To sum up, the Committee realizes that the question of cross-media ownership is a complex issue. Private media ownership groups are larger and more integrated than at any other time in Canadian history. The owners of media conglomerates argue that they need to be large in order to be competitive internationally and to achieve economies of scale. They are, after all, competing against global giants such as Disney, AOL-Time Warner, Bertelsmann and Viacom. On the surface at least, having big media companies with deep pockets engaged in Canadian broadcasting appears to be a positive step. They have the reach, resources and durability needed to take chances, absorb losses and promote programs. But this argument creates a particular set of problems related to cross-media ownership.
For example, companies such as CanWest Global and Bell Globemedia do not invest as heavily in Canadian television drama as many witnesses — particularly creators — would like, and for a variety of reasons (as outlined in chapters 5 and 8) remain heavy importers of prime-time American shows. Moreover, CanWest Global's insistence on a centralized editorial policy has caused some to worry that journalists will be pressured to comply with the expectations and perspectives of the parent group that owns their respective newspapers.
As witnesses concerned about the perils of cross-media ownership told the Committee, the danger is that too much power can fall into too few hands and it is power without accountability. Ownership of multiple media outlets in the same local or national market gives corporations extraordinary power to shape the views of citizens. Under such circumstances the number and range of voices and perspectives that are available to readers and viewers can be sharply limited. The cross-promoting of one media outlet by another turns news and commentary into an advertisement or a marketing ploy. This can only have a corrosive effect on the trust that citizens place in news organizations.
There are also concerns about the effects that multitasking will have on journalists. The problem is that if newspaper reporters are expected to appear on television and radio as well as file stories for the Internet, they will have less time to devote to cover news stories.
Furthermore, the argument that Canadians now live in a multi-channel universe and have access to a wide range of online news sources, ignores an important consideration. National and local news programming still attracts millions of viewers each day and newspapers still enjoy a sizeable readership.
It is noteworthy that other jurisdictions have taken action to limit cross-media ownership. In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission has prohibited cross-ownership between press and broadcasting since the 1970s. For example, in 1975 the FCC banned television/newspaper cross-ownership for two reasons: to promote a diversity of ownership and to encourage a diversity of viewpoints in the American media. More recently, the FCC reduced these barriers, but it is doing so in a market that is highly fragmented. In France, legislation seeks to ensure that no group will be in a position to dominate more than two of the four leading media sectors (press, radio, television, cable), and applies thresholds to the allowable degree of concentration at the regional and national levels. Meanwhile, the new Communications Act in the United Kingdom, proposes that no person who owns a newspaper with 20% of either a national or local readership be allowed to hold a licence for either a national or regional commercial TV service. In the U.K., restrictions would also apply to newspaper owners who wish to have radio licences.
In Canada, cross-media ownership has reached unprecedented heights with the media takeovers that occurred in 2000. The problem the Committee has confronted is how to address this situation, given that is faced with the fait accompli of convergence, consolidation and concentration. This means making recommendations that will ensure that citizens can have access to a variety of viewpoints, without throwing the Canadian media industry into financial turmoil. This is perhaps the most delicate issue that the Committee has had to address. This is why it has carefully considered a series of options:
1) Take no action and let the issue be resolved by the marketplace. Ensure strong support for public broadcasting.
The Committee has considered whether it is necessary to recommend any action given that the market appears to be in the process of "resolving" at least some of the issues. Some corporations that were caught up in a wave of optimism during the stock market and high-tech euphoria of the late 1990s now find themselves heavily in debt and unable to find ways to make convergence work. Some financial analysts have argued that the convergence model is deeply flawed and that companies will eventually retreat to their core businesses. The argument in favour of inaction is that the situation may be very different two years from now than it is today and that government intervention should be seen as a last resort. One can argue that public policy goals would be better and more effectively served by investing in public broadcasting as a way of providing the balance that the system needs.
2) Make a strong statement about the need for journalistic independence and ask the CRTC to strengthen its policy on the separation of news rooms.
With this option, the effects of cross-media ownership can be mitigated if journalists are insulated from the pressures of convergence. Regulatory barriers can be implemented to ensure that newsrooms of newspapers will be run separately and independently from television operations. This will ensure that a variety of voices is maintained. It will also avoid taking the drastic step of ordering media corporations to sell their properties. But here the CRTC may be in a bind. It will only act if it receives complaints — but journalists and others may be too afraid to complain. This may be an instance where the proposed Canadian broadcasting monitor (see Chapter 19) could play a role.
