AGRI Committee Report
If you have any questions or comments regarding the accessibility of this publication, please contact us at accessible@parl.gc.ca.
As a follow-up to the avian influenza outbreak of February 2004 in British Columbia’s Fraser Valley, the B.C. Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (BCMAFF), the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and the B.C. poultry industry decided to organize a forum entitled “Avian Influenza — Lessons Learned and Moving Forward.” On 27 and 28 October 2004, over 180 people participated in the Canadian Poultry Industry Forum in Abbotsford, B.C. They shared experiences and made recommendations covering four areas: the interface between animal and human health; biosecurity; enhanced emergency management; and industry and community economic recovery. The report on the Forum was tabled in December 2004 (see the list of recommendations in Appendix 2).
This comprehensive industry report and recommendations provide the basis for implementing new measures and policies aimed at improving the management of any eventual outbreak of animal disease in Canada. The report also served as a reference document for witnesses who appeared before the Standing Committee on 18 and 19 January 2005. By relating their own experiences to the information contained in the Forum report, witnesses were able to provide the Standing Committee with well-thought-out views that combined the immediacy of personal response with the advantages of hindsight and a broader context.
It became evident in the first hours of the hearings that two main themes would dominate the discussions. A large majority of witnesses raised these themes in relation to the role played by the CFIA during the AI outbreak:
| • | Leadership (or the lack thereof) |
| • | Communication (or the absence of appropriate communication) |
It was also evident that witnesses clearly understood that the Standing Committee, which has the mandate and powers to study and report on all matters relating to the mandate, management and operation of federal organizations concerned with agriculture and agri-food, was the appropriate open forum to continue the discussion on the role and approach of the CFIA throughout the outbreak.
If hindsight can provide a better view on a situation, it also offers more time to identify a target. For various reasons the CFIA has become that target. Many witnesses expressed to the Standing Committee — sometimes in a visceral way —their perceptions of various mismanagement practices during the crisis. For some, the management of the crisis became itself a management crisis. Already in the spotlight, the CFIA further exacerbated the debate by publishing on 17 January 2005 — the day before the Standing Committee hearings began in Abbotsford — its report entitled Lessons Learned Review: The CFIA’s Response to the 2004 Avian Influenza Outbreak in B.C.1 The report incorporates a series of commitments to respond to both the CFIA’s internal review findings and those of the Canadian Poultry Industry Forum held in October 2004, and it offers a comprehensive and improved action plan for an enhanced emergency preparedness strategy. The timing of its release, however, has largely eclipsed its contents.
The objective of the present report is not to review the scientific issues of the outbreak or the entire list of “what went well and what went wrong,” but rather to concentrate on the most politically sensitive issues. The recommendations, therefore, mainly focus on the two themes most often mentioned by witnesses during the Standing Committee hearings.
The leadership issues raised during the Standing Committee hearings were closely related to jurisdictions — federal, provincial and local — and the relationship between officials of these jurisdictions.
Although it was recognized that the CFIA had the legal authority, scientific mandate and international responsibilities that qualified it to play the lead role and, as mentioned in the CFIA Lessons Learned document, that “the CFIA President had the ultimate accountability for the Agency’s response to the outbreak,” many witnesses held that such a crisis should not have been managed from Ottawa. This centralization of decisions became a dominant theme during the hearings.
B. Leadership Means Being Prepared
British Columbia Minister of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries John van Dongen referred to the 2004 AI outbreak as the “Fraser Valley’s wildfire.” Canada had not responded to such a large-scale foreign animal disease outbreak (i.e., a disease that is not indigenous to Canada) since the 1952 foot and mouth outbreak. Federal-provincial response plans to animal health issues had become obsolete by 2004, and some witnesses saw this as the result of a lack of leadership over the years. In a world where public and animal health policies are closely related, public authorities must always be prepared to react quickly to animal diseases.
One of the lessons learned is clearly that “effective preparation for, and response to, foreign animal disease outbreaks in Canada must be seen as a shared responsibility.”2 To identify and eradicate a disease, to compensate those affected by the outbreak, and to facilitate a quick return to normal operations require close collaboration between all levels of government, between agriculture and health authorities, and between industry and governments. Regular monitoring and updating of federal-provincial plans, such as the B.C. Foreign Animal Disease Eradication Support (FADES) plan, are imperative to ensure that shared responsibilities are well understood and respected. Management of a crisis such as the AI outbreak is a major challenge that requires decisive action by every stakeholder; focus and energy should not be dissipated through jurisdictional uncertainties.
