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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, October 9, 2003

0905

The Chair (Hon. Andy Scott (Fredericton, Lib.))

Mr. John McAvity (Executive Director, Canadian Museums Association)

The Chair

Mr. John McAvity

0910

Mr. Marcel Brisebois (Director, Musée d'art contemporain de Montréal, Canadian Museums Association)

The Chair

Mrs. Deborah Windsor (Executive Director, Writers' Union of Canada)

0915

Ms. Marian Hebb (Legal Counsel, Creators Copyright Coalition, Writers' Union of Canada)

0920

The Chair

Mr. Kirk Tousaw (Policy Director, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association)

0925

0930

The Chair

Mr. Charles Montpetit (responsable du Comité liberté d'expression, Union des écrivaines et écrivains québécois)

0935

0940

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.))

Mr. Richard Marceau (Charlesbourg—Jacques-Cartier, BQ)

Mr. Charles Montpetit

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Marcel Brisebois

Mr. Richard Marceau

0945

Mr. Marcel Brisebois

Mr. Richard Marceau

Mr. Marcel Brisebois

Mr. Richard Marceau

Mr. Marcel Brisebois

Mr. Richard Marceau

Mr. Marcel Brisebois

Mr. Richard Marceau

Mr. Marcel Brisebois

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Ms. Marian Hebb

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Charles Montpetit

Mr. Richard Marceau

Mr. Charles Montpetit

Mr. Richard Marceau

Mr. Charles Montpetit

0950

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. John McAvity

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Inky Mark (Dauphin—Swan River, PC)

Ms. Marian Hebb

Mr. Inky Mark

Ms. Marian Hebb

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

Mr. Inky Mark

Mr. John McAvity

Mr. Inky Mark

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Inky Mark

0955

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Charles Montpetit

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Hon. Lorne Nystrom (Regina—Qu'Appelle, NDP)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Charles Montpetit

1000

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. John McAvity

1005

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Charles Montpetit

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Ms. Marian Hebb

1010

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Charles Montpetit

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Inky Mark

1015

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

Mr. Inky Mark

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

Mr. Inky Mark

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. John McAvity

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Charles Montpetit

1020

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

Hon. Lorne Nystrom

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay)

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin (Northumberland, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

Ms. Marian Hebb

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin

1025

The Chair

Ms. Marian Hebb

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin

Ms. Marian Hebb

The Chair

Mr. Charles Montpetit

The Chair

Mr. Richard Marceau

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

1030

Mr. Richard Marceau

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

The Chair

Mr. Charles Montpetit

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

1035

The Chair

Mr. Charles Montpetit

The Chair

Mr. Inky Mark

The Chair

Mr. Charles Montpetit

Mr. Inky Mark

The Chair

Mr. Charles Montpetit

The Chair

Mr. Marcel Brisebois

The Chair

Mr. Derek Lee

1040

Mr. John McAvity

Ms. Marian Hebb

The Chair

Mr. Charles Montpetit

1045

The Chair

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

The Chair

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

Mr. John McKay

The Chair

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

1050

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

The Chair

Mr. Charles Montpetit

The Chair

Mr. John Maloney (Erie—Lincoln, Lib.)

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

The Chair

Mr. Charles Montpetit

1055

The Chair

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Kirk Tousaw

The Chair

Mr. Charles Montpetit

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

NUMBER 069

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, October 9, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0905)

[English]

The Chair (Hon. Andy Scott (Fredericton, Lib.)): Good morning.

[Translation]

Welcome, everyone.

[English]

I call to order the 69th meeting of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights.

Pursuant to the order of reference of Tuesday, April 1, 2003, we are examining Bill C-20, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (protection of children and other vulnerable persons), and the Canada Evidence Act.

We have before us today four groups of witnesses: the Canadian Museums Association is represented by John McAvity from Rothsay, New Brunswick, and Marcel Brisebois; from the Writers' Union of Canada we have Marian Hebb, legal counsel, Creators Copyright Coalition, and Deborah Windsor, executive director; from the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association we have Kirk Tousaw, policy director; and from the Union des écrivaines et écrivains québécois, Charles Montpetit.

We'll go in the order they appear on the agenda. I'm going to go first to the Canadian Museums Association, Mr. McAvity and Mr. Brisebois.

Mr. John McAvity (Executive Director, Canadian Museums Association): Perhaps I could begin by saying my capacity is that of the executive director of the Canadian Museums Association.

[Translation]

Mr. Brisebois is the distinguished director of the Musée d'art contemporain de Montréal.

[English]

We will share our presentation.

The Chair: That gives me the opportunity to point out that you have ten minutes for each group. Please deal with the sharing yourselves. Don't ask me to decide with 30 seconds to go. Thanks.

Mr. John McAvity: Hopefully we'll get extra points for being under time.

Thank you for the opportunity today to address you on this very important piece of legislation concerning the protection of children and other vulnerable persons from abuse.

The Canadian Museums Association is the national organization for the museums in Canada. We represent some 2,000 non-profit museums that are run in the public interest all across Canada. They include history museums, art museums, and galleries whose purpose is to engage Canadians in an understanding and an appreciation of their culture. All of these are non-profit institutions, and it is in the public interest therefore that we are here before you today.

Let us be very clear about our position. We are not here to debate the intention of Bill C-20. We are not here to debate the need to protect children from abuse. Indeed, there can be nothing more important to society, to every child, to every parent, and to every grandparent. Rather, we are here to urge you, the committee, to consider one request and one request only, and that is to withdraw the proposal to eliminate the artistic defence from section 163 of the Criminal Code.

Why is this so important to us? It is because eliminating that defence will have a profound and harmful impact on the very public good the bill seeks to protect. It will leave the choice of what is good and bad art to policemen, to prosecutors, and to others who must decipher the subjective and elusive benchmark of community tolerance. Is this an appropriate role for the state in a democratic society? It will suppress creative expression, and by extension the right of all Canadians to self-expression, by confronting honest, hard-working artists with the prospect of criminal charges and ensuing costs that they simply cannot afford.

¿ (0910)

[Translation]

Mr. Marcel Brisebois (Director, Musée d'art contemporain de Montréal, Canadian Museums Association): This amendment will undermine the efforts of hundreds of Canadian museums that are striving to enhance the appreciation of Canadian art and artists. Museum curators will naturally fear that the decisions they make regarding the choice and design of their exhibits might lead to criminal charges. This amendment will effectively set back the cultural clock in Canada by setting aside a well-established and internationally recognized principle of law. It will bog down an already overloaded justice system with long, costly, complicated and always controversial court cases. Will these proceedings do very much to protect our children?

We would ask that you recognize that the artistic merit defence, which is a legal concept recognized in Canada and many other democracies, is an integral part of the broader right of all Canadians to freedom of expression. In this regard, it is worth mentioning and quoting the Supreme Court judgment in the Butler case in 1992:

Artistic expression rests at the heart of freedom of expression values and any doubt in this regard must be resolved in favour of freedom of expression. [...] The Court must be generous in its application of the 'artistic defence.'

We maintain that the elimination of the artistic defence will do little to help protect children and other potential victims of violence. On the other hand, it will convey an unhealthy message to Canadians, by implying that their fundamental right to freedom of expression is endangered. Far from compromising the general intent of the bill, maintaining the artistic merit defence would rather strengthen and clarify the general intent of the bill.

We must not forget that artists are also Canadians and citizens like everyone else. In fact, the vast majority of them lead normal lives, and often have several other jobs and contribute to the local culture and economy. Whether or not we agree on what constitutes a good work of art, the fact remains that we have the freedom to choose, the freedom to decide what we want to see or what we refuse to see, and which exhibition we prefer. The irony is that the elimination of the artistic merit defence will actually undermine the freedom of choice so dear to us all.

Thank you for your attention.

[English]

The Chair: Merci.

We'll go to the Writers' Union of Canada, Ms. Hebb and Ms. Windsor, for 10 minutes.

Mrs. Deborah Windsor (Executive Director, Writers' Union of Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Writers' Union of Canada is a national organization representing approximately 1,500 book writers. Its objects include protection and advancement of freedom of expression.

While we strongly support the overall purpose behind Bill C-20, that is, to protect children from sexual exploitation and abuse, we believe the child pornography provisions of this bill are a misguided and unwarranted attack on freedom of expression.

We submit that they infringe the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in a way that is unacceptable to a free and democratic society. Furthermore, we see no additional protection for children under this poorly crafted bill.

In 1993 we were unsuccessful in our opposition to the legislation that introduced section 163.1 into the Criminal Code and for the first time created an offence that dealt specifically with child pornography.

The role of a writer is to hold up a mirror to society, to probe human experience, and to explore the truth as he or she sees it. The whole of society is deprived if restraints are placed upon the writer's pursuit of his or her vision.

