FAAE Committee Report

Rebuilding Afghanistan after decades of war is not an easy task, and not one that can be reduced to a simple equation. Along with our Afghan and international partners, we are working to ensure that the progress being made becomes irreversible.

Hon. Maxime Bernier, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Evidence, FAAE Meeting No. 8,
December 11, 2007, p. 3.

We have to readjust some of the priorities, and that includes CIDA. There has been an overemphasis on certain types of activities that are confined within the framework of security. I think we have to recognize those issues.

Emmanuel Isch, Vice President,
International and Canadian Programs, World Vision Canada,
Evidence, FAAE Meeting No. 5,
November 29, 2007, p. 9.

The mission has to change. We must put more effort into reconstruction and development in order to help the population and to improve their situation. … It is not just a question of having programs, it is a question of projects that the population can see. This is the change we recommended.

Hon. John Manley, Chair,
Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan,
Evidence, FAAE Meeting No. 18,
March 11, 2008, p. 2.

In the course of its study of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, the Committee was particularly interested in examining Canada’s role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development, including the purpose and objectives of its aid programs, their effectiveness and efficiency, and those factors which the Canadian government needs to take into account as it charts Canada’s future involvement in this war-ravaged state.

The Committee believes that, while good progress has been made in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development, Canadian and international efforts and resources must be intensified and priorities restructured in order to build on the progress already achieved, nurture it more deliberately in areas that have not received much attention, and in the end make it irreversible.

Afghanistan has come a significant distance. As Nipa Banerjee, who headed Canada’s aid program in Kabul from 2003-2006 and is currently with the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, attested:

[G]iven the zero-base capacity with which the Afghanistan transitional government started, progress in the post- Taliban period in social and economic sectors has been commendable and has overreached the achievement of other south Asian countries within the first five years of their independence.[123]

The Hon. Flora MacDonald, former Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and founder of Future Generations Canada, has travelled frequently to and extensively throughout Afghanistan over the course of the last several years. She agrees with Dr. Banerjee about progress there, saying: “ [P]rogress is being made in Afghanistan, although certainly not uniformly across the country.”[124]

Afghanistan’s progress is particularly evident with respect to the treatment of women and across different spheres. As the Minister of International Cooperation, the Hon. Bev Oda, told the Committee:

[O]ne of the key successes is enabling [girls and women] access to formal education, where they represent two-thirds of the children attending schools. The education and literacy has improved. There's mobility now. … [Y]ou see Afghan women, young women and girls, going to school, in the streets, going shopping, walking down the streets, and then you recognize that this is a significant change in the lives of those women. The other part I can report on is the improvement of the health care they're receiving. In fact, we have seen a four times increase in the access of women to childbirth attendants. Consequently, with improved medical care and access to medical care, we've been able to reduce the infant mortality by 22%. The Afghan women, I would suggest, are like all women around the world. They're very entrepreneurial, very industrious, etc. We have contributed $56 million to date to the microfinancing facilities, the MISFA facility. The majority of people accessing that facility, as I say, are women. They are now earning an income for their families. They are establishing businesses. On top of that they're repaying those loans at a 90% rate. We are also supporting their agricultural efforts with our programs that support livelihood—livestock, seeds, and fertilizer. We see improvements there. Many of the women, of course, are the caregivers in their families, so that they're able to not only participate on an increased level but actually to contribute significantly. One of the things I'd like to speak to is to recognize that when they have the opportunity, they participate in elections. They participate as voters. To me, that shows they are concerned about their futures, when 43% of the 6.5 million Afghans who voted in the last election were women. They had been denied that previously under the Taliban. Not only that, but 25% are parliamentarians right now. … I think one of the things is to basically understand that there's a recognition of the basic rights of women, their basic human rights—protection against violence, ability to have free mobility, access to education, access to democratic process, access to literacy, access to facilities that are taking better care of their health and consequently the health of their families as well. There's a saying that if you want to ensure that the people are educated, you educate the women, and the women will ensure that everyone gets educated. Of course, the same goes for health care. The same also goes for respecting basic rights. [125]

Hon. Flora MacDonald also testified to the Committee on the role of women:

One year ago the capital of Bamian Province, Bamian Town, elected its shura, and for the first time in the history of Afghanistan a woman was elected to head the sshura. Four of the 10 members of that shura are women, and this is a breakthrough indeed. Bamian Province is the only one of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan to have a woman governor.[126]

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Recommendation 6

The Government of Canada should ensure that its development and reconstruction projects continue to include aspects that focus on Afghanistan’s women and improvements in their social, economic and political capacities.

It is clear to the Committee that Afghanistan has much to benefit from the continued assistance and support of the international community. Matt Waldman, Afghanistan Policy Advisor at Oxfam International, summarized the unanimous view of witnesses in this way:

I would certainly agree that there have been significant strides forward in a number of areas, but I think it is important to recognize that in many areas of Afghanistan … there are still areas of very severe poverty. In those conditions, we may find that individuals are joining the militants or growing poppies. … There have been improvements, but we can certainly do a lot more with the funds that are coming into Afghanistan.[127]

Scope of Canada's Reconstruction and Development Activities and Achievements

The Canadian government’s strong support for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development is evident in the amount of its financial and human resource contributions, as well as the scope of its activities. As the Committee already detailed in its preliminary report, Canada ranks among Afghanistan’s top five donors. Afghanistan itself is Canada’s largest single country bilateral aid commitment: Canada has already pledged C$1.2 billion in total aid until 2011, the end of the five-year period of the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) and the Afghanistan Compact.[128]

