PACP Committee Report
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Efforts were made by some witnesses to discredit or refute certain elements of the Auditor General’s report. These efforts were generally self-serving and wholly unconvincing. From past experience, the Committee is quite familiar with the audit methodology employed by the Office of the Auditor General and the vetting process the Office follows to confirm the findings that methodology produces. This process is painstaking and thorough. Those who are subject of an audit have ample opportunity to correct misinterpretations and errors of fact. They are also given an opportunity, should they remain at odds with the Auditor General regarding her observations, to say so at the end of audit chapters. The Committee notes that no such objections appear at the end of any of the chapters on the Sponsorship Program that it has reviewed.
The overwhelming weight of the evidence presented to the Committee has consistently confirmed and strengthened the observations and conclusions made by the Auditor General in her report. Thus the summary of audit findings found in the opening paragraphs of the report rest on a solid foundation of empirical evidence and remain as accurate and credible now as when first written. The Auditor General wrote in those paragraphs that her Office:
found that the federal government ran the Sponsorship Program in a way that showed little regard for Parliament, the Financial Administration Act, contracting rules and regulations, transparency, and value for money. These arrangements — involving multiple transactions with multiple companies, artificial invoices and contracts, or no written contracts at all — appear to have been designed to pay commissions to communications agencies while hiding the source of funding and the true substance of the transactions.
We found widespread non-compliance with contracting rules in the management of the federal government's Sponsorship Program, at every stage of the process. Rules for selecting communications agencies, managing contracts, and measuring and reporting results were broken or ignored. These violations were neither detected, prevented, nor reported for over four years because of the almost total collapse of oversight mechanisms and essential controls. During that period, the program consumed $250 million of taxpayers' money, over $100 million of it going to communications agencies as fees and commissions.
Public servants also broke the rules in selecting communications agencies for the government's advertising activities. Most agencies were selected in a manner that did not meet the requirements of the government's contracting policy. In some cases, we could find no evidence that a selection process was conducted at all.38
In addition to finding that the facts surrounding the Sponsorship Program, as presented by the Auditor General, are beyond dispute, the Committee endorses her recommendations without reservation. It has noted the Government’s acceptance of those recommendations and is aware of several actions taken to realize them. Nonetheless, to provide the Committee, Parliament, and the people of Canada with the assurance that those recommendations will be implemented fully and in a timely manner, the Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 1
That the government provide the Committee with an action plan that includes target implementation and completion dates for the components of the Auditor General’s recommendation.
No other issue in recent history has angered Canadians to the extent that the scandal surrounding the Sponsorship Program has. It has sometimes been said in its defence that the Program served and achieved a good purpose: the preservation of Canadian unity. This argument implies an ends-justifies-the-means rationale which suggests that any mismanagement, regardless of how reckless, costly, and damaging, should be overlooked because the ultimate objective was attained. Yet regardless of whether the Program achieved its objectives (an assertion that remains without an empirical foundation), it would not have justified the cavalier fashion in which rules were broken and tax dollars squandered — those are the real reasons why Canadians are angry and their respect for governing institutions jeopardized.
Canadians need, therefore, to know conclusively that the opportunities that were exploited to produce the scandal have been closed. They need concrete assurance that the actions that produced this scandal will never be repeated. Accordingly, they and their Parliament must be kept regularly informed of the progress being made toward full implementation of the Auditor General’s recommendations. The Committee therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 2
That the government provide an annual report to the House of Commons on progress being made in implementing the action plan until it is completed.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
The Committee learned from its witnesses that government rules, regulations, and procedures surrounding contracting and financial management are for the most part sound. Nevertheless, it was also brought to the Committee’s attention that there are a number of areas in which greater precision is required.
Mr. Guité testified that when he was in charge of the CCSB, he signed invoices for services provided by communications agencies doing work related to the Sponsorship Program. He then sent the invoices he had certified to the financial services unit in PWGSC for payment. The unit would verify that Mr. Guité had the necessary authority to authorize payment in the amounts listed on the invoices before issuing a cheque. There was no evidence that the financial service unit had done anything more than this before making payment.