3) Propose a "contract" between media owners and directors of editorial services.
The Committee notes that one way out of this dilemma would be to adopt a suggestion made by former Royal Commission chair Mr. Tom Kent during his testimony before the Committee. Mr. Kent repeated a proposal first made in the report of the Royal Commission on Newspapers that owners sign a "contract" with editors-in-chief to ensure that there is an arm's-length relationship between editors-in-chief and publishers and owners. The contract would cover a certain time period — five years for instance — and would give editors wide discretion over all newspaper operations including editorial policy and hiring. They could also be free in the words of the Royal Commission to "comment adversely on the views or the particular actions of any person, company or other organization associated with the proprietor."39
The Committee recognizes, however, that since the CRTC does not have jurisdiction over newspapers, any move to impose jurisdiction would probably provoke a major legal battle as well as a political uproar. That said, the regulator could ensure that such "contracts" would apply to television station managers. This would have the effect of distancing television operations from pressures to converge with newspapers.
4) Recommend that Canada devise a clear policy on cross-media ownership.
In this scenario, no action would be taken until new rules are formulated. As in the case of France, these rules could allow for some level of cross-media ownership to exist. A variety of solutions could be imagined. A newspaper owner might be allowed to enjoy the benefits of holding a local broadcasting licence only in cities where there were a minimum, for instance, of four other television stations. A corporation might be allowed to maintain a television licence only if it sold its majority position in the local newspaper. A minority stake could be allowed. Similarly, strict limits could be imposed on the number of broadcasting outlets and newspapers that one corporation could own. Distinctions could be made between local, regional and national markets.
5) Recommend that the CRTC be directed to not licence any broadcasting operation whose owners have a controlling interest in a daily newspaper.
Several witnesses who appeared before the Committee made this particular suggestion. Although this proposal needs further examination (e.g., it is far from clear that newspaper editorials would be influenced simply because an owner must apply to the CRTC for renewal of a broadcast licence) it is certainly appealing. As noted above, the CRTC received such a directive from government during the early 1980s. Its subsequent repeal may have been unwise. The difficulty now would be the impact that such a regulation would have on the industries concerned.
6) The outright prohibition of cross-media ownership
The Committee recognizes that this option is the most drastic. Presumably radio, television and broadcasting distribution undertakings would have to divest themselves of newspaper properties or risk not having their licences approved when they came up for renewal. The effects on Quebecor and CanWest Global in particular would be substantial. Many of the major newspapers in the country would all be for sale at the same time. It is not clear who the prospective buyers might be or whether such a step would lead to less rather than more newspaper competition. Such a recommendation, however, would be a clear message to the government, the CRTC and corporate owners.
Proposed Solutions
The Committee notes that two committees of the Quebec National Assembly, La commission de la culture and Le comité conseil sur la qualité et la diversité de l'information have released reports on media concentration in recent years. The Committee recognizes the important work of these committees and notes that before dissolution of the National Assembly in March 2003, that the government of Quebec announced its intention to introduce legislation to enhance media diversity in a context of concentrated ownership.
Thus, the Committee makes two recommendations on editorial independence and on cross-media ownership.
Editorial Independence
The Committee believes that the many challenges of cross-media ownership must be addressed to defend journalistic independence. The Committee therefore makes the following recommendations, which it believes are required to deal with the current situation, seek to correct it, and look to the future.
The Committee realizes that this is a daunting task as it implies numerous contingencies and particular circumstances. It would be tempting to propose, for example, that the CRTC be directed to refuse broadcast licences to applicants who control a Canadian daily newspaper. But should this apply only to cross-media ownership in the same local market? What about national networks and national newspapers? Who would be able to buy the properties of which certain owners may find themselves obliged to divest?
