NDDN Committee Report

MISSION DURATION

This is like playoff hockey Sir. Lose and you’re out. You don’t want to leave the game feeling you could have done more.

A young Canadian Army officer in Kandahar, over coffee
January 2007

Government has committed the Canadian Forces to operations in Afghanistan until February 2009. Minister O’Connor made that clear when he appeared before the Committee on May 30, 2006, saying, “People are speculating about 10, 15, or 20 years. That's just speculation. Right now, our military commitment — I can't speak for diplomacy or aid — is to February 2009.”

From all that has gone before it is apparent that the rebuilding of Afghanistan and the establishment of democratic institutions will not be complete by then. Many speak of taking decades or generations to finish the job. In the immediate future however, the International Community, agreed, in the Afghan Compact, to assist the Afghan government in a number of specific ways until at least 2011. Canada is a signatory to the Afghan Compact and has committed $1 billion in official development assistance to Afghanistan until 2011.

Apart from those wider concerns, the Committee sees two specific issues of prime importance to the Canadian military mission in Afghanistan. First is the hope that a sufficiently secure environment will exist in February 2009, in which reconstruction and development proceeds unhindered by the Taliban. Second is the desire to see adequately trained Afghan security forces able to protect their country on their own, by February 2009. If both those conditions exist at that time, Canada can happily declare an important part of the job done and bring its military forces home, leaving a robust contribution of professional development personnel in place. However, if either of those conditions is not present, and we insist on bringing the troops home, Canada’s current military responsibilities will have to be handed off to someone else. We will have left the job undone.

There are compromises available, but even they will require another country to deploy combat troops to Kandahar Province, in placed of Canadian troops. Canada may decide to keep its leadership of the PRT and simply bring home the battle group. Government may also consider moving the military reconstruction elements to another location in Afghanistan. Both of these options require additional combat troops from another country.

The Committee thinks however, that the central issue in any call to end the mission 2009 or earlier, is the fact that some simply do not like to see the Canadian Forces fighting. As we alluded to earlier, such a view is at odds with our national history, is not in keeping with our demonstrated strength of national character and it certainly is not in keeping with the current reality in Afghanistan.

Much in this conversation troubles us. It all sounds too much like packing our bags and getting out of town because the task is too hard. Is it really in our nature to plan to not complete our work simply because we don’t want to?

While visiting Kabul in May 2007, on behalf of CARE Canada, which has worked in the country for decades, former Deputy Prime Minister John Manley said, in a telephone interview, he felt it is too soon to conclude that Canada should withdraw its troops when its commitment expires in two years. "I don't think we should leap to conclusions," he said, and added that the debate about keeping troops in Afghanistan has to look at what progress has been made in establishing a civil society and what Canada's allies plan to do. "It's far too simplistic to say we've done our part and we should go," Mr. Manley said.[1]

The Committee strongly feels that any decision to end the military mission, at any time, should be based entirely on whether or not the strategic objectives assigned by Government have been achieved, or can be achieved. An important consideration in reaching that decision will include whether Canada wants to, or is able to, continue to pay the cost in terms of national blood and treasure. Simply put, in February 2009, is it still worth it?

In addressing the Committee on February 27, 2007, James Appathurai, the NATO Spokesman and Ambassador Christopher Alexander made it clear — talk of withdrawing from Afghanistan provides solace to our enemies, causes our allies to lose confidence in us and reduces Afghan hopes for continued help. Almost everyone we heard from agrees that Afghanistan is a long-term project and that Canada should be “in for the long haul.”

The Committee believes there is still time to give the military mission a chance to do its work. In acknowledging that government has a mission deadline in place, the first topic of discussion ought to be an examination of what we need to do to succeed in that timeframe — not why and how we should get out before the job is done. Having given ourselves a deadline, it is a moral and professional responsibility to develop and execute a plan that meets the goals we have set for ourselves. Given our military experiences during the past year, what is it we can now do to ensure we meet our objectives by February 2009?

Frankly, the Committee believes Parliament and government should not have put the country in this position in the first place. Approving an operation for a specified period of time is like saying we will come home after only one period of hockey, no matter what the score. Deciding a timeline and then deciding what to do is the reverse of what should happen. Proper strategic planning would start with a thought-out definition of the aim, followed by the development of a strategy and campaign plan to achieve it. Parliament should debate the strategy, not the timeline.

The Committee believes that the first step to set things right must be a renewed effort to help Canadians understand the military mission in Afghanistan. We also believe that government has an opportunity to regain constructive, non-partisan support for the mission by ensuring that a fully informed Parliamentary debate on mission objectives and strategy is conducted in 2008. The debate should be preceded by a concerted government effort to inform the public of the mission status and present a realistic measure of the mission’s success and the outlook for the future. Such information should also include a clear explanation of the benefits to Canada, to be gained from the effort.

RECOMMENDATION 4

The government should hold a debate on the Canadian mission in Afghanistan without delay, to provide Canadians with an accurate and up-to-date understanding of the aim and status of the mission, Canada’s role in it and to inform government decision-making relating to the mission deadline in February 2009.

STATE OF PERSONNEL

Given the pressure of combat, the Committee was impressed by the aggressive professionalism of the Canadian Forces men and women in Afghanistan and by how well they all seemed to be holding up.

The Army bears the brunt of the manpower load for the Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan. Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, the Commander of Canada’s Army appeared before the Committee on November 20, 2006 and outlined the personnel challenges he faces, the more important of which are covered in following paragraphs.

The Army has sufficient personnel to fulfill the requirements of the mission until 2009, but it will not be easy. One of the areas of considerable pressure is that facing senior non-commissioned officers (Senior NCOs — personnel in the rank of Sergeant). These men and women are the backbone of the Army. They lead soldiers in operations, train them in combat schools, and carry out other important duties, but there are simply not enough of them.

Apart from needing more people, the Army must also deal with the fact that its unit establishments do not match the structures that are being deployed to Afghanistan. For example, an infantry company in Canada is usually composed of 100 to 110 soldiers. The operational companies in Afghanistan are about 145 to 150 strong. That means when an infantry company is assembled for deployment, the Army has to draw on at least two other companies in the same battalion.

Lieutenant-General Leslie has directed that Army establishments here in Canada be restructured to mirror those in operations. The regular field force structure is migrating towards one that is based on three brigades and 9, perhaps 10, infantry-based battle groups. These brigades and battle groups are then to be organized, trained, and equipped just as they will deploy in operations. After its current tour of duty in Afghanistan ends, the 2^nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (2 RCR) will be designated a standing battle group for a five-year trial.

Apart from these general concerns, another personnel issue that gets attention from everybody is the care and handling of casualties.

Health Services

The Canadian Forces has established a separate Health Services command. A separate military health care system exists because The Constitution Act of 1867 assigned sole responsibility for all military matters, including military health care, to the federal authority. The National Defence Act gives the Minister of National Defence the management and direction of the Canadian Forces. He, in turn, gives management and direction of the medical and dental services to the Canadian Forces.