Various audits and reviews have all shown that there was little or no documentation on the CCSB’s files — despite Mr. Guité’s protestations to the contrary — to demonstrate that the communications agencies had actually done the work that the government paid for. In terms of issuing payment, all that was needed was Mr. Guité’s certification that the agencies had indeed performed the services they were contracted to do. It is now abundantly clear that these assurances were not based on available evidence that was kept on file. Had that evidence been required by a departmental unit outside the CCSB, there is a distinct possibility that the excesses associated with the Sponsorship Program would have been at the very least minimized. The Committee strongly believes, therefore, that a final verification by financial services units based on tangible proof is needed before payment is made, and accordingly recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 3
That financial services units in departments and agencies review supporting documentation, as per recommendation 19 below, to ensure that it is correct before issuing payments for contracts.
The mishandling of the Sponsorship Program shows that financial services units must do more than make sure that the required documentation and certification accompanies invoices sent to them for payment; they should also, from time-to-time, contact the contracting authority to discuss the basis upon which payments are being issued. This should be the rule particularly when large sums of money and intense contracting activity are involved, or where past internal audits have signaled problems with the contracting authority involved. The Committee therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 4
That financial services units in departments and agencies challenge requests for contract payment on both a random and a risk basis.
RECOMMENDATION 5
That all programs and activities involving contracts, grants and contributions, and transfers to other departments or agencies be subject to a regular schedule of internal audits.
One of the most striking impressions left on the Committee by its review was the crucial role played by internal audit in the proper management of government departments and programs — and the failure of internal audit in this instance to bring abuses under the Program to a timely halt.
One explanation for this failure can be found in the relationship between internal audit units and senior departmental management. Senior managers, including deputy ministers, face a natural temptation to “manage” unfavourable audit results, either by withholding them from external distribution or by diluting the findings to avoid an unflattering portrait of management within their departments. As long as deputy ministers retain the final authority over internal audit, there will be no possibility that this temptation can ever be entirely eliminated.
In its 10th Report (37th Parliament, 2nd Session). the Committee expressed similar concerns and recommended that the internal auditing function be placed under centralized control in Treasury Board Secretariat. This recommendation was rejected.
The hearings on the Sponsorship Program have confirmed the Committee’s view that an effective internal audit function in indispensable to sound management in departments. The evidence shows that although an earlier review and an audit commissioned by the internal audit function at PWGSC identified many of the very same questionable practices that characterized the management of the Sponsorship Program, effective corrective measures were not taken. On the contrary, the same individual who presided over the unit responsible for these dubious practices was promoted and placed in charge of running the Sponsorship Program. In addition, the Department saw no necessity to monitor the performance of the unit or its executive director. Nor did it think it necessary to separate procurement from contract management as practiced elsewhere in the Department and as recommended by the audit it had commissioned. All of these findings serve to underline the urgent necessity to give internal audit units greater autonomy from senior departmental management.
In the past year, the government has taken steps to reinforce its ability to monitor and control expenditures within departments. The position of Comptroller General of Canada has been restored as a distinct office within Treasury Board Secretariat. As such, the Comptroller General, who has deputy minister status and reports to the President of Treasury Board, will be involved in the staffing of the comptroller positions in departments and agencies, since departmental comptrollers will also have a functional reporting relationship to the Comptroller General.
Changing the relationship of departmental internal auditors to give them enhanced autonomy would be entirely in keeping with the new roles and relationship currently in place for the Comptroller General and departmental comptrollers. The government is now taking steps to restore the internal audit function to the robust position it held prior to the program review exercise. Accordingly, this may be an appropriate time to change the structural reporting relationship of the function within government. The Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 6
That internal audit be placed under centralized authority located within Treasury Board Secretariat.
RECOMMENDATION 7
That overall authority for the internal audit function in government be assigned to the Comptroller General of Canada.
RECOMMENDATION 8
That the government continue to restore the internal audit function and report to Parliament on the status of the internal audit function on an annual basis, addressing such issues as the levels of human, financial, and technological resources being devoted to the function.
As indicated above, the Committee was astonished to discover that the principal recommendation of the review that took place in 1996 — that the selection and procurement processes for contracting be separated — never occurred. This should have been brought to the attention of Treasury Board Secretariat and Parliament but was not. In order to prevent this from happening and in order to provide Parliament with the assurance it needs that internal audits lead to appropriate and timely corrective action, the Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 9
That there be mandatory follow-ups of internal audits within one year of an initial audit with the results posted on the Treasury Board Secretariat Web site.