Teenagers engaged in sexual activity is a fact of modern society and a frequent theme of literature past and present. When we opposed this legislation in 1993, we were concerned that films and theatrical performances based on written work would run afoul of the language now contained in existing section 163.1.

Today, in theory, The Tin Drum or Lolita, for example, should not be shown in Canada. The classic Blue Lagoon is also pornographic because it involves teenage sex. This may also be so of certain productions of Romeo and Juliet or West Side Story or, closer to home, the CBC film Gentle Sinners, based on the Canadian coming-of-age novel by Bill Valgardson.

However, the artistic merit of these particular works of fiction is generally recognized. Also in theory off limits to film and theatre productions are non-fiction works such as Charlotte Vale Allen's Daddy's Girl or Sylvia Fraser's My Father's House, both moving accounts of the authors' own experiences of being sexually abused as children and instrumental in first bringing the issue of child abuse to public attention.

Bill C-20 now purports to close loopholes in the child pornography law enacted in 1993 by deleting from the legislation the defences of artistic merit and educational, scientific, or medical purposes and by expanding the definition of child pornography to include written descriptions of certain acts that are offences under the Criminal Code.

This is further unreasonable restraint on the freedom of expression guaranteed to every Canadian under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Just as an example, Paulette Bourgeois has written books such as these. These are books written for children—boys and girls—in grades four, five, and six in the primary schools. Clearly these works have an educational value, but they would be basically banned if this law were to come through as it is.

Now the law, if these amendments are enacted, will be even more intolerable to a free and democratic society. The current proposal contained in Bill C-20 is to amend the Criminal Code so that the books and plays themselves are at risk, not just visual depictions of scenes from them.

We have no quarrel with law protecting real children. The real problem is not that Canada has laws that are inadequate to protect children from sexual exploitation and abuse, but rather that Canada has inadequate strategies and insufficient resources to support the police in dealing with situations involving real children.

We share the view of the University of Toronto philosophy professor and pornographic specialist Wayne Sumner, who earlier this year said the question is how effectively the existing law can be enforced.

It is our view that section 163.1 of the Criminal Code, the existing child pornography legislation, already has a chilling effect as authors and other creators tend to engage in self-censorship to avoid possible prosecution when writing or depicting characters who are under the age of 18.

I'd ask Marion Hebb to speak a little further on this.

¿ (0915)

Ms. Marian Hebb (Legal Counsel, Creators Copyright Coalition, Writers' Union of Canada): Child pornography is very broadly defined, even in the existing legislation. The current definition has three branches, and Bill C-20 will add a fourth.

First of all, there is the existing definition, which includes visual representations showing people who appear to be under 18 engaged in, or depicted as being engaged in, sexual activity.

Then we have the second branch, which includes visual representations of which the dominant characteristic is a depiction for sexual purposes of a sexual organ or the anal region of a person under 18.

The third branch is one that particularly affects writers; that is, any written material or visual material that advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person under 18. That would be an offence under the Criminal Code.

The Writers' Union opposes very strongly the advocating or counselling of such offences, but there are people in our society who feel very strongly that exposure to certain books is tantamount to encouraging certain actions or lifestyles. We see this all the time in the debates that go on between parents, teachers, and school boards over the contents of school libraries and curricula.

The proposed fourth branch, I would submit to you, is overkill to a definition that is already very broad and uncertain in meaning. If Bill C-20 passes, child pornography as defined by the Criminal Code will also include any written material the dominant characteristic of which is the description for a sexual purpose of sexual activity with a person under the age of 18. That would be a Criminal Code offence. This amended definition will create an offence based on mere description. Its broad language targets written material that would encompass and surpass the third branch of the definition.

Under the general obscenity section, child pornography is not judged by community standards of tolerance. The language in the obscenity section has allowed the courts to consider community standards of tolerance when considering whether an accused is guilty of an obscenity offence. In the Butler case, the Supreme Court set out the test of internal necessities, requiring the sexually explicit material that would constitute undue exploitation to be viewed in context to determine whether it was the dominant theme of the work as a whole. This is not applicable to the child pornography offence.

If Bill C-20 is passed with the defences of artistic merit and educational, scientific, or medical purposes removed, the single defence remaining will be that the acts alleged to be child pornography serve the public good and do not extend beyond what serves the public good. It is the defendant who must demonstrate that there are facts that show the work serves the public good.

Although the definition of public good accepted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in a 1957 obscenity case was that it was something that was necessary or advantageous to religion or morality, to the administration of justice, to the pursuit of science, literature or art, or of other objects of general interest, it would be very difficult for a court to find a work of literature or art to be for the public good if Parliament had deliberately amended child pornography offences to remove the defence of artistic merit and the other defences.

The books my colleague showed you are books about puberty—an educational tool about puberty—and they would clearly fall within this section.

We submit that the proposed removal of the defence of artistic merit from section 163.1 would affect how police, prosecutors, and ultimately the courts would be likely to interpret the existing and added paragraphs of the definition of child pornography. Courts rely on the evolution of legislation to assist them in interpretation. Driedger, a foremost expert on construction of statutes, says this:

It is presumed that amendments to the wording of a legislative provision are made for some intelligiblepurpose: to clarify the meaning, to correct a mistake, to change the law. ... When two successiveversions of a provision are compared to one another, it is often apparent that a substantive change wasintended. ... Examining successive amendments to legislation often reveals the direction in which alegislative policy is evolving.

If Parliament deliberately removes the defence of artistic merit, courts will not be willing to interpret the public good to include a defence involving artistic merit or purpose. This is especially so because the public good is an existing defence. This does not seem to be recognized by people. It is not a substitute for artistic merit or for the other existing defences; public good is already in the statute. It already applies to the child pornography offence as it exists. It is not a replacement for the defence that Bill C-20 would eliminate, so how could a court then interpret the public good to include a defence of artistic merit, or educational, scientific or medical purpose?

¿ (0920)

Proposed paragraph 163.1(7)(c) states that “the motives of an accused are irrelevant”. We are dismayed that this remains in the revised legislation, since there already have been a number of decisions under the charter that this provision of the general obscenity offence is unconstitutional, particularly where the accused has made an honest and reasonable mistake of fact. To take a practical example, teachers and librarians, along with the writers and other artists who have created the material, are potentially at risk as possessors or distributors of material alleged to be child pornography.

In summary, we believe the proposed changes to the child pornography provisions of the Criminal Code will greatly increase the likelihood of the arbitrary exercise of prosecutorial discretion to lay charges against creators of written and visual material, falling within a very much broadened definition of child pornography, particularly without the existing defence of artistic merit. Our greatest concern is that the sole remaining defence of public good will not encompass a defence of artistic purpose or merit, because Parliament has deliberately chosen to remove this from the existing legislation.

We oppose the sexual exploitation of children, but we do not believe censorship laws address this problem. We submit that the proposed changes to the law will lead to further self-censorship by writers and other artists and will cast a greater chill on the expression of ideas. If writers have to fear being on the wrong side of the law, their creativity will be stifled. Laws repressing free expression will not be the magic that will eliminate the sexual exploitation of children. It is behaviour that should be outlawed, not free expression.

We submit to you that the amendments to section 163.1 are unacceptable to a society that values freedom of expression, and we call on Parliament to delete them from this important bill intended to address the vulnerability of children to exploitation.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Now to the B.C. Civil Liberties Association.

Mr. Kirk Tousaw (Policy Director, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association): Mr. Chair, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to present our submission today.

Our association and civil libertarians in general believe that this law on child pornography as it stands, even before Bill C-20, is already seriously flawed and inimical to freedom. When amending a statute, we have an opportunity to take some of these flaws and make them better. Instead, the provisions of Bill C-20 take an already flawed approach and make it worse. In many respects, this bill is an attack on free speech, particularly an attack on artistic expression. In addition, if these amendments are enacted, it's our belief that the pornography legislation in general will not be able to pass constitutional muster.

I suppose it's obligatory to state at this point, like all of the panellists, that the BCCLA does not support child pornography; we oppose child pornography. We support child pornography legislation, and have since its inception. We believe that carefully targeted legislation is important, and that criminalizing the photographic representations of actual children is appropriate—even the mere possession of such expressive material. We hasten to point out that this possessory law is the only one on the books criminalizing the mere possession of expressive material. We support it, with significant limitations.

We believe that when actual children are harmed in the making of material, it's appropriate to criminalize that material, and even the mere private possession of that material. However, where children are not harmed, it is inappropriate in a free society to restrict expression.

In order to put my comments on Bill C-20 in context, I will lay out some of the objections to the existing regime. The inclusion of representations of imaginary people, even those who are not children, is currently a crime. This is inappropriate. When you have legislation that is designed to protect children, it should protect actual children, not imaginary persons.