Unfortunately, the Committee does not have enough information at this stage to properly allow for all contingencies. That being said, the Committee is in a position to make a strong statement and propose a number of immediate measures. Therefore, and despite the fact newspapers are outside the mandate of this Committee — and are not subject to regulation — the Committee is of the view that action must be taken to protect the integrity of editorial independence and journalistic freedom. Therefore, the Committee strongly denounces any attempt to stifle editorial independence and journalistic freedom. Furthermore:
RECOMMENDATION 11.1:
The Committee recommends that the CRTC be directed to strengthen its policies on the separation of newsroom activities in cross-media ownership situations to ensure that editorial independence is upheld. |
But for this to be effective, the Committee also believes that an oversight mechanism is necessary. For this reason, the Committee believes that the Canadian broadcasting monitor, proposed in Chapter 19, could play a role. Accordingly:
RECOMMENDATION 11.2:
The Committee recommends that the CRTC put in place a mechanism to ensure the editorial independence of broadcasting operations. A report to Parliament should be made by an appropriate authority (e.g., the Canadian broadcasting monitor) on an annual basis. |
The Committee also agrees with the Centre d'études sur les médias that elected officials have a role to play. As the Centre wrote in its report prepared for the Committee:
We believe the onus is on elected representatives to take action in this field. There are major limits to the case-by-case approach. Decisions depend on specific situations and the players involved. On the other hand, the legislative approach makes it possible to develop a conceptual framework and allows for a certain continuity in rules, which should not change abruptly in response to business plans.40
The Centre further suggests that:
Every Canadian mechanism designed to govern media ownership should therefore take the language aspect into consideration and include rules designed to maintain ownership diversity, first, at the local level, but also at the national level, to ensure diversity of national information sources.41
And, that:
... any mechanism designed to regulate cross-ownership would do well to take the groups' spheres of influence into consideration by examining all the media outlets they own or wish to acquire.42
In addition to ownership regulations, the Centre notes that measures could be adopted to improve competition. Financial assistance could be provided to local media who make a vital contribution to their community. Support could be provided to media, which add to the range of diversity in information and opinion. The CBC is, of course, the first among these and any move toward resolving its chronic funding difficulties (along the lines of those recommended in Chapter 6) would help.
Cross-Media Ownership
The Committee is of the view that the potential problems with cross-media ownership are sufficiently severe that the time has come for the federal government to issue a clear and unequivocal policy on this matter. The Committee's principal recommendation on this issue is that the government direct the CRTC to postpone the awarding or renewal of broadcasting licences involving cross-media ownership pending the publication of such a policy. This should be done within one year of the tabling of the Committee's report.
RECOMMENDATION 11.3:
The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada issue a clear and unequivocal policy statement concerning cross-media ownership before 30 June 2004.
Furthermore:
RECOMMENDATION 11.4:
Until the Government of Canada declares its policy on cross-media ownership, the Committee recommends that:
(a) The CRTC be directed to postpone all decisions concerning the awarding of new broadcast licences in cases where cross-media ownership is involved.
(b) Existing licence renewals that involve cross-media ownership be automatically extended (i.e., an administrative renewal) for a minimum of two years and a maximum of three years. |
C. Foreign Ownership
Canada, at least in terms of population and the size of its economy, is relatively small compared to those countries with which it has historically had political and geographic links. Canada has availed itself of foreign capital to aid its growth, but it has had concerns throughout its existence about the effects of capital flows — and strong economic links with other, larger countries — on its sovereignty and distinctiveness.
The United States, because of its geographic proximity, has always been a concern for some Canadian policy-makers. In the elections of 1887 and 1891, for example, Sir. John A. MacDonald was able to tap feelings of Canadian nationalism and a distrust of the U.S. to win elections. During this period, it was the United Kingdom that provided the bulk of foreign investment in Canada. This investment was predominantly portfolio investment rather than direct investment; that is, investment in bonds rather than equity, which entails some control in an enterprise.
By the 1950s, the U.S. was the leading source of foreign investment in Canada, particularly equity investment. Concerns about losing control of our economy led to several studies, such as the Watkins Report in 1968 and the Gray Report in 1972, both of which examined the costs of the large flows of foreign investment. These studies, in turn, led to legislation to screen foreign investment to ensure benefits would outweigh costs. These included the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) of 1973, which was replaced by the less restrictive Investment Canada Act in 1985.
Both FIRA and the Investment Canada Act were broad-based, dealing with foreign investment in general. Some sectors, such as banking, were considered especially susceptible to having high costs from foreign investment and control. These sectors had specific restrictions on foreign investment. Not surprisingly, cultural industries have long had such specific restrictions.
Since the mid-1960s technical developments and regulatory changes have led to increased competition in telecommunications. This, in turn, has led to some questioning of the restrictions on foreign ownership in both the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors.