In addition, the 1984 Canada Health Act specifically excludes Canadian Forces members from the definition of “insured persons”. They are also excluded from insurance coverage under the public service medical and dental care plans. Accordingly, the Canadian Forces leadership has a strong legal and moral obligation to provide comprehensive health care to Canadian Forces members, whether in Canada or abroad. In return for the commitment and unlimited liability to serve their country, Canadian Forces members must be provided with health care comparable to that which is provided to all Canadians, yet tailored to meet their unique needs.

Despite what many people assume, the Canadian Forces Health Services does not provide regular health care to military families. The provision of health care to military families, like the provision of health care to all citizens, is a responsibility of the Provincial governments. Many military families, such as those in CFB Petawawa for example, being somewhat more remote from a big city than some other bases, have a difficult time finding a family physician. In such cases, the Military Family Resource Centres on Base offer counselling and referral help for military families who need such support, particularly when a spouse is deployed away on an operational mission like that in Afghanistan (more information about Military Family Resource Centres is found below).

In operations, health care takes on a whole new meaning and importance. There are generally two types of casualties in theatre — physical and psychological.

Physical Injury

The physical casualties, particularly battlefield casualties are dealt with quite effectively by the tactical level medical elements that extend from immediate first aid in combat, back through the unit medical station, to the Role 3[2] Multinational Hospital at Kandahar Airfield. During its visit to the Role 3 facility, the Committee was greatly impressed by the multinational team who treated everyone —  allied soldiers, Afghans and yes, even Taliban casualties — with the same professional urgency and care.

Casualties stabilized in the Role 3 facility, but who require further treatment beyond what is locally available, are usually evacuated to the US regional medical facility in Landstuhl,[3] Germany, a world-class hospital that provides the finest care available to our wounded service men and women. If a Canadian casualty is required to spend any amount of time in Landstuhl, the Canadian Forces makes arrangements for their next-of-kin to fly over and be with them.[4] General Hillier, the CDS, has presented the hospital with an official award of thanks, on behalf of Canada, for all they have done for Canadian troops. .

Depending on the nature of their injuries, casualties may be flown directly home to Canada from either the Multinational Hospital in Kandahar, or from Landstuhl. Upon return, they are put in the hands of the Canadian Forces Health Services for further care.

During our visits to CFBs Edmonton and Petawawa, Committee members spent considerable time talking with wounded soldiers who had come home and who were under continuing care. Every one of them — every one of them — had nothing but praise for the care and attention they had received from the time of their injury, no matter what route they followed in coming home.

When we met with more seriously injured soldiers in CFB Edmonton and CFB Petawawa, they clearly told us that their primarily concern was being able to remain in uniform. They knew that the extent of their injuries might not allow them to continue the kind of soldiering they had been doing, but each of them was determined to stay in the Canadian Forces and do something of value.

After a period of treatment, a medical judgement is made whether an injured soldier can continue to serve in the Canadian Forces. This judgement is based on the Canadian Forces policy of ‘universality of service’ which means, essentially, that everyone in the Canadian Forces is liable to be deployed into an operational theatre and they must therefore be able to meet the physical requirements demanded by such a posting. Regrettably, some wounds or disabilities are so serious they will never heal or be mitigated to the point of allowing the serviceman or woman to have any hope of regaining such a high standard of fitness.

Personnel who are medically released from the Canadian Forces are subject to the close scrutiny and administration of an integrated transition process that is cooperatively managed by DND and Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC). These young Veterans and their dependent families are eligible for all the compensation and benefits provided by the New Veterans Charter.[5]

Psychological Injury

Psychological injuries are more difficult to diagnose, treat and follow-up. Officially categorized as Operational Stress Injuries (OSI), these injuries can occur as a result of a myriad of incidents of stress and manifest themselves in a variety of ways. Here again, DND and VAC have developed an effective, cooperative programme for service personnel with OSI — both serving and retired.

It comes as no surprise that the stress of continued combat is one cause of OSI, but there are others. Those who live in anticipation, or dread of bad news, like families at home in Canada, might be affected by OSI too.

In preparing for the battlefield, Canadian Forces leaders at all levels are now routinely briefed on the signs of OSI and they keep close eye on their subordinates for any sign of abnormal behaviour. There is a traditional machismo in military ranks that, in past, has tended to mask, ignore and denigrate the apparent ‘weakness’ of ‘shell-shock’ or other signs of ‘cowardice.’ Although such extreme attitudes are no longer the case, the Committee did hear that the inclination to hide signs of OSI was still prevalent, particularly in the more combat-oriented units. As troubling as that may sound, it should also be noted that it is in those units that the low-level leadership is most attuned and able to detect signs of trouble, because the consequences of letting OSI fester on the battlefield are so dire. Brigadier-General Hilary Jaeger, the Canadian Forces Surgeon General at the time,[6] believes that the current generation of combat arms leaders is very aware of the crucial role they play in looking out for the mental health of their personnel, and they do consider the possible emotional reactions to each incident, encourage peer support, and they do not hesitate to ask for advice.[7]

Of primary importance is the pre-deployment training that the troops receive, for at least two reasons: one, the more confident a member is of his or her skills, the better they will be able to react when challenged; and two, the more a member feels part of a cohesive group, the better it is for their mental health. Challenging collective training is also extremely important in building a cohesive team.

Some of Brigadier-General Jaeger’s additional thoughts on the Canadian Forces mental health regime, which she outlined for the Committee on 27 November 2006, are outlined in the following paragraphs.

All soldiers are given a thorough but general psycho-social screening before deploying. Spouses are normally invited and encouraged to attend with the member. Regrettably, some spouses are not able to attend for a variety of reasons — some simply do not wish to attend, others may live out of town and still others may have other obligations at the time. The intent is to discuss any personal concerns or complicating circumstances the soldier may have (i.e. their own health status, an ailing parent, pending legal action etc.) to assess the impact that the deployment would have on these kinds of stressors. All Canadian Forces personnel also undergo a general medical screening done prior to being cleared for the mission.

While in theatre, all troops can access the mental health team, which currently includes a psychiatrist, mental health nurse and a social worker, or, they can discuss concerns with a Chaplain or general duty medical officer.

Concurrently, the Canadian Forces Health Services continue to work at educating all personnel on mental health issues. There are three important lessons. First, Acute Stress Reaction (sometimes known as Combat Stress Reaction, once known as ‘shell shock’) is the classic case of the good soldier who just can't go on any more, develops tremors, tearfulness, etc., or perhaps even runs away. This is an acute, usually short-term condition best treated close to the soldier’s unit through simple measures such as adequate rest and food, coupled with the clear expectation that the member is normal and will return to duty.  Most do return to duty if managed correctly.  Second, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a very different thing. As an anxiety disorder, it can arise on the basis of a single severe stressor and produce a variety of symptoms that can be lumped under three general headings — avoidant, re-experiencing, and hyper-vigilance. In the Canadian Forces, it seems to come to light in a delayed manner and therefore most of the military’s focussed mental health tools address this condition in the enhanced post-deployment screening process that takes place four to six months after military personnel return home. Third, the stresses of deployment can certainly make almost any mental health condition worse, from depression to simple phobias to personality disorders.