In addition, the definition of a child should not include persons who are not under 18 years of age; persons over 18 are simply not children. Moreover, under the existing regime, because the age of consent in Canada is 14, we have an anomaly where it is a crime to express or depict legal acts. That's inappropriate in a free society.

The standard of legal harm ought to be the direct and measurable damage to actual people or property. The concept that bad ideas lead to bad acts is both scientifically unsound and ought not to be the basis of criminal legislation.

I remind the committee that in the Sharpe case, the court reviewed the child pornography legislation and only saved it from constitutional invalidity by reading in exemptions. The court was particularly concerned about the overbreadth of the law. Bill C-20 takes some of these problems and makes them worse. Again, it has terminology that is overbroad and subject to constitutional attack. In a sense, this bill is going to recreate some of the problems, and those problems will ultimately have to be resolved by the courts.

I want to say that the Civil Liberties Association supports the comments made by the other panellists on the issue of artistic expression. Removal of that defence is a mistake; it should not be taken out. But because those panellists are adequately addressing that, I'm not going to comment any further.

I will say that replacing the artistic merit defence with a defence of public good is repugnant to free expression in a democratic and free society. The concept itself of public good is not defined in the statute. That alone makes this bill problematic and, I believe, fatally vague. Though there are some efforts to give guidance to the courts, we simply don't know from reading Bill C-20 what public good is—and what it is not is clearly artistic expression, because that's being removed.

¿ (0925)

Moreover, and more fundamentally, from the position of civil libertarians, requiring citizens to have and express only thoughts and expressions that meet a standard of public good, or that support the public good, is inimical to freedom. It's a hallmark of totalitarian societies to extract right or good thinking from its citizens, and this is not a road Canada should go down.

Another problem with Bill C-20 is the broadening of the definition of child pornography to include merely descriptive writings, or writings that don't advocate the commission of criminal offences but are merely descriptive. Again, to broaden the definition in such a way creates a situation in which the legal acts that produced the writing become crimes—and this is an attack on free expression.

I'd also like to speak to section 153 of Bill C-20 and the sexual exploitation of young persons. Under the existing regime, young persons are already protected from sexual activity with adults in exploitive situations. Those situations are defined in the legislation; somebody reading the law can understand and know what is illegal and what is not illegal. So when an adult is in a position of trust or authority with a young person, or when the young person is in a dependent relationship with the adult, or when the adult induces the sexual activity, those are crimes—and someone can know they're committing a crime.

The problem with Bill C-20 is that it adds an undefined term of “exploitative” to these existing situations. The term is not defined in the bill, and it's susceptible to numerous meanings; it's vague and imprecise. And although some factors are outlined, they're simply not sufficient to allow someone to know whether or not they're going to be breaking the law if they engage in this type of sexual activity. Moreover, it's not clear from the bill what harm is being targeted by adding “exploitative” as a definition. It appears that it is in fact designed to move towards preventing all sexual relations between persons over 18 and persons under 18. If that's the case, then the bill ought to be explicit about that, and we can have a debate on that issue. We would object to that as an imposition of sexual morality, as opposed to the targeting of harm.

To sum up, in positive terms, our recommendations on this bill are that artistic merit be left in as a defence; that public good not replace the existing defences; that all written materials be exempted from the ambit of child pornography legislation, because they are not created as a result of harm caused to children, as opposed to photographic representations of criminal acts under the code. The law should only capture representations that in fact involve actual children and whose production requires the commission of crimes under the code. Finally, whatever “exploitative” means, it ought not be added to section 153.

Thanks very much.

¿ (0930)

The Chair: Thank you.

[Translation]

I will now give the floor to Mr. Montpetit.

Mr. Charles Montpetit (responsable du Comité liberté d'expression, Union des écrivaines et écrivains québécois): Good morning.

First of all, I would like to point out that the brief you received from us, the Union des écrivaines et des écrivains québécois, is supported by the Ligue des droits et libertés. Since we submitted the brief to you, we have received other support for our brief, for example from the Corporation des bibliothécaires professionnels du Québec, the Société des auteurs de radio, télévision et cinéma, the Canadian Literary Translators Association of Canada, the Société civile des auteurs multimédia, the Société des auteurs et compositeurs dramatiques and the Association des auteures et auteurs de l'Ontario français. We therefore have the support of almost all areas of the artistic community, and these organizations represent a total of over 50,000 members.

As my colleagues emphasized earlier, I am here on behalf of the Union des écrivaines et des écrivains québécois to present our position on replacing the artistic, educational, scientific and medical defences with the defence of the public good. I would emphasize in passing that often the only term used is “artistic defence”, but since the other four defences would be eliminated and replaced with the defence of the public good, this reference must be seen as a shortcut, which is intended to cover the four areas.

Rather than reading you the brief submitted by the Union des écrivaines et des écrivains québécois, I would like to give a human face to the problem we are discussing today. I would like to clarify at the outset that the Union holds exactly the same view as the other groups that have been in touch with me. I would just like to tell you what would happen to an author if this change were in place. To illustrate, I will give you the example of an author I know very well: myself.

The last time I came to Ottawa was to accept the Governor General's Award for children's literature. This time, I am here because I could be charged with child pornography. That changes my situation considerably. I take this personally.

My works include two anthologies entitled La Première Fois, which are a collection of my own stories and those of other authors who have also won children's literature awards, about our first sexual experiences. These works are for teenagers. The purpose of the anthology is to inform teenagers about what they can expect in a much more realistic way than do the “sexual plumbing” courses offered in the schools. We provide all the information about what happened to real people. These two books have been successful not only in Canada, but also internationally, because they were included by the International Young People's Library in Germany among the 200 best books for young people in the world. These two books would become evidence of my criminal behaviour if this bill were passed in its present form. I thought I was doing a service to Canadian society, and now I am told that I am attacking it. I take that very badly. Moreover, the books have also been translated in English Canada and in Australia. So now we are talking about an international crime.

What astounds me in all of this is that it is perfectly legal for a 14-year-old, and even a 12-year-old in some cases, if I understand correctly, to have sexual relations in Canada.

¿ (0935)

If it is legal to make love in real life, I fail to see why talking about it would become illegal, and I understand even less why a work of fiction would also be illegal.

I was here yesterday at your meeting to hear what was said. Some of you made the point that it was becoming increasingly philosophical—that is the word that was used—to try to distinguish between virtual children and real children.

I maintain that the difference is not philosophical at all. It is very important. In fact, I have never abused a real child, and the fact that I talk about sexuality in one of my books does not make me a criminal. To the extent that writers of detective novels are not charged with murder, I do not understand why the rules are different when it comes to sexuality. I understand even less why talking about sexuality in a book is more criminal than talking about the murder of a teenager in a detective novel for young people, for example.

There is a double standard here, depending on whether we are talking about murder or sexuality. As far as I am concerned, there should be no such distinction. When we are talking about books, we are not talking about real crimes. I would therefore invite you to distinguish between the two. When no real child is harmed, there is no crime: for me, it is as simple as that.

I would like to emphasize that even a noble cause such as efforts to protect young people from sexual abuse does not justify placing a gag on artists. At your meeting yesterday, some of you asked whether we should not try to determine how many artists would be at risk compared to the number of children who would be at risk if the bill is passed or withdrawn.

I would like to tell you that it is not one or the other. Arresting artists will not make children safer, and leaving artists alone will not mean that children are less safe. The two things have nothing to do with each other. I used the word “artist”, but this applies as well to scientists, people who do medical research and people who provide sexual education courses.

I would also like to emphasize that in its present form, the bill contains a basic contradiction. It says that anyone who writes a work for sexual purposes may be guilty of a crime. I fail to understand how we can assign intentions to individuals and then tell them that their intentions are not relevant to their defence. That is a basic contradiction. So the bill invents intentions for such individuals. It would be preferable for them if they could say what their real intentions were in their defence. That is what is known as a complete defence, and that is what should be authorized under Canadian law at the moment.

I would also like to point out that even if an artist is ultimately found not guilty after a long trial and if it is recognized that he complied with the public good or met one of the other criteria, for example if the artistic defence is maintained, the artist will have spent two years in court for nothing. This will be very costly, and, above all, will have destroyed the artist's reputation.

This is the type of thing that cannot be taken lightly, and you should not take it lightly for yourselves, because it happens that at committee meetings, you too describe sexual acts involving young people. I am sure you would not want to be considered criminals because of those discussions. The same is true of artists.

Thank you very much.

¿ (0940)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.)): Thank you.

Mr. Marceau.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau (Charlesbourg—Jacques-Cartier, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank the witnesses for coming today. Your presentations were very eloquent.

