:
Mr. Chairman and honourable members, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today on the topic of Arctic sovereignty.
My name is John Keating. I'm the CEO of COM DEV International, a Canadian-owned space company. I think the issue facing us as Canadians is well understood by this Parliament and this committee, so I will not belabour it here.
To summarize, climate change and a receding ice cap have already had a profound impact on opening up the north to activities of all kinds, both by Canadians and foreigners. And while there is heightened activity there now, it will continue to grow exponentially over the coming years. This provides huge opportunities for Canada, but it also brings significant sovereignty threats and stewardship responsibilities. In the words of the Prime Minister, “To develop the North, we must know the North. To protect the North, we must control the North.”
We agree with the previous witnesses who have explained that what is needed is a whole of government, system of systems solution to support the development, the sovereignty, and the stewardship of the north. The Department of National Defence is already contributing to this comprehensive solution with projects like the Arctic offshore patrol ship and the northern training centre.
These systems, including those being provided by DND, will all depend on an information infrastructure that provides the sorts of basic services and data we take for granted in the south, things like communications, search and rescue, weather forecasting, and navigation. This information infrastructure is still largely non-existent in the north. The north is simply too big, too isolated, and too remote to cost-effectively build a traditional ground-based information grid.
Whilst it is impracticable to provide traditional ground-based infrastructure to support Arctic sovereignty, it is possible to implement the necessary services from space using satellites. Depending on the payloads carried, these satellites can conduct a number of critical functions in the north, including tracking ships, providing secure communications, providing the data to support accurate weather forecasting, monitoring climate change, and enabling search and rescue services.
Northern sovereignty is a Canadian issue that requires a Canadian-controlled situation. There is a uniquely Canadian solution that is able to provide cost-effective, reliable, and rapidly deployed northern information infrastructure using modern, low-cost, small, and microsatellites.
Traditionally, satellites were effective but usually very expensive, weighing several tonnes and costing more than $100 million each. Few companies had the ability to deliver these satellites and few customers could afford to buy them. But recent advances in technology have dramatically cut their size and costs, so that today, microsatellites can weigh less than 100 kilograms and cost less than $10 million.
Canada, including Canadian-owned and operated COM DEV, is a world leader in this field, and both the CSA and DND have laid out plans to meet Canada's national needs using microsatellite-based infrastructure.
By way of example, I'd like to illustrate the ability of one such satellite mission to track ship traffic worldwide, including the most remote areas of the Arctic.
[Video Presentation]
Mr. John Keating: This very short video is about the fact that we have a satellite-based system that does all of these things: vessel detection, securing our borders, search and rescue, environmental monitoring—all the things I just described to you gentlemen and ladies earlier.
The solution is a Canadian solution developed by a Canadian company, a very advanced technology to detect existing communications from ships. It comprises six satellites flying in a polar orbit, as you see here; several ground stations; a data centre; and an operations centre. It provides a global picture of ship traffic all over the world. This is something that simply doesn't exist today. This information you're seeing in front of you is a simulation of where the satellites actually travel in their journey. This particular picture shows real data from a real satellite that COM DEV has actually produced and launched into space.
As an example of the traffic that we detected, that's the Louis S. St-Laurent right up in the north there. This system is real information, as I described.
That's the Terry Fox up in the high Arctic waters. And we can see each ship and lots of information about each individual ship, where it's from and where it's going.
There's a Russian cruise vessel that we detected using our demonstrator satellite in space. We can track where it has come from, where it's going, how fast it's going, and what cargo it has on board.
We can see all of the information from the Arctic, from the North Atlantic, and from the western coasts of Canada. There's Vancouver Island and all of the ship traffic around Vancouver Island.
Up until today, you would never have seen these pictures because they simply didn't exist.
There's Juneau, Alaska.
This is a tremendously accurate system. That's the Port of Juneau, Alaska. We can detect the accuracy of those ships down to 20 metres. So if somebody has been in our Canadian waters, polluting Canadian waters, we can track them right to the dock of where they are today.
If you're interested in fishing and in people encroaching on our fishing waters, that's a fishing fleet there.
This information is put into detailed maps and information for the users. We can use traffic management to keep ships where they're supposed to be fishing or moving them into the right areas.
If people are polluting or there's a natural disaster, we can monitor what's going on.
We can send people to the last place where somebody was to do effective search and rescue. And of course, all of our authorities, navies, and security people can see what's happening there.
