:
Good afternoon, everyone.
Madam Chair, members of the committee, it's once again my pleasure to be here to talk about our response to the H1N1 flu virus, in particular our efforts to support and assist on-reserve first nations communities.
With me today are Dr. David Butler-Jones, our chief public health officer, and Shelagh Jane Woods, director general of primary health care and public health for Health Canada's First Nations and Inuit Health Branch.
I would also like to introduce Dr. Paul Gully, who has joined Health Canada as a special medical adviser. He will help coordinate the provisions of emergency health services in first nations communities affected by the H1N1 virus. Dr. Gully is joining us following his assignment at the World Health Organization as the deputy UN system influenza coordinator. He has also worked with Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada in the past.
During our time together, I'll turn to them for information in answering your questions as fully as possible.
In my remarks today, I want to talk about how we've been managing the H1N1 virus for almost five months. In particular, I will delve into why focusing on first nations communities is important in preparing for the fall, how we're collaborating with the provinces and first nations leaders in helping communities get prepared, and what we're planning to do going forward to strengthen our response and raise awareness in protecting the health of our communities.
Understanding the virus, how it's spread, and who is most vulnerable to it has been our priority. We immediately saw the need to implement our national pandemic influenza plan. Since then, we have followed the guidelines of the plan, and it has served us well. For that reason, we must stay the course and see it through as we prepare for a possible increase in the spread of the disease in the fall.
Communicating with Canadians has been and will continue to be an essential part of the plan. Collaborating with provinces, territories, first nations, Inuit, and health agencies across the country has enabled a clear and consistent approach to the disease nationwide. Health Canada is committed to working with stakeholders and domestic and international partners to help further our understanding and our methods of preventing and treating the H1N1 virus.
Next week, the Public Health Agency of Canada will host a conference that will be the first of its kind in Canada. Public health officials, intensive care specialists, and medical experts from Canada and other countries will meet in Winnipeg to discuss the best methods for treating and managing the severe cases of H1N1. We hope to develop new guidelines for treating and managing severe cases and new guidelines dealing with the impact they will have on hospitals.
Development of a vaccine is going according to plan. Clinical trials should start in October, if not earlier. As you know, we will make more than 50 million doses of the vaccine available so that every Canadian who needs and wants it can be immunized. Vaccination is key to managing the disease. I hardly need remind you that prevention of the disease is our primary goal.
I would like to turn my attention now to the work we've been doing with first nations. It is important to note that there are different health care delivery models for different aboriginal Canadians. I am focusing today on on-reserve first nations because the provision of health services is a shared responsibility between federal and provincial governments. Territorial and provincial governments have primary responsibility for health care for Inuit, but the Inuit remain a priority of Health Canada as well. In fact, I met with 25 mayors in Nunavut on Wednesday.
There are demographic and social factors that make on-reserve first nations and northern and remote communities a priority as we prepare for the fall. While Inuit are also a priority for Health Canada and are supported by Health Canada's regional offices, I will focus on first nations today.
Our research has shown that some segments of society appear to be at greater risk of developing complications if they contract the virus. We know, for example, that younger people age 16 to 25, pregnant women, and individuals with underlying health conditions, such as diabetes, fall into this category.
Many of you already know that 50% of the people on reserve are younger than 25. In fact, the median age of the first nations population as well as Inuit is 25, as compared with 40 in the rest of Canada. In addition, the birth rate on reserves is three times higher than in the rest of the country, which means there are more pregnant women per capita in first nations communities.
Finally, there are higher rates of chronic disease within first nations communities.
All told, a higher percentage of the first nations population is at greater risk of developing a more serious case of H1N1 than in the rest of the population. On top of this, we know well that social conditions, including overcrowding and communities having limited access to water for handwashing, pose challenges in minimizing the spread and impact of any virus.
For all these reasons, we're putting greater priority on preparing for a possible stronger wave in the fall by ensuring that care is well coordinated for communities when they need it, that needed supplies are both available and accessible, and that communities are well prepared and well informed.
When it comes to providing care to first nations communities, ensuring effective collaboration between levels of government is paramount. When someone from a remote first nations community needs to be transferred to a provincial hospital, Health Canada provides for the emergency medical transportation. This means that on-reserve first nations with severe H1N1 symptoms receive hospital care through their provincial health systems.
When there are many players involved, we need to make sure that our roles are clearly defined and our tasks well executed. I would like to mention that H1N1 preparations for first nations communities will be on the agenda for discussions with my provincial and territorial counterparts at our meeting on September 17.
Health Canada officials from our regional offices have been strengthening working relationships with provincial counterparts. In Manitoba, for example, First Nations and Inuit Health attend regular tripartite meetings with the province and Manitoba first nations. These networks have proven to be effective, particularly at the height of the outbreak in Manitoba earlier this year.
In British Columbia, first nations are well positioned to deal with an H1N1 outbreak through their collaborations with the tripartite H1N1 partners group. Other members include Health Canada, provincial health officials, including the office of provincial health offices, and the British Columbia aboriginal health physicians adviser. Similar activities have taken place across the country.
In addition to our communication with provinces, our officials have also been working directly with first nations leaders, as they always do. In July, officials from the health portfolio were on hand to both provide presentations and answer some questions before the Assembly of First Nations annual general meeting, held in Calgary. On a regular basis, Health Canada's regional offices distribute information bulletins and hold teleconferences with first nations community leaders. On top of this, we also provide financial and technical support to communities for preparing their pandemic plans.
I should note that since his election in July, I've had a chance to speak with AFN National Chief Atleo, and H1N1 was central to our discussions. I should also add that I had a meeting with him again this morning. I'll also be meeting with British Columbia chiefs in the next two days.
We do have a national plan, the Canadian pandemic influenza plan, but we need pandemic plans at all levels in all sectors. In other words, a one-size-fits-all approach does not work for a country like ours. For first nations, the Canadian pandemic influenza plan includes annex B, which defines the roles and responsibilities of all partners in pandemic planning for on-reserve first nations, including federal and provincial governments and first nations communities themselves.
We also have plans that meet the needs of individual first nations communities, plans inspired by the principles of national and provincial plans but developed by community leaders. The community plans map out in greater detail how a particular community will respond in case of an outbreak. To date, more than 90% of the first nations communities in Canada have completed and tested their plans.
Health Canada officials in each region have been contacting and visiting communities in recent weeks to determine if any additional plans are needed. We know that many first nations have not only completed but also tested their community pandemic plans. I was in Saskatchewan last week and noted that practically every first nations community in that province had tested its plan. Those communities and many others across Canada have put a lot of effort into their preparations.
