:
Good afternoon, colleagues.
This is the tenth meeting of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, on Monday, March 23, 2009. We are continuing our committee's study of key elements of Canadian foreign policy.
Today we will turn our attention to Sri Lanka.
In our first hour, our witnesses are Susan Johnson, director general of international operations for the Canadian Red Cross, and, also from the Canadian Red Cross, Faisal Mahboob, program manager of the Pakistan and Sri Lanka international operation.
Welcome.
From the Association of Sri Lankan Graduates of Canada, we have Yoga Arulnamby, president, and Raj Thavaratnasingham, executive committee member.
Welcome.
I see by the nodding of your head that I didn't mess up the name too much. If I did, I apologize, sir.
Our committee provides time for each witness to make a short opening statement. Then we'll go into the first round of questioning. Each party will have seven minutes for questions and answers.
By way of information for our committee, if it would be all right, we would like to reserve about five or ten minutes for committee business. Our subcommittee has a budget that they've presented, just to bring witnesses to their committee, so we'll want to deal with that.
Welcome, everyone. I will begin by asking Ms. Johnson to make her presentation.
:
Mr. Chair, members of the committee, on behalf of the Canadian Red Cross, I want to thank you for this opportunity to appear before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.
My name is Susan Johnson and I am the Director General of International Operations. With me today is my colleague Faisal Mahboob Program Manager, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
The Canadian Red Cross has been actively working in Sri Lanka for nearly 20 years. Our long-standing experience in this country qualifies us to speak to this issue today. However, before we discuss our operations in Sri Lanka, I would first like to speak to you briefly about the Canadian Red Cross and the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.
The Canadian Red Cross is a volunteer, humanitarian, non-profit organization dedicated to improving the lives of the most vulnerable people in Canada and throughout the world with the assistance and dedicated efforts of over 30,000 volunteers and members and 3,500 employees. The Canadian Red Cross has a unique mandate to play an auxiliary role to all levels of government in Canada. The Canadian Red Cross is part of the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.
[English]
The international Red Cross and Red Crescent movement is an international humanitarian movement with approximately 100 million volunteers worldwide. The movement consists of several distinct organizations that are legally independent from each other but are united within the movement through common basic principles, objectives, emblems, statutes, and governing organizations.
The movement includes the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ICRC, which was founded in 1863. It is a private humanitarian institution with a unique authority under international humanitarian law to protect the life and dignity of the victims of international and internal armed conflicts.
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the federation, was founded in 1919 and coordinates the activities of 186 national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. On an international level, the federation leads and organizes, in close cooperation with its member national societies, relief and assistance operations responding to large-scale emergencies.
The national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies exist in nearly every country in the world. As I already said, there are 186 national societies, and each acts as an auxiliary to the public authorities of its own country.
I will now turn to talk specifically about Sri Lanka. The international Red Cross and Red Crescent movement has long been providing humanitarian assistance in Sri Lanka. The international Red Cross movement places Sri Lanka as one of its top 10 priorities in the world. Since January of this year, the Canadian government has responded to this by contributing $1.75 million to the Red Cross movement for the humanitarian operations in that country.
Given the gravity of the situation, it would be appropriate for the federal government to consider doubling its contribution at this time. The Canadian Red Cross has been deploying Canadians to work with the International Committee of the Red Cross in Sri Lanka since the committee opened its operations there in 1989. As needs to assist the civilian population have become more and more apparent, the International Committee of the Red Cross has conducted its humanitarian activities with the agreement of both parties to the conflict. These humanitarian actions include providing humanitarian assistance to civilians, providing basic health attention in areas of the country outside of the reach of the government, and staffing crossing points to enable civilians to cross between the government-controlled areas and the LTTE-controlled areas, as well as visiting those detained in relation to the conflict.
In 1992 the Canadian Red Cross opened a direct relationship with our sister society, the Sri Lankan Red Cross Society. Our efforts there have been focused on building the capacity of the Sri Lankan Red Cross in responding to community needs and particularly in preparing and responding to disasters. However, nothing could have prepared the Sri Lankan Red Cross for the tsunami that struck the country in December 2004. The destruction was widespread and massive. Three-quarters of the island's coastlines felt the impact. More than 35,000 people lost their lives. Hundreds of thousands were left homeless and with no source of income.
Within days, the Canadian Red Cross, thanks to the generous outpouring of donations from the Canadian public and the Canadian government, was able to mobilize resources and join with national societies from many other countries--the international federation and the International Committee of the Red Cross--to respond to the tremendous needs. In Sri Lanka, the Canadian Red Cross response included the distribution of 300,000 kilograms of relief items. These included 17,000 kitchen sets, 430,000 personal hygiene kits, and water purification sachets that were capable of treating over 15 million litres of water. In the north of the country, the Canadian Red Cross responded to the damage and destruction of several hospitals with immediate medical assistance, training for local doctors and nurses, and equipment for local hospitals.