So this is a system that enables us to know the north and control the north. This small microsatellite-based infrastructure will provide an essential and cost-effective support layer to the suite of systems providing Arctic sovereignty, including those currently being developed by the Department of National Defence.
The services they provide, such as weather forecasting, communications, and search and rescue, would also provide much-needed infrastructure development in the north, contributing to the well-being and quality of life of those living in the north today and those planning to further develop it. In short, we are talking about nation building.
The satellite infrastructure would be developed right here in Canada by world-leading Canadian companies. These high-technology, high-value jobs created at COM DEV, its partner, and supplier companies span Canada.
Canadians are rightly proud of our accomplishments in space, and I believe this made-in-Canada space-based solution approach to our Arctic sovereignty issue would be embraced by Canadians coast to coast to coast.
The Department of National Defence has embraced the use of small satellites and microsatellites for operational space missions such as the applications I have described to you here today. Meanwhile, the Canadian Space Agency, in consultation with a number of government departments and other stakeholders, is developing a long-term space plan for Canada. These groups all recognize that the use of space continues to be essential for Canada and in particular for its vast and remote Arctic territories.
It's imperative that both of these departments continue to promote and invest in microsatellite solutions as an urgent and vital component of Canada's integrated northern strategy.
Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss Arctic sovereignty with all committee members in attendance.
[English]
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the invitation to present the views of Inuit on the subject of Arctic sovereignty.
The Inuit Circumpolar Council (Canada) President, Duane Smith, who will be here later this week, is in his home in Inuvik at the moment. He has asked me to express his regrets that he is unable to appear before this committee. He has requested that I speak on his behalf. I'm sure he'd be open to any questions later on by mail, e-mail, or otherwise.
I'm going to present to you a little bit of a different twist on what some members here believe sovereignty is. I want to talk about more of an international dimension of sovereignty and how the Government of Canada, especially this committee, should be aware of how the Inuit--who don't only live in Canada--can be a good partner, building relationships with Canada and furthering its political goals.
As you may know, the Inuit Circumpolar Council was founded back in the late 1970s when Inuit from four countries came together to talk about issues very much related to sovereignty, at least to what Inuit perceived the notion of sovereignty to be. It was in part because of oil companies in Alaska, at that time, moving in without regard for any kind of Inuit sovereignty in the northern part of Alaska. As you know, later on, in the Mackenzie Valley and other parts of Canada, similar things happened. A lot has changed in the last 30 or 35 years, and for the better, as you know, Mr. Chair.
Your invitation to speak here today could not have been more timely, as the Inuit Circumpolar Council issued a circumpolar Inuit declaration on sovereignty in the Arctic only two weeks ago in northern Norway. I have it here. If the clerk could tell me if it was translated into French, perhaps I could even distribute it as well. You can also find it on the ICC website.
This circumpolar declaration on sovereignty in the Arctic, Mr. Chair, came about for several reasons. One, as the previous witness just said, there's an increasing focus on the Arctic by Canadians and also by people abroad, and by states, by academics, by industry, and, as we heard today, by the space industry. As you also know, Mr. Chair, there was a very important meeting, which the--
:
As I was saying, this declaration states in essence that Inuit have the right to self-determination in their Arctic homeland, which stretches from Chukotka, at the eastern tip of Russia, across Alaska, the Canadian Arctic, and all the way to Greenland. The right of self-determination is enshrined in various international human rights instruments and conventions.
I wish to emphasize, however, that this declaration is not intended to be confrontational. The closing of the declaration, if I could point out the last paragraph to everybody, says:
We, the Inuit of Inuit Nunaat
—and Inuit Nunaat, by the way, is this vast territory in which Inuit live—
are committed to this Declaration and to working with Arctic states and others to build partnerships in which the rights, roles and responsibilities of Inuit are fully recognized and accommodated.
Inuit intend to be strong partners in the future of the Arctic. This declaration lets the world know the foundation upon which Inuit are standing.
The Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic applies to all of the activities going on in the Inuit homeland. First of all, it means that Inuit need to be at the table when things such as military action involving the Arctic are discussed. ICC's position is that disputes should be settled using cooperation and diplomacy rather than military action, if possible, and I think everybody here would agree.
Second, Inuit need to be at the table when economic development of the Arctic is discussed. As you know, it is exceedingly important that economic development be done in a sustainable manner. The needs of Inuit communities must be front and centre. On the one hand, Inuit are eager to train for the new jobs that are coming to the area and are looking forward to the growth this could bring to Inuit communities. On the other hand, Inuit are very concerned about the risks to the fragile environment, because their way of life and indeed their physical, emotional, and spiritual health depends on their connection to a healthy Arctic ecosystem.