At the end of an operational tour of duty in Afghanistan, all personnel spend some “decompression time” in Cyprus, four days to relax and reduce the stress associated with coming back home. While much of the value of this activity is in the rest and recreation it affords the soldiers, there is an educational component that allows members to recognize, understand, and in some cases control their emotional reactions to certain situations. Some personnel, who have gone through the decompression process told Committee members that, before they left Afghanistan, some of them viewed the stop‑over in Cyprus as being a ”four-day obstacle between me and my wife and kids.” However, upon having completed the decompression programme, they all agreed the break was beneficial and needed, particularly for those who had been involved in prolonged bouts of combat.

Given the proven popularity and perceived value of the decompression period and its positive impact on managing the mental health of returning soldiers, the Committee wonders why such a decompression is not provided to those who are coming home for their mid-tour leave period. Is this just a simple oversight?

Consider the 1RCR Battle Group in ROTO 2, over the autumn and winter of 2006‑07. Almost from the days of arrival in August, the battle group remained in intense combat for at least three months and then saw sporadic fighting for the rest of the tour. Surely soldiers who were slated for their leave in, say, November, would have been subject to a significant degree of combat stress. Surprisingly, there seems to be no attention paid to the requirement for any decompression in such a case. So, given all the good work that has been done in recent years by the Canadian Forces in the field of OSI prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care, here we have an instance where it seems to have been ignored. A soldier who has experienced severe combat stress early in his tour and is scheduled to take his leave back home is simply put on a plane and sent back to his young wife and children. Why is he any less likely to be a victim of OSI than the soldier going home at the end of the tour?

RECOMMENDATION 5

DND should review the need for some sort of flexible decompression programme for soldiers going home on mid-tour leave.

Four to six months after returning home, the troops undergo an enhanced post‑deployment screening, which consists of a standardized, fairly extensive questionnaire followed by a semi-structured, one-on-one interview with a mental health professional. This is thought to be an effective tool for early detection of mental health and coping concerns. Brigadier-General Jaeger thinks four to six months is about the right point at which to do this testing because, at this point, many people who may have had symptoms upon their return home will have had them resolved spontaneously, while others may have either had delayed onset of symptoms or may be more willing to admit to symptoms that have been there all along. Moreover, a member who has any concerns about their mental health at any time can seek help from a variety of sources without waiting for this particular screening to be scheduled.

Not all major Army bases have equal access to mental and other health support. When we visited CFB Petawawa, we learned that among the three major Army bases that support Afghanistan deployments, CFB Petawawa was served by only nine mental health professionals, as compared with 27 at CFB Edmonton and 35 at CFB Valcartier. However, Brigadier-General Jaeger explained that about 30 health care professionals are available in Ottawa to support the nine in Petawawa whenever needed.

There are other mental health team members. In addition to military mental health support, there is an independent, but complementary network that is doing great work.

Operational Stress Injury Social Support (OSISS)

The Operational Stress Injury Social Support (OSISS)[8] network came into being in the spring of 2001, in response to a combination of recommendations made by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, the Department of National Defence Croatia Board of Inquiry and the Department of National Defence Ombudsman. The objectives of OSISS are:

a.      To develop social support programs for the members, veterans and their families who have been affected by operational stress; and

b.      To provide education and training that will eventually change the culture within the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces particularly — but also within Veterans Affairs Canada — toward psychological injuries.

The OSISS program provides confidential peer support and social support to CF personnel, Veterans, and their families, affected by an operational stress injury like anxiety, depression, or PTSD resulting from military service. Social support is offered by individuals who have themselves experienced an operational stress injury, and by family members who fully understand, through their own experiences, operational stress injury issues.

The OSISS peer support program is available throughout Canada to serving Canadian Forces personnel, Veterans and their families. Peer Support Coordinators are located in most major cities. Trained Peer Support Coordinators, who themselves have been injured by operational stress, offer support by listening to those who are suffering, drawing on similar experiences, and providing guidance on resources available in DND, VAC and their own community. Privacy is respected and conversations are kept confidential.

Family Support Coordinators offer support to families affected by an operational stress injury by listening, providing information, engaging in discussion groups, and making connections to community resources.

One of the advantages of the OSISS network is the fact that it is entirely independent of the military chain of command and so many serving personnel and their families feel more comfortable seeking OSISS assistance. Despite encouragement to the contrary, many believe that their military career will be adversely and irreparably affected if operational stress injuries are pursued through normal military channels.

To support the OSISS network, Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) has established OSI Clinics to help Veterans, Canadian Forces members, and eligible RCMP recovering from an OSI. Support is also available for their families. The OSI clinics have teams of mental health professionals, including psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses and clinical social workers, who provide high quality standardized assessment, treatment, prevention and support services.[9]

RECOMMENDATION 6

The government should recognize the critical and growing work done by the Operational Stress Injury Social Support Network and support it with appropriate funding and other resources, so that it can keep up with the growing need of caring for returning Afghanistan Veterans and their families.

Amenities

JTF-Afg is perhaps the best supported force Canada has ever sent abroad. The degree of support provided by Canadians across the country is simply phenomenal. It rivals, and sometimes surpasses that of the Second World War. Certainly nothing since then compares with what we see now.

This support has been manifest in the amount of material Canadians have sent overseas to the troops. Everything from Christmas cards from school children, to toques, to cakes has made its way to Kandahar. In fact, Committee members heard from several soldiers who sheepishly said that there was simply too much coming their way. However, they quickly pointed out that nothing was wasted and what did not end up with in military hands went to worthwhile charities in Afghanistan.

The Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency (CFPSA) provides morale and welfare programs, services, and activities to JTF-Afg. They have over 60 civilian volunteer employees (75% of whom are women) who organize sports, holiday flights and internet cafés for the troops, among other things. The Agency manages the amenities that support the decompression period in Cyprus too.

CFPSA also manages the Tim Hortons outlet at the Kandahar airfield, located right beside “Maple Leaf Gardens” a full-scale ball-hockey rink, complete with overhead floodlights. Situated along the “boardwalk”, a raised walkway around the main sports field, where other nations’ commercial outlets are beginning to appear,[10] the Tim Hortons trailer has become a symbol of Canada and a popular stop for troops of all nationalities living on the base. The outlet is not a traditional Tim Hortons franchise operation. It is owned by the Canadian government and cost $1.2 million to put in place, but profits have been coming in at a rate much higher than expected.[11]

CFPSA contracts live radio and television programmes to be transmitted to troops deployed overseas. Deployed troops can also make regular contact with family at home via e-mail. They can also book time at a video centre, to connect with their families in the supporting base video centre.

Books, videos, nightly movies and the popular Christmas show tour featuring well‑known Canadian celebrities — Rick Mercer for example — are all provided through CFPSA.

As might be expected though, most of this terrific support is found at Kandahar airfield, but some of it also makes its way out to military personnel serving at isolated forward operating bases and exposed strong-points. Exercise and weight-lifting equipment is a common feature at these isolated locations.

The entire morale and welfare support programme for the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan is better than it has ever been. There is however, room for more. A double-double is good with a Beavertail.

RECOMMENDATION 7

The government should actively encourage other appropriate Canadian entrepreneurs to increasingly participate in support of Canada’s overseas missions.

