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NDDN Committee Report

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INTRODUCTION

The insurgents chose to test Canada, and Canada responded magnificently.

General James Jones
Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe
[1]

STUDY MANDATE

The mandate adopted on May 16, 2006, by the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence stated:

That the Committee examine the various aspects of the mission of Canadian troops in Afghanistan, such as its duration, the state of the personnel and materiel, the relationship between the mission’s combat operations and its efforts to help reconstruct the country, and the criteria for assessing its effectiveness, with a view to determining whether it is possible to complete the mission successfully while still meeting Canada’s other international obligations, and that the Committee submit recommendations in a report to the House based upon its examination.[2]

GENERAL

Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-Afg) is the most combat capable, best trained, best equipped and best led formation of its size and kind that Canada has ever fielded. It has been strategically relevant, operationally effective and tactically decisive.

Other reports on Canada’s mission in Afghanistan have tended to be pessimistic and some have called for and end to Canada’s role in the country. Your Committee knows Canada is better than that. Canadians have never shirked from their responsibility to help those in need, nor has Canada ever failed to take operational leadership when it was necessary to do so. Difficult challenges will not deter our national will. Our military history is the story of Canadians going abroad to fight in the national interest of Canada and on behalf of others who could not defend themselves. From Vimy to Visoko, from Kapyong to Kabul and from Paardeberg to Panjwayi, Canadian military missions, despite the difficulties, have accomplished the job they were sent to do.

Canadian diplomatic, development and military personnel in Kandahar were unanimous in telling us that they were clear on what they had to do, that good progress was being made and that now was not the time to waiver. They, more than most, know success is achievable. We agree. That is why this report takes a positive, but realistic and sober view of Canada’s military accomplishments and prospects in Afghanistan.

We are realistic and know that the job is not yet over, and that what remains to be done requires the dedicated work of brave Canadians. Canadian soldiers will still have to fight Taliban insurgents. Diplomats will still have to mentor an immature Afghan democracy. Development officers and aid workers will still have to provide resources and support to destitute Afghans throughout the countryside. Therefore, our report presents a realistic, constructive critique of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. Our findings result in clear and achievable recommendations that, if implemented quickly and energetically, will help Canada fulfill its role in the United Nations-led international development effort and its leadership role in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operations designed to create a secure environment throughout Kandahar province.

To spend Canadian blood and treasure abroad is one of the most important and weighty decisions to be taken by government. Parliament has a central role to play in such decision making. The Committee therefore felt the full import of its duty to examine the Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan.

The Committee’s first lesson was that Canada’s mission in Afghanistan is a noble endeavour, but an exceedingly difficult and complex one.

The international mission in Afghanistan can be successful with more work. The NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts to help Afghan security forces establish a secure environment have been successful in a majority of the country and are currently making progress in the southern and eastern provinces. The Committee fully understands the challenges facing ISAF in 2007, but we think the appropriate approach is to get on with doing what is necessary to overcome those challenges and not simply dwell on how hard it is going to be. We applaud all ISAF pre-emptive operations that have effectively nullified any expected ‘spring offensive’ by Taliban forces, this year.

Consider that NATO is the most powerful and successful alliance in the history of the world and the world’s best peacekeeping force for the last half of the 20th century. It brought peace to Europe after two World Wars. It imposed peace on the post-Cold War Balkans. It has never failed in any undertaking. Now, in Afghanistan, NATO is engaged in its first out-of-area operation, in another effort to bring peace and stability to a troubled country. NATO will succeed here too.

However, our confident attitude does not prevent us from appreciating the dangerous and significant challenges standing in the way of a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.

While we recognize that the existence and future of the Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan is entirely a political decision, we found it necessary to keep in touch with sources of ‘ground truth’ to ensure our deliberations and findings did not become so political, so academic or so unconnected to practicality as to be unhelpful. Along the way, the Committee’s work was grounded by candid views offered by serving men and women of the Canadian Forces and their families. We wish to make particular note of our visits to Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Edmonton and CFB Petawawa where we were able to meet with many returning soldiers, some of them injured, and their spouses. Together they provided the Committee with a special insight into the effects of the mission that no amount of second-hand testimony or academic research could have given us. Most importantly, as a culmination to our study, we were pleased to visit Joint Task Force Afghanistan at Kandahar Airfield. It allowed us to judge all that we had heard against the reality on the ground.

Other witnesses appearing before us, particularly those having recent experience in Afghanistan, were also of great value. Testimony from a wide range of academics, diplomats, along with defence, international development and women’s advocates provided important benefit to our work. Military officers returning from Afghanistan, who served in senior military headquarters or who worked in the fledgling Afghan government brought novel insight into the larger issues at play. We were also grateful for the informative contributions of Ministers Mackay, O’Connor and Verner.