Third, Inuit want to be involved in the scientific research that is happening in the Arctic. Inuit are detailed students of their environment and can contribute a wealth of traditional knowledge. In many cases, Inuit also have concerns about research methods that need to be addressed.
You will notice in the declaration a provision that notes sovereignty begins at home, and that economic and social issues, including language matters, need to be addressed to build a strong, sovereign people. The declaration, you will see, reiterates the rights that Inuit have as one people under international law. Yet it also speaks to the issue of rights gained within states and within territories in those states. But mostly it insists that Inuit be at the table.
As many of you know, Inuit were not at the negotiating table when sovereignty was discussed among the five—or so-called “oceans five”—ministers of foreign affairs in Greenland in May 2008. Canada, as you know, Mr. Chair, sent the Minister of Natural Resources. There were the ministers of foreign affairs from Russia, Norway, the U.S., and also from Denmark. I would strongly recommend that the Department of National Defence take ICC and all Inuit leaders up on their invitation in this declaration to talk, to build relationships.
We heard something earlier about threats to the Arctic. I would say, from my experience of the Arctic Council, that this is one area in which there's a lot of cooperation and a lot of goodwill, even among those who are dropping flags at the North Pole.
Hans Island is often cited as either a joke or as something very serious to look at, and we've had our ministers land there. Inuit from Greenland have often said, as Inuit in Canada have said, leave those disputes to us and there wouldn't be a lot of discussion.
There's a lot of harmony in the Arctic; let's build upon that. We see it in the Arctic Council. Unfortunately, they didn't use the Arctic Council, or at least did not invite the Inuit to participate, in the sovereignty talks in Greenland in the same manner that they do and have done at the Arctic Council. But if we continue to involve the Inuit, whether it be through development in space technology, through academia, through tourism, or, most importantly, through state policies, take the Inuit up—all the Inuit of the four countries, including the Canadian Inuit—on what they're asking for in this declaration.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
:
Mr. Chair and honourable members, I'm honoured to have the opportunity to speak to you today.
The Standing Committee on National Defence is charged with responsibility for guiding Canada's defence and strategic planning—a daunting task, given the fast-changing nature of global and continental affairs.
I was asked specifically to speak to you about matters of Arctic sovereignty and Canada's role in defending the far north. The historian in me is compelled to tell you that Canada has been reluctant to determine its long-range strategy in this region, from Confederation to the present. This country has generally responded to external threats and challenges to Canadian sovereignty, rather than preparing its own plans for incorporating the region. From the Klondike gold rush to the militarization of the north during World War II and the Cold War, Canadian policy has been largely reactive. Threats from outsiders, rather than national or regional priorities, have pushed this country into action. As the current situation once again suggests, the north and indeed Canada have not been well served by this episodic interest and the absence of sustained commitment.
As this standing committee knows very well, the Arctic situation has changed dramatically. There is uncertainty about Arctic boundaries, and there is the prospect of major resource discoveries in the region. Arctic navigation has opened up through the melting of Arctic ice. There is growing international interest in the region, with Japan, China, and the European Union expressing new interest or renewed interest in Arctic affairs. The re-empowerment of indigenous peoples, particularly the Inuit, has emerged as a major factor in northern politics.
At the same time, the increasingly urban and southern orientation of the Canadian population, which has left very few Canadians with a personal stake in the far north, has weakened the national bonds with the Arctic. It is not clear to me that the decades-old and often romantic notions of Canada as a northern nation still resonate with the people of this country.
I understand you wish to determine whether the Canadian Forces are properly equipped and trained for the challenge of protecting and asserting Canadian national sovereignty in the region. Permit me to offer my thoughts on this very critical question.
The Canadian Forces do an admirable job, as they do in other theatres, with limited resources and without the full range of equipment and new technologies that are required. As I'm sure this committee agrees, the country cannot ask the men and women of the Canadian Forces to tackle major assignments without the proper equipment and preparation.
At present, Canada does not have the scientific capacity in the north that is required to back up a sustained military presence in the region and that is needed to understand the regional impact of anticipated environmental change. Scientific understanding is a critical underpinning of regional defence.