The Committee recognizes that there may be instances in which it would be advisable not to adopt all recommendations stemming from internal audits. Circumstances change and government must have the flexibility to exercise discretion over the changes it makes to administrative practices and structures. Yet any decision to follow a different course of action than that recommended by internal audit units must be justified and made known. In recognition of this, the Committee also recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 10
That all decisions to reject recommendations stemming from internal audits be documented, reported to Treasury Board Secretariat, and posted on the Treasury Board Secretariat Web site.
The Advertising, Public Opinion and Research Service (APORS) was the subject of a critical audit done by an outside firm in 1996. APORS was subsequently merged with other functions to become the Communication Co-ordinations Services Branch (CCSB). Mr. Guité, formerly in charge of APORS became Executive Director of the new entity. Yet the CCSB was not subject to an internal audit until 2000. This was the result of poor judgment on the part of the Deputy Minister and the person in charge of the internal audit unit at PWGSC. In the case of new entities within departments an internal audit within a reasonable length of time after their creation would allow for early corrective action if there were need for it. The decision to conduct such an audit should not be a matter of discretion but should occur automatically. The Committee therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 11
That all new branches within departments and agencies be subject to internal review one year following their establishment and a follow-up internal audit be conducted within six months.
As indicated above, the Communications Co-ordination Services Branch was established within Public Works and Government Services Canada and was able to function in an environment of minimal controls without any effort to correct the situation. This occurred in spite of earlier warnings about the faulty control environment inside CCSB’s predecessor and the questionable methods used by Mr. Guité. No new entity within a department should be allowed to begin operation until there is solid assurance that the proper financial management and control mechanisms are in place. Based on what the Committee has learned, it believes that this assurance needs to come from an autonomous source. The Committee therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 12
That the Comptroller General of Canada be authorized to sign off on all internal re-organizations or creation of new departments or agencies to ensure that the corporate and internal audit systems remain intact, functioning, adequate, and capable.
A clear message that emerged from the Committee’s review, as well as from earlier studies, was that the rules and regulations that govern contracting in the government are unambiguous and appropriate. Yet previous experience has shown, and this episode has sadly confirmed, these rules and regulations are widely ignored or broken. Those who circumvent or break the rules are seldom if ever reprimanded. Those responsible for managing the Sponsorship Program broke all of the contracting rules, and likely did so in full knowledge that they would suffer no penalty as a result.
Those engaged in contracting activities must be made aware that their performance is rigorously monitored and that there are real consequences for failure to adhere to the rules. The Committee therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 13
That internal audit units monitor adherence to contracting rules and regulations and report non-compliance to Treasury Board Secretariat.
RECOMMENDATION 14
That administrative penalties up to and including dismissal from the Public Service of Canada be established to discourage non-compliance with contracting rules and regulations.
RECOMMENDATION 15
That when public service employees working in procurement are subject to annual evaluations, or being considered for performance bonuses or promotion, adherence with contracting rules and regulations be taken into account.
RECOMMENDATION 16
That Treasury Board Secretariat report to Parliament on a regular, timely basis on departmental contracting activity. Reports should include references to instances of non-compliance and corrective measures/sanctions.
The Committee has long held the view that Treasury Board Secretariat should play a more active role in ensuring that its contracting policy and regulations are respected. It is simply inadequate to formulate policy and expect that it will be followed without monitoring adherence and intervention when non-compliance is suspected. The Committee therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 17
That Treasury Board Secretariat actively challenge departments on their contracting activities with an emphasis on areas of highest risk.
It is normal practice in government to separate contract procurement from contract management and payment. This was how things were done in APORS prior to Mr. Guité’s merger of the two functions: one unit awarded contracts through competitive tender; another managed the contracts themselves and arranged for payment once the contracted goods or services had been delivered. As the Auditor General has pointed out, there is a good reason for this kind of arrangement: it eliminates, “as far as possible, any opportunities for fraud or misstatement or an override of controls by management.” (3.22) Yet this separation of roles and responsibilities was itself eliminated under Mr. Guité and allowed to remain that way. The Committee believes that this must never happen again and recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 18
That Treasury Board Secretariat amend its contracting policies to require that the awarding and management of contracts are conducted as separate activities by separate units within departments, enforce these policies and monitor their application to ensure that they are rigorously adhered to.
