FAAE Committee Report

CANADIAN POLICY TOWARDS BURMA

Officials from DFAIT and CIDA provided us with an overview of Canada’s policy towards, and programming related to, Burma. In particular, we heard of Canada’s responses to the recent developments occurring in the country and the evolution of Canadian policy as a result.

Mr. Giokas told the Subcommittee that Canada has consistently spoken out about the human rights situation in Burma,

raising this issue bilaterally at all appropriate opportunities, as well as in international forums such as the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council. Specific concerns we have raised included the detention of hundreds of political prisoners, fighting and abuses in ethnic areas.[348]

In 2011, in its statement during the interactive dialogue portion of Myanmar’s Universal Periodic Review at the United Nations Human Rights Council, Canada “expressed concern about the human rights situation and requested answers to its advance questions, especially on the legislation planned by the new Parliament to address human rights gaps and the lack of participation in international human rights instruments.”[349]

Following recent moves towards democratic change in Burma, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird travelled to Burma on 8 March 2012. According to Mr. Giokas, “this was the first official visit to that country by a Canadian foreign minister. He conveyed Canada’s hope that progress made to date will continue and lead to further reforms.”[350] Mr. Giokas stressed that the Government of Canada is willing to engage and support Burma in its democratic transition.[351] On 13 July 2012, Minister Baird announced Canada’s intention to open an embassy in Burma.[352]

Witnesses stressed that Burma will require assistance to build its capacity to implement democratic reforms. Mr. Giokas told the Subcommittee that one area where Canada may be able to contribute usefully is through parliamentary exchanges or contacts with the Government of Burma.[353] The Subcommittee believes that an exchange of information and views on the role of parliaments and governments in federal states in the context of such exchanges should be part of any such contacts. Mr. Nankivell told the Subcommittee that CIDA monitors developments in Burma “very closely” and is liaising with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, UN bodies, and the donor agencies of like-minded countries regarding their activities on the ground.[354]

The Government of Canada does not provide aid directly to the Burmese government. Canada provides humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons inside Burma and in border regions, as well as food aid and other humanitarian assistance to those affected by natural disasters. Canada has also recently begun to support some programs within Burma that aim to further its democratic transition.[355] Since 1988, CIDA has provided significant assistance to Burmese migrants and refugees in border areas through the Burma border assistance program, which is implemented by Inter Pares, a Canadian NGO.[356]

Witnesses alerted the Subcommittee to the fact that a number of countries that have traditionally supported civil society organizations in Burma’s border regions or in neighbouring countries are beginning to shift their resources to groups deeper inside Burma. In light of the acute humanitarian needs in Burma’s border regions and the capacity of existing organizations to contribute to strengthening civil society within the country, Mr. Davis urged Canada to continue to support civil society organizations that operate on the borders and which advocate for reform from outside the country.[357]

A. Sanctions

In light of the recent reforms being undertaken in Burma, Canada — as well as other countries around the world — has moved with cautious optimism to adjust its policy and engage with Burma. This process has included the suspension of most sanctions. In particular, Canada removed prohibitions on exports, imports, financial services and investment that had been imposed under the Special Economic Measures (Burma) Regulations.[358] It also removed Burma from the Area Control List, which means that an export permit from the Minister of Foreign Affairs will not be required to export most non-military and non-dual-use goods and technology to Burma.[359] Canada maintains a prohibition on any trade in arms and related material along with the provision of related technical and financial assistance. It also maintains an asset freeze and prohibition on transactions against certain designated individuals and entities listed in the Regulations (the “list of designated persons”).[360]

Canada is, in good company, reassessing its sanctions policy in response to developments in Burma. The European Union has lifted sanctions, with the exception of its arms embargo.[361] The United States has also eased restrictions, including the suspension of certain sanctions to permit American investment in the country, through the issuing of a licence to American businesses.[362]

As Mr. Giokas put it, the question for Canada now is how best “to encourage, facilitate and assist in democratic development and change? The suspension of sanctions enables us to engage with these issues. Whether that is a question of losing influence or gaining influence remains to be seen; we don’t know yet.” [363]