Whether in responding to disease outbreaks, improving bio-security standards and their enforcement, or delivering economic recovery assistance, we need to strengthen partnerships, clarify mandates and accountabilities and align resources with objectives.
Rory McAlpine, Deputy Minister
British Columbia Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries
Hearings, 18 January 2005
Focus groups and participants who contributed to the CFIA Lessons Learned document 3 indicated that effective leadership was provided at multiple levels in the organization, and that one measure of effective leadership was the fact that the CFIA’s risk management decisions were supported by the industry.4 But risk management leadership is not only a matter of making the right decisions during the course of a crisis; it is also, if not more, a matter of vision and preparedness. The relevant question to ask is then: if the CFIA had a lead role, why was the FADES plan, for instance, not up to date? The hearings did not provide a clear response to that question. Leadership, however, is a shared responsibility, and one may presume that both levels of government and, to a lesser extent, the industry, should bear part of the blame. This view is somewhat shared by the CFIA:
Recently we [the CFIA] have been criticized for our handling of the AI outbreak in BC. I am not going to deny that there were shortcomings which included the Agency. As I mentioned in Abbotsford, I think all those involved could have been better prepared.
Richard Fadden, President
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food
Meeting No. 21 — 15:35
1st Session, 38th Parliament
Ottawa, 8 February 2005
In its Lessons Learned document, the CFIA reviewed the following specific aspects of leadership: governance, collaborative arrangements, decision-making and accountability, which are exactly the same ones mentioned by witnesses before the Standing Committee. Furthermore, the following excerpt from the CFIA document, based on comments made by participants in the focus groups, also reflects in part the concerns and irritants described by witnesses to the Standing Committee:
Many participants felt that decision making could have been more localized and that the requirement for certain policy/strategic decisions to be made by the CFIA AI Executive group at headquarters impacted on the timeliness of decision-making. Others recognized that it was necessary for the AI outbreak to be managed as a national emergency with policy and domestic and international trade implications that extended beyond the province of B.C. Overall it was felt that the parameters around which decisions can be made locally (i.e. tactical) versus nationally (i.e. strategic) can be better defined. The lack of clarity may have contributed to the elevation of certain operational decisions to the national level. 5
The CFIA Lessons Learned exercise resulted in three recommendations pertaining to leadership issues, to which the Agency responded.
| • | The first recommendation is on the review of protocols associated with the activation of local, area and national emergency response teams and on the roles and responsibilities, and decision-making accountabilities, at each level. The CFIA is currently reviewing the various levels of emergency response to ensure a consistent national approach, and it has invited Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada to participate in the review process. According to the CFIA, updated emergency response procedures and protocols should be recommended by the spring of 2005. |
| • | The second recommendation is on the development of collaborative arrangements with Health Canada and the new Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) with the goal of increasing the federal capacity to respond to zoonotic6 disease outbreaks. In its response, the CFIA mentioned that discussions have been launched with both Health Canada and the PHAC to develop an updated roles and responsibilities framework and a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on response to zoonotic disease outbreaks, including protocols for liaising with provincial health authorities. The framework and MOU will be ready by December 2005. |
| • | Finally, the third recommendation concerns the ongoing development and practising of FADES plans in all provinces. The CFIA is committed to negotiating and finalizing agreements on this matter with all provinces and territories, and all FADES plans will contain a mandatory fixed schedule for their practice. |
These three recommendations on the leadership issues, and the CFIA’s responses, are certainly a step in the right direction. Unfortunately they are viewed as coming too late for the Fraser Valley poultry producers and citizens. Certainly, mistakes were made due to a certain lack of leadership during the 2004 AI outbreak in British Columbia. The Standing Committee hopes that the lessons learned will help avert similar mistakes in the future, because it is almost certain that there could be other outbreaks of animal diseases in the future. The main lesson learned by the people of the Fraser Valley is that proper management of AI, or other zoonotic diseases, is a matter of public health and safety, and it requires the proper reaction of public authorities. That realization prompted many witnesses at the hearings to request an independent inquiry into the mismanagement of the 2004 AI outbreak. Because of the integrated nature of human and animal diseases, and the high probability of other outbreaks, the Standing Committee endorses that request and therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 1
That an independent commission of inquiry be struck with the mandate to investigate the 2004 avian influenza outbreak in British Columbia. To prevent the reoccurrence of outbreaks, the commission must review the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness and implementation strategies that were deployed in British Columbia, regarding zoonotic diseases.