The Home Front

When Canadian Forces personnel deploy to Afghanistan, there are a number of organizations activated at home, to support the families left behind. They are:

a.      The Deployment Support Centre

b.      Unit rear parties

c.      Military Family Resource Centre; and

d.      Local civic groups and officials.

Deployments are built around a major unit such as an infantry battalion, but many troops from other units on a base, or within a brigade, are taken up in the mission. When such a large group deploys, the parent Canadian Forces Base establishes a Deployment Support Centre to act as a ‘one stop’ point of contact for all deployment support matters going to the troops overseas, or coming back to the families from the mission area. Each unit that has provided a significant number of troops for the mission has a representative located in the Deployment Support Centre to take care of unit personnel interests. In practice, everyone in the Deployment Support Centre cooperates with everyone else and helps all equally.

Complementing the Deployment Support Centre are the Unit Rear Parties, an element of a deployed unit that remains behind to take care of unit business, while the majority of the unit are away on operations. Rear Parties act as the contact point for families and play a part in keeping the families informed of the mission circumstances. They also provide support and advice to families left behind.

Perhaps the most formidable of support establishments available to families is the Military Family Resource Centre (MFRC), one of which is found on each major military base. They are part of a network of centres sponsored and managed by the Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency and each one is independent of, but enjoys the support of, the military chain of command. The MFRC provides a range of programmes and support for families from arranging for babysitters, to daycare, to counselling sessions. The MFRC acts as a drop-in centre or it can be a refuge in times of stress. They run Reunification Workshops to help families adjust to the return of parent from overseas. Deployment workshops are conducted for the children of service personnel, to help them understand and cope with the departure, or return of a parent. The average MFRC agenda is a model of service.

MFRCs are guided by a Board of Directors, usually composed of wives or husbands of military members and representatives of the military chain of command. The MFRC functions under the day-to-day management of an Executive Director and a small staff. The majority of the work is done by a corps of volunteers from the military community — mainly from those same stalwart military families of whom we are so proud.

Finally, but certainly not least, is the considerable support provided by local municipal organizations and officials how have helped to take care of military families at home.

Recently though, a troublesome issue has come up. As noted above, stress can affect military families at home, just as much as it might impact on soldiers serving overseas. As troops from CFB Petawawa returned home after six months of virtually constant combat in Afghanistan, there has been a noticeable increase in stress related cases among Petawawa military families, but wait times at a local clinic in Pembroke deny treatment for months. The clinic’s budget allowed it to handle about 10 referrals a month from the military base at Petawawa. However, over January and February 2007, the centre has become inundated with up to 90 referrals in one month. It needs more resources to handle the load.

While Canadian Forces personnel are exempt from the Canada Health Act and are therefore provided with health care by the Canadian Forces and federal funds, military families are not. Their health care, like all other civilians, is the responsibility of provincial governments. While they wait for help, some military families, who already bear a considerable burden, struggle even more.

Provincial authorities hesitated to take responsibility, so much so that the Ontario Ombudsman investigated the matter.[12] On April 13, 2007, in a news release,[13] the Ombudsman made it clear that something had to be done and that same day the Ontario government announced a $2 million emergency fund to provide children’s’ mental health support in communities facing crises, such as Petawawa, and committed to provide the Phoenix Clinic in Pembroke with the budget it requires to meet military families’ counselling needs.

According to the press release, the Ombudsman’s investigation confirmed that while health services for military members are a federal responsibility – and while the federal government has a moral obligation to support its troops – the province is solely responsible for mental health services for Ontario children, regardless of their parents’ occupation. There was no provision for dealing with a crisis situation like that in Petawawa.

The Provincial Ombudsman made three recommendations:

a.      That it immediately fund children’s mental health services through the Phoenix Centre;

b.      That it ensure long-term support for the children of military personnel in consultation with the federal government; and

c.      That it provide the Ombudsman with monthly progress reports.

The Ontario Government has accepted the Ombudsman’s recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION 8

Recognizing its moral responsibility, the federal government should strongly encourage the provincial and territorial governments to provide the resources needed to address the mental health support required by military families.

STATE OF MATERIEL

For perhaps the first time in Canadian military history, since the magnificent Canadian Corps in the First World War, we can say that Canada’s military contingent in Afghanistan is the best equipped and most capable unit of its size in ISAF. A notable achievement has been the speed with which some equipment has been procured. Many will have heard of the notoriously slow government procurement process, in which it has routinely taken up to 15 years to acquire an important piece of major equipment, but the process has been trimmed considerably for the Afghanistan mission. Since the Canadian Forces first joined ISAF in 2003, government, military and public service leadership has joined in a cooperative effort to get Canadian troops the clothing, weapons and equipment to do the job we have sent them to do.

The individual clothing and equipment worn by our men and women in Kandahar is simply the best the Canadian Forces has ever had. From the combat vests to helmets, the gear is first class. Of particular note are the ballistic glasses everyone is obligated to wear on operations. The committee saw pictures of Canadian soldiers with minor shrapnel wounds to their face and noted the fact that the area around the eyes was clear of wounds, due to the ballistic glasses. Another picture showed the lens of a set of ballistic glasses, in which a piece of shrapnel about the size of a small peanut was lodged, having been stopped before it reached the eye of a soldier.

Perhaps the most effective vehicle has been the LAV III armoured personnel carrier. It enjoys the confidence of the troops and many of them told us that the LAV III had saved their lives, both in ambushes by Taliban armed with machine guns and RPG rocket launchers, and in IED explosions.

To meet a growing improvised explosive device (IED) threat, the Canadian Forces acquired the South-African made RG-31 Nyala wheeled vehicle, which has a specially designed hull built to withstand the shock of a mine explosion underneath. The Nyala took a little over one year from first request until it was patrolling in Kandahar.

In November 2005, the M777 lightweight howitzer was an urgent operational requirement purchase. It was deployed in February 2006 — a mere four months later. DND is now negotiating for six additional M777s, with options on 15 more. Precision munitions that use a Global Positioning System (GPS) “to steer precisely to the target” are being bought for the new howitzers.

In 2006, the Canadian Forces deployed a squadron of Leopard tanks. Many people thought the days of the tank were numbered after the Cold War and that, particularly in Canada, there was simply no need for them. Indeed military plans had them being phased out in favour of lighter, more agile vehicles. However, continuing DND strategic analysis and operational lessons learned began to prove that a contemporary role did exist for tanks. Practical experience in Afghanistan also generated a requirement for their firepower and protection.

The Army quickly refurbished 17 tanks and deployed them to Kandahar. Canada is the only ISAF contingent to have tanks in Afghanistan and Canada has never before deployed a tank force that far away. Canadian tank and maintenance crews have done wonders in making the tanks operational in such an uninviting environment.

The Committee thinks some points should be made clear. First, the tank is an offensive weapon and its accurate direct fire capability provides a significant amount of combat power to the Canadian battle group, allowing them to fight more effectively. Second, the tank provides a hefty degree of protection for our soldiers. It can withstand rocket propelled grenade attacks and most improvised explosive devices seen so far.