As the focus shifted from relief and recovery to long-term development, the Canadian Red Cross, working with the Sri Lankan Red Cross, expanded its program in support of vulnerable communities.
To date, 940 permanent houses have been constructed. But we are not only building homes, we are also rebuilding communities. To ensure future resilience, community-based organizations have been established and the members provided with leadership training. With grants administered by these organizations and after consultation with residents, community centres have been built and roads improved. The Canadian Red Cross is also contributing to improving health conditions by supporting the renovation and expansion of ten hospitals across the country. To date, eight hospitals have been fully rehabilitated and two are still under rehabilitation. This includes construction of diagnostic and outpatient facilities, doctors' and nurses' quarters, and installation of vital medical equipment, such as bulk oxygen storage tanks and distribution lines.
The Canadian Red Cross is committed to sustaining a long-term relationship with the Sri Lankan Red Cross. Our current budget is $74 million Canadian for the period of 2005 to 2015.
The Canadian Red Cross is also committed to helping the Sri Lankan Red Cross sustain knowledge and capacity gained from the massive tsunami operations. To date, significant accomplishments include renovating branch and divisional facilities of the national society, developing a strategic plan for 2005-15, and improving financial and information management systems in order to facilitate accountability and transparency of the national society.
Given our presence in the country, we have been very aware of the changing security environment. During the past two years, the Canadian Red Cross, alongside our movement partners, has been pre-positioning emergency stocks and preparing contingency plans for future humanitarian needs. This includes the provision of up to 100 tents and 1,000 tarpaulins. We are in a good position to be able to respond quickly to humanitarian needs.
However, it has become more and more difficult for the Red Cross to sustain the full range of humanitarian action as the conflict has worsened throughout the latter part of 2008 and the early months of 2009. Currently, as I'm sure the members of the committee are aware, approximately 250,000 people are caught up in an area 250 kilometres square that has come under intense fighting.
The International Committee of the Red Cross is the only international aid agency to have remained permanently in Nivani over the past four months and is operating in a highly insecure environment. Staff in the field report that the humanitarian situation is deteriorating by the day.
However, as access allows, the International Committee of the Red Cross continues to work with the Sri Lankan Red Cross to assist those affected by the fighting. This work includes: maintaining a continuous presence at all entry points; following up on detained internally displaced people, such as unaccompanied minors; provision of humanitarian assistance; provision of medical supplies and staffing medical teams; supporting the Ministry of Health team; and evacuation of war-wounded. To date, 2,400 war-wounded have been evacuated.
The sick and wounded continue to arrive at areas such as Puthumatalan, where local people have helped set up a makeshift medical facility in a community centre and school. Medical staff from the Ministry of Health are doing their best to cope with the constant influx of people injured by the fighting, but there are not enough medical supplies to meet the needs.
One of the key services of the international Red Cross movement is the family messaging service. As part of this global network, in Canada the Canadian Red Cross Restoring Family Links program helps people re-establish contact with immediate family members after separation due to war and other humanitarian crises.
In the case of Sri Lanka, we have been receiving requests from persons in Canada looking to locate their families in the Nivani area. Due to the severity of the current situation, the international committee cannot currently provide tracing services for families located in the Nivani area. However, we are providing support to tracing people who are originally from Nivani but who have left the area. To date, in Canada, we have received approximately 150 inquiries. Each person has been inquiring about family members, with 4 to 26 people per inquiry.
As the guardian of international humanitarian law, the International Committee of the Red Cross continues to remind both parties to the conflict of their obligations to comply with international humanitarian law, emphasizing that the law requires all parties to refrain from harming civilians, to allow them to receive aid, and to enable humanitarian organizations to work in safety. As such, recent Canadian government statements calling for the respect of international humanitarian law have been welcomed by the Canadian Red Cross. Also, we appreciate the financial support of the Canadian government for the humanitarian assistance programs of the Canadian Red Cross and the programs of the international Red Cross movement.
As I mentioned at the beginning of my statement, the humanitarian needs are high and continue to grow. Sri Lanka must remain a priority for Canadian humanitarian assistance. It would be appropriate for Canada to make further contributions to the humanitarian response of the international Red Cross movement, which is currently seeking an additional $19 million to continue the operations there.
In addition, full compliance with the provisions of IHL is essential to allow humanitarian organizations the appropriate conditions to provide for basic needs in the face of the growing suffering. In this regard, it would be appropriate for the Government of Canada to reiterate its concern about this issue and to make clear its expectation that IHL will be fully respected.
