NDDN Committee Report

INFORMING CANADIANS AND PARLIAMENT

The Committee’s interest in this topic came about as a result of collective, general frustration over the lack of official information being made available to Parliament about Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. As one Committee member put it:

… we do not have a great deal of information to go on. Before sending men and women off to war, the government has a duty to first inform parliamentarians of the specifics of their mission. It is unacceptable to us that as parliamentarians, we have been kept in the dark and that many of our questions have gone unanswered….[1]

This opinion came into sharp focus because some Members of Parliament felt that the time available before the debate dealing with the extension of the Afghanistan mission until February 2009, held in the House of Commons on Wednesday, 17 May 2006, did not provide sufficient opportunity for members to become acquainted with details of the mission.

In initiating the debate, Prime Minister Harper was clear in laying out the elements of the military mission for which his government was seeking Parliamentary approval:

… we are seeking to extend the mission of both the Canadian Forces in Kandahar as well as the efforts of Canadian military diplomats, development workers and police in the PRT, the provincial reconstruction team, for 24 more months. This mission extension …will cover the period from February 2007 to 2009 …

Extending the mission of the Canadian Forces has operational consequences. We will take on once again a second leadership rotation from November 2007 to May 2008, and this is new. As I said earlier today, we will be prepared to assume overall leadership of the ISAF for one year starting February 2008.[2]

With such a weighty issue on the table, the Committee regrets that some Members rising in reply chose to go a different route. The first responder declared, “My question has to do with process.”[3] A subsequent speaker offered, “… so suddenly has this debate been brought on, so little information has been provided in advance on such an important issue and so much time is remaining until decisions really have to be made, I find this who process insulting …”[4] The Leader of the Official Opposition eloquently captured the general mood of members, who genuinely wanted to understand the mission and give it informed support, when he opined:

We firmly believe in the current mission and the global goals. We also firmly believe that the government’s process will not allow many parliamentarians to make an informed decision about this critical issue. It is unfair to place parliamentarians in this position.[5]

And so the tone was set for the rest of the evening and throughout the conduct of this study. Despite having a consistently good story to tell Parliament and the Canadian people, it has seemed to the Committee that the Government has not been forthcoming with regular, informative accounts of the Afghanistan mission. Diminished information can lead to misunderstanding and make it hard to generate the support due such a noble endeavour.

Professor Roland Paris, while appearing on TV Ontario’s The Agenda, on 20 February 2007, lamented the fact that much of the Parliamentary discussion of the Afghanistan mission seemed stuck on who could be seen to support the troops the most, rather than dwelling on important matters of substance, such as what are we trying to do and how are we trying to do it. We agree with Professor Paris and hope our recommendations below help to address this concern.

Public Understanding of the Mission

Throughout its study, but particularly after its visit to Afghanistan, the Committee was struck by the widespread lack of understanding of Canada’s mission. Despite the considerable amount of information found on government websites and speeches by involved Ministers, ordinary Canadians and many Parliamentarians still have only a cursory idea of the mission’s details and its effect. Media reporting has been unbalanced, focussing mainly on combat operations and the repatriation of soldiers killed. The efforts of Canadian Forces personnel with strategic planning skills, who support Afghan government bureaucrats in Kabul, are unknown to Canadians. The RCMP officers who form part of the Canadian-led PRT and who help to train the Afghan National Police have received little coverage. The Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) role that forms a fundamental component of the reconstruction effort has never been fully explained to Canadians.

Kandahar is the home of the Taliban movement and continuing access to safe haven in Pakistan gives the Taliban an ability to avoid decisive engagements with Canadian troops. However, there was one time the Taliban did choose to stand and fight. They were decisively defeated by Canadian troops during Op Medusa, a battle that occurred in September 2006. General Sir David Richards, the Commander of ISAF has repeatedly praised the martial accomplishment of Canadian troops in this battle, noting that this victory was perhaps the most significant to date. It thwarted further Taliban activity in the area and allowed rejuvenated reconstruction work in the Panjwayi district.

Yet Op Medusa exemplified many of the difficulties apparent in providing Canadians with adequate information about the mission as a whole. At the time of the battle and even today, there is no information about Op Medusa to be found on any government internet website. The only mention of it on the DND website can be found in media releases announcing the unfortunate death of soldiers engaged in the fight. The media also covered Op Medusa, but not nearly in the depth it deserved. They too concentrated on military deaths and injury.

Media reports also spoke of widespread civilian casualties and the Committee heard some witnesses who shared the concern that an apparent over-reliance on air support and artillery gun fire caused unnecessary civilian casualties during Op Medusa. During its visit to JTF-Afg in Kandahar, the Committee heard from Lieutenant Colonel Omer Lavoie, the Commanding Officer of the 1 RCR Battle Group, who led the brunt of the fighting. Colonel Lavoie was clear in stating that there were no non-combatants in the 1 RCR Battle Group area and that he saw no ‘widespread civilian casualties’ as a result of the fighting. “I was the man on the ground and there were none,” he said. [6] This clarity was never transmitted to Canadians at the time.

Government needs to do more to help Canadians understand the nature, importance and effect of the mission in Afghanistan. Granted, the Prime Minister, on a number of occasions, has been clear in explaining why we are in Afghanistan, as have Ministers Mackay, O’Connor and Verner, but perhaps something more than their explanations are required.

RECOMMENDATION 11

The government should conduct regular, televised, public briefings, at meaningful intervals, to accurately inform Canadians about the status, activity and effect of the mission in Afghanistan.  

In the absence of such briefings, the Committee sought to receive information direct from DND.

Parliamentary Understanding of the Mission

In appearing before the Committee on May 30, 2006, the Honourable Gordon O’Connor, Minister of National Defence responded to a question about the possibility of him coming to brief about the Afghanistan mission at least four times a year. He replied:

I'll take this as something to deal with. I don't know if three months is the appropriate time or not. I don't know whether in three months progress or the lack of progress can be registered. I certainly expect to be back to this committee on a regular basis, but today I couldn't commit to giving you an update every three months until I find out if it makes any practical sense.

