emerging market and developing economies.
The expected weakness in the global economy and commodity prices combined with government spending reductions and restraint are expected to weaken economic growth and job creation going forward. As a result, the PBO projects Canada's real GDP to grow 1.9% this year, 1.5% next year, and 2.0% in 2014. The weakness in near-term growth pushes the economy further below its potential, resulting in an increase in the unemployment rate in the short term.
Since the release of the PBO's April 2012 economic and fiscal outlook, private sector forecasters have revised down their outlook for real GDP growth in 2012-13, bringing it more into line with PBO's April economic and fiscal outlook. Compared to the average of private sector forecasts published in September, PBO is projecting slower real GDP growth and lower GDP inflation in 2013-14. As a result, the PBO's outlook for nominal GDP, the broadest measure of the government's tax base, is lower by $22 billion annually, on average, than the projection based on average private sector forecasts.
The PBO judges that the balance of risks to the private sector outlook for nominal GDP is tilted to the downside, reflecting larger impacts from government spending reductions and a more sluggish U.S. recovery, as well as differences in views on commodity prices and their impacts on real GDP growth and GDP inflation.
On the basis of this economic projection, the PBO's fiscal projection shows significant improvement in the government's budgetary balance from a deficit of $18.1 billion—that's 1% of GDP—in 2012-13 to a surplus of $13.8 billion—0.6% of GDP—in 2017-18. The improvement is partly due to a cyclical rebound in revenues, but can be mainly attributed to policy actions to restrain operating expenses.
Based on the outlook presented in budget 2012, the government's direct program expenses are assumed to remain essentially frozen for six years, growing at 0.2% annually, on average, which is well below the average of 6.3% observed over the last 10 years.
Given the PBO's assessment of the balance of risks to the private sector economic outlook, the PBO estimates that the likelihood of realizing budgetary balance or better is approximately 60% in 2015-16, 70% in 2016-17, and 75% in 2017-18.
Although the PBO projects the government's structural balance to improve from a deficit to a surplus position over the medium term, assessing whether a government's fiscal structure is sustainable requires looking over a longer horizon to take into account the economic and fiscal implications of Canada's aging population.
In its 2012 fiscal sustainability report, the PBO concluded that the government's fiscal structure was sustainable over the long term given recent policy changes, which include the reduction in growth to the Canada health transfer, CHT, beyond 2016-17, reductions in direct program expenses, and the increase in the age of eligibility for the old age security, OAS, program.
The PBO estimated that the government would have sufficient fiscal room, amounting to 1.4% of GDP, to reduce taxes, increase spending on programs, or some combination of both, while still maintaining fiscal sustainability.
The PBO is pleased to note that last week Finance Canada published a report on Canada's aging population and long-term fiscal sustainability. Finance Canada's report confirms the PBO's analyses of the federal fiscal structure presented in its September 2011 fiscal sustainability report, as well as its January 2012 assessment of the CHT renewal, as well as its September 2012 fiscal sustainability report.
That is, prior to the government's December 2011 change to the CHT, the Canada health transfer, the federal fiscal structure was not sustainable, as federal debt relative to GDP was projected to rise unchecked over the long term. The PBO noted in its January 2012 assessment that as a result of the reduction in the growth rate of the CHT, the federal fiscal structure was rendered sustainable. Furthermore, the PBO's January 2012 assessment did not incorporate the government's program spending reductions and restraint, or the increase in the age of eligibility for the OAS, the old age security program.
[Translation]
In its labour market report, the PBO provides a richer perspective on the performance of Canada's labour market by analyzing a broad set of labour market indicators, comparing current levels to PBO estimates of their underlying trends, exploiting longer time periods, which include previous recessions, and comparing Canada's recent performance to a large group of advanced economies.
Most of the key labour market indicators in Canada have improved significantly from their recessionary lows, but they remain below the PBO's estimate of their underlying trend values. PBO analysis also suggests that the labour market in the current cycle has generally fared better relative to past economic cycles in the 1980s and 1990s. Looking abroad, Canada's labour market is currently out-performing the U.S. and some European countries and scores above average among the G7 and OECD countries.
[English]
The PBO is pleased to note that Finance Canada is now publishing its estimates of the government's structural, or cyclically adjusted, budget balance on a public accounts basis in its annual fiscal reference tables. Consistent with the PBO's estimates, Finance Canada's estimates now indicate a relatively small but growing structural deficit over the period 2008-09 to 2011-12.
Further, to improve budget transparency and accountability, the PBO continues to strongly encourage the Government of Canada to publish: historical estimates and medium-term projections—i.e., five years ahead—of the economy's potential GDP, accompanied by the methodology and assumptions relied upon to arrive at such estimates; medium-term projections of the government's structural, or cyclically adjusted, budget balance, accompanied by the methodology and assumptions relied upon to arrive at such projections; and the fiscal sustainability analyses of the provincial-territorial government sector that it has prepared in the past, which the Auditor General noted in his recent report.
[Translation]
Thank you again for inviting us here. We would be happy to take your questions.
[English]
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
:
Mr. Chair, the report released yesterday by the PBO is actually a very favourable report on Canada's labour market. Just to reiterate some of the points you've made, I think it shows that certainly in level terms, we are much better than where we were prior to the recession.
We make three large points in the report. We look, again, on a cyclical basis. First, Canada, we still see, I think, from the Bank of Canada, the IMF, the OECD, and others, is still operating a bit below potential. We're still recovering to get back to Canada's potential after the recession of 2009. We provide estimates on how we are relative to where we think those longer term trends are. But clearly, just as you highlighted, sir, relative to pre-recession peaks and levels in past cycles, such as the recessions we experienced in the 1980s and the early 1990s, this recession is much milder. We went in with better numbers. We're coming out with better numbers. I think it's highlighted in many ways. When we look at comparisons with other countries, Canada has done very well.
When you started your point, you talked about, I think, employment being lower. Some people were making comments to this point. It is also true that employment rates, participation rates—the level of employment relative to the population—are lower at the present time relative to where we were on a pre-recession basis. Again, that reflects the fact that we're still recovering. We're getting back to potential. I think the Governor of the Bank of Canada might have said something very similar.