[Translation]
Mr. Chair, members of the committee, thank you for your attention. I would now be happy to take your questions.
Thank you very much.
:
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it's an honour and privilege for the Association of Sri Lankan Graduates of Canada to be invited for this presentation. I wish to extend our deepest gratitude for this invitation.
The Association of Sri Lankan Graduates of Canada, ASGC, was formed in 1989 as a non-profit organization. It is run by university-educated volunteers of Sri Lankan heritage, and ASGC has no political affiliation. For the past twenty years, ASGC has continued to elevate the educational and professional profiles of our community and successfully help the community to integrate with the Canadian mainstream.
Having observed the recent developments in Sri Lanka, the association--for the first time--decided to get involved in the Sri Lankan crisis as the lives of the entire community here are being affected directly or indirectly by the unfolding human tragedy in Sri Lanka.
In an emergency session the committee passed three resolutions, a copy of which has been attached to this report as addendum A. The resolution, as it pertains to the two warring parties, has the following recommendations: lift the embargo on food, medicine, and other essential items flowing to the affected areas; stop indiscriminate bombing and shelling of civilian areas; cease fighting immediately and work towards a permanent and lasting solution; allow local and international NGOs and other humanitarian workers to provide much needed assistance to the trapped civilians; allow access to the independent media; and allow civilians to move freely to areas of their choice.
In the international arena, Canada has an excellent reputation as an impartial peacekeeper in conflict areas around the world. As the largest Tamil diaspora outside of Sri Lanka have chosen Canada to be their home, it is our sincere wish that our Canadian government will take an active role in resolving the Sri Lankan crisis. Therefore, in the resolution we have requested that Canada play a major leadership role in resolving this crisis.
To improve your understanding of this crisis, I must give you a glimpse of the history. It is documented that in Sri Lanka, in those days known as Ceylon, there were three separate kingdoms--two Sinhalese and one Tamil—before colonial Britain conquered all kingdoms and established one unified rule for administrative purposes. During British rule they brought Indian Tamils to work in the plantations. After giving independence in 1948, the British left the island as a secular state, with English as the administrative language. In 1956 the language of administration was changed to Sinhala only. Since then the various Sinhala majority governments have ruled with policies that discriminated against Tamils in employment, education, and political representation. Each time a Sinhalese party tried to correct some of the mistakes, they ended up unilaterally abrogating the pacts when there was a protest from the opposition Sinhalese party or the Buddhist priests.
The country was proclaimed as a free, sovereign, and independent Republic of Sri Lanka. The name was changed from Ceylon to Sri Lanka in 1972. Under this constitution Buddhism also became the official religion of the state, relegating Hindus, Christians, and Muslims to being second-class citizens. With the new republican constitution, the language is Sinhala only; the state religion is Buddhism; the new name is Sri Lanka; the flag is the lion with a sword, symbolizing the Sinhalese. The government sponsored the colonization of Sinhalese in traditional Tamil areas so that the country could now effectively be known as a Sinhalese land. Government-sponsored armed groups also burned down the largest Tamil library in the Tamil area that had all the priceless Tamil history.
In the 1977 election the Tamil parties fought on one issue—a call for a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka—and won 95% of all seats in the traditional Tamil area. But nothing happened to resolve the issue. Therein lies the birth of Tamil armed struggle and the current situation. Tamil militancy started with many groups; now the only active group left is the LTTE.
Since 1956, thousands of Tamils have had to stand by and watch as their houses were set on fire, their businesses were looted, and their relatives were burned to death. There were three major riots--in 1958, 1977, and 1983--and many minor ones. The Tamils were forced to become refugees in their own land, all because they spoke a different language.
I have added more detail of the history in addendum B.
Since 1980, violence has taken over the island. As the Tamils felt their grievances were not addressed through peaceful means, various Tamil militant groups started guerilla warfare, in many instances with the support of a neighbouring regional power. This guerrilla warfare became armed resistance, funded and supported by this power. Unfortunately, this interference by this regional power continues in different ways even now.
Since 1983, though various governments were elected with a promise of solving the problems, none have come up with a realistic working solution. Both the LTTE and the various governments have to accept joint blame for this status quo. Violence has been committed by both parties, as documented by various organizations, and innocent Tamil people have been at the receiving end of all these brutalities.
While violent acts committed by LTTE often get reported in the post-9/11 era, the violence perpetrated by states is often ignored and justified as an act against terrorism. The Sri Lankan army, even before the LTTE was formed, has used the most violent measures to quell any type of even peaceful Tamil protest, as from 1958 they have considered themselves to be an army of occupation in Tamil areas. In the recent past, in their effort to gobble up territory held by the LTTE, the government forces have shelled populated areas indiscriminately.