We are also committed to ensuring that first nations nursing stations are equipped with all the supplies they will need to treat patients affected by H1N1 virus. We have distributed antivirals in advance to nursing stations in remote communities and regional medical storage facilities so that they can be accessed quickly.
Of course, during a pandemic our most important resource is our hard-working front-line medical worker. If the H1N1 virus reaches its potential, there will be an unprecedented demand for nurses. Because Health Canada depends on nurses to provide the bulk of its services in remote communities, we need to be ready to respond to the communities where the need is greatest.
Earlier this summer, in response to the elevated situation in northern Manitoba, we reallocated our nursing staff among nursing stations to meet the urgent need. We will be ready to take similar approaches this fall.
In preparing for the fall, we're providing additional training to workers to respond to emerging needs. For example, we're making sure that the nearly 400 home care nurses on reserves are trained to administer vaccines. As you are already aware, we are also collaborating with other jurisdictions to provide supplies, training, and guidance to first nations communities.
All of these preparations should convey the fact that our top priority is to gear up for the possible stronger second wave of H1N1 during the upcoming flu season. This is the kind of outbreak that members of our health portfolio have been preparing for since SARS in 2003.
During those years of preparation, it became clear that public awareness and education would be a key component of our strategy. That's why we're now in the midst of placing public service announcements in aboriginal print publications. It's also why we've been providing information to band councils, chiefs, and Inuit organizations. It's why we're planning to run community radio ads with calls to action translated into 26 aboriginal languages and dialects, along with TV ads on aboriginal networks and community stations.
In addition, we're providing information specifically geared to first nations on fightflu.ca, and we've been launching a social media campaign to ensure that our reach is as broad and deep as possible. As our ad campaign reads, knowledge is your best defence.
Through our communications effort, we're seeking to ensure that first nations community residents have all the information they need. I look forward to continue working with the community leaders, many of whom are here today, on how to best support and strengthen preparedness for the fall. We know that we have to remain vigilant.
I look forward to receiving your questions this afternoon. Thank you very much.
:
Thank you, Madam Chairperson.
Thanks, Madam Minister, Dr. Butler-Jones, Shelagh Jane Woods, and Dr. Gully. I appreciate your being here.
This is a week after our first meeting, and the reason we all felt it would be important to hear from you at this meeting, as well as from representatives of first nations and Inuit communities, is that we had the sense that of all the areas of a possible pandemic, we were least prepared in terms of aboriginal issues.
Today you presented a fairly rosy picture, Madam Minister, suggesting that we're in great shape as we head into the fall, when we might be faced with a pandemic. But that flies in the face of everything we're hearing from first nations communities. We will hear from them again later today. They seem to feel that in fact we aren't as prepared as you're suggesting. They have big questions. There are very grave concerns about the adequacy of supplies, resources, staff, and communications.
So we're here to try to figure out what's missing and how we can fix the problems, because I don't think anybody here today would dare suggest we're as prepared as we should be at this point, near the end of August, facing a possible outbreak in September.
My first question is this. In Manitoba the first nations communities, under Grand Chief Evans, came together and requested funding for flu kits. The Province of Manitoba has agreed to provide some money for those flu kits. First nations communities have had to resort to doing fundraisers to raise money for flu kits. I was at the fundraiser last Friday night, which was well attended and raised a great deal of money, where Chief Evans indicated that this was a very important contribution to communities in Manitoba.
So my question to you is, Madam Minister, are you prepared to put some money on the table to support the provision of flu kits for every first nation and Inuit community in this country?
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thanks very much, Minister, for coming back and speaking with us again on this very important issue. I know that the whole committee, as well as all Canadians, are certainly concerned about it. I'm glad to see that we are progressing as quickly as we are and as successfully as we are.
One of the things that I was really pleased to hear you say in your opening remarks, Minister, was your step-by-step rationale for going through what's happening to address the issue of the H1N1. You talked about understanding how it spreads, who are the most vulnerable, recognizing those things, and making sure there is a plan in place and recognizing what that plan is: communicating to the public, collaborating with the territories and provinces, and the international aspect of the whole thing. I think all of those things are very good, and I think they are what is going to make this H1N1 issue manageable for this country.
I certainly don't have experience in pandemic planning, but as a municipal mayor for many years, I've had many courses on emergency planning and the role of the different levels of government. I think it's critical that we are able to collaborate and that everybody understands what their role is, because this isn't a federal problem, this is a problem at every level of government. Whether it is the municipal, provincial, or federal level, I think it's something wherein everybody has to understand what their role is and they have to clearly be able to implement their role. So I think it's good that we're talking today and we're talking in particular on first nations issues and the issues as they may apply specifically to those areas.
One thing you talked about was communication with the public. Although I didn't jot it down, I thought I heard you say in your remarks that you were doing some first nations publications. If I did, could you elaborate on that and tell me a little bit more about how that's happening, and how they're being distributed, who it goes to, and how the people in the first nations areas can access those publications?
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I can't believe what I heard the minister say earlier in response to my question, that first nations people should simply go out and buy what they need in terms of flu supplies. We used to have an old expression about 30 years ago that said, what if day cares had all the money they needed to raise children, and the Senate had to hold a bake sale in order to pay for its offices and salaries? I find it absolutely appalling that first nations communities should have to hold a bake sale to raise money for flu supplies.
I appreciate, Madam Minister, that you are from an Inuit community and you've seen the conditions, but it sure doesn't seem to be applied in terms of what we're dealing with today. I've been to Iqaluit and Pond Inlet and Pangnirtung and Resolute Bay, and I know how much groceries cost and how hard it is to get those groceries. There isn't a Shoppers Drug Mart around the corner. There isn't a quick way out of a community.
It just seems to make sense that you look at some of the issues around the conditions on reserves--for which you have full responsibility--especially since under your government conditions have deteriorated, poverty has grown, and people have less and less access to the kinds of supplies you're talking about.
In fact also, as I understand it, some nursing stations don't even have the ability to give out Tylenol. We're talking about basic supplies that are needed in the event of a pandemic that could hit in less than a month from now. Yet you're still telling me that people should go out and buy the supplies.
[Translation]
I will repeat that in French. I have given this a lot of thought, because I took part in an event to raise money to fight the flu. No community or reserve should have to raise money, or depend on charity, to cover its flu-related expenses.
[English]
My questions are simply these. Are you going to stop putting this lens of a middle class suburban family on the situation, start looking at the real conditions, and start addressing the needs in first nations and Inuit communities? I want to know specifically, if this thing hits tomorrow, how many reserves, how many first nations and Inuit communities, will know who to call? Can they get to a place and get the supplies that we're now trying to provide for them? Can they pick up a phone and call emergency?