The Committee eventually succeeded in having a senior Canadian Forces officer present bi-weekly reports on the Afghanistan mission. However, these ceased over the late December 2006-January 2007 period when Parliament was not sitting. In February, the Committee passed a motion to have the briefings resume on a monthly basis.

The Committee feels that it should take a more active and aggressive role in seeking current and relevant information about the Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan. To that end, it will seek a more structured approach to briefings and visits. In fact, the Committee believes it should receive regular briefings on all Canadian Forces operations.

RECOMMENDATION 12

The Minister of National Defence should appear at least four times a year before the Standing Committee on Defence to provide a televised situation report, outlining the status, activity and effect of all Canadian Forces operational missions being conducted at the time.

The Committee also found it could have done a better job of gaining an early understanding of the international command and control structure governing the international and Canadian missions in Afghanistan, particularly in the defence realm.

RECOMMENDATION 13

In months during which the Committee is not travelling and in which the Minister does not appear, a Canadian Forces senior officer should continue to appear before the Committee to present a briefing on the mission status, activity and effect of all ongoing Canadian Forces operational missions since the last report and provide a view of what can be expected in the next month.

RECOMMENDATION 14

For the life of the current Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan, or in the future case of a similar mission, the Standing Committee on National Defence should make an annual visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels, to receive detailed briefings on the NATO mission in Afghanistan and meet with the North Atlantic Council to discuss multilateral strategic coordination and other issues of mutual interest.

RECOMMENDATION 15

In addition to the visit to NATO Headquarters, the Committee should attempt to annually visit Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), which oversees all NATO operations, and/or Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum, which oversees ISAF operations, to receive detailed strategic and operational level briefings of the NATO operation in Afghanistan. If a visit is not possible, alternate means of communication such as video-conferencing or invitations to SHAPE/JFC Brunssum officials should be considered.

RECOMMENDATION 16

The Standing Committee on National Defence should visit the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan at least once annually, at an appropriate time, in order to review the status of the mission at that time and any progress being made.

DEPARTMENTAL SUPPORT OF COMMITTEE TRAVEL

When the Committee travelled to Afghanistan in January 2007, DND provided helpful advance briefings on various issues including mission status, travel plans and operational security. The visit to JTF-Afg was entirely worthwhile and we are grateful to DND for the support they provided throughout the trip. There were however, two important issues that should be highlighted.

First, although the Committee did eventually get to travel “outside the wire” to visit an ANA camp and an ANP training centre (and would have visited a Canadian Forward Operating Base had bad weather not stopped helicopters from landing), there were other important mission elements we did not see. The PRT is a major component of Canada’s military mission and it was unfortunate we did not get to see Camp Nathan Smith and PRT work in Kandahar City while we were there. In fairness, it should be noted that all senior PRT personnel did come to Kandahar Airfield to meet with the Committee, but as helpful as such briefings were, they are less effective than actually seeing operational locations in person.

While the Committee understands the significant responsibility borne by the MND, CDS and Commander JTF-Afg for the safety of visiting VIPs, we enthusiastically urge them to consider the necessity of getting visiting Parliamentarians around to see all mission elements and arrange opportunities to meet with military personnel in situ.

The second issue is more irksome. DND restricted the number of Committee personnel who could visit Kandahar Airfield to 10. The rationale for this number, given in the advance briefings, was that there was simply no room to take any more on the military aircraft flying from the Theatre Support Base into Kandahar Airfield. The effect of this restriction was to prohibit attendance by other Committee members who may have wanted to visit JTF-Afg and to require the Committee Clerk to remain in Camp Mirage. So, only eight Committee members, accompanied by one interpreter and one analyst spent time with JTF-Afg.

It is highly irregular and unsatisfactory to travel without the Committee Clerk and the Committee is still at somewhat of a loss as to why DND could not accommodate just one more person on the trip, particularly since no less than five DND representatives (one Colonel from the Canadian Forces; one policy officer from the DND Parliamentary Affairs staff; and two members of the office of the MND) met the Committee upon arrival at the Theatre Support Base. One of them had been in Kandahar days earlier and had come out to meet the Committee at Camp Mirage. All five officials then returned to Kandahar Airfield with the Committee — taking up five seats on a crowded military aircraft. This left the Committee with the distinct impression that the restriction of 10 personnel that was placed on the Committee was, at best, an artificial imposition that need not have been applied at all. We think the one DND official could have remained in Kandahar Airfield to meet us on arrival and thereby allow the Committee Clerk to make the trip as he should have.

However, there is a broader issue here and it is one of ensuring Parliamentary Committees are supported to the extent required to allow travel by the full Committee (if they so desire) and the necessary staff required to support Committee work.

RECOMMENDATION 17

When visiting Canadian Forces international operations, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Defence should be accorded early and full support by DND, to ensure that the full Committee and necessary staff are able to complete the trip and their work.

THE AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN BORDER

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border has long been a source of dispute. Afghanistan and Pakistan relations have been problematic ever since Pakistan was created as part of the partition of India in 1947. Some elements of friction were apparent even before then, between Afghanistan and India under British Imperial rule. All governments of Afghanistan have never recognized the Durand Line, delineating the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghan Pashtuns have historically made claims on the Pashtun and Baluch regions of Pakistan.[7] In remote regions, the border has been more of a notion than a fact. Central governments in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have never succeeded in establishing firm control over their mutual border region.

When US forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001, to assist the Afghan Northern Alliance to expel the Taliban leadership and eliminate al-Qaeda terrorists, the US was concerned that Taliban and al-Qaeda personnel would disappear into Pakistan’s western regions and never be brought to justice.

When ISAF forces expanded into southern and eastern Afghanistan, the Taliban heartland, in 2006, Taliban insurgent forces were reinforced from western Pakistan and challenged the ISAF presence. Taliban forces gathering in Afghanistan were defeated in Operation Medusa, during the fall of 2006. As has been historically the case, the Taliban insurgency ebbed during the winter months, as travel through the mountainous border regions becomes difficult, but a renewed Taliban surge is expected in spring 2007 and once again, the issue of Taliban support from, and access to, Pakistan may be an operational concern to ISAF. Nonetheless, ISAF initiated pre-emptive operations. Some Taliban forces in Kandahar Province were dispersed by ISAF troops in Op Falcon Summit in January 2007 and in March 2007, another ISAF military operation, Op Achilles, cleared Taliban insurgents from the area of the Kajaki dam in Helmund Province.