What the Committee Heard
Witnesses raised several issues concerning foreign ownership. The first was whether the current restrictions should be retained or loosened. The second had to do with the coverage of any changes. Should ownership restrictions be relaxed for both content providers and carriers? If the components are treated differently, what should the differences be? A final issue, related to the first, was how Canadian broadcasting policies, particularly Canadian content policies, could be maintained with foreign ownership.
Discussions of foreign ownership before the Committee were at times heated, with fairly clear differences among those who appeared. In general, the unions, creators and supporters of public broadcasting opposed changes to the foreign ownership restrictions. Some broadcasters and distributors favoured continued Canadian control in the industry, but thought that the current restrictions might be relaxed to allow up to 49% foreign ownership.
The Minister of Canadian Heritage told the Committee that it was the policy objectives of the Broadcasting Act, not the associated regulations that are important. She said:
The intent of the foreign ownership requirements is to ensure a diversity of voices. If these objectives can be achieved in another way, I don't think we should preordain that review, but I think you should be reviewing that.43
One of the strongest statements on the need to maintain limits on the foreign ownership of broadcasting in Canada was made by Ms. Joie Warnock of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada. She said:
On foreign ownership, the very fact the foreign ownership issue is being considered in the context of the Canadian broadcast system is evidence of the extent to which our public agenda is being controlled by the forces of globalization.
... The direction indicated by the very few who advocate elimination of foreign ownership restrictions runs contrary to the fundamental goals of the current Broadcasting Act. We must protect our sovereignty in one of the few remaining bastions of Canadian identity.44
Those arguing for a loosening of foreign ownership restrictions included AOL-Time-Warner and the Canadian cable companies. The latter group emphasized the distinction between content providers (broadcasters) and carriers (the BDUs), and argued that the restrictions should continue for the former and be relaxed for the latter. AOL-Time-Warner (with AOL Canada) made its case for relaxing ownership restrictions in its brief and in its appearance before the Committee:
The Canadian government and the CRTC have recognized that Canadian companies need to be strong and well financed to compete in an increasingly global broadcasting market. The broadcasting and media industries continue to experience consolidation. Canada is no exception. Foreign investment is required to ensure Canadians continue to have access to a wide diversity of views.45
The Canadian Association of Broadcasters, however, argued in favour of Canadian control of broadcasting but suggested that this could allow the relaxing of current restrictions to allow for up to 49% foreign ownership:
Our members have a variety of approaches to the topic of foreign ownership, as you know, and that's due largely to their corporate strategies, their structures international development strategies and so on.
At this point in time there is consensus on majority Canadian control with views on foreign ownership levels ranging from the status quo to an unrestricted 49% of ownership tied to a reciprocal liberalization of similar rules in other countries.46
At least one broadcaster, however, saw a relaxation to 49% for foreign ownership as just the first step to getting more capital for the industry. The ultimate position could be 100% foreign ownership, a position that would not upset the broadcaster if Canadian content requirements stayed in place and were applicable to all broadcasters. As Mr. Leonard Asper of CanWest Global Communications told the Committee:
We're saying for content companies, as a practical measure in a first step, go to 49 percent. Keep the content rules, make sure you get reciprocity for it so that we can expand it to their markets and have broader outlets over which to amortize Canadian programming, for example.
We also say that a second step could be to go to 100 percent. It doesn't matter, as long as there's content regulation underneath it.47
Another reason given for relaxing ownership rules was the increased cost of investment in Canadian capital: either in the form of debt or equity investments. This is often referred to as the cost of capital. Indeed, current limits on foreign ownership in the broadcasting sector in the U.S. and other countries can strain or limit the ability of Canadian companies to forge those strategic partnerships. As Mr. Geoffrey Elliot of CanWest Global Communications explained:
Strategic partnerships require a sufficient level of investment to ensure participation in the management and strategic direction of an asset as opposed to possible portfolio investments that the current lower foreign investment limits usually imply.48
Mr. Elliot went on to argue that the complete elimination of the rules — although not objectionable to CanWest Global — was not required and that Canada should only make changes to its rules if similar changes were, in parallel, made in other countries.