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
First of all, under this government we've increased transfers to the provinces and territories for health care by 6% again this year, which the member voted against.
The other point is that we've also transferred an increased budget for the delivery of health care to first nations communities, which was in the budget and which the member, again, voted against.
In terms of the question related to the remote communities, I know full well what it's like to live in a remote community, and there are some inaccuracies in the picture you paint. In terms of the stores, there are supplies in the stores in remote communities, Tylenol and so on.
That being said, I want to commend the communities--first nations communities, as well as the mayors in most communities--who have gone out of their way to communicate with their residents on H1N1. It takes a lot of work, dialogue, and partnering with communities to get that information out.
I also want to commend the communities that are fundraising to assist people who may not be able to afford to purchase hand soap. As individual citizens we purchase hand soap. Does the health care insurance program provide a bar of soap? That's a question we need to ask.
In terms of providing communities with the medical supplies needed to respond to H1N1, the nursing stations in every community are equipped to respond to H1N1. The question was about this kit. I have no idea what's in the kit. Even in terms of whether what's in the kit is effective, again, we can't respond because we don't know what's in the kit, nor were we consulted when that decision was being made.
Thank you.
The H1N1 virus is a world health threat that is affecting Manitoba first nations disproportionately in comparison to the general public. This is due to poverty, lack of access to home medical supplies, lack of access to health care, the lack of information about H1N1, overcrowded housing, and a lack of access to running water. Overcrowded living conditions are breeding grounds for the rapid spread of an airborne virus.
A second wave of the H1N1 virus is poised to devastate our communities. The Manitoba first nations have completed training on an incident management system to enable us to respond in a coordinated manner to the H1N1 threat and to act as nerve centres for each first nation. They will respond to local emergencies and will prepare for the fall flu season in respect of pandemic planning.
As an educational campaign, we printed and distributed H1N1 posters to 17,000 first nations homes and businesses in Manitoba. On June 24, 2009, under the direction of the AMC executive council, I requested that all Manitoba first nations declare a state of emergency on the H1N1 pandemic. This was done to ensure the safety of all first nations citizens during this upcoming crisis and to hold governments responsible and accountable for taking the necessary measures to fulfill their fiduciary responsibility towards first nations.
There is abundant reason to be concerned about the H1N1 virus threat in Manitoba, where 62% of the first nations population are under the age of 25. We know that the average age of confirmed H1N1 is from 12 to 17, that the average age of death is 22, and that 52% of those hospitalized were under the age of 19. We also know that pregnant women are the highest at risk and are four times more likely to be hospitalized.
In the first wave, we were ill prepared to deal with the impacts of the influenza. Our nursing stations reached surge capacity almost immediately. Thirty-seven first nations communities have health centres that do not provide any primary care. The nearest primary care is, on average, an hour's drive away.
In the last four months we have encountered challenges and obstacles while putting an intervention plan in place. On training, for instance, INAC and FNIHB were non-responsive to requests to train managers to set up the incident command centres until media reported that MKO had gone ahead with the training without any help from the federal government. We are continually stonewalled by tight-fisted financial decisions that ignore crown fiduciary responsibilities for health care. FNIHB, for example, delivered instructions to use health dollars for pandemic operations when they were already earmarked for other essential services.
We are discouraged by how quickly governments stepped up to prop up the hog industry from revenue losses because of the words “swine flu”, and then dragged their feet when we needed help. It takes extensive and necessary discussions and continual interventions at many different government levels to determine precisely who and what agency has the respective jurisdictional responsibility and, in some cases, the simple willingness to act in these important matters. As with all other jurisdictions in Canada and, for that matter, the world, we await the availability of a vaccine, but we are very concerned that the flu virus may well occur before the vaccine is widely available.
As a first line of defence, we have developed a medicine kit against H1N1, which the province and corporate partners are stepping up to pay for. We would like to think that the federal government would support such well-thought-out actions as opposed to raising both explicit and implicit criticisms and barriers. We have come to the conclusion that our best preparations may fall short of what is required, particularly because of our unique situation where many of our communities are remote and very poorly equipped.
We are absolutely amazed that the Government of Canada, even though it has a well-developed plan called “Annex B” for dealing with the unique situation as it relates to first nation communities, has not chosen to implement that plan. That particular lack of action is, in our view, totally unconscionable. My overarching concern in the matter of the H1N1 pandemic is that we are not ultimately addressing the very conditions that make first nations populations high risk.
As an economic factor, it is widely recognized that the maintenance of good health is more affordable over both the short and long term than dealing with chronic illness. Therefore, why is it that first nations continue to face the substandard community realities that have long been identified and well documented? Why are we not dealing with the physical conditions that simply continue to worsen, further increasing the risks of this particular pandemic, not to mention the already-present high risk factors of illnesses such as diabetes and obesity? What better opportunity is there to finally address the pervasive issue of living conditions on first nations communities than by addressing such a serious health issue?
It is entirely clear to me that the cost of dealing with these identified conditions of risk in a proactive manner would be an excellent investment in the present and future health of first nations. This investment would also address once and for all the treaty responsibilities of the Government of Canada with respect to the very unequal living conditions of first nations and ensure equality of access and resources over the long term.
Ekosani. Meegwetch. Masi-cho. Wopida. Thank you. Merci beaucoup.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
To members of the committee, thank you for the privilege of appearing here. I appreciate the vigorous focus on something so important. As has already been articulated here today, we're talking about the lives of people.
Grand Chief, I echo the sentiments; please pass them on to the chief. Our prayers are with the chief and his family.
I want to begin by recognizing, respecting, and supporting the grand chief's comments, in particular as he finished off, with an acknowledgment of the importance of the treaties. They were always about mutual recognition and respect, about living in harmony with one another. This issue, H1N1, is bringing light to, as the grand chief said, the opportunity for us to rethink how it is we view one another and work together.
In support of what the grand chief has said, perhaps I'll add some comments on the part of the Assembly of First Nations.
I very much see it as our role, the role of the office of national chief, to support the chiefs in their efforts and to recognize that they are the ones whose ancestors signed treaties. They're the ones who hold title and rights.
Grand Chief Garrioch, when I travelled up to see you in northern Manitoba, the first thing the chiefs talked about at the meeting you were hosting was H1N1. They were deeply concerned about the health and well-being of their families and their communities.
Really, this is a conversation about how we can bring sharp focus and attention to the health and well-being of our people in our communities and to make sure there is a timely response to the issue of H1N1, which, as we head into the fall, will be increasingly important. This is why I'm appreciative of the committee bringing us all here together.
I had expressed my concerns, reflecting much of what the grand chief has expressed to the minister, and asked that we do meet. I was pleased that we did have a fulsome discussion with the minister this morning. We were talking about a number of issues, principally around the recognition of jurisdiction of first nations to care for their people, much of what the grand chief has described.