First of all, I would like to be clear on something. You all agree that the concept of public good should be rejected by our committee. Is that correct? Do you agree that the public good defence should be rejected?

Mr. Charles Montpetit: Yes.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Brisebois.

Mr. Marcel Brisebois: I really do think there is no exclusion between common good and artistic merit. We are dealing with artists. The work of art is contributing to the public good. So there is no exclusion between those two concepts.

We have to think that an artist is working with the idea that he will enhance society, that he will make a good step toward the public good.

[Translation]

Do you understand what I mean?

Mr. Richard Marceau: Yes, I understand, but that is not quite what it said in the letter dated august 29, 2003 signed by Mr. John G. McAvity. I presume it was written by your colleague, and it says, and I quote:

The artistic merit defence must be maintained...

¿ (0945)

Mr. Marcel Brisebois: Absolutely.

Mr. Richard Marceau: Very well.

Mr. Marcel Brisebois: Mr. Chair, what I am trying to tell Mr. Marceau in answer to his question is that the concept of common good does not exclude the concept of artistic merit. However, in the act as it is written, it is as if...

Mr. Richard Marceau: In the act or in the bill?

Mr. Marcel Brisebois: In the bill. In the bill as drafted, it is as if those two concepts were mutually exclusive, when in fact, for artists... You must understand that I am not an artist, I am a manager.

Mr. Richard Marceau: I am not an artist either.

Mr. Marcel Brisebois: And my training was in philosophy.

Mr. Richard Marceau: I see.

Mr. Marcel Brisebois: What you must understand is that the concept of artistic merit can be included in the concept of public good. It must not be excluded.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Tousaw, Mr. Montpetit, and Ms. Hebb all want to answer your question.

Ms. Hebb, I think, is the first one.

Ms. Marian Hebb: I want to point out to everybody that the defence of public good is already in the existing child pornography offence. It doesn't immediately appear that it is because it's in the obscenity section, but then there's another section that refers to it. So currently in the act you have the defence of public good and you also have artistic merit, educational, scientific, and medical purpose. So you have all those defences. You are proposing to remove the defences of artistic merit and scientific purpose, etc., but you are leaving--not adding, not replacing, but leaving--the defence of public good. Now what is a court, a judge, going to think when they look at the clause and they see that you have removed artistic merit and the others from this offence, leaving public good, which was originally there and it was something separate?

Obviously the drafters of this bill, the legislators, to start with, did not intend the concept of public good to include artistic merit. They thought it was necessary to have that separately.

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: I'd like to reiterate that the problem in this bill is not so much that the public good remains as a defence; the problem is that it replaces and subsumes artistic merit, and scientific, educational purpose, and those are gone. Once those are taken out of the bill it's going to be awfully difficult for an artist or an educator to argue to a court that their art or their educational material serves the public good.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Monsieur Montpetit.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Montpetit: Since your question was for all witnesses, I would also like to answer.

First I said yes in answer to your question because I thought you were simply asking if we all believe that the artistic, educational, scientific and medical defences should not all be replaced by the public good defence. If that is the meaning of your question, yes, I believe that we all agree on that.

Mr. Richard Marceau: I just want to make sure that a legitimate artist will not be subjected to groundless charges of child pornography. You gave us the example of your books which I would very much like to read. I did not know about them and I apologize, but I can assure you that I will read them and that I will be giving them to my little niece very soon.

Mr. Charles Montpetit: I can leave them with you.

Mr. Richard Marceau: That is very kind of you. And if you wouldn't mind, I would like you to sign them.

Mr. Montpetit, would you be in favour of replacing the concept of public good by something more specific, such as artistic merit, educational purposes—and I believe that defence or even both would apply to your books— scientific purposes or research purposes? Should we be more specific in what we are trying to do? Is this what you would prefer?

Mr. Charles Montpetit: I believe that these already exist in the act as it stands. The defences of artistic merit and educational, scientific or medical purposes are already in the act and there is no need to replace them. There is no need to be more specific since these exemptions are already in the law.

¿ (0950)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. McAvity, would you finish off this round?

Mr. John McAvity: I'd like to respond to that.

First of all, in terms of the artistic defence, there have been cases where that has upheld the very principle that's involved. So it has been very successful to date. There was a case in Toronto a few years ago with a public art gallery.

The second thing is, if you add words such as “aesthetic”, that's a highly subjective term. I have to admit that our museums and art galleries hang a lot of work that I don't consider very aesthetic and many of you may not consider very aesthetic. It is a personal judgment.

So I think we are very content with leaving the words “artistic merit”. It has worked. There's jurisprudence on it. It ain't broke, so don't fix it. That's where we're really at.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Thank you, Mr. Marceau.

Mr. Mark.

Mr. Inky Mark (Dauphin—Swan River, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'll continue on the same line of questioning.

In the Sharpe decision, paragraph 70 basically says that “The public good defence has received little interpretation in the obscenity context...”. They conclude by saying that, “Again, the same procedure would apply as for the defence of artistic merit.”

So is the public good exactly the same as artistic merit?

Voices: No.

Ms. Marian Hebb: In the obscenity section, that phrase “public good”, I believe, has been interpreted to include artistic merit. This other section now has a different legislative history, so that would not happen.

Mr. Inky Mark: Would it help?

Ms. Marian Hebb: Theoretically, I think I mentioned in our Writers' Union brief that there have been cases where in fact this phrase “public good” has been interpreted to include pursuit of art, literature, and so on.

In theory, you're right. In theory, the public good could include all these things in an artistic merit defence. The way it's happened, it can't, because you're proposing to eliminate one and to leave only the public good, which courts will consider means something else.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Tousaw.

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: I guess the question I would ask is this. If the intent of the bill is that artistic merit be subsumed into public good, and if “public good” also means artistic merit, scientific merit, then why change the law? As it stands today, those defences are clearly enunciated in the statute. There's no reason to change it. If the conception behind public good includes art, let's just simply leave it alone. As said, if it's not broken, let's not fix it and introduce more problems that will ultimately lead to significant amounts of litigation on the constitutionality of the statute as a whole.

Mr. Inky Mark: There's no gain by broadening the definition of “public good” by including artists and other groups in there.

Mr. John McAvity: Absolutely. If you included it by stating “artistic merit”, that is an issue we're comfortable with. We can defend that. It has been defended in courts before. Expert witnesses are brought in. It's still just a defence. It isn't a carte blanche that gives us rights to do everything.

Our biggest concern is that without artistic merit it leaves considerable ambiguity about what a public museum or art gallery can do. What is considered art to one person may not be considered art to another. What may be considered good art today may have been considered very controversial art hundreds of years ago.

Our museums are filled with what is today highly regarded art. In the time of Michelangelo, in the time of Goya, even in the 19th century with the Canadian artist, Paul Peel, these works were considered very risqué at that time. Time has healed that. We've moved on. Any works that perhaps we're seeing today may in the fullness of time be looked at totally differently in the future.

So our concern is that if this bill leaves us in a very unclear position about what can be exhibited, it leaves the potential for other people to interpret not what our curators, who are professionally trained and accredited, have to judge, but what community groups may object to.

Mr. Inky Mark: Perhaps I can continue. My time is running short.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): You have three minutes left, Mr. Mark.

Mr. Inky Mark: The crux of the problem is about balance. Even in the Sharpe decision, paragraph 83 says that “Parliament can prohibit possession of child pornography”. But the issue is whether or not it had done so in a reasonable and proportionate manner, having regard to the right of free expression. That's really the question. So how do we do it? You're saying we should go back to artistic merit and leave it at that, and others are saying artistic merit is too broad.

¿ (0955)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Montpetit.

Mr. Charles Montpetit: I don't understand why people blame artistic merit for being too broad.

[Translation]

I will continue in French, if I may.

The artistic merit defence is not too broad, as compared to the public good defence. On the contrary, the artistic merit defence is much more specific than the public good defence. In order to defend a work of art, it is a lot easier to get reliable testimony based on concrete facts and on measurable characteristics. By comparison the public good defence is extremely vague. We do not want to rely on only one defence that is so vague. We want the more specific defences, such as artistic merit and educational, scientific or medical purposes, to be retained.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Tousaw.

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: Two other problems I think exist with bringing artistic merit into the public good defence, as opposed to leaving it separate, and that is, that the public good defence, as it reads in Bill C-20, says you can produce a work that's in the public good, but you can't go any further than that.

So you may be in a situation where you have a piece of art, it has some artistic merit, but some parts of it may not be found to have artistic merit. And then you're in a situation where one whole piece of art may be in fact illegal because some parts of it aren't good enough art or aren't acceptable.