There is a particular need for proper communications and surveillance capacity in the Arctic, whether in the form of electronic networks, as we saw a few minutes ago, regional bases, underwater capabilities, icebreakers run by the navy or the coast guard, and/or an expanded Canadian Rangers operation. Put simply, Canada needs to know what is going on in the north.
The Inuit and first nations of the Canadian north have critical roles to play in asserting Canadian sovereignty in the area. The implementation of land claims is crucial to defending Canadian interest in the region. Indigenous Canadians are vital partners in the north, and their circumpolar connections have been important in presenting Canada to the world as an Arctic nation.
It's vital that investments in defence and the protection of sovereignty not be viewed in isolation from other national commitments in the region. Coordinating the development of military facilities with the provision of infrastructure required for community and northern development can help address pressing social, economic, and related problems while strengthening the long-term foundations for national defence.
Canada also tends to approach issues of Arctic sovereignty based on current threats and issues. This is a very risky time to take that kind of approach. The pace of change in the Arctic is unprecedented. Preparations for the defence of Canadian interests have to look not to the north today, but to the north of 10, 20, and 30 years ahead, to a time of potential conflicts over oil and gas reserves, intense concern about the environment, increasing prospects for conflict along Arctic boundaries, and issues and threats that are not yet fully understood.
Canadians' understanding of northern challenges also tends to focus on the Arctic islands, the location of many of the current conflicts. It's important in my mind that the country adopt a broader definition of the north, one that reaches from Labrador to the Yukon and that recognizes the commonality of interests across this vast expanse of Canada. We need a northern defence plan with a substantial Arctic component, and not simply an Arctic sovereignty strategy.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it's time to break Canada's historic pattern of treating Arctic sovereignty and northern defence as a short-term issue. Canada includes vast northern and Arctic territories. Canada is responsible for the protection of these lands and the peoples within them and for the assertion of Canadian sovereignty over the whole region. There are aspects of the current uncertainties that are truly disturbing. There would be significant national benefit from this uncertainty, if Canada rises to the challenge of the sovereignty question and implements a viable and long-term approach to defending Canada's interests in the far north.
I hope my comments are of some value to the standing committee. You face an important challenge in helping Canada define a proper and sustainable approach to Arctic sovereignty and northern defence.
Canadian governments have wrestled with this issue many times over the years. I wish you the very best in your efforts.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
:
First off, I would say that I'm personally quite concerned about what you described as a love affair. I think our notions have always been romantic and mythological. Very few Canadians travel to the north, and the number of Canadians who go to the Yukon is much smaller than the number of Canadians who go to Florida, for example. We haven't embraced the north in that kind of practical sense.
When you talk about what we could do, I think sometimes the vision people have of the Yukon, with a quarter million people, and of the Northwest Territories, with 500,000 to 600,000 people, is wrong-headed. I don't think those territories can sustain that kind of activity, or surely it wouldn't be beneficial in the short term. I think we need stability. We need stability in the population, we need security of jobs, and we need a sort of sustained and properly planned development of natural resources, rather than the quick hit, taking the cream of the crop of our resources as quickly as we can.
I think we need to know that in fact we understand the whole region, that we have a presence across the whole north. I don't, again, mean that we should have 10,000 people in the military base on Ellesmere Island. Those kinds of things are impractical and are very expensive.
I was raised in the Yukon. When I first went to the Yukon, we had an air force base in Whitehorse, and it actually stabilized the population. It meant there were more stores, more businesses, and more things going on. Then it went away, and for a long time there was virtually no Canadian defence presence in the Yukon at all, and the Yukon suffered as a consequence. I would suggest to you that as you start thinking about how you plan the military expenditures—whether it's a permanent station, an air force base, or actual infrastructure such as satellites or whatever else—you combine it with not just the military side but with all the other sides. When you build a road, an airfield, a vital communications system, you'll actually build a better north.
:
Thank you for that question.
There are two ways of looking at it.
First is an expansion of the Arctic Council on the international level. I think the Arctic Council has to do more. We're very happy with it; we're very proud of it. It's the first, or perhaps the only, international organization where Inuit and other indigenous peoples sit at the same table. As you know, I was in Tromsø two weeks ago, and the ICC chair, Duane Smith from Inuvik, was there at the same table as Minister Cannon and the other seven ministers.
The unfortunate thing about the Arctic Council—and there's so much good to say about it—is that there should be more things on the table.