To sum up, it is not one party or the other causing this violence, but both of them. The current Sinhala government, in addition to giving a free hand to the army for its ruthless action in the traditional Tamil areas, has also suppressed or manipulated Tamil politicians and curtailed press freedom and freedom of expression and assembly, not to mention barring all types of third-party presence, whether it be non-partisan NGOs, humanitarian personnel, or media-related personnel in the affected Tamil areas. Recently a number of newspaper editors have been arrested or simply shot dead.
The current situation in Sri Lanka begs for the involvement of the international community. Whether the international community agrees or not, it is generally accepted among the majority of Tamils that the only group that is steadfast in defending Tamil rights, notwithstanding the violence, is the LTTE.
There have been other groups from time to time that have been eliminated by the LTTE or coerced or bribed over to the government side. Many Tamils consider the actions by LTTE are justified. They feel that had the LTTE not existed, the Tamil population would have been wiped out or it would have suffered more at the hands of the Sri Lankan armed forces.
I am sure you would agree that violence from all quarters must be condemned, especially if it is coming from an elected government. The Sri Lankan government has taken measures to silence the Tamil-elected politicians who were not toeing the government line--for example, within the past two years two of my former classmates, who were members of Parliament for two different parties, were assassinated for supporting the Tamil cause.
While we talk about the LTTE and the government, we are all ignoring the power and influence the Buddhist priests have exerted on various Sinhalese governments. If you study the history of the pacts that were signed before the violence broke out, you will see they were always abrogated when the Buddhist priests marched, stating the Sinhalese government was giving too much to the Tamils.
The Sri Lankan constitution says the Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddha Sasana. I quote from the recent article from the East-West Centre in the United States:
A fundamental tenet of that nationalist ideology is the belief that Sri Lanka is the island of the Sinhalese, who in turn are ennobled to preserve and propagate Buddhism. The ideology privileges Sinhalese Buddhist super ordination, justifies subjugation of minorities, and suggests that those 5 belonging to other ethno religious communities live in Sri Lanka only due to Sinhalese Buddhist sufferance.
As recently as February, there were four motions brought forward in our Canadian Parliament against a bill tabled in Sri Lanka called the anti-conversion bill.
In view of all of this, in our opinion, as suggested in the resolution, Canada should take a leadership role and use its good offices to pressure both parties to come to a peaceful solution soon. If necessary, we feel that Canada should work towards imposing sanctions and take the matter to the United Nations. Simply put, force them to sit down at the negotiation table and come out with a lasting solution. We don't think there is any better country in the world with the same credibility as Canada to better interfere in the Sri Lankan issue. Thousands of Tamils have braved the weather and have been protesting to gain the attention of Canadians to solve this problem as soon as possible. We think Canada is the only hope left to avoid a disastrous situation unfolding there.
History has shown there can be no long-term military solution to any ethnic conflict in any part of the world. LTTE is not the cause of the problem; LTTE is a by-product of the problem, and that's why the root cause of the problem must be solved. While we cannot say from here what type of solution is acceptable after nearly 61 years of suffering there, we can only voice what our association feels, that any solution arrived at must be acceptable to Tamils, and it should be modelled after what we have in Canada, with provinces adopting their own powers in an evolved form of federalism.
Presently, our main concern is that the fighting ceases and that NGOs, like the friends we have today, and other agencies, including all media, be given free access to all areas. I'm sure we will need the help of all NGOs, because without them, our people would not have survived for so long. When the conditions are favourable in Sri Lanka, NGOs and other international agencies can help in building a prosperous and peaceful Sri Lanka.
In conclusion, we would like to urge our government to do everything within its powers to bring peace to this island, known as the pearl of the Indian Ocean.
Thank you.
:
Yes, it is. Section 9 of the constitution of Sri Lanka explicitly states exactly what the president just read. It's the state's responsibility to protect Buddha Sasana. That's very clearly defined, even now, in the constitution.
I think that's been one of the problems that's not been highlighted. In 1957, 1965, and 1972, when the peace process was going through, every time the politicians realized they had made a mistake and tried to come to a negotiated settlement with the Tamil parties, the opposition party, together with the Buddhist priests, immediately went on a protest, and they had to abrogate the pact. The Prime Minister, Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who brought the Sinhala only act in 1956, actually signed the pact with the Tamil leader at that time, Chelvanayakam. However, when the Buddhist priests came marching up to his house, he actually brought the pact outside and tore it up in front of them. And that was the very first time, in 1957, that the peace process broke down immediately. Certainly, even now, the state actually has to protect the Buddha Sasana first. Of course, there are equal rights given to everybody else, but once you put the onus on the state to protect Buddhism, everybody else takes second place.