Given the sometimes life and death issues inherent in the mission, your Committee has worked hard to maintain a non-partisan approach to this study. We tried to look at the issues objectively and come up with realistic recommendations that, if implemented quickly and energetically, will improve the quality and effect of Canada’s defence effort in Afghanistan and therefore enhance the overall mission.

Our focus is on the Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan and therefore this report deals mainly with issues related to the establishment of a secure environment in Kandahar province. We discuss related issues only in so far as they relate to the Canadian military mission. Broader issues of diplomacy and development are left to be examined by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which is conducting a wide-ranging, high-level study of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan.[3]

FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS

Throughout our study we were constantly reminded of three fundamental factors that continue to shape Canada’s Afghanistan mission.

First, Canada is not acting unilaterally in Afghanistan. Canada is contributing to an international effort in each of the diplomatic, development and defence (3D) environments. Consequently well-intentioned calls for Canada to do ‘this’ or change ‘that’ tend to oversimplify issues. Canada works through the United Nations (UN) and NATO, cooperating in a variety of multilateral strategies, programmes and projects. The international effort in Afghanistan is immense. Over 60 countries contribute to the overall development and reconstruction effort.[4] The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)[5] has over 1,000 staff (of which about 80% are Afghans) in 13 regional offices throughout the country. There are 15 UN agency offices in Afghanistan. More are being established. ISAF[6] is made up of military contingents from 37 countries and nearly 40,000 troops.

Second, perhaps the most misunderstood aspect of the mission is that it is one of capacity building. From the beginning, the international effort has been offered in support of Afghans. The 2001 Bonn Agreement and the 2006 Afghanistan Compact clearly explain the lead role to be taken by Afghan authorities. When Canadian units initially served in ISAF, in Kabul, in 2003, they openly advertised their role as “leading from behind” or “second row” support. In Kandahar this support role continues. Canadian development and reconstruction support is also delivered through International Organizations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and UN aid agencies to help Afghans, according to Afghan priorities. Canadians do not do the work for Afghans, they help Afghans build the capacity to do the work themselves, giving development and reconstruction an ‘Afghan face.’ A corollary is that improvements come only as fast as the emerging capacity will allow — an ‘Afghan pace,’ so there is no advantage in simplistically throwing Canadian money, people or equipment at problems faster than they can be absorbed and used effectively. There is also no advantage in Canada trying to arbitrarily take action on its own, without international support.

Third, and perhaps most important, Canada has taken sides in this issue. Along with its allies, Canada has decided to stand with the democratically elected government of Afghanistan. Therefore, the mission is not, and never has been, anything akin to a peacekeeping mission. Peace, stability and reconstruction are important aims, but so is the effort to help Afghan security forces eliminate the Taliban insurgency, in order to establish not just any security environment, but one in which democracy and human rights flourish. If generic security were the only aim, then it could be attained under either a Taliban regime or a democratic Afghan government. The issue is really which of those two forms of government provides Afghans with hope, dignity and prosperity in the future. The Committee believes any future under a feudal Taliban regime would simply bring a return to repression, a largely medieval standard of living and an absence of human dignity. Canada has chosen to join the international community in helping Afghanistan to build a democratic and prosperous future and the Canadian Forces will continue to support Afghan security forces in their fight against Taliban insurgents.

GOVERNMENT POLICY BACKGROUND

Government international policy describes the Canadian ‘whole-of-government’ approach in Afghanistan as being an effort that integrates civilian, government and military resources, to offer a broad-based contribution to the international effort to rebuild Afghanistan. While the term might be novel, the idea is not. Nations have always applied all elements of national power when engaged in any serious effort abroad, particularly one in which important national interests are at stake.

Government policy also mentions 3 “Ds”, a term meant to describe the cooperative application of defence, diplomatic and developmental efforts to complex conflict and post‑conflict situations. The overall Canadian mission in Afghanistan[7] does indeed feature all three ”Ds”, but, in order to understand the focus of this report, it is necessary to understand how each “D” is applied.

The first “D” is diplomacy. Reporting to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan, Arif Lalani is located in the Canadian Embassy in Kabul. He is the head of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan[8] and pursues Canadian diplomatic activity with the government of Afghanistan and other countries in the region as required. Given the military focus of this study, diplomatic elements are discussed in this report only in so far as they directly impact the CF mission in Afghanistan.