There are broader, historical questions regarding the stability of the tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Pakistan's policies toward these areas and the effects of tribal militancy upon international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. It is a complicated issue and there is sometimes a tendency to oversimplify the issue.

It is useful to begin with a review of the situation in western Pakistan, were a system of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) attempts to govern the people. The FATA are bordered by: Afghanistan to the west with the border marked by the Durand Line (a boundary never formally accepted by Afghanistan), the North-West Frontier Province and the Punjab to the east, and Baluchistan to the south. [8]

The total population of the FATA was estimated in 2000 to be about 3,341,070 people, or roughly 2% of Pakistan's population. Only 3.1% of the population resides in established townships. It is thus the most rural administrative unit in Pakistan.

The Tribal Areas comprise seven Agencies — Khyber, Kurram, Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, and North and South Waziristan and five Frontier Regions (FR) namely FR Peshawar, FR Kohat, FR Tank, FR Banuu, and FR D.I. Khan.

About 30% of the FATA is inaccessible both politically and administratively. The region is only nominally controlled by the central government of Pakistan. The mainly Pashtun tribes that inhabit the areas are fiercely independent, but until friction ensued following the fall of the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan, the tribes had mostly had friendly relations with Pakistan's central government.

Despite more than fifty years of independence, human development and physical infrastructure of this area, sufficient to connect FATA to the rest of Pakistan remains weak. A colonial-era legal system that is inconstant with Pakistan's own constitution remains in place. Rights are inconsistently applied and arguably, as a result, many FATA residents could have a negligible sense of responsibility and allegiance to the Pakistani state.

The tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border present a number of challenges for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and for the international community. Taliban and al Qaeda militants have taken refuge in the remote villages of these areas, from which they launch attacks against Afghan and ISAF forces in Afghanistan. These Taliban fighters have also allied with local insurgents based in Waziristan and Baluchistan, raising several disquieting questions about Pakistan's own internal security and ability to exert control over this area.

As a result of some international pressure, regular Pakistani army troops entered the tribal areas for the first time in Pakistani history and in 2004. Pakistan Army attacks on local militant groups resulted in civilian casualties, fuelling an insurgency by some Waziri tribal groups. Pakistani troops and US forces have carried out "coordinated operations" in the border region that has further antagonized some local tribes. The Pakistani Army has about 80,000 troops in the region now.

The Pakistan military's lack of success in South and North Waziristan — and concomitant peace deals — have empowered and legitimized the socio-political role of the mullahs, the militants, and their Taliban allies. International forces now confront a fundamentally different Taliban than they did in October 2001. The Taliban has replenished its revenues, recruited new cadres, and adopted Iraq-like tactics, such as improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers.

Pakistan has tried in recent years to mitigate cross-border infiltration into Afghanistan. They have talked about fences; they have talked about mines (which Canada opposes) and aerial surveillance. Pakistan has deployed more than 80,000 troops into the border regions and have suffered over 800 casualties fighting insurgents since 2002.

Canada has not been blind to this overall situation and positive steps are being taken. In October 2006, the Minister of National Defence, The Honourable Gordon O’Connor outlined the issue for the Committee.  According to Minister O’Connor, there are about 12.5 million Pashtun people on the Afghan side of the border. There are also about 22 million in Pakistan. Together they equal the population of Canada.

 The border is porous. Anyone moving across the border — two or three men — may not necessarily be Taliban. There is no paperwork needed for the Pashtun to move back and forth across the border, because they have a right to cross freely, much as native Canadians have to move back and forth into the US.

When Minister O’Connor met with the president of the Pakistani senate and Minister of Defence in October 2006, , he told both of them that Canada appreciates what they're doing and that we understand  they also have other insurgencies in their country with which they must deal. But Pakistan was asked to do more, because in Canada’s view, a porous border is like an open door allowing movement into our area of operations.

One of the modest steps of confidence suggested by Minister O’Connor was the possible deployment of a liaison officer, with the 12th Army Corps of the Pakistan Army, in southern border region and the positioning of a Pakistan liaison officer in the Canadian military headquarters in Kandahar.

When he appeared before the Committee on 22 November 2006, Minister of Foreign Affairs the Honourable Peter Mackay outlined some of the Canadian measures to address this complicated situation.[9]

The level of Canadian political and military engagement in Pakistan is arguably greater now than at any point in the past. In March 2006 Prime Minister Harper and Defence Minister O'Connor visited Pakistan and Minister O'Connor returned in September 2006. On both occasions they raised the importance of security and development missions in Afghanistan with the Government of Pakistan and the premium Canada placed on Pakistan's cooperation. They specifically raised Canadian concerns regarding the activities of insurgents within the Pakistani territory. Minister Mackay subsequently discussed these same issues with Pakistani Prime Minister Aziz in October 2006, in Halifax and then with President Musharraf himself, at the United Nations General Assembly in New York that same month.

Canada, in concert with allies, continues to push Pakistan to step up its efforts to prevent the cross-border movement of insurgents. Specifically, Canada encouraged Pakistan to seek out and arrest senior Taliban figures inside their country; improve border security; sign, ratify, and implement key United Nations conventions and resolutions against terrorism; legislate and enforce more robust anti-money laundering laws and counter-narcotics training; and work to prevent the exploitation by insurgents of refugee camps inside Pakistan.

On another front, Canada is working with Pakistan's security and law enforcement personnel to increase their capacity to deal with border management and related issues. Liaison arrangements between Canadian Forces personnel stationed in Pakistan and Pakistan's armed forces are being enhanced.

