PACP Committee Report

OBSERVATIONS

The Committee began is investigation of ministerial and deputy ministerial accountability by asking the following question: “Did one or more of these individuals [in positions of authority with regard to the Sponsorship Program] fail to meet requirements of a doctrine that continues to be clear and reasonable, or does their conduct suggest that the doctrine is itself unclear or impractical and needs to be revised?” It is now time to return to that question.

Reflecting on the testimony provided to the Committee by earlier witnesses, Dr. Franks concluded that the current doctrine of ministerial responsibility (and the role of deputy ministers implicit in it) was clearly reflected, along with its deficiencies:

I might conclude that the Privy Council Office’s interpretation of responsibility and accountability in our parliamentary system contains far too many gaps, ambiguities and contradictions, and that the system does not work to the satisfaction of parliament or to the people of Canada.

I do not believe that responsibility and accountability could be much more shirked, or the division of responsibility between ministers and deputy ministers much more confused and blurred that the committee has proven them to be in the sponsorship affair. (43:1120) [*]

Having pointed out that the events surrounding the Sponsorship Program had exposed serious weaknesses in the current interpretation and application of ministerial and deputy-ministerial responsibility and accountability, Dr. Franks proposed a solution:

If Canada adopted the accounting officer approach [following a long established practice in the United Kingdom], then at least the Public Accounts Committee and Canadians in general, would know who was responsible and who should be held accountable. That, to put it mildly, would be a great improvement. (43:1120) [*]

Dr. Franks argued that the deficiencies in the Canadian interpretation and practice of the accountability doctrine are exacerbated by the high turnover rate among both ministers and deputies in Canada. This phenomenon impedes both the functional capacity to take responsibility and the sense of being responsible. His alternative:

A better way exists. Britain has a quite different approach towards responsibility and accountability to Parliament for administration and the use of funds. In Britain the permanent secretaries are heads of department, equivalent to our deputy ministers, are designated as accounting officers and have full and personal responsibility for the transactions in the account, including matters of prudence, probity, legality, value for money, unless they have been explicitly overruled in writing by their minister. This responsibility of the accounting officers is personal and remains with them, even when they change office or retire. Either the minister is responsible or the deputy is. Not both, not neither. Establishing the accounting officer approach and ensuring that it works in practice has been the central concern on the public accounts committee in Britain for over a century.

The accounting officer approach was recommended for Canada by the Lambert Commission on Financial Management and Accountability, but this recommendation was rejected by the government. The government’s rejection in part was based on a misunderstanding of the British practice. (43:1115) [*]

In the past, other observers have commented on the mismatch between the prevailing doctrine and practice of ministerial accountability and the complexities of contemporary government, and have recommended that an accounting officer approach be adopted to clarify lines of accountability and responsibility. Among the first to do so was the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability in the late 1970s.

The Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability

As Dr. Franks testified, the proposal that Canadian deputy ministers be assigned direct responsibility for the administration of their departments and be held accountable for is not a recent one. In 1979, the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability (Lambert Commission) noted in its final report that,

Although deputy ministers have multiple accountabilities, deputy heads are not regularly held accountable in a systematic or coherent way for program management and departmental administration ^[8].

To correct this weakness, the Commissioners recommended that:

[d]eputy ministers be liable to be held to account directly for their assigned and delegated responsibilities before the parliamentary committee most directly concerned with administrative performance, the Public Accounts Committee ^[9].

The Commissioners reasoned that the doctrine of ministerial accountability was useful and vital, but that it should not provide an opportunity for those bearing direct administrative and operational responsibility to avoid being held to account for their actions:

The doctrine of ministerial accountability has a great deal to recommend it, for it identifies who has the final responsibility for decisions taken — the minister, and it provides a forum in which he is publicly accountable — Parliament. Nevertheless, this valuable tool for achieving accountable government must not become an obstacle to holding to account those who carry out tasks on the basis of delegated authority — the officials of departments and agencies ^[10].

Far from calling for the abandonment of the doctrine of ministerial accountability, the Commissioners were arguing that it be strengthened through a more precise alignment between accountability and responsibility. They wrote that their

… recommendation that accountability for administrative performance be focussed directly on the deputy heads of departments and agencies is intended to relieve ministers of some of the burden of operational detail without removing final responsibility for policy development and implementation ^[11].

Accordingly, they made a second recommendation to accompany their first:

[t]he deputy minister as chief administrative officer account for his performance of specific delegated or assigned duties before the parliamentary committee responsible for the scrutiny of government expenditures, the Public Accounts Committee ^[12].

If adopted, these two recommendations would have made deputy ministers accountable before the Public Accounts Committee for their assigned duties and delegations and for the administration of their departments. It is notable that the Royal Commission called for deputy ministers to be accountable before the Public Accounts Committee rather than to the Committee ^[13] and the final responsibility for policy and its implementation would remain with the minister. Neither recommendation was accepted.