:
Thank you, and good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to present my views regarding your study of energy security in Canada, and specifically the role of oil sands. I regret that I can't be there in person but am glad to appear by teleconference.
Canadian Oil Sands is the largest owner in the Syncrude joint venture, which is an oil sands mining project. Syncrude is one of the pioneers in the oil sands industry and has been operating in the region for more than 30 years. Syncrude currently has the capacity to produce 350,000 barrels a day of light sweet crude oil.
To begin, I'm going to assume that this committee appreciates the size of this resource, the potential importance to North American energy security, and the positive economic benefits to both Canada and the U.S. These are well-known, cited points put forth by many people, including me. Most people now recognize that the oil sands are large and are economically vital, particularly in today's economy. Oil sands represent 97% of our oil reserves in Canada and currently over 50% of our production.
Without them, Canada's oil production would be in decline and our country would be a net importer, purchasing oil largely from countries that do not demonstrate the same environmental stewardship, social responsibility, or sharing of economic benefit. There's no doubt that the oil sands can and do contribute to Canadian energy security. I believe the question before you is, should they?
First, we must address the use of oil. There is a small but vocal group that believes, for various environmental and social reasons, that the world needs to move away from oil altogether. While this is not practical, in my view, it is a valid viewpoint.
To bring some realism to this question, we must consider the global energy landscape. The International Energy Agency estimates that global energy demand will increase between 36% and 47% over the period out to 2035. This is driven primarily by population growth and expansion of economies of developing countries. This hard and inescapable reality requires us to further develop all forms of energy. Not only do we need to drastically increase renewable energy sources; we need a concerted effort to expand our supplies of fossil fuels. As part of an honest discussion, let's disabuse ourselves of the notion put forth by oil critics that it is one or the other. The fact is, we need all sources of energy, and in growing amounts.
All sources of energy need to be developed responsibly, and we should acknowledge that all energy development, including renewables, has consequences, both environmental and economic. Most people do not appreciate that oil, natural gas, and coal make up about 80% of today's global energy; further, even in a relatively conservative scenario they will contribute 70% to 80% of total global energy needs by 2035. Meanwhile, the world's known oil production is declining at a rate of at least 7% on average, and producing regions are struggling to maintain oil production, let alone try to grow it.
Turning specifically to oil sands development, we fully recognize that our industry has an impact on the environment and local communities. We recognize that our future success depends on our continued ability to show improvement in our environmental and social performance.
The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers has appeared before this committee on behalf of the broader industry and has followed up with supporting information. With that in mind, I'd like to review some Syncrude specific successes and challenges.
Like the broader industry, Syncrude has a solid track record of improving both its operational and its environmental and social performance. On land, Syncrude has reclaimed 22% of its disturbed land, planted over five million trees, and become the first oil sands operator to receive government certification for a reclaimed area, known as Gateway Hill.
The Alberta government's 2010 Directive 074 has sent challenging requirements that drastically speed up the timeline for reclaiming tailings ponds. Syncrude is responding with a suite of new technologies, such as centrifuging, for managing current tailings and perhaps reducing the need for future ponds. Industry continues to explore these technological opportunities and to share these best practices among themselves.
Syncrude is also pioneering a new initiative to establish newly created wetlands as part of its reclamation efforts. On air, Syncrude's greenhouse gas emissions arise from the use of energy, most notably natural gas in the production of crude oil. Since 1982, however, Syncrude has reduced its energy use per barrel by 39%.
Syncrude has also reduced sulphur dioxide emissions per barrel by about 60% since the early 1980s. Furthermore, in 2011 Syncrude will complete construction of a $1.6-billion sulphur emissions reduction plant, which will contribute another 60% reduction in sulphur dioxide emissions from the current approved levels and reduce, on top of that, particulate matter by 50%, despite increasing production rates.
Concerning water, Syncrude recycles 85% of the water it uses, with the remainder being lost to evaporation. Syncrude has reduced the water intensity of its process by more than half from its levels in 1980. Syncrude and other companies continue to research new extraction methods that do not require water.
Concerning community, Syncrude is one of the largest employers of aboriginal people in Canada, if not the largest; they represent 8% of our workforce. In addition, since 1992 Syncrude has conducted over $1.2 billion of business with local aboriginal companies, and Syncrude has donated over $18 million to community projects since 2005.