The Canadian government’s commitment is not static or rigid, but importantly has evolved to suit changing circumstances and needs on the ground. For instance, the amounts spent have increased to over $250 million in 2006-07 from $139 million the previous year, which itself increased from $100 million the previous year.[129] In 2007, the Government anticipated spending more than $30 million in Kandahar province, five times more than in 2005-06.[130]

In order to manage the increased disbursements and associated activities, programs and projects, CIDA officials told the Committee that the size of the field presence in Afghanistan as well as staff at headquarters has increased. As CIDA President Robert Greenhill told the Committee, “Our field presence has more than doubled in the past two years: we will have 35 professional staff working in Afghanistan by April 2008 compared to just 10 in 2006. Overall with the creation of the Afghanistan Task Force, we have grown from a program of just 20 full-time employees to a staff of almost 80.”[131] This includes nine staff overseeing projects in Kandahar.[132]

The Committee notes the scope of activities in which Canada is involved and which it has supported. These include initiatives that directly target reconstruction such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, the Anti-Mine Program for Afghanistan, construction of the Spin Boldak road, infrastructure projects and road and bridges rehabilitation.[133] It also includes economic development activities such as the Micro-Finance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA),[134] and the re-building of Afghanistan’s governance institutions, such as through the National Solidarity Program as well as the support for democratic development.[135] In particular, Canada’s contributions have stood out in Afghanistan’s health and education sectors.[136]

As noted by many witnesses and in its preliminary report, the Committee acknowledges the positive results of Canada’s contributions to Afghanistan’s development and reconstruction. For example, Linda Jones of the Mennonite Economic Development Associates of Canada (MEDA), which had been operating in Afghanistan for three years, told the Committee that during that time “we have also seen the tremendous impact that Canada’s development contribution is having on the rebuilding of the nation.”[137]

Canada’s aid contributions and commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan are not taken for granted. The Ambassador of Afghanistan to Canada, His Excellency Omar Samad, told the Committee:

We are very grateful for this [aid], and we appreciate every dollar. I, as an Afghan, have said many times that I want every dollar of Canadian aid to go as far as it can in changing and improving the lives of Afghans, whether it's for children and women, whether it's for infrastructure, whether it's for governance or rule of law or human rights.[138]

Recognising the Relationship Between Development and Security

The Committee feels strongly that the progress Canada and the international community have achieved and continue to promote in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development is not disconnected from the parallel purpose of advancing Afghanistan’s security, particularly the human security of the Afghan men, women and children. As indicated in its preliminary report, the Committee appreciates and supports Canada’s multifaceted approach, which recognises the mutually reinforcing relationship between security and development.

The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Leonard Edwards, noted that: “Our development projects are also aimed at building a more secure environment for the Afghan people. The pillars reinforce one another, showing that Canadian interests and values come together in our mission in Afghanistan.”[139] It is, therefore, not surprising that Canada has multiplied its reconstruction assistance to Kandahar, a region where approximately 2500 Canadian troops are deployed under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to promote security and diminish the influence of the insurgents, by almost eight times since 2005-2006, totalling $39 million in 2006-2007.[140]

At the same time, the Committee believes that the level of security on the ground can influence reconstruction and development efforts. The more stable the conditions, the easier for aid to be delivered, reconstruction projects to take place and endure, and the sooner the Afghan people can resume their daily routines. Many witnesses affirmed this view. For instance, Paul Heinbecker emphasised the connection:

[I]t's not obvious to me how you're going to carry out a development effort unless you have an adequate measure of security. The UN has just said that most of the south of Afghanistan is not safe for aid workers, and it's not safe for aid workers because of the efforts of the Taliban. … So I think it starts with security.[141]

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However, as some witnesses testified, there is concern that the activities of the insurgents are on the rise, thereby undermining the conditions under which development and reconstruction can proceed, risking the progress that has been achieved. For instance, Seddiq Weera, Senior Policy Advisor, Ministry of Education, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan attested that, “We are witnessing a surge in the insurgency, both in terms of actual fighting, the guerrilla-style fighting, and suicide bombings.”[142] Lina Holguin, Policy Director of Oxfam Quebec, testified about the impact of the insurgency on the Afghan people:

On top of the 130,000 long-term displaced people in Afghanistan, recent fighting in the south has displaced up to 80,000 more. The war has affected people's ability to farm, forced the closure of education and health facilities, and curtailed the availability of humanitarian relief workers.[143]

Moreover, Peggy Mason, Senior Fellow of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, said that, “I would suggest that women's rights are not being advanced in Afghanistan in a situation where the security of everyone is deteriorating on a daily basis. That is not the way to protect women in Afghanistan.”[144]

As Hon. Maxime Bernier, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, testified: “No project can be carried out without security. Security is the basic element. The Canadian Forces oversee these people to be sure that the area is secure and that development projects can be carried out.”[145]

This point was also emphasised by the Hon. John Manley:

Security and reconstruction are linked and we cannot forget that. At the moment, it is not possible to advance the cause of reconstruction and development in Afghanistan without having the military force necessary to guarantee the security of workers, of representatives of non-governmental organizations and of those of CIDA or other international aid agencies. This is necessary in a dangerous situation. An alternative government in the form of the Taliban would like to establish itself. They are ready to say that no progress has been made, that the international forces are providing nothing and that another uprising is needed. Conflict exists, and it is clear to us that we must continue our security efforts if we want to continue development.[146]