For all the advantages of using a tank in these circumstances, concern developed about the effects of heat on the tank crews during the blistering hot summer months. With the ambient heat generated within a tank, temperatures on the inside might climb to over 50^o C. The Army examined possible solutions, from water-cooled vests for crew members to an interior air conditioning system similar to that built into the LAV III. Regrettably none proved to be workable so the decision was made to acquire new tanks.

It has been announced that the Government will purchase up to 100 Leopard 2 tanks, as well as securing the loan of 20 Leopard 2A6 tanks for use in Afghanistan this summer. The Leopard 2 tanks are newer, more heavily armoured and more technologically advanced than the Leopard 1 that is currently used by the Army. Leopard 2 tanks have significantly increased personnel protection against explosive devices and landmines, an ability to travel considerably faster in difficult terrain, more powerful engines, and stronger firing capabilities.

The 20 combat-ready Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks will be loaned by Germany for short-term requirements and will be deployed to Afghanistan this summer with the next rotation of Canadian troops. The 100 Leopard 2 tanks will be purchased from the Netherlands for the long-term requirements of the Canadian Forces. They are expected to be delivered by the end of summer 2007, after which they will be upgraded to Canadian Forces standards.

But General Leslie and Lieutenant-General Mike Gauthier, the Commander of Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, still have one further requirement they hope can be granted as quickly as others have been. They need medium-heavy lift helicopters.

Canadian Forces elements in Afghanistan depend, in large part, on vehicle convoys to transport troops into action, re-supply forward operating bases and conduct routine administrative movement in the Kandahar city area. Any road movement is liable to attack by an improvised explosive device, a suicide bomber or ambush by insurgents. Having a medium lift helicopter to move troops around the operational area will mitigate the risk of road movement and increase the speed of tactical deployments.

Lieutenant-General Leslie also pointed out that those same helicopters are operationally required here in Canada, for a variety of domestic operations. They are particularly valuable in moving people and supplies in the area of floods, fires and ice‑storms.

DND is currently pursuing a project worth a total of $4.7 billion to acquire a fleet of 16 medium-heavy lift helicopters for the Canadian Forces. However, the project schedule does not provide helicopters to the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan before February 2009. The Committee therefore feels that the project should be accelerated to the degree required to give our deployed troops the necessary helicopters as soon as practicable.

RECOMMENDATION 9

The government should accelerate its effort to expedite the delivery medium-heavy lift helicopters to support combat operations of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan and ensure that the helicopters acquired are effective in both domestic and international operations.[14]

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMBAT OPERATIONS, DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION

Humanitarian Aid, Development, Reconstruction and CIMIC

Before discussing issues of mission balance, it will be helpful to clarify a number of relevant terms. There are undoubtedly better technical explanations of the terminology discussed below, but the versions offered here were helpful in helping the Committee understand the concepts involved.

During our visit to the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, the Committee came to learn that there are subtle differences between humanitarian assistance, development programmes and projects, reconstruction projects and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC).

Humanitarian aid is the provision of emergency assistance and resources to help those in desperate, life-threatening circumstances. It alleviates human suffering and seeks to maintain human dignity. An example is the widespread relief effort deployed to help millions of people after the December 2005 tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean. Another would be the humanitarian assistance sent to counter extensive human suffering and starvation in Somalia in 1992. Humanitarian aid is invariably delivered by nations and organizations other than those at risk. It is often provided by UN relief agencies or other international humanitarian organizations such as CARE and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Development assistance seeks to address the underlying socio-economic conditions that may have led to a humanitarian crisis. It is distinguished from humanitarian aid as being aimed at alleviating poverty in the long term, rather than suffering in the short term. It may come from developed or developing country governments as well as from international organizations such as the World Bank.

Reconstruction is the repair or rebuilding of infrastructure that has been destroyed or damaged as a result of conflict, a natural disaster or long-term wear and tear. It may also involve the construction of a new facility. An example of traditional reconstruction activity by the Canadian-led PRT would be the rebuilding and opening of a local school. The provision of support and security to the construction of a new road — Route SUMMIT in the Panjwayi district — is another example of reconstruction activity.

Related to the provision of aid, development or reconstruction is the military Civil‑Military Cooperation (CIMIC) function, but where humanitarian aid, development and reconstruction are primarily focussed on the population, CIMIC is very much a military ‘force multiplier,’ exercised to assist military commanders in achieving their mission.
There is a CIMIC element in the Kandahar PRT. The main objective of CIMIC is to achieve the necessary cooperation between civil authorities and the Canadian Forces with a view to improving the probability of success of military operations.[15]

In Canadian Forces operational doctrine, the main CIMIC objectives are to:

a.      Fulfill obligations imposed by Canadian law (e.g. NDA and Criminal Code) and international law (e.g. Law of Armed Conflict, International Human Rights Law), the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977, Treaties and such memoranda of understanding (MOU) and agreements, or technical arrangements reached between national authorities or parties;

b.      Support the Task Force mission by providing support to civil administration, assisting or reinforcing the judicial, executive and legislative branches of government, as well as political and socio-economic infrastructure to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public institutions and civil services;

c.      Facilitate the Task Force mission by minimizing interference by the local population in the military phase of an operation while obtaining civil support for the civil phase and associated tasks;

d.      Assist all military commanders by providing those resources necessary to meet essential civil requirements, avoiding damage to civil property and usable resources, and minimizing loss of life and human suffering;

e.      Identify and coordinate the use of local resources, facilities and support such as civilian labour, transportation, communications, maintenance, medical facilities and supplies to restore local government; and

f.        Support, as required, IOs, NGOs, the UN and national civilian agencies.

In practical terms, military commanders deploy CIMIC teams at the tactical level to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the local people. If done well, it represents a classic ‘win-win’ situation. The population receives help and the military is able to concentrate on operations against the enemy.

Military Involvement in the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid, Development or Reconstruction

There is a fundamental, conceptual difference of opinion relating to the role of military forces in the delivery of humanitarian aid, development or reconstruction. Professional international aid agencies believe that military forces should, in no way, be involved in the physical delivery of any form of aid.

When he appeared before the Committee on June 8, 2006, Mr. Kevin McCort, the Senior Vice-President of Operations for CARE Canada told us,

… that we must not confuse the mandates of entities primarily responsible for combat operations with those of organizations dedicated to reconstruction. I know security is needed for development, just as I know development can reduce insecurity. But I am convinced organizations specialized in one should not assume they can take on the roles and responsibilities of the other.

Mr. Gerry Barr, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation offered further detail:

The issue that's front and centre for many NGOs active in Afghanistan is the blurring of lines between aid strategies and military strategies. You've heard a little bit about that here from my colleague Mr. McCort. This blurring arises when the military delivers aid, and when aid delivery by NGOs or the government is tied, implicitly or explicitly, to a military strategy…

Canada's official position is that there is no confusion of roles in the Canadian strategy in Afghanistan because humanitarian assistance — that is, specific life-saving
assistance — is not being provided through the provincial reconstruction team in Kandahar. In fact, that is simply a budget-line distinction, not a distinction of roles. The military is carrying out community development-type activities, such as repairs to local schools. There is a civil‑military cooperation fund managed by the military for these types of activities …

We need clarification of the military's position with respect to the use of development assistance in their campaign, and I would respectfully say, Canada needs to make this right[…] The delivery of aid should be focused on the needs and rights of Afghans and not tied to any military or political strategy, and in all but exceptional circumstances, military forces should avoid engaging in reconstruction or relief activities in Afghanistan. Aid workers are the right people for that job…

… the military should stick to security and protection of civilians, not to delivering assistance.