Furthermore, because it is important to look ahead and send guidelines to the government, the Standing Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 2
That using the 2004 avian influenza outbreak in British Columbia as a benchmark, the Auditor General of Canada be asked to audit the effectiveness of various emergency preparedness strategies related to animal diseases, with an emphasis on strategies related to zoonotic diseases.
C. Being Prepared Means Practising
Conveners emphasized that there needs to be a collaborative approach to emergency management, that FADES plans need to be redesigned and there is a need to “Practice, Practice, Practice.”
Canadian Poultry Industry Forum report, Avian Influenza — Lessons Learned and Moving Forward, December 2004, p. 37
Another clear shortcoming that marked the AI outbreak is that some plans that were used had never been tested. The CFIA and the Province of British Columbia executed the existing emergency plans at the beginning of the outbreak, and the FADES was the plan that broadly guided the operations.
Many witnesses before the Standing Committee testified to a long list of situations that indicated a general lack of preparedness in the first, and most critical, days of the outbreak. For example: decisions were not always made based on science; infected carcasses were dumped in a large feed mixer not adapted to the disposal of such a volume of birds; infected carcasses were transported along a public road in unsealed containers; frequent delays in reaction worsened an already urgent situation; many vehicles left the high-risk zone without having their wheels sanitized. It was also mentioned that, while carbon dioxide (CO2) gas was chosen as the method of euthanasia for the first flock, a mobile electric stunning machine normally used for the euthanasia of spent commercial egg-laying hens was employed on the second farm. Some observers interpreted this as indicating that the CFIA was testing another method of euthanasia, and perceived it as a further sign of lack of preparedness.
A large majority of witnesses who appeared before the Standing Committee — many of whom had seen these questionable activities at first hand — stated that the beginning of the outbreak was marked by a series of decisions that revealed that emergency plans had not been practised for a while, if at all.
Despite the advantages of the quick diagnosis of AIV by the BCMAFF-AHC laboratory, the natural geographic boundaries (the index farm was bordered by a mountain and the Fraser River on two sides) and the on-farm provisions for self-quarantine, the authors speculate that biocontainment was not achieved due to the release of vast quantities of virus into the environment associated with the depopulation procedures employed and the delay in depopulating suspect positive farms until laboratory confirmation. Based on these observations, the depopulation methods employed during an outbreak of a highly infectious disease such as HPAI must not allow the opportunity for aerosol-assisted spread and the contamination of the environment, including roadways, people and vehicles.
Dave K. Loewen, Trevor R. De Jong
Stewart J. Ritchie, Victoria A. Bowes
Brief Communication: A Producers Account of the Euthanasia and Depopulation Procedures at the First and Second Farms Diagnosed with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in British Columbia in 2004.
Draft report tabled with the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food, Abbotsford, B.C., 18 January 2005
Witnesses also raised questions in relation to the respective roles, responsibilities and decision-making accountabilities of the CFIA’s area emergency response team (AERT), the national emergency response team (NERT), and the AI Executive group. There was evidence of confusion about which team had the lead and which decisions could be made locally as opposed to nationally. This lack of clarity also points clearly to a lack of practice.
When the lessons have been learned, the real test is yet to come. Exercises and dry runs must be part of an integrated emergency preparedness strategy, as recognized by the CFIA regarding the FADES plans (see Recommendation 3 in Appendix 3). The Canadian strategy in this matter should be inspired by the European Union, where simulation exercises within the framework of “avian pests” are regularly conducted using various methods of euthanasia on spent egg-laying flocks. During the Standing Committee hearings in Abbotsford, and later in Ottawa, the idea of a “Special Animal Disease Response Team” was raised. Such a team would not only be quickly operational when an outbreak occurs, but would also be in charge of conducting regular exercises with provincial partners to ensure that all those who may be called upon during an outbreak are well trained and that bureaucratic plans are in fact applicable. For instance, it was mentioned that February 2004 was the first time that the CFIA had used chemical euthanasia, in this case CO2, for a massive depopulation of birds in Canada. International scientific documents and field manuals all strongly recommend that chemical euthanasia procedures be carried out only by trained individuals who are properly authorized to use the appropriate chemicals. The Standing Committee therefore recommends:
That the Canadian Food Inspection Agency establish a “Special Animal Disease Response Team,” comprising CFIA, provincial and local experts, that can be quickly deployed with appropriate well-maintained equipment, and that is responsible for overseeing practices of emergency preparedness plans and procedures on a regular basis.
COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION
Many witnesses from the industry complained that the CFIA did not communicate information on protocols, procedures and compensation effectively to stakeholders. Another general complaint was that the CFIA excluded stakeholders and local authorities from discussions and meetings where important planning and logistics decisions were made that involved the poultry industry. The following excerpt from the CFIA Lessons Learned review reveals that focus groups consulted by the CFIA shared the same issues that witnesses raised before the Standing Committee:
As in most emergency response situations, the demand for information, briefings and reports quickly escalated throughout the AI outbreak. While protocols were in place to facilitate internal and external information flow, some focus group participants indicated that they were not satisfied with the timeliness and relevance of the information provided. In particular, laboratory testing results were identified as key information that was not being shared in a timely fashion. Problems with the LSTS (Laboratory Sample Tracking System) system described above and the requirement for laboratory results to be reported at the headquarters level prior to being forwarded to the local EOC (Emergency Operations Center) were identified as contributing to delays.
Overall it was recognized that a better anticipation of information needs and coordination of reporting activities could improve information flow. For example, the requirements of senior decision makers for information on the status of farms, number of birds depopulated, compensation costs etc. were entirely predictable. While situation reports were shared with federal and provincial partners, some felt that the information contained in these reports was outdated. However, it was also noted that regular AI updates were being posted on the Agency’s website.7
The shared jurisdiction and responsibility of the CFIA may be difficult to manage in some situations, and protecting the jurisdiction of one’s organization is a normal reaction for a manager. However, at the same time, consultation and collaboration are imperative for a seamless strategy aimed at serving Canadians. As highlighted in its Report on Plans and Priorities, the CFIA recognizes the importance of a collaborative approach: “strong partnerships with other federal government departments, as well as provincial, territorial and municipal authorities are imperative to the Agency’s success. All share responsibility for setting and/or enforcing standards that support the integrity of Canada’s food safety, animal health and plant protection systems.”8
The message heard by the Standing Committee in Abbotsford was that consultation and communication were problematic. For example, the CFIA did not always make adequate use of local resources such as veterinarians with vast expertise in poultry diseases, and it sometimes ignored industry suggestions on pre-emptive culls and disposal of carcasses.
The CFIA, however, told the Standing Committee that it consulted and communicated extensively. Agency officials stated that:
| • | The CFIA held 36 conference calls with the national and B.C. poultry associations between 9 March and 27 August 2004. |
| • | The Agency held daily meetings with provincial and industry representatives at the Abbotsford Emergency Operations Centre, starting on 1 April 2004. As the pace of operations slowed, the meetings were reduced to three and two times per week until they were no longer necessary. |
| • | Prior to April 1, several meetings on AI were held between the CFIA, BCMAFF and the industry. |
| • | The industry and the province had representatives present in the CFIA's local Emergency Operations Centre in British Columbia from early April to late May. |
| • | CFIA headquarters officials had eight face-to-face meetings with national and B.C. industry association representatives on a full range of issues, and responded to 118 letters and electronic messages from these groups. Several face-to-face sessions were also held in British Columbia with other levels of government, industry and the general public. |
| • | The CFIA also held two open-house meetings in the Fraser Valley to promote understanding and provide practical demonstrations of biosecurity measures.9 |
Whether or not this is a dialogue of the deaf between the CFIA and stakeholders or, as stated by the CFIA President, “two ships passing in the night,” the CFIA has nevertheless recognized the communication and consultation issues and addressed them, notably in Recommendations 1 and 5 of the Lessons Learned review. The Committee is pleased with those recommendations, but will monitor their implementation in its future meetings with the CFIA.
B. Cooperation in Developing a Laboratory Network Within Canada
During the AI outbreak in the Fraser Valley, samples were sent by plane to the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health in Winnipeg. That Centre is located in Winnipeg precisely because it is approximately a midpoint in Canada. Although the Standing Committee recognized that this was probably the best approach during the outbreak, concerns were raised about the efficiency of such an approach, in terms of both cost and timing. At the Abbotsford hearings, an official from BCMAFF told the Standing Committee that the Ministry was in the process of upgrading its animal health laboratory to a Containment Level 3 facility. Three animal diagnosis laboratories are currently certified to work at Level 3 —Winnipeg, Nepean (Ottawa) and Lethbridge — and another is expected to be certified in Prince Edward Island.