The other problem, of course, is that Bill C-20 proposes, when you're talking about public good, to take away from consideration the subjective intent of the creator of the work. Now, if you're going to take away the subjective intent of the creator of the work, it's awfully difficult to show that the work itself, the expression, was designed to be art or designed to be educational or designed to be scientific. That evidence is made irrelevant.

So when you bring artistic merit into this idea of public good, you have dealt with all these other problems that the flawed definition of “public good” in Bill C-20 creates, and those problems would then be transferred to educational, artistic, and other expressive materials.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Thank you, Mr. Mark.

Mr. Nystrom.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom (Regina—Qu'Appelle, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I welcome you all here this morning. I really support and sympathize with the position you're taking collectively.

I want you to help answer a question all of us face. I have 70,000 constituents, and they're concerned about the abuse of children and about pornography that is very explicit, with children and against children. I want to ask you whether or not you think the existing law strikes the proper balance. I'm not talking about this legislation, but the existing law. Is there some refinement of the existing law that we can come up with that meets the concern we hear back in our ridings that we have to do something to clamp down on pornography and the sexual abuse of children? Is there something we can do to protect the artistic and scientific community, on the one hand, and yet meet the concern of our constituents on the other hand?

Perhaps some people are overreacting in terms of what we can actually do in the law, but is there some fine-tuning we can do?

[Translation]

I was very impressed by your comments, Mr. Montpetit. Do you have any suggestions? I sometimes get people from my riding who tell me how concerned they are about child abuse, but I also totally agree with you. Do we have the right balance in the present provisions or should we amend them to better protect children?

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Montpetit.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Montpetit: In my opinion, the problem with the existing provisions is that they apply to works of fiction. The government is not going to better protect children or address child abuse against real children by arresting artists. That does not serve the interests of artists and does not serve the interests of the public either. That does not serve the interests of the children either because we are only arresting the wrong people.

It seems to me that if the law didn't criminalize artists for having depicted, for example, sexual acts between young people of 14 or older—as is now the case—the public good would be much better served because the problem would be defined more specifically. Right now we are not going after the real criminals. I believe that neither the existing provisions nor Bill C-20 serve the public good. To serve the public good, we should focus our efforts on real abuse against real children.

À (1000)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Nystrom.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: I have the same question. Does the present law strike a proper balance between freedom of expression and the protection of children, and if not, is there something we can do to refine it?

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: No, I don't think it does, and I second the reasons my colleague has put forward.

The existing law is deeply flawed from the perspective of civil libertarians. For example, the inclusion of representations of imaginary people in works of fiction is illegal currently, but that's inappropriate in a free society. In addition, depiction of persons who are not children is illegal under the current regime. That ought to be changed. Child should mean child; it should mean children. It shouldn't mean persons above the age of 18 who are merely depicted as being under 18.

Moreover, the law actually criminalizes some of the very people it's intended to protect. There are persons under 18 years of age who, if they write down descriptions of their sexual activity, are criminals under this law. For a law designed to protect children, to actually make criminals out of some of them makes very little sense. So the existing law could be amended in that way.

Moreover, the advocacy of illegal acts is not a crime in Canada, unless the illegal act is child pornography and it's committed to writing. That doesn't make any sense. If I can orally advocate engaging in child pornography, which I can do under the existing regime, I'm not a criminal, but if I write that down I become a criminal. For one, that is illogical, and two, again, it's a restriction on expression that is far too broad. It simply ought not to be a crime to commit your expressive thoughts to writing when those expressive thoughts are not crimes if they're not committed to writing.

So I do think there are some flaws that can be remedied to be more in comport with freedom in this country.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: Maybe I can ask another question. My time is quite short.

If the present legislation were to go through, some people have suggested that it would maybe alleviate the situation a bit if we had a panel of experts designated by the legislation to describe if a certain piece of art or a certain work were in the public good.

Would this alleviate the concern a bit if you had that panel of experts who would make the decision and advise the courts? That's not my preference either, but some have suggested to us that it may improve the legislation.

Mr. John McAvity: It's the first time I've heard of that, and, to be quite honest with you, just the very notion of it sends shudders right through our community. It's essentially having a censor board put in place; we have perfectly qualified curators who are extremely well trained, and who make expert judgments all the time. They make expert judgments on what is good art and what is not good art, and they make expert judgments on acquisition, on travelling shows, and hanging, and so on. I would see that as a complete intrusion into our lives.

In terms of the current bill, I really can only comment with respect to artistic merit, which is of course in the current bill. I guess I've been around this mulberry bush before; I remember a bill, Bill C-54, that was brought in back in the mid-eighties. It held tremendous implications for our sector; again, for anyone who was nude, or depicted to be in a sexual activity, under the age of...I can't remember whether it was 18 or 16. But at the end of the day, the government had the judgment to withdraw that legislation, and it did disappear. It, too, would have had huge implications for legitimate institutions like museums. We would have had to erect signs saying, “Nobody under the age of 16 or 18 can enter the following gallery”, or a warning sign with a big dark drape over the door, so that nobody under the age of 16 or 18 could see into that room. Those are the kinds of practical implications we've seen before.

As I've said, right now we have artistic merit. It works; we've had jurisprudence on it. We just see no need for, or no value being added by, confusing this further.

À (1005)

[Translation]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Very briefly, please.

Mr. Charles Montpetit: Such a board would ultimately have to be made up of every member of the Canadian public. You cannot trust just a few people to make a moral assessment of all Canadian works of art. I submit to you that if only one person wants to produce a work of art and if everyone else believes that that work of art has no merit, that work of art should still have the right to exist.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Madame Jennings, for seven minutes.

[Translation]

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): I won't need seven minutes. I only have two questions.

You were very clear in your explanation as to why you object to having the public good defence replace the artistic merit defence, but some of you believe that the concept of public good includes artistic merit. If we specified that the public good defence includes, in particular, artistic merit and educational, scientific or medical purposes, would that reassure you?

My second question is on imaginary sexual activity. When you say that depictions of such activities in a book, a painting or some other work of art should not be criminalized, I have problems with that. At one point in your brief, you mentioned detective novels. I personally love detective novels—my husband likes to joke that I have thousands of them—and I have my favourite authors. Some authors do write novels about the murders of children or teenagers. It is all completely fictional even if it might be based on actual events.

I would like you to elaborate on why you are opposed to the criminalization of imaginary depictions of sexual acts between young people, which are presently legal given the age of consent. In your opinion, would that truly stifle the growth and development of Canadians who want to explore their talent or their desire to express themselves through depictions of imaginary acts?

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Madam Hebb.

Ms. Marian Hebb: I think there's an easy answer to the first question, which is that it creates a bigger problem.

I agree with you that one could make the defence of public good more expansive and more specific, so that one would understand what it was intended to be. There's still the problem at the end of saying it does not exceed the public good; so that's problematic. But you'd have to look at other sections of the Criminal Code to see where that was used and make sure everything was consistent. For instance, it is an obscenity defence. I don't know whether it's in other sections of the code or not. So this might be opening a door to something rather confusing, which could cause problems with the interpretation of other sections later. That was my answer to that.

I'll have a little go at your second question, which is much more difficult. How are students to know what goes on in the world unless they read about it? But you do have other problems.... We have problems all the time with parents who don't want to have books in the school, The Diviners, or whatever, because those books talk about things that really happen to kids and that they are involved in. Do you want to protect children to that extent, so that they aren't aware of what goes on in the world, except for what happens in their own small worlds?

À (1010)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Montpetit.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Montpetit: With regard to your first question, I would say that if the public good defence specifically included the four other defence elements, I believe that our organization, the Union des écrivaines et des écrivains québécois, would be satisfied with regard to that particular point, but that is not our only objection. May I remind you that when you criminalize a work which was created with a sexual intent, you are assuming you know what the author's intentions were. That's another problem.

There is also a problem when you criticize a work because it extends beyond what serves the public good, even when your definition is used. Extending beyond that which serves the public good means stepping a tiny bit over the line. This means that you could criminalize a work because of one of its elements, and not because of the entire work. So, that would not solve the problem at all.

As for the comparison between mystery novels and other areas, I did address that issue in my brief. Let me put it in simple terms. How can you draft legislation which would not criminalize a hit series like Law and Order, but which would criminalize a hit likeLaw and Order: SVU,which focuses on sex crimes? I don't think such a law is tenable.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Tousaw.

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: I'm not going to address the first question; I think it's been addressed adequately.

With respect to the second question, the reason civil libertarians find the prohibition of certain types of expression palatable in the context of child pornography is that laws criminalizing photographic sexual representations of actual children do so for representations or expressions that exist only as a result of crimes committed against children. Actual living, breathing children have been harmed in the making of the expressive work, and therefore it's palatable to civil libertarians to ban that type of material. However, when you cross over that, and you begin to criminalize material that has been created not as a result of any harm to any actual children, you've gone too far in restricting expression. There's a concept of harm underlying that type of legislation, which I think makes some pretty big assumptions.

