NDDN Committee Report

The Canadian Forces have suffered from a “decade of darkness,” seeing their operational, personnel, and institutional infrastructures erode to a level unseen in our history. This steady erosion of capabilities was largely attributable to expenditure cuts from previous governments, due to both fiscal constraints and lack of policy prioritization. Indeed, a study from a recent Queen’s University Report stated that without urgent action the Canadian Forces would cease to exist as a credible security force. ecurity force.^{[ 1]}  

This untenable situation was inherited by the current

This untenable situation was inherited by the current Government of Canada when it took office in February, 2006. It was certainly not of their choosing, but urgent action was and is still needed if we are to avoid the catastrophic scenarios envisaged from past inactions. The report stresses three general principles in any possible reform of the procurement process—transparency, fairness, and efficiency. These three essential elements of the procurement process form the basis of the recommendations and are accepted by all parties. However, our disagreements come from how these three principles are weighted and evaluated given the context of specific procurement needs and time constraints.

However, we feel the report inadequately examines the most serious problems facing defence procurement today—namely the efficient and timely acquisition of new equipment. There are several ways to address these time sensitive procurement issues—such as a greater reliance on sole source contracting and ACANS (advance contract award notices), buying proven “off-the-shelf” equipment, lessening the average procurement wait times in the competitive bidding processes through minor reform measures, and large scale structural—bureaucratic reform.

The Government has wisely relied on the first two means for some equipment, namely the acquisition of strategic lift (C-17s) and also new Leopard II tanks for our troops in Afghanistan. We applaud the Government on these efforts.

However, the procurement process today is unacceptably long. The Senate interim report of 2005 noted that the average wait time for new equipment in Canada from the identification stage to the acquisition stage is over 15 years.^[2] Long procurement wait times lock Canadian Forces into a constant game of technological “catch-up,” as equipment can become outdated before it is even deployed. Therefore, we recommend that the Government of Canada endeavour to substantially cut average defence procurement wait times for new equipment from their current levels.

The report recommended some ways to do this, namely in recommendation 6. The question of bureaucratic restructuring—from a tri-departmental procurement process currently to a single departmental process—is an important debate. However, we feel the committee has not heard enough evidence to make a truly informed recommendation in this direction. While we appreciate the rationale and goals contained in such a recommendation, we cannot support a system that without proper scrutiny could become a cure that is worse than the disease it seeks to remedy.

We are however concerned about recommendations 3 and 5.

Recommendation 3 asks the Government of Canada to release and make public the Canada First Defence Plan by the end of the fiscal year. While we earnestly look forward to its release, we cannot rush the process of a reevaluation of Canadian defence strategy. Recent years have witnessed dramatic changes in the international security environment, including the increase of [t]errorist organizations …with members linked through technology and loosely linked groups or cells; ^[3] the illicit possession and spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their delivery systems;^[4] and the implementation of the responsibility to protect doctrine for oppressed people(s). These are just some of the international concerns that a new Canada First Defence Plan will have to address, along with salient domestic issues, such as NORAD, northern sovereignty, and domestic force structure and distribution. Many people spend years studying such questions—a relatively new Government can and should be given the needed time to effectively tackle these questions.

Recommendation 5 would seek a new role for the committee in terms of examining major defence procurement projects over $100 million. The committee specifically envisions a role “before rather than after” procurement projects have been announced. Quite simply this recommendation does not work with our present system of Government—which is based upon cabinet confidentiality, parliamentary privilege, and blind contract bidding in the case of procurement processes. We are also concerned that this recommendation would add another layer of bureaucracy to the procurement process—lengthening a process we should be trying to shorten.

In addition, the committee has many powers that it has not chosen to use that could satisfy its request for more involvement in the process. For instance, the committee could ask when the contract is first tendered for departmental briefings on the policy rationale of the contract, and a similar process could be engaged in when the contract has been awarded. Such a system would be in keeping with our parliamentary system and historical committee roles. To date, the committee has not substantially used the powers it currently has. We are not convinced that additional powers (whose congruency with our parliamentary system is suspect at best) would aid in the efficiency, accountability, and transparency of the procurement system—especially when the committee has not thus far engaged the powers it has.

The report also briefly mentions perceptions that “the defence industry is too closely linked to the department through lobbyists.” We share the committee’s general concerns, but also note that the Government of Canada in its first bill in parliament—the Federal Accountability Act—brought in some of the most stringent accountability measures in the Western World. These measures will improve the transparency and accountability measures for all of Government—including the procurement process.

In conclusion, the report highlights some important issues that should help to reform the procurement process. However, many of the recommendations need to be further expanded and studied—particularly those surrounding major bureaucratic restructuring (recommendation 6) and an expanded committee role for procurement oversight (recommendation 5). We applaud the committee for tackling these issues, as the procurement process is deeply connected to the effectiveness and safety of our brave men and women in the field. Finding the proper balance between fairness, transparency, and efficiency will always be a difficult one. Canada’s Government should be applauded for its recent procurement decisions on strategic and tactical lift and also the Leopard II Tanks that were urgently needed to keep the Canadian Forces operationally effective. However, improvement in procurement timeliness is always possible, and we hope this report will aid the Government and Department of National Defence to that end.