I was also there, back in 1994, 1996, when we were negotiating the Arctic Council. The United States of America said immediately that if we were going to talk about marine mammals, they were not going to be at the table. The Marine Mammals Protection Act, which as you all know wouldn't stand up to any WTO...it is not on the table. I must commend the minister for raising the sealskin issue in Tromsø two weeks ago, the European ban. He had the prerogative, he's the minister, but at the working group level we can't even study the issue of sealskins. The military is another thing the United States—and to some degree Canada and Russia—didn't want at the table. I think that's unfortunate.
It's not a decision-making body, but I think these kinds of things should be there, given that if you want to know what the Inuit are thinking about things, ask them. They have a constitutional right. In the four countries, it's a different degree of constitutionality, but that's.... I know we don't have a lot of time. Let's make the Arctic Council an enhanced institution.
:
You've asked some big questions.
The future, I'm not too sure of, but I'm positive about it.
But to get back to your earlier comments, to remind the members here, I think what you're getting at, for example, is that in Greenland they had what they called home rule in 1979. On June 21 of this year there will be further self-government, which they've negotiated very peacefully with their former colonizer, Denmark. I think many Canadian officials will be invited to that very important day. They're taking over many more issues, such as resources, and so on.
Most of you people here and members know there are four Inuit land claims regions. Nunatsiavut in Labrador was the last one to settle.
In Alaska we have a similar kind of arrangement. Their so-called rights or sovereignty are not as advanced in many instances.
In Russia, we don't have a lot going on other than administrative reforms.
To answer your question, I think what you're getting at is that there are these regional powers now, where regional devolution is going on. How can they have their voices heard internationally and also nationally?
Is that right?
:
That's a very interesting question.
The way we will likely get to the dispute is the way we always do with the Americans, and that is to argue publicly and to resolve it quietly behind closed doors. We tend to take our stances: Canada has to say certain things; America has to say certain things. Then back behind closed doors, arms are twisted and things get resolved, such as allowing certain kinds of ships to go through the Northwest Passage.
I would agree with you 100% that this actually is the one that's more important than the Northwest Passage. The whole question of who controls the drilling rights in the Beaufort Sea, and things like that, are really, really important issues. The fishing rights issue is the one that's coming up to the table right now.
There was an expectation, I think—and certainly among the academic circles I work in—that as long as President Bush was there, we were going to get a fairly hard-nosed approach, and that perhaps when President Obama came in, we would get a lessening of that conflictual orientation. I don't think that's likely. In fact, I think the Americans are quite concerned about making sure they defend their interests in the region.
So the United States and Canada get on each other's nerves from time to time on a whole range of issues. We do tend to resolve these things relatively quietly behind closed doors, and I suspect on this one, that may well be part of the solution.
There was an issue, as you well know—and maybe you have talked about this before—raised by the Americans about fishery control, which I think has the potential to blow this up sooner rather than later.
It's a pleasure to be here with you, at least for this particular meeting.
I want to come back to that quote, “To develop the North, we must know the North. To protect the North, we must control the North.” I'm sure this was not taken from the Inuit perspective, this particular quote.
First of all, when you talk about development, it almost has a certain connotation of somehow being primitive, which it isn't. Secondly, on “we must know the North”, well there are 40,000 Canadians who know the north very well, and they're the Inuit of the north, and we don't seem to include them within our strategy.
Regarding “to protect the North we must control the North”, I just want to ask a question to Mr. Coates and to Mr. Reimer. I just read the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans report talking about the coast guard. It seems that throughout this document there is a fair criticism that the Inuit have been ignored, in terms of the development of the strategy and maybe now the implementation of the strategy. We have legally binding agreements with the Inuit, from Labrador right to the Yukon, the land claims agreements.
There is a conference happening this week, actually right here in Ottawa, starting today, about the problems regarding land claims implementation. Do you think if we had proper implementation of those claims, which are enshrined in the Constitution of Canada, that would actually add to our sovereignty in terms of a legal perspective? Secondly, if we strengthen the self-determination—and that's kind of an oxymoron, but if Inuit had the tools for self-determination—does that not also enhance sovereignty?
The only other question I have is that we have a lot of assets out there within the north—Labrador, I agree, Mr. Coates, should be included, as well as the Yukon. We have a base for instance--$90 million goes in there every year--and we have 68 regular force personnel on that particular base. Because of the urgency, should not the Department of National Defence and other agencies be taking a very close look at the existing assets we have and how they can be better utilized in terms of developing our Arctic sovereignty and our whole policy around that particular issue?