We know there are other examples out there, including that of tripartite arrangements, where the various jurisdictions, first nations and other levels of government, have the opportunity to work together to respond to the issues, as opposed to just having unilateral decisions being taken or solutions being brought in.
I think the principal message that I want to share with the committee is the idea of jointly responding to these issues, the idea of joint policy analysis, jointly arriving at the data and the information, particularly as it pertains to recognizing first nations as a priority. I think if there's one strong message that I want to bring forward--this comes from the chiefs I just met with yesterday, and it's shared by chiefs across the country--it's that we firmly feel that while we are addressing issues of the scientific analysis, importantly, we need to look at this through the full lens here of the social indicators of health. That includes first nations issues like the ones I heard being talked about, water and other factors. This is going to require full partnership and recognition of the jurisdiction of first nations, that we have treaties.
We have some examples. In the B.C. tripartite situation, there was joint communication occurring. Perhaps these sorts of examples need to be contemplated as far as how we work together. Clearly the resources need to be there as well for this sort of work to occur.
The joint development of national guidelines is something that I want to table to the committee as being important and needed.
These are all points, by the way, that I also tabled with the minister. I suggested very strongly that first nations jurisdictions need to be recognized. The issue of the high rates of pregnancy, the particular vulnerability that the grand chief alluded to--these are elements that this country, this committee, needs to pay particular attention to. We're talking about the lives of individuals here, and extremely vulnerable people within our society and within our community. There's a need for full collaboration and transparency in this effort.
When I spoke to the grand chiefs when we were meeting, I heard disparities in information. Disparity in information about what is actually happening on the ground is not helpful. It raises fear, it raises anxiety, and it puts mistrust between people in the relationship. I believe our people require us to be demonstrating much better leadership than that. I believe we received the commitment from the minister to follow up and work much more closely, and this is something that grand chiefs need to talk further about as to exactly how we would execute that.
Last, the idea we tabled was that we have a national exercise of some kind rather quickly to make sure that we bring focus and attention to this. To conclude, what the grand chiefs said was that while absolutely this is a crisis—it's in front of all of us, and you heard the call for declaring a state of emergency—we need to turn this crisis into an opportunity to talk about what's not working in the system more broadly, to make sure that we talk about the link to the broader social determinants of health, which include water and the need for proper education and educational facilities, and most importantly, the recognition of first nation jurisdiction and of the sacred treaty relationship.
I'm very pleased that Dr. Barker is here today. We've asked the minister to make sure that the H1N1 first nation adviser who has been put in place work very closely with our Assembly of First Nations health adviser, and there has been a commitment to that process as well. So Dr. Barker is here also to offer any thoughts as this conversation ensues.
Thank you once again.
:
I have with me Chief Bart Tannsie, from the Hatchet Lake Denesuline First Nation. I guess I'll be speaking.
I want to say good afternoon to you, Madam Chair and members of the committee. I'm Don Deranger, vice-chief of the Prince Albert Grand Council.
I want to thank you for giving me the invitation to appear before you to address the concerns, preparedness, and response plans for first nations of the Prince Albert Grand Council on the H1N1. I just want to brief you a little bit about who we are.
The Prince Albert Grand Council consists of 12 first nations, representing approximately 35,000 members and 24 communities. The 12 first nations are divided into two and four sectors: the first sector, the one far north, the Athabasca Denesuline sector, the Swampy Cree, the Plains Cree and Dakota nations, and the Woodland Cree.
The Prince Albert Grand Council also occupies four treaty areas, Treaties 5, 6, 8 and 10. The land base of Prince Albert Grand Council area is approximately 100,000 square kilometres. This area is located in the greater part of central and northeastern Saskatchewan. The Prince Albert Grand Council is one of the largest tribal councils in western Canada, and we have isolated communities in our jurisdiction as well.
Since the arrival of the H1N1 flu virus, the Prince Alberta Grand Council and its communities have been busy dealing with the challenges associated with this. We have been quite fortunate thus far as we have had no fatal cases in our PAGC communities. With the flu season upon us and the medical experts predicting the next wave of the H1N1 to be this fall, we at the Prince Albert Grand Council are doing our best to prepare our communities with the best possible pandemic plans; however, to assist our communities and to ensure the plans developed are effective, there are a number of issues we need to reflect to ensure that our communities can sustain themselves during the outbreak of the H1N1. These issues include, one, the lack of additional financial support; two, nurse recruitment and retention; and three, the sustainability of programs and services.
The lack of financial resources. The population in each of the Prince Alberta Grand Council communities increases significantly on an annual basis without being reflected in the administration funds. Population and financial increments are lagging, which puts many of our communities at a disadvantage right from the start.
The meagre annual 3% increase does not even begin to address the health issues and the demands that our communities face each year. The Prince Albert Grand Council is expected to prepare for the H1N1 with these limited funds and carry out the day-to-day administrative programs and services, purchase expensive medical emergency supplies and stockpiles of essentials, retain health professionals, etc. Over the past six years, the Prince Albert Grand Council communities have been preparing, with the assistance of NITHA , the third-level service provider, pandemic plans that would assist communities in being prepared for the H1N1 flu outbreak. In that sense, we are fortunate; however, there is still the underlying fear of running our already financially exhausted budgets to a stage where financial recovery will be a burden long after the H1N1 virus has made its mark.
The federal government needs to acknowledge the fact that this issue is long-standing and needs to be addressed before we can expect our communities to have adequate and effective plans in our communities.
Nursing recruitment and retention. The Prince Albert Grand Council communities continue to struggle with the retention and recruitment of our nurses in our communities. Nurses working in first nations communities are not treated fairly when it comes to financial compensation. Nurses working for the provincial system receive substantial increases and incentives that draw them out of our communities because we cannot compete with the provincial pay scales. The federal government has not recognized the fact that we do not receive any additional resources to compensate nurses working our communities.
The lives of our members will be jeopardized because we will not have the medical professionals in our communities to assist when the H1N1 outbreak arrives in full force. The lack of nurses is a major issue that needs to be addressed because of how it affects how well we are prepared to take care of our people during the outbreak. It is a critical issue that needs to be acknowledged and can no longer be ignored. We need to address this issue before the outbreak is upon us.
An example of the nursing crisis we face in some of our communities is that there are service contracts being set up with emergency medical service providers. They contract nursing personnel from far and wide just to have the coverage in a community for the weekend. Nurses are becoming stressed out and end up going to work for the province because we cannot compete with the provincial nursing pay scale.