We hold the view that the standard of legal harm ought to be direct and measurable damage to people and property. Indirect harms, such as influencing people by expressing bad ideas that may or may not lead to bad acts ought not to be the basis of criminal legislation. We should be preventing actual, tangible harm to real people, not imaginary harm to imaginary people.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Thank you, Mr. Tousaw.

Does anybody on the opposition side want to ask a question?

Inky, for three minutes.

Mr. Inky Mark: On that same line of debate, Kirk, you mentioned that personal expression was important.

Now, I'm going to ask the question, should use of distribution of personal expression be criminalized? For example, if it's put on a pedophile Internet site, is that criminal, or should it be?

À (1015)

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: The position would be that if the material has been created by harming actual children, then certainly we support the criminalization of the possession of that material and of course we support the criminalization of distributing it as well. But if there's no harm being done to actual children from expressive material, we would not support—

Mr. Inky Mark: How do you measure that, though?

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: Well, when you have forms of expression that only exist as a result of crimes being committed against children.... Pictures of children engaged in sexual activity, for example, only exist—

Mr. Inky Mark: Let's say in writing, in this case; just written—

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: Our position is that written material ought not to be the subject of criminal sanctions.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Thank you, Mr. Mark.

Mr. Lee.

Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.): Thank you. One of the witnesses here referred to—and other witnesses previously have referred to—the concept of changing standards over time. But I suggest to you that the benchmark standard we're working from here for developing legislation is harm to children or exploitation: using children for a sexual purpose.

I'm going to suggest to you that for our lifetimes here and for the foreseeable future, that standard isn't going to change. We're not dealing with so much a moral question as a societal one. We're not going to use our children as sexual inventory.

Is that concept of changing standards still out there? I don't think it is. That's the benchmark we're using, and everything flows from it. I don't see that changing for the foreseeable future for which we would attempt to legislate. Do you have any comment on this?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Does anyone want to respond to Mr. Lee's question?

Mr. John McAvity: I would hope as well that standard would not change in Canada, but we know things are never totally written in stone.

I think the biggest implication to our sector, if I may say so, isn't with the standard per se. It is with, as Ms. Jennings was questioning earlier, where it is implied or suggested. There are many great works of art in the world about which you may feel there is a sexual overtone—nothing explicit.

I can give you some examples: works such as this Giorgione, which is in the Dresden Gallery. Is that a person under the age of 18? I don't know. Is that a sexual, provocative position? I don't know.

We want yes or no answers. I would think the artistic merit is clear in cases such as this and in other works of art. This is Bouguereau, a nineteenth-century artist. The Montreal museum had a huge exhibition of his work, and there are a lot of nude young children in these—very flamboyant. Even Canadian artist Alex Colville.... Are these people under the age of 18? There is a suggested sexual thing going on here. Or there is the more contemporary photography of two young children kissing, by Anne Geddes.

There are other examples. This is by a famous American photographer who has exhibited in Canada, Robert Mapplethorpe. It's that kind of ambiguity that has us mostly concerned.

We are completely in support of the intention of the bill—with, however, artistic merit being included.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Monsieur Montpetit.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Montpetit: If, as you claim, the work of this committee was strictly limited to fighting the sexual exploitation of real children, we would not even be here today to express any objections. Have moral standards changed with regard to the exploitation of real children? No, I don't think they have changed and I agree with you that I do not want them to change.

However, since, in fact, the bill addresses not only the exploitation of real children, but also the issue of artistic works, I would say that, yes, standards have changed with regard to artistic works. Years ago, some things would not even have been tolerated, and would even have been considered criminal, whereas they are not today. Therefore, since standards have changed with regard to artistic creation, I think that becomes a problem.

À (1020)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Thank you, Mr. Lee.

Mr. Nystrom.

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: Do you support—this is maybe to you, Kirk—the rest of this proposed legislation, excluding the sections on changing the child pornography laws? There are other things in this bill as well, such as the sections dealing with child testimony in the courts, or the creation of a new offence in voyeurism.

This morning you mentioned the obvious concern, which involves artistic merit and child pornography laws, and how it changes the reality for your work. What about the rest of the bill? Have you had a chance to look at it? Do you have any advice on it?

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: Yes, I have had a chance to look at it. From the perspective of our association, the problems we've identified in our brief and that have been identified today, and of course the problems that already exist in the regime, are the key areas of concern. With respect to the rest of the bill, I don't think we have a tremendous amount of concern, no.

[Translation]

Hon. Lorne Nystrom: Are there any other comments?

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. John McKay): Mr. Macklin.

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin (Northumberland, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to see if I can get some clarification of your position. I would like to do so in terms of the dual tests that are being proposed respecting “public good”.

I am wondering whether you accept what appears to be a statement of fact by the Supreme Court of Canada, that material can pose—and I think the material we're talking about is material that would be caught under the existing section dealing with child pornography—a potential risk of harm to children. Are you saying that from your perspective you don't accept that as a concept when you deal with art? Accordingly, would you regard the second part of the test, dealing with the public good defence and its risk of harm to society, as something you would not find acceptable?

This is to the panel generally.

The Chair: Mr. Tousaw.

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: I think we certainly accept that there is expressive material that poses harm to children. We've identified material that's created as a result of crimes that are committed against children; it certainly poses harm to children. The mere possession of that material ought to be criminal.

With respect to imaginary works--for instance, works of fiction--we don't accept that the concept of legal harm ought to encompass expressive materials that aren't a result of crimes against children. So we don't accept that portion of the harm analysis.

I'll see if anyone else on the panel wants to address it.

Ms. Marian Hebb: Could you just read what the Supreme Court said there?

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin: I'll just read you one sentence. It said:

Most material caught by the definition of child pornography could pose a potential risk of harm to children.

That was in the Sharpe case. My question is, are you saying that from the point of view of your literary and artistic communities, in fact you don't believe that when works of the mind do not involve children directly and a direct harm to children...? Can you see that there should be some restriction within the artistic community, as posed by the second part of the public good defence—in other words, whether there is greater harm to society? Do you see from your perspective, or are you postulating, that there isn't a potential risk of harm to children from your works of the mind?

À (1025)

The Chair: Ms. Hebb.

Ms. Marian Hebb: “Works of the mind” is ambiguous too, because I can write about real children, or I can involve real children in the production of my work. I could make a film, or write a book on which a film was based, in which a real child was being used as an actor for something that could bring harm to that child, or their psyche, or whatever, and that would be wrong. The film is still a work of the mind in some sense, but if in fact it was an animated cartoon and there was no real child involved, or it was an actor of age 30—sorry, that's a bit extreme maybe, but some actresses do it—or a 25-year-old actress being the 13-year-old Juliet, I don't see any harm in it.

I agree with what the Supreme Court is saying. I think what they're saying is correct, but I think it's compatible with what we're saying.

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin: You're not asking for unlimited freedom, then, to express yourself?

Ms. Marian Hebb: No, and I think even if the child pornography offence was not there, these things would still be caught by other sections of the Criminal Code because they would be offences that involve real children, or it would be under the obscenity section.

The Chair: Monsieur Montpetit.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Montpetit: I would like to remind you that the quote you read from the Supreme Court ruling specifically applies to the case of a pedophile who, in reality, sexually abuses children. The expression “most material” was used. Even though I don't really know what materials were seized from the pedophile, chances are that a good deal of it involved real children. Therefore, there was absolutely no contradiction between your position and ours; we stand formally opposed to any material involving real children. However, in the case of John Robin Sharpe, it was not a crime for him to write fiction. It was enough to arrest him on the grounds of his real activities. And so the case you quoted does not contradict our position.

[English]

The Chair: Monsieur Marceau.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: My question is for Mr. Tousaw. Yesterday, the committee—I don't know if you were here—heard that one of the problems which frequently arises in connection with court cases is the fact that police have to look at every child porn picture which they seize, something which is emotionally very difficult to do. The pictures are often extremely revolting, if not worse.

Some people were wondering whether it would be possible to receive the authorization, through a court application, to produce as evidence only part of the seized materials, so that the police do not have to look at thousands of pictures contained in a pedophile's computer files. Would you support this request as it applies to a case involving child pornography with pictures of real children?

[English]

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: Frankly, I wasn't here yesterday. It's the first time I've considered that question. I think my initial response would be no, but that doesn't do it. I think when you're accused of serious crimes you have the right to have the material that you're potentially being convicted of possessing used against you. You have the right to cross-examine that material. You have to test the assumptions behind that material.

