FAAE Committee Report

The world needs more, not less, Canadian leadership and action with respect to international democratic development efforts.

Grant Kippen, former NDI director for Afghanistan[259]

Why should democracies bother with promoting their form of government in other parts of the world? The answer is not simply that it corresponds to our highest ideals of government, but also that it serves our national interests. Democracies are more peaceful. They govern their economies better, and they make better trading partners.

- Professor Jeffrey Kopstein[260]

[W]hat is the record of Western governments and international institutions? Despite all the policy statements and declarations, how serious are they about democracy promotion?… there is considerable evidence that the rhetoric about democracy promotion is not matched by the reality of actual support.

Professor Gordon Crawford[261]

Canada has always paid lip service to the value of democracy promotion — what democracy has not? — but unlike trade promotion or the responsibility-to-protect principle, it has never been a fundamental of Canadian foreign policy. ….As in so many other areas of international policy, on democracy we talk a good game, but the Government of Canada has very limited capacity.

Thomas Axworthy, Chair, Centre for the
Study of Democracy, Queen’s University[262]

As the Committee indicated in the report’s first chapters, democracy promotion is not an uncontested foreign policy objective given the current controversies and challenges that surround it, notably in the Middle East. Although Foreign Minister, Peter MacKay, was confident that the “vast majority of Canadians will agree that democracy should be a high priority for our foreign policy”[263], Jeffrey Kopstein acknowledged that “many Canadians tend to be wary of democracy promotion.”[264] We believe that support for international democratic development, using a universal human rights-based approach as we have defined it in Recommendation 1, will alleviate those concerns. Democracy promotion in this sense can be compellingly affirmed to be in the Canadian and the global interest.

Moreover, virtually all of our witnesses were positive about Canada’s role in assisting democratic development. None argued that Canada should be doing less in this field. Many argued that Canada should be doing considerably more and we will examine their proposals for doing so in the next chapters, contributing our own ideas as well.

First, however, the Committee believes that there must be the political leadership in place and clear, coherent policy direction applied across the federal government. Mindful of the citation from Crawford above, that direction must not only be declaratory but must be manifested in concrete action in support of the stated policy goals.

The Committee agrees with Minister MacKay that: “Canada's commitment to democracy extends well beyond politicians, diplomats, and development experts. Democracy involves our whole society, all of Canada. From our universities to our faith-based organizations, from our professional associations to our political parties, we should mobilize Canadian society in promoting democratic values.”[265] At the same time, government leadership is essential since most of the funding for democracy support will be from public sources. Moreover, it is essential that the Canadian government speaks with one voice and conveys consistent messages in regard to democratic development. Uncoordinated or incoherent actions will weaken Canadian support for democracy abroad.

At present, Canada lacks a comprehensive policy framework on democracy assistance. It is our expectation that this report will spur the articulation of such a framework making support for democratic development a key priority of Canada’s international policy.

Recommendation 9

Accompanying its comprehensive written response to the recommendations in this report, the Government should outline a comprehensive “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-Canada” policy framework on Canadian support for international democratic development. This framework should as a minimum:

·        Commit to making support for democratic development a key priority of overall Canadian international policy;

·        Set out a broad conception of democratic development and common Canadian policy objectives in this field;

·        Commit to providing multi-year funding sufficient to address those policy objectives and to finance the instruments chosen to implement them.

At the government’s own policy and program level, it should ensure that it has the means to respond effectively and coherently to the evolving challenges of democratic development. At present, the government has a small Democracy Unit within DFAIT which was established in 2006. In keeping with the priority attached to democracy support as government policy, the Unit could be enhanced and represented at a higher level within DFAIT’s policy planning structure. (It might also be advisable to create a policy coordination capacity within the Privy Council Office (PCO) in order to ensure there is coherence among all Canadian government activities in the area of democracy promotion.)

Most government funding for democratic governance programs currently comes from CIDA’s budget. The Committee will propose a major new arms-length funding instrument for democracy support in the next chapter. However, CIDA will continue to be an important player in terms of democracy assistance programs. It has created an Office of Democratic Governance in October 2006, the functions of which were elaborated on by CIDA President Robert Greenhill in his testimony to the Committee in March 2007, and in the CIDA Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008 — Estimates Part III, as we have discussed in Part II of the report.

The Committee also takes note that Bill C-293, An Act respecting the provision of development assistance abroad, was passed on division by the Committee in December 2006, and passed third reading on division in the House of Commons on March 28, 2007. If this bill eventually becomes law, it will, for the first time, give a legislative mandate to CIDA. Bill C-293 makes poverty reduction a priority of Canada’s ODA and also includes accountability elements. We have argued strongly in Chapter 2 that democratic development and poverty-reducing socio-economic development are integrally linked. Hence, under any likely future scenario, we do not foresee any conflict with democratic governance remaining part of CIDA’s mandate.