The final issue I want to bring forward is the sustainability of programs and services. The expectation that the Prince Albert Grand Council communities must continue to operate, develop, and plan for the H1N1 flu outbreak on the existing budgets and resources is no longer acceptable. Additional resources are needed to be able to sustain the existing programs and services in our communities. The Prince Albert Grand Council has developed its own contingency plan for where areas of critical response may be required and how we will respond to the communities that will experience cases of the H1N1. Due to provisions of additional second levels in nursing, training, education, and prevention, assistance in the development of pandemic plans has been extremely beneficial and rewarding in terms of keeping the spread at a very low rate. Pandemic planning in our communities has been ongoing for the past six years or more and continues to be a priority with the Prince Albert Grand Council.
In all, with the exception of the three areas identified, the Prince Albert Grand Council has taken a very keen interest in making sure that our communities are prepared for the H1N1 flu season. It is hoped that there will be positive response from the federal government to recognize our needs.
On behalf of the 30 first nations and 62,000 citizens of northern Manitoba represented by MKO, I thank you for the opportunity to take part in your expert panel on H1N1 preparedness and response of aboriginal and Inuit communities to the H1N1 virus.
I wish to point out an alarming trend that occurred within our region during the first wave of the current H1N1 pandemic. According to the Public Health Agency of Canada, on July 15 there were 151 first nations laboratory-confirmed cases nationwide, and 139 first nations laboratory-confirmed cases were from Manitoba. According to Manitoba Health, on the same date, 125 first nations laboratory-confirmed cases were from northern Manitoba, or the MKO region. As of August 6, 2009, there were 133 laboratory-confirmed cases from our region of northern Manitoba, and there were two recorded deaths, with one questionable death involving the loss of a child to a pregnant mother who was confirmed with H1N1. The severity of the H1N1 impact in the MKO region is illustrated by known statistics.
The alarming trend in our region is in fact a “cluster”, as defined by the World Health Organization. This cluster should have alerted First Nations and Inuit Health Branch and Public Health Agency of Canada to the severity of our situation, and these organizations should have been prompted to respond according to the mandate of the National Office of Health Emergency Response Teams, whose goal is “to train and certify Health Emergency Response Teams across the country, and to ensure that they are ready to be deployed on a 24-hour basis to assist provincial, territorial or other local authorities”—our emphasis—“in providing emergency medical care during a major disaster.”
We are concerned that our first nations are being left out of the scope of the emergency response protocol of the Public Health Agency of Canada, since there has been no reaction from them to date in the MKO region, other than in the Island Lake region in response to political pressure, despite a similarly high incidence of H1N1 in other communities.
Funding and human resource response levels to date provided by First Nations and Inuit Health on pandemic preparedness have proven wholly inadequate, with unrealistic expectations. Since 2007, MKO has received $375,000 for consultation and training with our first nations in pandemic preparedness. The three tribal councils represented within our organization received a total of $72,000 for pandemic preparedness. Our first nations have received nothing.
When one considers the vast geographic area to be covered in the provision of consultation and, most recently, planning assistance to our first nations, the human resources that can be dedicated under such limited funding regimes leaves the coordination, planning, and implementation of community pandemic response plans and related training out of our grasp. The MKO region covers two-thirds of the province of Manitoba, with 16 of our first nations accessible by air only. In short, the federal government has not prepared to respond to the current pandemic as it concerns our citizens.
It is inconceivable to complete the first-nation-specific community pandemic response plans with no new local funding available and sporadic regional funding for tribal councils and MKO and the unrealistic timeframe of two months, as First Nations and Inuit Health publicly stated on May 29, 2009. In comparison, the Burntwood Regional Health Authority, funded by the Province of Manitoba, received in excess of $60 million per annum and continues to develop its pandemic plan.
To further highlight First Nations and Inuit Health's lack of preparation, the Manitoba regional director general issued a letter on June 17, 2009, advising first nations that an arrangement may be negotiated to divert program resources, as an interim measure, to address influenza outbreaks. This is ridiculous, as it asks first nations to defer desperately needed programs to support presently unfunded pandemic planning. There is no long-term strategy at this time. MKO had to divert its funding from the aboriginal health transitions fund adaptation envelope to help communities respond, through education, awareness, planning support, research, media analysis, and policy development.
MKO employees have met with the regional health authorities—the Burntwood, Nor-Man, and Parkland authorities—to determine their response to first nations' pandemic planning and preparedness needs. To date, only the Churchill Regional Health Authority has produced and shared a pandemic response plan with MKO. Others have done internal planning, but generally have not involved first nations directly, except when political pressure is applied. MKO trained incident managers from each of our 30 first nations on June 22 to June 25.
There are no first nations community pandemic plans that have been tested. Only two first nations out of the 30 have completed their community pandemic plans.
Several of the incident managers who were trained have quit functioning due to the complexity and magnitude of the tasks involved, with all of them citing the fact that the role of incident manager is a voluntary position, as funding is not available for it from existing programs and services.
A dedicated human resource response is required, where all of the agencies involved collaborate with first nations on a community-by-community basis. This, together with a long-term funding commitment for local health emergency planning and preparedness, is needed immediately to ensure that pandemic plans are not only completed but are also thorough and comprehensive. Right now, communities are overwhelmed and don't have the support they need to at least feel prepared.
MKO has submitted a modest proposal to the Minister of Health, geared to the planning and preparation for health emergencies. Separate contingency funds should exist to be released to cover the implementation costs of actually responding to health emergencies. The proposal to the Minister of Health is only for the immediate needs to combat H1N1, apart from the long-term needs for adequate housing, safe drinking water, and access to quality health programs and services.
This expected funding will allow first nations to develop comprehensive community pandemic and health emergency plans. MKO and the tribal councils will be able to assist community pandemic planning coordinators with research and policy analysis, as well as education and awareness, in developing their plans and preparing their communities for implementation. MKO will also have the capacity to create regional plans and conduct policy research and analysis on regional, provincial, and national levels. We maintain at MKO that health is a treaty right.
Clearly, a new and more in-depth approach is required, one that brings together all levels of government in full partnership with first nations governments to ensure that the health and well-being of our citizens is maintained and enhanced through proper planning and investment in the determinants of health, and readiness to respond to any and all threats to the lives of first nations people.
MKO, on behalf of the 30 first nations and the 62,000 citizens we represent, is requesting that the Standing Committee on Health use its influence in Parliament to ensure that first nations receive adequate funding, necessary supplies, and essential services that should be available during an international crisis of this magnitude. Given our social and health conditions, MKO first nations require the necessary resources to adequately prepare and respond to this immediate threat, as well as future threats.
Thank you.