In this process, even during this difficult time in February, there was a bill that came to Parliament called the anti-conversion bill. Knowingly or unknowingly, if you try to convert somebody else to another religion--it's mainly against the missionaries who are working in the south--you're going to be fined seven years or $50,000 Sri Lankan rupees. I think it was raised in the Canadian Parliament. I think the high commissioner in Sri Lanka heard that, and somehow it's now been shelved in Sri Lanka. It's gone through three readings already.
Yes, that's one of the problems.
And thank you to both of you for coming.
The way we see it, there are two immediate crises taking place right now. One is the humanitarian crisis that is due to the civilian war, which Canada is very much concerned about, and the question is--through the Red Cross or whatever--how quickly aid is getting through there. Canada has called for a ceasefire to allow humanitarian access. So this is very important at the current time with the conflict going on. That is the immediate concern.
I am going to say to the Red Cross that they are doing a good job. To the Tamil community out here, their concern should not be the political solution at this time, but to make sure that medicine and everything is quickly getting to the people who are suffering from this. That's the key element right now.
I don't have a question. I know the Red Cross is saying they need more money--of course, we always need more money--but I think in cooperation with our allies, we will ensure that you have access, that the World Food Programme has access, and you are cooperating with that. So I want to take this opportunity to congratulate your organization and everybody in it for doing such a marvellous job in this thing.
The second issue--and I want to ask you folks here about it--is that there is no question there needs to be a political solution. Let's forget the past; you've indicated the history. The history there is littered with errors on the part of many, by everybody. Speak about now, at this time here. There is no question that the LTTE has a history as a terrorist organization because of the manner in which it tried to bring about a new state and a voice of the Tamils. We disagree on that because of the methods they used--suicide bombings, killing civilians, and this kind of thing.
The question I have to the Tamil community here, which you rightly pointed out, is how are you going to put pressure for a political solution on the Government of Sri Lanka and the Tamils to come to the table and talk? I think by now the LTTE itself may not have enough capital left to represent the Tamil community. There is an opportunity here for a new breed of leaders coming from the Tamil community to say to the Sri Lankan government, now is the time to come to a peaceful settlement. They would not carry the baggage of the past that the LTTE and others have carried. You are the student association in this thing, the future. I want to see if the Tamil community here are debating among themselves to seize this opportunity and say, we are coming up with a new solution here in this thing. Forget the baggage you pointed out. I want to hear from you whether the Tamil community here has put forward how they would resolve this thing.
You have just stated here that it must be acceptable to Tamils. Look, there are two parties here, the Sri Lankan government and the Sinhalese, along with the Muslims and everybody else. An opportunity has presented itself, and I want to know whether you guys have actually grabbed that opportunity and are thinking along those lines.
I wish to acknowledge that it's a great honour to be invited to address this committee. At the outset I have to make it clear I'm speaking today in my personal capacity as a professor. My comments should in no way be seen as reflecting the policy or views of the various organizations with which I'm affiliated--it's the usual disclaimer--especially as I'm a member of the board of directors of Rights and Democracy and president of the Canadian Friends of Sri Lanka. So I'm just me today.
It may be useful to spend a few moments providing a broad perspective on how we arrived at the current situation. Then I'd like to spend the remainder of the time speculating on constructive ways to address the situation we're in.
I will provide some information on the political and historical context—one of the previous witnesses gave you some background on this, but I have my own take on it. Two specific points from the long history of Sri Lanka might help clarify how we got to be where we are today.
I know there are members present with great knowledge of Sri Lanka. I'd like to provide an interpretation of the political and historical context from a very broad sweep of South Asia's political experience. It may be helpful to summarize two important dimensions in the struggle in Sri Lanka today.
The first is what I call a double minority complex. The small, beautiful island--and some of you have had the pleasure of being there--has only 20 million inhabitants but is divided into numerous communities. As you know, the majority Sinhalese population forms about 74%. It is predominantly, but not exclusively, Buddhist, while the Sri Lankan Tamil population is approximately 12% and predominantly Hindu. There are another 7% who are called Indian Tamils and who were brought in later just to work on the tea plantations.
This division between Buddhist and Hindu, Tamil and Sinhalese, is central to what we understand about the conflict. Both populations have been on the island since antiquity. The Sinhalese population, a majority on the island, strongly centre their identity as a Sinhalese people on Buddhism, and you just heard some of that a moment ago. They perceive themselves as a minority in the broader South Asian region. They are Sinhalese in a Tamil sea, because just across the Palk Strait, the very narrow strait separating Sri Lanka from India, lies the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu. It's now approaching 70 million Tamils. So the Sinhalese population sees that and feels it. On the other hand, the Tamil population of Sri Lanka rightly sees itself as a small minority within the island; therefore, both of these communities can be described as having something of a minority complex. They see the need to defend themselves as communities, and they behave accordingly. I think a lot of that perception of threat can explain the underlying causes of the current situation.