We also recognize that we need to do more. Syncrude has the only dedicated research and development facility in the oil sands industry and currently spends more than $50 million a year on research and development. It pioneered many of the industry's technologies to improve operations and environmental impacts. We will continue to invest heavily in new technologies to reduce the environmental impact of our operation. This commitment has been part of Syncrude for more than 30 years, and history has shown us that innovation holds the key to improved performance.
We need to ensure that the measurement and monitoring systems are effective and transparent and continually improving, and we need to continue to communicate with our stakeholders and stand up to the agenda-driven critics who mislead them with incomplete information. In addition, Canadian Oil Sands is contributing to the ongoing discussions regarding a Canadian energy strategy based on economy-wide solutions that focus equally on industry and consumers, on energy supply and energy demand.
Governments also have a role to play. It includes ensuring a continuing world-class regulatory system and standing up for Canada's record as a steward of the environment. They need to increase investment in technology, expand markets within the U.S. and offshore, and ensure fiscal and regulatory competitiveness necessary to attract capital and human talent.
Finally, I'd like to close by affirming my belief that the oil sands can and should contribute to Canadian energy security. In fact, it is our greatest opportunity. A lot of rhetoric surrounding energy and the environment focuses on the need to wean North America off oil and convert to renewables. As I said, development of renewables is important; I believe in it. But crude oil, specifically the oil sands, can act as a bridge to a future in which renewables play a much larger role. Given that over the coming decades, again, 70% to 80% of global energy needs will be met using coal, natural gas, and oil, Canada has the opportunity and indeed the responsibility to both provide that source of energy and to do it responsibly.
Crude oil will continue to play a critical role in the global economy, and Canada is indeed very fortunate to have the oil sands. Make no mistake, it is a national treasure.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for your time. I'm available to try to answer any questions you might have.
Thank you for inviting me here today to speak.
My name is Gillian McEachern. I manage the climate and energy program for Environmental Defence. We are a national non-profit organization. We work on a range of issues, including climate and energy, toxics, and land use, among others.
We were asked to present on energy security, and specifically as it relates to the federal government's role in the tar sands. According to the International Energy Agency, the definition of energy security is the uninterrupted physical availability of energy at a price that is affordable, while respecting environmental concerns. So according to the IEA, energy security inherently means addressing the environmental and economic issues with energy production and consumption.
We would argue that in addition to addressing the local environmental impacts of energy production, any definition of energy security needs to also include climate security. A federal plan to address energy security needs to address the risk posed by climate change. There is no such thing as energy security in a catastrophic climate change scenario; therefore, our working definition of energy security includes climate security and dealing with the economic and environmental impacts of energy production.
The environmental risks of the tar sands are growing, and these risks are not contained to the local region where the production occurs. It includes the Northwest Territories, the Pacific coast, and important watersheds in the United States.
I understand that my colleague, Simon Dyer, was here last week presenting from the Pembina Institute concerning a report that we jointly produced called Duty Calls, which clearly outlines the area of federal jurisdiction as it relates to tar sands. I won't repeat much of what he said. We would echo his statements regarding the climate impacts of planned tar sands expansion--how, even with an optimistic role for carbon capture and storage, the planned expansion will blow the current government's carbon budget and force other sectors to do more than their fair share.
Today I'm going to focus in more detail on two areas from that report: first the risk of a major tailings spill, and second the economic implications of our current unspoken energy policy—rapidly escalating tar sands production and export.
The massive toxic tailings lakes in northern Alberta pose a threat to human health, the environment, and the economy, given the risk of a breach of one of the dams that holds the toxic waste back from the nearby rivers. Currently nearly one billion cubic meters of toxic tailings are contained in these lakes. They now cover more than a 130-kilometre square, an area larger than the size of the city of Vancouver.
The tailings contain chemicals harmful to humans and aquatic organisms, including naphthenic acids, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, heavy metals, and arsenic. The contaminated material is held back by unlined earthen dams reaching as high as 300 feet. Worldwide, tailings dams are ten times more likely to fail than other types of dams, and there have already been problems with some tar sands tailings dams.