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[
Witness speaks in Inuktitut]
Good afternoon. I wish to thank the Standing Committee on Health for the opportunity to speak today representing Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and the Canadian Inuit on the issues of H1N1 and its impact on us.
I am an Inuk public health nurse currently working as director of health services in Nunatsiavut, northern Labrador, and the current chair. I speak from a place of knowing.
Inuit Nunangat, our Arctic homeland, comprises 40% of Canada's land mass and 50% of its coastal shoreline. We number only 50,000 people living in 53 remote and isolated communities across the north. Most of our communities have no roads or hospitals, doctors or pharmacies. We live with significant issues of overcrowding, which creates an environment for disease spread and challenges the ability to reduce the risk to others. We have very poor general health and a much lower life expectancy than other Canadians.
We have a huge generational divide, with 35% of our population under the age of 15, compared with 18% for non-aboriginal Canadians. Young people and pregnant women, two of the high-risk groups identified for the current circulating H1N1 virus, are highly represented among Inuit. For the pregnant Inuit women, the risks are increased by having to travel in their last few weeks before delivery away from family and familiar health care providers to larger centres where they may be in communal accommodations.
Inuit fear H1N1, a fear generated not by media attention but rather by the very real history of the impacts of previous pandemics on Inuit. In Okak, northern Labrador, where I live, the Spanish flu wiped out nearly the whole community in a matter of days. Inuit are aware as well of their vulnerabilities created by geography, weather, and co-morbidities. Not for us the comfort of knowing that access to health care is nearby. As wonderful as the nurses are in the clinics in our communities, should we fall ill and our condition worsen, there must be a plane to the next level of care, and that is totally dependent on the weather.
The Canadian pandemic plan does not specifically address the unique issues pertinent to pandemic planning in Inuit regions as it does for first nations on reserve. In fact, it does not give the attention warranted to remote and isolated communities in Canada where guidelines created do not fit and use a language that is full of false assumptions and hints of colonial bureaucracy. In June the board of directors of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami met in Nain, Labrador, and passed a resolution calling for an Inuit-specific appendix to the Canadian pandemic plan. They consider that given the high risks for contracting H1N1 and other viruses, having a pan-Inuit strategy would be an important step in the prevention and management of current and future pandemics.
The challenges for planning for Inuit are further complicated by jurisdictional issues, with land claims in two territories and two provinces and the lack of clarity around the role of Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada. The relationships between federal, territorial, and provincial governments reflect the changing nature of politics and require a more concentrated focus on the people they serve. We have heard back from Dr. Butler-Jones a willingness to begin discussions of such a plan, and we are aware that this will not be until the pandemic is over.
In the interim, we are working on a trilateral work plan for H1N1. The plan must be written by us and not for us. Inuit must be engaged so that what is written is culturally relevant, and we can take our realities and include what we have learned from our journey with H1N1 and our pandemic planning efforts to date and create a meaningful document that can guide us in the future to the level of preparedness that we deserve.
Our human health resources are a great concern. We have communities where there is only one nurse, and his or her priority will have to be the provision of primary care. The logistics are daunting. With both staff and supplies having to be flown in, and the vaccine itself protected against the extreme temperatures that we face in the Arctic, by the time this vaccine is ready, we cannot be efficient. Immunizing a community of 250, given our resources, could take several days once you factor in the flight schedule and the weather.
Consideration must be given to support access to the vaccine for Canadian Inuit. We cannot change the social determinants in our immediate future. Right now, vaccine is our only defence against spread. We have no capacity for alternate care sites and will have to use home isolation.
I'd like, first of all, to thank you for inviting me to attend this meeting on this important topic.
I'm going to say three things. One is that I want to be clear what my role is here. That's the first thing I want to briefly talk about. Second, I want to talk--very high level--about what we've learned in Manitoba from the first wave of the pandemic. And third, I'll talk about what I think are the key things going forward.
First of all, just so it's clear, I'm the chief public health officer of Manitoba. I'm here to speak to this very specific question that's on the agenda. I'll do that on my own behalf, as the provincial public health officer. I'm not here speaking on behalf of my deputy minister, minister, or government. And I'll do the best I can to speak truthfully and clearly with facts and opinions, as I'm asked.
Regarding our experience in the first wave, it looks as if it's probably mostly over with in Manitoba. The first point is that overall the pandemic was not as bad as some people feared it would be; however, some groups in Manitoba were more severely affected than others, not the least of which were our first nations people and other aboriginal people. I could give a lot of statistics and numbers, but I won't do that. I think those are pretty much known.
It's important to point out that from our analysis so far, even when accounting for many other of the known risk factors, it still appears that being a first nations person or an aboriginal person is a marker of risk for severe disease. Of course there are lots of reasons for why that's true, and I'd be happy to entertain that discussion if there are questions and if there's time.
Moving on to the third part, is the next wave going to be worse? Many experts think it may be. We have to plan for that possibility as well as for other possibilities. In Manitoba there are three issues we need to be aware of and plan for. The first is to prioritize aboriginal people for early use of the vaccine when it's available--presuming it's effective and safe--as well as early use of antivirals and early treatment for people, simply because we know they're at high risk by being aboriginal, regardless of what all those reasons might be.
The second is that we need to strengthen and improve our public health and primary programs and services for aboriginal people, wherever they live in Manitoba. They need better coordination and they need better integration. And that work needs to continue and improve more quickly than it has, through collaboration of aboriginal people, federal government agencies and organizations, and the provincial health department and its regional health authorities.
The last point, but not the least important, is that although we're battling influenza in this conversation, the long-term effective strategies and actions for public health to address the public health issues and health outcomes for aboriginal people require addressing the underlying social determinants and many other long-standing reasons for the poorer health outcomes that we've observed in people of aboriginal descent, not only from infectious diseases but for practically any health outcome that we measure.
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We also developed an emergency preparedness guide. There's a section in here on the pandemic. We talk about what we do before an emergency, during an emergency, and after an emergency. This was delivered to every house in our community as well.
We also purchased this book, Do I Need to See a Doctor?. We didn't develop this, but we felt it was an awesome resource. It's really easy to understand. It's illustrated well. We felt our community could really understand this information.
We also developed a flu kit, an emergency response kit, and this went to all the people in our community who were at most risk. So 40 to 45 people got this, and here's a list of what's in this kit. We dragged this all over Ottawa today, wondering, should we bring this kit, should we not? We don't know. We're asking people, calling, what do we do? We took the scissors out, we put them back in. We took the canned stuff out, put it back in. Anyway, here's the flu kit, and here's the list of what's in it. We tell people, “Here's your list. Keep it and replenish it if you take anything out, and then put in what else you think is necessary.” It's available to take a look at later.