The Standing Committee is aware that Level 3 facilities are very expensive to build. Maintenance costs are also high, not only for the infrastructure but also for the Level 3 operating process, especially if the facility is used just as a back-up in case of an emergency.
In its evaluation report on the outbreak, the European Commission recommended that:
The Central Competent Authority (CCA) should consider formalising the co-operation developed between the British Columbia Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease (NCFAD) and use this model to establish a laboratory network within Canada with the necessary capability to assist fully in any future outbreak of notifiable avian disease. 10
In response to the EC recommendation, the CFIA noted that federal-provincial laboratory networks have been developed in Canada for federally reported diseases and for the purpose of information exchange among laboratory workers under the Canadian Animal Health Laboratorians Network. The CFIA also made a commitment in Recommendation 4 of its Lessons Learned review to improve its intelligence and information management capabilities “to ensure more timely and efficient management and transmission of field and laboratory data.” Since the CFIA’s Laboratory Sample Tracking System “crashed” several times during the AI outbreak, that recommendation is very appropriate. However, as mentioned in the foreword to this report, that outbreak might very well be followed by others in the near future. If so, an ever-tighter network of laboratories, including additional Level 3 facilities, might be required. Recognizing the importance of such a network, but also the potential costs associated with it, the Standing Committee recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 4
That the Canadian Food Inspection Agency be required to present a cost-benefit analysis, by the end of 2005, on the need to have an increased number of Containment Level 3 facilities in Canada.
C. Allegations of Inhumane Treatment of Poultry
During the Abbotsford hearings, some witnesses accused the CFIA of inhumane treatment of birds, either when euthanizing large groups of birds or when destroying backyard flocks. An incident involving the shooting of birds, and another one involving the clubbing of birds to death, were reported to the Standing Committee. Some witnesses also questioned the use of CO2 on waterfowl such as ducks. According to a witness from the Specialty Birds Association, 100,000 ducks and geese were gassed with CO2, which the Association asserted was not an acceptable humane euthanasia method for waterfowl.
The CFIA President clarified these allegations in a subsequent appearance before the Standing Committee, at which he emphasized that CFIA veterinarians are trained to handle and euthanize animals humanely:
Throughout the entire crisis, we worked closely with the SPCA and provincial and private veterinarians. SPCA inspectors were regularly consulted and kept aware of the CFIA’s challenges and decision-making. Various alternatives for depopulation were considered in consultation with the B.C. SPCA.
We determined that carbon [dioxide (CO2)] gas, an internationally recognized humane method for euthanizing large groups of birds, including ducks, would be [the] main method for depopulating.
It has been suggested that untrained agency staff shot peacocks. Unfortunately, peacocks that could not be caught and euthanized with CO2 had to be shot. We made sure that this was done as humanely as possible, and these animals were killed only by properly trained provincial conservation officers.
It has also been suggested in the media that agency staff had been caught clubbing birds to death. I had this investigated. In fact, agency staff stopped contract employees doing this. They were stopped, and as a result, every euthanization operation subsequently had agency supervisors on site.
Richard Fadden, President
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
Standing Committee on
Agriculture and Agri-Food
Meeting No. 21 — 15:35
1st Session, 38th Parliament
Ottawa, 8 February 2005
While the above statement provides answers to some of the comments made by witnesses before the Standing Committee, the issue of the use of CO2 as an appropriate humane euthanasia method on ducks remains unclear. The witnesses did not support their statements with precise scientific references, but the Standing Committee found various scientific sources, such as Dr. Mohan Raj, Senior Research Fellow at the Department of Clinical Veterinary Science, University of Bristol, that question the use of CO2 on waterfowl. One source clearly states that CO2 is not acceptable for waterfowl,11 while the Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Welfare of the European Commission, in a report adopted on 23 June 1998, describes various methods using CO2 as “unlikely to be acceptable on humanitarian grounds for ducks.”12 The European Commission report mentions that “there is evidence that Argon alone or Argon/ CO2 mixtures may be used satisfactorily for domestic ducks.”