The contribution of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) is invaluable in this regard. As the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs described the activities of Canada’s PRT in Kandahar to the Committee:

The 350- person team utilizes the expertise of diplomats, development experts, corrections advisers, the police, and the military. Its mandate closely mirrors the priorities of the Afghan Compact and Afghanistan national development strategy, namely, security, governance, development. The provincial reconstruction team supports key national Afghan programs such as the national solidarity program. … The provincial reconstruction team also carries out a broad range of programming, such as police training, strengthening local governance and justice capacity, and delivering material assistance.[147]

Matt Waldman of Oxfam International supported the work of the PRTs, saying that:

The mandate of PRTs is very clear and that is to create a stable and secure environment in which development can take place. We believe that they should adhere to that mandate as far as possible. We accept now that given that over the last few years PRTs have been engaging in development activities in providing assistance, it may be necessary for them to continue to do so to an extent.[148]

The Committee understands that support for military delivery of development assistance, and PRTs more specifically, is controversial. Indeed, some witnesses testified that military participation in development activities is not only ineffective, but compromises the neutrality of development work. On the matter of PRTs specifically, Lina Holguin, Policy Director of Oxfam-Quebec, stated:

PRTs are no substitute for long-term development work, and the military has neither the expertise nor the staying power to engage in it. PRTs also blur the distinction between the military and aid workers, placing our staff in considerable danger and reducing our ability to operate. Association with the military has also turned PRT projects, such as school buildings, into targets. Canada's PRT should be refocused. PRTs should exist only where security conditions make them absolutely necessary. They should concentrate on achieving security, stability, and law and order, which is their primary expertise. They should engage in relief activities only where lives hang in the balance and no civilian alternative exists. They should not engage in development work. In accordance with the interim status of PRTs, Canada should develop an exit strategy for its PRTs, with downscaling and closure plans for when areas become comparatively secure.[149]

The Committee heard from Gerry Barr, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, about the risks posed by insurgents to development workers and the impact on projects generally:

Aid worker insecurity poses a major challenge in at least two ways: first because, if aid workers are threatened, abducted, or killed, they are of course unable to deliver assistance; second because aid agencies have to decide whether their staff are able to operate with reasonable levels of safety. The more aid staff are targeted, the less likely it is for organizations to actually engage in programming. In both instances, it means that aid can't reach those in need, and that has severe repercussions on the country's ability to make vital progress in development.[150]

These risks of course are not to be minimised or dismissed, and the Committee is gravely concerned about the increase in the danger to aid workers who are committed to improving the lives of others. However, the Committee firmly believes that the alternative, no development assistance at all because of the insecure conditions, is unacceptable. This view was best expressed by the Hon. John Manley:

[I]f you're not there doing anything because of the security risks, surely it's better to be there doing something, even with the protection of the military, than not to be there at all, so that people get the benefit of it, rather than leave the military as the only people who can deliver development assistance.[151]

As Robert Jackson, Director of International Relations at the University of Redlands, bluntly stated:

[I]f reconstruction takes place today without military support, we in fact will have the people who are carrying out the reconstruction killed. It's as simple as that. The Taliban will in fact murder them. … So I think when we talk about aiding and reconstruction, first of all we have to bear in mind that the Taliban are there, and therefore we have to protect the people who are carrying out reconstruction.[152]

The Committee unanimously shares the hope that the military’s involvement in these activities is only temporary, and the sooner the security conditions improve because of increased commitment on the part of the international community, the sooner the military will be able to disengage from development activities, the Afghan National Army will become operational, and the development community will be able to function under more secure conditions.

Moreover, a majority of the Committee hopes that the April 2008 announcements on the part of Canada and its NATO allies concerning increased troop levels in ISAF will help address the threats posed by insurgents, diminish the risk to aid workers, and restore conditions on the ground that permit NGOs to function in a neutral manner.

Recommendation 7

Recognising the importance of security if reconstruction and sustainable development are to occur, and given the security conditions that currently prevail in Kandahar, the Canadian Forces should continue to be involved through Canada’s Provincial Reconstruction Team in providing protection for the delivery of vital humanitarian, reconstruction and development assistance to the population of Kandahar province. In addition, the Canadian government should monitor the security conditions in Kandahar for improvements and make changes accordingly to the roles of the military and PRTs in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development.

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Rebalancing Priorities

Notwithstanding its recognition of the need for a military presence to facilitate progress in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development, the Committee is concerned about the current balance of development and defence priorities in Afghanistan. Indeed, witnesses were unanimous that the current ratio needed to be revised in order to increase the proportion devoted to development. For instance, Nigel Fisher, UNICEF Canada testified that:

Assistance to Afghanistan should be a high priority for Canada today and for the foreseeable future. It’s in our self-interest to invest in Afghanistan’s security and reconstruction. Canada’s military role is important and absolutely necessary at this time, but it is not sufficient. An increase in non-military development assistance to Afghanistan is absolutely essential.[153]

This view was echoed by others, including Emmanuel Isch from World Vision Canada, who stated:

We have to readjust some of the priorities, and that includes CIDA. There has been an overemphasis on certain types of activities that are confined within the framework of security. I think we have to recognize those issues. But if we broaden our reach, our sectoral approach, and the partners we connect with, I think we will be able to achieve some of these.[154]

Such concerns about rebalancing priorities were raised in the House of Commons motion passed March 13, 2008, which recommended specifically that: “Canada’s contribution to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan should: (a) be revamped and increased to strike a better balance between our military efforts and our development efforts in Afghanistan.” [155] It was also addressed in the report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan: “It is essential to adjust funding and staffing imbalances between the heavy Canadian military commitment in Afghanistan and the comparatively lighter civilian commitment to reconstruction, development and governance.”[156] The Committee agrees.