A related argument was put forward by Professor Matthew Fraser who argued that the cross-subsidy model in Canadian broadcasting — foreign ownership restrictions that allow Canadian broadcasters to profit from showing U.S. programs so they will produce and show loss-making Canadian programs — does not really work and is, in some respects, paradoxical. As he suggested:
I would argue that in Canada, we have to conceive of the Canadian market in a different way and realize that Canada is now part of a continental market. The distinction between Canada and its regulatory system and the United States as a different territory no longer is valid.49
One of the main economic arguments for allowing foreign ownership is that it would lower the cost of capital for Canadian firms. This argument came up several times. If foreign ownership restrictions were lessened or eliminated, the cost of capital would fall for incumbent broadcasters or, put another way, the value of their assets could rise, which would also increase their stock values. An important but difficult question is how much would the cost of capital fall if ownership restrictions were removed?
One attempt to sketch an answer to this question was given by a senior vice-president with Rogers Communications Inc., Mr. Dean MacDonald, who appeared before the Committee with the Canadian Cable Television Association:
The intense infrastructure expenditures required to maintain our competitive edge are the biggest challenge our industry now faces. It is imperative that avenues be open to gaining access to the capital needed to continually invest in the latest technology and maintain our position as a world leader in communications, and not just our industry's, but also our country's leadership role.50
He went on to note that:
... cable companies' customers in the U.S., on average, are valued at approximately $2,000 more than the Canadian companies. With higher valuations comes a greater ability to leverage capital investments, obviously. Canadian cable companies are at a severe disadvantage relative to those in the U.S. So in order to keep making infrastructure investments, we need access to capital on more favourable terms.51
However, as Mr. Richard Paradis, President, Canadian Association of Film Distributors and Exporters, explained:
I would like to highlight the weak credibility of the argument whereby Canadian companies desperately need an injection of foreign capital to ensure their growth. This would not occur without Canadian ownership restrictions being dropped. In the last few years, a significant number of major transactions have occurred in the Canadian communication, broadcasting and media sectors in general. Nevertheless, every Canadian company involved in these transactions has easily managed to raise capital, which amounted to billions of dollars. Further, the majority of these companies raised this money entirely in Canada without needing to look for foreign investment, which is authorized to a maximum of 33.33% for parent companies and 20% for licence holders.52
Another example of this view can be found in a newspaper interview with the newly appointed chairman of the CRTC, Mr. Charles Dalfen, in July 2002. Mr. Dalfen suggested that the foreign ownership rules in telecommunications and broadcasting do not need to be changed given that the current restrictions do not limit growth in these sectors. He argued:
I've worked a lot of these files in the private sector. I have rarely if ever seen deals that didn't succeed because there was a lack of foreign capital. They were business-plan driven, and to the extent that the business plan made sense, capital was available.53
As mentioned, the cable companies drew the distinction between foreign ownership restrictions for carriers and restrictions for content providers. In line with this distinction comes the argument that it is the content providers who have a protective responsibility for Canadian culture and, because of this position, the foreign ownership restrictions should be retained for them. Carriers, who simply carry whatever channels or programming is approved, do not need these restrictions. Many witnesses accepted the feasibility of having different restrictions for the two segments of the broadcasting industry. For example the Alberta Motion Picture Industries Association observed that:
... if it's distribution it's on one side of that line ... Canadian ownership is not the issue; if it's about broadcasting undertakings, clearly it has to be majority owned and controlled by Canadians.
If a company had both, they would have to split it into two parts, and only the distribution holding could hold higher foreign investors. The broadcasting undertaking would still have to be majority and effectively controlled by Canadians. I think that split makes some sense. Who owns the wires and how it gets there doesn't really matter; it's what's on it. But we have to make sure that doesn't slip into them owning the content in some way. As long as it doesn't, we're okay.54
But BCE, which owns conventional broadcasters, specialty channels and the satellite distributor Bell ExpressVu, disagreed and argued for the retention of foreign ownership restrictions for both parts of the Canadian broadcasting industry:
BCE believes that the need is still there for Canadians to control broadcasting enterprises, both programming and distribution. It has been a fundamental and long-standing policy in this country that the Canadian broadcasting system be effectively owned and controlled by Canadians. ...
BCE also believes that cable television undertakings, like satellite television undertakings, are properly characterized as "broadcasting undertakings" under the Broadcasting Act, rather than as "carrier undertakings". There's a fundamental distinction between the two activities.