Yes, I understand the police have a very difficult job and it's very difficult to go through and look at this material, but because it's a difficult job we shouldn't abdicate the responsibility to go ahead and do that very difficult job.

À (1030)

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: If you don't mind, I will draw an analogy between the case at hand and a cocaine seizure. If you have a ton of cocaine, the entire amount does not have to be brought to court and introduced as an exhibit. Only a sample will be brought to court: one, three or even ten bags, for instance. Could this approach not apply to cases involving child pornography?

Say a computer contains 10,000 pictures of children being sexually abused. Instead of producing every single one of these pictures as evidence, you would only have to produce 100 or 150 of them.

[English]

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: I think the analogy breaks down, because if you're charging someone with possession of a quantity of cocaine, in order to convict them of possessing that quantity, all of that quantity will have to be put before the court. Now you're only going to have to sample part of it to show that it is in fact cocaine, but the entire amount will have to be introduced into evidence.

So if you're going to charge somebody with possessing 10,000 pictures of child pornography, you have to put the 10,000 pictures in front of the court. If you only want to charge the individual with possessing 100, only put 100 before the court, and frankly that'll probably garner just as heavy a sentence as would be appropriate.

The Chair: Monsieur Montpetit.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Montpetit: There is another problem with your analogy: the child pornography legislation, as well as Bill C-20, which is in fact an amendment to the legislation, specify that a work must be considered based on its dominant characteristic. So, if ever a sample were taken, would the sample in question duly represent the dominant characteristic of the work?

I'll give you the fairly simple example of passages in the Bible involving incest. Could the Bible therefore be banned on the basis of such samples only? This type of approach can be very dangerous if you apply it to artistic creation. The chosen samples could give people the wrong impression.

[English]

The Chair: It's to Mrs. Jennings.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Mr. Tousaw, I'm still working my head around the idea that your association is proposing that any fictitious depiction of activity that would be unlawful, if it actually occurs, but in this case it's fictitious, should not be dealt with at all under the Criminal Code provisions.

I'm assuming you're familiar with the hate propaganda and public incitement of hatred. Does that mean your association is opposed to those particular criminal provisions?

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: Well, in a word, yes, we are opposed to that type of criminal prohibition and expression. And I would say, in response, that one of the things said in the Sharpe case is that among the most fundamental rights possessed by Canadians is freedom of expression. That right, free expression, makes possible our liberty, our creativity, and our democracy, and it does so by protecting not only good and popular expression, but also unpopular or even offensive expression. So when you have a right that's so fundamental to freedom and so fundamental to democracy, I think it has to be protected from a criminal legislation that's based on works of fiction.

The detective novel analogy holds in this case. You can write a work of fiction about murder and it's not criminal, even though the activity itself, murder, would be unlawful if committed in real life.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: So your association is opposed to section 318 and section 319, and I assume also to what we commonly call the “Svend Robinson bill”, which included sexual orientation as part of the grounds under which section 318 and section 319 could be prosecuted.

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: Our association supports the right of Canadian citizens to engage in expression that's offensive. That's correct.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I just wanted the clarification. Thank you.

À (1035)

The Chair: Monsieur Montpetit.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Montpetit: I just want to note that these hearings do not affect the Criminal Code's provisions on hate-mongering or inciting a person to commit a violent act. We cannot speak to these matters because we have not studied them.

In theory, a work of fiction should not be criminalized. But if you ask us to give our opinion on specific provisions contained in other legislation, that is, other than what we are studying here today, we will not be in a position to answer.

[English]

The Chair: Merci.

Mr. Mark.

Mr. Inky Mark: Going back to the Sharpe decision, in paragraph 110, the judge concludes that “in broad impact and general application, the limits”--and it's noted here in subsection 163.1(4)--“imposes on free expression are justified by the protection the law affords children from exploitation and abuse”.

The reason I say that is this. Is it possible, do you think, to reach reasonable and proportionate equality with Bill C-20 in regard to the protection of children and the protection of artistic merit?

The Chair: Mr. Montpetit.

Mr. Charles Montpetit: I'm sorry, I didn't get your full question. Is it possible that...?

Mr. Inky Mark: Is it possible that both are priority items in this bill, even though you said in your initial comments, Mr. Montpetit, that it should be one or the other? There shouldn't be a winner or a loser. So is it possible to have equality, or do we need to have two pieces of legislation—one to protect artists and the other to protect children?

The Chair: You don't appear anxious to get at this question.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Montpetit: I don't understand why there is a distinction between the two subjects you mentioned. In my opinion, the public good would be well served if the current legislation did not mention artistic works. In that case, it would achieve exactly what it set out to do, namely to address situations of real abuse committed against real children.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Brisebois.

[Translation]

Mr. Marcel Brisebois: Mr. Chairman, allow me to repeat the words of a person who was at once an author and a head of State.

At the end of the Second World War, a French court imposed the death penalty on Robert Brasillach, a writer. Some of his colleagues asked Général de Gaulle to pardon him, but he replied that if they considered art as a serious endeavour, they should consider artists as being responsible people.

Indeed, artists bear some responsibility within society. Real artists want to behave like responsible citizens and contribute to the enlightenment and the development of society. Artists do not consider themselves as men of science or lawmakers. In the world of art, their role is to work on the development of society. They must be viewed as responsible people in terms of their role within society, and it is up to lawmakers to remind them of these responsibilities. That's what I think.

[English]

The Chair: I'm glad to visit General de Gaulle. We had Mr. Clinton yesterday. It was a little different....

But in any case, Mr. Lee, for three minutes.

Mr. Derek Lee: Thank you.

I'd like to invite some suggestions. Our difficulty with the artistic merit defence is that it is perhaps too broad from the point of view of some people.

There were two categories or factual situations manifesting that. One was a circumstance of what I would call a prolific child porn creator, a true artist who was a prolific creator of all things pornographic, a professional creator. He or she was simply really good at it, and produced and produced. In theory, that person could make use of the artistic merit defence, provided I guess that they didn't get involved with real children in real-life situations. That's one category.

The second was the person who consumed and used and distributed child pornography, who became an artist for a day or a week, or who would occasionally do a sketch. Something like that happened in the Sharpe circumstances, where there was lots of other child pornography, but amongst the mix of materials there was something created by him.

Those are the two categories that have caused us enough concern that we have now backed off the artistic merit defence and have now proposed this public good.

Is there anything you could suggest that would help us to address those two problems with the artistic merit defence? I realize it's a real challenge, but if we could solve that problem, we might be able to continue to use the artistic merit defence.

À (1040)

Mr. John McAvity: I guess I'd like to say it is a defence; it doesn't stop the charge from being laid. And if in fact there is proven to be a violation, so that the work in question by the artist in question has caused real harm to real children, then the defence would not stand up. It is a defence after a charge has been held.

We're not asking for carte blanche. Just because a work of art happens to hang in a gallery or be published by a reputable publisher, it is a defence, at the end of the day.

Ms. Marian Hebb: Can I add something to that?

That's a very interesting example, particularly your first one, because it is possible. But it is a “what if”, and it's a “what if” that's never happened and is unlikely to happen. It seems to me that this is the price our society has to pay, because we can't pin down everything; you can't make laws that cover absolutely every situation.

With respect to your second situation, the Sharpe situation, this man was somebody who was involved in other reprehensible activities, and maybe the writing was reprehensible, too, even though it had artistic merit. So what if he didn't get convicted on every charge, because in fact he was dealt with by the criminal justice system.

So I don't think either of those situations are things that you can expect to be able to deal with in legislation.

The Chair: Mr. Montpetit.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Montpetit: In your example, two things stand out. You say that an occasional artist who works maybe one day or one hour once in a while, could use the status of artist to defend unacceptable works. I do not believe that an artist should be judged based on a part-time or full-time career, but on his work. If an artist created work which was judged unacceptable based on criteria on which we all agreed, this work could make a criminal out of him even in the case of an artist who is well-known in other areas. You cannot simply say that a part-time artist would apply this excuse to all his production. We must judge the work and not the artist.

Second, I would like to recall something that Nadine Strossen, Chairperson of the American Civil Liberties Union, said, and which the Union des écrivaines et des écrivains québécois quotes in its brief. She simply pointed out that we should not be concentrating only on works which can be stopped with legislation, but on works which would be spared. Our concern is not so much to ensure that all the works would be caught in the net, but rather that innocuous works would not be.

As I understand the way the law operates, it is much more important to avoid arresting and criminalizing the innocents than to apprehend the guilty. If one has to be balanced against the other, the innocent should be protected.

À (1045)

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Tousaw.