The Committee has heard these concerns before but believes there is some misconception about what the military is actually doing in the way of helping Afghans. While we understand the different conceptual roles of humanitarian assistance agencies and military forces, we do not think such definitive distinctions can be applied in Afghanistan because they simply do not reflect the reality on the ground.

We discuss the militarization of development assistance in Chapter 4. Here, we simply make the point that, we agree that where professional aid agencies are able to do so, they, not military forces, should deliver such assistance. Military commanders also agree. The problem arises when professional agencies cannot, or will not, engage a suffering population. This is the problem in Kandahar province. Not many NGOs or other aid agencies, beyond the World Food Programme (WFP) are present to help Afghans. Mr. Philip Baker, the Director General of CIDA's Afghanistan Branch, in response to a question about the number of NGOs on the ground in Kandahar Province, told the Committee on 12 December 2006:

… the number of NGOs active in the province is somewhat limited, compared to other provinces, due to security reasons. For example, there were NGOs that were beginning to implement the MISFA [Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan] … They attempted that during one year but then brought those to a halt due to security reasons. There are other small NGOs across the province that are starting to gear up, but for large food distribution, it's the World Food Programme that is manning and leading the show.

As has been shown elsewhere in this report, the Canadian Forces is not directly delivering aid or development to Afghans. Canadian military forces are facilitating the delivery of aid and development through CIDA and USAID representatives, who work with NGOs and IOs present in Kandahar province. They in turn, consult local Afghan leadership about what needs to be done.

The Committee also understands that the military CIMIC function is much more of a pointed concern for professional aid agencies. CIMIC does purposely engage in helpful acts with a local population, particularly immediately after a battle or period of combat. Understandably, given their ethics, Canadian military commanders want to help non‑combatants as best and as quickly as they can. It is also understandable that there is tactical advantage to helping local civilians and their leaders, to ‘win their hearts and minds.’ CIMIC has always been a legitimate function of military forces and is not intended to be a ‘neutral’ activity. That said, military commanders in Kandahar all agree that while CIMIC consultation with local civilian authorities should continue as long as needed, the provision of military assistance, such as digging wells and rebuilding village compound walls, will cease as quickly as professional development agencies can take over the job.

From what the Committee saw in Afghanistan, both military and professional development personnel on the ground understand what each other is doing and what each other is capable of doing. There seems to be no conceptual dispute among those who must simply get on with helping Afghans. Within the Canadian mission, it is the role of the PRT to work with professional development agencies to address concerns and misunderstanding. When difficulties arise at a higher level, ISAF and UNAMA are the appropriate authorities to resolve them.

BALANCE

The Committee has examined the issue of ‘balance’ in the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. The central concern was that too much time and effort was being spent on engaging the Taliban in combat, rather than getting on with widespread development efforts that are so obviously needed.

Of all the issues associated with the Afghanistan mission, this is one of the most oversimplified and therefore misunderstood. Many argued that the sheer numbers devoted to combat (a battle group of about 1200 personnel) compared to the total strength of the Kandahar PRT (about 350) indicated an undesirable emphasis on combat and not enough on development. It looked even worse when considering the common perception that there were only one or two DFAIT diplomats and only one or two CIDA development officers in the PRT.

Those who thought the mission lacked balance usually based their criticism on two criteria — money and numbers. Both criteria miss the point.

On 6 June 2006, Minister Mackay told the Committee that the incremental cost of the military portion of the Afghanistan mission, between 2001 and 2006 had been $1.8 billion. This is the cost generated by having the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. It does not include normal pay and equipment maintenance costs that would have been incurred during normal duty at home. Minister Mackay also told us that $466 million had also been committed to development activity during that same time frame. Some then compared the military cost to development commitments and complained that military expenditures outpaced development money by a ratio of more than 4:1 and that this somehow proved the mission was unbalanced.

This is a specious argument for three reasons. First, there is no accepted definition of what military/development cost ratio would be considered ”balanced” and second, the two activities are so inherently different that any comparison is largely irrelevant. Third, in all the Committee heard, no one really seriously thought that the time was right to withdraw the Canadian Forces from Afghanistan. So even when Canada’s military forces are not conducting operations (hypothetical at this point, because they are conducting operations every day), they would still “cost” Canada something even when staying in garrison.

What surely must be important criteria in each case is the effect of military or development activity, and the Committee heard quite clearly from a number of people that the general state of insecurity was inhibiting development. It then stands to reason that more military effect was needed during the period in question, in the hope that more developmental effect could follow. As we are seeing now, perhaps improved security will allow and call for more developmental effect — a welcome possibility.

The other common criticism of balance tended to focus on the numbers of personnel fulfilling the various roles. The overall Canadian Forces mission strength is about 2500, of which about 1200 are found in the combat-oriented battle group, the unit that does the fighting. The National Command Element, National Support Element and the Theatre Support Element, who control and administer JTF-Afg, account for a little more than 950 personnel, which leaves about 330 personnel in the PRT. However, critics argue that more than 100 of the PRT are combat troops required for local security. In addition the PRT headquarters and administrative support element take up more personnel so that in the end, only about 180 personnel are available to engage in reconstruction work. This is hardly enough they say.

Such criticism is based on a misperception of just what exactly the PRT does. As mentioned, the PRT does not actually go out and repair or build things for Afghans. The PRT works with Afghans to enable them to decide on the work to be done and then to do the work themselves. The PRT works to build Afghan capacity, using Afghans — putting an ‘Afghan face’ on the projects. In this way, the PRT personnel are facilitators, not labourers. As facilitators, they can generate and oversee much more work than their numbers might indicate. Within the PRT, CIDA administers the provision of money to projects and programmes being carried out by Afghans, military engineers supervise Afghans digging wells, RCMP help to train Afghan policemen, financed by money provided through CIDA. In this way it can be seen that balance is not solely an issue of numbers. A more credible and accurate assessment of mission balance is to measure the pace and effect of reconstruction activity being facilitated by the PRT. Although slow to get started, both the pace and effect of PRT work has picked up over the winter and so the 180 facilitators are having much more impact than one would expect if they counted numbers alone.

During the Committee’s visit to Afghanistan the Commanding Officer of the PRT, Lieutenant Colonel Simon Hetherington, clarified the numbers. While it was true that there was only one CIDA development officer in the PRT, she was not alone. There was one other development officer in the higher headquarters of Regional Command South, three further development officers working in Kandahar City and another three in the Canadian Embassy in Kabul. As well, the one diplomatic officer in the PRT and the one diplomatic officer acting as the Political Advisor to the Commander JTF-Afg were not isolated either. They were in regular contact with Canadian diplomatic and development personnel in the Canadian Embassy, under the direction of Ambassador Arif Lalani.