... we operate broadcast distribution undertakings competing with cable and the wire-line service. ... we realize we make choices that are not like those of a common carrier. We make choices that actually have a big influence on what Canadians get to see and hear.
We recognize that if those choices were made in New York or Los Angeles, it's far more likely those people would deal with people they're used to dealing with and whom they have gotten to know socially. They owe them a favour or want a favour from them or they've done business with them. It's quite possible that the Canadian coming out of St. John's, Toronto, or Vancouver wouldn't even get in the door to present a proposal for a specialty channel.55
An important consideration in the debate on foreign ownership is whether Canadian broadcasting policies, especially Canadian content requirements, could be retained and enforced in a Canadian system dominated by foreign owners. The Canadian Cable Television Association (CCTA) argued that any Canadian laws or regulations would still have full effect. The president of the CCTA, Ms. Janet Yale, argued that it was alarmist to suggest that foreign-owned firms would ignore Canadian policies:
The analogy I like to draw is to all kinds of other multinational organizations that choose to operate in Canada or other jurisdictions around the world. No one suggests that when General Motors sets up a car plant in Canada they're going to be less likely to comply with the laws of the land, whether it's taxation or employment issues or environmental issues, or whatever. The fact of the matter is that the price of entry is compliance with the laws of the land.
I think the same is true for cable as a distribution undertaking. We are companies that carry programming, and those carriage requirements are established by the CRTC. Why would anyone think a company that happens to be owned by someone other than a Canadian would not comply with the laws of the land with respect to carriage rules any more or less than they would comply with other laws of the land? I think when we talk about Canadian content we really have to think about it as a case where in the cable industry we are distributors of programming, and whoever owns those undertakings will comply with the laws of the land in terms of the carriage requirements.
Having said that, we draw a very clear distinction between carriage businesses and content businesses. On the content side of the line, we support the idea that those content undertakings should be Canadian-owned and controlled.56
Mr. Peter Murdoch of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, however, warned that moving head office responsibilities outside Canada would eventually lead to weakened Canadian policies in broadcasting:
The movement of head offices alone to outside our national border means decision-making, research, response to cultural policies, broadcasting management expertise, and a host of other head office functions now homed in Canada would be lost.57
A Canadian Heritage official also acknowledged possible problems that could arise with foreign ownership in broadcasting, but saw them as challenges, and, like his minister, remained open-minded on the issue:
There are all kinds of distribution regulations designed to manage the impact of cultural policy. For example, broadcasters must include the [A]boriginal channel in their line-up. They must include channels in the minority official language, and there are other rules. It is difficult enough to regulate Canadian broadcasters. Regulating foreign broadcasters, and imposing the same conditions on them, will very likely present a whole new challenge, but as the [M]inister said, what counts at the end of the day is how those broadcasters act. What do they actually do? I believe she said that, if there were other models available or other ways of doing things, we would clearly have a responsibility to explore them.58
Proposed Solutions
While American conglomerates such as AOL-Time-Warner and larger cable and telecom operators such as Rogers would like to see foreign ownership limits either raised or lifted entirely, the Committee is of the view that one wrong move could do irreparable harm to the Canadian system. Once this happens, there will be no turning back. For this reason, the Committee believes that the suggestion that ownership restrictions can be lifted in the telecommunications sector without a serious impact on broadcasting content is seriously flawed.
Moreover, with the exception of large distribution undertakings and a few witnesses speaking as individuals, testimony on this question was virtually unanimous in favour of maintaining Canadian control. It is important to underscore the fact that Canada is in an absolutely unique position with respect to its proximity — both cultural and geographic — to the world's leading producers of broadcasting content. It is reasonable to assume that Canadian broadcasting companies would make an enticing target for takeover and integration into the North American media market, and that the policy apparatus that has been put in place to ensure a Canadian presence on the air would soon come under attack.
The Committee therefore believes strongly that the rules on foreign ownership should be maintained at current levels, as they are sufficiently high to promote an influx of foreign capital without relinquishing Canadian control. Investors are interested in placing their funds in viable businesses, not necessarily operating them. Current rules allow for up to 46.7% foreign ownership in the case of a holding company, which owns broadcasting or telecom operations (such as Rogers or BCE). This limit has yet to be reached in any significant cases. In short, there is already room for new foreign investment capital while holding the line on majority Canadian ownership and Canadian control.