In calling for an increase in attention to development priorities in Canada’s comprehensive approach to Afghanistan, the Committee acknowledges the concern of some witnesses that this rebalancing not take place at the expense of defence resources. This view was represented by retired General Lewis MacKenzie, who argued that, “There's too much emphasis on the military, but that doesn't mean you reduce the military. That means you increase the diplomatic side and the development side, as possible.”[157]

As the Committee was concluding our study in June 2008, the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan released its Report to Parliament Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan, in which it presents a rebalancing of Canada’s civilian and military programs in Afghanistan. [158]

Recommendation 8

The Government of Canada should rebalance its priorities in Afghanistan in order to give emphasis to reconstruction, development and peace-building efforts in Afghanistan, while maintaining Canada’s military commitment.

Some of the witnesses who testified about signature projects considered that, local Afghan awareness and perception about Canada’s contribution to Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development would be improved. In turn this would stabilise conditions on the ground, facilitate more reconstruction and development, and over time reduce the need for a military presence. As the Committee heard from Derek Burney, one of the members of the Manley Panel:

[T]he point we're trying to make is that if three-quarters of the assistance Canada is giving to Afghanistan is going through multilateral channels, or government channels in Afghanistan, there's no awareness on the ground that we are doing anything. And to your point about imbalance, which we agree with, we're not going to correct that imbalance unless there are more identifiable Canadian projects being conducted in that country. … All I would say is that in a war zone, I think we have to be more conscious of quick impact projects that people can identify.[159]

In its June 2008 Report to Parliament, the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan identified three signature projects in which Canada would invest its efforts:  the rehabilitation of Kandahar’s Dahla Dam and its irrigation and canal system;  the construction and rehabilitation of 50 schools plus the training of up to 3000 teachers;  expansion of support for polio immunization. [160] 

At the same time, the Committee acknowledges the concerns raised by some witnesses about the limitations of signature projects. Specifically, it heard the opinion of retired General Lewis MacKenzie, who said, “If we build these projects, … , and we have a Canadian flag on them, they're destroyed. … I know that the signature project with the Canadian flag is a popular idea. I just don't think it would last very long.”[161] Retired Colonel Mike Capstick was concerned about the effect that such signature projects would have on the legitimacy of the Afghan government in the eyes of its own people as a first order provider: “… [R]enovating the Mirwais hospital and slapping a Canadian flag on it does nothing to legitimize the Afghan government. In fact, it could send Kandaharis the clear message that Ottawa can do more for them than Kabul.”[162] 

Nipa Banerjee in her June 12, 2008 commentary published by the Ottawa Citizen echoed these concerns that signature projects diminish the Afghan government’s authority and legitimacy, noting in particular that “they will not increase the presence and visibility of the government of Afghanistan to its people or help to earn people’s loyalty to the government as opposed to the Taliban.” [163]  CARE Canada, Oxfam Canada and World Vision Canada remarked in a January 2008 press release issued in response to the Manley Panel’s recommendations for signature projects that such projects “provide few lasting benefits to Afghans and too often endanger civilians and aid workers.” [164]

Yet, the Committee returns to the point that security and Afghanistan’s reconstruction and developments are inter-related, and that improvements in one will have positive consequences for the other. It also emphasises Colonel Mike Capstick’s suggestion for mitigating the impact on the Afghan government’s legitimacy: “Any such project must therefore be designed in partnership with the Afghan government and the community. Most importantly, it must reinforce the governance pillar and Afghan government legitimacy by ensuring properly supported Afghan leadership and ongoing sustained capacity-building.”[165] Thus, Canadian signature projects could positively affect not only security and the Afghan government’s legitimacy, but also the lives of the men, women and children of Afghanistan.

Recommendation 9

Emphasising what is most likely to deliver benefits to Afghans in need while also raising local Afghan awareness of Canada’s efforts, the Government of Canada should consider projects in Afghanistan in a manner that respects the Afghan government’s authority and that is coherent with other international assistance activities.

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Strengthening Aid Effectiveness and Accountability

While the Committee heard many positive statements about Canadian aid effectiveness and accountability, it is not completely satisfied with the status quo and would like to see improvements.

Many witnesses pointed out that the current level of reconstruction aid is far too low given Afghanistan’s needs and challenges. This sentiment was best expressed by journalist Sally Armstrong who stated in her testimony to the Committee: “Consider that we are investing 1/25th of the military and 1/50th the aid that we put into Bosnia and Kosovo.”[166] Paul Heinbecker, former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, agreed, arguing: “A much greater effort is needed, proportionate at least to that of the Balkans.”[167] Other witnesses concentrated on the disconnect between the amounts of aid pledged and those actually delivered. For instance, according to Matt Waldman of Oxfam international, who recently wrote a report entitled, “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan” [168]:

[I]n terms of the volume of aid, it has been insufficient. According to the Afghan government, $25 billion of aid has been pledged and only $15 billion delivered. When we look at the comparison of military spending to development spending, we see that the American military alone is spending over $100 million a day and aid spending has averaged about $7 million a day. Too much aid is supply-driven, prescriptive, rather than being needs-based and addressing demand. It's been centralized and urban and has not been evenly distributed. Indeed, we believe that's one of the reasons why insecurity has spread.[169]

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy for 2008-2013 released in April 2008 notes as well that, “[t]he amount of money pledged per head for Afghanistan’s reconstruction is still low in comparison to pledges made previously for other post-conflict countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.” [170]

Moreover, as Nipa Banerjee noted before the Committee, “Large volumes of aid will be of no consequence if not properly programmed, producing results on the ground. Disbursement is not an indicator of success.”[171]

Recommendation 10

The Government of Canada should meet its commitments and provide the assistance it has promised to Afghanistan, and should strongly encourage other donors in both bilateral and multilateral settings to do likewise.