With respect to strengthening the accountability of all Canadian aid, we note that the Government has underlined this aspect in budgeting an increase of $900 million for foreign aid over the next two years. As the Budget Plan released on March 19, 2007 states:

[T]his Government will examine options to ensure the independent evaluation of our aid program, providing parliamentarians and Canadians with an objective assessment of the results we achieve with our international assistance. It will provide the knowledge to better understand the results we are achieving, so that the Government can make more effective choices about our aid spending. This Government will provide Canadians with reporting on a more frequent basis that is easier to understand, including report cards on our effectiveness in individual countries.[266]

In that context, the Committee believes that CIDA’s Office of Democratic Governance should make available to Canadians as much information as possible on what CIDA funding is accomplishing in the area of democratic development. CIDA funding of what it categorizes as democratic governance should be part of the independent evaluation of Canada’s aid program that the government has indicated it will undertake. Moreover, the government’s plans regarding this independent evaluation should take into account the Committee’s recommendations calling for a comprehensive independent assessment and evaluation of all existing Canadian support to democratic development.

Recommendation 10

The government should ensure that all government activities in the area of international democratic development are carried out on a coherent basis.

Recommendation 11

The government should ensure that CIDA, through its Office of Democratic Governance, makes available to Canadians as much information as possible on what CIDA funding is accomplishing in the area of democratic development. Moreover, the government’s plans for the independent evaluation of Canada’s aid program should take into account the Committee’s recommendations calling for a comprehensive independent assessment and evaluation of all existing Canadian support to democratic development.

Finally, there is the question of the future role of the Democracy Council, which currently brings together senior executives of DFAIT, CIDA, and six independent arms-length bodies as already referred to in previous chapters. At present, it is a limited informal forum for the sharing of information and good practices among participants. How should it evolve? A background note prepared for the Council-sponsored “Dialogue on Canada’s Approach to Democratic Development” of February 15 2007 states that:

The Council is currently examining options to evolve into a more permanent structure that will facilitate the involvement from a wider Canadian community of practice in democratic governance. The Council will engage other democracy promotion organizations with the aim of enlarging the community of practice in this area.[267]

In terms of broadening the consultative aspect of the Democracy Council, the Committee was told by one witness, Fergus Watt of the World Federalist Movement — Canada, that : “We feel it is deficient because it doesn’t involve a sufficient number of civil society organizations. … To get critical feedback in a consultative process, you need to consult more than just the organizations that are also getting their funding from government.”[268]

A January 2007 submission from the Parliamentary Centre suggested that the Democracy Council “should become a useful instrument for strengthening the Canadian voice and ensuring that it is heard internationally through the following developments:

·        By expanding the membership of the Council to include the full range of Canadian organizations directly engaged in the promotion of democracy internationally;

·        By having the Council convene public meetings of Canadian scholars, governmental and non-governmental experts, politicians and policy makers with international counterparts to promote understanding of the challenges of democratic development and define where Canada can provide leadership;

·        By giving the Council the mandate and resources to support Canadian governmental and non-governmental engagement in international forums on democratic development.”[269]

The most extensive proposal on future development of the Democracy Council came from Rights and Democracy, the arms-length body established by Parliament in 1988. Their submission argued:

Between the status quo and the creation of a centralized system of democracy promotion, there is a place and need for dialogue and convergence between the Canadian government and independent or arm’s length institutions devoted to international democratic development. In the last year, such an initiative was put forward: the Democracy Council. Over time, this Council could be expanded, refined and developed along the following lines:

1.       A consortium of independent and arm’s length Canadian institutions created by Parliament should meet two times a year with the following objectives:

·        To share information on their respective plan of action, research needs, best practices in knowledge creation and transfer, policy and institution development in order to further consolidate a common knowledge base, build strategic partnerships and convergence of action;

·        To define, when politically desirable and possible, convergent or joint programs for a given country or region;

·        To share information concerning national, regional and international development that may affect Canadian institutions or orient their activities;

·        To reflect on Canadian policies, objectives and priorities in the area of international democratic development and introduce joint proposals to the Canadian government.

2.   Two times a year, we propose that this consortium of independent or arm’s length institutions meet with Canadian authorities (interdepartmental committee or any other formula) with the following objectives:

·        To share with government authorities the content of their work and recommendations;

·        To be informed or planned governmental policies, objectives and priorities;

·        To identify specific initiatives that call for urgent action;

·        To contribute to policy coherence.[270]

The Committee agrees that an enlarged Democracy Council process could contribute to useful policy consultation, to greater coherence of efforts among Canadian organizations engaged in democracy support activities, and to more international impact. However, the Committee believes that this evolution should take place within the context of the establishment of a major new arms-length instrument for Canadian democracy support, to which we now turn.