The Committee notes that in parallel with its own study, the Standing Committee on Industry tabled a study on foreign ownership in the telecommunications sector on 28 April 2003. Its main recommendation is that:
... the Government of Canada prepare all necessary legislative changes to entirely remove the existing minimum Canadian ownership requirements, including the requirement of Canadian control, applicable to telecommunications common carriers.59
The Industry Committee also recommends that any changes to telecommunication carriers "be applied equally to broadcast distribution undertakings."60
The Heritage Committee strongly disagrees with the recommendations on foreign ownership made by the Industry Committee. The main arguments presented in the Industry Committee's report are economic. It argues that freer access to foreign investment will allow for more competition in the telecommunications sector and that this will benefit consumers. As Mr. Michael MacMillan, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Alliance Atlantis Communications Inc., told the Committee, ownership in broadcasting:
... has an importance well beyond most commodities. It's not a commodity, it's a cultural influence, and that's why we are here to talk about it and not about cups and saucers and pens and pencils. Ownership has a great deal of influence, I believe, over what is produced and why.61
The Committee agrees with this perspective and sees the Industry Committee's recommendations to be an extremely simplistic approach to a complex set of issues. In particular, its report ignores the many public policy and cultural issues that are at the heart of the matter. As the first section of this chapter explains, there are important issues about media ownership in Canada that can hardly be considered trivial. For example, in a discussion on the impact of vertical integration on Canadian journalism, Mr. Marc-François Bernier noted that:
The culture of journalism also has numerous flaws and failings, particularly when it comes to its lack of rigour or equity ... So we can't blame everything on convergence and concentration, but these phenomena are being added to the risk that exists already or which is weighing down on the quality of information.62
Therefore, "One scenario that we should consider is that, in the long term, [media concentration] will hurt the social legitimacy of journalism and its credibility."63
As for any relaxation of foreign ownership rules, this committee has several concerns. For example, if one is worried about concentration of media within Canadian controlled companies, it follows that one must, by extension, be concerned by any excessive concentration of Canadian media assets in foreign hands. As Ms. Anne-Marie Des Roches told the Committee:
This is a slippery slope and a blatant danger. If we open the door for telephony, I believe, that within about seven years, in other words the length of time that the CRTC licence lasts, everything will be out of our control. It should be noted that the pressure does not just stem from foreign capital; it also stems from all the free trade agreements on which no firm commitment has yet been made.64
Moreover, if ownership rules were changed, could Canada's creators be guaranteed the same access to the Canadian market they now enjoy? Furthermore, how would existing subsidy programs work if Canadian-controlled firms were no longer operating national networks in Canada? Would existing successes, for example, with French-language programming continue? As Mr. Alain Gourd told the Committee:
With regard to TV programming ... [l]et's say that the content acquisition policy were decided in Los Angeles: would it be easier to sell French-Canadian content in Los Angeles or in Montréal? Some might take refuge behind the CRTC regulation, which states that there must be a minimum of 60% in the grid and 50% in prime time... If TVA and TQS were suddenly controlled by foreign English-language interests, such as a company in the U.S., the U.S. owners might well be tempted to reduce Quebec's content to its very minimum and fill the slots with U.S. products dubbed into French. I think that is what would happen.65
As for the English-language market, Mr. Bernard Courtois, described the following hypothetical scenario:
Take diversity of voices in Canada when you're talking about content and markets. If Time Warner Cable buys a Canadian cable operation, AT&T Broadband buys a Canadian cable operation, or CBS, NBC, and ABC operate in Canada, you're going to have a North American market. There are significant economies of scale in this business, and you're not going to have as many diverse sources of information. When you talk about diversity of voices, you're talking about different sources.66
Similarly, Ms. Megan Williams, National Director, Canadian Conference of the Arts told the Committee that:
... while some might argue that it's not important who makes a program or who broadcasts it as long as it meets Canadian content requirements, we beg to differ. ... The artistic choices made in the creation of an individual recording, feature film, or radio or television documentary or dramas are of course affected by influences from around the world, but they are filtered through the sensibilities of Canada artists and producers. Similarly, the creation of a program schedule should be based on appealing to Canadian audiences not as an afterthought to an international schedule, but as the primary focus.67
An additional problem is that if the ownership rules are opened fully to foreign investment, it would require wholesale changes to Canada's regulatory agencies and support measures, because as Professor Matthew Fraser reminded the Committee, unlike the United States where:
... the Department of Justice and anti-trust officials are extremely aggressive about policing market failures such as vertical integration or undue market dominance. In Canada ... we don't have the same tradition. We don't have the same institutional vigour. We don't have the same kinds of statutes that give our institutions the same kind of legitimacy to go after market failures.68
Therefore, given what was heard during the study of the Canadian broadcasting system about corporate and technological convergence, the Committee remains convinced that any relaxation of the existing foreign ownership rules in broadcasting or telecommunications could have an adverse effect on the Canadian broadcasting system. For this reason:
RECOMMENDATION 11.5:
The Committee recommends that the existing foreign ownership limits for broadcasting and telecommunications be maintained at current levels. |
Endnotes
1 | As part of its study of the Canadian broadcasting system the Committee held a special set of panels on cross-media and foreign ownership in fall 2002. See Appendix 12 for the terms of reference used for these hearings. |
2 | Cited in the Report of the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy (Caplan-Sauvageau). (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1986), p. 643. |
6 | Public Notice CRTC 1999-97. |
11 | Section 1 of the Direction provides the relevant definitions. In short, a corporation must be a "qualified corporation" to count as Canadian. Appendix 13 provides the full text of this Direction. |
12 | A minor qualification to the exclusion of non-Canadians from holding a broadcasting licence is worth mentioning. There are two telecommunications companies (BC Tel and Quebec-Telephone) with long-standing foreign ownership of more than 50% of their common shares. The Telecommunications Act recognizes their special status, and these companies were grandfathered under the Canadian ownership requirements accordingly. Moreover, the 1997 Direction to the CRTC (Ineligibility of Non-Canadians) included a definition for "qualified successor," which had the effect of carrying the special status of the two telecommunications companies to broadcasting. A Canadian cable company challenged this element of the Direction in court. The decision in Rogers Communications Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1998) 145 F.T.R. 79 (F.C.T.D.) drew the distinction between individual undertakings in broadcasting and the broadcasting system as a whole: "Having two companies not 'effectively owned and controlled by Canadians' out of thousands involved in the industry does not alter the Canadian character and control of the system as a whole." |
13 | Konrad von Finckenstein, Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 22 May 2002. |
14 | Centre d'études sur les médias, Media Ownership in Canada, Prepared for the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, p. 9. |
15 | Canadian Film and Television Production Association, Profile 2002: Canadian Independent Production – The Challenges of Uncertainty, February 2002, p. 4-5. |
16 | Janet Yale, Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 19 February 2002. |
17 | This table shows the situation on 23 October 2002. The information may have since changed. Appendix 14 provides a more detailed table that summarizes the assets of these groups. |
18 | Centre d'études sur les médias, p. 6. |
21 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 26 November 2002. |
22 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 3 December 2002. |
23 | Centre d'études sur les médias, p. 95. |
25 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 26 November 2002. |
30 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 5 December 2002. |
34 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 26 November 2002. |
36 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 19 February 2002. |
37 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 21 November 2002. |
38 | Centre d'études sur les médias, p. 112. |
39 | Report of the Royal Commission on Newspapers (Kent Commission) (Hull: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1981). |
40 | Centre d'études sur les médias, p. 104. |
43 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 8 November 2001. |
44 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 25 February 2002. |
45 | Casey Anderson, AOL Time Warner/AOL Canada, Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 12 March 2002. |
46 | Glenn O'Farrell, President, Canadian Association of Broadcasters, Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 21 March 2002. |
47 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 1 March 2002. |
48 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 26 November 2002. |
50 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 19 February 2002. |
52 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 16 April 2002. |
53 | Ian Jack, "Foreign Ownership Rules Don't Need Review: Dalfen," The National Post, 29 July 2002. |
54 | Nic Wry, Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 27 February 2002. |
55 | Bernard Courtois, Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 26 November 2002. |
56 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 19 February 2002. |
57 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 25 February 2002 |
58 | Michael Wernick, Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 20 November 2002. |
59 | Opening Canadian Communications to the World, Report of the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology (Ottawa: House of Commons, 2003), p. 37. |
61 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 4 December 2002. |
62 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 26 November 2002. |
64 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 3 December 2002. |
65 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 26 November 2002. |
67 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 10 December 2002. |
68 | Meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 26 November 2002. |
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