The second dimension of history, which I will draw your attention to briefly, is what I call the delayed anti-colonial struggle. Sri Lanka sailed very calmly to its independence in 1948 without any of the mass anti-colonial movements and the nationalism that we saw associated with, for example, India or other colonial situations around the world.
However, there was turbulence simmering below that calm surface. During the prolonged British era the two major communities, either by British colonial intent of divide and rule or perhaps for convenience, reacted quite differently to British rule. The talented minority community took very quickly to English education and to all the avenues opened up within the colonial apparatus by the presence of the British. This was, of course, resented by the Sinhalese majority.
Years after independence, in 1956, a politician broke away from the ruling party, from the long-governing, what could be called a “gentlemen's” party. That was S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, whose name you heard a few moments ago. He formed his own party and stormed to power under the banner of Buddhist nationalism and Sinhala language superiority.
After that came all of those measures that you've heard a little about. The government imposed numerous measures to favour the majority at the expense of what it saw as an overpowered minority. So it thought it was taking actions redressing a colonial experience.
In keeping with the double minority complex, each of the communities has produced leaders to defend its interests. Today we see the long-term results of this political history—a defensive movement by the Tamil population to overcome discrimination, a movement that has shifted from being a moderate and constitutional one to a violent separatist and terrorist one under the leadership of the LTTE.
On the other side, the Government of Sri Lanka has responded in the name of all communities to preserve the unity of the island. It has responded in ways that have led to criticism, criticism that one finds throughout the world when a government is engaged in asymmetrical warfare.
You are all familiar with the results of the long civil war, the failed peace talks, the numerous deaths leading up to the present military endgame, and the humanitarian catastrophe, which you've already heard about today, particularly from the Red Cross.
The issue before us is what can be done? What role can Canada play, if any, in the current political and humanitarian situation?
Everyone agrees there should be a ceasefire, immediate humanitarian relief for the affected civilian population, and a return by the belligerents to the bargaining table. The goal is to hammer out an equitable, binding political solution based on some sort of power-sharing formula. However, there are severe obstacles to achieving this global consensus. They centre broadly around that double minority complex I've referred to—that mutual sense of discrimination of the major communities—and they centre more narrowly and specifically around personalities, tactics, and interests within Sri Lanka and abroad.
Because our time is short, I would like to move directly to some assumptions, and then to some suggestions for the near-term and the long-term future of Sri Lanka.
The short-term assumptions are these.
First, a military solution, with a territorial dimension attached, may soon succeed. This is just a fancy way of saying that the endgame may be approaching in regard to the territorial holding of power by the Tigers. If the Tigers are removed from their last enclave, there will likely be some repercussions and opportunities.
We know that the humanitarian situation may become worse in the immediate future, but then again, after that, it may improve. Members are familiar with the stories of Tamil Tigers forcing civilian populations to retreat with them, as they yield territory, and then constraining them from fleeing to safety. The government forces are accused of shelling civilians, even in the safe zones provided for them.
In the near term, a humanitarian ceasefire or military victory will offer opportunities for immediate short-term humanitarian relief. Canada and other states have already pledged to be in position to assist when this happens. This will be gratifying if it happens, but it should not be seen as the end of the story.
The second assumption is this. Seizing the final LTTE territorial enclave will not end violence in Sri Lanka. The Tamil Tigers are among the most resilient and resourceful terrorist organizations on earth. Among other things, they invented suicide bombings—and IEDs have become an export product, unfortunately; they badly bloodied a substantial Indian military force; and they fought the Government of Sri Lanka to a standstill repeatedly, at least up until the LTTE split in 2004. Reportedly they are much better organized among diaspora populations abroad than any other similar organization. The likelihood is that Sri Lanka will see a return to asymmetrical warfare, with deadly results.
The third assumption is this. A political solution is unlikely under the charismatic LTTE leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran. The highly respected International Crisis Group recently noted that, “The Tiger leadership, which has become as much a cult as a rational guerrilla force, will be highly averse to surrender.” Regrettably there's never been any tangible evidence that the leadership will accept anything short of total independence. It appears that only the departure of the charismatic Mr. Prabhakaran from operational control of the Tigers would change that situation.
Finally, the fourth assumption is that it is essential for policy purposes to make a clear demarcation between support for the Tamil people and support for the organization that purports to speak for them. The tendency to blur that distinction, perhaps deliberately encouraged, is a hindrance to effective policy clarity.