Witnesses who had worked within the CCSB told the Committee that rules — including rules requiring proper documentation in the sponsorship files — were not broken because there were no rules to break. This is unacceptable. At minimum, there must be sufficient documentation on file to provide an audit trail for internal auditors and to support certification that goods and services have been delivered as per contract requirements. Had this sort of documentation been required, opportunities to accept and approve for payment invoices for undelivered services would not have been available. In order to eliminate any ambiguity in this regard, the Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 19
That departments provide clear statements of required documentation on files involving contracting, grants and contributions, and communications and advertising activities, to satisfy accountability, internal audit, performance reporting, and payment requirements.
Furthermore, to make the need for adequate documentation absolutely clear, the Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 20
That Treasury Board Secretariat amend the appropriate policies by the inclusion of a prohibition against issuing payments of grants or contributions, or for contracts in the absence of required documentation.
The Committee was particularly disturbed by the actions of the Crown corporations that were involved in the Sponsorship Program. Despite the fact that these entities operate with public funds and are public sector organizations, they behaved as if they had no responsibility to act in a transparent or accountable way. It is clear that under current circumstances, Parliament is unable to exert the degree of control over these entities that is needed, particularly in light of behaviour with regard to the Sponsorship Program.
On 17 February 2005, Treasury Board Secretariat released a report on Crown Corporation Governance — Review of the Governance Framework for Canada’s Crown Corporations — Meeting the Expectations of Canadians. The report discusses Parliament’s role in legislation, oversight, and scrutiny with regard to Crown corporations, but — apart from bringing about the tabling of Crown corporation reports in the House of Commons — it does not propose any measures to change the status quo. The Committee believes that the involvement of some Crown corporations in the Sponsorship Program demonstrate that the current mechanisms that enable parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of Crown corporations are insufficient and therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 21
That Parliament’s ability to hold Crown corporations to account be enhanced.
RECOMMENDATION 22
That Parliament’s involvement in the selection and appointment of heads of Crown corporations be enhanced.
The actions of the Crown corporations that were involved in the Sponsorship Program were, at very minimum, questionable. It is disturbing that these entities operating with public funds were able to act in a manner lacking in transparency and accountability.
The powers of the Auditor General vis-à-vis Crown corporations are established under the Auditor General Act. The Auditor General is authorized under the Act to conduct annual financial audits and special examinations (performance audits) at least once every five years of many Crown corporations. The results of financial audits are submitted to the responsible minister for tabling in Parliament. Reports based on special examinations, however, are reported to the Board of Directors of Crown corporations. In certain cases, these reports are also submitted to the responsible minister and to the House of Commons through the annual report of the Corporation.
In its report on Crown corporation governance (Review of the Governance Framework for Canada’s Crown Corporations — Meeting the Expectations of Canadians) the Government is proposing to amend the appropriate legislation to make the Auditor General the external auditor for all Crown corporations and has indicated that it will require that each special examination (performance audit) report be submitted to Parliament.
In order to enhance the transparency surrounding the activities of Crown corporations and strengthen their accountability to Parliament, the Committee believes that any discretion over the public release of the results of special examinations should be brought to an end. Therefore, in keeping with the Committee’s earlier recommendation that Parliament should have a stronger role in holding Crown corporations to account, and in keeping with the recent commitment of the Government of Canada, it recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 23
That the Auditor General of Canada Act be amended to give the Auditor General the authority to conduct performance audits of all Crown corporations and to report the results directly to Parliament, and that the Office of the Auditor General be given the resources necessary to do so.
Throughout its hearings on the Sponsorship Program, the Committee was frustrated at its inability to fully comprehend the role played by the communications agencies. Witnesses from the agencies were less than forthcoming in their discussions with the Committee, and as entities outside the federal government, the agencies were beyond the purview of the Office of the Auditor General of Canada. While some of this information was available as a result of the work of the Quick Response Team (QRT), the Committee was never fully satisfied that it possessed all that it needed to know.
A number of provinces empower their auditors general to “follow the money,” or investigate private entities that have received public money, either through a government grant or private contract.
The Quebec Auditor General Act39 allows the provincial auditor to investigate grants made by a government agency to private parties. The auditor can access the records, files, documents and accounts of any establishment, institution, association or enterprise in relation to a grant made by a government agency. The Ontario Auditor General Act,40 as of 1 April 2005, will allow the provincial auditor to conduct a special audit of a grant recipient. The recipient must give the Ontario Auditor General any information that the he or she believes necessary, including all books, accounts, financial records, files and other documents. A similar law exists in Manitoba.41
British Columbia’s Auditor General Act goes further, authorizing the provincial auditor general to audit not just government grants, but a “transfer under an agreement,” meaning any contract between the British Columbian government and a supplier.42
The Committee asked the Auditor General whether any changes had been suggested to her Act as a consequence of her audit of the Sponsorship Program. She responded that some had suggested that perhaps her powers “should be expanded to be able to do what we call “follow the dollar” and go into organizations that receive funding from government.” She indicated that although she was satisfied with the authorities under her Act that “If that is the wish of the Parliament, obviously the Auditor General and my office will do as Parliament wishes.”