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: Let me suggest that in the Butler decision, the Supreme Court said, “Artistic expression rests at the heart of freedom of expression values and any doubt in this regard must be resolved in favour of freedom of expression.” I think that is true, and I think this committee ought to be mindful of that when it considers Bill C-20 and the removal of artistic merit, because removing artistic merit, in my view, puts the entire legislative scheme at significant risk of being found to be unconstitutional under the charter.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: Thank you, Chair. Thank you, witnesses.

I want to congratulate Mr. Tousaw on his intellectual consistency.

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: I've been trying.

Mr. John McKay: It may not have been politically wise, but it is intellectually consistent. It's a pity you weren't here about a month ago. We might have had a more robust debate on the circumscribing of Canadians' freedoms to speak as they see fit.

We're here because Canadians had a collective gag reaction to Mr. Sharpe. So the justice minister took a stab at it. He puts in this business of public good. Then there's another collective reaction to it saying, “Holy smokes, this is way too big”, and “If it ain't broke, don't fix it”--those kinds of reactions. We've seen that today. We've seen it from other panels. So we're now sitting here saying, well, aren't we throwing the baby out with the bathwater?

We had an interesting suggestion from Mr. Matas that possibly as some middle ground...and I don't know if you've had a chance to read his paper, but I asked this yesterday and I want to get your reaction as well.

He argues, in effect, for a nuancing of the defence. He argues that in order to establish the defence of artistic merit, you're going to have to show some intention on the part of the creator. Again, if we contrast Mr. Sharpe with, say, the people to whom Monsieur Montpetit makes reference, there seems to be some sort of qualitative difference in their intention.

He also argues that the work should have some kind of connection to some artistic, educational, aesthetic, scientific, or medical conventions. If you don't have it, that really undercuts your defence. Then he talks about what mode the artist uses. Presumably somebody throwing up to 500,000 pictures about children being exploited in some sexual fashion is somewhat in a different category from a Peel picture or something of that nature.

I'd be interested in knowing whether or not you would see some use in codifying, in some manner, or directing judicial people, in some manner, along those lines.

The Chair: Mr. Tousaw.

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: Well, I think that's problematic for a number of reasons. Number one, the current bill, Bill C-20, is going to remove any ability to introduce subjective intent. It's going to be a purely objective standard. That's problematic. Of course, when you get into subjective intent, again, you're going to make judgments about what someone else intended. All you can really go on is what they say they intended. So I'm not sure that really does anything to advance the defence or the clarity involved in the defence.

I'll point out the example you give of throwing up 100,000 pictures of children being exploited. We don't have an objection to that being illegal because those pictures are only made possible as a result of a crime committed against those children. So correspondingly, there's no problem from a civil libertarian's perspective with criminalizing that expression.

But I'm always hesitant to endorse a nuanced approach that seems to suggest a demarcation between good art and bad art. And who's to say which is which? I think the Supreme Court, at least, has been fairly clear that this is not a line that should be drawn in terms of whether or not a defence is available. Is it good or bad? What was it created for?

À (1050)

Mr. John McKay: if you don't do something, you get “all pornographers are artists and all artists are pornographers”. You have to deal with something.

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: You know, I'm not sure you do. Again, when we're talking about child pornography, if children have been harmed in the creation of the work, it ought to be criminal. If they haven't, it ought not to be criminal. It may be a difficult political position, as you say, but I'm not sure that most pornographers aren't artists in some sense of the word. It may not be art that a lot of people care for, but that doesn't necessarily mean it isn't art.

The Chair: Mr. Montpetit.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Montpetit: You mentioned the collective repulsion, the gag reaction of Canadians at the Sharpe case. I should point out that this reaction did not take into account certain factors, since John Robin Sharpe was apprehended and imprisoned for other activities than his artistic creations. Only the charge related to his artistic creations was referred to the Supreme Court and it therefore attracted a lot more attention than all the other charges against him which amply justified his arrest.

Since you congratulate Mr. Tousaw for his logical consistency, you should also recognize that the Supreme Court was just as consistent in recognizing that the charge related to artistic creation against Mr. Sharpe did not hold water. This might not be a popular position, but it is still not a loophole which should be eliminated.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McKay.

Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney (Erie—Lincoln, Lib.): We've heard from other panels of the dangers of child pornography, and some say its very existence suggests to some that it's okay and that predators use child porn to groom other children for these types of activities. Now, if we have a photo of a real child in a pornographic situation or movie, I think there's consensus amongst the panel that this is something we should protect against.

If a similar scene is done by an artist in a piece of artwork or by an author writing it down, you are saying that is okay?

I'm trying to reconcile the differences.

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: Our association is saying that if it's a work purely of the mind--I think that term was used earlier--yes, it is okay. “Okay” implies a moral judgment. It may not be okay, but it ought not to be criminal to create that work of expression.

The Chair: Mr. Montpetit.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Montpetit: I do not want to leave Mr. Tousaw and his association alone in taking this position. The Union des écrivaines et des écrivains québécois also agrees to say that, as long as a creation does not deal with real children, even if it is a repugnant creation, it has a right to exist if it is fictional.

I shall give you the example of Yvon Deschamps, a very popular Quebec comic, who based his whole career on comic monologues in which he took the role of someone whom society would find distasteful. He played a racist, a wife beater, and all sorts of other characters, but it was to denounce or ridicule these type of people that he played them.

You have to consider that even a repugnant creation can have a defendable use. It can inform people about a problem, denounce it and prepare people to confront it. It can even mobilize people against it. The groups that denounce pornography are the first ones to quote the works that they want to denounce. We have to consider the fact that an artist who wants to denounce a problem definitely has the right, just like an anti-pornography group, to quote this problem in a fictional work to denounce it. He does not even have to say explicitly in his work that he does indeed intend to denounce the problem described in his work. The author could simply mention the existence of a problem in a fictional work and let the reader draw his own conclusions. That would not be a problem in a work of the imagination.

À (1055)

[English]

The Chair: A very short question from Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: Mr. Tousaw's entire argument rests on the issue of a harm to a child. Does it have to be a specific child? Does it have to be an identifiable child?

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: It has to be identifiable as an actual, living child, yes.

Mr. John McKay: So even if there was harm to a composite of children, that would not fall within your definition?

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: I'm not sure what you mean by a composite of children?

Mr. John McKay: Well, artistic representation can take this part of a body, and that part of a head, and this part....

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: Oh, I see.

No, I think that would be problematic and potentially able to be criminalized, because at some juncture along the way, in order to get those representations you used and put into your composite, you're harming actual children. I don't think that would fall outside the scope of permissible criminal legislation.

Mr. John McKay: Would the police have to identify each and every child affected?

Mr. Kirk Tousaw: No, I don't think what we're suggesting is that you have to get the name or be able to specifically identify the individual child. What you have to be able to identify is that a child—in fact a living child, a human being—was hurt in the production of the material. The suggestion isn't that you have to find their name and address and produce that specific individual. It's enough to show that a specific child, anonymous or not, was harmed in the production of the material.

The Chair: The final word goes to Monsieur Montpetit.

Then I have to make an announcement to my committee.

[Translation]

Mr. Charles Montpetit: I must point out something else. Part of the composite image could very well be drawn from a non-criminal image which does not harm a real child. You could even draw a composite image from several images which would not do any harm to a child.

Under your definition, it would have to be proven that at least one of the components of the image caused harm to a child, because if the composite image is made up of various separate images which are all innocent individually, the composite image would also be innocent.

[English]

The Chair: I want to thank the panel for helping us out in this very complicated piece of legislation. We appreciate it very much.

Before our committee makes its way to other places, I'm going to quickly touch on a couple of things we hope to do the week we're back, Monsieur Marceau.

We now have Bill C-46 before us, so I put that on the record first. On the first Tuesday we're back, at 9 a.m. those who are interested are going to be meeting with a delegation from Romania on justice issues, for one hour at nine o'clock.

Then from ten o'clock to one o'clock we're organizing a presentation that would be put on by the RCMP concerning some of the actual content around this issue, so that we'll really have a sense of what it is.

I should say to Mr. Lee, who wants us to be efficient with our time, originally we were going to be hearing from the minister; in fact, we were going to be going to clause-by-clause on Bill C-23. That's been delayed, so consequently we're using that space.

Wednesday afternoon, October 22, at 3:30 we were scheduled to have the Minister of Justice on Bill C-45. I've asked the clerk to see whether we can convince the Minister of Justice, if he would, to give us an extra hour, if I have concurrence, and include Bill C-46. We could do both at the same time; they're similar issues, actually.

Welcome, Mr. Easter, to the room. We haven't started yet without you, don't worry.

On Thursday, October 23, we're doing Bill C-20, with more witnesses at 9 and 11, and then the week of October 27 we will be beginning clause-by-clause on Bill C-23 and receiving the minister of justice from Taiwan.

I'm going to suspend while the other witnesses find their way outside and the new witnesses find their way here.