It is not the role of the Standing Committee to make a review of scientific literature; but clearly euthanasia techniques are changing over time, and some may become unacceptable and be replaced by new procedures as more scientific data are gathered and evaluated. In its AI policy comparison sent to the Standing Committee, the CFIA recognizes that “other gases and procedures will be tested for waterfowl to resolve the issue of ducks not responding well to CO2.” The Standing Committee is pleased with that approach but wants to ensure that continuous learning will be part of the action plan. The Standing Committee therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 5
That the Canadian Food Inspection Agency must ensure that its euthanasia techniques are compatible with internationally recognized humane best practices, and that its personnel conduct euthanasia exercises to remain well trained for carrying out these techniques.
The AI outbreak resulted in the slaughtering of approximately 17 million birds in the Fraser Valley, or 90% of the estimated population. As of December 2004, the Agency had received more than 1,130 requests for compensation and paid out about $63.5 million. It is estimated that the loss of employment was roughly 3,000 full-time equivalent person years.
According to an economic impact study commissioned by the B.C. Poultry Industry Economic Impact Committee and conducted by Edmonton-based Serecon Management Consulting,13 the depopulation of 125 poultry operations made up of commercial and backyard flocks of chickens, turkeys, ducks, geese, and other birds had dramatic impacts on both the short-term and long-term economic welfare of the industry and the provincial economy. Serecon divided the total impacts in three types:
1. Direct Impacts
Direct financial impacts on the entire poultry industry are estimated at $216.9 million. This sum comprises loss in output (farm gate receipts) with respect to breeding and grower operations, plus the cost impacts on hatching and processing activities, as relevant, within each industry sector. These impacts occurred primarily in 2004, with some residual impacts to be felt in 2005 and 2006. Direct impacts in the first year (to the end of March 2005) were calculated at $201.8 million, or 93% of the total direct impacts.
2. Secondary Impacts
Secondary impacts are estimated at $156.4 million. They have been determined using economic multipliers based on the poultry industry, developed from the B.C. government input-output model. They measure the impacts on wage re-spending and secondary impacts on other industries, both upstream and downstream in the economy.
3. One-Time Losses
One-time losses total $7.5 million. This amount reflects the industry’s costs for cleaning and disinfecting, biosecurity, coordination and public relations.
The total economic impacts are the sum of these three types of costs, or $380.8 million.
B. Review of Compensation Under the Health of Animals Act
The amount of compensation allocated for destroyed animals or birds as a result of an outbreak was raised at the Standing Committee hearings of January 2005, in a recommendation of the Canadian Poultry Industry Forum of October 2004, and in a CFIA recommendation resulting from its Lessons Learned review.
The incapacity of the Health of Animals Act to distinguish between the specifics of different industries, the lack of recognition of the value of genetic material and rare breeding stocks, and the absence of compensation for forgone income, are not new issues to the Standing Committee. During the scrapie outbreak in 1998, the Standing Committee urged the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food to increase the maximum compensation for sheep in order to better reflect the market value of purebred animals. Other issues relating to regulations under the Health of Animals Act, such as the cost of cleaning and disinfection and the cost of maintaining animals while in quarantine, were raised in 1998 and appear to be as current now as they were then.
One witness before the Standing Committee claimed that the CFIA was reopening the specialty bird compensation file just because the Standing Committee had planned a fact-finding mission to Abbotsford. Notwithstanding that statement, the Standing Committee is certainly pleased to see that the CFIA is currently preparing to examine elements of the compensation program, including maximum compensation amounts and the periodic review of the schedule of values under the Compensation for Destroyed Animals Regulations. As in 1998, the Standing Committee is concerned that there be fair and consistent compensation among industries, and that the value of genetic material be recognized. The Standing Committee therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 6
That, in its review of the existing compensation program under the Health of Animals Act, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency must ensure fairness and consistency among all types of production. In recognizing the intrinsic value of the genetic material so important to some industries flexibility must be allowed in compensation. The Agency, in consultation with the affected industries, should also consider how equitable compensation might be offered for forgone income, and for one-time losses.
Another element related to government compensation pertains to pre-emptive culls recommended by some industries, notably the Canadian Egg Marketing Agency and the B.C. Specialty Birds Association. According to those organizations, protocols should allow pre-emptive culls even before tests are confirmed by a federal laboratory. Decisions on a pre-emptive cull would be based on symptoms in birds and the clinical experience of veterinarians.