Development — the second “D” — is largely actioned through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which contributes to the international development and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Along with other major international donors, CIDA supports Afghan government approved national programs and projects whose delivery is overseen by reputable multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The important point here is that CIDA works through other international organizations, it does not directly undertake development or reconstruction work itself. It supports international programmes and projects throughout the country, as well as in Kandahar Province. In keeping with our study mandate, this report deals only with development activity having direct relevance to the Canadian Forces mission in Kandahar Province.

During its study, the Committee learned that there are subtle, but important differences among the related terms “aid,” ”development,” “reconstruction” and “civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)”. These will be further explored in Chapter 4.

The third “D” — defence — is also not as straightforward as it appears. Canada’s defence contribution is directed at security sector reform, one of the three main pillars of the international effort in Afghanistan. While all Canadian Forces elements in Afghanistan remain under national Canadian command, Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-Afg) itself is also assigned under operational command of NATO. NATO, not Canada, is responsible for the overall conduct of military operations in Afghanistan. Canada does not act independently in this regard. While Canada always has a ‘veto’ over how its military forces are used, and Canada is responsible for the conduct of its soldiers in operations, Canadian operational influence is applied, as it always has been, through the NATO chain of command, where any such influence achieved is invariably in proportion to the practical contribution being made.[9]

THE REPORT

Given the complexity of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, the Committee felt that it was important to explain general aspects of the mission as a whole and offer a description of the Canadian Forces operations, to correct public misperceptions of what our soldiers are doing. Canadian troops are doing much more than simply fighting the Taliban. In fact, they are doing much more than either the government or the media have
reported. The first chapter presents the context of the mission. The second chapter is devoted to an examination of the Canadian Forces mission. Chapter 3 focuses on the issues specifically identified in our study mandate:

a.      The duration of the mission;

b.      The state of personnel;

c.      The state of equipment;

d.      The relationship between combat operations, development and reconstruction;

e.      Military involvement in the delivery of humanitarian aid, development or reconstruction;

f.        Balance;

g.      Criteria for assessing mission effectiveness; and

h.      Mission success and other international obligations.

Not surprisingly, the Committee identified other important issues in the course of its work and they are addressed in Chapter 4. They include:

a.      Informing Canadians and Parliament;

b.      The Afghanistan-Pakistan border;

c.      The status of women in Afghanistan;

d.      Poppy crop eradication;

e.      Detainee handling and transfer;

f.        Contributing to the training of the Afghan National Security Forces; and

g.      Sharing the burden.


[1]              Gauthier, Major General Michel. Evidence. Standing Committee on National Defence No. 22. November 8, 2006.

[2]              Standing Committee on National Defence. Minutes. Meeting Number 2, Tuesday, May 16, 2006.

[3]              A motion to conduct the study was adopted by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on Thursday 1 Feb 07. The amended motion adopted reads, “That this Committee hold hearings, starting at the earliest, for the purpose of evaluating Canada’s mission in Afghanistan and reviewing the present focus, and accordingly invite the appropriate Ministers, departmental officials, representatives of civil society, the Diaspora and other relevant witnesses.”

[4]              Mackay, The Honourable Peter. Evidence. Standing Committee on National Defence, June 6, 2006. p. 1.

[5]              See the UNAMA website at http://www.unama-afg.org.

[6]              See the ISAF website at http://www.nato.int/ISAF/index.htm.

[7]              See the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade website for the Afghanistan mission at http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/menu-en.asp. Also see the Department of National Defence Afghanistan website at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/afghanistan/index_e.asp. The Canadian International Development Agency Afghanistan website is at
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-129153625-S6T.

[8]              During the Committee’s visit to Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-Afg) in January 2006, the Commander of JTF-Afg, Brigadier General Tim Grant was unequivocal in stating that Ambassador Sproule was the ‘head Canadian in country.’

[9]              In addition to formal national diplomatic representation at various levels in NATO, it is interesting to note that Canadians have occupied a number of important positions within the NATO military hierarchy during our presence in Afghanistan. General R.R. Henault, a former CDS, has been Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, the alliance’s senior military advisory council, since 2004. Major General Ivan Fenton served as the Assistant Director of Operations on the Military Staff at NATO Headquarters from 2004-2007 as well. During 2006, Major General Angus Watt was the Deputy Commander Air in ISAF Headquarters. Recently, Brigadier General Jim Ferron was appointed Chief of the ISAF intelligence staff and Brigadier General Marquis Hainse will soon take up duties as the Deputy Commander of ISAF Regional Command South. Colonel Mike Kampman is the Chief of Staff in Regional Command South Headquarters. The government has also announced that Canada will provide the Commander of Regional Command South again, later in 2007 (Major General Marc Lessard is currently in training for the role) and will seek to provide the Commander of ISAF in 2008.