The capacity of Pakistan's security forces in the border regions is limited, particularly given the enormous security challenges they face in the rugged terrain. Pakistan military personnel are spread thin and often lack the proper equipment, particularly communications technology. This lack of capacity contributes to the degree of lawlessness throughout the border regions and undermines government efforts to address the cross-border movement of insurgents. Through the Foreign Affairs global peace and security fund and counterterrorism capacity-building fund, Canada is working to king to increase the capacity of Pakistani security forces. Projects currently being developed include a Pakistani police capacity-building course that aims to have RCMP trainers work with Pakistan to enhance the professional development of their security and law enforcement personnel along the border and elsewhere, and the provision of appropriate communications equipment, including satellite phone technical assistance, to the relevant Pakistani authorities to help secure the Pakistan-Afghan border and respond to the presence of security threats — that is, to detect and interdict smugglers and cross-border movement of insurgents.

THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN

The Canadian Forces has no direct role in this issue. It is much more central to the work of CIDA. Our interest was piqued, however, because throughout the conduct of our study, the Committee heard, time and time again, witnesses explain that among the objectives of Canada’s overall mission in Afghanistan is the enhancement of the lives of women and girls, to release them from the oppression of Taliban influence and the grinding poverty in which they have had to exist for the past generation. So we asked specifically to hear from some academic and advocacy experts on the subject.

Not all agreed that the situation everywhere had improved for Afghan women since 2001, but not all said it had deteriorated either. Ms. Rina Amiri, the Lead Consultant for Afghanistan and Regional Matters with the Open Society Institute said her views fell somewhere in the middle.[10] She thought that Afghan civil society had improved and that over 200 women’s organizations had started to gain a voice. On the other hand, Ms. Amiri pointed out that much of the progress had been made in bigger urban centres like Kabul and that women living in rural villages still suffer from domestic violence, rape, forced marriages and a maternal mortality rate of over 40%.[11] For women, increased security is much more than simply defeating the Taliban. The rule of law is not yet effectively established in Afghanistan and this relates to our earlier concern about the endemic corruption found among government officials and the ANP. Nonetheless, Ms. Amiri sees significant value in the military campaign:

I find it ironic that on the one hand people speak of the situation of women and the need to address this, but at the same time they say, no, we shouldn't engage militarily in the country; we should not send soldiers…. You cannot isolate the situation of women. They're not an island; they are part of Afghan society. As in every conflict situation in the world, those who bear the brunt of conflict, those who bear the brunt of instability are children and women. We have seen what the women of Afghanistan have endured in the past. Unless there is a resolute commitment to put soldiers on the ground and address the security situation in Afghanistan, the situation of Afghan women will not improve.[12]

POPPY CROP ERADICATION

Although the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan do not participate in poppy crop eradication, they are nonetheless affected by it. Poppy eradication is financed to a large degree by the US and UK. The actual crop destruction is carried out by the Afghan National Police.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),[13] noted in its Report “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006,” that opium poppy acreage increased by 59% from 2005 to 2006. Afghanistan opium production, of which 6,100 tonnes are produced annually, now accounts for 92% of the world’s opium supply. The increase in the southern provinces was even more spectacular, with production up by 121% overall, and by 162% in Helmand province, where the British military contingent is based. In Kandahar Province, where the Canadians are located, production decreased by 3%.

Huge amounts of money are involved. UNODC has estimated that the global retail value of Afghanistan based opium, and its heroin derivative, amounted to over $(US) 50 billion dollars. In early 2006, UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa said “Revenue from the harvest will be over three billion dollars this year ….” According to Costa, the opium farmers get about 25% of the take, with the druglords keeping the remaining 75% — or about $2.3 billion dollars.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai spoke of the drug problem when he visited Ottawa on 22 February 2005. In an address to a joint sitting of the House of Commons and the Senate, he said it would take five to 10 years to resolve and that, "If we do not destroy poppies in Afghanistan, then poppies will destroy us. I hope you have the patience to succeed."

Many international reports describe the Afghan government’s campaign to eliminate opium as failing. The British lead the international counter-narcotic effort and, among other things, are helping to train ANP counter-narcotics officers. In a complementary programme, Germany leads the training of the overall ANP, which includes border police who also play a role in stopping the drug trade. However, not everyone thinks poppy eradication is the way to go.

The Senlis Council[14] is an international policy think tank whose work encompasses foreign policy, security, development and counter-narcotics policies. Their extensive programme currently underway in Afghanistan focuses on global policy development in conjunction with field research to investigate the relationships between counter-narcotics, military, and development policies and their consequences on Afghanistan’s reconstruction efforts.

Based on research carried out in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kandahar and Helmand, Senlis council reports have been highly critical of the overall military strategy in Afghanistan.[15] Senlis reports claim that counter-narcotics policies pursued in Afghanistan by the international community have been largely ineffective and contribute to a worsening of relations with local communities. As the eradication of poppy crops continues, it has led to support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents among dissatisfied farmers instead of helping to "win their hearts and minds."

Even though Canadian troops do not conduct poppy eradication operations, there is some concern that local Afghan discontent will fall on Canadians, even if our troops are not directly involved in eradication. As well, some officials worry that antagonising farmers with forced eradication will only strengthen the insurgency. The Afghan government has so far resisted American pressure for aerial spraying, preferring to rely on tractors. It claims to be targeting “the greedy rather than the needy” (for instance destroying poppy fields allegedly owned by a former police chief). No compensation will be offered. But uprooting is often a haphazard affair, usually affecting those who cannot bribe the eradication teams to pass over their plots. Given that there can be little or no eradication in Taliban areas, those who live under government control feel unfairly penalised.[16]

The proposed Senlis Council solution to the opium crisis is a novel one — buy the total opium crop from the farmers directly, and process it into medical opiates, especially for distribution to developing countries. A full discussion of this and other proposals to bring the drug trade under control in Afghanistan is beyond the bounds of this study, but it may be informative to learn how Canadian field troops have been handling the situation. The following vignette comes from a 2006 article by Murray Brewster of the Canadian Press.[17]

When the commander of Canadian troops in southern Afghanistan's poppy-rich Helmand province gives his word to village elders that his soldiers are not there to rip up their fields, he means it.

In fact, Major Bill Fletcher takes great care to ensure his armoured vehicles don't wreck the green pastures, or generally cause damage to the plants that produce a scourge of drug addiction in the West.

