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NDDN Committee Report

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STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION FROM THE BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS

Acquisition of British submarines:

A senseless purchase

INTRODUCTION

This supplementary opinion falls within the parameters set by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans’ Affairs at the start of its study on submarines. These parameters were to assess:

The equipment needs of the Canadian Forces
The acquisition process
The decision-making process
The training of Canadian submariners.

The Committee’s recommendations pertain largely to parameters 2 and 4. They can be broken down as follows:

Training (3 recommendations)
Acquisition (5 recommendations)
Defence Policy (1 recommendation)
Increasing the Committee’s resources (1 recommendation)
Modernization and refitting (1 recommendation)
Bilingualism (1 recommendation)

It is apparent that the report does not address the evaluation of the Canadian Forces’ equipment needs, nor the decision-making process.

Moreover, the report carefully documents the acquisition process in a general way rather than providing the specific details of the study that are of interest to us, i.e., regarding the submarines. The training of submariners is however well documented and articulated.

In this supplementary opinion, the Bloc Québécois insists on evaluating the need for submarines as well as the decision-making process, which goes unnoticed in the Committee’s report.

EVALUATION OF THE NEED FOR SUBMARINES

During the study, witnesses testified before the Committee about Canada’s need for submarines. The Bloc Québécois wishes to refute those arguments.

1- Military necessity

1.1- Anti-submarine warfare

Some of the witnesses referred to their importance for anti-submarine warfare. The Bloc Québécois rejects this argument. The main submarine threats were from the Soviet Union. Since the end of the cold war, Russia’s submarine capability has apparently been in steady decline.

Can it be maintained that our allies pose a threat? We are not convinced of this. The Bloc Québécois seriously doubts that an allied submarine would one day sink a Canadian ship or vice versa.

1.2- Submarine network

Some witnesses mentioned the importance of being part of the submarine network to gather information about navigation plans in Canadian waters. The argument made is two-fold: avoid the risk of submarine collisions and protect the sovereignty of our waters.

We reject these arguments. First of all, if Canada did not have any submarines, there would be no risk of collision. Secondly, with regard to sovereignty, we consider that a visible presence is needed to exercise it, instead than a furtive one, as is the case with submarines.

The Bloc Québécois considers it unnecessary to have submarines to access to information on the presence of foreign vessels in Canadian waters. Canada should require all foreign naval platforms to be report to National Defence as a matter of courtesy.

1.3- Anti-submarine warfare training

Some witnesses mentioned the importance of Canadian submarines in anti-submarine warfare training. As we saw earlier, the Bloc Québécois does not believe in the submarine threat. The argument for an anti-submarine warfare program is not credible in our opinion and it would cost Canadian taxpayers too much to acquire submarines just to train the American navy for this type of warfare.

2- Need for constabulary

Some witnesses sought to convince the Bloc Québécois of the need for submarines to protect our coastal areas and to combat illicit traffic. Let us analyze these two arguments.

2.1- Coastal protection

The Bloc Québécois believes there is a real threat of infiltration of individuals or material that are not welcome. It is also true that with its three oceans, Canada has a vast coastline to protect. In the Bloc Québécois’s opinion, however, the solution is to use reconnaissance planes and UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) given the tremendous cost of submarines.

The number of submarines (4) and the surface area to be covered, as well as their traveling speed, would encourage any ill-intentioned person to defy the coastal detection system since the probability of detection is next to nil. Using UAVs would be much more effective and much less costly. These vehicles have a much larger radius of action and higher traveling speed than submarines. With a greater number of them, the entire coastline could easily be covered in a short time.

2.2 Control of illicit traffic

The explanation regarding coastal surveillance applies here as well. Undesirable ships, especially on the Pacific coast where just one submarine is in operation, would not consider submarines as a threat to their illicit activities. It would be a different matter however if various UAVs were patrolling the coastline constantly. Their number and operating speed would have a stronger deterrent effect.

3. Need to protect sovereignty in the Great North

There are two schools of thought on this matter. One favours an invisible presence to protect sovereignty, while the other advocates as visible a presence a possible. The Bloc Québécois advocates the second approach. Moreover, the Canadian Forces conduct regular exercises in the Great North to make their presence loud and clear. We consider troop movements and constant reconnaissance flights much more effective in asserting sovereignty than a vague, invisible threat.

Moreover, since diesel-electric submarines do not have an anaerobic capacity,¹ they cannot venture very far south of the polar ice cap.

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

1. Weak negotiating team

A simple reading of certain provisions suggests that the Canadian negotiation team was amateurish. The negotiators agreed in section 13 that British law would govern this contract. In so doing, they placed themselves on British turf. The negotiators also agreed to section 27.6, which provides that in the event of Canada defaulting on payment, the British government has the right to terminate the lease and demand payment of all outstanding amounts. It is Section 34.1, though, that is especially problematic. It exempts the United Kingdom from having to guarantee the design and construction of the submarines, while Canada acknowledges that the submarine design has been proven. This section leaves little room for potential recourse against the vendor.

2. Wavering in government decisions

While the Bloc Québécois acknowledges that the 1994 white paper provided for the purchase of submarines, it should be noted that Bloc Québécois MPs submitted a lengthy dissenting report on this entire policy.² The Bloc Québécois was already opposed to purchasing submarines at that time. For a long time, the Bloc Québécois has called for a review of defence policy. If the federal government had taken a long-term view and planned its acquisitions, it would not have wasted close to three quarters of a million dollars of public money on these submarines that even the Australian government did not want!

Equally noteworthy are the negative consequences of the decisions and non-decisions by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

Since Cabinet deliberations are secret, we must wonder about various things.

First of all, was it absolutely necessary to acquire submarines to replace the old Oberons? What was Cabinet’s assessment of the importance of a submarine capacity?

Did the Canadian navy fully inform Cabinet or was it so obsessed with the need to make this purchase that it closed its eyes to the drawbacks and to the state of the Victoria submarines?

Why only Victoria submarines and why were other submarines from other countries not considered?

Why maintain a submarine capacity when National Defence budgets had been considerably reduced and other priorities were more important?

Why was the possibility of a swap raised, whereby submarines would be received in exchange for using our bases for the training of British troops, when that was not what actually happened? The federal government decided to pay on a schedule of payments spread out over a number of years. The government never set the record straight that the swap never took place.

THE LAST $100 MILLION

Finally, the Bloc Québécois tried in vain to convince the Committee of the need to retain some bargaining power by holding back the last $150 million payment for a tentative mutual agreement with the British government. The Bloc Québécois’s defence critic even wrote to the Minister of Defence on March 30, 2005, to convince him to come to a mutual agreement with his British counterpart and not pay the $45 million instalment set out in schedule of payments. That correspondence was not answered. The Bloc Québécois considers that it must renew its appeal to Canada’s Minister of Defence to inform his British counterpart that Canada would like to enter into negotiations on a mutual agreement for Great Britain to recognize its responsibility in the dramatic turn of events and accordingly waive its right to collect the last $100 million.

Anaerobic systems allow conventional diesel-electric submarines to remain submerged for longer periods of time. Normally, diesel-electric submarines have to rise to the surface to recharge their batteries using a diesel engine, posing a great risk of detection because the snorkel has to be raised to take in air for the diesel engines and to operate the exhaust system. With an anaerobic system, diesel engines can operate when the submarine is completely submerged, without using a snorkel.

²	Dissident report by Bloc Québécois MPs belonging to the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy, in a report by this committee entitled Security in a Changing World, October 1994, p. 92.