We did a couple of other things. We have an outreach team in our community, promotion, prevention workers. We're not just a health centre, we're a wellness centre. We have health and social services in our community. What we've done is asked our prevention and promotion workers to be part of our team, and they give the message on H1N1 as well. They all have scripted messages. When they call people to invite them out to their activities, they say, “Although we'd really like to have you out to our activity, in light of flu season, we ask that if you're not feeling well, could you please stay at home.” We do all these little extra things. It's not just the clinical area working on pandemic planning and preparation; it's a whole team effort, a whole community effort.
What I wanted to say before I'm finished is that--and I know we're wrapping up--I've noticed something in Canada. This is just my personal observation coming into your community and your area, but I walked through two checkpoints, two stations, and was never screened once for H1N1. There were no handwashing facilities. I think it's really important, if you're really serious about giving the message, that you have to do it all the time.
:
Good afternoon, Madam Chair and members of the Standing Committee on Health. I want to thank the committee for your kind invitation to present to the government on the status of preparedness of Island Lake communities on the matter of an anticipated H1N1 pandemic for this coming fall season.
The population exceeds 10,000 residents, comprised of first nation, Métis, and non-aboriginal peoples. The communities are located approximately 600 kilometres northeast of Winnipeg. The communities are remote, accessible by air transportation year-round, except for six to seven weeks within the winter road season during January and February, weather permitting.
All four communities have the limited community infrastructure in place ordinarily granted by society. Most of our homes lack water and sewer facilities. Hauling drinking water in containers is not an uncommon occurrence in our communities. But when you do not have the proper infrastructure, what is the alternative? The alternative for the lack of sewage facilities is to construct makeshift sewage disposal units in very close proximity to the actual living quarters. For the purposes of clarity, I am talking about outhouses.
Our people live in crowded conditions. It is not surprising to find two or three or four family units in one house. The quality of housing, coupled with the wear and tear of overcrowded housing units, has rendered housing conditions deplorable. The present housing backlog will quadruple every two years. Managing the present housing shortage is just abysmal.
The reality is that we are losing our battle, to the point where we cannot provide adequate and decent shelter for our people. Shelter needs for the first peoples are reaching beyond the crisis state. The housing crisis will be further accelerated as young people reach adulthood. With the high aboriginal youth population, the fact is that their time is upon us.
Honourable members of the standing committee, the living conditions of our people that I am describing to you are central to the question of preparedness and response to the potential H1N1 pandemic. The prevailing conditions that I have tried to describe are the actual existing conditions. It's in these conditions that we, the people, are expected to respond to and prepare for the H1N1 pandemic that has claimed thousands of lives throughout the world.
I beg your indulgence. Health care is the right accorded to every citizen in Canada. I believe it may be enshrined in the Constitution. The four communities do not have a primary health care centre. Our communities have nursing stations manned by committed nurse practitioners, who work endless hours to provide medical health care services. Our communities have doctor visits. Our communities do not have any form of residential doctor permanently to respond to the 10,000 residents in our community. The wait time to see a doctor is not an issue; our people are just lucky to see a doctor.
The alternative to lack of immediate access to a medical doctor is the continual medical evacuation of our patients. Thirty-five cases were confirmed as H1N1 this past spring. More than 20 people with the virus were taken by medevac to hospital in Winnipeg for treatment.
The cost of medical response to the last pandemic outbreak demonstrated that communities, governments, and other agencies were not prepared for such outbreaks. The cost for additional nurses and doctors and support resources, coupled with high transportation costs, resulted in extraordinary expenditures to respond to the H1N1 outbreak.
It would be wrong for me to state that we are adequately prepared to respond to the H1N1 virus outbreak for this coming fall. The four communities have instituted the Island Lake region pandemic working group to coordinate the regional planning and to secure resources for a pandemic response. Furthermore, each community has organized a local pandemic working group. Each community has designed their incident commanders, who have the responsibility of coordinating intercommunity responses. There is only so much each of these units can accomplish without the required resources to make plans and to execute plans.
During the last outbreak, the Wasagamack First Nation, my community, had to institute response measures in an effort to contain the outbreak. These measures included quarantining family homes and the community at large, limiting intercommunity travel, launching mass communications processes, educating people on H1N1, meeting with the nurse in charge and incident manager on a daily basis, executing pandemic team recommendations, treating people with traditional medicine, and preparedness.
The Island Lake region had 35 confirmed cases of H1N1 in its first outbreak, which is 28% of the confirmed cases in northern Manitoba. The communities are bracing themselves for a higher incidence. The absence of economic well-being and the prevailing social challenges of our community present a formidable undertaking that must be addressed, not merely to respond to a pending outbreak but to plan to develop a long-range response to the present conditions of our communities.
On behalf of Island Lake first nations, we recommend that governments respond with the following: acquiring an assortment of adequate antivirals; engaging and supplying medical staff and resources reflective of the population and some circumstances; supplying assorted and accessible preventive goods, such as antibacterial lotions, etc.; plans for field medical unit and operations; upgraded medical equipment at the nursing stations; and financial resources to respond to the standard acceptable measures for first nations communities' prevention and intervention.
After mentioning the recommendations to address the immediate pending pandemic outbreak, strategy planning is crucial to the ongoing well-being of our people. The H1N1 pandemic outbreak is not our first experience with epidemics. Our history tells us that in comparable tragedies suffered by our nation, we have survived such pandemics in spite of circumstances, intended or otherwise. Our people continue today. In spite of the present danger of H1N1, our people—
:
Thank you, Madam Chair, members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health, and other participants in the panel discussion. I wish to express my appreciation on behalf of the Athabasca Health Authority for this opportunity to share our experience to date in preparing for the next wave of the current pandemic influenza, H1N1.
In a very real sense, the Athabasca Denesuline have been preparing for pandemics at least since the first contact with Europeans. The region of the Athabasca Health Authority, or AHA, is in northernmost Saskatchewan and encompasses approximately 150,000 square kilometres of much larger traditional territory of the Athabasca Denesuline. The total population of the AHA region is 3,500, of which more than 90% are Denesuline and other aboriginal peoples. More than 80% of the population lives on reserve at Fond du Lac and Black Lake first nations, while the remaining residents live in the three provincial communities of Stony Rapids, Uranium City, and Camsell Portage.
The Athabasca Health Authority was created through the independent and unanimous agreement of the members of the first nations and the provincial communities a decade ago in order to create an integrated and interjurisdictional health organization committed to the provision of comprehensive health service to all residents on an equitable basis. There were a number of foundation agreements to which AHA members, the Government of Canada, and the Government of Saskatchewan are parties, and both levels of government continue to provide significant funding to AHA operations. The Athabasca Health Authority's vision and mandate is funded on the principles and understanding that are currently described as “population health”.