"It's basically my word as a commander to them," he said in a recent interview at Forward Operating Base Robinson, in the heart of Helmand River valley.

"There's a code of ethics and honour around here. My word as a commander, and my platoon commanders give their word that Canadians will not be involved in these things, seems to be taken at face value…"

Besieged on three sides by poppy fields and in an outpost that was the target of a mass Taliban attack last month, Fletcher is practising what a senior British officer irreverently described as "realpolitik."

As commander of C Company, 1st Battalion, of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, Fletcher is faced with this potentially volatile conundrum every time he looks over the grey prefab walls of his remote outpost, where the poppies are so close they often kiss the edge of his razor-wire defences. Last week, in full of view of heavily armed Canadian troops, local villagers and temporary workers went about the business of harvesting this year's crop. All of it will be processed in drug labs sprinkled throughout the Afghan-Pakistan border area, with some of the refined heroin eventually finding its way to the streets of major Canadian cities.

The program to rip up and burn poppies is organized and led by the Afghan National Police and army, a point coalition commanders hammer home at every opportunity. Much of the super-secret anti-narcotics operation is focused on destroying the processing labs.

Given the grinding systemic poverty of this region, where the average civil service wage is equivalent to about $60 Cdn a month, the troops find it hard not to feel some sympathy for the farmers.

"The reality for these guys is, they grow poppies because they get enough money to live," said Fletcher. "They're not drug barons, you know. They're not huge traffickers or anything else. They're just farmers trying to make a go in what is a pretty tough landscape." The complaints of villagers around here aren’t much different than farmers on the Prairies back home, except this crop becomes an illegal narcotic.[18]

DETAINEE HANDLING AND TRANSFER

Since 2001, the Canadian Forces have captured and subsequently transferred numerous individuals suspected of committing crimes or planning to commit terrorist acts against international forces or Afghans themselves. These apprehended individuals are referred to as ‘detainees’ and they are routinely handed over to Afghan national security forces by Canadian troops. The Committee heard early testimony that highlighted significant concern over the practice of transferring detainees to Afghan authorities because it was thought that they will be mistreated or tortured by ill-trained Afghan police.

Public allegations subsequently surfaced that claimed three detained Afghans may have even been mistreated while in Canadian custody. The allegations came from University of Ottawa law professor Amir Attaran,[19] based on government documents he obtained under the Access to Information Act. The Canadian Forces launched a Board of Inquiry[20] to investigate the treatment and processing of detainees by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, and the circumstances regarding the transfer of the three detainees from a Canadian field unit to Military Police at Kandahar Airfield in the period 6‑8 April 2006.

The Board of Inquiry is distinctly different from a separate ongoing Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) investigation, in which trained investigators determine whether or not a criminal offence has occurred, and whether or not there is sufficient evidence to lay charges.

In addition to these proceedings, the Military Police Complaints Commission announced[21] it was launching a second public interest investigation into a complaint regarding the transfer of detainees by Military Police in Afghanistan. This decision relates to a joint, Amnesty International Canada and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, complaint letter received on 21 February 2007. In the complaint, it is alleged that the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal and unidentified members of the CF Military Police, on at least 18 occasions transferred detainees to Afghan authorities notwithstanding alleged evidence that there was a likelihood they would be tortured.

Detainee handling and transfer involves certain diplomatic issues too. Afghanistan is a sovereign country and is responsible for the handling of all detainees captured on its own territory. Canada, and other nations, are in Afghanistan at the invitation of the Afghan government and so, detainees captured by the Canadian Forces were originally turned over to Afghan authorities, subject to conditions found in an arrangement between the Canadian Forces and the Afghan ministry of defence, signed on 18 December 2005.

The document in question is entitled, “Arrangement for the Transfer of Detainees between the Canadian Forces and the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The first section of the arrangement establishes the technical nature of the document when it says, “This arrangement establishes procedures in the event of a transfer ….” It is an agreement between two government agencies, not an agreement between two countries per se.

According to Ms. Colleen Swords,[22] the DFAIT Assistant Deputy Minister International Security Branch and Policy Director, the arrangement is not a formal treaty and is not legally binding. It simply reaffirms existing legally binding commitments, in particular those in the Third Geneva Convention, as well as obligations undertaken by both Canada and Afghanistan under international law with respect to detainees. In these circumstances, it was felt, there was no need to enter into a separate legally binding agreement with the Government of Afghanistan. Ms. Swords also pointed out that the mechanisms for the transfer of detainees concluded between Afghan authorities and other NATO allies such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are also not legally binding.

The transfer arrangement establishes the procedures to be followed in the event of a detainee transfer. It is intended primarily to provide commanders on the ground with clarity on what to do in the event of a transfer, the arrangement lays out two key principles:

a.      Recognition of the need for detainees to be treated humanely under any circumstance and in accordance with the standards set out for prisoners of war[23] in the Third Geneva Convention;

b.      Afghan authorities, in exercising sovereignty over their own territory, should have the ultimate responsibility for detainees transferred and held within Afghanistan.[24]

The agreement acknowledges the right of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit detainees at any time during their custody and an obligation for both parties to notify the ICRC upon transferring a detainee, in accordance with their obligations pursuant to international law. It also establishes a commitment that persons transferred from the Canadian Forces to Afghan authorities will not be subject to the application of the death penalty. Finally, it features recognition, by both parties, of the legitimate role of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) with regard to the treatment of detainees. Canada notifies the ICRC in a timely manner each time a detainee transfer occurs and Canada also notifies ISAF of any detainees transferred. The information shared with NATO is similar to that provided to the ICRC.

Based on the premise that Afghan authorities should have the ultimate responsibility for detainees transferred and held within Afghanistan, Canada has been actively contributing to efforts to assist and strengthen Afghan capabilities in this field. Consistent with its leadership role in security system reform in southern Afghanistan, Canada has deployed a corrections expert to the UNAMA for the past three years and has recently deployed more Corrections Services Canada officers to the Kandahar PRT, to help with capacity building in the Afghan corrections and detention centre in Kandahar province.