The Subcommittee heard that although there has been an absence of relationships with many Western countries in recent years, Burma has forged economic and political relationships with its Asian neighbours. For instance, Mr. Giokas told the Subcommittee that when Western companies left Burma due to economic sanctions, China, Thailand and India filled the void.[364] Prior to the easing of sanctions, there had been concern by some in the international community, such as Mr. Markus Loening, Germany’s federal commissioner for human rights policy, that the continuing Western sanctions on Burma allowed China to further extend its strategic reach in Burma. In a June 2011 article, Mr. Loening argued that “Beijing is exploiting the gap we have left with our across-the-board hard-line sanctions policy.”[365] Indeed, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, relations between Burma and China have been important in recent years: China was “the strongest backer of the military junta” which ruled until 2010, and remains a “crucially important trade and investment partner.”[366]

Nevertheless, all of the witnesses before the Subcommittee expressed the view that Canadian sanctions had played an important role in bringing about change in Burma. Some witnesses expressed a concern that Canada could lose leverage to promote further change in Burma if remaining sanctions are lifted too quickly. In particular, some witnesses suggested that prematurely lifting sanctions could jeopardize peace negotiations between the military and ethnic armed groups that are currently underway. One witness indicated that “the majority of Burma’s ethnic populations believe that the regime is engaging in these negotiations to win economic concessions from the ethnic armed groups. If the international community rewards the regime with economic gains, critical leverage is lost to ensure that national reconciliation and peace is achieved.”[367]

These witnesses advocated a gradual approach to the reduction of sanctions that sets clear benchmarks for democratic progress and provides for a reassessment of the situation in the future. For example, Mr. Din told the Subcommittee:

I support the gradual relaxation of sanctions in a way that is directly tied to progress. A gradual approach enables the international governments to engage and influence the Burmese government in a direction that supports genuine and sustained political reform toward democratization, durable peace, and improved respect for human rights.[368]

Mr. Davis argued that

if Burma is on this true path of reform, people will see benefits, people in power will see benefits and the middle class in Rangoon and Mandalay will see benefits, and this will start pushing and supporting more reforms. So there has been a carrot-and-stick approach with sanctions, and sanctions will be maintained until different indicators are met. Those indicators, I think, should include stopping human rights violations.[369]

Inter Pares and Dr. Wakar Uddin also stressed the need for concrete human rights benchmarks to be attained before sanctions are permanently lifted.[370]

Several witnesses recommended that the Government of Canada not take further steps towards lifting sanctions at this point in time. Mr. Davis, for example, strongly advocated the maintenance of all remaining sanctions, in particular those targeting individuals within the Burmese regime suspected of human rights violations or associates of the regime suspected of benefitting from these violations.[371]

The Subcommittee notes that DFAIT has indicated that Canada’s list of designated persons will be reviewed and updated in light of Burma’s recent reforms.[372] Witnesses highlighted the effectiveness of such listings in bringing about change in Burma and stressed the importance of keeping the list of designated persons up to date as reforms progress. Mr. Davis, for example, recommended that Canada ensure that its list of designated individuals is “broad, and includes those individuals who have profited from human rights violations, such as forced labour and displacement.”[373] Mr. Din, on behalf of the U.S. Campaign for Burma, suggested that as part of such an update, Canada ought to consider listing individuals and businesses closely associated with the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the Burmese military following the 2010 elections, with a particular focus on:

• individuals holding senior command positions in the Burmese military;
• top military commanders in northern Shan State and Kachin State, where armed conflict continues involving serious violations of international humanitarian law and gross violations of international human rights;
• regional military commanders and divisional commanders whose economic activities have resulted in or contributed to land confiscations, forced labour, forced relocation and other human rights violations and abuses;
• military-appointed ministers, deputy ministers and Members of Parliament at the Union and regional levels;
• a wider range of military-owned business entities;
• Burmese nationals and business entities that have strong ties to the military and which act to undermine or oppose reforms, or that are involved in the commission of human rights abuses; Burmese government ministers and USDP leaders who oppose democratic reform.[374]

Mr. Giokas told the Subcommittee that “there’s a willingness to reimpose sanctions if conditions warrant.”[375] While the Government of Canada believes that the progress achieved thus far merited the suspension of sanctions, Mr. Giokas indicated that Canada will “monitor carefully” developments in Burma to “encourage but also to ensure that there's due process and due respect given to the areas of concern that resulted in these sanctions in the first place.”[376] The Subcommittee agrees with this cautious but supportive approach to reform in Burma.