Given the proximity of the ponds to down-river Saskatchewan and the Northwest Territories, a major spill would have trans-boundary impacts as tar sands tailings entered the Athabasca River and made their way into the Athabasca delta, which is a world heritage site and an important nesting ground for migratory birds from across the continent. It would impact the Mackenzie River basin, which drains about one-fifth of Canada's water supply and is the traditional homeland for dozens of aboriginal communities.
Yet despite this potential risk, the federal government currently has no emergency response plan to deal with a catastrophic spill and is mostly hands-off in terms of dam safety to prevent a spill from ever happening. The Alberta government says that companies have emergency response plans for tailings dam failures, but none of these is open to public scrutiny to allow independent assessment of how effective they would be in the event of a dam breach.
We've seen tailings dams like these fail, with devastating consequences: most recently in Hungary, a couple of years ago in Tennessee. Until the federal government takes responsibility to prevent this type of catastrophe, the legacy of tar sands production is creating a serious risk to the security of people living downstream of the tar sands.
The potential for a major spill, of course, is in addition to the ongoing spill happening in the tar sands. An estimated 11 million litres of tailings is leaking from the ponds every day.
It's hard to call this a secure source of energy, given these risks.
Now I'm going to turn to some of the economic impacts associated with tar sands. The tar sands industry is undoubtedly providing economic benefits in the form of jobs and government revenues; that's not disputed. But what we rarely hear much discussion about is some of the negative economic implications of rising oil exports on other parts of the Canadian economy. So far there's been no robust federal discussion, analysis, and response to deal with this.
Jeff Rubin, the former head of CIBC World Markets, recently asked whether Canada can afford Alberta's tar sands, citing the extent to which Canada's dollar has become a petro-currency. Increasing oil prices and tar sands production will continue to strengthen the Canadian dollar, which when coupled with a continued sluggish economy in the U.S. will have an impact on other sectors in the Canadian economy, most notably manufacturing.
If the tar sands play an increasingly large role in the Canadian economy, we're at risk of succumbing to what is known as Dutch disease, in which increased exploitation of natural resources impacts the nation's currency, thereby making export of other products more expensive. In fact there's evidence already that Canada is suffering from some of the symptoms of Dutch disease. A study published last year by Serge Coulombe at the University of Ottawa found that between 2002 and 2007, 42% of manufacturing job loss in Canada due to rising currency had been the result of Dutch disease stemming from oil exports. The majority of this impact is felt in Ontario and Quebec, the regions where the sectors hardest hit by Dutch disease are located.
As Dan Trefler, a research chair in competitiveness and prosperity at the Rotman School of Management, recently put it,
Canada has regressed. It is time to step back and ask ourselves whether this is what we want. The choice is ours: Sit back while world commodity demand drowns us in our own tailings, or react aggressively and strategically.
Norway, which is the world's third-largest exporter of oil, provides an example of a country that has acted aggressively and strategically in response to a resource boom. Norway set up the government pension fund, which is now worth more than $400 billion. It invests the vast majority of oil wealth overseas to avoid driving up the value of the currency, and only 4% of oil wealth is spent every year. Norway's GDP per capita is nearly double that of Canada's. The manufacturing sector is thriving. They have among the highest disposable incomes in the world. And when the oil runs out there will be a very large trust fund to help map out an energy future for them.
It's the role of the federal government to look at these impacts, both positive and negative, and come up with some type of plan that is fair for all regions of the country. So far that has not happened.
In Canada we're still feeling the hangover effects of the National Energy Program, which is now decades past. It's prevented us from planning our energy future. In the absence of a plan or policy to map out energy security in Canada, we've put all our eggs in one basket: tar sands growth. The federal government is allowing tar sands production to rapidly expand, granting approvals for new mines and projects. It is also permitting massive new infrastructure to ship tar sands to consumers, and some of these new pipelines will also ship jobs out of the country.
In light of the looming federal decisions about whether to approve these new mines and pipelines or allow oil tankers off the north coast of B.C., it's time to step back and map out our energy future rather than locking ourselves into decades of expanded fossil fuel production at a time when other countries are recognizing the need to transition off oil to clean energy. We need to decide what pace and scale of tar sands development makes sense.
In terms of the small group of people advocating to get off oil, which was referred to by the previous witness, that small group of people happens to include the President of the United States, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and many other countries around the world.
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.