Professor Michael Byers, Professor and Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, also appeared before us on 11 December 2006, and expressed strong concern that the transfer agreement was not as robust as it could be. He, like Mr. Alex Neve of Amnesty International Canada was deeply concerned that when the Canadian Forces transfer a prisoner into Afghan custody, torture or ill treatment by Afghan police will occur. They felt that the transfer agreement was not sufficient to prohibit such abuse and that it therefore left Canada and Canadian Forces personnel liable to be in violation of their international human rights obligations.

Professor Byers, cited the detainee transfer agreement between the Netherlands and Afghanistan as a good model, suggested a number of amendments be made to strengthen the transfer agreement. First, he wants Canada to insist on a right to conduct follow-up checks on detainees transferred to Afghan authorities. Second, in addition to ensuring that the death penalty is not applied to any transferred detainees, Canada should also insist that no transferred detainees are sent to any third country. Finally, Professor Byers thinks the agreement ought to be elevated to the status of a legally binding undertaking, so that Afghanistan can be held to account if they violate any aspect of international law.

Being sensitive to the debate surrounding the handling of detainees, Canadian military leaders in Afghanistan worked to ensure this issue was being handled appropriately. A Canadian Press article[25] described how Brigadier-General Tim Grant, the Commander of JTF-Afg, reached an agreement with the Kandahar office of the AIHRC, to have the AIHRC act as watchdog for detainees captured by Canadians to ensure that valid complaints of abuse are investigated.

Abdul Quadar Noorzai, the Kandahar manager of the AHIRC said, "Canadians respect human rights very well…. It is one of the greatest acts taken by them and I really appreciate it from the core of my heart." Noorzai said he was now free to investigate and document cases of suspected abuse, whether the allegations involve Canadian troops or Afghan authorities. The agreement gives victims a way to have their complaints investigated by either Canadian authorities or the local judiciary for prosecution.[26]

Nonetheless, there was continuing concern over the transfer of detainees to Afghan security authorities. The Minister of National Defence subsequently visited Kandahar to discuss the details of detainee transfer and the role of AIHRC in monitoring the subsequent treatment of detainees held in Afghan prisons. Minister O’Connor returned to Canada and confirmed that the AIHRC will monitor the treatment of detainees transferred by Canada to Afghan authorities.

On May 3, 2007, the government went one step further and signed a supplemental arrangement between the government of Canada and the Afghan Ministry of Defence, in which both parties agreed to additional and more stringent criteria for the treatment, supervision and access to detainees in Afghan prisons. This supplemental arrangement addresses the major concerns voiced in previous testimony and, in fact, is now being held up as the best arrangement of its kind in Afghanistan. In combination, the two Canadian-Afghan arrangements on detainee transfer are being touted as an example for all other national contingents.

However, one preferred step remains and that would be to have NATO ISAF develop a common detainee transfer arrangement between ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan, so that all detainees are handled and transferred in a consistent manner and common expectations of follow-up are known and understood by all parties.

RECOMMENDATION 18

The government should attempt to convince NATO to establish a general arrangement with the Government of Afghanistan to ensure the consistent treatment of detainees, but in the meantime, the Government of Canada should ensure that, in all combined operations conducted by Canadian and Afghan military and/or police forces, all detainees captured by Canadian Forces are treated in accordance with the December 18, 2005 and May 3, 2007 arrangements between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in the spirit of the Geneva Conventions and the Convention against Torture.

CONTRIBUTING TO THE TRAINING OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

An important aspect of the international effort to assist in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, are the programmes to establish and build the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The aim is to make each capable of playing its full role in the maintenance of peace and security in Afghanistan. When they are able to do this, international military forces can leave.

The US is the lead nation for the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA).

Once elements of the ANA complete their training programme, ISAF’s involvement with the ANA is focused on its operational employment rather than its manning, initial training and sustainment.  ISAF helps to bring the ANA up to operating capability through the provision of Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT).  These teams support training and deploy on operations in an advisory role.

At a Geneva conference on Afghanistan security in April 2002, donor countries agreed to support the rebuilding of the security forces in Afghanistan. They established a ‘five pillars’ approach, each to be led by a different nation. The US took the lead to build the ANA and Germany took the lead for the ANP.[27] The Afghanistan government and the international community agreed to set up the ANP with 62,000 personnel, a number thought to be the minimum that could function effectively and be sustained by the government of Afghanistan over the long term. That number was to include 44,300 uniformed police, 12,000 border police, 3,400 highway police and 2,300 counternarcotics police. In January 2006, a standby reaction police force was added.

Together, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) comprise the major elements of the Afghan national security forces The ANA is overseen by the Afghan Ministry of Defence and the ANP are overseen by the Ministry of the Interior.

The US-led Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A). is responsible for training the Afghan National Army and also interacts with the German-led project to train the Afghan National Police. In partnership with the Government of Afghanistan and the International Community, CSTC-C plans, programs and implements reform of the Afghan Police and defense sectors in order to develop a stable Afghanistan, strengthen the rule of law, and deter and defeat terrorism within its borders.[28] It is commanded by a US Major-General with a Canadian Brigadier-General as Deputy Commander.

Training the Afghan National Army

Upon becoming president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai set a goal of an army of 70,000 by 2010. Three years ago, there was virtually no ANA to speak of, but today, the ANA has nearly 37,000 soldiers[29] and ANA units now regularly take part in or lead combined ANA-ISAF combat operations.

Initial recruiting problems lay in the lack of cooperation from regional warlords and inconsistent international support. The problem of desertion dogged the force in its early days. In mid-March, 2004 estimates suggested that 3,000 soldiers had deserted.

As part of Op Enduring Freedom different nations have undertaken various responsibilities in training the ANA, managed by Combined Security Transition Command — Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a US-led two-star level multi-national command headquartered in downtown Kabul. Canadian Brigadier-General Denis Tabbernor serves as the Deputy Commander.

From July 2006, ANA training and education has been managed and implemented by the newly-formed Afghan National Army Training Command (ANATC), which reports directly to the Afghan Chief of the General Staff. All training centers and military schools are under ANATC HQ, to preserve the approach that ISAF forces are mentoring Afghan military appointments, who remain responsible for the training of their own soldiers.

