AFGH Committee Report

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON ANA/ANP TRAINING FROM CONSERVATIVE PARTY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CANADA’S MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

The Special Committee on Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan (SCOCMIA) has produced a succinct and observant report on the training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).   The report notes accurately that Canadian Afghan National Army (ANA) training efforts in Kandahar have “shown promising progress” and that the ANA could be capable of autonomous operations by 2011.^[1]  The significance of ANA progress cannot be overstated and should be celebrated as a major Canadian and Allied achievement. 

However, we note that the report does not take into account important information and testimony regarding: 1) Security benchmarks; 2) Significant nuance and information on the ANSF from Brigadier-Generals Alan Howard and Denis William Thompson and RCMP officers Deputy Commissioner Raf Souccar and Superintendent Paul Young; and 3) The reporting mechanism and quarterly report process of the Government, which is readily acknowledged as the most comprehensive in NATO/ISAF.   We feel with this information the report would have better reflected the testimony we heard and the reality on-the-ground.

On points 1 and 3, the report at several points seems overly critical of not having more information to assess current benchmarks and also the timing of the reports.  We feel these criticisms are largely unfair.  Canada, as noted in recent testimony by Minister Stockwell Day, has the most aggressive and comprehensive reporting structure in NATO/ISAF.  In fact, countries such as the United States are examining and moving towards our usage of benchmarks and progress indicators in Afghanistan.  The committee is of course always free to request more comprehensive explanations provided operational and national security is respected. 

The issue of timing and verbal briefings in the Report’s Recommendation 1 is also highly suspect.  The most recent quarterly report was produced in approximately 9 weeks (March 31, 2009 to June 3, 2009) from receiving the information, assessing it, and writing the document.^[2]  One can hardly describe this process and/or information as “dated” as the report does,^[3] considering the in-depth analysis and process in place.  In fact, one would be hard-pressed in any organization to provide information from start to finish that quickly and to publicly comment on this information before it has gone through this process would be imprudent in the least.

As we mention, the report fails to mention significant portions of testimony, specifically and most importantly from Brigadier-Generals Alan Howard and Denis William Thompson.  For instance, BGen Thompson spoke extensively regarding ANA benchmarks.  The report’s commentary on lack of information regarding fluctuations in ANA Kandak and headquarters’ effectiveness (see commentary on Benchmark 1) does not address the reasonable and plausible explanations of BGen Thompson, who stated, ”The important thing to take away here is that as with any army, it's not a linear path … There is a plan in place that has 2011 as a target, at least in Kandahar province, and we will get there, but it won't be along a linear path; it will be a sinusoidal curve that grows from this point in time to that point in time.”^[4]  In fact, BGen Thompson’s testimony can probably help explain other benchmark criticisms in the report, but the report simply fails to even acknowledge, let alone engage, Brigadier-Generals Thompson’s or Howard’s testimony.    

We also believe that while the analysis of ANP training was largely correct, once again the report could have more thoroughly engaged expert testimony from Deputy Commissioner Raf Souccar and Superintendent Paul Young on recent advances in ANP training.^[5]   The report does acknowledge the expansion of the police training centre and police trainers.  However, the report does not readily connect the significance of Canadian actions to correct previous inadequacies in the ISAF approach to ANP training.  The report was also unable to examine the very recent announcement by Minister Cannon (June 12, 2009) that Canada will be increasing its contribution to ANP salaries by an additional $12 million.^[6]  These additional funds will aid the recruitment, retention, and training of an additional 1,000 Afghan National Police specifically in the Kandahar region.  This is a significant announcement which should aid in furthering Canada’s commitment to ANP training.  We understand that because of timing issues it was too late to include an analysis of this announcement in the report but we feel it is important to relay the information in some fashion.    

Overall, we appreciate the report’s attention to these important matters.  ANSF progress is one of the most significant Allied actions and work in Afghanistan.  Coupled with diplomatic and governance efforts, effective security will allow Afghans to take control of their destiny.  We thank the committee for its multi-partisan efforts and look forward to working together to better inform Canadians about our mission in Afghanistan on all fronts.