As president of the Alberta Federation of Labour, I represent many of the Albertans who for the past decade have found themselves at the heart of an economic juggernaut centred around the oil sands. For example, we represent thousands of manufacturing workers who produce the pipes and build the modules that are the building blocks of oil sands projects. We represent thousands of transportation workers who move these building blocks by rail and truck to remote locations in the northern part of our province. We represent thousands of iron workers, welders, electricians, and other construction workers who put the pieces together, in what is becoming one of the biggest industrial projects the world has ever seen. We also represent thousands of plant operators and maintenance people who keep many of the new and existing facilities running. We represent thousands of public sector workers in areas such as health care, education, and municipalities whose work is funded, at least in part, by the proceeds of resource development. Finally, we represent thousands of retail and service sector workers who benefit from spinoffs from the energy sector.
From a distance, the economic edifice that we've created in Alberta looks extremely impressive. Our unemployment rates are low. Our GDP per capita is 75% higher than the Canadian average, and our average wages are 30% higher than the rest of the country's. But as is often the case with things that look good from a distance, when you look at them more closely, cracks become evident. As Alberta workers, or the members of our federation, have taken a closer look, we've seen some troubling cracks.
In my presentation today I'd like to talk about some of these cracks. Given the time constraints, I'll focus my remarks on three areas: first, value-added jobs; second, royalties; and third, a grab bag of other issues that I've put under the heading of unintended consequences. I'll wrap up with a brief discussion of our proposed solutions and some ways forward.
When it comes to jobs in the oil sands, our big concern as a federation is that Canada in general and Alberta in particular are in the process of losing an historic opportunity to move up the value ladder. Up until very recently, more than two-thirds of all the bitumen produced in Alberta was upgraded in the province, meaning it was either transformed into synthetic crude or refined into higher-value products such as gasoline, diesel, or jet fuel. In the process, thousands of high-paying, family-sustaining, community-sustaining jobs were created among upgraders and refineries in places such as Fort McMurray, Fort Saskatchewan, and Edmonton.
To give you a sense of just how many jobs were created, consider the examples of Alberta's two original oil sands producers, Suncor and Syncrude. Both have mines and upgraders in the Fort McMurray area that employ about 5,000 people each in direct operations, and thousands more in ongoing maintenance contracts and other spinoffs. But over the past few years the traditional ratio of value-added upgrading to unprocessed raw exports has begun to slip. According to figures and projections recently released by Alberta's Energy Resources Conservation Board, the proportion of bitumen upgraded in Canada has already fallen from about 70% to 63%, and is projected to fall to 48% by 2019.
This, unfortunately, is exactly what we at the AFL predicted would happen when we appeared before the National Energy Board five times over the past four years to oppose the construction of massive new bitumen export pipelines. It's also what we predicted a year and a half ago, when we published a study called Lost down the Pipeline, which I'll make available to members of the committee. In that study, we identified 10 refineries in the U.S. that were being retooled to handle bitumen from the oil sands, with a combined refining capacity of 2.8 million barrels per day. We also pointed out that the NEB had approved two major bitumen pipelines to the U.S., particularly the Keystone pipeline and the Alberta Clipper pipeline, which have a combined capacity to export 1.4 million barrels per day of raw bitumen from Alberta to refineries in the U.S. We also identified six other planned pipelines, which together have the capacity to export 2.3 million barrels of raw bitumen across the border each day.
The size and number of these American refineries and the size and number of the American-bound pipelines is significant, because it means that the U.S. refineries will have the capacity to absorb all expected increases in Alberta's oil sands production over the next ten years, and likely beyond. In other words, we warned then and continue to warn now that if left to themselves, energy companies may decide they don't need any new Alberta-based upgraders, even after the global economy recovers and international prices for oil rebound.
That in fact is exactly the scenario that we see playing out in Alberta today. Almost all of the upgraded projects that had been on the books before the recession have either been mothballed or abandoned altogether, even though prices for oil have recovered and investment in the oil sands is starting to ramp up again.
Of the approximately 250,000 barrels per day in new production that came onstream in 2009, almost all of it is being exported from Alberta in raw form. Even stalwarts like Suncor and Syncrude, who traditionally have upgraded all of their bitumen in Alberta, are starting to export increasing amounts of raw bitumen.