Moving from these assumptions, the following recommendations seem worth tabling for the members' consideration. They range from the most immediate to longer-term considerations. They deal with humanitarian, political, and developmental approaches. As well, these suggestions are offered keeping in mind that today's focus on Sri Lanka is part of a broader review by this committee of the conduct of Canadian foreign relations.
:
I'm sorry. I thought I had it timed better, but again, I was cautioned to speak slowly for the translators. I was doing so. I'll speed up.
My apologies to the translators and to the members.
The first suggestion is humanitarian. This has already been touched on by the member. It is support for the Government of Sri Lanka at the IMF, but conditionally, in that I have a different set of conditions than those just mentioned. Canada does have the means now to apply leverage from the government on Sri Lanka for the humanitarian ceasefire. This aid to the government is needed imminently. This can be both the carrot and the stick.
As I've suggested, support could be accompanied by efforts to support the Tamil people, demarcating it from the support for the Tamil Tigers. I think this is an opportunity for Canada. Much of the package that's been requested is for reconstruction assistance in the north. We can do so demonstrably on the grounds that funds are for neither party in the dispute, but for the Tamil population. It would complement the special $3 million aid package and the earlier tsunami package already committed to by Canada.
At this point, I would conclude on this. Sri Lanka can be a case study of the healing role of humanitarian support in transitional or post-conflict situations.
The second recommendation is on the political side. Canadian regional and multilateral support is needed for transitional politics. Do we have plans for long-term political transformation in Sri Lanka after the humanitarian crisis? Clearly, the longer-term solution resonates from our prior engagement, with which one member has been very prominently engaged, for power-sharing and accommodation. But we can't achieve those conditions for implementation alone. It's going to take the global community working together on various aspects to create the conditions by which an international effort can lead to a role for accommodation and power sharing. I think Canada perhaps can play a leadership role in an international effort.
Finally, on the development side, I'm suggesting that equitable redevelopment may be possible here. That would conceive of this as an all-of-government program approach, an alternative approach to what we're currently undertaking. Generally speaking, we can use Sri Lanka as an example of an alternative approach, a program approach, because there are unresolved conflicts and questions of equality and dignity in Sri Lanka.
If we wish to become a significant force in situations of post-conflict transitions, we have an opportunity before us. We need an integrated package in order to respond appropriately. There's a saying right now that we should not “waste a crisis”. States such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan offer Canada opportunities to evolve effective packages as a player in the evolving global environment. This crisis is an opportunity to conceive and implement a Sri Lankan program.
:
Thank you very much, Chair.
I'll keep my comments brief. I see my role here as one of responding to questions and queries from the committee.
My relationship with Sri Lanka is now, I'm embarrassed to say, almost 29 years long. I first went to Sri Lanka in 1980. Much has happened since then.
Currently, I'm a professor of peace and conflict studies at Saint Paul's University. Over the last 15 years I've gone back and forth to Sri Lanka, and in the last five years, probably three or four times a year. I go back to undertake a variety of different types of policy-focused research. I work with different international development organizations, as well as bilateral organizations.
I will keep it short.
It is not worth our while for me to repeat some of the excellent reporting that has been done on Sri Lanka. So I will refer you to a number of reports that I've been reading over the last six months. The first is the Human Rights Watch report, War on the Displaced, which is very detailed and empirical, and generates, I think, a very useful set of recommendations worth our attention.
The second two documents that I think are worth reading, if you haven't already done so, are from the Human Rights Council, first, the report of the special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment. That was published in February 2008. The Human Rights Watch report was published very recently, in February 2009. And the second, and the last, official document I'll refer you to is the report of the representative of the secretary-general on the human rights of internally displaced persons.
I think empirically, and having sat through the presentations by the Red Cross, you should have a fairly clear idea of where the situation is right now on the ground. It's very fluid.
My starting point is to sketch out a little bit of the context, as I see it right now, in terms of Canada and other international actors trying to effect positive change on the ground for the protections of civilians and the protection and promotion of human rights.
First of all, I have to say that over the span of the last 29 years, I haven't seen the situation in Sri Lanka quite as dismal as it is today, in terms of the levels of disappearances, systematic human rights abuses, and a regime that has rabid antipathies towards the international community. We're seeing international organizations' development workers thrown out of the country, we're seeing international NGOs accused unfairly of having LTTE sympathies, we're seeing the killing of NGO workers on the ground, and certainly we're seeing the blocking of access by the media and humanitarian assistance to areas in the north and the east.