The Committee also heard testimony about aid effectiveness in terms of its impact on the local economy. Former Canadian diplomat Scott Gilmore of the Peace Dividend Trust argued that “… among the donor community, CIDA has one of the largest impacts on the local economy per dollar spent” while also pointing out that “[d]onors, including Canada, have pledged in the Afghanistan Compact to … increas[e] the use of Afghan staff and Afghan business, but to date no one has ever attempted to actually measure how much money is entering the local economy.” [172]

Matt Waldman was especially concerned about the allocation of resources, noting that: “A lot of the aid money is going to major contractors and to consultants. We accept that contractors and consultants will be required in the reconstruction process, but it's no reason not to rigorously assess whether they are providing value for money.”[173]

As Nipa Banerjee commented, “A slew of overpaid, inexperienced, and untrained recent graduates from the northern countries have used ODA resources to develop their own capacity, working in the ever-expanding aid industry that has engulfed Afghanistan.”[174]

The international community in its Declaration of the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan issued June 12, 2008 took note of the issues surrounding aid effectiveness.  Moreover, in the Declaration it agreed to provide “increased, more predictable, transparent and accountable assistance” and to provide “aid in a way that promotes local procurement and capacity-building.” [175]

Recommendation 11

The Government of Canada should ensure insofar as possible that Canadian personnel working on international reconstruction and development projects are suitably qualified and experienced in order that Afghanistan’s development be carried out efficiently and effectively.

Recommendation 12

Given the impact of the international presence on Afghanistan’s economy and capacity-building, the Government of Canada should increase efforts to ensure that Afghan personnel and services receive all necessary consideration in Canada’s reconstruction and development efforts.

Sound accountability and evaluation practices are critical for determining progress in Afghanistan. In general, the benchmarks used by Canada and the international community are defined in the Afghanistan Compact.[176] Moreover, according to Nipa Banerjee, aid programs—whether bilateral or multilateral—have accountability and reporting mechanisms built in. “If these are not found adequate by the Canadian government, tighter accountability requirements might be demanded, but just for the sake of tracking Canadian dollars.”[177]

The Committee heard from Ministers and government officials about their confidence in the evaluation methods used to ensure sound accountability of the reconstruction and development funds and programming. As the Minister of International Cooperation Bev Oda told the Committee:

As our programming continues, we are mindful of the challenges we face to ensure aid effectiveness and accountability. That is why monitoring, reporting, and evaluation are employed at three levels: nationally, working with the international community and the Afghan government; at the program level; and at the project level.[178]

The Minister also testified that she was satisfied with the level of cooperation at the multilateral level to generate the necessary information for Canada’s accountability requirements.

We have to remember, first of all, that we are working with the Afghan government and with 60 international partners. … Because these organizations are internationally very experienced organizations, such as the World Food Programme, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the World Bank, the International Red Cross—we work with them— they also understand the requirements of all their contributors to report back on the utilization of their funds and the contributions, so they're always willing to work with us on reporting back. I could not have given you the facts and the numbers that I reported in my presentation if there wasn't that cooperation on reporting back to the donor countries and to the donor organizations.[179]

At the same time, the Committee was pleased to hear from the Minister that efforts have been made to improve accountability and evaluation:

We've also just recently completed discussions with the Government of Afghanistan… on strengthening their requirements and coming up with our agreements when we're working with them, as far as the requirements of how they will report on the utilization of the funds are concerned.[180]

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Notwithstanding the Minister’s confidence, the Committee was concerned to hear from other witnesses about points of weakness concerning evaluation methods. For instance, as Nipa Banerjee testified that, “expenditure tracking alone cannot make aid effective. Performance measurements for aid effectiveness is essential.”[181] Such concerns were raised in the Manley Report, which specifically noted that, “… [the Afghanistan Compact’s] targets have proved more formal than real, and performance assessments have been flimsy.”[182]

Moreover, the Committee heard witness concerns regarding the lack of transparency of the evaluation process. According to Professor Pierre Beaudet of the University of Ottawa:

… I do know that CIDA is refusing, despite access to information requests, to release information on the estimated and partial results of those operations. … A number of documents that are currently circulating show that these initiatives are not achieving their expected objectives. The aims were perhaps worthy, but the circumstances prevented us from achieving them. … Where is the money going? … I would like for CIDA to be transparent and provide us with the information, because it does exist.[183]

The concerns about transparency were echoed by other witnesses. Specifically, Matt Waldman noted:

[T]here is not enough transparency. If there were, we could identify clearly the bad practices and try to put them right, which is why we are advocating for full transparency—indicators of aid effectiveness that apply to all donors and measure all the key aspects of aid, such as impact, efficiency, relevance, sustainability, accountability, and the use of Afghan resources.[184]

Accountability and transparency issues were also addressed in the House of Commons motion passed on March 13, 2008, which specifically called for Canada’s contribution to Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development to “be held to a greater level of accountability and scrutiny so that the Canadian people can be sure that our development contributions are being spent effectively in Afghanistan” and for the Canadian government to “provide the public with franker and more frequent reporting on events in Afghanistan, offering more assessments of Canada’s role … .” [185]

Recommendation 13

The Government of Canada must continue to improve its accountability and evaluation methods concerning its reconstruction and development commitments, and must ensure that its evaluation process is transparent. In this regard, the Government of Canada should also work with the international community to structure an effective framework for measuring progress and conducting performance evaluation on the basis of the benchmarks established by the international community in the Afghanistan Compact.