The PRT also includes five Canadian civilian policemen, led by RCMP Chief Superintendent David Fudge. This contingent, working with other allied police, helps to train the local Afghan National Police (ANP) and will grow to 10 policemen by March 2007. There is also a 25-person Military Police Platoon that supports the training of the ANP. Two officers from Corrections Services Canada have also been deployed to Kandahar, to work with allies in establishing a proper Afghan detention system.

The PRT reconstruction programme is pursued in a manner that engages Afghans themselves. It asks local village Shuras to decide on what reconstruction projects are needed and the priority in which they should be tackled. In this way, not only are Afghans helping themselves, they are being encouraged to take ownership of local projects and develop their own capacity for further work. The PRT facilitates reconstruction work by Afghans, it doesn’t do it for them.

The Honourable Joseé Verner, Minister for International Development explained why such local ownership is important, when she appeared before the Committee on 12 December 2006:

Throughout Afghanistan, these projects — some 8,100 to date — are being done by community councils and less than 1% have been subject to rebel attacks. It is for just this reason that we are working with local partners, with elected councils, with representatives of the population. We are assured that they are in full possession of the projects because these people enjoy considerable support.

It is important to remember that the Kandahar PRT is not a Canadian PRT, but a Canadian-led PRT. In addition to the Canadian elements mentioned there are representatives of the USAID, the WFP and the United National International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). The PRT is more of a ‘cooperative’ than a ‘unit,’ in which various teams with a variety of talent contribute their services and management skills to a growing menu of development activities.

In the end, when the PRT administrative elements are put aside, the Committee learned that there are about 180 PRT personnel who deploy into the field to facilitate development and reconstruction work.

Still, to many, 180 reconstruction personnel does not seem balance the 1200 combat personnel, but closer examination reveals no great cause for worry. Where the 1200 combat personnel have defeated hundreds of Taliban, the 180 reconstruction personnel, because they facilitate the work of Afghans, have had positive influence on thousands of Afghans, an effect out of all proportion to their number. This extended impact is explained by the fact that PRT personnel act as ‘enablers’ not ‘doers.’ The Committee was impressed by this short list of PRT general accomplishments during the period of their rotation from August 2006 to January 2007:

a.      Medical — village medical outreach teams that helped repair local clinics, administered first aid and health care to rural Afghans and provided professional support to Afghan hospitals;

b.      The provision of equipment to Afghan security forces, assistance in building infrastructure such as police stations and extensive mentoring of Afghan soldiers and policemen;

c.      16 schools were repaired; two new schools were opened, hundreds of tents were provided to act as ‘portable’ classrooms to accommodate all students; and

d.      The PRT has paid students and teachers to begin an immense cleanup of the debris-strewn Kandahar Technical College, the first of small-scale projects that could become a million-dollar investment. In February 2007, the university, after months of delays due to earlier contractor woes, will fire up a new $17,000 Canadian-supplied generator, and plumbers will put the finishing touches on new water and plumbing systems.[16]

The Committee was also reminded by Minister Verner that:

In Kandahar, such programs have achieved good results in close to 400 villages so far, with more to come. In Kandahar, Provincial Reconstruction Team projects are being completed at a rate of roughly 10 to 20 new projects per month, touching 7 Kandahar districts so far. We are funding the roll out of these projects to 2 more of the 17 Kandahar districts, and more will follow.

In the province of Kandahar alone, Provincial Reconstruction Team projects with CIDA and other donor assistance have resulted in tangible improvement in the life of villagers and the rural population. For example, more than 1,000 wells have been dug and 800 manual pumps have been distributed; 4 large water reservoirs are now in service; 100 km of irrigation canals have been rehabilitated; the provincial transportation and electricity networks have been improved. This means 150 km of new roads, 4 bridges, 50 km of power lines, 10 transformers, and 42 power generators.

So it becomes apparent that this “balance” issue is not as simple as was originally thought. There is more.

When Professor Douglas Bland, the Chair of Defence Management Studies at Queen’s University, appeared before the Committee on 9 May 2006, he addressed the question of mission balance and said that criticisms often rest on an error in reasoning, in which people see balance and equal as synonyms. “True balance,” he said, “is achieved one ‘D’ at a time, when just the right number of resources are provided to meet the particular demands of each of the three Ds.” He went on:

Balance is sustained when we adjust resources as the needs and circumstances change. There is no logical or appropriate way to balance the Ds without measuring particular needs independent of each other. In other words, there is no logic or requirement to make all three Ds equal in every respect.

With regard to the first D — diplomacy, for example, some 25 or 30 Canadian diplomats are stationed in Kabul today, where there were none in 2001. Scores of Canadian officials, on the other hand, in Ottawa, at the UN, at NATO, in Washington, in European capitals, and elsewhere, are coordinating Canada's diplomatic efforts and policies for humanitarian and security missions in Afghanistan. Then consider the second D — development. Afghanistan is Canada’s largest recipient of official development assistance and is one of the leading developmental donors in Afghanistan. The total allocation of development assistance to Afghanistan, over the period 2001 to 2011, is about one billion dollars. The third D — defence — is seldom reported as fully as it could be. Canada's military operations get a great deal of attention in the media, and although it has improved lately, the previous emphasis on combat and flag-draped coffins left many Canadians with the impression that combat is Canada's only mission and that members of the Canadian Forces spend all of their time fighting. Not enough Canadians know that the Canadian Forces support valuable and extensive reconstruction work too.

During the early stages of study, the Committee heard from many witnesses who complained that Canadian media at large and those embedded with Canadian troops in particular were being unbalanced in their reporting, concentrating almost entirely on exciting combat stories and tragic deaths of Canadian soldiers in action. Solemn ‘ramp ceremonies’ made frequent appearances on television screens and front pages.

Seemingly forgotten in all this battle coverage was the fact that other Canadians were advising the Afghan government, training Afghan National Police, mentoring Afghan National Army units, building roads and canals and sending medical outreach teams to visit mothers and babies in rural villages. Many thought the only ‘imbalance’ to be found was in media reporting.

The Committee found no disagreement from anyone that more development was needed. The argument was not whether development assistance should be increased, but rather when, how and by who. The international strategy, wholeheartedly supported by Canada, is based on building the capacity of Afghans to help themselves. In Kandahar Province, Afghans decide, design and implement their own development plans with Canadian help. This means that things happen at a pace acceptable to Afghans.

In the Committee’s view, the ideal circumstance would be to have a clear ‘imbalance’ in the favour of reconstruction and development work. It is universally accepted that the preferred circumstance is less combat and more development and reconstruction. Minister O’Connor told the Committee that “there is no military solution to Afghanistan.”[17] When Brigadier-General Tim Grant, the Commander of JTF-Afg was briefing the Committee during their visit in January 2007, he made it clear that the military aim is to “work itself out of a job.” Lieutenant-Colonel Simon Hetherington, the Commanding Officer of the Kandahar PRT reinforced these views by explaining that as quickly as the security environment improves and the Taliban threat recedes, military combat forces will be replaced by more reconstruction and development activity.