One of the very important contextual factors we have to keep in mind as we think through what the various roles Canada might play in Sri Lanka is something that I started seeing develop in Sri Lanka over the last two years, which is that ODA does not have the political leverage it used to have. It used to be that overseas development assistance could be used conditionally to effect the incentives and disincentives of decision-makers in Sri Lanka, and we saw that in their change of Sri Lankan policy in 1990.
Here, however, what we see is a regime that doesn't care about overseas development assistance, or puts a lower priority on it because it sees the much larger quantity of resources coming into the country through remittances. It also sees investments coming from East Asia, to the point where overseas development assistance no longer has the leverage it once had.
I think the suggestion by Professor Tepper that there is a need to demarcate development aid to ensure it goes directly to the Tamil people is a very good one. In fact, all development assistance that goes to Sri Lanka should be assessed on whether or not it contributes to bringing communities together or pushing them apart.
We all had stories 25 years ago about the way a project might affect the environment or gender relations. Today, we have various stories of the way overseas development assistance, tsunami assistance, contributed directly to the war-fighting capacities on either side, but we don't have the means, or we're just developing the means, to evaluate our development assistance through a peace- and conflict-sensitive lens. So one of the most important possibilities that opens itself up is to look not just at the overtly political role Canada might play in Sri Lanka, but to look at the ways in which our humanitarian and development assistance could help to bring communities together. I have many examples from Sri Lanka, on the ground, that might illustrate that point, but I do want to stop there and open the floor to questions.
:
Thank you very much for your analysis. For all practical purposes, the background I have fits in with what you've been saying.
In terms of what you've been saying, then, what you've said, all these things fit. The challenges are great, are too much, are very strong. But I'll allude to one point: the international community, everybody, is tired of this constant warring. I would not hesitate to say that even India is tired of the constant eruption of humanitarian crises and so on.
We in Canada have a strong Tamil community or diaspora. I think it's the largest outside of Sri Lanka and India. With regard to the role of the diaspora, going back to my last question, there are new people, new players. I think the LTTE is probably on its way. It carries too much baggage or something like that. I do not dispute what the last speaker said, that he felt it is gone, and if the political situation is not resolved, somebody will replace it.
It is critically important that we resolve the political issue. If it's left festering, somebody else will come in and replace this, and it'll carry on and on. This young, dynamic community outside of Sri Lanka has a very strong, key role to play. Many of them have alluded to putting in the Canadian federation system there, or whatever; you alluded to it.
I agree that the current Sri Lankan government is a hard-stand government, no question, as compared with the previous one. Whatever reasons they have for being that way, it doesn't change the fact that it's time now for the international community to put pressure, whether through ODA or not. But collectively speaking, we have to use the diaspora. We have to use it but we have to come up with a solution, a new kind of solution. The time is right now. I believe the time is right; you alluded to that a bit.
This is the question I have for your academic circle, and it's the same thing I asked the Tamil community: has debate started within the community around the goalposts now, around the LTTE almost being gone, around the hard-line government, around where we go from here?
:
The member knows that I've done some studies--it's some years ago now--on the role of diaspora in Canada. The question of how to transform all of our peoples of the world into an asset for Canada is a broader question. When it comes to conflict, however, Ken Bush has alluded to the fact that diasporas often play a negative role. They tend to be, as I think the phrase goes, more royal than the Queen. They tend to have outdated images of the homeland. Youths abroad looking for a focus are endlessly recruitable, as they come of age, to causes of their people, even though they're now third generation away. So I believe there may be a role, but “sensitive” is only the beginning of how you would approach that role.
I will give you some anecdotes, because that's all we have. When I was in Jaffna, I made a point of interviewing. This was during the time when the government had an interregnum. They had a hold on it, with known Tigers roaming the streets. I was told there, as well as by people here very recently, when we had an Amnesty International meeting on Sri Lanka, by Tamils, and I was told the same story almost a decade apart, there and here, “You give us a package. You give us what we're asking for. You give us the powers we need. We will get rid of the Tigers.” I heard that where, as I say, it was dangerous to be hearing it, and from a newspaper editor in Jaffna, and recently here in the streets, and in a boardroom in Ottawa.
Again, I'll just emphasize that whatever the diaspora here may be feeling, I think the peoples of Sri Lanka are thoroughly sick and tired of this war, just as you've alluded. The rest of us would like it behind us.
In terms of this equitable redevelopment program, if Canada can play a role, saying to the parties involved...and there are multiple parties involved; we didn't even talk about the Moors and the Burghers. If we can say to them, “Canada does have a way, and we are willing to help”, and then we find a way to do that helping, maybe among this diaspora we'll have an equivalent of a Peace Corps, a development corps. Who knows what the future could bring if we could go from a negative cycle to a positive cycle?
That's where we are right now, and that's the opportunity and challenge.