Recommendation 14

The Government of Canada should take the necessary steps to improve awareness among the Canadian population of the achievements and shortcomings of Canada’s reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan. The Government of Canada should strengthen transparency in the process for evaluating its assistance to Afghanistan’s development.

National and Local Level Reconstruction and Development Programs and Projects

In looking at Canada’s reconstruction and development role in Afghanistan, the Committee notes that both national and local targets are important considerations for Afghanistan’s future. We were pleased to hear testimony of Canadian efforts at the national level, supporting in particular the Afghan government’s legitimacy. As the Minister for International Cooperation testified, “While Canada's activities have a special focus on Kandahar, our development program reaches all corners of Afghanistan. In fact, 80% of our commitments are directed to national programs impacting all 34 provinces in the country.”[186] Nipa Banerjee remarked on the positive impact of such national programs, noting in particular that “... the financing of national programs designed and delivered by the Afghan ministries do earn the support of the people. There is evidence of that.”[187] Pointing to the importance of observing the “do no harm” principle by which actions should be carried out that benefit and do not harm the recipient, she also cautioned against approaches that are harmful by being “counterproductive to the objective of expanding the Afghan government's legitimacy.”[188]

The Committee was also encouraged to hear about the extent to which Canada works with the Afghan people to identify their needs and promote local ownership. As the then Minister of Foreign Affairs commented to the Committee: “Canada, along with our international partners, is fully committed to help the Afghan government provide security, education, greater economic opportunity and a better future for its people. Every day we see the difference we are making as Canadian soldiers and civilians work with Afghans to help them build a better society.”[189] This was reinforced by the Minister for International Cooperation’s statement that: “Our aim is to enable the citizens of Afghanistan to take full ownership of all aspects of the country's development and future. We stand firmly by their side as they strive to rebuild their country one village and one day at a time.”[190]

Even so, the Committee believes that the greater impact on Afghanistan’s future lies with the development of the rural areas, notably community-based initiatives that emphasise local, or Afghan, ownership. In this context, there was consensus among witnesses that while attention is already paid to rural development, there is room for improvement. We first noted this view in our preliminary report, in which we referred to Seema Patel’s testimony, specifically:

We believe the best way to ensure that R and D funds go further, particularly in the tough southern provinces, is to engage ordinary Afghans, from planning to implementation. The process is as important as the programs. At various times, from shuras to micro hydro projects to informal government justice structures, Afghanistan has shown the value of local ownership.[191]

This view remains current, and was recently expressed by one of the Committee’s last witnesses, Matt Waldman from Oxfam International, who noted:

I would like to address the key issue of rural development. We think this is the priority issue in Afghanistan today. It is clear when you go to communities that things still are very difficult in rural areas as opposed to urban areas, which have seen some progress. In one community I was in recently of 260 families, 45 children died over the winter due to preventable causes; 12 women died in pregnancy or childbirth. … There need to be more resources directed to communities themselves who can then lead the development process, and we can build civil society at a local level as well.[192]

In this respect, the Committee believes that giving the local communities a role in their own development gives them more tangible stakes in their own future. As Rémi Landry testified to the Committee, “What we need to do is empower the people, and I think the solution is with the people. Provide them order and empower them.”[193] The Hon. Flora MacDonald was equally emphatic and confident about the capabilities of the Afghan people in their own future, exclaiming, “For goodness' sake, give Afghans the chance to do what they can do. They are very good at what they can do.”[194]

As the Committee heard, the Afghans would be more likely to protect locally-owned projects and insurgents will be less likely to target them;  as a result, security conditions would improve. As the Afghan ambassador remarked: “Every project that has been implemented in such a manner has not been destroyed, because the locals in the communities have protected it. The Taliban and the terrorists have not been able or not dared to go into those communities to try to create problems for themselves.”[195] Retired General Lewis MacKenzie also spoke to this point— “Of 200 projects where we came in the back door and provided the project management, empowered the local people, and gave them the money, only one has been destroyed.”[196] Emmanuel Isch of World Vision Canada put it this way to the Committee:

We want to make sure as well that donor funding not only is more equally distributed, but also is not primarily focused on urban centres, as often there is little trickle-down within the grassroots. We want to make sure that the population, wherever it is located in the country, gains confidence and hope that they will also benefit from international and government aid efforts. I'm not suggesting that Canada should support programming in every province or district of the country, but certainly that the bilateral assistance should be more evenly spread …, and again I want to emphasize community base and grassroots.[197]

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The Afghan ambassador to Canada further stated to the Committee:

We are now looking at new concepts, including, for example, how to empower Afghans even more so that they can make decisions about their priorities and needs without having some consultant from a third country who is contracted for three months to come and tell all of us how to spend millions of dollars. We have learned many lessons over the past six years in terms of how to disburse funds towards development and reconstruction. One of the lessons is to go to the communities, go to the Afghans, engage the Afghans, engage the communities. Afghanicize the process, listen to them, get them involved. They will protect your money and they will protect the school you build. Every project that has been implemented in such a manner has not been destroyed, because the locals in the communities have protected it. The Taliban and the terrorists have not been able or not dared to go into those communities to try to create problems for themselves.[198]

Recommendation 15

In order to contribute more effectively to poverty reduction in Afghanistan, the Government of Canada should ensure that commitments regarding Afghanistan’s rural development, particularly in remote areas and areas that are more stable than Kandahar, are integrated into the reconstruction and development effort. The Government of Canada should also continue to support projects and activities with impact at the national level.