In a region primarily populated by aboriginal peoples, we understand very clearly that the colonization; loss of control of territory, resources, and the ability to make a living from the land; dependency; poverty; inadequate infrastructure, housing, and culture; and community and family crises are determinants of health. Our approach to pandemic preparedness begins with the same understanding. We can never really be adequately prepared until we have addressed the determinants of health that make our region and our residents so vulnerable to the disease.
Two documents attached to this presentation contain summaries of the current measures and the determinants of health and health status of the Athabasca region in northern Canada. Copies can be picked up through the office of the MP who represents our constituency.
During the first six years of AHA operations, various emergency preparedness plans have been developed to respond to natural and industrial disease crises, both at the community and, more recently, at the regional level. With the assistance of Health Canada's First Nations and Inuit Health Branch and Saskatchewan Health, community-based pandemic plans have been developed. During the past year, through agreement of the AHA board and the regional leadership, AHA has been developing, in cooperation with local communities, an integrated and comprehensive regional pandemic influenza preparedness plan.
There is now a regional operational plan for preparing and responding to a pandemic influenza outbreak. Again, the attachment to this presentation is part of the presentation and documents that we distributed to our MP. While further development and refinement of the regional plan continues, there's support throughout the region to work within the provisions and protocol of the plan as it continues to evolve.
Discussions, partnerships, and collaborations continue outside the Athabasca region with health and environmental agencies and transportation and various material and service sectors to address a range of issues related to the security of the supplies during a pandemic. While we have made significant progress in planning, our preparedness will be limited by our capacity to implement the regional pandemic plan. Currently our community primary health care--
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I'm not sure where to start. So many pieces were covered. Clearly, as you parse it out, there are the issues or the challenges for many communities, aboriginal communities, remote communities, in terms of their capacity, in terms of issues of housing, sanitation, water, etc. These are long-standing challenges that ultimately are essential to good health and to the resilience of communities.
The other that I think I heard spoken to was how different communities have approached the issues and planning. As an aside, it was quite gratifying for me because I used to be the medical officer in Algoma, and Garden River was one of the reserves that I related to. And I was the chief medical officer in Saskatchewan when we actually set up the conditions with public health medical officers, nurses, and others so that the services on and off reserve were coordinated between the province and the federal government and with the band councils' support. So to actually see some of those things pay off, I think, is very gratifying.
But it does speak to the many challenges, ultimately, and the value of the sharing of experience and expertise across communities. I'll leave Shelagh Jane and Paul to speak to some of the things that they're looking at around that.
In terms of the advice, whether or not it's a structured position, we've often talked about that, but we've also been consulting with national aboriginal groups and others in terms of the most effective way to engage around public health. Representatives of AFN, ITK, and others are involved with us on an ongoing basis in terms of our planning, reviewing our plans, the development of plans, etc. So I think that's important. And whatever best ways we can do that, we're obviously interested.
And then, finally, it is about how we actually apply this, given the diverse country that we are, at the time of the pandemic. I remember a great many years ago working with municipalities, band councils, etc., around emergency planning, around pandemic planning, and it's obvious that in spite of all that work over these years, across the country communities are at very different stages of planning. We might have hoped that we would have another year or two, or three or four, to get those things in place, but obviously we don't. So right now it really is key to focus our attention around addressing those issues that we can in the short term, recognizing that there are many, as members have identified, long-term challenges to be addressed to ultimately get at this in the long term.
But in the short term, access to vaccine, access to antivirals, access to knowledge and information and the kinds of resources that communities can do, I think, is key. I very much appreciate the committee's comments, and certainly those of the witnesses today.
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I can't speak to the financial; that's in another area. I do support families having things in their households, as we've talked about before, and the items that I've talked about before and that Dr. Kettner has spoken to as well.
On the issue of prioritization--or it's really, again, sequencing of the vaccine--clearly, while the final decisions, which are a collective decision across the country, are not finalized yet, isolated and remote communities are going to be at the top of the list in terms of prioritization because of the nature of health care access. And if you are wrong and they do get sick, they're going to have to be flown out, etc.
In addition, antivirals are already pre-positioned in those communities to provide early treatment. So even in advance of a vaccine, that's in place at the nursing stations and others.
Third, those with underlying risk conditions—we recognize diabetes, pregnancy, etc.— are going to be at the top of the list whether they're aboriginal or non-aboriginal. What we have not been able to sort out scientifically is whether a perfectly healthy person of aboriginal descent is at greater risk or substantially greater risk of developing serious disease with H1N1 for no other reason than that they are aboriginal. That we have not been able to sort out. Even if it is a slightly increased risk, the logistical challenge is in reaching that group other than on reserves, etc., which will be obviously high on the list because it will be one in a thousand, and so you're chasing 999 to try to find that one.
But that having been said, regarding the provincial and territorial plans, the local plans to actually roll it out, you will be going into a community and doing a community. You will not be going into a community and asking, “Do you have diabetes or not?” You're going to do the whole community. So again, from a practical standpoint, once the vaccine is available, people will be getting it. In the meantime, there will be antivirals in order to address that.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
First of all, I hope there is general acknowledgement that the testimony we heard this afternoon was extremely worthwhile and brought to light a number of issues facing the different communities.
Dr. Butler-Jones, I understand that, at this stage, we cannot focus primarily on the long term, because there is concern about the fall, which is the short term. However, as we heard, it is clear that general living conditions in these communities have to be looked at. The fact is that the circumstances in which they live weaken the communities, making them more susceptible when pandemics occur, such as the H1N1 flu pandemic.
One of the witnesses told us that it may be because Health Canada is lacking information. I hope that is not the reason why no action has been taken to deal with these issues and make improvements to general living conditions in these communities.
Earlier, Ms. Wasylycias-Leis made reference to the availability of vaccine. That could also be a problem: when they receive the vaccine, will they actually be in a position to administer it? Have you also looked at that and have you taken steps to ensure that they will be able to immunize their population once the vaccine is available to them in the communities?
I also heard the representatives of the Inuit communities say that they do not have clear understanding of the federal government's role with respect to developing a strategy or plan to deal with the H1N1 virus. I am not necessarily asking you to provide clarification now, but at the very least, you should be cognizant of the need to work with these people in order to clarify everyone's role, so that the communities will have an effective plan to deal with the H1N1 virus.
Also, will those plans be tested? I know that Dr Duncan referred to this earlier. That is another interesting point.
As well, how is it that the tool developed by the Garden River First Nation was completed forgotten for four or five years? Is that because it fell between the cracks or because you lost sight of the need to pay close attention to the development of tools for prevention?