Were the Auditor General to have the authority to “follow the money” beyond the limits of government, this power would be exercised — as is the case with the majority of decisions concerning what and when to audit — at the Auditor General’s discretion. The existence of such an authority would accomplish two goals. In instances such as the audit of the Sponsorship Program, it would provide Parliament with a full explanation of the ultimate destination and use of public funds paid to achieve public policy goals. It would also act as a preventative by discouraging those who otherwise might be tempted to misuse public monies for purposes other than those intended. The Committee accordingly recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 24
That the Auditor General of Canada Act be amended through the inclusion of a clause giving the Auditor General the authority to conduct an audit of the records, files, documents and accounts of any individual, establishment, institution or enterprise in relation to the receipt and/or use of any grant, contribution, or transfer under an agreement made to it by the Government of Canada.
PARLIAMENT AND THE SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM
The Auditor General’s findings and the Committee’s hearings have shown that Parliament was not in receipt of the information it needed to scrutinize the Sponsorship Program. As the Auditor General reported, the government “did not inform Parliament of the program’s real objectives, nor has it ever reported the results.” (3.14) The first mention of the Sponsorship Program in PWGSC’s performance reports was in 2001, years after the program was initiated, and it only contained minimal information.
The only way to ensure that the transparency and the accountability that accompanies it are made real is to establish a formal reporting requirement regarding contracting and grants and contributions activities to Parliament. The Committee accordingly recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 25
That departments and agencies be required to include sections in their performance reports that specifically address contracting activities, grants and contributions, and transfers to other departments or agencies. The goals and objectives of these activities, performance indicators, and results must be clearly stated.
Past study has convinced the Committee that Treasury Board Secretariat, which is responsible for Estimates documents, exercises little meaningful control over the framework of departmental performance reports. These reports often fail to mention key departmental activities or to address shortcomings and what will be done to overcome them. It is therefore of concern to the Committee that performance reporting with respect to contracting, grants, and contributions may skirt around or gloss over, problems. To avoid this possibility, and to improve the quality of performance reports in general, the Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 26
That Treasury Board Secretariat develop a more effective monitoring and compliance regime, to ensure that departments and agencies reflect existing guidelines in their performance reports.
One of the most deeply disturbing revelations contained in the Auditor General’s report was that the CCSB had used “highly complicated and questionable methods to transfer sponsorship funds.” (3.36) The CCSB had made payments to Crown corporations “through communications agencies … rather than transferring the funds to the corporations directly.” (3.37) If, according to the Auditor General, the Sponsorship Program had been framed as a contribution under the Treasury Board’s Policy on Transfer Payments, then the CCSB would have had to follow a more structured approach that would have required more information be given to Parliament. (3.37) In acting as it did, the CCSB, in the opinion of the Auditor General, “violated the intent of the transfer payments policy.” (3.39)
Mr. Guité’s testimony confirmed that, in effect, funding allocated by Parliament to PWGSC had been transferred from the CCSB to Crown corporations using communications agencies as a conduit. In return the communications agencies charged their usual commissions, thus adding cost to the Program without achieving reciprocal value. These transfers were effected without obtaining prior authorization from Treasury Board — and without Parliament’s knowledge or approval. Mr. Guité was able to do this because of ambiguities and lack of specificity in Treasury Board policies and because there was no specific prohibition against doing so. He was also able to do this, as the Auditor General observed, because sponsorships had not been structured as contributions. The Committee wishes to prevent similar maneuvering around reporting requirements and therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 27
That all programs involving payment to individuals or entities outside government that do not result in the direct receipt, by government, of goods or services in return be framed as contributions under the Treasury Board’s Policy on Transfer Payments.