Recommendation 16

The Government of Canada should continue to ensure that its reconstruction and development projects respect the importance of Afghan ownership in their own development.

Balance of Short- and Long-Term Projects

The Committee believes that the continued and irreversible progress of Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development can only be assured by due consideration of both the short- and long-term dimensions.

As noted in the Manley Report, projects that focus on the short-term have an immediate impact on the lives of Afghan men, women and children and generate support in and loyalty to the larger endeavour.[199] As Derek Burney emphasised before the Committee:

[T]his is, after all, a war zone and … normal procedures for the kind of development assistance that is normally conveyed by CIDA is not directly applicable to the situation. So what we were recommending, in essence, was that there be a change in procedures that would enable a quicker response to some of the more basic needs of the people in Kandahar whose area has been made secure by our military activity. That's what we were concerned about, the ability of CIDA to react quickly, to provide assistance such as wells for drinking water, health care centres, very basic needs of the people, so that the full strategy of secure, hold, and develop in a war zone is applied in an efficient manner. The change in procedure that we were emphasizing and the change of emphasis that we were recommending was to key it more to the reconstruction effort, the immediate needs of the people in Kandahar, as opposed to the longer-term needs of the Afghan government to develop capability and competence to run a government.[200]

Moreover, projects with immediate results will help sustain the will of the Canadian public with respect to Canada’s role in Afghanistan’s future.

Recommendation 17

The Government of Canada in concert with its international partners should increase support for projects that will have an immediate impact on the lives and living conditions of the Afghan people.

The Committee believes that, to benefit Afghanistan more comprehensively, short-term projects should be supplemented with long-term impact projects which have greater depth and are more likely to be enduring.

Witnesses were unanimous about the significance of long-term projects and the need to encourage them. However, Robert Jackson warned that Canada and the international community must be prepared to make “a long-term comprehensive contribution. An extended period … of possibly up to 30 years will be required before Afghan is up to scratch.”[201] As Afghanistan’s ambassador to Canada noted to the Committee:

As we are a fragile state, we cannot always expect quick fixes and immediate solutions that can satisfy all the stakeholders, domestic or foreign. Given the Afghan traditions, the rebuilding process is a long-term mission, with many pitfalls along the way, and it will require statesmanship, strong political will, sacrifice, leadership skills, perseverance, and sustainable support to attain its objectives.[202]

Indeed, as Ambassador Samad subsequently pointed out, patience must be accompanied by more realistic expectations of the timeframe for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development. Specifically, he stated:

Just imagine any society, whether developed or semi-developed or under-developed, being hammered politically, militarily, economically for 25 years constantly. What would happen? Do you expect that to rebound over five years? It doesn't happen. It has never happened in history. Why do we have such expectations for Afghanistan? The question is whether we have the political will to understand this and then to commit long term, not only to the military aspect of this mission but also on all the other fronts that exist.[203]

Such patience and realism is critical for sustaining the international community’s will and interest in Afghanistan’s rehabilitation. Indeed, Marc André Boivin foresaw that “with the initial anti-terrorism impetus gone, this more long-term approach is also faced with the renewed insignificance of Afghanistan on the world scene.”[204] Colonel Mike Capstick emphasised this concern: “My biggest fear is that in its frustration with slow progress, confusing politics, and weak governments, the international community will blame the victim and simply abandon Afghanistan and Afghans yet again.”[205]

The Committee believes that a combination of short- and long-term projects will have the greatest benefit for Afghanistan, as well as the greatest value for Canada’s foreign policy and aid objectives. As the Committee already noted in its preliminary report, any reconstruction and development strategy that only looks at the short-term puts at risk not only our considerable investments to date and commitments under the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, but more importantly the prospects of the Afghan people for a better life.

Recommendation 18

The Government of Canada should take the necessary steps to remind Canadians and the international community of the value of long-term projects for Afghanistan’s long-term and sustainable development. The Government of Canada should also encourage the international community to place the necessary importance on long-term projects, while demonstrating both realism and resolve about their outcomes.

Recommendation 19

The Government of Canada should ensure that its contribution to Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development includes a balance of both short- and long-term projects.

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Strengthening Coordination

The Committee heard testimony regarding the coordination of Canada’s reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan. For instance, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, is primarily responsible for the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact. Canada’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter MacKay also noted:

We’ll continue to keep all development projects under constant review to ensure that our efforts align closely with the intent and purposes that have been set out in the annual UN Security Council resolutions and the benchmarks established by the Afghanistan Compact.[206]

However, the Committee also heard significant criticism from witnesses about the ineffectiveness of these mechanisms, with the consequences of a less than optimal impact on Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development. As the Committee heard from Stefan Lehmeir of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee:

The UN was initially confined to a very narrow humanitarian coordination role … . Despite all these lessons learned over the years, even the recently established coordination mechanism to oversee the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, is proving to be largely ineffective in its current set-up and with its current procedures.[207]

These concerns were more recently highlighted by Kai Eide, the newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Afghanistan and head of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), in his 9 April 2008 press conference:

The first and most important priority is, … the question of coordination of the international efforts. I think we have seen that it is still too fragmented to have the effect that we want it to have on the ground. So we are looking at the structures of cooperation and coordination that we have in place, including the JCMB. [208]

This report earlier noted more general coordination problems. Reference was also already made to the appointment of a high-level special envoy with responsibilities different from the SRSG and head of UNAMA as a possible solution.