Another example I draw your attention to from today's news, on the front page of the business section in the Globe and Mail, is a story about Husky Energy making a decision to invest another billion dollars in the Alberta oil sands. It's important to note that the project that is discussed in this article, the Sunrise project, will be an extraction-only project, and that Husky will be sending all of the bitumen produced from that mine to two refineries that they've bought in the Ohio area.
Without more Alberta-based upgrading, Canada will lose thousands of good jobs in upgrading and refining and associated petrochemical production. Thousands of jobs in plant maintenance and other spinoffs will also be lost. Instead of creating long-term value-added jobs in places like Fort McMurray, Fort Saskatchewan, or Edmonton, those jobs will be shipped down the pipeline to places like Ohio and Illinois. Once the Keystone XL pipeline is complete, many of those jobs will be sent to places like Texas, Mississippi, and Alabama. That's the first big crack in Alberta's economic edifice, and from our perspective it's opening to become a big chasm.
The second crack that I'd like to talk about has to do with royalties. The starting point for this discussion is a reminder about who owns Alberta's energy resources. It's not the energy companies. It's not the pipeline companies. Despite all their talk about continental energy strategies, it's not the American government. Instead, our energy resources are owned by the Canadian public. And in the case of Alberta's oil, gas, and oil sands resources, they're owned by Albertans. Royalties aren't a price we pay. Royalties are the price we as owners charge energy companies to develop and sell the resources. This is an important point. Royalties are not a tax. They're a price, a price we receive for selling something we own, and which energy companies pay for something they need to run their businesses.
It's also important to note that royalties are only paid after the company using the resource has paid off its costs and taken a normal profit of roughly 10%. Everything earned over and above these amounts is what we call resource rent. The problem we're experiencing in Alberta is that our provincial government has been, from our perspective, lax in collecting the rents that are owed to them as owners of resources.
In that regard, I'll draw the committee's attention to a recent study produced by the Parkland Institute, which is housed in the faculty of arts at the University of Alberta. In the study entitled “Misplaced Generosity”, which was released last week, the Parkland Institute demonstrates that despite having a stated target of collecting between 50% and 70% of resource rents from the energy sector, the Alberta government has consistently failed to meet those targets.
As an average over the last ten years, they haven't even met the lower range of that target. So, on average, over the last ten years the Alberta government has collected only 47% of available resource rents. The result is that they have forgone literally billions of dollars in revenue that could have been taken in by the government on behalf of the citizens who own the resource and been made available either for savings or to spend on valuable public services. Those figures refer to the energy industry as a whole.
The situation is even worse when it comes to the oil sands. On average, over the last ten years the Alberta government has collected only 14.6% of available resource rents.
I see that I'm being asked to wrap up, so I'm just going to skip over the unintended consequences—I would encourage the committee to ask me a little bit about that when it comes time for questions—and talk about solutions. In particular, I want to present two suggestions and pose a question.
From our perspective, the first solution that should be considered by both provincial and federal governments is to begin negotiation on the establishment of a national energy plan. We are one of the few energy-producing jurisdictions in the world that doesn't have an overarching energy plan to deal with things like job creation, building industries, environmental impacts of development, and creating opportunities for green energy. As a result of this lack of a plan, decisions are being made, but they're not being made by elected people like yourselves who are accountable to the public; instead, the decisions are being made by industry. I would submit to you that what's good for the industry may not be good—and in many cases it is not good—for the public.
The second suggestion we have, which relates to the first, is that in order to build an energy policy that supports the public interest, governments at the provincial and federal levels should get over their reluctance to consider a more interventionist approach to the oil sands. In particular, I think the Alberta government and the federal government should learn lessons that were learned by the previous Alberta government of Peter Lougheed. He built a petrochemical industry in Alberta where none had existed before explicitly by using the levers of economic public policy to create the conditions for investment.
The final thing I want to do is to ask a question. Given the track record of the Alberta government on these issues, can that government be left on its own to make decisions that obviously have impacts not only on the province of Alberta, but across the country? We're a small economy, with a small population, and I would argue that in many ways our provincial government has become captive of the industry; it cannot by itself make decisions about the development of the resource in the broader public interest.
I'll wrap up there, and I'd be happy to answer questions.