During its earlier review of an audit of three contracts issued under the Sponsorship Program to communications agency Groupaction, the Committee learned that an assistant to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, who had overseen the Program in the Minister’s office, transferred to the Department and became the executive director of CCSB following Mr. Guité’s retirement. It was evident that this individual knew very little about public service regulations or his obligations under the Financial Administration Act. Yet, as a former assistant to the Minister, he was able to transfer to the Public Service and assume a position of responsibility because of provisions in the Public Service Employment Act. The relevant sections of the Act read as follows:
41(2) Priority for appointment over all other persons shall be given to a person employed in the office of a minister, or in the office of a person holding the recognized position of Leader of the Opposition in the Senate or Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, for a period of one year after the person ceases to be so employed, if
(a) the person was an employee immediately before becoming employed in that office; or
(b) while employed in that office the person was found by the Commission, in an advertised external appointment process, to have met the essential qualifications for an appointment to the public service
(3) Priority for appointment, to a position at a level at least equivalent to that of executive assistant to a deputy head, shall be given over all other persons to a person who for at least three years has been employed as the executive assistant, special assistant or private secretary in an office referred to in subsection (2) or in any of those capacities successively, for a period of one year after they cease to be employed.
The Committee was of the view that these sections of the Act contradicted the Act’s underlying purpose of ensuring the political neutrality of the Public Service of Canada and conflicted with the Public Service Commission’s role as guardian of the merit principle. The Committee therefore recommended, in its 10th Report (37th Parliament, 2nd Session), that these sections of the Act be thoroughly reviewed to ensure that they were being applied properly.
The review of the Sponsorship Program has reinforced the Committee’s strong reservations about the ability of ministerial exempt staff — partisan appointments — to move into senior positions in the Public Service of Canada. Any utility obtained as a consequence of these transfers is overshadowed by the potential politicization of the upper ranks of the Public Service and does not strengthen the perception of the Public Service as a neutral body made up of employees who hold their positions based upon their competence. Accordingly, the Committee now recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 28
That section 41(2) — 41(3) of the Public Service Employment Act be repealed immediately.
The Committee noted that although there were sound reasons to question Mr. Guité’s performance and ability prior to the creation of the CCSB, he was the beneficiary of several promotions, including his final elevation to the position of ADM reporting directly to the Deputy Minister. All that was required was that the Deputy Minister fill out the appropriate forms and send them to Treasury Board Secretariat for approval. The Committee finds it astonishing that no challenge was ever issued regarding Mr. Guité’s rise when there were clear warning signs that he should not be put in charge of contracting activities. The Committee accordingly recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 29
That Treasury Board Secretariat examine the procedures that are in place for reviewing and approving candidacies for all EX-level appointments and promotions to ensure that past performance is taken into account.
In the aftermath of a lengthy review, the Committee has reached several conclusions which mirror those of the Auditor General of Canada. The objectives of the Sponsorship Program along with its costs and the results it produced were never presented to Parliament as they should have been. Borrowing from an earlier observation made by the Auditor General in regard to another unfortunate matter, Parliament was kept in the dark. The financial controls that should have been in place were not. The documentation that was needed to provide proof that value was obtained for money spent was absent. The persons in charge of the Sponsorship Program broke, bent, or circumvented existing rules and did so without any apparent regret or misgiving. A highly irregular relationship between a minister of the Crown and a lower-ranking public servant — one that bypassed the deputy minister with that deputy’s knowledge — was allowed to continue undisturbed. Those whom Parliament and Canadians rely upon to make sure that poor management and potentially unlawful activities are caught, ended, and sanctioned failed to live up to the trust placed in them. It would be difficult, indeed impossible, to conceive of any way in which this program did not go wrong.
At this time, the courts and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are determining whether criminal culpability was involved in the mishandling of the Sponsorship Program. The Committee trusts that they will perform their tasks and that the appropriate penalties, if called for, will be applied and justice done.
For its part, the Committee desires that through its work and its recommendations — if accepted and fully implemented — the administrative lapses inside government that allowed the Sponsorship Program and the actions of those charged with its management and oversight to escape detection and punishment will be corrected. The Committee also sincerely hopes that its hearings have helped reveal the truth and provided Canadians with a better understanding of a series of events that have so badly served them.
| 38 | Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, November 2003, Overall Main Points, chapters 3, 4, and 5, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3. |
| 39 | S. Q. 1985, c. 38, s. 22. |
| 40 | R.S.O. 1990, c. A. 35. |
| 41 | Manitoba Auditor General Act, C.C.S.M. c. A180. |
| 42 | BC Auditor General Act, SBC 2003, c. 2. |