Individual basic training is conducted primarily by ANA instructors and staff at ANATC's Kabul Military Training Center. Foreign mentors at the Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC) work under a US Army General Officer and in addition to the majority American contingent, there are 60 British troops, along with small detachments of French, Romanian and even Mongolian soldiers. Fifteen Canadian Forces personnel serve at the KMTC, acting as mentors to the Afghan instructors who teach Afghan soldiers. Note that the Canadians are ‘mentors,’ not instructors per se. This is consistent with the overall approach of building Afghan capacity, not doing the work for them.

KMTC has about 2,500 Afghan soldiers under training at any one time and it graduates a 615-man kandak (battalion) every month. It takes 16 weeks to turn an Afghan recruit into a trained soldier (as compared with 13 weeks in Canada).

CSTC-A provides the ANA with other various degrees of oversight, mentorship, and assistance. The US assists in the basic and advanced training of enlisted recruits and trains non-commissioned officers (NCO) for the basic training courses. A French Army advisory team oversees the training of officers for staff and low level field command in the Officer Training Brigade. The UK also conducts initial infantry officer training and commissioning at the Officer Candidate School. The British Army also conducts initial and advanced NCO training in a separate training brigade.

The Canadian Forces supervises the Combined Training Exercise portion of initial military training, where trainee soldiers, NCOs, and officers are brought together in field training exercises to certify them ready for field operations. Ideally, these exercises would be held at the kandak level, but the ANA is simply not able to perform at that level yet. However, as the ANA grows and matures they will reach that level and in order for such training to be effective, more training staff will be needed. This is one area where Canada and the Canadian Forces can reinforce success.

RECOMMENDATION 19

The government should increase the Canadian Forces contributions to Afghan National Army training so that, as the Afghan National Army grows and matures, higher level collective training of new kandaks can be conducted prior to real operations.

Once trained ANA forces leave the KMTC in Kabul and join the Regional Corps deployed around the country, ANA kandaks are supported by attached ISAF military personnel called Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLT — affectionately known as ‘omelettes’) that mentor the kandak leadership and advise commanders in the areas of intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics and infantry tactics. OMLTs also play a particularly important coordinating and de-conflicting role between ANA and ISAF operations. There are at least 20 OMLTs currently deployed, and the Alliance is working to increase this number significantly.

Canada provides a 64-man OMLT in Kandahar Province, which recently took over responsibility for supporting an entire ANA Brigade. Here too, as the ANA grows and more kandaks are deployed in the Kandahar area, Canada could provide valuable help by increasing the size of the Canadian OMLT as the number of kandaks grows.

During its visit to Kandahar, the Committee heard a variety of comments about the Afghan army covering the gamut from recklessness to courage. Most experienced views agreed that Afghan soldiers fought well in combat, even if they tended to lack a bit of battle discipline. There are difficulties however. Apart from the ever present concern that a trained soldier might run off to join the Taliban, desertion and difficult recruitment are reoccurring problems. Soldiers are recruited from all nine ethnic groups across the country and, once enlisted, will spend their three year tour of duty on operational deployment. Some simply grow tired of being away from home for perhaps the first time in their lives. Once paid, some just take their money back to their family, with no thought to their ‘professional’ military responsibilities. None of this information was supported by empirical facts. It was all anecdotal, but it did provide the Committee with a better feel for the circumstances.

In the end, the Committee came away with a realistic understanding of the difficulties prevalent in growing and developing an effective ANA. Good, moral armies are not built overnight and the ANA faces many years of hard work before it is able to stand by itself, in its own land. It is not yet ready to operate on its own.

The Committee feels this is one area where Canada could do more. A fully trained ANA that can protect its own country is essentially our ‘exit strategy’ for this mission. When the ANA can stand on its own, foreign military forces can go home. In light of this perspective, providing additional training support to the ANA should be the Canadian Forces’ number two priority after security operations, because the entire Afghanistan Compact security sector reform is based on the development of the ANA, to the point that they can effectively establish and sustain a secure environment throughout the country. Right now, the US, British and French are carrying the majority of the load. We could do more.

Not only are Canadian soldiers world-class trainers in military operations, the profession of arms in Canada is built on solid moral and physical criteria, guided by ethical leadership, all of which could usefully be applied to the development of the ANA.

Training the Afghan National Police

The development of the ANP has lagged behind that of the ANA and only in the past two years has the international community come to realize the importance of a stronger domestic police force, capable of contributing effectively to the establishment of peace and security and of law and order. The Afghan Compact authorized an ANP strength of 62,000 personnel and the international community, under US and German leadership have been offering effective help to reach this goal.

The ANP is part of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and is organized by regions, then provinces and then districts, each led by a Chief of Police.[30]

The basic training of a new ANP recruit is 8 weeks long, after which he/she is assigned to a duty station typically close to home. Many of the new ANP members lack formal education and are illiterate. Most of the new ANP officer-level personnel are trained at the Kabul Police Academy, where they receive a three-year university level professional education, after which they can expect duty assignments throughout the country.

The prevailing public perception is that the ANP is corrupt and ineffective due to the lack of mentoring and development, and also because of low pay (approximately US$ 70 per month), as well as inadequate supervision. Some of those issues will be addressed by on-going rank and pay reform, a programme to professionalize the force by retaining only trained officers and ensuring that all can receive their pay as earned. Despite the international community’s focus on ANP development, it is generally accepted that the ANP is about three years behind the level currently enjoyed by the ANA. The current goal is to reach a strength of 60,000 by 2011.

However, even now, the government of Afghanistan cannot afford to pay its police, so the international community has established a mechanism to pay ANP salaries through the Law and Order Trust Fund, administered by the UN Development Program (UNDP).[31] Costs are considerable. For example, the US contributed $20 million in 2004, $40 million in 2005 and $9.5 million in 2006. As of May 2006, the US Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs funding for the ANP program totaled nearly $1.1 billion for the period 2004-2007. In addition there was a transfer of $200 million from the ANA program to procure weapons and equipment for the ANP in 2005.