The current reality is that much of the fighting has been initiated by offensive action of the Taliban. Those who call for more ‘balance’ (less fighting) tend to ignore the fact that the Taliban have a ‘vote’ in whether fighting occurs or not. Where Canadian combat initiative occurred it was in reaction to an impending Taliban threat, usually the occupation of local villages by insurgent forces. In this way, the degree of combat is entirely dependent on the presence of Taliban forces and activity. No Taliban; no fighting. Discussions of balance have never considered the possibility of even greater combat effort in the short term, to generate a major effort to eliminate the long-term Taliban threat.

So it is clear to the Committee that the only impediment to more Canadian reconstruction and development work is the continuing existence of an insecure environment in Kandahar Province. The Committee heard from a range of witnesses who told us that military forces should not be reduced at this time, while the threat remained. Military briefings, not surprisingly, also made this point clearly.

In Afghanistan, Sara Chayes[18], a prominent American author and Kandahar entrepreneur was quite clear in how she felt about the issue of ‘balance.’ When asked about her views of the so-called Canadian ‘debate’ over whether to keep military forces in Afghanistan or bring them home, she said that, framed that way, the question is much too simplistic. “Kinetic operations are essential,” she said. Ms. Chayes also explained that the Afghan insurgency is not home-grown. In her view it is an ‘invasion’ from Pakistan, using Taliban foot-soldiers. More aid is definitely needed, but it cannot be just given to Afghans without effective oversight to ensure it is not lost to endemic corruption. In the meantime, the lack of security demands that substantial military force remain in place.

Another clear message came from the Afghan Women's Counselling and Integration Community Support Organization, in a letter[19] to the Committee in January 2007. The organization expressed concern that the current debate about Canada's mission in Afghanistan oversimplifies and politicizes the very complex conflict and humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. They thought that the choices for Canadian policy should not be limited to either maintaining the current military mission or withdrawing altogether. In their view, they strongly felt that Canada's military presence is essential.

In late May 2007, there were growing indications that the security situation in Kandahar Province was improving. There is considerably more reconstruction and development activity than at this time last year. The soldiers are seeing significant improvement on the streets and in the markets. A number of NGOs are now doing good work in the area. 

In light of overwhelming evidence, the Committee is satisfied that the Canadian mission in Afghanistan is adequately balanced for the circumstances. In fact, the mission is showing impressive flexibility in adjusting the balance as circumstances change. Nonetheless, we must not lose sight of the fact that more development and reconstruction aid must begin to flow as the security situation improves.

RECOMMENDATION 10

The government should rebalance the diplomatic, development and defence components of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, to increase the focus on diplomacy and development.

CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING MISSION EFFECTIVENESS

The Committee has maintained a consistent interest in the government’s mechanism for measuring the effectiveness and success of the Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan, but was, for some time, disappointed in the lack of a clear explanation. How do we know if we are doing any good?

Interestingly, the 2005 Defence Policy Statement presents eight factors to be considered by Government before reaching a decision to deploy a military mission overseas. A clear exit-strategy or desired endstate is one of them, but the list does not include clear metrics against which the effectiveness or success of the mission can be measured. Without such measures of mission success, how can we be sure we are closing on the desired endstate?

We understand that certain mission parameters may be classified for operational security reasons, but, in our view, it cannot be that no mission parameters are made public. We also understand that the nature of mission parameters will vary at different levels and that their attainment may ebb and flow depending on the situation, particularly at the tactical level. However at some higher level, Government must be able to explain to Parliament, how it goes about judging whether the Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan is meeting it assigned objectives.

The Committee was therefore happy to see measurable criteria, in the form of clear questions, presented in the government’s recent report on the progress being made in Afghanistan.[20] The questions are:  

a.      Is there a democratically-elected government of Afghanistan that represents the will of the Afghan people, and does it want the support of the international community in establishing security and providing development assistance?

b.      Do the United Nations, NATO and the Government of Afghanistan welcome Canada’s participation in the mission and are our allies willing to share the burden in our sector of Afghanistan?

c.      As progress is made in building the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), is the Government of Afghanistan prepared to commit more ANA and ANP units to Canada’s sector of Afghanistan? Are Canadian and allied forces making progress training the ANA and the ANP?

d.      Is progress being made in combatting corruption in Afghanistan?

e.      Is our assistance making a difference? Further, would leaving Afghanistan jeopardize the progress being made in education, the construction of basic infrastructure and the advancement of the rights of women in our sector?

f.        Is the Afghan government committed to respecting human rights, including the rights of women?

Two other considerations include the level of international community burden‑sharing across the three pillars of the Afghanistan Compact and how Canada’s contribution stands in relation to that of other nations that have also pledged to assist in Afghanistan.

MISSION SUCCESS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

The Committee expressed an interest in knowing whether the current mission in Afghanistan could be accomplished, while still meeting Canada’s other international obligations. There are many facets to this issue, but generally, we think it is fair to report that throughout the duration of the mission, Canada has indeed succeeded in meeting its other existing international obligations.

The Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan does not impede the conduct of any other existing Canadian international military obligation. A list of current operations being conducted by the Canadian Forces, concurrent with Afghanistan operations, is found on the DND website at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/current_ops_e.asp.

Although all current military commitments are being met, the Committee heard from a number of military witnesses who made the point that the Canadian Forces could not, while it is conducting the current mission in Afghanistan, deploy an equivalent force to some other overseas mission. We recall Lieutenant General Leslie’s remarks earlier in this Chapter, describing the personnel strains that challenge him. Commodore Margaret Kavanagh, the Commander of the Canadian Forces Health Services told the Committee, on 27 November 2006, that there are difficulties in her area too. When asked if the Health Services could support another mission, she replied, “Could we do another Afghanistan‑type mission with the same capability? No. Could we do something else? Yes. It just depends on where it is, what we're being asked to do, and who else is coming to the party with us.”

The process of taking on an international military obligation is not ad hoc, despite the occasional event where it might seem so. Theoretically, government can deploy every soldier, ship and airplane it owns, so, equally theoretically, government can take on as many commitments as it has resources for. In reality, the Canadian Forces is not able to deploy ‘everything’ all at once, because a good proportion of their kit and capability must remain in place to serve the institution — training schools, recruiting offices, staff colleges, maintenance workshops, supply depots. Once this ‘corporate’ requirement is set aside, there is a certain amount of deployable capabilities available to go where the government sends them.

However, these deployable capabilities are not all ready to go all the time. The Navy, Army and Air Force each have their own unique ‘managed readiness system’ that ensures the availability of certain capabilities. In the case of the Army’s managed readiness system, Major-General Stuart Beare, the Commander of the Land Force Doctrine and Training System, told the Committee that the Army is required to maintain, “… the capability to provide, one high-readiness brigade headquarters, and, two land task forces for expeditionary operations on an enduring basis.”

Government decides when and where to deploy the Canadian Forces. In arriving at such a decision, they will have to consider a variety of factors, an important one of which is the priority of the mission compared to other obligations being undertaken at the time. Military advice from the Chief of Defence Staff will offer views on the risks involved and the menu of capabilities needed to achieve assigned objectives. In the end, government can send its military assets anywhere it wants to, but any decision will invariably involve important trade-offs, which is why prioritization is so important.