:
Well, I think it boils down to a philosophical decision made by the Alberta government. In the past, previous conservative governments in Alberta, in particular the government of Peter Lougheed, have used a mix of regulation and even in some cases public ownership to promote value-added production in the energy sector.
More recent Alberta governments have basically left decisions about investment to the market. The market is deciding, and they're deciding to build their upgrading facilities south of the border for a couple of reasons, first because it's cheaper for them in some cases to simply retool existing refineries in places like the American Midwest and the gulf coast, which are major petrochemical hubs in the States, rather than building new facilities here. The decisions are also being driven in that direction by the push for the development of pipelines. So up until recently, pipeline capacity, especially for exporting raw bitumen, was more limited, but as a result of recent approvals by the National Energy Board we now have what we would describe as bitumen superhighways taking resources.
This interest among American companies to have a continental strategy and to build in the States, together with the fact that we've basically built piping that allows them to bring the bitumen there, has provided an incentive for companies to ship across the border.
Our position is that while it may make all sorts of sense for individual companies to do their upgrading and refining in the States, that doesn't necessarily make that decision something that's in the public interest of Canadians or that should be supported here.
I think we should learn lessons from the Lougheed era in particular. There's a very close parallel, actually, between what happened in the 1970s with natural gas and petrochemicals and what's happening now with bitumen. Back then the concern that faced the new Lougheed government when it first assumed power was that natural gas was being exported in its raw form, and what they called natural gas liquids, in particular ethane, were being shipped south and being used as a feedstock for petrochemicals and plastics and that kind of thing. So the plants in eastern Canada and the United States were getting all the jobs and value from this.
Peter Lougheed and his government decided that wasn't in the interest of the broader Alberta public, so he used a mix of regulation and public investment to change the situation. For example, the Alberta Energy Company, which was eventually privatized to become Encana, was a public company created by the Alberta government to take this valuable ethane and turn it into petrochemicals. So they created a multi-billion-dollar industry that hadn't existed there before.
The short answer to your question is that what we need is a willingness to consider an active role for government that's not currently being considered, so we need regulation and public control. Otherwise the market will continue doing what the market has been doing, which is exporting literally thousands and thousands of value-added jobs down the pipeline.
:
Thank you for your question.
My understanding of your question is that it's with respect to the impact on the biodiversity of forests and fauna, etc., and also about what is in the river's water chemistry and what processes we use.
We do open-pit mining, so we do strip all of the forests. We preserve all of the topsoil. We do our mining operations. When they are complete, we replace that topsoil and replant the trees. This process takes anywhere from 20 to 40 years. We have proven that we can do it. As I mentioned earlier, we've been in business long enough, for 30 years, to have fully reclaimed and returned re-certified land to the province. So I think that cycle works quite well.
To your other question, about river toxicity, remember that the river cuts through the Athabasca formation of oil sands. So the oil sands formation actually intersects the river, and has ever since the river started cutting through this region many millennia ago. So the toxicity level is a reflection of the riverbed, if you will, and we have no impact on that. The oil sands mining industry does not return any processed water whatsoever to the river. There are some sanitation water returns that happen, but that's the same as any municipality: it's treated water. But all the processed water is contained in our tailings ponds and we recycle it in our process. So we do not affect any of the river's chemistry and we only extract, on average, 1% of the river's flow.
I think our processes are fairly well proven. They are under strict scrutiny by the Alberta government and are monitored by two independent water panels.
While I'm at it, if I could, Mr. Chairman, I'll comment on a couple of other questions relating to water. To my knowledge, there have been no breaches of earth-filled dams at Syncrude or elsewhere, and if there have been, they've probably been very minor, which is why I've never heard of them. I've been in this business over ten years. The dams are closely monitored by geo-technical experts, both within industry and by outside third-party independents. We have wells drilled around all these tailings ponds so that we can monitor any flow through the ground. Through these wells and through interceptor ditches, we collect any leakage that comes from these dams and pump it back into the tailings ponds. So that water is maintained and continues to be recycled. Of course, as it evaporates it returns to the atmosphere quite cleanly that way.
In the long term, which Suncor has proved up, these tailings ponds do get filled with sand and sediment and are finally topped off with topsoil and reclaimed as well.
I'll perhaps leave my comment on that, but I'd be happy to comment on upgraders, if you like, as well as on creating wealth for the future from these vast operations.