Many of the concerns pertaining to aid effectiveness and coordination are raised in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy released by the Afghanistan government in April 2008.  Its priorities in this regard are “to minimize the risk of duplication, poor alignment, coordination and harmonization.” [209]

Recommendation 20

Working with the United Nations special envoy, the Government of Canada should pursue the necessary steps to strengthen the coordination of aid priorities among all key actors, including the Afghan government.

Witnesses also argued that other aspects of Canada’s role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development merited greater attention. One such controversial issue was that uniquely presented by Professor Robert Jackson, who was concerned that the international community was not giving more attention to the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan’s gas pipeline. While debate about its viability surrounds the project, its success would significantly improve Afghanistan’s infrastructure and energy services. In his words:

[W]e should talk about things like the gas pipeline. The gas pipeline Russia had built. It goes throughout Afghanistan and helps to bring the electricity to the country. … Canada should help with the reconstruction of the pipeline, which is needed. Norway's taking the lead here. They're having trouble with countries like Canada providing enough money and enough clout and saying they will support them. … In my opinion, building a national pipeline is crucial in order to make electricity work again in the country. Rather than some of the low level projects, maybe it's more important. [210]

In particular, the Committee heard concerns about the prevalence of poverty and unemployment and the lack of employment opportunities for the Afghan population, particularly its youth and young men, and the impact this has on Afghanistan’s stability. As Seema Patel testified: “Poverty is fuelling the anger towards the central government and motivating many young men, particularly in the south, to rearm and fight with the insurgency or with local armed groups to earn cash.” [211] Mirwais Nahzat, an Afghan Canadian, argued that: “… Canada should support enhanced participation of Afghan youth in governance, development, and socio-political processes.” [212]

Recommendation 21

In order to deepen the foundations of Afghanistan’s future governance, stability and economic productivity, the Government of Canada should ensure that its aid efforts emphasise human capital development, particularly programs and projects that focus on Afghanistan’s youth in the rural areas in particular. Such programs would include not only job creation projects, but also the development of employable skills and training across different sectors that are part of the reality of Afghan life.

Recommendation 22

The Government of Canada should continue to contribute to the development of Afghanistan’s education system at the primary, secondary and post-secondary levels.

Recommendation 23

In consultation with the Afghan government and people, Canada’s aid efforts should target poverty reduction in Afghanistan more tangibly, in part by attending to the development of the private sector and the local economy in the urban centres and especially in the rural areas. This can be achieved by encouraging the international community to make better use of Afghan services, skills and procurement rather than relying on non-Afghan contractors and consultants.

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Barnett Rubin commented that not enough attention is being devoted to infrastructure projects that support the rehabilitation of the agricultural industry in Afghanistan. Specifically, he said:

What I see that has been really missing in the agricultural sector has been the type of infrastructure and institutional changes that are needed above the village level – for instance, larger-scale and medium-sized water projects, which are very essential, and measures that would improve marketing, such as roads, more information, and things like that. Those are actually very key to counter narcotics also, because people need to be able to market alternative crops and create employment and other types of activity. [213]

The April 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy also emphasizes the role of agriculture and rural development to “ensure the social, economic and political well-being of rural communities, especially poor and vulnerable people, while stimulating the integration of rural communities within the national economy.”  In this regard, the ANDS includes a policy and strategic framework for this sector. [214]

The importance of rural and agricultural development was also highlighted in the Declaration of the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan held in Paris, June 12, 2008 whereby investment in infrastructure, especially in the agriculture sector was identified as essential for the security and prosperity of the Afghan people. [215]

Recommendation 24

In line with support for poverty reduction and investment in Afghanistan’s rural areas, Canadian aid efforts should reflect awareness of and attention to agricultural development, particularly in the context of infrastructure rehabilitation involving water and irrigation systems and transportation.

Ambassador Samad testified that the Afghan diaspora in Canada has not been fully accessed by the Canadian government in its reconstruction and development projects in Afghanistan:

[O]ne of the most effective ways to build capacity and transfer knowledge and skills to this newly redeveloping country, and to be a bridge between the new home and the old home, is to reconnect the Afghans, who had to leave their country under duress over the past 25 to 30 years, to their homeland. I have talked to my colleagues within the Canadian government on many occasions, especially in CIDA, about looking at ways to facilitate the return of some qualified Afghans who are willing to go—and spend whatever period of time they would like—and be of help. I think that help will not only go a long way to assist Afghanistan, but it will also go a long way to assist Canada and other countries where we have large communities of Afghans.[216]

Mirwais Nahzat similarly commented on the “largely neglected Afghan diaspora in Canada’s development efforts.” [217]

Recommendation 25

In noting that the talent and knowledge of the Afghan diaspora in Canada have not been as systematically and effectively accessed to the benefit of Canada’s reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan, the Government of Canada should actively pursue mechanisms by which the Afghan community in Canada could be consulted and engaged in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.

Notes to Part II