One of the four Canadian Poultry Industry Forum recommendations that has been added to the CFIA’s own list of recommendations concerns “the feasibility of establishing a pre-emptive cull program for suspect cases of AI to limit the potential spread of the disease.” This would require amendments to the Health of Animals Act in terms of the threshold required to allow for the destruction of animals and the triggering of compensation. One major difficulty in amending the Act is that pre-emptive cull thresholds must be based on reasonable probabilities, in order to avoid undue waste of taxpayers’ money every time an animal disease occurs in the country. The Standing Committee is, however, pleased to see that the CFIA and the industry are collaborating in examining proposals for pre-emptive slaughter, and that vaccination protocols are also being considered as an alternative to pre-emptive culls.
Pre-emptive culls are a controversial measure. The Standing Committee was made aware of allegations by the Vancouver Humane Society that the poultry industry had proposed to take responsibility for depopulating flocks without consulting the CFIA in the event of future outbreaks. For various ethical and legislative reasons, and in light of Canada’s excellent international reputation regarding animal disease control, the Standing Committee cannot support such a unilateral approach to pre-emptive culls. The Committee therefore recommends:
RECOMMENDATION 7
That any industry recommendations/actions for a pre-emptive cull to limit the potential spread of an outbreak of animal disease must be submitted to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. The Agency, in consultation with the affected provinces and industries, must be proactive and responsible for authorizing and supervising any such pre-emptive cull.
The CFIA has recognized that there were shortcomings in the handling of the 2004 AI outbreak in British Columbia. In fact, all stakeholders could have been better prepared. This situation, however, is typical of all kinds of crises: no matter how careful the preparation, there are always uncontrollable events.
Canada’s comprehensive and responsive food safety system is well recognized on the international scene, and our country is respected for its capacity to address challenges to that safety system. This capacity is noted in the conclusion to the final report of the European Commission mission to Canada concerning the control of the avian influenza epidemic:
The effort made to control the AI outbreak has been considerable and great commitment/technical ability was demonstrated on-the-spot. Innovative measures and improved procedures were used that were not foreseen in the current contingency plan and a number of areas were identified that required improvement.
The Standing Committee is convinced that the stakeholders’ input and recommendations that emerged from the Canadian Poultry Industry Forum held in Abbotsford on 27-28 October 2004, the CFIA’s own Lessons Learned review, and the present report and its recommendations based on witnesses’ comments during the Standing Committee’s fact-finding mission to Abbotsford in January 2005, provide a comprehensive and effective list of measures that will help begin to build an even stronger emergency preparedness system. The Standing Committee believes that the best management approach to take for the CFIA, the provinces and the industry is to keep learning, building on and, most of all, sharing what has been learned from the 2004 AI outbreak.
| 1 | The report is dated 10 January 2005, but it was released one week later accompanied by a press release dated 17 January 2005. |
| 2 | Rory McAlpine, Deputy Minister, British Columbia Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, Hearings, 18 January 2005. |
| 3 | Please consult Appendix 4 for an exhaustive list of participants. |
| 4 | Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Lessons Learned Review: The CFIA's Response to the 2004 Avian Influenza Outbreak in B.C., Ottawa, 10 January 2005, p. 3. |
| 5 | Ibid., p. 12. |
| 6 | Zoonotic diseases are those transmissible from animals to humans. |
| 7 | Canadian Food Inspection Agency (2005), p. 15. |
| 8 | Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Report on Plans and Priorities 2005-2006, Ottawa, p. 4. |
| 9 | Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food, Meeting No. 21 - 15:35, 1st Session, 38th Parliament, Ottawa, 8 February 2005. |
| 10 | European Commission - Health and Consumer Protection Directorate General, Final Report of a Mission Carried Out In Canada from 5 to 9 July 2004 Concerning the Control of the Avian Influenza Epidemic, DGg(SANCO)/7323/2004-MR-Final, 3 November 2004, p. 21. |
| 11 | Center for Animal Welfare, College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, University of California, Davis, Euthanasia of Poultry: Considerations for Producers, Transporters, and Veterinarians, http://animalwelfare.ucdavis.edu/publication/poultryeuth.html. |
| 12 | http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/scah/out08_en.html. |
| 13 | Serecon Management Consulting Inc, Economic Impacts on British Columbia Poultry Industry Due to the Avian Influenza Outbreak, Final Report, Edmonton, 19 August 2004. |