The government of Afghanistan is projected to maintain an ANP funding level through 2012 and beyond at about $170 million, but forecasted sustainment costs for the ANP (training, infrastructure and equipment) show it will be closer to $600 million. The gap will presumably have to be filled by the international community.[32]

But deterioration in the security situation in 2006, forced the MOI to act to rebalance the ANP and to establish the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP). The MOI also considered increasing the ANP to 82,000. To study the issue, a working group was constituted in February 2007, consisting of representatives of Germany, the US, Norway, the Special Representative of the European Union (EUSR), UNAMA, and the Afghan Government (MOI, MOF). It met four times, chaired by the German Embassy.

The proposal to increase the size of the ANP was based on an analysis that due to the security situation, which began to worsen in early 2006, more Afghan security forces were required in order to guarantee stability in the country. A series of steps were taken in to rebalance the ANP and establishment the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), which was essentially a local self-defence force, in the face of growing insurgent infiltration in the south.  

The primary mitigating factor on the proposal to increase the size of the ANP is the effect of this increase on the financial situation of both the Government of Afghanistan and the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan. The Afghanistan government does not have sufficient funds to pay the salaries of even a 62,000 police force and the Law and Order Trust Fund also constantly struggles to find enough funds.

The Task Force agreed that whatever decision is made the ultimate solution to increasing the effectiveness of the police lies not only in numbers, but in improving the quality of the police force, The MOI has reiterated the urgent and continuous need for an improvement of the quality of the police force, but professionalization of the police also depends on thorough reform of the Ministry of Interior itself.

The Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) is intended to be a community-based auxiliary police force to promote security at the district and village level, working under the local Chief of Police.  In the Kandahar area, candidates for the ANAP are recommended and selected jointly by the village elders and mullahs, and are sent back to their communities upon completion of training. Monthly pay is equivalent to that of regular ANP personnel and they are provided with uniforms and weapons when they complete the CSTC-A sponsored and a Canadian Forces delivered two-week basic training programme in Kandahar. Their initial contract is for one year, after which they have an option to renew it, or join the regular ANP. The current plan is to train and deploy 2,000 ANAP policemen in Kandahar Province, with an increase to 2,080 if funding permits.

In comparison to some, Canada’s contribution to training the ANP is small, but it does have some influence. Canadian civilian police and Canadian Forces Military Police provide instruction to the ANP on a variety of subjects including responding to an attack by an improvised explosive device (IED), first responder training, patrol training, weapons training, searching of suspects and vehicle checkpoint procedures. Some training support is also provided to Afghan National Auxiliary Police recruits at the US-run Regional Training Centre.

The Canadian Military Police Platoon is part of the KPRT. One detachment (2 military policeman) are tasked to support ANP training in the Kandahar area.

The RCMP work with international partners to assist with the mentoring and training of the ANP. One RCMP officer is deployed to the Police Reform Unit of the US-led Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in Kabul and one is placed in the Afghan Ministry of the Interior.

Within the KPRT, 10 Canadian civilian police, under the leadership of RCMP officers, assist in building the capacity of the ANP by mentoring the local police force. Canadian police are responsible for establishing relationships with law-enforcement partners and serving as the point of contact between the KPRT and local police. They work in close cooperation with other international policing partners. Canadian police officers conduct regular joint patrols with KPRT military officers to liaise directly with the ANP at numerous police stations and checkpoints both within Kandahar City and in some of the rural districts.

Since 2005, Canadian police officers have distributed more than 2,500 working uniforms that were locally procured and distributed to the ANP. Other essential policing equipment, including boots, flashlights, belts, traffic cones, spike belts and portable speed bumps have also been provided to the ANP.

Canadian development funds were obtained to improve the living/working conditions of six local ANP stations. Four were renovated. Three new police stations, located in key areas of the city, are being constructed with two more planned. 

In Kandahar, the fire department is part of the ANP. It lacked basic fire-fighting gear and so the KPRT Civilian Military Cooperation (CIMIC) team received equipment from the Langford, B.C. Volunteer Fire Department for the Kandahar Fire Department. The Langford Fire Department also donated approximately $400,000 of equipment to be divided between Kandahar and Kabul.

SHARING THE BURDEN

Throughout 2006, Canadians came to think that we were carrying too great a share of the fighting in southern Afghanistan. This perception was abetted by the concern of ISAF leaders that many of the participating nations had imposed caveats on the employment of their troops that denied ISAF commanders any flexibility in deploying ISAF troops to the areas of greatest threat. The caveat issue became a hot discussion within NATO circles over the summer and fall.

National troop contingents assigned to NATO have always come with caveats attached — some explicit, but many implicit. Most are reasonable in the circumstances. A common complaint was that some forces focused on reconstruction and development work in the north, were considered to be not pulling their weight because they were not allowed to deploy into the southern provinces and fight alongside the British, Canadians, Dutch and Americans. Ignored in the argument were two important facts. First, national parliaments and governments had agreed to deploy their troops to do a specific job and were fortunate enough to find themselves in an area where fighting was minimal. Such contingents were organized and trained to do the job they were sent to do — mainly run a PRT operation, which leads to the second point.

Most of the PRT oriented elements are not easily turned into a combat unit in a short time. They are neither trained nor equipped to fight serious battles. If they came south, they may have turned out to be more of a burden than a help.

The Canadian government has caveats on the Canadian Forces contingent in Afghanistan now. For example, the Canadian-led PRT cannot be packed up and deployed elsewhere without approval of our national chain of command.

While Canadian troops certainly suffered terrible injury and death, we must not allow ourselves to be disheartened by the loss. There have been over 10,000 Canadian Forces personnel deployed to Afghanistan since 2001. Counting our 46 tragic deaths and over 180 injuries, our troops have suffered about a 2% casualty rate. The Committee knows such calculations can seem cold-hearted, but it is important to keep an objective perception of the price being paid.

Canadians are not the only ones paying a price. Some have paid more. While others may not have paid the same steep price as that paid by our troops, many of our allies have been involved in the fighting. The following chart shows the number of ISAF military deaths so far, in Afghanistan.

NATO fatalities in Afghanistan by Country (as of adoption)

Source:      icasualties.org